

# HW3

## Labor Economics

Chia-wei, Chen\*

October 16, 2022

### 1 Normalization of the Selection Equation

#### 1.1 Distribution of $F_U(U)$

We consider the CDF of the CDF, that is,

How much of the U's will the CDF of U be less than y?

Apparently this is exactly the definition of a CDF, hence this number is trivially  $y$ , and therefore we know

$$\Pr(F_U(U) \leq y) = y$$

, which is a uniform distribution between  $[0, 1]$

#### 1.2 $\mathcal{P}(z) = F_U(v(z))$ <sup>1</sup>

The original definition of selection is

$$D = \mathbb{1}(U \leq v(Z)) = \mathbb{1}(\tilde{U} \leq F_U(v(Z)))$$

where  $\tilde{U} \equiv F_U(U)$ . This holds because CDF is a increasing function.

Therefore inside the propensity score we substitute  $D = 1$  with the condition

$$F_U(U) \leq F_U(v(Z))$$

---

\*R10323045

<sup>1</sup>I denote the propensity score as  $\mathcal{P}$ .

Hence

$$\mathcal{P}(z) = \Pr(D = 1 \mid Z = z) = \Pr(F_U(U) \leq F_U(v(Z)) \mid Z = z) = \Pr(F_U(U) \leq F_U(v(z)))$$

Because  $F_U(U)$  is uniformly distributed, we conclude that

$$\mathcal{P}(z) = F_U(v(z))$$

### 1.3 Show that $D = \mathbb{1}\{\tilde{U} \leq \mathcal{P}(Z)\}$

A direct substitution should do the work.

$$D = \mathbb{1}(U \leq v(Z)) = \mathbb{1}(\tilde{U} \leq F_U(v(Z))) = \mathbb{1}(\tilde{U} \leq p(Z))$$

## 2 Derivation of the Weights for LATE

$$\text{LATE}_{z'}^z = \frac{E[Y \mid Z = z] - E[Y \mid Z = z']}{E[D \mid Z = z] - E[D \mid Z = z']} = \int_0^1 \text{MTE}(u) \times \frac{\mathbb{1}\{u \in [p(z'), p(z)]\}}{p(z) - p(z')} du$$

### 2.1

*Proof.* First, note that  $\mathcal{P}(z) = \Pr(D = 1 \mid Z = z)$ , which is the proportion of observations that gets the treatment given the state of instrument  $z$ , which will be  $\mathbb{E}(D \mid Z = z)$ .

Accordingly,  $\mathbb{E}(D \mid Z = z) - \mathbb{E}(D \mid Z = z') = \mathcal{P}(z) - \mathcal{P}(z')$ , thus corresponds to the denominator of the weight.  $\square$

### 2.2

Show that  $\mathbb{E}[Y \mid Z = z] = \mathbb{E}[Y_1 \mid U \leq \mathcal{P}(Z)]\mathcal{P}(z) + \mathbb{E}[Y_0 \mid U > \mathcal{P}(Z)](1 - \mathcal{P}(z))$

*Proof.* We start by expression  $y$  in the potential outcome framework

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}[Y \mid Z = z] &= \mathbb{E}[Y_1 D + Y_0(1 - D) \mid Z = z] \\ &= \mathbb{E}[Y_1 D \mid Z = z] + \mathbb{E}[Y_0(1 - D) \mid Z = z] \end{aligned}$$

The probability of  $D = 1$  given  $z$  is the propensity score  $\mathcal{P}(z) = \Pr(D = 1 \mid Z = z)$ , and  $D = 1$  implies  $\tilde{U} \leq \mathcal{P}(Z)$ . Together we get

$$= \mathbb{E}[Y_1 \mid \tilde{U} \leq \mathcal{P}(z)] \mathcal{P}(z) + \mathbb{E}[Y_0 \mid \tilde{U} > \mathcal{P}(z)] (1 - \mathcal{P}(z)) \quad (1)$$

Where  $1 - \mathcal{P}(z)$  is the probability of not choosing  $D = 1$ , which is the probability of choosing  $D = 0$   $\square$

## 2.3

Show that

$$\mathbb{E}[Y \mid Z = z] = \int_0^{\mathcal{P}(z)} \mathbb{E}[Y_1 \mid \tilde{U} = u] du + \int_{\mathcal{P}(z)}^1 \mathbb{E}[Y_0 \mid \tilde{U} = u] du$$

*Proof.* Let us start with  $\mathbb{E}[Y_1 \mid \tilde{U} \leq \mathcal{P}(z)]$  in Eq. (1). The condition is a range, hence we expand it into

$$\mathbb{E}[Y_1 \mid \tilde{U} \leq \mathcal{P}(z)] = \int_0^1 \frac{\mathbb{E}[Y_1 \mid \tilde{U} = u]}{\Pr(\tilde{U} \leq \mathcal{P}(z))} \mathbb{1}\{u \leq \mathcal{P}(z)\} dF_{\tilde{U}}(u)$$

Since  $\tilde{U} \sim \text{Unif}[0, 1]$ ,  $\Pr(\tilde{U} \leq \mathcal{P}(z)) = \mathcal{P}(z)$ , and  $dF_{\tilde{U}}(u) = 1du$ . The above term simplifies to

$$\frac{1}{\mathcal{P}(z)} \int_0^{\mathcal{P}(z)} \mathbb{E}[Y_1 \mid \tilde{U} = u] du$$

Similarly,

$$\mathbb{E}[Y_0 \mid \tilde{U} > \mathcal{P}(z)] = \frac{1}{1 - \mathcal{P}(z)} \int_{\mathcal{P}(z)}^1 \mathbb{E}[Y_0 \mid \tilde{U} = u] du$$

Substitute into Eq. (1), we get

$$\mathbb{E}[Y \mid Z = z] = \int_0^{\mathcal{P}(z)} \mathbb{E}[Y_1 \mid \tilde{U} = u] du + \int_{\mathcal{P}(z)}^1 \mathbb{E}[Y_0 \mid \tilde{U} = u] du$$

$\square$

## 2.4

*Proof.*

$$\begin{aligned}
& \int_0^{\mathcal{P}(z)} \mathbb{E}[Y_1 \mid \tilde{U} = u] du + \int_{\mathcal{P}(z)}^1 \mathbb{E}[Y_0 \mid \tilde{U} = u] du - \int_0^{\mathcal{P}(z')} \mathbb{E}[Y_1 \mid \tilde{U} = u] du - \int_{\mathcal{P}(z')}^1 \mathbb{E}[Y_0 \mid \tilde{U} = u] du \\
&= \int_{p(z')}^{p(z)} \mathbb{E}[Y_1 \mid \tilde{U} = u] du - \int_{p(z')}^{p(z)} \mathbb{E}[Y_0 \mid \tilde{U} = u] du \\
&= \int_{p(z')}^{p(z)} \mathbb{E}[Y_1 - Y_0 \mid \tilde{U} = u] du \\
&= \int_{p(z')}^{p(z)} \text{MTE}(u) du
\end{aligned}$$

□

## 3 Policy Relevance Treatment Effect

### 3.1 ATE

The ATE measures

$$\mathbb{E}[Y_1 - Y_0]$$

It is the expected difference of future average earning on whether one attends college or not.

### 3.2 ATT

The ATT measures

$$\mathbb{E}[Y_1 - Y_0 \mid D = 1]$$

It is the expected difference of future average earning for people that attended college. This is a what if question: *What will be a bachelors' future earning if he doesn't go to college?*

### 3.3 PRTE

Although the treatment effect mentioned above tells us some aspects of potential outcome, it is not really useful for policy makers. For example, given a ATE, a consultant tell the policy makers *This is the average different of earning, but I can't tell you whether changing the tuition makes any different.* Similarly, the ATT tell the policy maker *I don't know whether this policy make people tend to attend college more or not, but if they already attend college, this will be how much they earn.*

The policy relevant treatment effect, on the other hand, considers together the difference in the outcome we are interested in ( $Y$ ) as well as the change in the decision making process according to a policy driven channel ( $Z^*$  changing  $D$ ).

With PRTE, we can estimate the effect of conducting a policy.

### 3.4 Relationship with LATE

The local average treatment effect is defined as

$$\text{LATE} = \mathbb{E}[Y_1 - Y_0 \mid D_z = z, D_{z^*} = z^*]$$

and its estimation

$$\widehat{\text{LATE}} = \frac{\mathbb{E}[Y \mid Z = z^*] - \mathbb{E}[Y \mid Z = z]}{\mathbb{E}[D \mid Z = z^*] - \mathbb{E}[D \mid Z = z]}$$

Notice that the only different with PRTE is the condition. Requiring  $\mathbb{E}(Y^*) = \mathbb{E}[Y \mid Z = z^*]$  and vice versa is the key for the two to match. Intuitively, the PRTE will be equivalent to LATE if the samples that we consider are the ones that given a change in policy, it will definitely react to it.

## 4 Arellano-Bond

$$Y_{it} = \rho Y_{it-1} + \delta_i + \epsilon_{it}$$

with  $\text{Cov}(\epsilon_{it}, Y_{is}) = 0 \quad \forall s \leq t-1$

### 4.1 Show the inconsistency of FE estimator

We first demean the entire model

$$Y_{it} - \bar{Y}_i = \rho(Y_{it-1} - \bar{Y}_{i,-1}) + (\epsilon_{it} - \bar{\epsilon}_i)$$

This is an OLS with no constant term. Ideally we can extract  $\rho$  by regressing  $Y_{it} - \bar{Y}_i$  on  $(Y_{it-1} - \bar{Y}_{i,-1})$ , but there exist correlation between the error term and the regressor, therefore it is doomed to be inconsistent (if  $T$  is not big enough).

*Proof.*

$$\begin{aligned} & Cov((Y_{it-1} - \bar{Y}_{i,-1}), (\epsilon_{it} - \bar{\epsilon}_i)) \\ &= Cov(Y_{it-1}, \epsilon_{it}) - Cov(Y_{it-1}, \bar{\epsilon}_i) - Cov(\bar{Y}_{i,-1}, \epsilon_{it}) + Cov(\bar{Y}_{i,-1}, \bar{\epsilon}_i) \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

Note that

$$\begin{aligned} Cov(Y_{it-1}, \bar{\epsilon}_i) &= Cov(Y_{it-1}, \frac{1}{T} \sum_0^T \epsilon_{it}) \\ &= \frac{1}{T} Cov(Y_{it-1}, \epsilon_{it-1}) \neq 0 \end{aligned}$$

The last equation comes from the assumption that  $Cov(\epsilon_{it}, Y_{is}) = 0 \quad \forall s \leq t-1$ . Other terms in Eq. (2) are zero according to the assumption as well.

Therefore we prove that as long as  $T$  is finite, the fixed effect estimation for  $\rho$  is inconsistent. □

## 4.2 Taking first difference

$$\begin{array}{rcl} Y_{it} & = & \rho Y_{it-1} + \delta_i + \epsilon_{it} \\ -) Y_{it-1} & = & \rho Y_{it-2} + \delta_i + \epsilon_{it-1} \\ \hline Y_{it} - Y_{it-1} & = & \rho(Y_{it-1} - Y_{it-2}) + (\epsilon_{it} - \epsilon_{it-1}) \end{array}$$

## 4.3 OLS on first difference

The correlation between the error term and the regressor still remains.

*Proof.*

$$\begin{aligned} & Cov((Y_{it-1} - Y_{it-2}), (\epsilon_{it} - \epsilon_{it-1})) = \dots \\ &= Cov(Y_{it-1}, \epsilon_{it-1}) \neq 0 \end{aligned}$$

□

We can, however, choose an instrumental variable such that it correlates with  $y_{it-1}$  but not  $y_{it}$ . The second lag term will  $Y_{it-2}$  be a good choice.

## 5 TWFE is Biased

### 5.1 Plot the concept




Figure 1: A failure of simply using the two way fixed effect on staggered treatment effect

See figure 1. The purpose of DiD is to extract the trend of the treated in a way that the counterfactual outcome can be obtained. The TWFE, however, takes the treated (the orange line after  $T_1$ ) as the controlled group, causing the DiD on the blue cohort to actually look to have a downward effect.

### 5.2 Simulation

Referring to an excellent article written by Callaway and Sant'Anna (2022), I replicated a simplified version of the concept <sup>2</sup>.

The data generating process is as follow

$$Y_{i,t,g} = (2020 - g) + \alpha_i + \alpha_{t,g} + \tau_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

where  $i$  is the unit,  $t$  is the year, and  $g$  is the group. Each unit belongs to a state. There are 40 states in this data generating process, each randomly assigned

<sup>2</sup><https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/did/vignettes/TWFE.html>




Figure 2: Data for Monte-Carlo simulation

to one of the treated-year in the group  $\{2005, 2010, 2015, 2020\}$ . Therefore each unit corresponds to one of the group, and hence is treated in one of the year above. The fixed effects are defined as follow

$$\begin{aligned}
 \alpha_i &\sim \mathcal{N}(0.2state, 1) \\
 \alpha_t &\sim 0.1(t - g) + \epsilon_t^{FE} \\
 \epsilon_t^{FE} &\sim \mathcal{N}(0, 1) \\
 \tau_{i,t} &= \mu(t - g + 1)\mathbb{1}\{t \geq g\} \\
 \epsilon_{i,t} &\sim \mathcal{N}(0, \frac{1}{4})
 \end{aligned}$$

The time series data is shown in figure 2. Here the treatment effect  $\mu$  is set to be 2.

Note that  $\alpha_t$  is a cohort specific parallel time-trend, the expected value of time fixed effect for each group will then be set to 0 when they are treated.






Figure 3: Monte Carlo simulation using the twoway fixed effect estimation with  $N = 1000$

We then estimate the following TWFE

$$Y_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \alpha_t + D_{it}\beta_{TWFE} + \epsilon_{it}$$

The result is shown in figure 3

We test the hypothesis

$$H_0 : \hat{\mu} = 2$$

using a two tail t-test. The t-value is 147.84, and the confidence interval is  $[2.529415, 2.543658]$ . We reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the TWFE estimator causes a bias on this scenario.

### 5.3 The did Library

Using the `did` package contributed by Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021), we get the following result:




Figure 4:  $ATT(g, t)$  estimated by the `did` package. The ribbon represents  $\pm 1s.e.$

The slope is roughly 2, which matches the setting of our data generating process.