A Longitudinal Analysis of the Privacy Paradox

Tobias Dienlin<sup>1</sup>, Philipp K. Masur<sup>2</sup>, & Sabine Trepte<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> University of Hohenheim

Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz

Author Note

3

5

All authors contributed extensively to the work presented in this paper. TD, PM, &

<sub>7</sub> ST designed the study; PM supervised the data collection; PM administered the data

- 8 importation; TD & PM wrote the code, ran the models, and analyzed the output data; TD
- <sup>9</sup> wrote major parts of manuscript, and PM & ST contributed individual sections and
- comments; ST supervised the project and wrote the grant application (in 2012). The
- 11 authors declare no competing interests. This research was funded by the German Federal
- <sup>12</sup> Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) Grant 16KIS0094, awarded to Sabine Trepte.
- This manuscript features online supplementary material that includes the code,
- additional analyses, and a reproducible version of the manuscript (https://osf.io/4wabh).
- The data can be downloaded from http://dx.doi.org/10.7802/1937.
- 16 Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Tobias Dienlin,
- University of Hohenheim, Department of Media Psychology (540F), 70599 Stuttgart,
- Germany. E-mail: tobias.dienlin@uni-hohenheim.de

Abstract

The privacy paradox states that people's concerns about online privacy are unrelated to

21 their online sharing of personal information. Using a representative sample of the German

22 population, which includes 1403 respondents who were interviewed at three waves

23 separated by 6 months, we investigate the privacy paradox from a longitudinal perspective,

<sup>24</sup> differentiating between-person relations from within-person effects. Results of a

25 cross-lagged panel model with random intercepts revealed that people who were more

26 concerned about their online privacy than others also shared slightly less personal

27 information online and had substantially more negative attitudes toward the online sharing

of personal information than others (between-person level). Next, people who were more

29 concerned than usual also shared slightly less information than usual (within-person level).

At the same time, we found no long-term effects of privacy concerns on information sharing

or attitudes 6 months later. Together, the results provide further evidence against the

32 privacy paradox.

33 Keywords: privacy paradox, privacy concerns, information disclosure, longitudinal

analysis, structural equation modeling

35 Word count: 6418

36

# A Longitudinal Analysis of the Privacy Paradox

The privacy paradox states that information disclosure practices of Internet users are 37 problematic: Although many people are concerned about their online privacy, they still 38 tend to share plenty of personal information on the web (e.g., Acquisti & Grossklags, 39 2003). The privacy paradox and its underlying theoretical conundrum is hence of considerable interest to society—it is discussed in newspapers (Frean, 2017), Wikipedia 41 (Wikipedia, 2018), designated websites (New York Public Radio, 2018), books (Trepte & Reinecke, 2011), and top-tier academic journals (Acquisti, Brandimarte, & Loewenstein, 2015). If the privacy paradox really exists, it should inspire worry: It would suggest that online behavior is irrational and that people are revealing too much of their personal lives to unknown third parties, which can foster potentially unintended consequences such as commodification (Sevignani, 2016), inappropriate recontextualization (boyd, 2008), or increased predictability of future behavior (Bagrow, Liu, & Mitchell, 2019). In conclusion, understanding why people disclose information online and whether this is paradoxical or not represents an important challenge for scholars in the social sciences. However, current research on the privacy paradox has one major limitation: To the 51 best of our knowledge, all empirical studies conducted so far have investigated the privacy paradox from a between-person (i.e., interpersonal) perspective. By employing empirical 53 tests of between-person variance (e.g., cross-sectional questionnaires analyzed with multiple 54 regression or Pearson correlations), studies have analyzed whether people who are more 55 concerned than others also share less personal information than others. Granted, such a 56 between-person perspective is interesting and represents a viable first step in analyzing the 57 relation between these variables. At the same time, it is important to emphasize that the privacy paradox actually implies a within-person (i.e., intrapersonal) perspective: Does a 59 person, if he or she becomes more concerned about online privacy, then also share less personal information? This mismatch is problematic because although between-person 61 variance is, except for some special cases, a necessary condition for within-person effects, it is by no means a *sufficient* condition. For example, it could be that the between-person relation is determined by another stable third variable. Hence, as the next step in investigating the privacy paradox and to better understand the intrapersonal relation between privacy concerns and information sharing, we need to conduct studies with within-person designs.

As a result, with this study we aim to answer four major questions. First, on a between-person level, how are concerns about online privacy related to the online sharing of personal information? Second, on a within-person level, does information sharing decrease when concerns increase? Third, what are the potential long-term effects, are changes in concerns related to changes in information sharing 6 months later and/or vice versa? Fourth, what is the role of privacy attitudes, do they mediate the relation between privacy concerns and information sharing? To best answer and contextualize these questions, we first provide an in-depth theoretical analysis of the privacy paradox, after which we present the empirical results of a longitudinal panel study.

## 77 A Brief History of the Privacy Paradox

Acquisti and Grossklags (2003) were among the first to argue that the online 78 disclosure of personal information is paradoxical. "Experiments reveal that very few 79 individuals actually take any action to protect their personal information, even when doing so involves limited costs" (p.1). Three years later, Barnes (2006) discussed the behavior of 81 young people using SNSs and coined the expression of the privacy paradox. Barnes listed six notions that she considered to be particularly paradoxical: (a) illusion of privacy, (b) high quantity of information sharing, (c) attitude behavior discrepancy, (d) lack of privacy concerns, (e) lack of privacy literacy, and (f) fabrication of false information. 85 Subsequent research analyzed the privacy paradox more explicitly, focusing on 86 Barnes's third tenet, the attitude-behavior discrepancy. On the one hand, some studies 87 reported that privacy concerns were not significantly related to the disclosure of personal

information (e.g., Gross & Acquisti, 2005; Taddicken, 2014; Tufekci, 2008), lending credence to the privacy paradox. On the other hand, a different set of studies showed relations that 90 were statistically significant (e.g., Dienlin & Trepte, 2015; Heirman, Walrave, & Ponnet, 91 2013; Walrave, Vanwesenbeeck, & Heirman, 2012), thereby refuting the privacy paradox. 92 It is interesting that in a parallel line of research other studies have also analyzed the 93 relation between privacy concerns and information sharing; however, the term privacy 94 paradox has often not been mentioned explicitly. Instead, studies have referred to the 95 so-called *privacy calculus*. The privacy calculus states that sharing personal information is affected by both the respective costs and the anticipated benefits (Culnan & Armstrong, 97 1999). By now, several studies have found empirical support for the privacy calculus in various online contexts (e.g., Bol et al., 2018; Dienlin & Metzger, 2016; Krasnova, Spiekermann, Koroleva, & Hildebrand, 2010). Baruh, Secinti, and Cemalcilar (2017) published the first empirical meta-analysis on 101 the relations between privacy concerns and various forms of social media use (e.g., 102 information sharing or SNS usage). On the basis of 37 studies, Baruh et al. (2017) found a 103 small and significant statistical relation between concerns about online privacy and online 104 information sharing (r = -.13). For other systematic literature reviews, see Barth and Jong 105 (2017), Gerber, Gerber, and Volkamer (2018), and Kokolakis (2017). In conclusion, the 106 current literature suggests that a significant relation between concerns about online privacy 107 and the online sharing of personal information exists and that it is small—which speaks 108 against the privacy paradox.

#### Defining Privacy Concerns and Information Sharing 110

109

Privacy is defined as the "[...] voluntary and temporary withdrawal of a person from 111 the general society through physical or psychological means [...]" (Westin, 1967, p. 7). 112 Hence, privacy captures aspects of both volitional control and social separateness. Several 113 dimensions of privacy have been proposed: For example, it is possible to distinguish a 114

vertical and a horizontal level; whereas the vertical level captures privacy from authorities, 115 institutions, or companies, horizontal privacy addresses privacy from peers, colleagues, or 116 other people (Masur, 2018). When it comes to concerns, it is interesting that they do not 117 seem to be established as a stand-alone theoretical concept in psychology: For example, the 118 Oxford Dictionary of Psychology does not feature a designated entry (Colman, 2015). In 119 general, however, a concern is defined as a "marked interest or regard usually arising 120 through a personal tie or relationship" that also reflects an "uneasy state of blended 121 interest, uncertainty, and apprehension" (Merriam-Webster, 2018). A concern therefore 122 partially represents both a latent motivation (or increased attention) to invest oneself in a 123 specific entity and a negatively valenced *emotion* (or affective condition). As such, a 124 concern is not predominantly the result of a deliberate explicit cognition; instead, it 125 primarily reflects an automatic implicit perception. Taken together, concerns about online privacy represent how much an individual is motivated to focus on his or her control over a 127 voluntary withdrawal from other people or societal institutions on the Internet, 128 accompanied by an uneasy feeling that his or her privacy might be threatened. As a 129 theoretical construct, privacy concerns can hence be categorized as an affective 130 motivational disposition. As such, there are many similarities with other concepts, which 131 includes emotions (e.g., fear, anxiety), moods (e.g., dismay, fatigue), attitudes (approval, 132 dissent), values (e.g., autonomy, freedom), personality traits (e.g., introversion, risk 133 avoidance), and even physiological activation (e.g., attention, arousal). 134 The online sharing of personal information, on the other hand, captures how much 135 person-related information people share when they use the Internet, which includes, for 136 example, information about their age, sex, name, address, health, or finances. Information 137 sharing can be differentiated from communication and self-disclosure: Whereas 138 communication is broad because it comprises all verbal and nonverbal information that is 139 emitted (e.g., Watzlawick, Bavelas, Jackson, & O'Hanlon, 2011), self-disclosure is narrow 140 because it focuses on deliberate revelations about the true self to others (e.g., Jourard, 141

142 1964)

### 143 The Relation Between Privacy Concerns and Information Sharing

It is somewhat surprising that the literature seems to lack explicit theoretical 144 treatises on why and how human behavior should be affected by concerns specifically. More 145 fortunately, however, there are several theoretical insights regarding how the affective 146 motivational concepts presented above can pertain to behavior. The results are unanimous: 147 They can all affect behavior profoundly. For example, let us consider the concept that is 148 perhaps closest to concerns, emotions. By causing fight or flight reactions, emotions are 149 potentially the most primordial trigger of behavior, they are considered an adaptive 150 mechanism that fosters the evolution of a species (Dolan, 2002). With their direct link to 151 the amygdala, emotions can already trigger reactions subcortically (i.e., without activation 152 of the more recently evolved cortical structures; Dolan, 2002). It hence seems plausible to 153 suggest that privacy concerns, with their emotional dependency, also share this function at 154 least partially. Moreover, changes in concerns might be correlated with changes in behavior 155 because people usually aim to reduce discrepancies between cognitions and behavior 156 (Festinger, 1957). There are also several empirical accounts of how concerns affect behavior: People who are more concerned about the environment show more environment-related behaviors (Bamberg, 2003), people who are more concerned about 159 their appearance consume fewer calories (Hayes & Ross, 1987), and people who are more 160 concerned about their bodies engage in more physical exercise (Reel et al., 2007). Hence, it 161 seems reasonable to expect that also concerns about online privacy should be reflected in 162 the online sharing of personal information. 163

At the same time, there are some factors that are likely to diminish the relation. Most prominently, there is the so-called *attitude behavior gap*, which pertains to the idea that people often act against their own attitudes (e.g., Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010). For example, despite endorsing the importance of physical health, a large part of the population still

does not exercise regularly. Transferred to the privacy paradox, it should not be surprising 168 to encounter this general discrepancy also in the specific context of privacy concerns and 169 information sharing. The explanation is simple: Other factors such as subjective norms 170 and perceived behavioral control can also determine behavior (Ajzen, 1985), and this 171 automatically limits the predictive capacity of attitudes or concerns. Specifically, two of 172 the most influential factors that affect online information sharing are (a) the strong 173 subjective norms to participate online (Heirman et al., 2013) and (b) the manifold benefits 174 that accrue from participation (Krasnova et al., 2010). In other words, instead of 175 considering privacy concerns it is often more important to attain social support, special 176 offers, or tailored services. Trepte, Dienlin, and Reinecke (2014) listed several factors that 177 can additionally attenuate the relation: concerns might be missing any actual strength, a 178 lack of negative personal experiences, and situational constraints due to social desirability. Finally, there are also some methodological reasons that can explain why some 180 studies did not find statistically significant relations, even when they exist empirically. In 181 general, researchers are always confronted with the Duhem-Quine problem, which holds 182 that it is impossible to test theories in isolation, because empirical tests always rely on 183 auxiliary assumptions (e.g., Dienes, 2008). In other words, if a psychological experiment 184 fails, we do not know whether the theory is wrong or the questionnaire subpar. This tenet 185 is particularly relevant for the privacy paradox: Detecting statistical significance for small 186

Precisely, in order to be capable of detecting a correlation between privacy concerns and 189 information sharing in 95% of all cases, which Baruh et al. (2017) estimated to be r = -.13, 190 we need a sample of N = 762 people. The reality, however, looks different: In their 191 meta-analysis, Baruh et al. reported a median sample size of N=300, which can explain

because it means that large samples are necessary to guarantee sufficient statistical power.<sup>1</sup>

effects—and in this case, we should expect to find small effects—is more challenging

187

188

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Statistical power describes the probability of statistically detecting an effect that exists empirically. Only with high statistical power is it possible to make valid claims about an effect's existence (Cohen, 1992).

why several studies did not find significant effects.

To conclude, in line with prior research (Baruh et al., 2017) and the within-person rationales that we have presented above, we expect to find a small significant relation between privacy concerns and information sharing, both on the between-person level and the within-person level.

Hypothesis 1: People who are more concerned about their online privacy than others will also be less likely to share personal information online than others.

Hypothesis 2: People who are more concerned about their online privacy than they usually are will also share less personal information online than they usually do.

## Long-Term Perspective

202

Although we hypothesize that changes in people's concerns about online privacy will 203 be reflected by their behavior directly, we are not sure about whether there will also be 204 long-term effects. First, when analyzing potential long-term effects, it is important to 205 choose an interval that is both plausible and relevant. For example, it makes a difference 206 whether the effects of alcohol consumption on driving performance are tested 1 min, 1 h, or 207 1 day after consumption. One factor that determines an interval's optimal length is the variable's stability (Dormann & Griffin, 2015). Privacy concerns and privacy attitudes are 209 predominantly trait-like constructs with high stabilities, therefore necessitating longer intervals. Other studies with comparable research questions have used an interval of 6 211 months (e.g., Valkenburg & Peter, 2009), which we consider to be plausible also in this case. 212 In general, we believe that it should be possible to find long-term effects. It has been 213 argued that privacy concerns affect privacy behavior in the long run (e.g., Heirman et al., 214 2013). The underlying theoretical mechanism could be that the emotional part of privacy 215 concerns causes (a) motivated information selection and (b) motivated information 216 processing, which is likely to change actual behavior (Nabi, 1999). Specifically, when 217 privacy concerns increase (e.g., because of experienced or witnessed privacy infringements), 218

people might begin reading more media articles on privacy issues and might also consume
these articles more carefully, which could prompt information sharing practices that are
more cautious. Also empirically, a study with 290 participants found small negative
longitudinal (between-person) relations between privacy concerns and self-disclosure
(Koohikamali, French, & Kim, 2019).

At the same time, the adverse effect of information sharing on privacy concerns seems 224 also plausible, with two potential outcomes. On the one hand, the long-term relation could 225 be negative: If people start to share more information online, they might become 226 increasingly aware that their privacy is at risk, which might stir concern. On the other 227 hand, the long-term relation might also be positive, because when people share more 228 personal information online, they might become accustomed to doing so, which might 229 reduce concern (for example, due to the mere exposure effect; Zajonc, 1968). Finally, there 230 could also be no long-term relation after all. For example, people might have already 231 become used to sharing information online, which might stifle any further cognitive or emotional processing – a rationale central to the observation of so-called privacy cynicism 233 (e.g., Hoffmann, Lutz, & Ranzini, 2016). 234

Research Question 1.1: Do changes in concerns about online privacy affect the online sharing of personal information 6 months later?

Research Question 1.2: Do changes in the online sharing of personal information affect concerns about online privacy 6 months later?

# 239 The Role of Attitudes

It has been argued that privacy attitudes could "bridge the gap" between concerns and information sharing (e.g., Dienlin & Trepte, 2015). In contrast to privacy concerns, privacy attitudes capture a more explicit, fluctuating cognitive appraisal. Although both variables are related to information disclosure, attitudes are likely to be the better predictor. This reasoning follows the rational choice paradigm (Simon, 1955), which

maintains that behavior is always, at least in part, influenced by convictions, attitudes, and 245 cost-benefit analyses. Likewise, evolutionary psychology also suggests that although 246 emotions guide behavior in the long run, it is more adaptive if behavior instead reflects a 247 cognitive appraisal; a tenet arguably reflected best by the phylogenetic development of the 248 neocortex or the general dominion of the human race. These rationales have also found 249 some empirical support. For example, a study of 1,042 youths from Belgium found that the 250 relation between privacy attitudes and disclosure of personal information was strong (r =251 .56), whereas the relation between privacy concerns and disclosure was moderate (r = -.29; 252 Heirman et al., 2013). 253

Hypothesis 3.1: People who are more concerned about their online privacy than 254 others will also hold a less positive attitude toward the online sharing of personal 255 information than others.

Hypothesis 3.2: People with a more positive attitude toward the online sharing of 257 personal information than others will also share more information online than others. 258

Hypothesis 4.1: People who are more concerned about their online privacy than they 259 usually are will also hold a less positive attitude toward the online sharing of personal 260 information than they usually do.

Hypothesis 4.2: People with a more positive attitude toward the online sharing of 262 personal information than they usually have will also share more information online than 263 they usually do. 264

261

265

266

267

268

271

Concerning the potential long-term relations of privacy attitudes, the same situation exists here as mentioned above: Given that no prior research exists on long-term relations, several scenarios seem plausible. For example, attitudes could either have long-term relations or not, and information sharing could either foster or diminish privacy attitudes.

Research Question 2.1: Do changes in concerns about online privacy affect attitudes 269 toward the online sharing of personal information 6 months later? 270

Research Question 2.2: Do changes in attitudes toward the online sharing of personal

information affect concerns about online privacy 6 months later?

Research Question 3.1: Do changes in attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information affect the online sharing of personal information 6 months later?

Research Question 3.2: Do changes in the online sharing of personal information affect attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information 6 months later?

277 Method

## 278 Statistics

We follow the recommendation by Lakens et al. (2017) and first justify the choice of 279 our alpha level. We determined adequate error margins by considering the potential 280 implications of both false positive and false negative findings (i.e., alpha and beta errors): 281 On the one hand, if we committed an alpha error, we would wrongfully conclude that 282 people's concerns and behaviors are consistent. Communicating such a false result to the 283 public would unjustly reassure and placate people when they should instead be more alert. 284 On the other hand, if we committed a beta error, we would wrongfully conclude that 285 individuals behave paradoxically. Communicating such a false result would unjustly accuse 286 people of implausible behavior, potentially causing unnecessary distress or reactance. We 287 consider both errors to be equally detrimental. Hence, we chose to use error rates that are 288 balanced. Next, we set a maximum error rate of 5% for both alpha and beta. As the smallest effect size of interest (SESOI; Lakens, 2014), we chose to consider effects that are at least small (i.e., standardized coefficients above  $\beta = .10$ ; Cohen, 1992) as able to offer 291 empirical support for our theoretical hypotheses; significantly smaller effects were not 292 considered able to offer support. The six hypotheses were tested with a one-tailed approach 293 and the six research questions with a two-tailed approach. On the basis of the balanced 294 alpha-beta approach with a maximum error probability of 5%, a desired power of 95%, and 295 an SESOI of  $\beta = 0.10$ , we calculated that we needed a minimum sample size of 1,293 296 respondents. Given the final sample size of 1,403 respondents (see below), alpha and beta 297

errors were balanced for our hypotheses (research questions) when we used a critical alpha 298 of 3% (4.20%), resulting in a power of 97% (95.80%) to detect small effects. 299 The data were analyzed by means of a random-intercept cross-lagged panel model 300 (RI-CLPM) (Hamaker, Kuiper, & Grasman, 2015), a method that already has been used 301 for similar research questions (Dietvorst, Hiemstra, Hillegers, & Keijsers, 2018). Note that 302 in contrast to regular cross-lagged panel models (CLPMs), RI-CLPMs allow to separate 303 between-person variance from within-person variance. We used factor scores as observed 304 variables to represent the variables' latent structure more closely. We tested H1, H3.1, and 305 H3.2 by correlating the random intercepts, which represent the respondents' individual 306 mean scores across all three waves. We tested H2, H4.1, and H4.2 by correlating the 307 respondents' within-person variance at T1, which captures their specific deviation at T1 308 from their overall score. We tested all research questions by regressing variables on all other measures obtained 6 months earlier. Given that we had three points of measurement, 310 this resulted in two estimates for each Research Question. As we did not expect 311 longitudinal effects to differ across time, they were constrained to be equal across all waves, 312 thereby producing one single general measure of each effect instead of two time-specific 313 ones. Fit was assessed according to the common criteria as described by Kline (2016). The 314 final model fit the data well,  $\chi^2(15) = 25.18$ , p = .048, cfi = 1.00, rmsea = .02, 90% CI [< 315 .01, .04, srmr = .01. 316 For the analyses, coding, and typesetting, we used R (Version 3.5.1; R Core Team, 317 2018) and the R-packages GGally (Version 1.4.0; Schloerke et al., 2018), qqplot2 (Version 318 3.2.0; Wickham, 2016), lavaan (Version 0.6.4.1412; Rosseel, 2012), lme4 (Version 1.1.21; 319 Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015), magrittr (Version 1.5; Bache & Wickham, 2014), 320 MissMech (Version 1.0.2: Jamshidian, Jalal, & Jansen, 2014), papaja (Version 0.1.0.9842: 321 Aust & Barth, 2018), psych (Version 1.8.12; Revelle, 2018), pwr (Version 1.2.2; Champely, 322 2018), RVAideMemoire (Version 0.9.73; Hervé, 2019), semTools (Version 0.5.1; Jorgensen et 323 al., 2018), sistats (Version 0.17.5; Lüdecke, 2019), td (Version 0.0.1; Dienlin, 2018), and 324

tidyverse (Version 1.2.1; Wickham, 2017). The code, additional analyses, and a 325 reproducible version of the manuscript can be accessed in the Online Supplementary 326 Material (OSM) at https://osf.io/4wabh. 327

#### Procedure and Respondents 328

350

This study is part of a large-scale project which investigates the development of 329 privacy and self-disclosure, including several other variables. Other publications linked to 330 the project can be accessed at https://osf.io/y35as/. The data come from a longitudinal, 331 paper-and-pencil questionnaire study, in which a representative sample of the German 332 population (16 years and older) was surveyed on overall five occasions. The data can be 333 downloaded from http://dx.doi.org/10.7802/1937. 334 The first three waves were collected from May 2014 to May 2015, with intervals of 6 335 months each. The last two waves, collected on May 2016 and May 2017, had an interval of 336 one year. Because we hypothesized the effects to take place across half a year, the last two 337 waves were not included in the analyses presented here. First, a sample of 14,714 potential 338 respondents was drawn from a representative omnibus survey in Germany (ADM master 339 sample), employing a random last-two-digit dialing procedure. In this CATI screening, 5,286 respondents agreed to participate in all following waves. Wave 1 was completed by 3,278 respondents (response rate: 38%), Wave 2 by 2,448 342 respondents (attrition rate: 25%), and Wave 3 by 2,021 respondents (attrition rate: 17%). 343 We filtered respondents who never used the Internet at all waves, answered fewer than 50% 344 of the items in each scale for at least one wave, provided inconsistent birth-dates across 345 measurements, or who did not report sociodemographic variables. The final sample 346 consisted of  $n = 1{,}403$  respondents. 347 In the final sample, the rate of missing data was 5.40%. Visual inspection of the 348 missing value patterns as well as the non-parametric test by Jamshidian et al. (2014) 349 suggested that all missing values could be considered missing at random (p = .400).

Therefore, Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) estimation was conducted using all available data.

The average age was 54 years (SD=15 years), and 49% were male. About 39% reported that they had graduated from college.

#### 355 Measures

We tested the factorial validity of all measures using confirmatory factor analysis 356 (CFA). Each CFA included the items from all three waves. For each item, factor loadings 357 were constrained to be equal across waves. Constrained and unconstrained models were 358 compared using  $\chi^2$  differences tests; all results were nonsignificant, suggesting longitudinal 350 factorial invariance. The measures showed good composite reliability in all three waves. 360 Graphical displays of the variables' distributions showed that privacy concerns were skewed 361 to the left, privacy attitudes were normally distributed, and information sharing was 362 skewed to the right (Figure 1, diagonal). Finally, we also calculated the intra-class 363 correlation coefficient, quantifying how much variance in the variables' factor scores could 364 be attributed to between-person differences. An English translation of the original German 365 items can be found in the OSM.

Concerns about online privacy. Privacy concerns were measured as a 367 second-order factor: Three items captured the vertical dimension (e.g., "How concerned are 368 you that institutions or intelligence services collect and analyze data that you disclosed on 369 the Internet?"), and three items captured the horizontal dimension (e.g., "How concerned 370 are you that people that you do not know might obtain information about you because of 371 you online activities?"). Respondents rated all items on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (not 372 at all concerned) to 5 (very concerned). The means were  $M_{\rm t1}=3.67,\,M_{\rm t2}=3.62,\,M_{\rm t3}=$ 373 3.59, and the standard deviations  $SD_{t1} = 0.88$ ,  $SD_{t2} = 0.89$ , and  $SD_{t3} = 0.90$ . The 374 two-dimensional model fit the data well,  $\chi^2(118) = 661.17$ , p < .001, cfi = .97, rmsea = .06, 375 90% CI [.05, .06], srmr = .04. The reliability was high ( $\omega_{t1} = .95, \, \omega_{t2} = .96, \, \omega_{t3} = .97$ ). 376

Overall, 73.85% of the measure's variance was explained by differences between persons.

The online sharing of personal information. To measure respondent's level of 378 information disclosure, they were asked to indicate how often they disclosed 10 different 379 pieces of information on the Internet. The exact question was: "How often do you disclose 380 the following pieces of information online (i.e., on the Internet)?" Each item was answered 381 on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (daily). Factor analyses suggested a 382 second-order factor structure with five first-order factors. The first first-order factor 383 subsumed financial and medical information, the second covered first and last name, the 384 third included place of residence and street (including house number), the fourth email 385 address and phone number, and the fifth contained information about education and 386 current job. The means were  $M_{\rm t1}=2.12,\,M_{\rm t2}=2.13,\,M_{\rm t3}=2.10,\,{\rm and}$  the standard 387 deviations  $SD_{t1} = 0.66$ ,  $SD_{t2} = 0.64$ , and  $SD_{t3} = 0.61$ . The model fit the data adequately,  $\chi^2(375) = 2527.69, p < .001, cfi = .95, rmsea = .06, 90\% CI [.06, .07], srmr = .06. The$ reliability was high ( $\omega_{t1} = .91$ ,  $\omega_{t2} = .92$ ,  $\omega_{t3} = .91$ ). Overall, 64.29% of the measure's 390 variance was explained by differences between persons. 391

Attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information. Respondents' 392 attitudes toward disclosing personal information online were similarly captured with 10 393 items that measured the general appraisal of disclosing the same 10 pieces of information. 394 Adhering to the principle of compatibility (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010), the items were parallel 395 to those of the actual disclosure scale. Specifically, we asked: "Do you think that it is 396 sensible to disclose the following pieces of information online (i.e., on the Internet)?" The 397 scale ranged from 1 (not at all sensible) to 5 (very sensible). The means were  $M_{\rm t1}$  = 3.67, 398  $M_{\rm t2}=3.62,\,M_{\rm t3}=3.59,\,{\rm and}$  the standard deviations  $SD_{\rm t1}=0.88,\,SD_{\rm t2}=0.89,\,{\rm and}$   $SD_{\rm t3}$ 399 = 0.90. The second-order model with five first-order factors showed an adequate model fit, 400  $\chi^2(375) = 2683.43, p < .001, cfi = .93, rmsea = .07, 90\% CI [.06, .07], srmr = .08. The$ 401 reliability was high ( $\omega_{\rm t1} = .88$ ,  $\omega_{\rm t2} = .89$ ,  $\omega_{\rm t3} = .87$ ). Overall, 59.19% of the measure's 402 variance was explained by differences between persons. 403

Results 404

430

In a first descriptive step, we analyzed the variables' bivariate relations. All variables 405 associated with the hypotheses showed correlations that were in line with our theoretical 406 rationales (Figure 1, above the diagonal). 407 Hypothesis 1 predicted that people reporting higher concerns about online privacy 408 than others would also be less likely to share personal information online than others. 409 Results revealed that the random intercepts of the two variables were significantly 410 correlated ( $\beta = -.09$ , b = -0.03, 95% CI [-0.05, -0.01], z = -2.57, p = .005). Respondents 411 who—on average across all three waves—were more concerned about their privacy than 412 others also shared slightly less personal information online. The effect was small. However, 413 when looking at the standardized effect's confidence interval ( $\beta = -.09, 95\%$  CI [-.15, -.02]), 414 it was not significantly smaller than our SESOI of beta = .10. Thus, Hypothesis 1 was 415 supported. Hypothesis 2 proposed that if people perceived more concerns about their online 417 privacy than they usually do, they would also share less personal information online than 418 they usually do. Results revealed a small significant correlation ( $\beta =$  -.10, b = -0.02, 95% 419 CI [-0.03, > -0.01], z = -2.37, p = .009), suggesting that if respondents were more 420 concerned about their online privacy at T1 than usual, they also shared less personal 421 information online at T1. In conclusion, the results supported Hypothesis 2. 422 With Research Question 1.1, we analyzed the longitudinal relation of concerns about 423 online privacy and the online sharing of personal information 6 months later. No significant 424 lagged effect across 6 months was found ( $\beta = .01, b = 0.01, 95\%$  CI [-0.05, 0.07], z = 0.41, 425 p = .683). With Research Question 1.2, we investigated the longitudinal relation of the 426 online sharing of personal information and concerns about online privacy 6 months later, 427 again revealing no significant effect ( $\beta = -.03$ , b = -0.03, 95% CI [-0.09, 0.04], z = -0.80, p 428 = .422). 429 Hypothesis 3.1 predicted that people who perceived more privacy concerns than




Figure 1. Results of the bivariate relations. Above the diagonal: zero-order correlation matrix; diagonal: density plots for each variable; below the diagonal: bivariate scatter plots for zero-order correlations. Solid regression lines represent linear regressions, dashed regression lines represent quadratic regressions. Calculated with the variables' latent factor scores.

- others would also hold more negative attitudes toward the online sharing of personal
- 432 information than others. The results revealed a medium-sized negative correlation between
- the two variables on the between-person level ( $\beta = -.31$ , b = -0.11, 95% CI [-0.14, -0.08], z

```
= -8.46, p < .001). Thus, people who—on average across all three waves—reported being
434
   more concerned about their online privacy relative to the rest of the sample, were also
435
   moderately more likely to hold a more negative attitude toward the online sharing of
436
   personal information, thereby supporting Hypothesis 3.1. Hypothesis 3.2 posited that
437
   people who held more positive attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information
438
   than others would also share more personal information online than others. Results showed
439
   a very strong between-person correlation between the two variables (\beta = .66, b = 0.15,
440
   95% CI [0.13, 0.17], z = 15.12, p < .001): When averaged across all three waves, if people
441
   had more positive attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information than others,
442
   they were much more likely to actually share personal information online. In conclusion,
443
   the results supported Hypothesis 3.2.
         Hypothesis 4.1 proposed that people who perceived more privacy concerns than usual
    would also hold more negative attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information
   than usual. The results did not reveal a significant effect (\beta = -.06, b = -0.01, 95% CI
   [-0.03, < 0.01], z = -1.38, p = .084). Hypothesis 4.2 proposed that people who held more
    positive attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information than usual would also
440
   share more personal information online than usual. Results showed a moderate
450
   within-person correlation between the two variables (\beta = .15, b = 0.03, 95% CI [0.02, 0.05],
451
    z = 4.01, p < .001), indicating that when respondents had more positive attitudes toward
452
   the online sharing of personal information at T1 than usual, they also shared more
453
   personal information online. In conclusion, the results supported Hypothesis 4.2.
454
         With Research Question 2.1, we analyzed the longitudinal relations of concerns about
455
   online privacy and positive attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information. No
456
   significant effect was found, \beta = -.02, b = -0.02, 95% CI [-0.09, 0.06], z = -0.47, p = .641.
457
   Regarding Research Question 2.2, again no significant longitudinal relations emerged
458
    between privacy attitudes and privacy concerns 6 months later \beta < .01, b < 0.01, 95\% CI
459
    [-0.06, 0.06], z = 0.06, p = .951.
460
```

Research Question 3.1 asked whether changes in attitudes toward the online sharing 461 of personal information would affect changes in personal information sharing 6 months 462 later. No significant effect was found ( $\beta > -.01$ , b > -0.01, 95% CI [-0.06, 0.05], z = -0.07, p463 = .947). Next, Research Question 3.2 asked whether changes in the online sharing of 464 personal information would affect attitudes toward the online sharing of personal 465 information 6 months later. Again, no significant effect was found ( $\beta = .04$ , b = 0.04, 95% 466 CI [-0.03, 0.11], z = 1.15, p = .249).467 Table 1 presents an overview of all results and the OSM presents additional 468 information and supplementary analyses (e.g., results of the RI-CLPM without 469 socio-demographic control variables or results of alternative multilevel regression models). 470

Discussion 471

486

Current research on the privacy paradox revealed that a significant relation between 472 concerns about online privacy and the online sharing of personal information exists and 473 that it is small (e.g., Baruh et al., 2017). However, whereas the theoretical premise of the 474 privacy paradox actually addresses a within-person effect, empirical studies have analyzed 475 between-person relations. On the basis of a representative sample of the German population, from which three waves of data separated by 6 months were collected, we have 477 hence analyzed the privacy paradox by differentiating general between-person relations, short-term within-person relations, as well as long-term within-person effects. 479 The results of the between-person analyses showed that people who were more 480 concerned about their privacy than others also shared personal information slightly less 481 frequently. In addition, people who were more concerned about their privacy than others 482 also held substantially more negative attitudes toward disclosing personal information 483 online. Notably, we found a very strong between-person correlation between attitudes 484 toward information sharing and actual information sharing, implying that typical online 485 disclosure can be precisely predicted by a person's attitude. Taken together, the

Table 1

Parameter Estimates Obtained in the Random-Intercept Cross-Lagged Panel Model

		95% CI			
Effect	b	11	ul	beta	p
Between-person correlations across all waves					
Privacy concern <-> information sharing	-0.03	-0.05	-0.01	09	.005
Privacy concern <-> positive attitude	-0.11	-0.14	-0.08	31	< .001
Positive attitude <-> information sharing	0.15	0.13	0.17	.66	< .001
Within-person correlations at T1					
Privacy concern <-> information sharing	-0.02	-0.03	> -0.01	10	.009
Privacy concern <-> positive attitude	-0.01	-0.03	< 0.01	06	.084
Positive attitude <-> information sharing	0.03	0.02	0.05	.15	< .001
Within-person effects across 6 months					
Privacy concern -> information sharing	0.01	-0.05	0.07	.01	.683
Information sharing -> privacy concern	-0.03	-0.09	0.04	03	.422
Privacy concern -> positive attitude	-0.02	-0.09	0.06	02	.641
Positive attitude -> privacy concern	< 0.01	-0.06	0.06	< .01	.951
Positive attitude -> information sharing	> -0.01	-0.06	0.05	>01	.947
Information sharing -> positive attitude	0.04	-0.03	0.11	.04	.249

Note. The between-person correlations represent interpersonal relations. For example, results showed that people who were more concerned than others, averaged across all 3 waves, also shared less information than others. The within-person parameters reflect how intrapersonal changes in one variable are related to intra-personal changes in another. For example, results showed that if a person was more concerned at T1 than he or she usually is, he or she also shared less information than usual.

cross-sectional results are in line with the extant literature: Specifically, the between-person 487 correlation of privacy concerns and information sharing found in this study (i.e.,  $\beta = -.08$ ) 488 fell within the 95% confidence interval of the effect reported by Baruh et al (i.e., r = -.13, 489 95% CI [-.07, -.18]; 2017). Note that the between-person correlations reported here 490 represent averaged measurements across three waves, thereby rendering the findings 491 comparatively robust. In conclusion, this study replicates the finding that the privacy 492 paradox does not seem to exist on a between-person level: The differences between people 493 with regard to their online information sharing behavior can be explained by differences in 494 privacy concerns to a small extent, and by differences in privacy attitudes to a large extent. 495

The within-person results showed that when a person's privacy concerns increased,
the same person also shared slightly less information online than he or she usually did.
Moreover, we found that people who developed more positive attitudes toward sharing
personal information online than usual also shared substantially more personal information
online. In conclusion, the results suggest that changes in concerns and attitudes are both
partially related to changes in behavior, implying that the privacy paradox does not seem
to exist also on a within-person level.

Turning to the potential long-term effects of privacy concerns, the effects that we found were both theoretically negligible and statistically nonsignificant.

503

504

Changes in both privacy concerns and attitudes toward the online sharing of personal 505 information were not related to any meaningful changes in the online sharing of personal 506 information 6 months later. As an explanation, it might be the case that changes in 507 privacy concern affect information sharing more immediately. To test this assumption, we 508 would need study designs with shorter intervals (cf., Keijsers, 2016). Moreover, given that 509 the directions of most longitudinal relations were in line with the between-person and 510 within-person relations, it might be the case that longitudinal effects do indeed take place, 511 but only that they are very small. Finally, it could also be that longterm longitudinal 512 effects simply do not exist. 513

#### Limitations 514

524

525

As a major point of criticism, one can argue that some of the effect sizes reported in 515 this study are only small, too small to refute the privacy paradox. On the one had, they 516 could simply be a manifestation of the so-called "crud factor" (Meehl, 1990, p. 204), which 517 states that all psychosocial measures are related to one another to some extent. On the 518 other hand, other factors such as expected benefits might play a more important role 519 (Dienlin & Metzger, 2016). In conclusion, although our results suggest that privacy 520 concerns and privacy attitudes are correlated with information sharing, one should indeed 521 not overestimate the importance of privacy concerns; the impact on the online sharing of 522 personal information could be larger, and other variables also play a role. 523

The study relied on estimations of information sharing that were based on self-reports. As has been shown before, people are not particularly good at estimating the frequency of behaviors that are part of their daily routines (Scharkow, 2016). Whenever possible, future studies should aim to combine self-reports of cognitions with objective observations of behavior.

Finally, please note that the hypotheses presented in this study were not formally preregistered. At the time when the study was conceived in 2014, we unfortunately were not yet aware of the importance of this practice.

#### 532 Future Research

Although this is arguably the first study to demonstrate a within-person relation
between concerns about online privacy and the online sharing of personal information,
what is still missing is evidence of within-person longitudinal effects. The fact that we
found significant within-person correlations at T1 but not across the 6-month intervals
suggests that longitudinal effects do take place, but that a different time interval might be
needed to uncover them. For theoretical reasons (e.g., due to availability heuristics), it
would be plausible to use intervals that are shorter; for statistical reasons (e.g., because of

the high stability of privacy concerns), however, it would even make sense to probe intervals that are longer (Dormann & Griffin, 2015).

Linking general personality traits with typical behavior, recent studies have analyzed 542 the privacy paradox by taking an aggregate perspective. However, it seems important to 543 analyze privacy behaviors from a situational perspective as well, one that accounts for 544 temporal needs, interpersonal perceptions, contextual cues, or characteristics of 545 communication channels (Masur, 2018). For example, it might be the case that whereas 546 general levels of information sharing are best explained by using privacy concerns, 547 situational information sharing might be best explained using privacy heuristics, which are 548 less energy consuming and more situational (cf., Sundar, Kang, Wu, Gu, & Zhang, 2013). 549 As a final note, the privacy paradox argues that privacy concerns do not reflect 550 whatsoever on the sharing of personal information online, which we view as a strong claim. However, when a single study does not yield a significant result, it does not necessarily 552 imply a theoretical problem; instead, it could also be a statistical miss. Because when analyzing the privacy paradox we are likely dealing with small effects (Baruh et al., 2017), 554 and to be able to reliably detect these effect we need large samples. In conclusion, we 555 encourage researchers to use statistical designs that allow for sufficient statistical power.

### 557 Conclusion

Taken together, one might ask: What's the big deal? Researchers have now come 558 closer to solving the privacy paradox, which is a problem that by producing studies with 559 non-significant results they have created themselves. Admittedly, there is some truth to 560 this statement. At the same time, it is not only researchers who have thought that the 561 online sharing of personal information is paradoxical—the public media have also often 562 suggested that people tend to use the Internet in a somewhat nonsensical or overtly risky 563 way (e.g., Naughton, 2019). Hence, given the common interest and involvement in the 564 privacy paradox, providing the public with a scientific answer seems relevant. 565

Second, being able to show that online behaviors are not paradoxical has another 566 benefit: It suggests that online and offline behaviors are not ontologically different. In 567 offline contexts, as well, we find that concerns are not closely aligned with behaviors. For 568 example, although most people are concerned about their health, a considerable number of 569 people are nonetheless smokers. However, despite this discrepancy public agencies are 570 aware that they still need to foster concern about health. For example, in May 2016, the 571 European Union mandated that cigarette packages must display graphic warning labels: 572 while stable in the years before, sales of cigarettes in Germany in 2016 dropped by 6.3 573 billion units, equaling 7.7% (Bundesamt, 2017). Although this result is only a correlation, 574 it suggests that addressing concerns can have societal benefits. Therefore, proclaiming that 575 the online sharing of personal information is not paradoxical and that concerns about 576 online privacy matter might leverage both people's responsibility and their agency (see also Adjerid, Peer, & Acquisti, 2018). 578 In sum, this study showed that when people were more concerned about their 579 privacy, they also shared a little less personal information about themselves online, and if 580 respondents considered sharing personal information not to be a sensible idea, they 581 disclosed even less. Both this study and the majority of the extant literature do not 582 support a "privacy paradox"; instead, if anything, they suggest a "privacy orthodox".

References

- Acquisti, A., Brandimarte, L., & Loewenstein, G. (2015). Privacy and human behavior in
- the age of information. Science, 347(6221), 509-14. doi:10.1126/science.aaa1465
- Acquisti, A., & Grossklags, J. (2003, January 1). Losses, gains, and hyperbolic discounting:
- An experimental approach to information security attitudes and behavior. Lecture,
- Berkeley, CA.
- <sup>590</sup> Adjerid, I., Peer, E., & Acquisti, A. (2018). Beyond the privacy paradox: Objective versus
- relative risk in privacy decision making. MIS Quarterly, 42(2), 465–488.
- doi:10.25300/MISQ/2018/14316
- <sup>593</sup> Ajzen, I. (1985). From intentions to actions: A theory of planned behavior. In J. Kuhl & J.
- Beckmann (Eds.), Action control (pp. 11–39). Berlin, Germany: Springer.
- doi:10.1007/978-3-642-69746-3\_2
- Aust, F., & Barth, M. (2018). papaja: Create APA manuscripts with R Markdown.
- Retrieved from https://github.com/crsh/papaja
- Bache, S. M., & Wickham, H. (2014). Magrittr: A forward-pipe operator for r. Retrieved
- from https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=magrittr
- 600 Bagrow, J. P., Liu, X., & Mitchell, L. (2019). Information flow reveals prediction limits in
- online social activity. Nature Human Behaviour,  $\Im(2)$ , 122–128.
- doi:10.1038/s41562-018-0510-5
- Bamberg, S. (2003). How does environmental concern influence specific environmentally
- related behaviors?: A new answer to an old question. Journal of Environmental
- Psychology, 23(1), 21–32. doi:10.1016/S0272-4944(02)00078-6
- Barnes, S. B. (2006). A privacy paradox: Social networking in the United States. First
- Monday, 11(9). Retrieved from
- 608 www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue11 9/barnes/index.html
- Barth, S., & Jong, M. D. T. (2017). The privacy paradox Investigating discrepancies
- between expressed privacy concerns and actual online behavior A systematic

```
literature review. Telematics and Informatics, 34(7), 1038–1058.
611
          doi:10.1016/j.tele.2017.04.013
612
   Baruh, L., Secinti, E., & Cemalcilar, Z. (2017). Online privacy concerns and privacy
613
          management: A meta-analytical review. Journal of Communication, 67(1), 26–53.
614
          doi:10.1111/jcom.12276
615
   Bates, D., Mächler, M., Bolker, B., & Walker, S. (2015). Fitting linear mixed-effects models
616
          using lme4. Journal of Statistical Software, 67(1), 1-48. doi:10.18637/jss.v067.i01
617
   Bol, N., Dienlin, T., Kruikemeier, S., Sax, M., Boerman, S. C., Strycharz, J., ... Vreese, C.
618
          H. (2018). Understanding the effects of personalization as a privacy calculus:
619
          Analyzing self-disclosure across health, news, and commerce contexts. Journal of
620
           Computer-Mediated Communication, 23(6), 370–388. doi:10.1093/jcmc/zmy020
621
   boyd, d. m. (2008). Taken out of context. American teen sociality in networked publics
           (Thesis). Berkeley, CA.
623
   Bundesamt, S. (2017, January 13). 2016: 75 billion of cigarettes on which tax was paid.
624
          InternetDocument. Retrieved January 25, 2018, from
625
          https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2017/01/PE17 014 799.html
626
   Champely, S. (2018). Pwr: Basic functions for power analysis. Retrieved from
627
          https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=pwr
628
   Cohen, J. (1992). A power primer. Psychological Bulletin, 112(1), 155–159.
629
          doi:10.1037/0033-2909.112.1.155
630
   Colman, A. M. (2015). A dictionary of psychology (4th ed.). Oxford, UK: Oxford
631
           University Press. doi:10.1093/acref/9780199657681.001.0001
632
   Culnan, M. J., & Armstrong, P. K. (1999). Information privacy concerns, procedural
633
          fairness, and impersonal trust: An empirical investigation. Organization Science,
634
           10(1), 104–115. doi:10.1287/orsc.10.1.104
635
   Dienes, Z. (2008). Understanding psychology as a science: An introduction to scientific and
636
           statistical inference. New York, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan.
637
```

- Dienlin, T. (2018). Td: Functions for everyday use.
- Dienlin, T., & Metzger, M. J. (2016). An extended privacy calculus model for
- SNSs—Analyzing self-disclosure and self-withdrawal in a representative U.S.
- Sample. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 21(5), 368–383.
- doi:10.1111/jcc4.12163
- Dienlin, T., & Trepte, S. (2015). Is the privacy paradox a relic of the past? An in-depth
- analysis of privacy attitudes and privacy behaviors. European Journal of Social
- Psychology, 45(3), 285–297. doi:10.1002/ejsp.2049
- Dietvorst, E., Hiemstra, M., Hillegers, M. H. J., & Keijsers, L. (2018). Adolescent
- perceptions of parental privacy invasion and adolescent secrecy: An illustration of
- Simpson's paradox. Child Development, 89(6), 2081–2090. doi:10.1111/cdev.13002
- 649 Dolan, R. J. (2002). Emotion, cognition, and behavior. Science, 298(5596), 1191-4.
- doi:10.1126/science.1076358
- Dormann, C., & Griffin, M. A. (2015). Optimal time lags in panel studies. *Psychological*
- 652 Methods, 20(4), 489–505. doi:10.1037/met0000041
- Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University
- Press.
- Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (2010). Predicting and changing behavior: The reasoned action
- approach. New York, NY: Psychology Press.
- <sup>657</sup> Frean, A. (2017, November 1). Finding solutions for the privacy paradox deserves a very
- public debate. The Times. Retrieved from https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/
- finding-solutions-for-the-privacy-paradox-deserves-a-very-public-debate-czmt3jlxz
- 660 Gerber, N., Gerber, P., & Volkamer, M. (2018). Explaining the privacy paradox: A
- systematic review of literature investigating privacy attitude and behavior.
- 662 Computers & Security, 77, 226–261. doi:10.1016/j.cose.2018.04.002
- 663 Gross, R., & Acquisti, A. (2005, January 1). Information revelation and privacy in online
- social networks. Lecture, Alexandria, VA.

```
Hamaker, E. L., Kuiper, R. M., & Grasman, R. P. P. (2015). A critique of the
665
          cross-lagged panel model. Psychological Methods, 20(1), 102–16.
666
          doi:10.1037/a0038889
667
   Hayes, D., & Ross, C. E. (1987). Concern with appearance, health beliefs, and eating
668
          habits. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 28(2), 120. doi:10.2307/2137126
669
   Heirman, W., Walrave, M., & Ponnet, K. (2013). Predicting adolescents' disclosure of
670
          personal information in exchange for commercial incentives: An application of an
671
          extended theory of planned behavior. Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social
672
           Networking, 16(2), 81–87. doi:10.1089/cyber.2012.0041
673
   Hervé, M. (2019). RVAideMemoire: Testing and plotting procedures for biostatistics.
674
           Retrieved from https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=RVAideMemoire
675
   Hoffmann, C. P., Lutz, C., & Ranzini, G. (2016). Privacy cynicism: A new approach to the
          privacy paradox. Cyberpsychology: Journal of Psychosocial Research on Cyberspace,
677
           10(4). doi:10.5817/CP2016-4-7
678
   Jamshidian, M., Jalal, S., & Jansen, C. (2014). MissMech: An R package for testing
679
          homoscedasticity, multivariate normality, and missing completely at random (mcar).
680
           Journal of Statistical Software, 56(6), 1–31. Retrieved from
681
          http://www.jstatsoft.org/v56/i06/
682
   Jorgensen, D., T., Pornprasertmanit, S., Schoemann, M., A., ... Y. (2018). semTools:
683
           Useful tools for structural equation modeling. Retrieved from
684
          https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=semTools
685
   Jourard, S. M. (1964). The transparent self. New York, NY: Van Nostrand.
686
   Keijsers, L. (2016). Parental monitoring and adolescent problem behaviors. International
687
           Journal of Behavioral Development, 40(3), 271–281. doi:10.1177/0165025415592515
688
   Kline, R. B. (2016). Principles and practice of structural equation modeling (4th ed.). New
680
           York, NY: The Guilford Press.
690
```

Kokolakis, S. (2017). Privacy attitudes and privacy behaviour: A review of current

```
research on the privacy paradox phenomenon. Computers & Security, 64, 122–134.
692
          doi:10.1016/j.cose.2015.07.002
693
   Koohikamali, M., French, A. M., & Kim, D. J. (2019). An investigation of a dynamic model
694
          of privacy trade-off in use of mobile social network applications: A longitudinal
695
          perspective. Decision Support Systems, 119, 46–59. doi:10.1016/j.dss.2019.02.007
696
   Krasnova, H., Spiekermann, S., Koroleva, K., & Hildebrand, T. (2010). Online social
697
          networks: Why we disclose. Journal of Information Technology, 25(2), 109–125.
698
          doi:10.1057/jit.2010.6
699
   Lakens, D. (2014). Performing high-powered studies efficiently with sequential analyses.
700
           European Journal of Social Psychology, 44(7), 701–710. doi:10.1002/ejsp.2023
701
   Lakens, D., Adolfi, F. G., Albers, C. J., Anvari, F., Apps, M. A. J., Argamon, S. E., ...
702
           Zwaan, R. A. (2017). Justify your alpha: A response to "Redefine Statistical"
703
           Significance" (UnpublishedWork). PsyArXiv. doi:10.17605/OSF.IO/9S3Y6
704
   Lüdecke, D. (2019). Sistats: Statistical functions for regression models (version 0.17.5).
705
          doi:10.5281/zenodo.1284472
706
   Masur, P. K. (2018). Situational privacy and self-disclosure: Communication processes in
707
           online environments. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.
708
   Meehl, P. E. (1990). Why summaries of research on psychological theories are often
709
          uninterpretable. Psychological Reports, 66(1), 195–244.
710
          doi:10.2466/pr0.1990.66.1.195
711
   Merriam-Webster. (2018, January 1). Definition of concern. InternetDocument. Retrieved
712
          from https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/concern
713
   Nabi, R. L. (1999). A cognitive-functional model for the effects of discrete negative
714
          emotions on information processing, attitude change, and recall. Communication
715
           Theory, 9(3), 292-320. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2885.1999.tb00172.x
716
   Naughton, J. (2019, May 5). The privacy paradox: Why do people keep using tech firms
717
          that abuse their data? Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/
718
```

- New York Public Radio. (2018, January 1). The privacy paradox. InternetDocument. 719 Retrieved January 25, 2018, from https://project.wnyc.org/privacy-paradox/ 720 R Core Team. (2018). R: A language and environment for statistical computing. Vienna, 721 Austria: R Foundation for Statistical Computing. Retrieved from 722 https://www.R-project.org/ 723 Reel, J. J., Greenleaf, C., Baker, W. K., Aragon, S., Bishop, D., Cachaper, C., ... Hattie, 724 J. (2007). Relations of body concerns and exercise behavior: A meta-analysis. 725 Psychological Reports, 101(3), 927-42. doi:10.2466/pr0.101.3.927-942 726 Revelle, W. (2018). Psych: Procedures for psychological, psychometric, and personality 727 research. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University. Retrieved from 728 https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=psych 729 Rosseel, Y. (2012). lavaan: An R package for structural equation modeling. Journal of Statistical Software, 48(2), 1–36. Retrieved from http://www.jstatsoft.org/v48/i02/ 731 Scharkow, M. (2016). The accuracy of self-reported Internet use—A validation study using 732 client log data. Communication Methods and Measures, 10(1), 13–27. 733 doi:10.1080/19312458.2015.1118446 734 Schloerke, B., Crowley, J., Cook, D., Briatte, F., Marbach, M., Thoen, E., ... Larmarange, 735 J. (2018). GGally: Extension to 'ggplot2'. Retrieved from 736 https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=GGally 737 Sevignani, S. (2016). Privacy and capitalism in the age of social media. New York; 738 London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group. 739 Simon, H. A. (1955). A behavioral model of rational choice. The Quarterly Journal of 740 Economics, 69(1), 99. doi:10.2307/1884852 741 Sundar, S. S., Kang, H., Wu, M., Gu, E., & Zhang, B. (2013). Unlocking the privacy 742 paradox: Do cognitive heuristics hold the key? In CHI 2013: Changing Perspectives 743
- Taddicken, M. (2014). The "privacy paradox" in the social web: The impact of privacy

(pp. 811–816). Paris, France.

```
concerns, individual characteristics, and the perceived social relevance on different
746
          forms of self-disclosure. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 19(2),
747
          248–273. doi:10.1111/jcc4.12052
748
   Trepte, S., Dienlin, T., & Reinecke, L. (2014). Risky behaviors. How online experiences
749
          influence privacy behaviors. In B. Stark, O. Quiring, & N. Jackob (Eds.), Von der
750
           Gutenberg-Galaxis zur Google-Galaxis: Alte und neue Grenzvermessungen nach 50
751
           Jahren DGPuK (Vol. 41, pp. 225–244). Konstanz, Germany: UVK.
752
   Trepte, S., & Reinecke, L. (Eds.). (2011). Privacy online. Perspectives on privacy and
753
           self-disclosure in the social web. Berlin, Germany: Springer.
754
   Tufekci, Z. (2008). Can you see me now? Audience and disclosure regulation in online
755
          social network sites. Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society, 28(1), 20–36.
756
          doi:10.1177/0270467607311484
   Valkenburg, P. M., & Peter, J. (2009). The effects of instant messaging on the quality of
758
          adolescents' existing friendships: A longitudinal study. Journal of Communication,
759
           59(1), 79–97. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2008.01405.x
760
   Walrave, M., Vanwesenbeeck, I., & Heirman, W. (2012). Connecting and protecting?
761
           Comparing predictors of self-disclosure and privacy settings use between adolescents
762
          and adults. Cyberpsychology: Journal of Psychosocial Research on Cyberspace, 6(1).
763
          doi:10.5817/CP2012-1-3
764
   Watzlawick, P., Bavelas, J. B., Jackson, D. D., & O'Hanlon, B. (2011). Pragmatics of
765
           human communication: A study of interactional patterns, pathologies, and
766
           paradoxes. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co.
767
   Westin, A. F. (1967). Privacy and freedom. New York, NY: Atheneum.
768
   Wickham, H. (2016). Gaplot2: Elegant graphics for data analysis. Springer-Verlag New
769
           York. Retrieved from https://ggplot2.tidyverse.org
770
```

Wickham, H. (2017). Tidyverse: Easily install and load the 'tidyverse'. Retrieved from

https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=tidyverse

771

- Wikipedia. (2018, January 1). Privacy concerns with social networking services.
- InternetDocument. Retrieved January 25, 2018, from
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privacy\_concerns\_with\_social\_networking\_services
- <sup>776</sup> Zajonc, R. B. (1968). Attitudinal effects of mere exposure. Journal of Personality and
- Social Psychology, 9(2, Pt.2), 1–27. doi:10.1037/h0025848