

January 30.


EXTERNALITIES

So far philosophical case for markets:

$$u_i = \tilde{\phi}_i(x_i) + \underbrace{m_i}_{M_i - p x_i} = \phi_i(x_i) + M_i$$

where $\phi_i(x_i) = \hat{\phi}_i - p_i x_i$

$$\phi'_i(x_i) = 0$$




individual 1 producing
2 suffering from it

* 2 Ind 2 would prefer Ind 1 consume cigars until this point.

Individual 2
likes small qty
of cigars but
not much.

* Pigou (rian) Taxation : $t > 0$

(Draw the subsidy version of it).



consume h as much as she is able to do.

$\phi' \rightarrow$


Social Max. Problem $\phi(h) - c(h)$

$$\text{FOC: } \phi'(h^*) = c'(h^*)$$

Original CS = $\alpha + \beta + \gamma$ | original CS to cone 2 = $\beta + \gamma + \delta$
to cons 1

Social welfare: $\alpha - \delta$


New social welfare = α (Add why this is so).



* Weitzman

Is tax better or quota

Q) How to optimally set the quota?



Weitzman.


$$\max_{\hat{h}} S = x \phi_H(\hat{h}) + (1-x) \phi_L(\hat{h}) - c(\hat{h})$$

$$x \phi'_H + (1-x) \phi'_L = c'$$

$$x (\phi'_H - c') = -(1-x) (\phi'_L - c')$$


you equate the probability weighted marginal dwl

Class II



- MPC: Marginal Pvt. Cost
- MSC: Marginal Social Cost
- DWT from overproduction
- These are Aggregate demand & Aggregate Supply curves.



* Getting back to quotas / taxes :-



- A & B are DWLs.
- By changing t , you can inc A & reduce B or vice versa.
- Equate probability weighted marginal DWL.


* Taxes are only returned to the public \$ for \$.

* Lagrangian (in the handout)



ϕ'_H & ϕ'_L are parallel, same probability
 \Rightarrow quota in the middle
 The flatter the MC, taxation is the optimal

* Coase Theorem.



* Pt. of mutually advantageous trade



* They both know their Marginal benefit curves

* Govt. sets the property rights.

* Absence of transaction costs

Property Right

\uparrow
 $\textcircled{\text{PR}} \bar{h}$ take it or leave it by 1

$$\max \phi(h) + T$$

$$T? : \cancel{M}_2 - c(\bar{h}) \leq \cancel{M}_2 - T - c(h)$$

$$L = \phi(h) + T - \underbrace{\lambda(c(h) + T - c(\bar{h}))}_{=0}$$

$$\lambda = 1$$

$$\phi' = c' \Rightarrow h^*$$

$$T = \gamma + \delta$$

* Do alternative case when property right is with the sufferer. / take it or leave it offer by (2).

* Remember
minimize

$$\min c(h) + T \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \phi(\bar{h}) \leq \phi(h) + T$$

$$\mathcal{L} = c(h) + T + \lambda(\phi(\bar{h}) - \phi(h) - T)$$

$$\lambda = 1$$

$$\phi' = c' \Rightarrow h^*$$


* We get to the same place.

If ~~pro~~ govt mandates at 0, the social surplus at
grabs = $\alpha + \beta$

Feb 1,

Utility Possibility Frontier

$$\phi'(h^*) = c'(h^*) \quad (\text{how is this not a single point})$$



* Nash Bargaining

(In the slides)

(SLOW DOWN !!)

* Fish cleaning & beer.

$$\text{let } \pi_f(h) = \phi(h)$$

$$\pi_b(h) = \bar{\pi}_b - c(h)$$

Take-over price

$$\max \alpha + \beta + \gamma + \delta$$

↳ what trade is voluntary

Misring market Interpretation.

* Card Games

$$(p-c) \underbrace{\Pr(b > p)}_{1-F(p)}$$

Uniform Distⁿ. \rightarrow What is $(1-p)$

$$(p-c)(1-p)$$

\rightarrow arg max.

$$p = \frac{1+c}{2}$$

eg: $c=6$

$p=10$; $\pi=4.3$

$p=9$; $\pi=3.4$


$$\begin{array}{c|c} \text{black} \rightarrow \text{Benefit} & \text{red} \rightarrow \text{Cost.} \\ \hline \hat{b} & \hat{c} \end{array}$$

Class II

• Nash Equilibrium: Kandout.

Vickrey - Groves - Clark -edyard

• Tragedy of the commons.



$P_f f(b)$

prodⁿ function
of fishing


$-rb$

Total cost spent
fishing

* Economic Maximum.

$$\text{Max. } P_f f(b) - rb$$

$$\Rightarrow P'_f f(b) = r$$




max / low


x

$$M = a - bc$$

lowe.

$$P_m M - P_c = 0$$





$$p_m(a - bc) = p_c a$$

$$\left(a - \frac{p_c}{p_m}\right) \frac{1}{b} = c^{eq}$$

* Traffic Congestion (Transport Economics)

\$40 MPC \rightarrow marginal private cost.
 6000 people
 \$1 10/hr


slowed down by $\frac{10}{h}$
 1 min

1 hr \rightarrow \$10

60 min \rightarrow

1 min $\rightarrow \frac{10}{60}$

Total MSC = 1040



$$\left(\frac{10}{60}\right) 6000$$



$$1000$$

$$+ 40$$

$$\boxed{1040}$$

② \bar{n} : want to travel

$$n_A + n_B = \bar{n}$$



Auctions

Vickrey ; 2nd Price Auction
(VCG)

↓
My payment depend on other
people's values

[Facebook is using VCG
auction for selling ads.]

* English, Ascending bid : bid your own value.

* CONGESTION

Rush hour : Tariff time specific. Higher tariff
at rush hours.)

Tariff for externality cost

What time of the day should I go?