Beliefs: a catalyst for cooperation

Evolutionary dynamics in infinite populations

Brief description

In total there are eight different strategies. The strategies can be enumerated by the generic profile (a_1^*, a_2^*, u^*) where a_i^* is the hunting strategy of the focal individual when in reality i and u^* is the preferred reality of the focal individual (objective or inter-subjective). The individuals in the tribe form a group of size G and first they need to decide which reality they choose to believe in.

Definitions and variables that will be used

there are eight possible strategies as defined by (a_1^*, a_2^*, u^*) , since there are two action in each reality i so



Group size if G of which M is the minimum number of stag hunters required to bring down a stag. The nutritional worth of a hare is set to πH while that of a stag is πS .

$$ln[440]:=$$
 G = 5; M = 4; π **S = 4;** π **H = 1;**

All calculations done here (compile this)

Group decides on how to define reality

$$\begin{array}{ll} & \text{In}[441] := & \text{f1[k_, state_]} := (*0.5*) \\ & & \text{G} \\ & & (*Round \left[\frac{k + KroneckerDelta[state, 1]}{G}\right] *); \end{array}$$

The function $f_1(k, \text{ state})$ returns the probability of group G choosing reality 1. The probability is a frequency dependent function

What is an individuals behaviour? Hare hunting or stag hunting?

This function returns "Hare" if the focal individual is a hare hunter for a given reality.

What is the group composition?

What is the composition of the group? How many stag hunters are there?given that k of the group

believe in reality 1 and the rest in reality 2

```
In[443]:= Pcomposition[k_, state_] :=
          \left(\sum_{l=0}^{k}\sum_{m=0}^{k}\sum_{n=0}^{k}\sum_{o=0}^{c}\sum_{p=0}^{G-1-k}\sum_{q=0}^{G-1-k}\sum_{r=0}^{G-1-k}\sum_{s=0}^{G-1-k}\left(\text{If}\left[l+m+n+o=k\&\&p+q+r+s=:G-1-k\right]\right)\right)\right)
                               Multinomial[l, m, n, o] Multinomial[p, q, r, s] (x_{hh1})^{l}
                                 (x_{hs1})^m (x_{sh1})^n (x_{ss1})^o (x_{hh2})^p (x_{hs2})^q (x_{sh2})^r (x_{ss2})^s
                                 If [state = 1, HeavisideTheta[1 + n + o + r + s - M], If [
                                    state == 2, HeavisideTheta[1 + m + o + q + s - M], 0]], 0]);
```

Calculating the average payoffs

What is the composition of the group? How many stag hunters are there? given that k of the group believe in reality 1 and the rest in reality 2

Simplified version of the average payoffs

```
In[444]:= avgpayoffsimplified[focal1 , focal2 , state ] :=
      \pi H \left( Phare1[focal1] \sum_{k=0}^{G-1} (Binomial[G-1, k] (x_1)^k (x_2)^{G-1-k} f1[k, state] \right) +
            Phare1[focal2] \sum_{k=1}^{G-1} (Binomial[G-1, k] (x_1)^k (x_2)^{G-1-k} (1-f1[k, state])) +
       \pi S \left( (1 - Pharel[focal1]) \sum_{k=0}^{G-1} (Binomial[G-1, k] fl[k, state] \times Pcomposition[k, 1]) + \right)
              \sum_{k=0}^{G-1} (Binomial[G-1, k] (1-f1[k, state]) Pcomposition[k, 2]);
```

The average payoffs are stored in a table called payoffstab:

```
In[445]:= payoffstab =
    Flatten[Table[{{foc1, foc2, flags}, avgpayoffsimplified[foc1, foc2, flags]},
         {foc1, {"Hare", "Stag"}}, {foc2, {"Hare", "Stag"}}, {flags, {1, 2}}] /.
        HeavisideTheta[0] → 1, 2] // Simplify;
```

In the following we write down the matrix which gives the average payoff of strategy i when playing with strategy j at the i,j entry of the fullreducedmatrix

```
\mathsf{In}[446] = \mathsf{nullreplace} = \{ \mathsf{x}_{\mathsf{hh}1} \to \mathsf{0}, \, \mathsf{x}_{\mathsf{hh}2} \to \mathsf{0}, \, \mathsf{x}_{\mathsf{hs}1} \to \mathsf{0}, \, \mathsf{x}_{\mathsf{sh}2} \to \mathsf{0}, \, \mathsf{x}_{\mathsf{sh}1} \to \mathsf{0}, \, \mathsf{x}_{\mathsf{sh}2} \to \mathsf{0}, \, \mathsf{x}_{\mathsf{ss}1} \to \mathsf{0}, \, \mathsf{x}_{\mathsf{ss}2} \to \mathsf{0} \};
     toreplace[pair_] :=
         nullreplace /. { (freqnotation[pair[1]]] \rightarrow 0) \rightarrow freqnotation[pair[1]]] \rightarrow y,
             (freqnotation[pair[2]]] \rightarrow 0) \rightarrow freqnotation[pair[2]]] \rightarrow 1 - y;
     reducedmatrix = {};
     Table[
         temp = Table[Drop[Drop[nullreplace, {j}], {i}], {i, 1, 7, 1}];
         AppendTo[reducedmatrix,
           Table[payoffstab[j, 2] /. temp[i] // Simplify, {i, 1, 7, 1}]], {j, 1, 8, 1}];
     diagonals = Table[payoffstab[j, 2] /. Drop[nullreplace, {j}] // Simplify,
           {j, 1, 8, 1}];
     fullreducedmatrix = Table[Insert[reducedmatrix[i], diagonals[i], i], {i, 1, 8, 1}];
```

Calculating fixed points

Next we calculate the fixed points between two strategies at a time and store the results in the array allpairs

```
In[452]:= allpairs =
    Table[If[i ≠ j, freqnotation[i]] /. Solve[freqnotation[i]] > 0 && freqnotation[i]] <
                 1 && 0 = freqnotation[i] (1 - freqnotation[i])
                  (fullreducedmatrix[i, j] - fullreducedmatrix[j, i]) /.
              {freqnotation[j] → 1 - freqnotation[i]}, freqnotation[i], Reals] //
          N,] // Flatten, {i, 1, 7, 1}, {j, i+1, 8, 1}] // Quiet;
```

Using the above information now we can simply plot the dynamics between any two strategies

Prepping the plot package

```
In[453]:= Pairwiseplot[strat1_, strat2_] :=
     (eq = freqnotation[strat1] (1 - freqnotation[strat1])
          (fullreducedmatrix[strat1, strat2] - fullreducedmatrix[strat2, strat1]) /.
         {freqnotation[strat2] → 1 - freqnotation[strat1]}};
      Plot[eq /. {freqnotation[strat1] \rightarrow x}, {x, 0, 1}, Frame \rightarrow True, Filling \rightarrow Axis,
        FillingStyle → {colors[strat2], colors[strat1]}, PlotStyle → Black,
        FrameStyle → Directive[Black, Thickness[0.002]], FrameLabel →
         {freqnotation[strat1], freqnotation[strat1] (1 - freqnotation[strat1])
            (f<sub>freqnotation[strat1]</sub> - f<sub>freqnotation[strat2]</sub>)}, ImageSize → Medium]);
```


```
In[454]:= (*CirclePoints is an alternative to manually generating the vertex list*)
    pts = CirclePoints[{1, 23 Degree}, 8];
    pts = \left\{ \left\{ -\cos[23^{\circ}], -\sin[23^{\circ}] \right\}, \left\{ -\cos\left[23^{\circ} - \frac{\pi}{4}\right], -\sin\left[23^{\circ} - \frac{\pi}{4}\right] \right\},\right\}
         \left\{-\cos\left[23^{\circ}+\frac{\pi}{4}\right], -\sin\left[23^{\circ}+\frac{\pi}{4}\right]\right\}, \left\{\sin\left[23^{\circ}\right], -\cos\left[23^{\circ}\right]\right\},
         \left\{ \cos \left[ 23^{\circ} + \frac{\pi}{4} \right], \sin \left[ 23^{\circ} + \frac{\pi}{4} \right] \right\}, \left\{ -\sin \left[ 23^{\circ} \right], \cos \left[ 23^{\circ} \right] \right\},
         \{\cos[23^\circ], \sin[23^\circ]\}, \{\cos\left[23^\circ - \frac{\pi}{4}\right], \sin\left[23^\circ - \frac{\pi}{4}\right]\}\};
    (*Generate all edges and internal diagonals as Line objects*)
    lines = Line /@ Subsets[pts, {2}];
    (*List all possible pairs of lines from the set above*)
    linepairs = Subsets[lines, {2}];
    (*Find unique intersection points between lines in each pair*)
    intersectionpts = DeleteDuplicatesBy[N]@
         Simplify@DeleteCases[RegionIntersection /@linepairs, _EmptyRegion];
    eqpts = {};
    Table[If[MatchQ[allpairs[i, j][1]], _Real],
         AppendTo[eqpts, {pts[i][1] + (1 - allpairs[i, j][1]) (pts[j + i][1] - pts[i][1]),
            pts[i][2] + (1 - allpairs[i, j][1]) (pts[j + i][2] - pts[i][2])}]],
        {i, 1, 7, 1}, {j, 1, Length[allpairs[i]], 1}];
    eqpts = DeleteCases[eqpts, Null];
    eqptsplot = Point[#] & /@ eqpts;
```

Plotting


Simply choose the two strategies you want to see the dynamics of selected strategies, the list below might be useful for coding

```
1. (x_{hh1}, \blacksquare); 2. (x_{hh2}, \blacksquare); 3. (x_{hs1}, \blacksquare); 4. (x_{hs2}, \blacksquare);
5. (x_{sh1}, \blacksquare); 6. (x_{sh2}, \blacksquare); 7. (x_{ss1}, \blacksquare); 8. (x_{ss2}, \blacksquare)
```

In[463]:= Manipulate[Pairwiseplot[i, j], {{i, 1, "Strategy"}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}}, {{j, 4, "against strategy"}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}}]



In[464]:= Show[Pairwiseplot[1, 5], Frame → True, FrameStyle → Black, FrameLabel → {Style["Frequency of (H,H,1)", 14, Black], Style["Change over time in\n the frequency of (H,H,1)", 14, Black]}]



The dynamics of the whole population takes place in a seven dimensional simplex Δ_7 and we can show the dynamics as . (x_{hh1}, \blacksquare) ; 2. (x_{hh2}, \blacksquare) ; 3. (x_{hs1}, \blacksquare) ; 4. (x_{hs2}, \blacksquare) ; 5. (x_{sh1}, \blacksquare) ; 6. (x_{sh2}, \blacksquare) ; 7. (x_{ss1}, \blacksquare) ; 8. (x_{ss2}, \blacksquare)

In[465]:= Graphics[{lines, Black, PointSize[0.03], eqptsplot, White, PointSize[0.02], eqptsplot, PointSize[0.05], Point[pts, VertexColors → colors]}]

