A Longitudinal Analysis of the Privacy Paradox

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All authors contributed extensively to the work presented in this paper. TD, PM, & ST designed the study; PM supervised the data collection; PM administered the data 7 importation; TD & PM wrote the code, ran the models, and analyzed the output data; TD wrote most parts of manuscript, and PM & ST contributed individual sections and comments; ST supervised the project and wrote the grant application (in 2012). The 10 authors declare no competing interests. This research was funded by the German Federal 11 Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) Grant 16KIS0094, awarded to Sabine Trepte. 12 This manuscript features a companion website that includes detailed summaries of 13 the statistical results, the code, additional analyses, and a reproducible version of the 14 manuscript (https://tdienlin.github.io/privacy-paradox-longitudinal). The data can be 15 downloaded from http://dx.doi.org/10.7802/1937. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Tobias Dienlin, 17

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20 Abstract

The privacy paradox states that people's concerns about online privacy are unrelated to 21 their online sharing of personal information. On the basis of a representative sample of the 22 German population, which includes 1403 respondents who were interviewed at three waves 23 separated by 6 months, we investigate the privacy paradox from a longitudinal perspective. Using a cross-lagged panel model with random intercepts, we differentiate between-person 25 relations from within-person effects. Results revealed that people who were more concerned 26 about their online privacy than others also shared slightly less personal information and 27 had substantially more negative attitudes toward information sharing (between-person level). People who were more concerned than usual also shared slightly less information 29 than usual (within-person level). We found no long-term effects of privacy concerns on information sharing or attitudes 6 months later. The results provide further evidence 31 against the privacy paradox, but more research is needed to better understand the variables' potential causal relations. Keywords: privacy paradox, privacy concerns, information sharing, longitudinal 34

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The privacy paradox states that the information disclosure of Internet users is

problematic: Although many people are concerned about their privacy online, they still 39 share plenty of personal information on the web (e.g., Acquisti & Grossklags, 2003). The 40 privacy paradox is of considerable interest to society—it is discussed in newspapers (Frean, 2017), Wikipedia entries (Wikipedia, 2018), designated websites (New York Public Radio, 2018), books (Trepte & Reinecke, 2011), and top-tier academic journals (Acquisti, Brandimarte, & Loewenstein, 2015). If the privacy paradox really exists, it should inspire worry: It would suggest that online behavior is irrational and that people are revealing too much of their personal information, which can cause various problems (e.g., Sevignani, 2016). Understanding why people disclose information online and whether or not this is paradoxical therefore represents an important challenge. However, current research on the privacy paradox has one major limitation. To the 49 best of our knowledge, most empirical studies conducted so far have investigated the privacy paradox from a between-person perspective. By employing empirical tests of relations between people (e.g., cross-sectional questionnaires analyzed with multiple regression or Pearson correlations), studies have analyzed whether people who are more 53 concerned than others also share less personal information than others. Although such a perspective is interesting and represents a viable first step, it cannot make informed claims 55 regarding causality. The privacy paradox, however, implies a causal perspective: Does a person, if he or she becomes more concerned about online privacy, then also share less 57 personal information? This mismatch is problematic because although between-person relations are, except for some special cases, a necessary condition for causal within-person effects, they are by no means a sufficient one. For example, it could be that the between-person relation is determined other third variables. Hence, as the next step in investigating the privacy paradox and to better understand the causal relation between privacy concerns and information sharing, it is necessary to conduct studies with

within-person designs.

With this study we aim to answer four major questions. First, on a between-person level, how are concerns about online privacy related to the online sharing of personal information? Second, on a within-person level, does information sharing decrease when concerns increase? Third, what are the potential long-term effects? Are changes in concerns related to changes in information sharing 6 months later and/or vice versa? Fourth, what is the role of privacy attitudes, do they mediate the relation between privacy concerns and information sharing? To best answer and contextualize these questions, we first provide an in-depth theoretical analysis of the privacy paradox, after which we present the empirical results of a longitudinal panel study, which is representative of the German population.

# 74 A Brief History of the Privacy Paradox

Acquisti and Grossklags (2003) were among the first to argue that the online 75 disclosure of personal information is paradoxical. "Experiments reveal that very few 76 individuals actually take any action to protect their personal information, even when doing 77 so involves limited costs" (p.1). Three years later, Barnes (2006) discussed the behavior of young people on SNSs, popularizing the term privacy paradox. Barnes listed six aspects of online behavior that she considered to be particularly paradoxical: (a) illusion of privacy, (b) high quantity of information sharing, (c) attitude behavior discrepancy, (d) lack of privacy concerns, (e) lack of privacy literacy, and (f) fabrication of false information. Norberg, Horne, and Horne (2007) were one of the first to empirically analyze the privacy paradox explicitly. The study found a mismatch between concerns and behavior, which is aligned with several other experimental studies conducted at the time (Beresford, Kübler, & Preibusch, 2012; Hann, Hui, Lee, & Png, 2007; Huberman, Adar, & Fine, 2005). 86 While there are various understandings and operationalizations of the privacy 87 paradox (Kokolakis, 2017), subsequent research focused on Barnes's third tenet, the 88 attitude-behavior discrepancy. Whereas some studies reported that privacy concerns were

not significantly related to the disclosure of personal information (e.g., Gross & Acquisti, 2005; Taddicken, 2014; Tufekci, 2008), which lends credence to the privacy paradox, a 91 different set of studies showed significant relations (e.g., Dienlin & Trepte, 2015; Heirman, 92 Walrave, & Ponnet, 2013; Walrave, Vanwesenbeeck, & Heirman, 2012), which refutes the 93 privacy paradox. 94 Notably, in a parallel line of research other studies have also analyzed the relation 95 between privacy concerns and information sharing. However, the term privacy paradox was 96 often not used explicitly. Instead, studies have referred to the so-called *privacy calculus*, 97 which states that the sharing of personal information online is affected by both the 98 respective costs and the anticipated benefits (Culnan & Armstrong, 1999). By now, several 99 studies have found empirical support for the privacy calculus in various online contexts 100 (e.g., Bol et al., 2018; Dienlin & Metzger, 2016; Krasnova, Spiekermann, Koroleva, & 101 Hildebrand, 2010). 102 Baruh, Secinti, and Cemalcilar (2017) published the first empirical meta-analysis on 103 the relations between privacy concerns and various forms of social media use (e.g., 104 information sharing or SNS usage). On the basis of 37 studies, Baruh et al. (2017) found a 105 small and significant statistical relation between concerns about online privacy and online 106 information sharing (r = -.13, 95% CI [-.07, -.18]). Another more recent meta analysis by 107 Yu, Li, He, Wang, and Jiao (2020) also finds a significant bivariate relation between 108 privacy concerns and information sharing, albeit smaller (r = -.06, 95% CI [-.01, -.12]). 109 There also exist several systematic literature reviews on the privacy paradox (Barth & 110 Jong, 2017; Gerber, Gerber, & Volkamer, 2018; Kokolakis, 2017). Kokolakis (2017) come to 111 the conclusion that "the dichotomy between privacy attitude and behaviour should not be 112 considered a paradox anymore." (p. 130) However, the authors also note that the privacy 113 paradox is a "complex phenomenon that has not been fully explained yet". Barth and Jong 114 (2017) are more skeptical, and argue that "attempts to theoretically explain and practically 115 solve the problem of the privacy paradox are still scarce and we feel the subject deserves 116

far more research attention" (p. 1052).

## Defining Privacy Concerns and Information Sharing

Privacy is defined as the "[...] voluntary and temporary withdrawal of a person from 119 the general society through physical or psychological means [...]" (Westin, 1967, p. 7). 120 Privacy captures aspects of both volitional control and social separateness (Bräunlich et 121 al., 2020; Marwick & boyd, 2014). Several dimensions of privacy have been proposed. For 122 example, it is possible to distinguish a vertical and a horizontal level (Masur, 2018). 123 Whereas the vertical level captures privacy from authorities, institutions, or companies, 124 horizontal privacy addresses privacy from peers, colleagues, or other people. When it comes 125 to concerns in general, interestingly they do not seem to be established as a stand-alone 126 theoretical concept in psychology (Colman, 2015). Lexically, concerns are defined as a 127 "marked interest or regard usually arising through a personal tie or relationship" that also 128 reflect an "uneasy state of blended interest, uncertainty, and apprehension" 129 (Merriam-Webster, 2018). Concerns therefore represent both a latent motivation (or 130 increased attention), a negatively valenced *emotion* (or affective condition), and are mostly 131 implicit. As a theoretical construct, privacy concerns can hence be categorized as an affective motivational disposition. As such, there are many similarities with other concepts, including emotions (e.g., fear, anxiety), moods (e.g., dismay, fatigue), attitudes (risk 134 perception, approval), values (e.g., autonomy, freedom), personality traits (e.g., 135 introversion, risk avoidance), and even physiological activation (e.g., attention, arousal). 136 Taken together, concerns about online privacy represent how much an individual is 137 motivated to focus on his or her control over a voluntary withdrawal from other people or 138 societal institutions on the Internet, accompanied by an uneasy feeling that his or her 139 privacy might be threatened. 140 The online sharing of personal information, on the other hand, captures how much 141 person-related information people share when they use the Internet, including information 142

about their age, sex, name, address, health, and finances. Information sharing can be
differentiated from communication and self-disclosure. Communication is broad, because it
comprises all verbal and nonverbal information that is emitted (e.g., Watzlawick, Bavelas,
Jackson, & O'Hanlon, 2011). Self-disclosure is narrow, because it focuses on deliberate
revelations about the true self to others (e.g., Jourard, 1964). Information sharing is even
more specific, because it addresses only person-related information but ignores other types
of self-disclosure such as personal fears, values, or plans.

### 150 The Relation Between Privacy Concerns and Information Sharing

Currently, there is a lack of studies that explicitly analyze how behavior is affected by

concerns in general. Fortunately, however, we know much about the behavioral effects of

related concepts such as attitudes or fears, which all can affect behavior, sometimes

profoundly (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010; Rogers, 1983). Emotions, perhaps the concept most

closely related to concerns, have a particularly strong effect on behavior. By causing fight,

flight, or freeze reactions, they are a primordial trigger of behavior and are considered to be

an adaptive mechanism of evolved species (Dolan, 2002).

Also empirically, concerns have been shown to affect behavior. People more concerned about the environment show more environment-related behaviors (Bamberg, 2003). People more concerned about their appearance consume fewer calories (Hayes & Ross, 1987). People more concerned about their bodies engage in more physical exercise (Reel et al., 2007). Taken together, it is reasonable to expect that also concerns about online privacy should somehow reflect in the online sharing of personal information.

At the same time, there are some factors that likely diminish the relation. Most prominently, there is the so-called *attitude behavior gap* (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010), which states that people sometimes act against their own attitudes. Evidently, not everyone concerned about their physical health exercises regularly. The explanation is simple: Other factors such as subjective norms and perceived behavioral control also determine behavior

to find a relation that is *small* or *moderate*.

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(Ajzen, 1985), which automatically reduces the impact of attitudes or concerns. 169 Specifically, two of the most influential factors that affect online information sharing are 170 (a) strong subjective norms (Heirman et al., 2013) and (b) expected benefits (Krasnova et 171 al., 2010). In other words, users often prioritize social support, special offers, or improved 172 services, accepting that their privacy will be diminished. Trepte, Dienlin, and Reinecke 173 (2014) listed several factors that can additionally attenuate the relation: lack of strength of 174 concerns, absence of negative personal experiences, or situational constraints due to social 175 desirability. In conclusion, also in the context of the privacy paradox it not reasonable to 176 expect a perfect relation between attitudes and behaviors. However, we should still expect 177

There are also some methodological explanations as to why some studies did not 179 detect statistically significant relations. Researchers are always confronted with the so-called *Duhem-Quine problem*, according to which it is impossible to test theories in 181 isolation, because empirical tests always rely on auxiliary assumptions (Dienes, 2008). In 182 other words, if a psychological experiment fails, we do not know whether the theory is 183 wrong or the questionnaire subpar. This tenet is particularly relevant for the privacy 184 paradox: Detecting statistical significance for small effects—and, again, we should expect 185 to find small effects—is more challenging because it means that large samples are necessary 186 to guarantee sufficient statistical power. Precisely, in order to be capable of detecting a 187 correlation between privacy concerns and information sharing in 95% of all cases, which 188 Baruh et al. (2017) estimated to be r = -.13, we need a sample of N = 762 people. The 189 reality, however, looks different: In their meta-analysis, Baruh et al. (2017) reported a 190 median sample size of N = 300, which can explain why several studies did not find 191 significant effects. 192

In conclusion, in line with prior research and the within-person rationales presented

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Statistical power describes the probability of statistically detecting an effect that exists empirically. Only with high statistical power is it possible to make valid claims about an effect's existence (Cohen, 1992).

above, we expect to find a small significant relation between privacy concerns and information sharing, both on the between-person level and the within-person level.

Hypothesis 1: People who are more concerned about their online privacy than others will also be less likely to share personal information online than others.

Hypothesis 2: People who are more concerned about their online privacy than they usually are will also share less personal information online than they usually do.

# 200 Long-Term Perspective

Although short-term effects are likely, it is still unclear whether long-term effects 201 exist as well. First, when analyzing potential long-term effects, it is important to choose an 202 interval that is both plausible and relevant. (It makes a large difference whether the effects 203 of alcohol consumption on driving performance are tested after say 1 minute, 1 hour, or 1 204 day.) One factor that determines an interval's optimal length is the stability of the 205 variables (Dormann & Griffin, 2015). Privacy concerns and privacy attitudes are 206 predominantly trait-like constructs with high stabilities, which is why they necessitate 207 longer intervals. Other studies with comparable research questions have therefore used an 208 interval of 6 months (e.g., Valkenburg & Peter, 2009), which we adopt also in this study. In general, we believe that it should be possible to find long-term effects. It has been 210 argued that privacy concerns affect privacy behavior in the long run (e.g., Heirman et al., 211 2013). The underlying theoretical mechanism could be that the emotional part of privacy 212 concerns causes (a) motivated information selection and (b) motivated information 213 processing, which is likely to change actual behavior (Nabi, 1999). Specifically, when 214 privacy concerns increase (e.g., because of experienced or witnessed privacy infringements), 215 people might begin reading more media articles on privacy issues and might also consume 216 these articles more carefully, which could prompt information sharing practices that are 217 more cautious. Also empirically, a study with 290 participants found small negative 218 longitudinal (between-person) relations between privacy concerns and self-disclosure 219

220 (Koohikamali, French, & Kim, 2019).

At the same time, the adverse effect seems plausible as well, with two potential 221 outcomes. On the one hand, the long-term relation could be positive: If people start to 222 share more information online, they might become increasingly aware that their privacy is 223 at risk, thereby stirring concern (Tsay-Vogel, Shanahan, & Signorielli, 2018). On the other 224 hand, the long-term relation might also be negative: When people share more personal 225 information online they might become accustomed to doing so, which potentially reduces 226 concern (for example, due to the mere exposure effect; Zajonc, 1968). Finally, there could 227 also be no long-term relation at all: People might have already become used to sharing 228 information online, which stifles further cognitive or emotional processing. This rationale is 229 central to so-called privacy cynicism (e.g., Hoffmann, Lutz, & Ranzini, 2016). 230 Research Question 1.1: Do changes in concerns about online privacy affect the online 231 sharing of personal information 6 months later? 232 Research Question 1.2: Do changes in the online sharing of personal information 233 affect concerns about online privacy 6 months later?

#### The Role of Attitudes

It has been argued that privacy attitudes could bridge the gap between concerns and 236 information sharing (e.g., Dienlin & Trepte, 2015). In contrast to privacy concerns, privacy 237 attitudes capture a more explicit, fluctuating cognitive appraisal (Tsay-Vogel et al., 2018). 238 Although both variables are related to information disclosure, attitudes are likely the 239 better predictor. This reasoning follows the rational choice paradigm (Simon, 1955), which 240 maintains that behavior is always at least partially influenced by convictions, attitudes, 241 and cost-benefit analyses. Also empirically, a study of 1,042 youths from Belgium found 242 that the relation between privacy attitudes and disclosure of personal information was 243 strong (r = .56), whereas the relation between privacy concerns and disclosure was only 244 moderate (r = -.29; Heirman et al., 2013). 245

Hypothesis 3.1: People who are more concerned about their online privacy than others will also hold a less positive attitude toward the online sharing of personal information than others.

Hypothesis 3.2: People with a more positive attitude toward the online sharing of personal information than others will also share more information online than others.

Hypothesis 4.1: People who are more concerned about their online privacy than they usually are will also hold a less positive attitude toward the online sharing of personal information than they usually do.

Hypothesis 4.2: People with a more positive attitude toward the online sharing of personal information than they usually have will also share more information online than they usually do.

Concerning the potential long-term relations of privacy attitudes, we are confronted with the same situation mentioned above. Because we are not aware of research on long-term relations, several scenarios seem plausible. Attitudes could either have long-term relations or not, and information sharing could either foster privacy attitudes or diminish them.

Research Question 2.1: Do changes in concerns about online privacy affect attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information 6 months later?

Research Question 2.2: Do changes in attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information affect concerns about online privacy 6 months later?

Research Question 3.1: Do changes in attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information affect the online sharing of personal information 6 months later?

Research Question 3.2: Do changes in the online sharing of personal information affect attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information 6 months later?

270 Method

#### 71 Statistics

We follow the recommendation by Lakens, Adolfi, et al. (2018) and first justify the 272 choice of our alpha level. We determined adequate error margins by considering the 273 potential implications of both false positive and false negative findings (i.e., alpha and beta 274 errors): On the one hand, if we committed an alpha error, we would wrongfully conclude that people's concerns and behaviors are consistent. Communicating such a false result to the public might unjustly reassure people when they should be more alert. On the other 277 hand, if we committed a beta error, we would wrongfully conclude that individuals behave 278 paradoxically. Communicating such a false result would unjustly accuse people of 279 implausible behavior, potentially causing unnecessary distress or reactance. We consider 280 both errors to be equally detrimental. Hence, we chose balanced error rates, setting a 281 maximum error rate of 5% for both alpha and beta. As the smallest effect size of interest 282 (SESOI; Lakens et al., 2018), we chose to consider effects that are at least small (i.e., 283 standardized coefficients above  $\beta = .10$ ; Cohen, 1992) as able to offer empirical support for 284 our theoretical hypotheses. Significantly smaller effects were not considered able to offer 285 support. The six hypotheses were tested with a one-tailed approach and the six research 286 questions with a two-tailed approach. On the basis of the balanced alpha-beta approach 287 with a maximum error probability of 5%, a desired power of 95%, and an SESOI of  $\beta$ 288 .10, we calculated a minimum sample size of 1,293 respondents. Given the final sample size 280 of 1,403 respondents (see below), alpha and beta errors were balanced for our hypotheses 290 (research questions) when we used a critical alpha of 3% (4.20%), resulting in a power of 291 97% (95.80%) to detect small effects. 292 The data were analyzed using of a random-intercept cross-lagged panel model 293 (RI-CLPM, Hamaker, Kuiper, & Grasman, 2015). For a visualization, see Figure 1. Note that in contrast to regular cross-lagged panel models (CLPMs), RI-CLPMs can separate 295 between-person variance from within-person variance. We used factor scores as observed




Figure 1. Visual representation of the estimated random-intercept cross-lagged panel model (RI-CLPM).

variables to represent the variables' latent structure more closely. We tested H1, H3.1, and 297 H3.2 by correlating the random intercepts, which represent the respondents' individual 298 mean scores across all three waves. We tested H2, H4.1, and H4.2 by correlating the 299 respondents' within-person variance at T1, which captures their specific deviation at T1 300 from their overall score. We tested all research questions by regressing variables on all other measures obtained 6 months earlier. Given that we had three points of measurement, this resulted in two estimates for each research question. As we did not assume longitudinal effects to differ across time, they were constrained to be equal across all waves, 304 which produces one single general measure of each effect instead of two time-specific ones. 305 (We later tested this assumption empirically. As expected, the model with constrained 306 effects did not show significantly reduced model fit,  $\chi^2(9) = .114$ , p = 14.25, which 307 supports that effects did not change over time.) Fit was assessed according to the common 308 criteria as described by Kline (2016). The final model fit the data well,  $\chi^2(15) = 25.18$ , p =309 .048, cfi = 1.00, rmsea = .02, 90% CI [< .01, .04], srmr = .01. 310

For the analyses, we used R (Version 3.6.1; R Core Team, 2018) and the R-packages 311 GGally (Version 1.4.0; Schloerke et al., 2018), qqplot2 (Version 3.2.1; Wickham, 2016), 312 lavaan (Version 0.6.5; Rosseel, 2012), MissMech (Version 1.0.2; Jamshidian, Jalal, & 313 Jansen, 2014), MVN (Version 5.8; Korkmaz, Goksuluk, & Zararsiz, 2014), psych (Version 314 1.9.12.31; Revelle, 2018), pwr (Version 1.2.2; Champely, 2018), semTools (Version 0.5.2; 315 Jorgensen et al., 2018), and sistats (Version 0.17.9; Lüdecke, 2019). The code, additional 316 analyses, and a reproducible version of this manuscript can be found on the manuscript's 317 companion website at https://tdienlin.github.io/privacy-paradox-longitudinal. 318

## 319 Procedure and Respondents

This study is part of a large-scale project which investigates the development of privacy and self-disclosure, including several other variables. Other publications linked to the project can be accessed at https://osf.io/y35as/. The data come from a longitudinal paper-and-pencil questionnaire study, in which a representative sample of the German population (16 years and older) was surveyed on overall five occasions. The data can be downloaded from http://dx.doi.org/10.7802/1937.

The first three waves were collected from May 2014 to May 2015, with intervals of 6 months each. The last two waves were collected on May 2016 and May 2017, and had an interval of one year. Because we hypothesized the effects to take place across half a year, 328 the last two waves were not included in the analyses presented here. First, a sample of 329 14,714 potential respondents was drawn from a representative omnibus survey in Germany 330 (ADM master sample), using a random last-two-digit dialing procedure. In this CATI 331 screening, 5,286 respondents agreed to participate in all following waves. Wave 1 was 332 completed by 3,278 respondents (response rate: 38%), Wave 2 by 2,448 respondents 333 (attrition rate: 25%), and Wave 3 by 2,021 respondents (attrition rate: 17%). We filtered 334 respondents who never used the Internet at all waves, answered fewer than 50% of the 335 items in each scale for at least one wave, provided inconsistent birth-dates across 336

measurements, or did not report sociodemographic variables. The final sample consisted of n=1,403 respondents.

In the final sample, the rate of missing data was 5.40%. Visual inspection of the missing value patterns as well as the non-parametric test by Jamshidian et al. (2014) suggested that all missing values could be considered missing at random (p = .514). Therefore, Full Information Maximum Likelihood estimation was conducted using all available data. The average age was 54 years (SD = 15 years), and 49% were male. About 39% reported that they had graduated from college.

#### 345 Measures

We tested the factorial validity of all measures using confirmatory factor analysis 346 (CFA). Each CFA included the items from all three waves. For each item, factor loadings 347 were constrained to be equal across waves. Constrained and unconstrained models were 348 compared using  $\chi^2$  differences tests. All results were nonsignificant, suggesting longitudinal 349 factorial invariance. The measures showed good composite reliability in all three waves. 350 Graphical displays of the variables' distributions showed that privacy concerns were skewed 351 to the left, privacy attitudes were normally distributed, and information sharing was skewed to the right (Figure 2, diagonal). We calculated intra-class correlation coefficients 353 to quantify how much variance in the variables' factor scores could be attributed to 354 between-person differences. An English translation of the original German items can be 355 found in the OSM. 356

Concerns about online privacy. Privacy concerns were measured as a second-order factor. Three items captured the vertical dimension (e.g., "How concerned are you that institutions or intelligence services collect and analyze data that you disclosed on the Internet?"), and three items captured the horizontal dimension (e.g., "How concerned are you that people that you do not know might obtain information about you because of you online activities?"). Respondents rated all items on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (not

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3.59, and the standard deviations  $SD_{\rm t1}=0.88,\,SD_{\rm t2}=0.89,$  and  $SD_{\rm t3}=0.90.$  The 364 two-dimensional model fit the data well,  $\chi^2(118) = 661.17$ , p < .001, cfi = .97, rmsea = .06, 365 90% CI [.05, .06], srmr = .04. The reliability was high ( $\omega_{t1} = .95, \omega_{t2} = .96, \omega_{t3} = .97$ ). 366 Overall, 73.85% of the measure's variance was explained by differences between persons. 367 The online sharing of personal information. To measure respondent's level of 368 information disclosure, they were asked how often they disclosed 10 different pieces of 369 information on the Internet. The exact question was: "How often do you disclose the 370 following pieces of information online (i.e., on the Internet)?" Each item was answered on a 371 5-point scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (daily). Factor analyses suggested a second-order 372 factor structure with five first-order factors of two items each. The first first-order factor 373 subsumed financial and medical information, the second first and last name, the third place of residence and street (including house number), the fourth email address and phone 375 number, and the fifth information about education and current job. The means were  $M_{\rm t1}$ 376 = 2.12,  $M_{\rm t2}$  = 2.13,  $M_{\rm t3}$  = 2.10, and the standard deviations  $SD_{\rm t1}$  = 0.66,  $SD_{\rm t2}$  = 0.64, 377 and  $SD_{\rm t3}=0.61.$  The model fit the data adequately,  $\chi^2(375)=2527.69,\ p<.001,$  cfi = 378 .95, rmsea = .06, 90% CI [.06, .07], srmr = .06. The reliability was high ( $\omega_{\rm t1}$  = .91,  $\omega_{\rm t2}$  = 379 .92,  $\omega_{\rm t3}$  = .91). Overall, 64.29% of the measure's variance was explained by differences 380 between persons. 381 Attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information. Respondents' 382 attitudes toward disclosing personal information online were captured with 10 items that 383

at all concerned) to 5 (very concerned). The means were  $M_{\rm t1}=3.67,\,M_{\rm t2}=3.62,\,M_{\rm t3}=$ 

Attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information. Respondents' attitudes toward disclosing personal information online were captured with 10 items that measured the general appraisal of disclosing the same 10 pieces of information. Adhering to the principle of compatibility (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010), the items were parallel to those of the actual disclosure scale. Specifically, we asked: "Do you think that it is sensible to disclose the following pieces of information online (i.e., on the Internet)?" The scale ranged from 1 (not at all sensible) to 5 (very sensible). The means were  $M_{t1} = 3.67$ ,  $M_{t2} = 3.62$ ,  $M_{t3} = 3.59$ , and the standard deviations  $SD_{t1} = 0.88$ ,  $SD_{t2} = 0.89$ , and  $SD_{t3} = 0.90$ . The

second-order model with five first-order factors showed an adequate model fit,  $\chi^2(375) =$  2683.43, p < .001, cfi = .93, rmsea = .07, 90% CI [.06, .07], srmr = .08. The reliability was high ( $\omega_{t1} = .88$ ,  $\omega_{t2} = .89$ ,  $\omega_{t3} = .87$ ). Overall, 59.19% of the measure's variance was explained by differences between persons.

Results

In a first descriptive step, we analyzed the variables' bivariate relations. All variables 395 associated with the hypotheses showed correlations that were in line with our theoretical 396 rationales (Figure 2, above the diagonal). 397 Hypothesis 1 predicted that people reporting higher concerns about online privacy 398 than others would also be less likely to share personal information online than others. 399 Results revealed that the random intercepts of the two variables were significantly 400 correlated ( $\beta =$  -.09, b = -0.03, 95% CI [-0.05, -0.01], z = -2.57, p = .005). Hence, 401 respondents who—on average across all three waves—were more concerned about their 402 privacy than others also shared slightly less personal information online. The effect was 403 small. When looking at the standardized effect's confidence interval (i.e.,  $\beta = -.09$ , 95% CI [-.15, -.02]), it was not significantly smaller than our SESOI of beta = .10. Thus, Hypothesis 1 was supported. Hypothesis 2 proposed that if people perceived more concerns about their online 407 privacy than they usually do, they would also share less personal information online than 408 they usually do. Results revealed a small significant correlation ( $\beta = -.10$ , b = -0.02, 95% 409 CI [-0.03, > -0.01], z = -2.37, p = .009), suggesting that if respondents were more 410 concerned about their online privacy at T1 than usual, they also shared less personal 411 information online at T1 than usual. In conclusion, the results supported Hypothesis 2. 412 With Research Question 1.1, we analyzed the longitudinal relation of concerns about 413 online privacy and the online sharing of personal information 6 months later. No significant 414 lagged effect across 6 months was found ( $\beta = .01$ , b = 0.01, 95% CI [-0.05, 0.07], z = 0.41, 415




Figure 2. Results of the bivariate relations. Above the diagonal: zero-order correlation matrix; diagonal: density plots for each variable; below the diagonal: bivariate scatter plots for zero-order correlations. Solid regression lines represent linear regressions, dashed regression lines represent quadratic regressions. Calculated with the variables' latent factor scores.

p=.683). With Research Question 1.2, we investigated the longitudinal relation of the online sharing of personal information and concerns about online privacy 6 months later, again revealing no significant effect ( $\beta=-.03,\ b=-0.03,\ 95\%$  CI [-0.09, 0.04],  $z=-0.80,\ p=-0.80$ 

= .422). 419

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others would also hold more negative attitudes toward the online sharing of personal 421 information than others. The results revealed a medium-sized negative correlation between 422 the two variables on the between-person level ( $\beta = -.31$ , b = -0.11, 95% CI [-0.14, -0.08], z 423 = -8.46, p < .001). Thus, people who—on average across all three waves—reported being 424 more concerned about their online privacy relative to the rest of the sample, were also 425 substantially more likely to hold a more negative attitude toward the online sharing of 426 personal information. The results therefore supported Hypothesis 3.1. Hypothesis 3.2 427 stated that people who held more positive attitudes toward the online sharing of personal 428 information than others would also share more personal information online than others. 429 Results showed a very strong between-person correlation between the two variables ( $\beta =$ .66, b = 0.15, 95% CI [0.13, 0.17], z = 15.12, p < .001). In other words, when averaged 431 across all three waves, if people had more positive attitudes toward the online sharing of 432 personal information than others, they were much more likely to actually share personal 433 information online. In conclusion, the results supported Hypothesis 3.2. 434 Hypothesis 4.1 proposed that people who perceived more privacy concerns than usual 435 would also hold more negative attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information 436 than usual. The results did not reveal a significant effect ( $\beta=$  -.06, b= -0.01, 95% CI 437 [-0.03, < 0.01], z = -1.38, p = .084). Hypothesis 4.2 proposed that people who held more 438 positive attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information than usual would also 439 share more personal information online than usual. Results showed a moderate 440 within-person correlation between the two variables ( $\beta = .15, b = 0.03, 95\%$  CI [0.02, 0.05], 441 z = 4.01, p < .001), which indicates that when respondents had more positive attitudes at 442 T1 than usual, they also shared more personal information than usual. In conclusion, the 443 results supported Hypothesis 4.2. 444 With Research Question 2.1, we analyzed the longitudinal relations of concerns about

Hypothesis 3.1 predicted that people who perceived more privacy concerns than

online privacy and positive attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information. No 446 significant effect was found ( $\beta =$  -.02, b = -0.02, 95% CI [-0.09, 0.06], z = -0.47, p = .641). 447 Regarding Research Question 2.2, again no significant longitudinal relations emerged 448 between privacy attitudes and privacy concerns 6 months later ( $\beta < .01, b < 0.01, 95\%$  CI 449 [-0.06, 0.06], z = 0.06, p = .951).450 Research Question 3.1 asked whether changes in attitudes toward the online sharing 451 of personal information would affect changes in personal information sharing 6 months 452 later. No significant effect was found ( $\beta >$  -.01, b > -0.01, 95% CI [-0.06, 0.05], z = -0.07, p =453 = .947). Next, Research Question 3.2 asked whether changes in the online sharing of 454 personal information would affect attitudes toward the online sharing of personal 455 information 6 months later. Again, no significant effect was found ( $\beta = .04$ , b = 0.04, 95% 456 CI [-0.03, 0.11], z = 1.15, p = .249).Table 1 presents an overview of all results. 458

Discussion

Most research on the privacy paradox suggests a significant small effect of privacy 460 concerns on the online sharing of personal information (e.g., Baruh et al., 2017). However, 461 whereas the theoretical premise of the privacy paradox addresses a within-person effect, 462 most empirical studies have analyzed only between-person relations. On the basis of a 463 representative sample of the German population, from which three waves of data separated 464 by 6 months were collected, we hence analyzed the privacy paradox by differentiating 465 general between-person relations, short-term within-person relations, as well as long-term 466 within-person effects. Together, this approach allows for informed inferences about the 467 variables' causal relationship. 468 The results of the between-person analyses showed that people who were more 469 concerned about their privacy than others were slightly less likely to share personal 470 information. In addition, people who were more concerned about their privacy than others 471

Table 1

Parameter Estimates Obtained in the Random-Intercept Cross-Lagged Panel Model

		95% CI			
Effect	b	11	ul	beta	p
Between-person correlations across all waves					
Privacy concern <-> information sharing	-0.03	-0.05	-0.01	09	.005
Privacy concern <-> positive attitude	-0.11	-0.14	-0.08	31	< .001
Positive attitude <-> information sharing	0.15	0.13	0.17	.66	< .001
Within-person correlations at T1					
Privacy concern <-> information sharing	-0.02	-0.03	> -0.01	10	.009
Privacy concern <-> positive attitude	-0.01	-0.03	< 0.01	06	.084
Positive attitude <-> information sharing	0.03	0.02	0.05	.15	< .001
Within-person effects across 6 months					
Privacy concern -> information sharing	0.01	-0.05	0.07	.01	.683
Information sharing -> privacy concern	-0.03	-0.09	0.04	03	.422
Privacy concern -> positive attitude	-0.02	-0.09	0.06	02	.641
Positive attitude -> privacy concern	< 0.01	-0.06	0.06	< .01	.951
Positive attitude -> information sharing	> -0.01	-0.06	0.05	>01	.947
Information sharing -> positive attitude	0.04	-0.03	0.11	.04	.249

Note. The between-person correlations represent interpersonal relations. For example, results showed that people who were more concerned than others, averaged across all three waves, also shared less information than others. The within-person parameters reflect how intrapersonal changes in one variable are related to intra-personal changes in another. For example, results showed that if a person was more concerned at T1 than usual, they also shared less information than usual.

also held substantially more negative attitudes toward disclosing personal information 472 online. Notably, we found a very strong between-person correlation between attitudes 473 toward information sharing and actual information sharing, which shows that typical 474 online disclosure can be predicted precisely by a person's attitude. Taken together, the 475 cross-sectional results are in line with the extant literature: The between-person correlation 476 of privacy concerns and information sharing found in this study (i.e.,  $\beta = -.08$ ) fall within 477 the 95% confidence interval of the effect reported by Baruh et al. (2017) (i.e., r = -.13, 478 95% CI [-.07, -.18]). Note that the between-person correlations reported here represent 479 averaged measurements across three waves, which makes the findings more robust than 480 typical one-shot measures. 481 In conclusion, this study suggests that the privacy paradox does not exist on a 482 between-person level. The differences between people with regard to their online information sharing behavior can be explained by differences in their privacy concerns to a 484 small extent, and by differences in their privacy attitudes to a large extent. The more specific we become, the better we can explain online behavior: Whereas privacy concerns 486 are related only weakly to online information sharing (e.g., Baruh et al., 2017), more 487 specific risks perceptions are related to behavior more closely (e.g., Bol et al., 2018; Yu et 488 al., 2020), whereas behavioral attitudes are the best predictors (Dienlin & Trepte, 2015). 489 The within-person results showed that when a person's privacy concerns increased, 490 the same person also shared slightly less information online than usual. Moreover, people 491 who developed more positive attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information 492 than usual, also shared substantially more personal information online. Together, changes 493 in concerns and attitudes are therefore related to changes in behavior, which speaks against 494 the privacy paradox also on the within-person level. 495 We did not find any long-term effects, however. Changes in both privacy concerns 496 and attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information were not related to any 497 meaningful changes in the online sharing of personal information 6 months later (and vice

versa). As an explanation, it might be the case that changes in privacy concern affect information sharing more immediately. To test this assumption, we would need studies with shorter intervals (Keijsers, 2016). Moreover, given that the directions of most longitudinal relations were in line with the between-person and within-person relations, longitudinal effects might indeed take place, but only that they are very small. Of course, it could also be that longterm longitudinal effects do not exist.

#### 505 Limitations

Some of the effect sizes reported in this study are potentially not large enough to refute the privacy paradox completely. On the one hand, they could be a manifestation of the so-called "crud factor" (Meehl, 1990, p. 204), which states that all psychosocial measures are related to one another to some extent. On the other hand, other factors such 509 as expected benefits might play a more important role (Dienlin & Metzger, 2016). In 510 conclusion, although our results suggest that privacy concerns and privacy attitudes are 511 correlated with information sharing, the importance of privacy concerns should not be 512 exaggerated. The effects could be larger, and other variables play a role as well. 513 In this study we measured information sharing using self-reports. However, 514 self-reports of frequent and routine behaviors are often imprecise and unreliable (Scharkow, 515 2016). This represents a profound limitation of our study. Whenever possible, future 516 studies should aim to collect objective observations of behavior. 517 Finally, please note that the hypotheses presented in this study were not formally 518 preregistered. At the time when the study was conceived in 2014, we were not yet aware of 519

#### 521 Future Research

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the importance of preregistration.

Evidence of within-person longitudinal effects is still missing. Although we found significant within-person correlations at T1, they were absent across the 6-month intervals. Together, this suggests that longitudinal effects might exist, but that they take place on a

- different time interval. Future research could hence probe different intervals. For theoretical reasons (e.g., due to availability heuristics), it is plausible to use short intervals; for statistical reasons (e.g., because of the high stability of privacy concerns), it would also make sense to test longer intervals (Dormann & Griffin, 2015).
- Although we argue that in most circumstances privacy concerns and behavior should correlate modestly, the exact extent depends on a many boundary conditions. Future research should hence explicitly analyze different contexts and situations. Building on Kokolakis (2017), we suggest to analyze the following boundary conditions:
- Context (e.g., professional, social, commercial, or health-related);
- Situation (e.g., new, habitualized, or unexpected);
- Mood (e.g., positive vs. negative);
- Extent of control (high vs. low);

- Type of information processing applied (implicit, heuristic, or peripheral vs. explicit, analytic, or central);
- Existence of bias (e.g., overconfidence, optimism, comparative optimism, or hyperbolic discounting);
- Type of information (e.g., sensitive vs. superficial, biographic, or person-related);
- Benefit immediacy and risk diffusion (high vs. low).
- Specifically, we encourage analyzing privacy behaviors also from a situational perspective, accounting for temporal needs, interpersonal perceptions, contextual cues, or characteristics of communication channels (Masur, 2018). For example, whereas general levels of information sharing are likely best explained by using privacy *concerns*, situational information sharing might be best explained by using privacy *heuristics* (Sundar, Kang, Wu, Gu, & Zhang, 2013).
- Next to these theory-related boundary conditions there are also methodological ones:
  - Analysis design (e.g., theoretical, experimental, questionnaire-based, interview-based,

or anecdotal); 551

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- Quality of measurement (high vs. low; low quality less likely to detect statistical 552 significance); 553
  - Sample size (small vs. large; small samples less likely to detect statistical significance);
- Statistical analysis (e.g., SEM vs. Regression; analyses without error control less 555 likely to find statistical significance); 556
  - Operationalization (e.g., concerns vs. risk perceptions vs. behavioral attitudes; the more specific, the stronger the relation).

We emphasize that when analyzing the privacy paradox we are likely dealing with 559 small effects (Baruh et al., 2017). Hence, to detect these small effects reliably we need large 560 samples. This is often not the case (Baruh et al., 2017). In conclusion, it is crucial to use 561 statistical designs that allow for sufficient statistical power. 562

### Conclusion

Being able to show that online behaviors are not paradoxical can be socially relevant. 564 Consider the similar case of fear appeals and protective behavior, where there is also only a 565 small correlation (Witte & Allen, 2000). However, fear appeals are used in public 566 campaigns nonetheless, oftentimes to much success (Wakefield, Loken, & Hornik, 2010). 567 Likewise, proclaiming that the online sharing of personal information is not paradoxical and that concerns about online privacy matter, could lead to more cautious and reflective behavior. It is probably no coincidence that the General Data Protection Regulation, which strengthens the privacy rights of consumers, was passed in Europe, where privacy 571 concerns are particularly pronounced (European Commission, 2015). 572 In sum, this study showed that when people were more concerned about their 573 privacy, they also shared a little less personal information about themselves online. If 574 respondents considered sharing personal information to be insensible, they disclosed 575 substantially less information. Together, these findings do not support the existence of a

- 577 privacy paradox, at least in this particular context and operationalization. No evidence of
- 578 long-term effects was found, however. Further research is needed to understand the
- 579 potential causal interplay of concerns, attitudes, and behavior.

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