#2 - Vulnerability Assessment of Networked Systems

Vulnerability Research

The process of finding and analyzing new vulnerabilities

- Through direct experimentation
- Through analysis of the architecture, code or system behavior

Important to many different stakeholders:

- Product owners: prioritize actions/budget on the product lifecycle
- Developers: understand what created the vuln, how it can be avoided
- Administrators: assess impact and deploy defense/recovery measures
- Vuln. Researchers: to pivot to new vulnerabilities

Vulnerability Assessment - Objective

Process to analyze, evaluate and review entities (software applications, devices, networks, systems)

Identify and categorize issues that may be explored, or constitute risk to the normal operation of the entity

Assessment vs Audit

Audit: determines compliance to a standard

- Scope: A given standard and its control points

Auditor is a "checklist" to verify security

Assessment: determines how good/bad something is

- Scope: may be broad. Driven by risk, compliance, contractual requirements
- aims to help improving systems
- done before the audit, to identify any loopholes
- done after the audit to measure how effective an audit is

Assessment is you are inside and try to do bad stuff knowing info

Relevant reference: SANS Institute, Scoping Security Assessments - A Project Management Approach , 2020

Assessment vs Penetration Test

Penetration test focus in infrastructures and systems with an idea of outside and inside

- Outside: out of the domain (other domain or the internet)
- Inside: in the domain

Pentest → you are an Hacker you don't have nothing and need to get something

Tests the capability of entering a domain and its impact

- How an attacker entered (which flaws or bugs were used)
- How/if an attacker moved laterally
- What other systems it may have reached
- What data/systems were impacted
- Was data exfiltrated?

Why?

An essential process in current organizations, products and systems

- Two distinct views: Internal and External

Current organizational landscape is complex

- Heterogeneous computing environment
  - Servers, desktops, laptops, BYOD…
- Multiple applications
  - From multiple vendors
  - Developed over time, using different tools, languages and stacks
- Rely on communication networks
  - Not all confined (e.g. Wi-Fi)
- Rely on external services and actors

Important to understand what are the risks, what to address, and what processes should be in place

Why?

Standard defensive measures are not enough

- They help creating/operating software with greater security
- They are also limited to the mindset of the developers/ops

Defensive technologies are limited in capabilities

- **Firewall**: Filter packets, connections
  - mostly used as perimeter control devices (but do not supervise internal networks)
  - inspect packets in clear, or publicly available data (ports, IP Addresses, protocols), but struggles with TLS
- **WAF**: Filter HTTP requests
  - matches profiles of known attacks (deny list), or allowed requests (allow list), but may be circumvented
- **IDS**: Network/Host Intrusion Detection Systems monitor network or OS changes
  - matches profiles of know attacks, but may be circumvented
  - may detect and block an attack AFTER it was done

Scope → outlines the systems, apps, networks affected in that certain scope

The definition of what systems/software/endpoints/approaches are considered

The most important component of setting up a successful security assessment

Too broad: Mimics a powerful attacker

- Too expensive
- May lead to a never-ending assessment
- May lead to lack of depth (missing vulns)

To narrow: Mimics a focused attack

- Cheap, fast, repeatable
- May miss easily found issues
  - Like focusing on the bulletproof entrance door, placed a wall with a glass window

Limitations

Assessment is only valid at a given point in time

- Other vulnerabilities may exist before or after the assessment

Researcher must be aware of latest vulnerabilities

- Risk of false negatives

Limited to the scope, location and methods used

- Different domain may have different FW access rules or security policies

Tests specific entities, not the overall security controls

- A vulnerability may exist, but the security controls may limit/block its exploitation

Types (for company scale assessments)

Active	Passive	External	Internal
Host-Based	Network	Application	Wireless

Type: Active

Runs software do discover network hosts

- Send probes
- Checks information repositories

Runs tools to actively test software/systems

- Sends crafted arguments, payloads, packets
- Creates flaws
- MiTM, DoS, etc…

May disrupt systems!

- Detection of vulnerability may have impact



Type: Passive

Runs software to eavesdrop on traffic

Observes logs and dumps

- Network logs
- Service/application logs
- Host logs
- May be run for a long time in production

Minimal impact



Type: External

Focus on the public exposition

- External attackers

Targets:

- Publicly available routers and firewalls rules
- Publicly available IP Ports
- Public services (DNS)
- Information exposed to the public
- Security mechanisms (throttling, TLS, blocking)

Allows to find vulnerabilities and enable deployment of countermeasures at FWs

- For assessment and exploitation



Type: Host Based → from inside

Focus on misconfigurations, permissions, existing software, updates

BYOD → Mau pois se este tem malware pode entrar na Lan

Targets:

- Servers
- VMs
- Workstations and Laptops

Allows finding vulnerabilities that could be explored by insiders or an attacker that gained access to the systems

↳ with fishing



Type: Network

From the outside

Focus on the communications of the network infrastructure

- Rules, misconfigurations, updates
- Individual services (FTP, SMTP, LDAP)

Targets:

- Communication links
- Networking Gear

Finds how exposed systems are to exploitation

Finds what information may be leaked



Type: Wireless

Focus on the wireless communications of the network infrastructure and support services

- Rules, misconfigurations, updates
- Authentication, confidentiality, access control
- Guest access

Targets:

- Wireless Networking Gear
- Authentication servers
- Networking Gear (VLANs)

Similar to network, but with specific tools due to range and authn/authz



Type: Application

Focus on a single application

- Input output
- Logic errors
- Authentication and authorization processes
- Operational assumptions
- Related services (databases, firewalls)

Targets:

- Application
- Service

Finds software vulnerabilities in the targeted application

- Bugs or flaws



Vuln. Management Life Cycle Life Cycle



Vuln. Management Life Cycle



Establish a Baseline

Scope

Select the assets to be assessed and defines priorities

- Some assets may be excluded due to potential impact or cost

Characterize the systems/software state

Determine what is known and what must be assessed

- Known vulnerabilities may be ignored from the assessment

Vuln. Management Life Cycle



Vulnerability Assessment

Assess the entities for vulnerabilities

- Takes in consideration priorities
- Takes in consideration scope

Constructs a detailed report with:

- What vulnerability was found
- What are the affected entities
- What are the recommendations to handle it

Assessment usually doesn't exploit the vulnerability or builds an exploit chain

- It's not a penetration test

Assessment Methods

Subject close to software testing but with focus in security related impact

- Extensively studied in the Robust Software course

Highly dependent on the scope of the assessment

- Application: Static, Dynamic or Component Analysis
- Network entity: Protocol, message, authentication, authorization analysis
- Processes/Companies: OSINT, Social Engineering

Assessment Strategies – Black Box

Researchers have no information about internal aspects and are presented with a publicly available view

- No source code, no documentation
- Assumes an actor with a specific set of resources
  - Script kiddie, a researcher, competitor, a crowd-based effort

Access to nothing just like an Hacker

Aims to mimic assessments from outside attackers

- Finds what can be explored by intruders with no access
  - Usually finds vulnerabilities easier to exploit
- May find alternative paths and use cases (which may present vulnerabilities)

Limited on the impact of the assessment

- Existing vulnerabilities with remedies (e.g. Firewall) may not be detected

Assessment Strategies – White Box

Researchers are given full documentation and access to systems

- A replica of the production system
- The production system with a limited scope
- The source code and infrastructure code

Aims to find faults and bugs at all scoped domains

- Assumes an actor at any location (insider and outsider)
- Finds what can be exploited by: outsiders, insiders, outsiders with lateral movement
- May mimic specific users and roles

Extensive (and expensive) analysis of the domains

- Remedies are known and considered, but vulnerability may still be found

Assessment Strategies – Gray Box

Some information is provided to researchers

- Documentation about the application or systems
- A specific set of credentials

Aims to find faults and bugs at a limited set of scoped domains

- Can mimic a specific user

Doesn't have all info available, just a fraction.

Avoiding attacks like fishing.

Vuln. Management Life Cycle



Risk Assessment

Company takes in consideration the report and assess the risk

- For every asset with vulnerabilities
- Assigns risk indicators (3-4 levels)

Risk assessment may take in consideration all vulnerabilities found

- Individual vulnerabilities may be combined in a exploit chain with higher impact

Documentation

Researchers should carefully document assessments

- Describing the rationale for the assessment, the strategy, the findings
- Essential in cooperation between teams

Important to understand how vulnerability was explored, what the impact may be

- Wrong attitude: we found this, you are not doing your job
- Correct attitude: we found this, which may be caused by that, this is the impact, you may fix it with doing X
  - Clients may not understand the vulnerability, the reason or the impact

Vuln. Management Life Cycle



Remediation

Sometimes may not be corrected

Company implements methods to increase the security of its assets

May fix the vulnerability

- Correct software bugs or flaws
- Implement specific configurations
- Update software/firmware
- This capability is not always present

May reduce the impact of a successful exploitation

- Implement mechanisms that reduce impact to a smaller domain
- Implement redundancy and fail recover

May increase the cost of exploiting the vulnerability

- Deploy firewalls or change its rules
- Increase isolation so that assets are not available in a domain

Vuln. Management Life Cycle



Verification

Verifies the effectiveness of the remediation

Involves assessing the existence and risk of the vulnerabilities found

- Using the same scope!
- Vulnerability risk may be similar if explored from other perspectives
  - E.g. External vs Internal actor

Vuln. Management Life Cycle



Monitoring

Deploys mechanism to detect the vulnerability being explored

- May consider variations

Involves configuring Firewalls, log analysis systems, IDS/NIDS/HIDS, profillers