Nov 16, 2023 Today: -Adding uncertainty to NGM ADE in a model w/ uncertainty RBC model Why uncertainty? stuff grows with wiggles Two approaches Deterministic complex dynamics K'=K K' 1 Generally This model dees not do a good perplaning the data. The capital oscillates, something we don't see in real world RBC = NGM + Aggregate productivity chocks

· Bit eyele fluctuations

· More complicated models collapse into others

· There are other chocks as well -> 200f for airs

	Notation
6	s, - state of the economy in t
•	Notation St - state of the economy in t St E Grigh, Low y
1	Def: $s^t = \int_{S_t}^{S_{t+1}} \int_{S_{t+1}}^{S_{t+1}} \int_{S_{t+1}}^{$
0	Let $\pi(s^t)$ - unconditional probability of flistory s^t . Routinely assume $\pi(s^\circ) = 1$
•	Let $r < t$, $\pi(s^t s^r)$ - conditional probability of s^t given s^r happened.
	Deterministre Case: Allocations une functions of time.
	Uncertainty Case: Allocations are functions of histories. Ex: st b st are 2 histories. In general, $c_{t}(s^{t}) \neq c_{t}(s_{t})$
*	Exchange Economy with uncertainty:
	Exchange Economy with uncertainty: I - number of agents [yi(st)] t - sequences of endowments
	An allocation is $\{c_t^i(s^t)\}_t^s$ $c_t^i: s^t \to \mathbb{R}_+$

*	Arrow - Debreu Equilibrium.
to trade, based	$q_t^*(s^t)$: price of one unit of consumption good at time t after sequence s^t .
on the prives in pd. 0. (set by	Problem of agent i
et mich clear) s in vanilla A-0.	$E_{o} \stackrel{\stackrel{\sim}{\underset{t=0}{\stackrel{\sim}{\longrightarrow}}}}{\overset{\sim}{\longrightarrow}} U(c_{t}^{i}(s^{t})) \rightarrow \max_{f \in c_{t}^{i}(s^{t})} f_{t}^{s}$
expected value at time 0.	$\underset{t \to 0}{\overset{\circ}{\mathcal{L}}} \underset{s \leftarrow S^{t}}{\overset{\circ}{\mathcal{L}}} q_{t}^{\circ} \left(s^{t} \right) \underset{t}{\overset{\circ}{\mathcal{L}}} \left(s^{t} \right) \leqslant \underset{t \to 0}{\overset{\circ}{\mathcal{L}}} \underset{t \leftarrow S^{t}}{\overset{\circ}{\mathcal{L}}} q_{t}^{\circ} \left(s^{t} \right) \underset{t}{\overset{\circ}{\mathcal{L}}} \left(s^{t} \right) $
	$c_t^i(s^t) \ge 0 + t + s^t$
	S
	R
	f-20 &
	t=1 β t=2
	of Uin UNH, then $\frac{z}{t} = \pi(s^t) p^t U(c_t^i(s^t))$
	Def: An ADE for this environment is the price eyetem for (st)] and allocations (ct) (ct) }, such that:
<u>)</u>	Given {q' (st) }t, {ct (st) }t solves the HH's problem;
2)	Mbt clearing! $\stackrel{?}{\underset{i=1}{\underline{z}}} C_{t}^{i}(st) = \stackrel{?}{\underset{i=1}{\underline{z}}} y_{t}^{i}(st)$ Ht Hst (were the milks support) pd in vanilla AD?)
	yes

	Remarks: The A-D equilibrium is PO. (Do at home) Kenneth Arrow: same allocation will arise if nefs open even time is agents trade from Securities.	we ai
	Remarks: (when he already know but	مل
I)	The A-D equilibrium is PO. (Do at home)	
2)	Kenneth trow: same allocation will arise if nkfs open even	
	(John Street, John	
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A (simple) NDC model
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SPP:
 max E, Ept U(ct(st), n(st)
                                                                 > histories so far
   c_{t}(s^{t}) + k_{t+1}(s^{t}) - (1-s)k_{t}(s^{t-1}) \leq As_{t}F(k_{t}(s^{t-1}), n_{t}(s^{t}))
    ko, so - given
    0 \leq \eta_{t}(s^{t}) \leq 1
  Simplifying Assumptions:
 labor supply inclustic u'nl)=0
 Production Technology is Ast kt(st-1)
  8=1
P(k_{0}, s_{0}) : \mathbb{E}_{0} \underset{t \to 0}{\overset{2}{\sim}} p^{t} u(c_{t}(s^{t})) \to \max_{\{c_{t}(s^{t}), k_{t}, l(s^{t})\}_{t}^{t}}
         s.t. c2(st) + K+ (st) = Ask + (st-1)
           c_{t}(s^{t}) \geqslant 0, k_{tri}(s^{t}) \geqslant 0 \forall t \forall s^{t}
let's assume U(c_t) = c_t^{1-\sigma} \tau \to \sigma i s k aversion
With this U(), V() is homogeneous of degree (1-5) U(\lambda k_0, s_0) = \lambda^{1-5} V(k_0, s_0)
Def: A stochastic proces s_0, s_1, s_2 is fout-order markov if P(s_{tel} | s_t, s_{tel}).
Ex: AR(1) [Auto-regnosive] is Markov of degree 1
    Stel = PStf Stel , Etil 11d N(0, 0-2)
  1.10 processes are Markov of degree O.
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	of $\{s \in \mathcal{F}\}$ is Markov of degree 1, because of Markov $V(k_1 s) = \max_{c, k'} \left(\frac{c}{1-\sigma} + \beta \mathbb{E}\left[V(k', s') \mid s\right]\right)$ because of Markov of degree 1.
	s.t. $c+k'=+sk$ ko, so given
	hroke homogeneity of $V:$ $v(k,s) = \max_{C,k' \geq 0} \left[\frac{c^{-c}}{1-c} + \beta \mathbb{E}[(k') v(1,s')] \right]$
	C+k' = Ask
	$= \max_{c,k'\geqslant 0} \left[\frac{c^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} + (k')^{1-\sigma} \mathbb{E}(V(1,s') s) \right]$
	Profesences are homotrutic as the above upremion is he 1-5
	$c = \varphi A s k$ $k' = (i - \varphi) A s k$ $\varphi - ?$
	$ \begin{aligned} & \left(- \frac{2}{5} \underbrace{2}_{t=0} \underbrace{p^{t}} \underbrace{J} \underbrace{\left(s^{t} \right)^{1-2} + \underbrace{2}_{t=0} \underbrace{2}_{s^{t}} \underbrace{\lambda_{t}} \underbrace{\left(s^{t} \right) \left(\underbrace{AS_{t}} \underbrace{k_{t}} \underbrace{\left(s^{t-1} \right) - c_{t}} \underbrace{\left(s^{t} \right) - k_{t+1}} \underbrace{\left(s^{t} \right) \right)} \right) \end{aligned} $
FOCs:	$(c_t(s^t))$: $\beta^t \prod (s^t) c_t (s^t)^{-\sigma} = \lambda_t (s^t)$
	$(E_{tel}(s^t)): -\lambda_t(s^t) + \underset{s_{tel}}{\geq} \lambda_{tel}(s^t, s_{tel}) [As_{tel}] = 0$
	$\beta^{t}\Pi(s^{t})c_{t}(s^{t})^{-\sigma} = \underset{s_{t+1}}{\leq} \beta^{t+1}\Pi(s^{t},s_{t+1})c_{t+1}^{-\sigma}(s^{t},s^{t+1})As_{t+1}$
チ	Ct (ct) = 5 T(Stellet) Ctill (st, Stell) ACET
	E [Astel Ctel (sta) st]
⇒	$1 = p E \left[As_{til} \left(\frac{C_t(s^t)}{C_{til}(s^{til})} \right)^{t} \right] $ Euler Egn.

P at harry Recall c = YASK 1 = PE (Actil (YActile (st)) st) $1 = \beta E \left[A c_{t+1} \left(\frac{c_t k_t (c^{t-1})}{c_{t+1} (1-\varphi)} A c_t k_t (c^{t-1}) \right) \right]$ 1 = BE[(Astri) (1-4) et] (1-4) = BE (ASty) - (5) drume Jet I vis i.i.d 9 (1-4) = [E(As) 1-6. B] 1/6 Growth of Ct: Tt, tel = Ctel = PASTELLE Stri (1-4) Astre = (1-4) Astri E[Ybita] = (1-4) A Estel Effect of uncurtainty: Case 1: $s_t = 1 + t$ Case 2: $\mathbb{E}[s_t] = 1 + V(s_t) > 0$ ι – Ψ &) Might have sometring num of here.

Caus: oe (0,1] 1-4-8 gros to met (1-4) = E(As) derive culer $V(s) = 0 \qquad \text{Fs} = 1 \qquad \sigma \in (0, 1)$ $V(s) > 0 \qquad \text{F(s)} = 1$ 2 r71: mie Mu maestainty 6 -> convex fn , her thank uncertainty with to, The effect of uncertainty