

COMP1812: Coursework 1 - 2022/2023

Operation Oval: Child Protection

Group: Student 1

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1. Overview of the Case

1.1 Narrative of the case

A Group of Persons do Sexual grooming of a Child. They engages in predatory conduct to prepare a child person for sexual activity at a later time. They communicate to befriend and establish a relationship by emotional connection with the child. In this case A person engages in predatory conduct to prepare a child person to befriend and attach with her and emotionally or systematically capture her social media id. Their connection was established via social media platforms. He has partners for grooming of a child.

1.2 Timeline of key evidence

Image Information:

Acquisition started: Wed Nov 9 05:19:45 2022

Acquisition finished: Wed Nov 9 05:25:36 2022

Segment list:

F:\Hamidemon705\Evidence Files download\Mensil.E01

F:\Hamidemon705\Evidence Files download\Mensil.E02

F:\Hamidemon705\Evidence Files download\Mensil.E03

Image Verification Results:

Verification started: Wed Nov 9 05:25:37 2022

Verification finished: Wed Nov 9 05:27:07 2022

1.3 Details of the offenders, victims and witnesses

A targeted child name arid tortoise sexually abused by offenders. Witness is child image & Project_1.pdf file collected from seizure device of offender.

1.4 Photographs of any physical evidence, clues or supplemental material



1.5 Scenario Rules

A tortoise represent a victim child image. Flag represent the Offender image.
Sample Pendrive represent the seizure device from the offenders.

2. Legislation Analysis

2.1 Legislation

High quality and disaggregated data on all forms of child sexual exploitation and abuse collected. children and young people's views are considered as a key element of the development of legislation related to online child sexual exploitation and abuse.

2.2 Points to prove

A Child emotionally abused by a grooming person & the person have partners for child sexual exploitation.

2.3 What the Digital Forensics case can prove

This Digital Forensics case can prove that who is the child, who is the offender & which member included with real offender.

2.4 What the Digital Forensics case will not prove

This Digital Forensics Case does not prove the exact location address of the offenders.

2.5 Highlight any artefacts that undermine the prosecution's case.

Here is social media chat between victim & offender that can prove, child emotionally attached with offender & offender treated her by like this and also the child social media id password collected by the offender. Attachment Below:

you wake up??

hm

Can we talk in call?

why?

You are so cute!

What is your pass!!

Share me!!

We will check out. Ok?

I am using phone
Pass tortoise 123



You unsent a message

3. Evidence File

3.1 Details of the Evidence File

Created By AccessData® FTK® Imager 4.5.0.3

Case Information:

Acquired using: ADI4.5.0.3

Case Number: 545

Evidence Number: 112

Unique description: Child_Protection

Examiner: Hamid Emon

Notes: Seizure_Image_From_device

Information for F:\Hamidemon705\Evidence Files download\Mensil:

Physical Evidentiary Item (Source) Information:

[Device Info]

Source Type: Logical

[Drive Geometry]

Bytes per Sector: 512

Sector Count: 15,814,593

[Physical Drive Information]

Removable drive: True

Source data size: 7721 MB

Sector count: 15814593

Image Information:

Acquisition started: Wed Nov 9 05:19:45 2022

Acquisition finished: Wed Nov 9 05:25:36 2022

Segment list:

F:\Hamidemon705\Evidence Files download\Mensil.E01

F:\Hamidemon705\Evidence Files download\Mensil.E02

F:\Hamidemon705\Evidence Files download\Mensil.E03

Image Verification Results:

Verification started: Wed Nov 9 05:25:37 2022

Verification finished: Wed Nov 9 05:27:07 2022

3.2 Hash value of the Evidence File

[Computed Hashes]

MD5 checksum: 9fd659c98c29a35e2766bb1dc7c490b4 : verified

SHA1 checksum: cbecf8dd5f5b71eadd72018a07a7383b59d3302b : verified

```
Mensil.E01.txt - Notepad
File Edit Format View Help
Created By AccessData® FTK® Imager 4.5.0.3

Case Information:
Acquired using: ADI4.5.0.3
Case Number: 545
Evidence Number: 112
Unique description: Child_Protection
Examiner: Hamid Emon
Notes: Seizure_Image_From_device

-----

Information for F:\Hamidemon705\Evidence Files download\Mensil:

Physical Evidentiary Item (Source) Information:
[Device Info]
Source Type: Logical
[Drive Geometry]
Bytes per Sector: 512
Sector Count: 15,814,593
[Physical Drive Information]
Removable drive: True
Source data size: 7721 MB
Sector count: 15814593
[Computed Hashes]
MD5 checksum: 9fd659c98c29a35e2766bb1dc7c490b4
SHA1 checksum: cbecf8dd5f5b71eadd72018a07a7383b59d3302b

Image Information:
Acquisition started: Wed Nov 9 05:19:45 2022
Acquisition finished: Wed Nov 9 05:25:36 2022
Segment list:
F:\Hamidemon705\Evidence Files download\Mensil.E01
F:\Hamidemon705\Evidence Files download\Mensil.E02
F:\Hamidemon705\Evidence Files download\Mensil.E03

Image Verification Results:
Verification started: Wed Nov 9 05:25:37 2022
Verification finished: Wed Nov 9 05:27:07 2022
MD5 checksum: 9fd659c98c29a35e2766bb1dc7c490b4 : verified
SHA1 checksum: cbecf8dd5f5b71eadd72018a07a7383b59d3302b : verified
```


4. Artefacts

4.1 Summary of Artefacts

| Data Recovery | |
|---------------|--|
| DRF | Content of Files |
| DRA | Contents of Application Data Structures |
| DROS | Contents of Operating System Data Structures |
| DRFS | Contents of File System |
| Data Hiding | |
| DHU | User |
| DHA | Application |
| DHOS | Operating System |
| DHFS | File System |

Figure 4.1 – Key for table 4.2

| Category | Type | Number | Filename or Data Structure | Comment |
|----------|-----------------------------------|--------|------------------------------------|---|
| DRF | Document File & Picture File | 4.2.1 | Project_1.pdf Arid-tortoise.jpg | Files containing the victim child image & Clarification. |
| DRA | Picture File | 4.2.2 | Chats.jpg | File containing some social media chat logs between victim & offender. |
| DROS | Registry File | 4.2.3 | .img_Mensil.E01/ Software_Hive | File containing the information about offender edited the victim image for sexually Abuse. Like tools and file. |
| DRFS | Document File | 4.2.4 | .img_Mensil.E01/ Deleted Files | Files containing information about child protection research article by UNICEF. |
| DHU | White text on white background | 4.3.1 | Something_ Bookmark.docx | Contains information about sexual abused images goes to online. |
| DHA | Audio file | 4.3.2 | Stegano.pdf | File Containing ethical consideration message for child protection. |
| DHOS | Unknown File(.sc) | 4.3.3 | Stegano.sc | File containing Data secret data hiding by changing the file extension |
| DHFS | Picture File | 4.3.4 | Catch me.jpg | File containing offender real image information. |
| DHU_1 | Compressed File | 4.3.5 | Child_abused_ Image.zip | File Containing the victim child abused image. |
| DHU_2 | Compressed File with Picture File | 4.3.6 | Gromming_ Partners.zip | File Containing the information of offender partners. |
| DHU_3 | Text File | 4.3.7 | Link.txt | File containing information on a article related with online child sexual exploitation and abuse |
| DR_1 | Image File | 4.3.8 | Victim.png | Here is Some secret string under this image. Containing information about victim real name. |


Table 4.2 – Summary Table of Artefacts

4.2 Data Recovery Artefacts

4.2.1 Category DRF

Screenshot of the artefact:

Content- Abusement– A tortoise we found from social media emotionally. We need to continue chatting with his favorite social media platform.

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|-------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|---|-------|-----------|-----------|---------|----------|
|  Project_1.pdf | 2 | 2022-11-08 19:26:48 GMT | 0000-00-00 00:00:00 | 2022-11-09 00:00:00 GMT | 2022-11-09 05:03:56 GMT | 13159 | Allocated | Allocated | unknown | /img |
| <div>< <div></div> ></div> | | | | | | | | | | |
| <div>Hex Text Application File Metadata OS Account Data Artifacts Analysis Results Context Annotations Other Occurrences</div> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Result: 1 of 1 Result <div>◀ ▶</div> | | | | | | | | | | Metadata |
| Type | Value | | | | Source(s) | | | | | |
| Version | 1.4 | | | | org.sleuthkit.autopsy.keywordsearch.KeywordSearchIngestModule | | | | | |
| Source File Path | /img_Mensil.E01/efi/microsoft/Project_1.pdf | | | | | | | | | |
| Artifact ID | -9223372036854775743 | | | | | | | | | |

Its me



A screenshot of artefact evidence details:

Metadata

Name: /img_Mensil.E01/efi/microsoft/Project_1.pdf
Type: File System
MIME Type: application/pdf
Size: 13159
File Name
Allocation: Allocated


Metadata
Allocation: Allocated
Modified: 2022-11-08 19:26:48 GMT
Accessed: 2022-11-09 00:00:00 GMT
Created: 2022-11-09 05:03:56 GMT
Changed: 0000-00-00 00:00:00
MD5: ff711451343cb686d9910b5c3d94a077
SHA-256: 7afd65bee62d08e5bfb4996e387fd134591a54f27db56c16a2f8a3901176ac3d
Hash Lookup
Results: UNKNOWN
Internal ID: 1969

Description and implications of the artefact:

This Document ensure that offender found a child person from social media by contacting emotionally. They planned for continue the chat in social media platform with her. They mentioned her name & we found the named picture. So that is relevant that the victim.

4.2.2 Category DRA

Screenshot of the artefact:



The screenshot shows a keyword search interface with a table of results. The table has columns for Name, Keyword Preview, Location, Modified Time, Change Time, Access Time, Created Time, and Size. Two results are listed: 'chatts.jpg' and 'chatts.jpg-slack'. Both results show the same modified and change times (2022-11-08 20:01:26 GMT) and access time (2022-11-09 00:00:00 GMT). The created time for both is 2022-11-09 05:04:36 GMT. The size of 'chatts.jpg' is 148111 and the size of 'chatts.jpg-slack' is 3441.

| Name | Keyword Preview | Location | Modified Time | Change Time | Access Time | Created Time | Size |
|------------------|--------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|--------|
| chatts.jpg | <chatts.jpg> | /img_Mensil.E01/chatts.jpg | 2022-11-08 20:01:26 GMT | 0000-00-00 00:00:00 | 2022-11-09 00:00:00 GMT | 2022-11-09 05:04:36 GMT | 148111 |
| chatts.jpg-slack | <chatts.jpg-slack> | /img_Mensil.E01/chatts.jpg-slack | 2022-11-08 20:01:26 GMT | 0000-00-00 00:00:00 | 2022-11-09 00:00:00 GMT | 2022-11-09 05:04:36 GMT | 3441 |



A screenshot of artefact evidence details:

| | | | | | | |
|------------------|--------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| chatts.jpg | «chatts.jpg» | /img_Mensil.E01/chatts.jpg | 2022-11-08 20:01:26 GMT | 0000-00-00 00:00:00 | 2022-11-09 00:00:00 GMT | 2022-11-09 05:04:36 GMT |
| chatts.jpg-slack | «chatts.jpg»-slack | /img_Mensil.E01/chatts.jpg-slack | 2022-11-08 20:01:26 GMT | 0000-00-00 00:00:00 | 2022-11-09 00:00:00 GMT | 2022-11-09 05:04:36 GMT |

<

Hex

Text

Application

File Metadata

OS Account

Data Artifacts

Analysis Results

Context

Annotations

Other Occurrences

Metadata

Name:

/img_Mensil.E01/chatts.jpg

Type:

File System

MIME Type:

image/jpeg

Size:

148111

File Name Allocation:

Allocated

Metadata Allocation:

Allocated

Modified:

2022-11-08 20:01:26 GMT

Accessed:

2022-11-09 00:00:00 GMT

Created:

2022-11-09 05:04:36 GMT

Changed:

0000-00-00 00:00:00

MD5:

a7710a64e811eb2e9f43bfa2d81b1a6c

SHA-256:

51982994961a5ff4aed5ee6e5d1bcb65327742561a64b7235f5e77ae86281ab9

Hash Lookup Results:

UNKNOWN

Internal ID:

2066

Description and implications of the artefact:

Here is social media chat between victim & offender that can prove, child emotionally attached with offender & offender treated her by like this and also the child social media id password collected by the offender.

4.2.3 Category DROS

Screenshot of the artefact:

Listing

/img_Mensil.E01/Software_Hive

5 Results

Table

Thumbnail

Summary

Save Table as CSV

| Name | S | C | O | Modified Time | Change Time | Access Time | Created Time | Size | Flags(Dir) | Flags(Meta) | Known | L |
|--------------------|---|---|---|-------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------|------------|-------------|---------|---|
| [current folder] | | | | 2022-11-08 20:33:34 GMT | 0000-00-00 00:00:00 | 2022-11-09 00:00:00 GMT | 2022-11-09 05:05:28 GMT | 4096 | Allocated | Allocated | unknown | / |
| [parent folder] | | | | 0000-00-00 00:00:00 | 0000-00-00 00:00:00 | 0000-00-00 00:00:00 | 0000-00-00 00:00:00 | 4096 | Allocated | Allocated | unknown | / |
| blank_tortoise.mui | | | 4 | 2020-09-27 21:02:04 BST | 0000-00-00 00:00:00 | 2022-11-09 00:00:00 GMT | 2022-11-09 05:05:28 GMT | 16384 | Allocated | Allocated | unknown | / |
| desktop.ini | | | 2 | 2022-11-08 20:33:34 GMT | 0000-00-00 00:00:00 | 2022-11-09 00:00:00 GMT | 2022-11-09 05:05:28 GMT | 75 | Allocated | Allocated | unknown | / |
| Paint.lnk | | | 2 | 2019-03-19 03:44:54 GMT | 0000-00-00 00:00:00 | 2022-11-09 00:00:00 GMT | 2022-11-09 05:05:28 GMT | 1114 | Allocated | Allocated | unknown | / |

<

>

Hex

Text

Application

File Metadata

OS Account

Data Artifacts

Analysis Results

Context

Annotations

Other Occurrences

A screenshot of artefact evidence details:

Listing

/img_Mensil.E01/Software_Hive

TableThumbnailSummary

| Name | S | C | O | Modified Time | Change Time | Access Time | Created Time | Size | F |
|--------------------|---|---|---|-------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------|---|
| [current folder] | | | | 2022-11-08 20:33:34 GMT | 0000-00-00 00:00:00 | 2022-11-09 00:00:00 GMT | 2022-11-09 05:05:28 GMT | 4096 | A |
| [parent folder] | | | | 0000-00-00 00:00:00 | 0000-00-00 00:00:00 | 0000-00-00 00:00:00 | 0000-00-00 00:00:00 | 4096 | A |
| blank_tortoise.mui | | | 4 | 2020-09-27 21:02:04 BST | 0000-00-00 00:00:00 | 2022-11-09 00:00:00 GMT | 2022-11-09 05:05:28 GMT | 16384 | A |
| desktop.ini | | | 2 | 2022-11-08 20:33:34 GMT | 0000-00-00 00:00:00 | 2022-11-09 00:00:00 GMT | 2022-11-09 05:05:28 GMT | 75 | A |
| Paint.lnk | | | 2 | 2019-03-19 03:44:54 GMT | 0000-00-00 00:00:00 | 2022-11-09 00:00:00 GMT | 2022-11-09 05:05:28 GMT | 1114 | A |

Hex

Text

Application

File Metadata

OS Account

Data Artifacts

Analysis Results

Context

Annotations

Other Occurrences

Metadata

Name:

/img_Mensil.E01/Software_Hive/blank_tortoise.mui

Type:

File System

MIME Type:

application/x-msdownload

Size:

16384

File Name Allocation:

Allocated

Metadata Allocation:

Allocated

Modified:

2020-09-27 21:02:04 BST

Accessed:

2022-11-09 00:00:00 GMT

Created:

2022-11-09 05:05:28 GMT

Changed:

0000-00-00 00:00:00

MD5:

2e3794bfe8607591d3fc1665623b9283

SHA-256:

6f47ddd085ee581e10d0edb4fa6bab8eb12e085cfd3b967f22b5a6ebd68b979c

Hash Lookup Results:

UNKNOWN

Internal ID:

2071


From The Sleuth Kit istat Tool:

Description and implications of the artefact:

Victim Image edited by this software. For make sexual abuse image edited by paint software & the files hives saved.

4.2.4 Category DRFS

Screenshot of the artefact:



| Hex | Text | Application | File Metadata | OS Account | Data Artifacts | Analysis Results | Context | Annotations | Other Occurrences |
|-----------------------|--|-------------|---------------|------------|----------------|------------------|---------|-------------|-------------------------|
| Result: 1 of 1 Result | | | | | | | | | |
| Metadata | | | | | | | | | |
| Type | Value | | | | | | | | Source(s) |
| /version | 1.4 | | | | | | | | org.sleuthkit.autopsy.k |
| Date Modified | 2022-06-08 21:51:35 BST | | | | | | | | org.sleuthkit.autopsy.k |
| Date Created | 2022-06-08 21:41:01 BST | | | | | | | | org.sleuthkit.autopsy.k |
| Source File Path | /img_Mensil.E01/Deleted Files/Legislating for the digital age_Global Guide.pdf | | | | | | | | |
| Artifact ID | -9223372036854775740 | | | | | | | | |

A screenshot of artefact evidence details:

Listing

/img_Mensil.E01/Deleted Files

Table

Thumbnail

Summary

| Name | S | C | O | Modified Time | Change Time | Access Time |
|--|---|---|---|-------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| [current folder] | | | | 2022-11-09 05:06:00 GMT | 0000-00-00 00:00:00 | 2022-11-09 00:00:00 |
| [parent folder] | | | | 0000-00-00 00:00:00 | 0000-00-00 00:00:00 | 0000-00-00 00:00:00 |
| Child_Protection_in_the_Digital_Age.pdf | | | 0 | 2022-11-08 20:37:58 GMT | 0000-00-00 00:00:00 | 2022-11-09 00:00:00 |
| ict_eng.pdf | | | 0 | 2022-11-08 20:37:36 GMT | 0000-00-00 00:00:00 | 2022-11-09 00:00:00 |
| Legislating for the digital age_Global Guide.pdf | | | 2 | 2022-11-08 20:36:10 GMT | 0000-00-00 00:00:00 | 2022-11-09 00:00:00 |

<

Hex

Text

Application

File Metadata

OS Account

Data Artifacts

Analysis Results

Context

Annotations

Other Occurrences

Metadata

Name:

/img_Mensil.E01/Deleted Files/ict_eng.pdf

Type:

File System

MIME Type:

application/pdf

Size:

5853604

File Name Allocation:

Allocated

Metadata Allocation:

Allocated

Modified:

2022-11-08 20:37:36 GMT

Accessed:

2022-11-09 00:00:00 GMT

Created:

2022-11-09 05:06:19 GMT

Changed:

0000-00-00 00:00:00

MD5:

0d07d4e4911f2d89e0de4f2414b93307

SHA-256:


f6057f6e6beb6a96cef14ca2d35a9f97b00df27f094993d43277004895e864be

Hash Lookup Results:

UNKNOWN

Internal ID:

2081




Description and implications of the artefact:

This Section clarify that offenders analysis the article on Child protection in the digital age & legislation on Global Guidance. Thinking to bypass the Digital law enforcement.

4.3 Data Hiding Artefacts

4.3.1 Category DHU

Screenshot of the artefact:



Content:

Q2hpbGQgc2V4dWFsIGV4cGxvaXRhdGlvbiByZWZlcnMgdG8gdGhIIHNleHVhbCBhYnVzZSBvZiBhIHBlcn
NvbiBiZWxvdyB0aGUgYWdlIG9mIDE4LCBhcyB3ZWxsIGFzIHQvIHQvZSBwcm9kdWN0aW9uIG9mIGltYW
dlcyBvZiBzdWN0eFidXNIIGFuZCB0aGUgc2hhcmcluZyBvZiB0aG9zZSBpbWFnZXMGb25saW5l

[Base64 Decode and Encode - Online](#)

A screenshot of artefact evidence details:

| Hex | Text | Application | File Metadata | OS Account | Data Artifacts | Analysis Results | Context | Annotations | Other Occurrences |
|-----------------------|---|-------------|---------------|------------|----------------|------------------|---------|-------------|-------------------|
| Metadata | | | | | | | | | |
| Name: | /img_Mensil.E01/Something_Bookmark.docx | | | | | | | | |
| Type: | File System | | | | | | | | |
| MIME Type: | application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document | | | | | | | | |
| Size: | 6475 | | | | | | | | |
| File Name Allocation: | Allocated | | | | | | | | |
| Metadata Allocation: | Allocated | | | | | | | | |
| Modified: | 2022-11-08 20:47:10 GMT | | | | | | | | |
| Accessed: | 2022-11-09 00:00:00 GMT | | | | | | | | |
| Created: | 2022-11-09 05:07:34 GMT | | | | | | | | |
| Changed: | 0000-00-00 00:00:00 | | | | | | | | |
| MD5: | 603d5c1082049d7938478f2676c52910 | | | | | | | | |
| SHA-256: | c4a9e1371dc435a555e637f8f568f8534bba3ef809991a40d2a5ad07312b5cbf | | | | | | | | |
| Hash Lookup Results: | UNKNOWN | | | | | | | | |
| Internal ID: | 2085 | | | | | | | | |

Description and implications of the artefact:


Offender Hide some secret data in a docx file by encrypting to a hash code like base64 format. After decode the hash found that text “Child sexual exploitation refers to the sexual abuse of a person below the age of 18, as well as to the production of images of such abuse and the sharing of those images online”. We clarify that they are planning to share the abuse images of a child to social media platform.

Description of the hiding/unhiding process:


Hide the characters in a docs file by a white background. Basically when it is opened then it can view by blank but mark the page and change the colour then we found the text that is hash value like base64. We decode from base64 decoder.

4.3.2 Category DHA

Screenshot of the artefact:



A screenshot of artefact evidence details:



Description and implications of the artefact:

Offender Used the steganography technique for hide some secret data that is related to Grooming of a child & Abuseement. The extracted message is **WEWILLSAFEOURCHILDFROMSEXUALABUSEMENT**

They used Morse Code Adaptive audio for hide the text.

Description of the hiding/unhiding process:

Data Hiding in Application section Like Steganography

This is a morse code adaptive audio for some plain text messages. We hide a readable message in audio via morse code. You can extract the plain text by decode the morse code adaptive audio using a suitable decoder. We used an online site to make the file [link](#).

Decode the file using Morse code Adaptive audio decoder site. Link:

[Morse Code Audio Decoder | Morse Code World](#)

Step-1: go to the link and upload the audio file.


Step-2: Set the morse speed 20 WPM & Minimum,maximum frequency is 700 HZ. Screenshot below

| Select | File | Speed (wpm) | Min volume (dB) | Max volume (dB) | Min frequency (Hz) | Max frequency (Hz) | Volume threshold | FFT size |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|-----------------|-----------------|--------------------|--------------------|------------------|----------|
| <input checked="" type="radio"/> | Morse | 20 | -100 | -30 | 700 | 700 | 200 | 256 |
| <input type="radio"/> | Alphabet | 30 | -100 | -30 | 600 | 600 | 200 | 256 |
| <input type="radio"/> | Alphabet | 40 | -60 | -30 | 700 | 700 | 200 | 256 |
| <input type="radio"/> | Fox (via mic) | 23 | -60 | -30 | 600 | 700 | 225 | 256 |
| <input type="radio"/> | Inspector Morse | 10 | -60 | -30 | 1313 | 1358 | 25 | 1024 |
| <input type="radio"/> | Two Tone | 20 | -60 | -30 | 300 | 300 | 200 | 1024 |
| <input type="radio"/> | Two Tone | 20 | -60 | -30 | 700 | 700 | 200 | 1024 |


Use the "Apply" button to change the parameters to those selected in the table. The "Play" button will play the selected file regardless.

4.3.3 Category DHOS

Screenshot of the artefact:



A screenshot of artefact evidence details:




Description and implications of the artefact:

In this section Offender Make corrupt the file by change the extension of the previous section file Compressed like Stegano.zip to stegano.sc

Description of the hiding/unhiding process:


Check the extension by matchinfg header signature.




Hex start from "50 4B 03 04" that is Related to zip file. Rename the file from stegano.sc to stegano.zip.

4.3.4 Category DHFS

Screenshot of the artefact:



A screenshot of artefact evidence details:



Description and implications of the artefact:

Finally we noticed that this is the offender image and information. But the image is being corrupted. We need to correct it. Here is, they do the file signature change for hide the real image. This is a offenders jpg image but not opened. So after correct the header signature of jpg file then it will opened. And we got it our offenders image.

Description of the hiding/unhiding process:

File Signature Correction

For the “Catch me” jpg fle, we showed that the fle does not open due to a signature or extension mismatched. This image extension we show that it's a jpg file but not opened. Using HxD tools, we can open it to check the signature with a detailed hex view with ascii value. After Open in HxD,

Check the file header signature.

We noticed that the hex value ended with FF D9.


```

00001B00 00 1F 51 F9 7F F0 35 F9 BF F8 AA 28 AE FC 0B B6 ..Qu.85ùzø*(@ü.¶
00001B10 22 16 38 31 B1 52 C3 CE E6 BF C6 ED 23 CB 92 C7 ".8l±RÄfæ¿Xi#E'Ç
00001B20 54 54 EF F6 79 3F F4 24 FF 00 D9 AB CB B9 A2 8A TTiöy?ô$ÿ.Ü«E¹cŠ
00001B30 E9 CD 12 8F 2A 56 38 B0 B9 39 61 63 70 E6 8E 68 éÍ.Ž*V9±¹9acpæŽh
00001B40 A2 BC 73 D8 0E 68 E6 8A 28 00 E6 8E 68 A2 80 0E c¼sØ.hæŠ(.æŽhc€..
00001B50 68 E6 8A 28 00 E6 8E 68 A2 80 0E 68 E6 8A 28 00 hæŠ(.æŽhc€..hæŠ(.

```

And start with some wrong hex like this.

catche me.jpg

| Offset(h) | 00 | 01 | 02 | 03 | 04 | 05 | 06 | 07 | 08 | 09 | 0A | 0B | 0C | 0D | 0E | 0F | Decoded text |
|-----------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|------------------|
| 00000000 | EF | D0 | EF | E2 | 00 | 10 | 4A | 46 | 49 | 46 | 00 | 01 | 01 | 01 | 00 | 60 | ËDiä..JFIF.....` |
| 00000010 | 00 | 60 | 00 | 00 | FF | DB | 00 | 43 | 00 | 03 | 02 | 02 | 03 | 02 | 02 | 03 | ..`..ÿÛ.C..... |
| 00000020 | 03 | 03 | 03 | 04 | 03 | 03 | 04 | 05 | 08 | 05 | 05 | 04 | 04 | 05 | 0A | 07 | |
| 00000030 | 07 | 06 | 08 | 0C | 0A | 0C | 0B | 0A | 0B | 0B | 0D | 0E | 12 | 10 | 0D | | |
| 00000040 | 0F | 11 | 0F | 0B | 0B | 10 | 16 | 10 | 11 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 0C | 0F | |

But also we can see that its start JFIF in ascii section & ended by hex FF D9. That means it's a jpg file. Extension is correct. But the signature is incorrect, that's why this is not open.

We know that the Jpg file header signature starts from **FF D8 FF E0** sequence. So we will correct from the beginning. And save it. Then it will be open.

File Extension Correction

For stegano file we can see that it's an unknown file. By open in HxD.

stegano.sc

| Offset(h) | 00 | 01 | 02 | 03 | 04 | 05 | 06 | 07 | 08 | 09 | 0A | 0B | 0C | 0D | 0E | 0F | Decoded text |
|-----------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|--------------------|
| 00000000 | 50 | 4B | 03 | 04 | 14 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 08 | 00 | 58 | A7 | 68 | 55 | 2B | 89 | ËK.....XShU+% |
| 00000010 | 4F | 3D | D3 | 09 | 00 | 00 | 82 | C4 | 03 | 00 | 0B | 00 | 00 | 00 | 73 | 74 | O=Ó....,Ä.....st |
| 00000020 | 65 | 67 | 61 | 6E | 6F | 2E | 77 | 61 | 76 | ED | DC | E9 | 9B | CF | E5 | 1E | egano.waviÜé>İâ. |
| 00000030 | 07 | F0 | E9 | 3A | 4F | C6 | 44 | B6 | A2 | 85 | 64 | 22 | 91 | 94 | E2 | 20 | .8é:OEDqç...d""'â |
| 00000040 | 4B | 1B | 4A | C6 | 16 | 99 | 54 | C6 | 96 | 65 | 22 | 8C | 19 | CB | 98 | C5 | K.JÆ.™TE-e"€..E~Â |
| 00000050 | 0C | C3 | 30 | 8D | 75 | 12 | 33 | 86 | 2C | 51 | D9 | 65 | AD | 53 | C3 | 49 | .Ã0.u.3†,QÜe.SÄI |
| 00000060 | B6 | 92 | A2 | E8 | A0 | 48 | 8B | D2 | 48 | 14 | 33 | 4F | CF | 9C | CE | F9 | Ŧ'çè H<ÖH.3Oİæİù |
| 00000070 | 03 | CE | 75 | 9D | AB | 93 | F9 | 7E | 5F | 2F | 97 | 67 | F3 | E4 | FD | E4 | .İu.«"ù~/—góâyâ |
| 00000080 | FD | FB | DC | 9F | FB | FE | FD | 9E | EC | D4 | B1 | E3 | B8 | 0F | FE | 12 | yûŬÿûpýžİô±â,.p. |
| 00000090 | 11 | FB | 70 | EF | 0E | 43 | 5E | 4C | BA | AD | 4A | 44 | 44 | C4 | 35 | 65 | .ûpİ.C^L°.JDDÄSe |
| 000000A0 | FF | 1A | DD | 15 | F1 | FB | FF | 6B | 22 | 22 | 23 | 9E | 1F | 90 | 34 | A0 | ÿ.Ý.ñûÿk""#ž..4 |
| 000000B0 | 77 | D9 | DF | 64 | 64 | 64 | 66 | 4E | 9E | 9C | 39 | 29 | 2D | 75 | 62 | 72 | wŬšdddfNžæ9)—ubr |
| 000000C0 | F2 | C4 | B4 | 8C | AC | EC | 9C | 97 | 72 | B2 | A7 | A4 | 4F | 48 | 4A | 18 | ôÄ'€-İæ-r'šæOHJ. |
| 000000D0 | 9D | 30 | 36 | 65 | 4A | CE | 9C | BC | 97 | E7 | E6 | 66 | A5 | 8C | 19 | 3E | .06eJİæ±-çæfŦ€.> |
| 000000E0 | 74 | E8 | F0 | 31 | A9 | D9 | 73 | F3 | 17 | 17 | 2E | 98 | 35 | 65 | DC | 0B | tèđİ@Ŭsó...~5eŬ. |
| 000000F0 | 03 | E3 | FA | 0D | 1E | 9D | 96 | 9B | BF | 7C | D5 | 6B | 85 | 73 | 32 | 46 | .äú...->İ Ök...s2F |
| 00000100 | 0F | 7C | BA | 57 | EC | 80 | 51 | 99 | F3 | 96 | AF | DD | B0 | 66 | E9 | EC | . °WiEQ™ô-Ŷ°féİ |

Hex starts from 50 4B 03 04 that means it's a zip file. Zip file header is 50 4B 03 04. so , we need to rename the file from stegano.sc to stegano.zip. Then it will be corrected and will open.

4.3.5 Category DHU_1

Screenshot of the artefact:

The screenshot shows a keyword search interface with multiple tabs. The active tab is 'Keyword search 8 - child_abused_'. Below the tabs, there is a table with columns: Name, Keyword Preview, Location, Modified Time, Change Time, and Access Time. The table contains two entries for 'child_abused_image.zip' and 'child_abused_image.zip-slack'. Below the table, there is a search bar and a list of tabs: Hex, Text, Application, File Metadata, OS Account, Data Artifacts, Analysis Results, Context, Annotations, and Other Occurrences. The 'Text' tab is selected. Below the tabs, there is a search bar and a list of tabs: Strings, Indexed Text, and Translation. The 'Indexed Text' tab is selected. Below the tabs, there is a search bar and a list of tabs: Page: 1 of 1 Page, Matches on page: - of - Match, 100%, Reset, and Text Source: Search. The 'Matches on page' tab is selected. Below the tabs, there is a search bar and a list of tabs: Error retrieving indexed text.

| Name | Keyword Preview | Location | Modified Time | Change Time | Access Time |
|------------------------------|--------------------------------|--|-------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| child_abused_image.zip | <child_abused_image.zip< | /img_Mensil.E01/child_abused_image.zip | 2022-11-08 22:19:56 GMT | 0000-00-00 00:00:00 | 2022-11-09 00:00:00 |
| child_abused_image.zip-slack | <child_abused_image.zip<-slack | /img_Mensil.E01/child_abused_image.zip-slack | 2022-11-08 22:19:56 GMT | 0000-00-00 00:00:00 | 2022-11-09 00:00:00 |

Page: 1 of 1 Page Matches on page: - of - Match 100% Reset Text Source: Search

Error retrieving indexed text.

67)
65)

(4)
5)

4)
nts (22)
sources (3)
(5)

s (162)

rs (14)

3)
ntmanifests

Keyword search 6 - catche me Keyword search 7 - catche me.jpg Keyword search 8 - child_abused_I... Keyword search 9 - child_abused_I... Keyword search 10 - notes 19

Keyword search

Table Thumbnail Summary

Save Table as

| Name | Keyword Preview | Location | Modified Time | Change T |
|--|--|--|-------------------------|-----------|
| acres.dll.mui | contact Logitech.Lotus «Notes» v5.x installs an older | /img_Mensil.E01/sources/en-us/acres.dll.mui | 2020-09-27 21:02:06 BST | 0000-00-(|
| ict_eng.pdf | 21«Notes» | /img_Mensil.E01/Deleted Files/ict_eng.pdf | 2022-11-08 20:37:36 GMT | 0000-00-(|
| f0195760.pst | JournalJunk Email«Notes»OutboxSent ItemsRE: | /img_Mensil.E01//%CarvedFiles/f0195760.pst | 0000-00-00 00:00:00 | 0000-00-(|
| Legislating for the digital age_Global Guide.pdf | platforms.344 As the GSMA «notes», it covers 'much of what | /img_Mensil.E01/Deleted Files/Legislating for the digital age... | 2022-11-08 20:36:10 GMT | 0000-00-(|
| notes | «notes» | /img_Mensil.E01/notes | 2022-11-08 22:21:54 GMT | 0000-00-(|
| notes-slack | «notes»-slack | /img_Mensil.E01/notes-slack | 2022-11-08 22:21:54 GMT | 0000-00-(|
| acres.dll | contact Logitech.Lotus «Notes» v5.x installs an older | /img_Mensil.E01/sources/acres.dll | 2020-09-27 21:02:06 BST | 0000-00-(|

Hex Text Application File Metadata OS Account Data Artifacts Analysis Results Context Annotations Other Occurrences

Strings Indexed Text Translation

Page: 1 of 1 Page Matches on page: 1 of 1 Match 100% Reset Text Source: Search Results

notes child abused image password can be found from a social media chat screenshot.

-----METADATA-----

A screenshot of artefact evidence details:

Hex Text Application File Metadata OS Account Data Artifacts Analysis Results Context Annotations Other Occurrences

Metadata

Name:

/img_Mensil.E01/child_abused_Image.zip

Type:

File System

MIME Type:

application/zip

Size:

633095

File Name Allocation:

Allocated

Metadata Allocation:

Allocated

Modified:

2022-11-08 22:19:56 GMT

Accessed:

2022-11-09 00:00:00 GMT

Created:

2022-11-09 05:12:17 GMT

Changed:

0000-00-00 00:00:00

MD5:

b7ca56ec568e0dd1d5d6968fe643fd7c

SHA-256:

474a0a8202f7fc94d8bf4fd28ffc0246bf9f47aadf12b94e9ec194dd9906c24b

Hash Lookup Results:

UNKNOWN

Internal ID:

2105

From The Sleuth Kit istat Tool:

| Hex | Text | Application | File Metadata | OS Account | Data Artifacts | Analysis Results | Context | Annotations | Other Occurrences |
|-----------------------|--|-------------|---------------|------------|----------------|------------------|---------|-------------|-------------------|
| Metadata | | | | | | | | | |
| Name: | /img_Mensil.E01/notes | | | | | | | | |
| Type: | File System | | | | | | | | |
| MIME Type: | text/plain | | | | | | | | |
| Size: | 78 | | | | | | | | |
| File Name Allocation: | Allocated | | | | | | | | |
| Metadata Allocation: | Allocated | | | | | | | | |
| Modified: | 2022-11-08 22:21:54 GMT | | | | | | | | |
| Accessed: | 2022-11-09 00:00:00 GMT | | | | | | | | |
| Created: | 2022-11-09 05:13:45 GMT | | | | | | | | |
| Changed: | 0000-00-00 00:00:00 | | | | | | | | |
| MD5: | e048cbd3f19115600ff0bc6185e10477 | | | | | | | | |
| SHA-256: | bc8f83071d036ef18c783931fca3aaea35ae609c101dbe9618ee2c8fc1a650f3 | | | | | | | | |
| Hash Lookup Results: | UNKNOWN | | | | | | | | |
| Internal ID: | 2115 | | | | | | | | |

Description and implications of the artefact:

In this section we found a notes text file that is define that a child abused image have in offender. We found the image zip file that is password protected. Offender hide the image in a zip file by password protect. Notes file define us that the zip file password can be found from chats. So from the leaked social media chats section we found the pass and using this password we extracted the image files. That can prove against offender by a strong proof.

4.3.6 Category DHU_2

Screenshot of the artefact:

Listing

Keyword search 11 - Grooming_Part...

X

Keyword search

Table

Thumbnail

Summary

Save Table as CSV

| Name | Keyword Preview | Location | Modified Time | Change Time | Access Time | Created Time |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------|---|-------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| Grooming_Partners.zip | <grooming_partners.zip> | /img_Mensil.E01/Grooming_Partners.zip | 2022-11-08 22:16:40 GMT | 0000-00-00 00:00:00 | 2022-11-09 00:00:00 GMT | 2022-11-09 05:13:45 GMT |
| Grooming_Partners.zip-slack | <grooming_partners.zip-slack | /img_Mensil.E01/Grooming_Partners.zip-slack | 2022-11-08 22:16:40 GMT | 0000-00-00 00:00:00 | 2022-11-09 00:00:00 GMT | 2022-11-09 05:13:45 GMT |

Hex

Text

Application

File Metadata

OS Account

Data Artifacts

Analysis Results

Context

Annotations

Other Occurrences

Page: 1 of 5

Page

Go to Page: 1

Jump to Offset

Launch in HxD

0x00000000: 50 4B 03 04 14 00 08 00 08 00 FB 21 69 55 00 00 PK.....11U..

0x00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 16 1F 01 00 11 00 20 00 53 69

0x00000020: 67 6E 5F 4C 61 6E 67 75 61 67 65 2E 70 6E 67 55 gn_language.pngU

0x00000030: 54 0D 00 07 1A D5 6A 63 1C D5 6A 63 31 D5 6A 63 T.....jcl.jc

0x00000040: 75 78 0B 00 01 04 28 03 00 00 04 28 03 00 00 74 ux.....t

0x00000050: 2B 75 59 56 4F 94 FE 6D 20 A0 A4 74 98 74 23 DD .UX.O..m..t.t#.

0x00000060: 30 5D D2 25 2D D0 DD AD 20 20 2D D0 20 2D D0 D0 .)k...s...-1

0x00000070: D2 DD D0 DD B1 29 9E DF 2C EF 39 E7 F0 EF 5D D29....

0x00000080: 0B D8 C5 3C 33 6B DD EB 73 CF B3 26 48 5E 56 1C ...<3k...s...4H^V.

0x00000090: E9 1D DE BB 17 2F 5E 20 49 4A 88 28 BE 78 F1 52/* I.J.(.s.R

0x000000A0: 0D FC B7 86 87 05 9F B0 89 68 7A 81 6F 30 0E 42hs.o.B

0x000000B0: 92 CA F0 E0 CB 13 DE F0 17 F8 1D D7 51 F4 AB A3Q...

0x000000C0: 92 8D B1 A3 8B 9E BD D1 0B 13 6B 1B 2B 23 7A 07k.+#+.

0x000000D0: 03 7B 23 23 6B 07 53 1B 47 C8 EB 56 7E F0 22 13 .(##k.S.G..V~..

0x000000E0: 33 25 AF 8E C2 F6 46 7A 8E 66 36 D6 C4 CA 66 56 3.....F..f...EV

0x000000F0: 45 7B 7A 5F 3B B6 45 AB 76 3F 5C 73 7A 3A 3F 7A 5.....F...V...>

Sources

Mensil.E01_Host

Mensil.E01

\$OrphanFiles (67)

\$CarvedFiles (65)

\$Unalot (2)

boot (11)

en-us (3)

fonts (22)

resources (4)

Deleted Files (5)

efi (4)

boot (6)

microsoft (4)

boot (11)

fonts (22)

resources (3)

Software_Hive (5)

sources (186)

dimanifests (162)

en-us (50)

etwproviders (14)

inf (3)

migration (3)

replacementmanifests (5)

sxs (6)

uap (3)


vista (3)

xp (3)

support (6)

logging (24)

A screenshot of artefact evidence details:




Description and implications of the artefact:

In this section, after extracted the zip file we found a image that is related to sign language. That means another some secret message encoded in sign language. Using <https://www.dcode.fr/american-sign-language> this site we convert the sign language to plain text.

4.3.7 Category DHU_3

Screenshot of the artefact:



A screenshot of artefact evidence details:

Hex

Text

Application

File Metadata

OS Account

Data Artifacts

Analysis Results

Context

Annotations

Other Occurrences

Metadata

Name:

/img_Mensil.E01/Link.txt

Type:

File System

MIME Type:

text/plain

Size:

864

File Name Allocation:

Allocated

Metadata Allocation:

Allocated

Modified:

2022-11-08 21:40:08 GMT

Accessed:

2022-11-09 00:00:00 GMT

Created:

2022-11-09 05:13:45 GMT

Changed:

0000-00-00 00:00:00

MD5:

d038954ca6d386ffd10b9ca8e5cb4dd8

SHA-256:

06ab51ef2595adc9b56963b3a9b2d303835a80972976198f33def2ffa34c192

Hash Lookup Results:

UNKNOWN

Internal ID:

2113

From The Sleuth Kit istat Tool:

Description and implications of the artefact:

In this section we found a link.txt file that is binary text. We will use an online decoder for this binary then we found a link that is related with Online child sexual exploitation and abuse. The link is: <https://www.unodc.org/e4j/zh/cybercrime/module-12/key-issues/online-child-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse.html>

4.3.8 Category DR_1

Screenshot of the artefact:

Host

1

anFiles (67)

edFiles (65)

oc (2)

(11)

us (3)

nts (22)

sources (4)

id Files (5)

ot (6)

rosoft (4)

boot (11)

fonts (22)

resources (3)

are_Hive (5)

ss (186)

manifests (162)

us (50)

providers (14)

f (3)

gration (3)

placementmanifests

is (6)

ip (3)

sta (3)

y (3)

rt (6)

gging (24)

Table

Thumbnail

Summary

Save Table as

| Name | Keyword Preview | Location | Modified Time | Change Time | Access Time | Created Time | Size |
|------------------|--------------------|---|-------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------|
| victim.png | <victim.png> | /img_Mensil.E01/efi/boot/victim.png | 2022-11-08 22:05:00 GMT | 0000-00-00 00:00:00 | 2022-11-09 00:00:00 GMT | 2022-11-09 05:13:45 GMT | 11007 |
| victim.png-slack | <victim.png>-slack | /img_Mensil.E01/efi/boot/victim.png-slack | 2022-11-08 22:05:00 GMT | 0000-00-00 00:00:00 | 2022-11-09 00:00:00 GMT | 2022-11-09 05:13:45 GMT | 1281 |

Hex

Text

Application

File Metadata

OS Account

Data Artifacts

Analysis Results

Context

Annotations

Other Occurrences

Page: 1 of 1

Page

Go to Page: 1

Jump to Offset

Launch in HxD

0x00000000: 85 50 4E 47 0D 0A 1A 0D 0A 00 00 00 0D 49 48 44 .PNG.....IHD

0x00000010: 52 00 00 02 80 00 00 01 25 08 06 00 00 00 74 F4 R.....t.

0x00000020: 53 E3 00 00 00 04 73 42 49 54 08 08 08 08 7C 08 S.....sBIT....l.

0x00000030: 64 88 00 00 00 19 74 45 58 74 53 6F 66 74 77 C1 d.....tEXtSoftware

0x00000040: 72 65 00 67 6E 6F 6D 65 2D 73 63 72 65 65 6E 73 re.gnome-screens

0x00000050: 68 6F 74 EF 03 BF 3E 00 00 00 67 69 54 58 74 43 hot....>...glTxC

0x00000060: 72 65 61 74 69 6F 6E 20 54 69 6D 65 00 00 00 00 reation Time....

0x00000070: 00 E0 A6 AC E0 A7 81 E0 A6 A7 E0 A6 AC E0 A6 BE 09

0x00000080: E0 A6 B0 20 30 39 20 E0 A6 A8 E0 A6 AD E0 A7 87 202

0x00000090: E0 A6 AE E0 A7 8D E0 A6 AC E0 A6 B0 20 32 30 32 2 04:03:32

0x000000a0: 32 20 30 34 3A 30 33 3A 33 32 20 E0 A6 AA E0 A7 /.....ID

0x000000b0: 82 E0 A6 B0 E0 A7 8D E0 A6 AC E0 A6 BE E0 A6 B9 ATx.....yt.U.....

0x000000c0: E0 A7 8D E0 A6 A3 F3 2F 90 80 00 00 20 00 49 44 /.....ID

0x000000d0: 41 54 78 9C ED DD 79 74 15 55 BE FE F1 A7 12 20 ATx.....yt.U.....

0x000000e0: 24 21 86 08 21 88 02 31 11 65 08 93 S1 0C 22 53 /.....ID

| Hex | Text | Application | File Metadata | OS Account | Data Artifacts | Analysis Results | Context | Annotations | Other Occurrences |
|-----------------------|--|-------------|---------------|------------|----------------|------------------|---------|-------------|-------------------|
| Metadata | | | | | | | | | |
| Name: | /img_Mensil.E01/efi/boot/victim file strings.png | | | | | | | | |
| Type: | File System | | | | | | | | |
| MIME Type: | image/png | | | | | | | | |
| Size: | 27431 | | | | | | | | |
| File Name Allocation: | Allocated | | | | | | | | |
| Metadata Allocation: | Allocated | | | | | | | | |
| Modified: | 2022-11-08 22:08:38 GMT | | | | | | | | |
| Accessed: | 2022-11-09 00:00:00 GMT | | | | | | | | |
| Created: | 2022-11-09 05:13:45 GMT | | | | | | | | |
| Changed: | 0000-00-00 00:00:00 | | | | | | | | |
| MD5: | f2c31b02c24f42997e73b2a9fe5caa87 | | | | | | | | |
| SHA-256: | 4289317f57ae0a2bc68bc49e3da32d7252ac44a35e3a593f6d760e148f90cba9 | | | | | | | | |
| Hash Lookup Results: | UNKNOWN | | | | | | | | |
| Internal ID: | 1976 | | | | | | | | |

Description and implications of the artefact:

In this section we will find the victim's original name. We found an image file named victim.png but it was also not opened. But here we found another image file that is related to this victim.png file. We noticed that the victim.png file string was compromised by this encase. So we noticed that in the strings section there were some hash txt like base64. We collected it and decoded it using the same method as followed in previous. Then finally we found the victim's original name. The extracted name or test is: "Victim Name: Nuria Lora"

Description of the hiding/unhiding process:

The victim.png file was corrupted by ASCII conversion. That means we need to check its strings.

```
>},++
[n1I6e
_TTd
RRRL
6m23
SI6d
+++33
SO=e
////
b%%~
2I6n
VmljdGltIEShbWU6ICJ0dXJpYSBMb3JhJw==
GEEYQQQ
%%6j
0aBP
itiV\\
h233
JKKC
4W4h
YYa
zkHy~~
zUPP
G+**
_%I]
,==]
a17R
*??_
%%U
p!366V
233k
~8
```


We can see that here is a hash value. Collect this hash and decode it. Then we found the text.

Hash: VmlldGltIE5hbWU6ICJOdXJpYSBMb3JhJw==

Decode site link: <https://www.base64decode.org/>

5. Supporting Material

Tools:

- Autopsy
- Access Data FTK Imager
- HXD

Site:

- <https://www.base64decode.org/>
- <https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/>
- <https://morsecode.world/international/decoder/audio-decoder-adaptive.html>
- [Convert Text to Audio Morse Code \[Downloadable Audio\] \(meridianoutpost.com\)](https://www.dcode.fr/american-sign-language)
 - <https://www.dcode.fr/american-sign-language>

6. Personal Reflection

6.1 Student 1

6.1.1 Reflection

Child Protection Policy is very need in this time. Digital crime is the most common factors for this time & child can easily the target by the social media.

6.1.2 Strengths/major contributions to the group

Completed the full Project on Child Protection Digital Crime Scenario make and Investigation on this.

6.1.3 What you found enjoyable

Data Encryption for Data Hiding. Most of Steganography Techniques Like morse and the other section is sign language.

6.1.4 What was challenging

File Signeture Mismatchce checking and Correction.

6.1.5 Technical challenges and outcomes

Encase Forensics Imager is not free version, is premium. I am use Access Data FTK Imager for create the crime scenario evidence .E01 file. That was techniqaal challenge for me. The outcome is it can be done easily by Encase Forensics but that is not available in every section like Not Open Source. So Its need to be Open source file.