

Oct 23, 2023

Slutsky Equation.

$$\underbrace{\frac{\partial x_i}{\partial p_k}}_{\text{Total}} = \underbrace{\frac{\partial h_i}{\partial p_k}}_{\text{substitution}} - \underbrace{\frac{\partial x_i}{\partial m} x_k(p, m)}_{\text{Income}}$$

for own-price effects ( $k=i$ )

$$\frac{\partial x_i}{\partial p_i} = \frac{\partial h_i}{\partial p_i} - \frac{\partial x_i}{\partial m} x_i(p, m)$$


if good  $i$  is normal  $\frac{\partial x_i}{\partial m} \geq 0$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{\partial x_i}{\partial p_i} \leq 0$$

if good  $i$  is inferior  $\frac{\partial x_i}{\partial m} \leq 0$

SE & IE are "opposed"

$\frac{\partial x_i}{\partial p_i} \geq 0$  only if good  $i$  is strongly inferior.



Normal Good

$$\frac{\partial x_i}{\partial p_i} = \frac{\partial h_i}{\partial p_i} - \frac{\partial x_i}{\partial m} x_i(p, m)$$

$$x_i(\bar{p}, e(\bar{p}, \bar{u})) = h_i(\bar{p}, \bar{u})$$

Redraw for inferior good.

Hicksian Dd: Min. expenditure <sup>for</sup> given utility

Hicksian Matrix.

$$\partial h(p) = \begin{pmatrix} \partial h_1 / \partial p_1 & \dots & \partial h_1 / \partial p_n \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \partial h_n / \partial p_1 & \dots & \partial h_n / \partial p_n \end{pmatrix}$$

- symmetric
- n, e, d
- $\partial h(p) \cdot (p) = 0$

Consider:

$$S(p, m) = \begin{bmatrix} s_{11} & s_{12} & \dots \\ s_{21} & \dots & \dots \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ s_{nn} \end{bmatrix} \quad \text{Slutsky substitution Matrix}$$

$$s_{j,k} = \frac{\partial x_j(p, m)}{\partial p_k} + \frac{\partial x_j(p, m)}{\partial m} \cdot x_k(p, m) \rightarrow \text{how?}$$

By Slutsky eq:

$S(p, m) = D h(p)$  should also satisfy property of hickarian matrix.

\* Special case (No income effect)


$$x_i(p, m) = x_i(p)$$

Duality identity:

$$h_i(p, \bar{u}) = x_i(p, e(p, \bar{u})) = x_i(p)$$

$$\Rightarrow h_i(p, \bar{u}) = h_i(p)$$

$$\text{say } h_2(p, \bar{u}) = h_2(p)$$



Slutsky eq<sup>n</sup>

$$\frac{\partial h_i}{\partial p_i} = \frac{\partial x_i}{\partial p_i} \quad (\text{Income effects go away})$$

\*  $\max x_1 + v(x_2) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad x_1 + p_2 x_2 = m$

$$\max_{x_2} m - p_2 x_2 + v(x_2)$$

$$\text{FOC: } v'(x_2) = p_2$$
$$x_2^*(p, m) = (v')^{-1}(p_2)$$

$$\frac{\partial x_2^*}{\partial m} = 0$$

From BC,

$$x_i^*(p, m) = m - p_2 [(v')^{-1}(p_2)]$$

$$\frac{\partial x_i^*}{\partial m} = 1$$

⇒ Quasilinear prefs. have no income effects.

### Integrability

Q

Given functions  $x(p, m)$  that satisfy:

→  $h_d = 0$

→ Walras' law

→ symmetric & n.s.d. Slutsky matrix

Can we recover utility? YES.

$$x_i(p, m) = - \frac{\partial u / \partial p_i}{\partial u / \partial m}$$


Roy's identity in reverse:

Proof strategy:

demand function  $\xrightarrow{(1)}$  expenditure function  $\xrightarrow{(2)}$  utility

Start w (2) : —

Say we know  $e(p, \bar{u})$   
 We want  $V(\bar{u}) = \{ \text{bundles that give utility at least } \bar{u} \}$



$$\{x : p \cdot x = e(p, \bar{u})\}$$

step 1:  $x(p, m) \rightarrow e(p, \bar{u})$

Pick a starting pt.  $(p_i^0, m^0)$   
 let  $u(x(p_i^0, m^0)) = u^0$

Goal: solve for  $e(p, u^0)$   
 Write as  $e(p)$

By shephard:  
 $\frac{\partial e(p)}{\partial p_i} = h_i(p, u^0)$

$$\frac{\partial e(p)}{\partial p_i} = x_i(p, e(p)) \quad \text{initial cond}^n \quad e(p^d) = m^0$$

Does a sol<sup>n</sup> to this partial differential eq<sup>n</sup> even exist?

A necessary & sufficient cond<sup>n</sup> for a system of equation  $\frac{\partial f}{\partial x_i} = g_i(x)$  to have a sol<sup>n</sup> is

$$\frac{\partial g_i(x)}{\partial x_j} = \frac{\partial g_j(x)}{\partial x_i}$$

$$\left( \frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial x_j \partial x_i} = \frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial x_i \partial x_j} \right)$$

In our problem:

$$\frac{\partial x_i(p, e(p))}{\partial p_j} = \frac{\partial x_j(p, e(p))}{\partial p_i}$$

$$S = [s_{ij}]$$

$S$  must be symmetric.

Symmetry of  $S$  is necessary & sufficient for system of PDEs to have a solution.

for the solution  $e(p)$  to be a valid expenditure f<sup>n</sup>, it also must be concave.

Concavity means  $D^2 e(p) = S$  is negative semi-definite.

Bottom Line: -

Given some  $x(p, m)$ , if  $S$  is symmetric & n.s.d., we can solve for  $e(p, u)$ . Then use earlier technique to go from

$$e(p, \bar{a}) \rightarrow v(p, m)$$

ex

$$x_1(p, m) = \frac{\alpha m}{p_1} ; \quad x_2(p, m) = \frac{\beta m}{p_2}$$

Find  $e(p, \bar{u})$  by solving:

$$\frac{\partial e(p)}{\partial p_1} = x_1(p) \quad \frac{\partial e(p)}{\partial p_2} = x_2(p)$$

Check symmetry:—

$$\frac{\partial^2 e(p)}{\partial p_2 \partial p_1} \equiv 0 = \frac{\partial^2 e(p)}{\partial p_1 \partial p_2}$$

$$\frac{\partial e(p)}{\partial p_1} = \frac{\alpha e(p)}{p_1}$$

$$\frac{\partial e(p) / \partial p_1}{e(p)} = \frac{\alpha}{p_1}$$

$$\int \frac{\partial \log e(p) \cdot dp_1}{\partial p_1} = \int \frac{\alpha}{p_1} dp_1$$

$$\log e(p) = \alpha \log p_1 + c_1(p_2, \bar{u})$$

Similarly,

$$\log e(p) = \beta \log p_2 + c_2(p, \bar{u})$$

$$\log e(p) = \alpha \log p_1 + \beta \log p_2 + f(\bar{u})$$

$$e(p) = e^{f(\bar{u})} p_1^\alpha p_2^\beta$$

$$= \tilde{u} p_1^\alpha p_2^\beta$$

to find  $v(p, m)$ :

$$e(p, v(p, m)) = m$$

$$v(p, m) p_1^\alpha p_2^\beta = m$$

$$v(p, m) = \frac{m}{p_1^\alpha p_2^\beta}$$