Good guides to best practices:
Best practices recommend that you regenerate all session tokens (for us, the
browser session ID and the remember_token cookie) on any privilege change (for
us, logging in or logging out) — see http://tinyurl.com/5vdvuq. This release
properly regenerates remember_token cookies, but does not by default
Calling reset_session can interact with Form Authentication tokens (a much
more important security feature). If a visitor logs in but has a form open in
another tab, or uses the back button to pull one up from their history (perhaps
the one that required them to log in), they will get the exceedingly unpleasant
Request Forgery error. Imagine spending twenty minutes crafting a devastating
critique of this week’s Battlestar Galactica episode, finding you need to log in
before posting — but then getting a Request Forgery when you re-attempt the
post. Frak! Thus, it’s disabled by default.
On the other hand, this does moderately reduce your defense-in-depth against a
Cross-Site Request Forgery attack. To
enable session_resetting, look for any
A Site key gives additional protection against a dictionary attack if your
DB is ever compromised. With no site key, we store
DB_password = hash(user_password, DB_user_salt)
If your database were to be compromised you’d be vulnerable to a dictionary
attack on all your stupid users’ passwords. With a site key, we store
DB_password = hash(user_password, DB_user_salt, Code_site_key)
That means an attacker needs access to both your site’s code and its
database to mount an offline dictionary attack.
It’s probably of minor importance, but recommended by best practices: ‘defense
in depth’. Needless to say, if you upload this to github or the youtubes or
otherwise place it in public view you’ll kinda defeat the point. Your users’
passwords are still secure, and the world won’t end, but defense_in_depth -= 1.
Please note: if you change this, all the passwords will be invalidated, so DO
keep it someplace secure. Use the random value given or type in the lyrics to
your favorite Jay-Z song or something; any moderately long, unpredictable text.
If someone were to capture your user accounts database, they could farm it out
for brute-force or dictionary-attack password cracking. “Password Stretching”
makes brute force (even with a compromised database and site key) attacks
harder, and scales with Moore’s law. Basically, you apply the password
encryption process several times, meaning that each brute-force attempt takes
that much longer. Hash your password ten times, and a brute-force attack takes
ten times longer; hash 100,000 times and an attack takes 100,000 times longer.
Now, adding even a 0.2s delay to page requests isn’t justifiable for most online
applications, and storing r is unnecessary (at least on your first design
iteration). But on a 1G Slicehost already under moderate load:
A modest 10 (the default here) foldings makes brute forcing, even given the site
key and database, 10 times harder at a 3ms penalty. An app that otherwise
serves 100 reqs/s is reduced to 78 signin reqs/s; an app that does 10reqs/s is
reduced to 9.7 signin reqs/s
The default of 10 is a reasonable compromise, but the security-paranoid and
resource-rich may consider increasing REST_AUTH_DIGEST_STRETCHES to match the
one-second best-practices value, while those with existing userbases (whose
passwords would otherwise no longer work) should leave the value at one.
The session and the remember_token should both be expired and regenerated
every time we cross the logged out / logged in barrier by either password
or cookie. (To reduce the risk from session hijacking
and brute force attacks, the HTTP server can seamlessly expire and
regenerate tokens. This decreases the window of opportunity for a replay or
brute force attack.) It does mean we set the cookie more often.
We restrict login names to only contain the characters
A-Za-z0-9.-_@ This allows (most) email addresses and is safe
for urls, database expressions (the at sign, technically reserved in a url, will
survive in most browsers). If you want to be more permissive:
Char ::= #x9 | #xA | #xD | [#x20-#xD7FF] | [#xE000-#xFFFD] | [#x10000-#x10FFFF]
We restrict email addresses to match only those actually seen in the wild,
invalidating some that are technically allowed (characters such as % and ! that
date back to UUCP days. The line to allow all RFC-2822 emails is commented out,
so feel free to enable it, or remove this validation. See this discussion of
what is sane as opposed to what
is legal. Also understand that this is just a cursory bogus-input check —
there’s no guarantee that this email matches an account or is even well-formed.
If you change these validations you should change the RSpec tests as well.
Last edited by mvz,