

January 30.


# EXTERNALITIES

So far philosophical case for markets:

$$u_i = \tilde{\phi}_i(x_i) + \underbrace{m_i}_{M_i - p x_i} = \phi_i(x_i) + M_i$$

$$\text{where } \phi_i(x_i) = \hat{\phi}_i - p_i x_i$$

$$\phi'_i(x_i) = 0$$



individual 1 producing


2 suffering from it

\* Ind 2 would prefer Ind 1 consume cigars until this point.

Individual 2 likes small qty of cigars but not much.

\* Pigou (vian) Taxation :  $t > 0$

(Draw the subsidy version of it).



consume  $h$  as much as she is able to do.

$\phi' \rightarrow$

Social Max. Problem  $\phi(h) - c(h)$

FOC:  $\phi'(h^*) = c'(h^*)$

Original CS =  $\alpha + \beta + \gamma$  | original CS to cons 2 =  $\beta + \gamma + \delta$   
to cons 1

Social welfare:  $\alpha - \delta$


New social welfare =  $\alpha$  (Add why this is so).



\* Weitzman

Is tax better or quota

Q) How to optimally set the quota?



Weitzman.


$$\max_{\hat{h}} S = x \phi_H(\hat{h}) + (1-x) \phi_L(\hat{h}) - c(\hat{h})$$

$$x \phi'_H + (1-x) \phi'_L = c'$$

$$x (\phi'_H - c') = -(1-x) (\phi'_L - c')$$

you equate the  
probability weighted  
marginal dwl

Class II




• MPC: Marginal Pvt. Cost

• MSC: Marginal Social Cost

DWL from overproduction

- These are Aggregate demand & Aggregate supply curves.



\* Getting back to quotas / taxes :-



- A & B are DWLs.
- By changing  $t$ , you can inc A & reduce B or vice versa.
- Equate probability weighted marginal DWL.


\* Taxes are only returned to the public \$ for \$.

\* Lagrangian (in the handout)



$\phi'_H$  &  $\phi'_L$  are parallel, same probability  
 $\Rightarrow$  quota in the middle  
 The flatter the MC, taxation is the optimal

\* Coase Theorem



\* Pt. of mutually advantageous trade



\* They both know priv. Marginal benefit curves

\* Govt. sets the property rights.

\* Absence of transaction costs

Property Right

PR  $\bar{h}$  take it or leave it by 1

$$\max \phi(h) + T$$

$$T?: \cancel{M_2} - c(\bar{h}) \leq \cancel{M_2} - T - c(h)$$

$$L = \phi(h) + T - \underbrace{\lambda(c(h) + T - c(\bar{h}))}_{=0}$$

$$\lambda = 1$$

$$\phi' = c' \Rightarrow h^*$$

$$T = \gamma + \delta$$

\* Do alternative case when property right is with the sufferer. / take it or leave it offer by (2).

\* Remember  
minimization

$$\min c(h) + T \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \phi(\bar{h}) \leq \phi(h) + T$$

$$L = c(h) + T + \lambda(\phi(\bar{h}) - \phi(h) - T)$$

$$\lambda = 1$$

$$\phi' = c' \Rightarrow h^*$$

\* We get to the same place.

If ~~pro~~ govt mandates at 0, the social surplus at  
grabs =  $\alpha + \beta$