

檢視中國債務陷阱

Examining the Chinese Debt-Trap Diplomacy

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

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Debt Trap

Debt-trap Diplomacy

China extends excessive loans to countries and places a debt burden upon them in exchange for political or economic concessions.

DEBT TO CHINA



SRI LANKA PROJECT LIST

Hambantota Port

- Initiated: 2007
- 2008: Phase I, \$307 million from Chinese Exim Bank, 6% rate
- 2012: Phase II, \$304 million
- 2017: 99-year lease, 70% sale to China Merchant Port

Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport

- 2009: \$181 million from Chinese Exim Bank, 2% rate
- 2013: Open
- 2014: 21,000 passengers only
- “The world’s emptiest airport”

Road Projects

- 2009: \$1.14 billion Colombo-Katunayake Expressway (CKE)
- 2010&2011: 1.51%
- 2014: \$1.99 on road construction and improvement

PAKISTAN PROJECT LIST

Power Project 2016

- \$2.7 billion on the Gwadar-Nawabshah LNG terminal and pipeline project;
- \$1.26 billion on the Karot Hydropower Project;
- \$1.28 billion on the Matiari to Lahore Transmission Line;
- \$1.55 billion on the Pakistan Port Qasim Power Project; and \$0.75 billion on the Qasim Datang Power Station (Horn, Reinhart and Trebesch, 2021).

Power Project 2017

- \$1.35 billion for Suki Kinari Hydropower Project
- \$1.5 billion on the Hubco Coal Power Plant Project

Gwadar Port

- 2015: 43-year lease to China Overseas Port Holding Company
- Develop Special Economic Zone (SEZ)

Model

MODEL SETTING

- Decentralized version of Eaton-Gersovitz model
- Tradable vs Nontradable goods
- Household, Firm, Government, Foreign lender

- Maximize

$$E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U(c_t) \quad (1)$$

- Utility function

$$U(c_t) = \frac{c_t^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1-\sigma} \quad (2)$$

- Aggregation function for consumption

$$c_t = A(c_t^T, c_t^N) = \left[a (c_t^T)^{1-\frac{1}{\xi}} + (1-a) (c_t^N)^{1-\frac{1}{\xi}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{\xi}}} \quad (3)$$

- Budget constraint

$$P_t^T c_t^T + P_t^N c_t^N + P_t^T d_t = P_t^T \tilde{y}_t^T + W_t h_t + (1-\tau_t^d) P_t^T q_t^d d_{t+1} + F_t + \Phi_t \quad (4)$$

- Working hours

$$h_t \leq \bar{h} \quad (5)$$

Notation: $p_t \equiv \frac{P_t^N}{P_t^T}$, $w_t = \frac{W_t}{P_t^T}$, $f_t = \frac{F_t}{P_t^T}$, and $\phi_t = \frac{\Phi_t}{P_t^T}$

$$p_t = \frac{A_2(c_t^T, c_t^N)}{A_1(c_t^T, c_t^N)} \quad (6a)$$

$$\lambda_t = U'(c_t) A_1(c_t^T, c_t^N) \quad (6b)$$

$$(1 - \tau_t^d) q_t^d \lambda_t = \beta E_t \lambda_{t+1} \quad (6c)$$

- Technology

$$y_t^N = F(h_t) \quad (7)$$

- Profit

$$\Phi_t(h_t) = P_t^N F(h_t) - W_t h_t \quad (8)$$

- F.O.C

$$p_t F'(h_t) = w_t \quad (9)$$

DOWNWARD WAGE RIGIDITY

$$W_t \geq \gamma W_{t-1}, \quad \gamma > 0 \quad (10)$$

This implies that the growth rate $\frac{W_t - W_{t-1}}{W_{t-1}} \geq \gamma - 1$

Slackness condition

$$(\bar{h} - h_t)(W_t - \gamma W_{t-1}) = 0 \quad (11)$$

Government decides to default or not for the economy

- If repay ($I = 1$): able to lend in $t + 1$, or $d_{t+1} > 0$
- If default ($I = 0$): excluded from international credit market, $d_{t+1} = 0$

Written as slackness condition

$$(1 - I_t)d_{t+1} = 0 \quad (12)$$

Government returns tax to household via lump-sum transfer

$$f_t = \tau_t^d q_t^d d_{t+1} + (1 - I_t)d_t \quad (13)$$

- If repay ($I = 1$): gives back $\tau_t^d q_t^d d_{t+1}$
- If default ($I = 0$): further distribute current debt d_t

- Risk neutral
- If country in good standing, offer price q_t for debt that returns 1 unit of $d_{t+1} \rightarrow$ return on debt $= \frac{1}{q_t}$
- take future default events into evaluation

$$\frac{\Pr(I_{t+1} = 1 \mid I_t = 1)}{q_t} = 1 + r^* \quad (14)$$

- Slackness condition

$$I_t \left[q_t - \frac{E_t I_{t+1}}{1 + r^*} \right] = 0$$

COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM I

Output

- Nontradable goods

$$c_t^N = y_t^N \quad (15)$$

- tradable goods

$$\ln(y_t^T) = \rho \ln(y_{t-1}^T) + \mu_t \quad (16)$$

- Endowment loss under bad standing ($I_t = 0$)

$$\tilde{y}_t^T = \begin{cases} y_t^T - L(y_t^T) & \text{if } I_t = 0 \\ y_t^T & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (17)$$

- $L(y_t^T) = \max\{0, \delta_1 y_t^T + \delta_2 (y_t^T)^2\}$

COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM II

- price demand = price supply during good standing

$$I_t(q_t^d - q_t) = 0 \quad (18)$$

- combine above with budget constraint

$$c_t^T = y_t^T - (1 - I_t)L(y_t^T) + I_t(q_t d_{t+1} - d_t) \quad (19)$$

COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM III

- law of one price $P_t^T = P_t^{T*} \mathcal{E}_t$
- normalize foreign currency price to 1L $P_t^T = \mathcal{E}_t$
- devaluation rate

$$\epsilon_t \equiv \frac{\mathcal{E}_t}{\mathcal{E}_{t-1}} = \frac{P_t^T}{P_{t-1}^T}. \quad (20)$$

$\{c_t^T, h_t, w_t, d_{t+1}, \lambda_t, q_t, q_t^d\}$ satisfying:

$$c_t^T = y_t^T - (1 - I_t)L(y_t^T) + I_t(q_t d_{t+1} - d_t), \quad (21)$$

$$(1 - I_t)d_{t+1} = 0, \quad (22)$$

$$\lambda_t = U'(A(c_t^T, F(h_t)))A_1(c_t^T, c_t^N), \quad (23)$$

$$(1 - \tau_t^d)q_t^d \lambda_t = \beta E_t \lambda_{t+1}, \quad (24)$$

$$I_t(q_t^d - q_t) = 0, \quad (25)$$

$$\frac{A_2(c_t^T, F(h_t))}{A_1(c_t^T, F(h_t))} = \frac{w_t}{F'(h_t)}, \quad (26)$$

$$w_t \geq \gamma \frac{w_{t-1}}{\epsilon_t}, \quad (27)$$

$$h_t \leq \bar{h}, \quad (28)$$

$$(h_t - \bar{h}) \left(w_t - \gamma \frac{w_{t-1}}{\epsilon_t} \right) = 0, \quad (29)$$

$$I_t \left[q_t - \frac{E_t I_{t+1}}{1 + r^*} \right] = 0, \quad (30)$$

given processes $\{y_t^T, \epsilon_t, \tau_t^d, I_t\}$ and initial conditions w_{-1} and d_0 .

$$\begin{aligned}
 v^c(y_t^T, d_t) = & \max_{\{c_t^T, h_t, d_{t+1}\}} \{ U(A(c_t^T, F(h_t))) + \beta E_t v^g(y_{t+1}^T, d_{t+1}) \} \\
 \text{s.t. } & c_t^T + d_t = y_t^T + q(y_t^T, d_{t+1})d_{t+1} \\
 & h_t \leq \bar{h}.
 \end{aligned} \tag{31}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 v^b(y_t^T) = & \max_{\{h_t\}} \left\{ U(A(y_t^T - L(y_t^T), F(h_t))) + \right. \\
 & \left. \beta E_t [\theta v^g(y_{t+1}^T, 0) + (1 - \theta)v^b(y_{t+1}^T)] \right\}
 \end{aligned} \tag{32}$$


$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{s.t. } & h_t \leq \bar{h}. \\
 v^g(y_t^T, d_t) = & \max \{ v^c(y_t^T, d_t), v^b(y_t^T) \}.
 \end{aligned} \tag{33}$$

- Given a debt level d_t , the output under which default is optimal

$$D(d_t) = \left\{ y_t^T : v^b(y_t^T) > v^c(y_t^T, d_t) \right\}. \quad (34)$$

PLOTTING THE DEFAULT SET

- Gray: Non-default set
- White: Default set



- $\Pr(I_{t+1} = 1 \mid I_t = 1)$ is probability that next period output falls into default set

$$q(y_t^T, d_{t+1}) = \frac{1 - \Pr \{y_{t+1}^T \in D(d_{t+1}) \mid y_t^T\}}{1 + r^*} \quad (35)$$

- Since y_t^T is AR(1), output today is enough information about tomorrow \rightarrow function of y_t^T

OPTIMAL DEVALUATION RATE

- Optimal labor supply: $h_t = \bar{h}$ or full employment
- To ensure full employment, wage must be

$$w_t = w^f(c_t^T) \equiv \frac{A_2(c_t^T, F(\bar{h}))}{A_1(c_t^T, F(\bar{h}))} F'(\bar{h}) \quad (36)$$

- Because downward rigidity

$$\gamma \leq \frac{W_t}{W_{t-1}} = \frac{w_t}{w_{t-1}} \frac{P_t^T}{P_{t-1}^T} = \epsilon \frac{w_t}{w_{t-1}}$$

- Optimal devaluation rate is any ϵ_t such that

$$\epsilon_t \geq \gamma \frac{w_{t-1}}{w^f(c_t^T)} \quad (37)$$

Calibration

PARAMETERS NEEDED TO BE CALIBRATED

Param.	Description
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ρ	Autocorrelation of output
σ_u	Standard deviation of output
r^*	Risk-free rate
θ	Probability of reentry
α	Labor share in nontradable goods sector
a	Share of tradable consumption
ξ	Intratemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption
σ	$1/(\text{intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption})$
γ	Downward wage rigidity
β	Discount factor
δ_1	Coefficient of the linear term in loss function
δ_2	Coefficient of the quadratic term in loss function


GENERAL PROCEDURE

- ρ, σ_u : Per capita tradable GDP \rightarrow HP-filter \rightarrow cyclical component \rightarrow AR(1) estimation $\rightarrow \hat{\rho}, \hat{\sigma}_u$
 - ▶ Since model period is quarter, data period is year
 - ▶ $\rho = 1 - \frac{1-\hat{\rho}}{4}, \sigma_u = \frac{\hat{\sigma}_u}{\sqrt{4}}$
- r^* : US 3-month T-bill $\approx 4\%$ per year
- θ : 1 / average years till reentry
- α : Follow calibration of literature
- a : mean of tradable-to-GDP ratio over 1980 to 2021
- σ, ξ : Follow literature, set as (2, 0.5)
- $\beta, \delta_1, \delta_2$: match three equilibrium moment
 - ▶ Quarterly unsecured debt-to-tradable-GDP ratio
 - ▶ Default frequency per century
 - ▶ Average output loss in bad standings


OUTPUT PROCESS I

- HP-filter with $\lambda = 100$ since annual data
- Also tried log-quadratic detrend
- Tradable = agriculture + forestry + fishing + industry

HP Detrending on Log Per Capita Tradable Output



Cyclical Component



OUTPUT PROCESS II

Sri Lanka

Filtering	ρ	σ	Unconditional std
HP	0.9114	0.0180	4.37%
Log-Q	0.9325	0.0266	7.38%

Pakistan

Filtering	ρ	σ	Unconditional std
HP	0.8518	0.0116	2.21%
Log-Q	0.9239	0.0174	4.55%

- Time span: Before 2008, China started to provide large loans
- Reentry to international credit market: Since no default in the past, follow literature and choose 0.0385
- Debt-to-tradable-GDP ratio
 - ▶ Data: 118% average annual
 - ▶ Haircut: use average sovereign haircut = 37% according to Cruces and Trebesch (2013)
 - ▶ times four to make it quarter
 - ▶ $118\% \times 0.37 \times 4 = 175\%$
- Default frequency per century: There is ambiguity in counting default events. Therefore, set as 2.6 following literature
- Output loss: Set as 7% following literature


Parameter	Value	Source
ρ	0.9114	Estimation of AR(1) on GDP
σ_u	0.0180	Estimation of AR(1) on GDP
r^*	0.01	U.S. 3-month treasury bill rate
θ	0.0385	Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012)
α	0.65	Jegajeevan (2016)
a	0.35	Share of tradable goods in GDP
ξ	0.5	Na et al. (2018)
σ	2	$1/\xi$
γ	1.109	Matschke and Nie (2022)
β	0.6919	Estimated
δ_1	-0.4391	Estimated
δ_2	0.5530	Estimated
\bar{h}	1	Normalized to 1

- Time span: Before 2013, China started to provide large loans
- reentry to international credit market: 1999 default → 2004 gain
positive flow → 6 years, or 24 quarters
- Debt-to-tradable-GDP ratio
 - ▶ Data: 69% average annual
 - ▶ Haircut: use average sovereign haircut = 37% according to Cruces and Trebesch (2013)
 - ▶ times four to make it quarter
 - ▶ $69\% \times 0.37 \times 4 = 102\%$
 - ▶ (Typo in the thesis)
- Default frequency per century: There is ambiguity in counting default events. Therefore, set as 2.6 following literature
- Output loss: Set as 7% following literature


Parameter	Value	Source
ρ	0.8518	Estimation of AR(1) on GDP
σ_u	0.0116	Estimation of AR(1) on GDP
r^*	0.01	3 month treasury bill rate
θ	0.0417	Trebesch (2011)
α	0.4	Rehman et al. (2020)
a	0.33	Share of tradable goods in GDP
ξ	0.5	Na et al. (2018)
σ	2	$1/\xi$
γ	1.048	Matschke and Nie (2022)
β	0.6252	Estimated
δ_1	-0.5148	Estimated
δ_2	0.5789	Estimated
\bar{h}	1	Normalized to 1

Result


SRI LANKA DEFAULT SET




PAKISTAN DEFAULT SET




REMOVING CHINA'S DEBT




REMOVING CHINA'S DEBT



REMOVING CHINA'S DEBT



REMOVING CHINA'S DEBT



PROBLEMS WITH REMOVING CHINA'S DEBT

- Debt is endogenous in the model — Might borrow from other countries
 - ▶ Hambantota Port is originally the former President's idea
 - ▶ Pakistan is under severe power shortage, might borrow money for infrastructure constructions
- GDP might be lower — BRI investment might have cause the counties' GDP to grow
 - ▶ BRI investment may increase labor demand on industrial sectors
- Counterfactual analysis must account for the two factor.

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