Pakistan in 1981: Staying on

Author(s): Stephen Philip Cohen and Marvin G. Weinbaum

Source: *Asian Survey*, Feb., 1982, Vol. 22, No. 2, A Survey of Asia in 1981: Part II (Feb., 1982), pp. 136-146

Published by: University of California Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2643940

PAKISTAN IN 1981: STAYING ON

Stephen Philip Cohen and
Marvin G. Weinbaum

IN A YEAR punctuated by several notable events—the dramatic hijacking of a PIA airliner from Karachi to Kabul, the effective abrogration of the 1973 constitution, the coalescing of opposition parties, the imposition of Islamic banking, and the revival of economic aid and military sales from the U.S.—much happened but very little changed in Pakistan. The martial law government of General Zia ul-Haq, in its fifth year, continued to proclaim a willingness to turn over power to civilians but had adopted a political formula for rule that seemed to leave future elections more indefinite than ever. The economy maintained its recent vigor, though problems of budget deficits, low productivity, and population growth continued to cast their shadow over the future. Notwithstanding its agreements with the U.S., Pakistan retained its non-aligned course and sustained its nuclear program. Though buffeted by external and internal pressures, the government held to a steady, largely standoffish policy toward the Afghan insurgency.

Pakistan is suspended between the 1973–75 mood of self-confidence, when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was at the height of his popularity and powers, and the despair of the post-coup period of 1977–79, when the very future of the state was in question. Yet what persists is the sharp edge of uncertainty about the future—even the immediate future. The year 1981 could turn out to have been the relatively calm interlude before the storm, or it might give way to a relatively stable period; such are Pakistan's uncertainties that either outcome is plausible.

The "Zia System"

By the end of 1981, President Zia ul-Haq seemed both more comfortable in his leadership role and more convinced of the correctness of the

0004-4687/82/020136+11$00.50

path he has chosen for Pakistan. His critics—and even some of his supporters—have begun to argue that he will eventually fall prey to overconfidence and a belief in his own indispensability and infallibility. Yet Zia retains control over the military and has managed to remove—by retirement, transfer, or redefinition of their power—most potential alternatives within the army. It is a truism that if he were to be replaced it would have to be by another general, but increasingly he rules less as a representative of military interests and more as a man with his own ideas and ambitions. Zia has demonstrated considerable political skill and patience in dealing with a number of highly explosive issues, notably the border intrusions of the Afghan and Soviet military and Shi'ite objections to *zakat*—the government's 2.5% tax on savings deposits. Advised on various issues by a series of civil-military committees, he has so far avoided many of the charges leveled at previous heads of state. While rumors of corruption in high places are widespread, none of them seem to touch him personally, nor can he be charged with insufficient religious piety. Zia's modest family origins in what is now India make it impossible to lump him with the widely resented indigenous *zamindar* (large landlord) class (although he is attacked by dissident Baluch and Sindhi leaders as representing Punjabi interests). The campaign for Islamization, the regime's principal theme, has not pleased everyone. The more Western-oriented find it irrelevant to Pakistan's real problems and a purposeful distraction. The *Jamaat-i-Islami* and other highly fundamentalist parties have complained about the slow pace of reforms. But the President's promotion of an Islamic order has won him the admiration of many people and made it difficult for religious leaders to attack him. Zia's mediation efforts in the Iran-Iraq war and his appearances in various international fora have helped his domestic standing. Even though his personal intercession in the war was futile, Zia demonstrated what Bhutto has boasted he alone could offer Pakistan—the ability of a leader to gain respect for Pakistan in Islamic and Third World circles.

It is probably still true that were free elections held today, the government (or its surrogates, could any be found) would not win, yet it is not clear that anyone else could either. Although Zia is actively disliked by many Pakistanis, an increasing number have come to regard him as a necessary evil. Whatever his popularity, the issues likely to serve as the catalysts for radical change are still absent. It was one thing to be prepared to vote against the regime, quite another to be willing to go into the streets to overthrow it. Zia remains a difficult target for his enemies, and they have come belatedly to appreciate that whatever his limitations as a charismatic politician, he knows how to retain power.

The Opposition

The restlessness shared by many educated and middle-class Pakistanis for the restoration of open political activity is more in hope of a

democratic solution than in favor of a particular party, ideology, or leader. With the possible exception of the Pakistan People's Party's Begum Nusrat and Benazir Bhutto, wife and daughter, respectively, of the executed former Prime Minister, none of the opposition politicians commands a broad national following. And though the Bhutto women are spared some of the cynicism felt toward most of the country's veteran party leaders, they were in 1981 not yet considered experienced enough to assume the reigns of government. In any case, at the end of 1981, Begum Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto were both under close supervision by Pakistan security forces.

A factor in the regime's survival was its simultaneous resolve and restraint in controlling the opposition. More than a hundred opposition politicians were jailed in the weeks following the formation of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) on February 6, 1981. The coalition, sealed by a secret meeting in Lahore later in the month, joined together the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and all but three parties that in 1977 had constituted the ideologically disparate anti-Bhutto Pakistan National Alliance. With the arrests reaching into the lower echelons of the legally "defunct" parties, coordination of opposition activities and plans for wide civil unrest were stymied. Press censorship denied the regime's critics the desired mass audience. Martial law authorities also reacted firmly to a series of anti-government strikes during January and February by students, teachers, lawyers, and doctors. Universities were closed after violent student disturbances in several cities in the Punjab, including the looting of an armory and firing on police by left-wing students in Peshawar. University teachers had been on a one-day-a-week strike since the beginning of the year to protest a federal ordinance that sought to give the government tighter control over academic affairs and university administration.

In quickly putting down anti-government demonstrations, the regime avoided bloodshed and refrained from massive force that could have created public sympathy for the opposition and widened the agitation. The government avoided calling out regular army troops, a step that could prove fatal to its existence. Many professional groups remained free to publicly criticize the regime, and the newpapers sometimes subtly conveyed anti-government information. The press remained under control through 1981, although late in the year the government announced that professional, academic, and technical publications would no longer be subject to official censorship. Maltreatment of those jailed occurred and is regarded by Amnesty International as the product of systematic policy. Civil liberties were perhaps most seriously violated in the frequent arrest of relatives of those persons who had eluded police capture. Such things are difficult to measure, but responsible critics of the Zia government are now arguing that arrests, torture, and capricious detentions dramatically increased in the last half of 1981. Amnesty International itself had praised Zia in 1977 for his early release of political prisoners, but by September 1981 thought it necessary to prepare a lengthy critical state-

ment for U.S. Congressional consideration.[1] While observers disagree on the ultimate significance of arrests of opposition leaders and workers, and on the numbers involved, they do seem to concur that there has been a "revolving door" policy of using arrests as a way of enforcing limits on political activity.[2] This may be a tactically successful policy, but the implications for the restoration of pluralistic politics are clear: the regime is trying to acquaint Pakistani politicians with the limited scope and intensity of political activity that may be sanctioned by any new constitutional order.

For all the tactical success of the regime in dealing with the domestic opposition during the remainder of 1981, the first two months of the year were uncomfortable for the government as opposition attacks became more focused. The prospects for the unraveling of political authority were dramatically reversed with the hijacking and diversion to Kabul on March 2 of a PIA Boeing 727 by men belonging to the guerrilla group *Al-Zulfikar,* headed by Murtaza Bhutto, eldest son of the late Prime Minister. Though the hijackers forced the release after 13 days of 54 political prisoners held by the Zia government, it was the PPP that paid the highest price. The Bhutto women denied their party's involvement or approval of the hijacking, but the killing of a Pakistani diplomat hostage and evidence of Afghan collusion in the operation was cited by Zia as proof that the PPP stood for terrorism and was a tool of foreign powers. *Al-Zulfikar* has also been blamed for the sabotage and destruction of a PIA DC-10. Such events also amplified Zia's arguments that at a time when the Pakistan's security was threatened from both Afghanistan and India, the country needed discipline and continuity in government and could ill-afford bickering, ineffectual politicians at the helm. In late November, Pakistani security forces carried out fresh and wide-scale arrests, jailing 2,000 in the Punjab. The round-up of these "anti-social elements" was allegedly in response to threats of sabotage and terror by the Kabul-based *Al-Zulfiqar* group; without a free press or an open opposition it is as difficult to assess these charges as those of government abuse and torture.[3]

Toward a New Constitutional Order

The regime's firm control in the streets notwithstanding, its authority had remained limited and was on occasion successfully challenged in Pakistan's judiciary. Senior judges, though frequently intimidated, could find refuge in provisions of a 1973 constitution that the Zia regime had never renounced. The country's Supreme Court had validated the martial law government in November 1977, citing its existence as a matter of necessity but holding the government responsible for proceeding with free and fair elections at an early date. However, the regime's relationship with the judiciary could not help but prove awkward; for in chosing to legitimize their rule constitutionally, government authorities thereby vest-

ed potentially enormous powers of review with the judges. As punitive acts increased, the regime's opponents turned to the higher courts to try to block detentions and reverse military sentences. The strongest challenges to the constitutional authority of the martial law authorities came in Baluchistan.[4] The trial of Bhutto's attorney general, Yahya Bahktiar, was declared to be illegal and non-Islamic by the Chief Justice of the province's High Court. The same court on December 1980 also stayed the executions and other sentences handed down by military tribunals. By early 1981 the pressure was building for the federal Supreme Court to use its remaining powers under Article 199 of the constitution to invalidate administrative and executive acts and force the government to carry out actions legally required.

Without prior notice, President Zia on March 24 promulgated a series of far-reaching constitutional changes. The question of supremacy of civilian and military courts was settled by prohibiting the High Courts from interfering with detention under martial law, and the provision was made retroactive. The provisional constitution gave President Zia the authority to amend the document at will during the duration of the martial law rule. Zia's order also made it a matter of fundamental law that only those four parties registered with the Election Commissioner on October 11, 1979 would be permitted to function once the ban on political activities was lifted. The PPP and most parties belonging to the MRD were thus dissolved, subject to having their property and funds confiscated. Moreover, any party deemed to be working against the ideology and security of the state could also be banished.[5] The changes provided for a 350-member Federal Advisory Council (*Majlis-i-Shura*), an appointive legislative body to be nominated from regular constituencies, with membership from ten occupation groups, the *ulema,* and ex-military personnel. Those serving, the government insisted, would be chosen for their "intellect and integrity."[6]

While the government immediately implemented those changes that would strengthen its already considerable power, it delayed the establishment of this consultative Council until late December. In a nationally broadcast speech, Zia described the Council as an important step towards restoring democracy and representative institutions as soon as possible. "This Council will not smell of any dictatorship. I and my associates want maximum sharing in matters of state." But he also declared that he had come to the conclusion that "elections were not possible despite our sincere and best efforts," and, expressing a view widely held in the military, noted that "elections have given birth only to goons and chaos and confusion" in Pakistan.[7]

It is still uncertain whether the Council will be unicameral or bicameral, what relationship it will have to the President and the Cabinet, or indeed, who are its members. What is certain is that all of Pakistan's major political parties rejected it even before its formation, and the MRD has called upon the U.S. to press Zia to hold free elections.[8]

Pakistan's already weakened judiciary was an early casualty of these constitutional changes. The refusal of Pakistan's Chief Judge, Anwar ul-Haq, and three other Supreme Court justices, along with four provincial High Court judges, to take an oath of allegiance to the provisional constitution brought their immediate dismissal. Another twelve senior judges who had shown sympathy for the opposition were purged.[9] Though many provisions of the 1973 constitution had been carried over into the new structures, President Zia had dealt severely with one of the few national symbols for which there was a broad consensus. The 1973 constitution had served for people of widely different political persuasions as a reference point on which to rebuild a democratic system. General Zia's defense of the changes left doubt, in fact, whether the regime viewed representative institutions as fully compatible with the concept of a just and stable Islamic order. But if Zia had finally gone too far in trying to insure his political survival, those who expected in 1981 that the stage was set for an early general uprising were disappointed. Though probably more unpopular than ever, Zia and the army were more determined and just as prepared to stay on.

The Afghan Refugees

By the end of 1981, the official count of Afghan refugees settled in the country exceeded two million. An economic drain at present, they could also become a political problem in time. Occasional clashes between the refugees and local tribesmen could escalate as the hospitality accorded the Afghans by their Pathan cousins wears thin. Some refugees have already moved into the towns and cities of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and elsewhere, often to take jobs vacated by people leaving for employment in the Gulf. Should more disperse from their camps, and should the cause in Afghanistan seem hopeless, economic tensions will grow. Estranged from their tribal codes, the Afghans are likely to become highly disruptive elements in an urban society. The Islamabad government voices concern about the possible infiltration of spys among the refugees, notably in Baluchistan where separatist sentiment still runs high and Soviet meddling could be used as a lever against the central government.[10] The longer term worry is that the massive influx of refugees might intensify Pathan national feelings and, in seeking greater political autonomy in the Pakistan political context, create a *de facto* Pushtunistan. This fear is strengthened as more sophisticated arms are acquired by the rebels from outside sources.

In November, a further intimation of trouble came in the form of a token Afghan air attack on several refugee camps. On the evening of November 16, several Afghan helicopter gunships dropped butterfly mines in the Parachinar salient, southwest of Peshawar. The next day four gunships strafed the Basso and Matasangar refugee camps, five miles from the border, killing one person and wounding sixteen. This was

the first time that Afghan security forces had actually carried out a raid on the refugee camps, although Afghan Air Force MiG's and helicopters had earlier violated Pakistani airspace. Since the two camps contained about 28,000 persons, casualties could have run much higher had the Afghan gunships stayed in the area; however, they fled before Pakistan's fighters arrived.[11] Meanwhile, the United Nations again passed a resolution calling for withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan; for the first time, the debate was not led by Foreign Minister Agha Shahi but by his deputy, giving rise to speculation that Pakistan was softening its position. This seems unlikely, but neither is there evidence that the renewal of U.S. military sales to Pakistan has meant a significant increase in Pakistan's support for the Afghan *Mujaheedin*.

The Economy

The state of the economy, a familiar source of political troubles in Pakistan, failed to give motive for mass discontent with the martial law government. Indeed, it continues the upswing begun in 1979. Agricultural production and industrial output have been growing in real terms by an average of 6% annually. Three good growing seasons in a row have boosted wheat production to near self-sufficiency. The 1981 crop was expected to be over 11 million tons, up nearly 30% from the 1977–78 low levels. The country's industry, which accounts for some 30% of industrial output, sustained its impressive growth in exports. Industrial profits in general were up again in the private sector during 1981, and confidence in continued expansion remained high. The government encouraged foreign and domestic investment that had been frightened off with the nationalization and threats of government takeovers during the Bhutto years.

The standard of living for many Pakistanis has improved largely because of the remittances through official or unofficial channels from 1.5 million workers, mainly in the Gulf countries. Remittances have created new consumer demand that has spurred a 15% inflation rate. Yet earnings abroad provide on balance increased disposable income across all economic groups, a far more effective and immediate distributive effect than could be devised by a government otherwise committed to trickle-down mechanisms and Islamic charity. The export picture was especially bright as receipts were expected to top the record $2.4 billion in 1980. Pakistan's current accounts deficit was eased by a three-year loan in March from the IMF worth $1.7 billion and a debt rescheduling worked out in January with the Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium. Though oil import costs consume almost half the country's export earnings, the leveling-off in oil prices during 1981 provided a needed respite for the country, which has seen its oil bill rise ten-fold since 1973. Roughly $200 million in development loans from the World Bank's IDA affiliate were slated for the country in 1981, and the U.S. had restored economic assistance with promises of

$100 million for FY 1982 in a multi-year program. Stepped up aid from Saudi Arabia and other Middle East sources continues to figure prominently in the country's financial plans. In March, the Saudi government announced its intention to invest in Pakistan up to $3 billion, some 60% of its total development assistance to the Third World. The aid was aimed mainly at agriculture and related industries in the hope that Pakistan might become a granary for the Middle East.[12] Finally, the U.S. support package included economic assistance in the form of low-interest loans and debt relief.[13]

Pakistan is by no means free of economic problems. The economy is increasingly burdened by the steady influx of Afghan refugees. An estimated $200 million was allocated in cash allowances to Afghan evacuees during the year, an amount equal to the total support given by all international agencies.[14] Military expenditures are high, justified by the perceived threats from India as well as along the northwest frontier. The investment picture is clouded by the uncertain effects of interest-free banking begun on the first of the year. Aside from sufficient rainfall, agricultural production will turn on the continued availability and delivery of fertilizers and pesticides that are dependent on the government's ability to support crop prices needed to cover the increased costs of farm inputs. However, it is the trade imbalance that remains most troublesome for Pakistan's planners. Despite the strong recovery in exports, the excessive dependence on imports and the worsening terms of trade for capital goods and raw materials were expected to push the trade gap at the end of 1981 to almost $3 billion.[15] As yet, there was little reason to believe that domestic industries can find native substitutes for imported raw materials and finished goods, or can curb consumer demand for food items that have already altered dietary habits. In all, Pakistan's external debt stands at over $10 billion, a condition that makes it unlikely that the country can build a substantial foreign exchange reserve in the near future or free itself from the attempts of major international creditors to dictate Pakistan's economic policies.

Foreign Policy and Security Issues

In 1981, Pakistan demonstrated a skill and sophistication in relations with neighbors, the Islamic world, and the superpowers that can no longer be dismissed as the product of mere luck. Although the military dominates the policy process, the strategies pursued would have been favored by Bhutto.

The year saw the revival of a strategic relationship with the United States, the sensational initiative of a no-war agreement with India, and the continuing management of good relations with China, several important Islamic states, and even the Soviet Union. Finally, it brought new indications that Pakistan's long-range strategic plans include the development of a nuclear weapon.

The agreement with the new Reagan administration announced on

June 15 and finally approved by the U.S. Congress on December 9[16] consists of a five-year program with three components. The least controversial was a $1.625 billion five-year economic assistance program. This in turn was composed of two parts: the continuation of PL-480 Title I/III food supplies (these consist entirely of edible oils; this program was not stopped when other aid was suspended, and is valued at $50 million a year), and low-interest loans for various developmental programs. The most important of the latter were various agricultural inputs, machinery purchases, storage facilities, water management projects (about $600 million), and energy development ($200). A sum of $45 million is earmarked for development projects in Baluchistan and NWFP.

The second component of the American program was the sale of a variety of weapons at commercial terms (i.e., at about 14% interest) and for hard currency. This will include such items as reconditioned tanks (M-48 Pattons), self-propelled howitzers, armored personnel carriers, and attack helicopters. These sales will total about $1.5 billion and involve credit from the U.S.

While neither economic aid nor the FMS program raised significant controversy in the U.S., Pakistan, or even India, this was not the case with the third component, forty F-16A aircraft and their spare parts. The Pakistanis insisted upon early delivery of the F-16. The first six, to be paid for in cash, will be delivered before the end of 1982, and the remainder over a subsequent period of a year and a half. The total cost for these aircraft will be about $1.1 billion. In purchasing the F-16s, which have a superior range and ground attack capability, Pakistan apparently turned down an offer to co-manufacture the Northrop F-5G (an advanced but shorter-range aircraft). Critics of the F-16 sale argued that it was the wrong plane for Pakistan, needlessly threatened India, and might provoke a war between the two, but the administration responded that the aircraft had become the symbol of a new U.S.-Pakistan strategic relationship and was politically necessary for the entire program.

Since the Pakistan aid package must be renewed on an annual basis (and the 1982–83 legislation includes the proviso that aid will be terminated if Pakistan develops a nuclear weapon), it is likely that Congressional criticism of the entire agreement will become an annual affair for several years to come.

Just as the above package was being considered in Washington, Pakistan stunned its neighbor by offering a "no-war" agreement to India on September 15. Since India itself had been making such an offer since 1949 (and Pakistan had alternatively offered a "joint defense" agreement), it was caught off-guard. After a two-month exchange of press releases and innuendos, India formally responded positively to the offer on November 25.[17] It remains unclear as to whether either side is motivated by a desire for regional reconciliation or whether they are playing to an international audience, while really more concerned about the deteriorating regional security environment.

Even as it was concluding the military sales agreement with Paki-

stan, the U.S. found fresh evidence of continued Pakistani attempts to acquire a nuclear weapons potential.[18] This is persistently denied by the Pakistani government, although on one occasion President Zia did let it slip that "Pakistan can make the bomb." On the next day a clarifying statement noted that President Zia "never said that Pakistan intends to make a bomb or that it has the capacity to do so," and reiterated the position that Pakistan would not be deprived of "nuclear technology for peaceful purposes."[19] In its other regional relationships, Pakistan has carefully cultivated the People's Republic of China, and has managed to improve greatly its relations with Iran (with which it now carries on a major export trade). It has even improved relations with the Soviet Union. Finally, President Zia maintains a special relationship with Saudi Arabia and several other Gulf states. There are Pakistani military advisory missions throughout the Gulf, and a healthy flow of remittance money back to Pakistan (in Pakistan FY 1980/81 this came to $2.128 billion, while the cost of oil imports was estimated at $1.4 billion). During the year, the Soviets inaugurated a new steel mill at Karachi, and Pakistani officials have been careful to restrain their public anti-Soviet rhetoric. They even hint at an agreement over the degree of pressure that Pakistan will be subject to because of its support for the Afghan *Mujaheedin*.[20]

All of this adds up to a skillfully conceived and implemented foreign policy, reflecting the two domestic constraints of military bureaucratic necessity (weapons) and popular support for non-alignment. It is a remarkable achievement, but—given Pakistan's precarious strategic position—this is the minimum required for survival.

Stephen Philip Cohen is Co-Director of the Office of Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, and Marvin G. Weinbaum is Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

NOTES

1. See Amnesty International (USA), *The Current Human Rights Situation in Pakistan*, Statement Submitted for the Record in Hearings before the Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs, Asian and Pacific Affairs, and International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, September 1981, and Pakistan Committee for Democracy and Justice, New York, *Atrocities of Military Rule in Pakistan*, September 1981.

2. For one of the most important analyses of domestic politics in 1980–81, see the *Report* of a Staff Study Mission to Pakistan and India, September 30–October 17, 1981, to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, November 20, 1981. Cited below as *Staff Report*.

3. Estimates of the number arrested vary widely. The PPP charged in mid-year that 3,000 persons were in prison on political charges, the Pakistan government says that there are no political prisoners, and Western diplomats estimated the number

at 1,500. See *India Abroad*, July 10, 1981, and *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)*, South Asia Daily Report, November 20, 1981.

4. See Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations* (New York: Carnegie Endowment, 1981).

5. *Pakistan Affairs*, April 16, 1981, pp. 1-3 (issued by Embassy of Pakistan, Washington, D.C.)

6. *Pakistan Times*, April 8, 1981.

7. *New York Times (NYT)*, December 25 and 26, 1981.

8. *NYT*, December 31, 1981.

9. *Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER)*, April 13, 1981, p. 14.

10. Unconfirmed reports indicate that "scores of Pakistani leftists have received asylum in Kabul," including Sardar Khair Bux Marri, chief of the Marri tribe of Baluchistan and leader of the outlawed National Awami Party. If this is true, then two of the three leading Baluchi politicians (Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo has been there for some time) are in Afghanistan, leaving only Sardar Ataullah Mengal in London. See *NYT*, December 29, 1981, and *FBIS*, December 15, 1981.

11. *Daily Telegraph*, November 23, 1981, and *FEER*, November 27, 1981.

12. *Dawn*, March 3, 1981.

13. See the testimony of M. Peter McPherson, Administrator, Agency for International Development, before the subcommittees cited in footnote 1.

14. *FEER*, May 29, 1981.

15. *Dawn*, April 13, 1981.

16. See the McPherson testimony, the testimony of James L. Buckley, Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology before the same three House subcommittees (September 16, 1981) cited in footnote 1, and the Committee of Foreign Affairs *Staff Report*.

17. *International Herald Tribune*, November 27, 1981.

18. David K. Willis, "Trying to Head Pakistan Off at the Nuclear Pass," *Christian Science Monitor*, December 1, 1981.

19. Zia's statements were broadcast from Turkish radio on November 24, 1981, and a corrective statement was issued from Islamabad on November 25. *FBIS*, November 24 and 27, 1981.

20. This was the burden of several speeches given by Foreign Minister Agha Shahi in Pakistan throughout the year, as he sought to reassure his audiences that the new relationship with the U.S. did not imply a change in non-alignment nor would it provoke the Soviets.