

The Twin Ds: Optimal Default and Devaluation[†]

By SEUNGHOON NA, STEPHANIE SCHMITT-GROHÉ, MARTÍN URIBE,
AND VIVIAN YUE*

A salient characteristic of sovereign defaults is that they are typically accompanied by large devaluations. This paper presents new evidence of this empirical regularity known as the Twin Ds and proposes a model that rationalizes it as an optimal policy outcome. The model combines limited enforcement of debt contracts and downward nominal wage rigidity. Under optimal policy, default is shown to occur during contractions. The role of default is to free up resources for domestic absorption, and the role of exchange rate devaluation is to lower the real value of wages, thereby reducing involuntary unemployment. (JEL E24, E32, E52, F31, F34, F41)

This paper introduces nominal rigidities into a sovereign default model to explain the empirical regularity, first established in Reinhart (2002), that sovereign defaults are accompanied by large devaluations of the nominal exchange rate. Specifically, using data for 58 countries over the period 1970 to 1999, Reinhart (2002) estimates that the unconditional probability of a large devaluation in any 24-month period is 17 percent. At the same time, she estimates that conditional on the 24-month period containing a default event, the probability of a large devaluation increases to 84 percent. Reinhart refers to the joint occurrence of default and devaluation as the Twin Ds phenomenon.

The present paper presents new evidence of the Twin Ds phenomenon by building an expanded sample (1975–2013) that includes more countries and more recent default events. In this dataset the typical default episode is associated with an excess devaluation of the domestic currency of 48 percent. A novel finding of our empirical analysis is that the large devaluation that occurs at the time of default is typically

*Na: Department of Economics, Krannert School of Management at Purdue University, 403 West State Street, West Lafayette, IN 47907 (email: sn2518@columbia.edu); Schmitt-Grohé: Columbia University, 420 W 118th Street, New York, NY 10027, CEPR, and NBER (email: stephanie.schmittgrohe@columbia.edu); Uribe: Columbia University, 420 W 118th Street, New York, NY 10027, and NBER (email: martin.uribe@columbia.edu); Yue: Emory University, 201 Dowman Drive, Atlanta, GA 30322, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, and NBER (email: vivianyuel1@gmail.com). This paper was accepted to the *AER* under the guidance of Martin Eichenbaum, Coeditor. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe thank the National Science Foundation for research support. We thank for comments Manuel Amador, Javier Bianchi, Robert Kollmann, and seminar participants at Bonn, Berkeley, Columbia, Georgetown, Harvard, Johns Hopkins, LSE, Mannheim, MIT, Notre Dame, Penn, Penn State, Rutgers, Seoul National, UT Austin, the ECB, the Philadelphia Fed, the Chicago Fed, the Board of Governors, the CIREQ-ENSAI workshop, the Cornell-PSU conference, the 2015 World Congress of the Econometric Society, and the IFM October 2014 Program meeting of the NBER. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Federal Reserve System. The authors declare that they have no relevant or material financial interests that relate to the research described in this paper.

[†]Go to <https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141558> to visit the article page for additional materials and author disclosure statement(s).

not followed by an increase in the rate of depreciation of the exchange rate. This characteristic suggests that the Twin Ds phenomenon consists in the joint occurrence of default and a large level change in the nominal exchange rate.

Motivated by these facts, the paper develops a theoretical model with the property that periods in which it is optimal to default are also periods in which it is optimal to bring about a large change in a relative price. In the proposed model, the key frictions are limited commitment to repay external debts and downward nominal wage rigidity. In the model, default is predicted to occur after a string of increasingly negative output shocks. In the run-up to default, domestic absorption experiences a severe contraction putting downward pressure on the demand for labor. Absent any intervention by the central bank, downward nominal wage rigidity would prevent real wages from adjusting downwardly and the labor market would fail to clear resulting in involuntary unemployment. To avoid this scenario, the optimal policy calls for a devaluation of the domestic currency, which reduces the real value of wages. As a result, in the model, as in the data, default episodes are typically accompanied by large devaluations.

In a calibrated version of the model, we find that the minimum devaluation necessary to implement the optimal allocation at the time of default exceeds 35 percent. Thus, the benevolent government's desire to preserve employment during a severe external crisis gives rise to devaluations similar in magnitude to those observed in the data during a typical Twin Ds episode.

Although, as emphasized above, in the data default events are typically accompanied by large devaluations, we find it of interest to consider the experiment of default when the central bank is unwilling or unable to apply the optimal devaluation policy. In particular, we consider a currency peg motivated by the experience of the periphery of Europe in the aftermath of the great contraction of 2008. Under a currency peg, the government gives up its ability to counteract the inefficiencies associated with downward nominal wage rigidity during periods of depressed aggregate demand. As a consequence, under a currency peg, the model predicts that default events are accompanied by involuntary unemployment. In the calibrated version of the model, we find that around defaults unemployment rises by about 20 percentage points. This result suggests that the proposed explanation of the Twin Ds, namely, that large devaluations around default events are needed to realign key relative prices, is economically important.

The present analysis is related to various strands of the literature on exchange-rate-based stabilization and sovereign default. An important body of related work focuses on the fiscal consequences of devaluations, emphasizing either flow or stock effects. Models of balance-of-payment crises à la Krugman (1979) focus on increases in the rate of devaluation as a way to generate seigniorage revenue flows when a government suffering from structural fiscal deficits is forced to abandon an unsustainable currency peg. This explanation has been used to understand the defaults of the early 1980s in Latin America, which were followed by a decade of high inflation. Under this hypothesis, the nominal exchange rate continues to grow at higher rates after the default. However, the pattern observed for a large number of defaults in our dataset (in fact the majority) is one in which high rates of devaluation stop within a year after default.

A literature that goes back to Calvo (1988) views devaluation as an implicit default on (the stock of) domestic-currency denominated government debt. Recent

developments along these lines include Aguiar et al. (2013), Corsetti and Dedola (2016), Da Rocha, Giménez, and Lores (2013), Du and Schreger (2015), and Sunder-Plassmann (2013). This channel is not open in the model studied in the present paper because debt is assumed to be denominated in foreign currency. This assumption is motivated by the empirical observation that most of the debt issued by emerging economies is denominated in foreign currency (see, for example, Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza 2005). However, we consider the present contribution complementary to this line of research as even in economies in which government debt is primarily denominated in foreign currency, devaluations can have fiscal consequences by decreasing the real value of other domestic-currency denominated government liabilities, such as the monetary base or nominal pension liabilities.

The real side of the model developed in this paper builds on recent contributions to the theory of sovereign default in the tradition of Eaton and Gersovitz, especially Aguiar and Gopinath (2006); Arellano (2008); Kim and Zhang (2012); Hatchondo, Martinez, and Saprizza (2010); Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012); and Mendoza and Yue (2012). This literature has made significant progress in identifying features of the default model that help deliver realistic predictions for the average and cyclical behavior of key variables of the model, such as the level of external debt and the country interest rate premium. We contribute to this literature by establishing that the social planner allocation in models of the Eaton-Gersovitz family can be decentralized by means of a debt tax. And we extend this literature by merging it with the literature on optimal exchange rate policy in models without default risk (e.g., Galí and Monacelli 2005; Kollmann 2002; and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 2016). Moussa (2013) builds a framework similar to the present one to study the role of debt denomination. Kriwoluzky, Müller, and Wolf (2014) study an environment in which default takes the form of a re-denomination of debt from foreign to domestic currency. Finally, Yun (2014) presents a model in which sovereign default causes the monetary authority to lose commitment to stable exchange rate policy.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I presents new evidence on the Twin Ds phenomenon. Section II presents the model and derives the competitive equilibrium. Section III derives the key decentralization results and characterizes analytically the equilibrium under optimal default and devaluation policy. Section IV analyzes quantitatively the typical default episode under the optimal policy in the context of a calibrated version of the model. Section V characterizes analytically and quantitatively the equilibrium dynamics under a currency peg. Section VI extends the model to allow for long-maturity debt and incomplete exchange rate pass-through. Section VII concludes.

I. New Evidence on the Twin Ds Phenomenon

In this section, we confirm the findings of Reinhart (2002) on the Twin Ds phenomenon on an expanded sample that includes the default-rich period 2000 to 2013. We also document a novel characteristic of the Twin Ds phenomenon, namely, that the large depreciation that occurs at the time of default is typically not followed by an elevation in the rate of devaluation.

The panel includes information on nominal exchange rates defined as the domestic currency price of US\$1 and sovereign default dates. The data source for nominal




FIGURE 1. EXCESS DEVALUATION AROUND DEFAULT, 1975–2013

Notes: The solid line displays the median of the cumulative devaluation rate of the domestic currency vis-à-vis the US dollar between years -3 and t , for $t = -3, \dots, 3$, conditional on default in year 0 minus the unconditional median of the cumulative devaluation rate between years -3 and t . Countries with less than 30 consecutive years of exchange rate data were excluded, resulting in 117 default episodes over the period 1975 and 2013 in 70 countries.

Sources: Default dates: Uribe and Schmitt-Grohé (2017, Table 13.19); Exchange rates: World Development Indicators, code: PA.NUS.FCRF.

exchange rates is the World Bank's World Development Indicator (WDI) database and the source for default dates is Uribe and Schmitt-Grohé (2017, Table 13.19). The panel includes all countries that had at least one default event in the period 1975 to 2013 and for which WDI has at least 30 consecutive years of data on the dollar exchange rate. These two criteria result in a sample of 70 countries and 117 default episodes.

Figure 1 displays the median excess depreciation of the nominal exchange rate around defaults. It shows that typically in a window encompassing three years before and after a default event, the exchange rate depreciates about 45 percent more than in the unconditional median window of the same width. Thus, the figure confirms the finding of Reinhart (2002) that defaults are accompanied by large devaluations.

A novel characteristic of the Twin Ds phenomenon uncovered by Figure 1 is the deceleration in the rate of devaluation that takes place shortly after default. Figure 2 highlights this characteristic. It shows the behavior of the level of the nominal dollar exchange rate in six recent well-known default episodes, namely, Argentina 2002, Ecuador 1999, Paraguay 2003, Russia 1999, Ukraine 1999, and Uruguay 2003. All six default events were followed by no further devaluations. The path of the level of the nominal exchange rate around default resembles a steep elevation followed by a plateau. The behavior of the nominal exchange rate documented in Figures 1 and 2




FIGURE 2. SIX RECENT DEFAULTS

Note: Exchange rates are nominal dollar exchange rates defined as the domestic currency price of one US\$1, annual averages, first observation normalized to unity.

Sources: Default dates: Uribe and Schmitt-Grohé (2017, Table 13.19); Exchange rates: World Development Indicators, code: PA.NUS.FCRF.

suggests a connection between the decision to default and the decision to change the level of the nominal exchange rate. In the theoretical model laid out in the next section, this connection is created by combining lack of commitment to repay sovereign debt with nominal frictions in the form of downward nominal wage rigidity.

II. The Model

The theoretical framework embeds imperfect enforcement of international debt contracts à la Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) into the open economy model with downward nominal wage rigidity of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016). We begin by describing the economic decision problem of households, firms, and the government.

A. Households

The economy is populated by a large number of identical households with preferences described by the utility function

$$(1) \quad E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U(c_t),$$

where c_t denotes consumption. The period utility function U is assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly concave and the parameter β , denoting the subjective discount factor, resides in the interval $(0, 1)$. The symbol E_t denotes the mathematical expectations operator conditional upon information available in period t . The consumption good is a composite of tradable consumption, c_t^T , and nontradable consumption, c_t^N . The aggregation technology is of the form

$$(2) \quad c_t = A(c_t^T, c_t^N),$$

where A is an increasing, concave, and linearly homogeneous function.

Households have access to a one-period, state noncontingent bond, which is assumed to be denominated in tradables.¹ We let d_{t+1} denote the level of debt assumed in period t and due in period $t + 1$ and q_t^d its price. The sequential budget constraint of the household is given by

$$(3) \quad P_t^T c_t^T + P_t^N c_t^N + P_t^T d_t = P_t^T \tilde{y}_t^T + W_t h_t + (1 - \tau_t^d) P_t^T q_t^d d_{t+1} + F_t + \Phi_t,$$

where P_t^T denotes the nominal price of tradable goods, P_t^N the nominal price of nontradable goods, \tilde{y}_t^T the household's endowment of traded goods, W_t the nominal wage rate, h_t hours worked, τ_t^d a tax on debt, F_t a lump-sum transfer received from the government, and Φ_t nominal profits from the ownership of firms. Households are assumed to be subject to a debt limit that prevents them from engaging in Ponzi schemes. We introduce a tax on debt as a way to decentralize the Eaton-Gersovitz

¹ In Section VIA, we show that the key results of the paper are robust to allowing for long-term debt.

model. Individual agents take the country premium as exogenously given, whereas, as we will see shortly, the government internalizes the effect of aggregate external debt on the country premium. Kim and Zhang (2012) also consider the case of decentralized borrowing and centralized default. However, we characterize the debt tax scheme that results in an equilibrium allocation identical to that of a model with centralized borrowing and centralized default (the standard Eaton-Gersovitz allocation). Specifically, both in the present setting and in Kim and Zhang's borrowers do not internalize the fact that the interest rate depends on debt. However, in the present formulation households face debt taxes that make them internalize the effect of borrowing on the country interest rate. By contrast, in the formulation of Kim and Zhang, debt taxes are absent and hence the allocation under decentralized borrowing is different from the one under centralized borrowing.

The variable \tilde{y}_t^T is stochastic and is taken as given by the household. Households supply inelastically \bar{h} hours to the labor market each period, but may not be able to sell all of them, which gives rise to the constraint

$$(4) \quad h_t \leq \bar{h}.$$

Households take h_t as exogenously given.

Households choose contingent plans $\{c_t, c_t^T, c_t^N, d_{t+1}\}$ to maximize (1) subject to (2)–(4) and the no-Ponzi-game debt limit, taking as given $P_t^T, P_t^N, W_t, h_t, \Phi_t, q_t^d, \tau_t^d, F_t$, and \tilde{y}_t^T . Letting $p_t \equiv P_t^N/P_t^T$ denote the relative price of nontradables in terms of tradables, the optimality conditions associated with this problem are (2)–(4), the no-Ponzi-game debt limit, and

$$(5) \quad \frac{A_2(c_t^T, c_t^N)}{A_1(c_t^T, c_t^N)} = p_t,$$

$$\lambda_t = U'(c_t)A_1(c_t^T, c_t^N),$$

$$(1 - \tau_t^d)q_t^d\lambda_t = \beta E_t\lambda_{t+1},$$

where λ_t/P_t^T denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with (3).

B. Firms

Nontraded output, denoted y_t^N , is produced by perfectly competitive firms. Each firm operates a production technology of the form

$$(6) \quad y_t^N = F(h_t).$$

The function F is assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly concave. Firms choose the amount of labor input to maximize profits, given by

$$(7) \quad \Phi_t = P_t^N F(h_t) - W_t h_t.$$

The optimality condition associated with this problem is $P_t^N F'(h_t) = W_t$. Dividing both sides by P_t^T yields

$$p_t F'(h_t) = w_t,$$

where $w_t \equiv W_t/P_t^T$ denotes the real wage in terms of tradables.

C. Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity

We model downward nominal wage rigidity by imposing a lower bound on the growth rate of nominal wages of the form

$$(8) \quad W_t \geq \gamma W_{t-1}, \quad \gamma > 0.$$

The parameter γ governs the degree of downward nominal wage rigidity. The higher is γ , the more downwardly rigid nominal wages will be.

The presence of downwardly rigid nominal wages implies that the labor market will in general not clear. Instead, involuntary unemployment, given by $\bar{h} - h_t$, will be a regular feature of this economy. We assume that wages and employment satisfy the slackness condition

$$(9) \quad (\bar{h} - h_t)(W_t - \gamma W_{t-1}) = 0.$$

This condition states that periods of unemployment ($h_t < \bar{h}$) must be accompanied by a binding wage constraint. It also states that when the wage constraint is not binding ($W_t > \gamma W_{t-1}$), the economy must be in full employment ($h_t = \bar{h}$).

The decision to model nominal rigidity as downward nominal wage rigidity is empirically motivated. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016) document that downward nominal wage rigidity is pervasive in emerging-market economies. For example, during the 1998–2001 crisis in Argentina, nominal hourly wages did not fall (actually they increased from 7.87 pesos in 1998 to 8.14 pesos in 2001) in spite of the fact that sub-employment (the sum of involuntary unemployment and involuntary part-time employment) increased by 10 percentage points and that the nominal exchange rate was fixed at \$1 per peso. This evidence suggests the presence of downward nominal wage rigidity. The period following the collapse of the Argentine currency convertibility (i.e., post December 2001) features sizable increases in nominal hourly wages. This suggests that nominal wages are upwardly flexible. This evidence favors a formulation in which wage rigidity is one-sided as opposed of two-sided. Consumer prices in Argentina do not appear to be downwardly rigid to the same degree as nominal wages. Over the period 1998 to 2001, nominal consumer prices fell by about 1 percent per year. Taken together, this evidence suggests that in Argentina around the 2001 crisis, wages were more downwardly rigid than were product prices.

The empirical relevance of downward nominal wage rigidity extends to the periphery of Europe around the Great Contraction of 2008. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016) show that between 2008 and 2011 nominal hourly wages in 13 peripheral European countries failed to decline (in fact they increased on average by 2 percent per year), despite the fact that unemployment increased massively, that

all 13 countries were either on the euro or pegging to the euro, and that inflation in the eurozone was low. In the boom period that preceded the crisis (2000 to 2007), nominal hourly wages increased by over 60 percent despite the fact that productivity growth in the periphery of the eurozone was virtually nil and that euro area-wide inflation was low. Again, this evidence suggests a formulation in which nominal wages are downwardly rigid but upwardly flexible.

As a consequence of one-sided nominal wage rigidity, the present model implies that the real exchange rate can be overvalued, in the sense of being higher than in the absence of nominal rigidities. An implication of this characteristic of the model is that a nominal devaluation will lead to a real depreciation insofar as the real exchange rate is overvalued absent the nominal depreciation. For a model in which nominal rigidities in the nontraded sector are two-sided and hence the nominal rigidity can cause both real exchange rate over- and undervaluation, see Burstein, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2007). These authors argue that the real depreciations observed in the United Kingdom after the 1992 nominal devaluation and in Korea after the 1997 nominal devaluation can be explained by upward rigidity in nominal prices of nontraded goods.

D. *The Government*

At the beginning of each period, the country can be either in good or bad financial standing in international financial markets. Let the variable I_t be an indicator function that takes the value 1 if the country is in good financial standing and chooses to honor its debt and 0 otherwise. If the economy starts period t in good financial standing ($I_{t-1} = 1$), the government can choose to default on the country's external debt obligations or to honor them. If the government chooses to default, then the country enters immediately into bad standing and $I_t = 0$. Default is defined as the full repudiation of external debt. While in bad standing, the country is excluded from international credit markets, that is, it cannot borrow or lend from the rest of the world. Formally,

$$(10) \quad (1 - I_t) d_{t+1} = 0.$$

Following Arellano (2008), we assume that bad financial standing lasts for a random number of periods. Specifically, if the country is in bad standing in period t , it will remain in bad standing in period $t + 1$ with probability $1 - \theta$ and will regain good standing with probability θ . When the country regains access to financial markets, it starts with zero external obligations.

We assume that the government rebates the proceeds from the debt tax in a lump-sum fashion to households. In periods in which the country is in bad standing ($I_t = 0$), the government confiscates any payments of households to foreign lenders and returns the proceeds to households in a lump-sum fashion. The resulting sequential budget constraint of the government is

$$(11) \quad f_t = \tau_t^d q_t^d d_{t+1} + (1 - I_t) d_t,$$

where $f_t \equiv F_t/P_t^T$ denotes lump-sum transfers expressed in terms of tradables.²

E. Foreign Lenders

Foreign lenders are assumed to be risk neutral. Let q_t denote the price of debt charged by foreign lenders to domestic borrowers during periods of good financial standing, and let r^* be a parameter denoting the foreign lenders' opportunity cost of funds. Then, q_t must satisfy the condition that the expected return of lending to the domestic country equal the opportunity cost of funds. Formally,

$$(12) \quad \frac{\Pr\{I_{t+1} = 1 | I_t = 1\}}{q_t} = 1 + r^*.$$

This expression can be equivalently written as

$$I_t \left[q_t - \frac{E_t I_{t+1}}{1 + r^*} \right] = 0.$$

F. Competitive Equilibrium

In equilibrium, the market for nontraded goods must clear at all times. That is, the condition

$$(13) \quad c_t^N = y_t^N$$

must hold for all t .

Each period the economy receives an exogenous and stochastic endowment equal to y_t^T per household. This is the sole source of aggregate fluctuations in the present model. Movements in y_t^T can be interpreted either as shocks to the physical availability of tradable goods or as shocks to the country's terms of trade.

As in much of the literature on sovereign default, we assume that if the country is in bad financial standing ($I_t = 0$), it suffers an output loss, which we denote by $L(y_t^T)$. The function $L(\cdot)$ is assumed to be nonnegative and nondecreasing. Thus, the endowment received by the household, \tilde{y}_t^T , is given by

$$(14) \quad \tilde{y}_t^T = \begin{cases} y_t^T & \text{if } I_t = 1 \\ y_t^T - L(y_t^T) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}.$$

As explained in much of the related literature, the introduction of an output loss during financial autarky improves the model's predictions along two dimensions. First, it allows the model to support more debt, as it raises the cost of default. Second, it discourages default in periods of relatively high output.

²It can be shown that the equilibrium dynamics are identical if one replaces the lump-sum transfer f_t with a proportional tax on any combination of the three sources of household income, $w_t h_t$, \tilde{y}_t^T , and Φ_t/P_t^T .

We assume that $\ln y_t^T$ obeys the law of motion

$$(15) \quad \ln y_t^T = \rho \ln y_{t-1}^T + \mu_t,$$

where μ_t is an i.i.d. innovation with mean 0 and variance σ_μ^2 , and $|\rho| \in [0, 1)$ is a parameter.

In any period t in which the country is in good financial standing, the domestic price of debt, q_t^d , must equal the price of debt offered by foreign lenders, q_t , that is,

$$(16) \quad I_t(q_t^d - q_t) = 0.$$

In periods in which the country is in bad standing d_{t+1} is nil. It follows that in these periods the value of τ_t^d is immaterial. Therefore, without loss of generality, we set $\tau_t^d = 0$ when $I_t = 0$, that is,

$$(17) \quad (1 - I_t)\tau_t^d = 0.$$

Combining (3), (6), (7), (10), (11), (13), (14), and (16) yields the market-clearing condition for traded goods,

$$c_t^T = y_t^T - (1 - I_t)L(y_t^T) + I_t[q_t d_{t+1} - d_t].$$

We assume that the law of one price holds for tradables.³ Specifically, letting P_t^{T*} denote the foreign currency price of tradables and \mathcal{E}_t the nominal exchange rate defined as the domestic-currency price of one unit of foreign currency (so that the domestic currency depreciates when \mathcal{E}_t increases), the law of one price implies that

$$P_t^T = P_t^{T*} \mathcal{E}_t.$$

We further assume that the foreign-currency price of tradables is constant and normalized to unity, $P_t^{T*} = 1$. Thus, we have that the nominal price of tradables equals the nominal exchange rate

$$P_t^T = \mathcal{E}_t.$$

Finally, let

$$\epsilon_t \equiv \frac{\mathcal{E}_t}{\mathcal{E}_{t-1}}$$

denote the gross devaluation rate of the domestic currency. We are now ready to define a competitive equilibrium.

³ Section VIB extends the model to allow for imperfect exchange rate pass-through.

DEFINITION 1 (Competitive Equilibrium): *A competitive equilibrium is a set of stochastic processes $\{c_t^T, h_t, w_t, d_{t+1}, \lambda_t, q_t, q_t^d\}$ satisfying*

$$(18) \quad c_t^T = y_t^T - (1 - I_t)L(y_t^T) + I_t[q_t d_{t+1} - d_t],$$

$$(19) \quad (1 - I_t)d_{t+1} = 0,$$

$$(20) \quad \lambda_t = U'(A(c_t^T, F(h_t)))A_1(c_t^T, F(h_t)),$$

$$(21) \quad (1 - \tau_t^d)q_t^d \lambda_t = \beta E_t \lambda_{t+1},$$

$$(22) \quad I_t(q_t^d - q_t) = 0,$$

$$(23) \quad \frac{A_2(c_t^T, F(h_t))}{A_1(c_t^T, F(h_t))} = \frac{w_t}{F'(h_t)},$$

$$(24) \quad w_t \geq \gamma \frac{w_{t-1}}{\epsilon_t},$$

$$(25) \quad h_t \leq \bar{h},$$

$$(26) \quad (h_t - \bar{h})\left(w_t - \gamma \frac{w_{t-1}}{\epsilon_t}\right) = 0,$$

$$(27) \quad I_t \left[q_t - \frac{E_t I_{t+1}}{1 + r^*} \right] = 0,$$

given processes $\{y_t^T, \epsilon_t, \tau_t^d, I_t\}$ and initial conditions w_{-1} and d_0 .

III. Equilibrium under Optimal Monetary Policy

This section characterizes the optimal default, devaluation, and debt tax policies. When the government can choose freely the devaluation rate, ϵ_t , and the debt tax, τ_t^d , the competitive equilibrium can be written in a more compact form, as stated in the following proposition.

PROPOSITION 1 (Competitive Equilibrium When ϵ_t and τ_t^d Are Unrestricted): *When the government can choose ϵ_t and τ_t^d freely, stochastic processes $\{c_t^T, h_t, d_{t+1}, q_t\}$ can be supported as a competitive equilibrium if and only if they satisfy the subset of equilibrium conditions (18), (19), (25), and (27), given processes $\{y_t^T, I_t\}$ and the initial condition d_0 .*

PROOF:

The key step in establishing this proposition is to show that if processes $\{c_t^T, h_t, d_{t+1}, q_t\}$ satisfy conditions (18), (19), (25), and (27), then they also satisfy the remaining conditions defining a competitive equilibrium, namely, conditions (20)–(24) and (26). To show this, pick λ_t to satisfy (20). When I_t equals 1, set q_t^d to satisfy (22) and set τ_t^d to satisfy (21). When I_t equals 0, set $\tau_t^d = 0$ (recall convention (17))

and set q_t^d to satisfy (21). Set w_t to satisfy (23). Set ϵ_t to satisfy (24) with equality. This implies that the slackness condition (26) is also satisfied. This establishes Proposition 1. ■

It is noteworthy that the compact form of equilibrium conditions includes neither the lower bound on wages nor the Euler equation of private households for choosing debt. This means that policy can be set to undo the distortions arising from downward nominal wage rigidity and the externality originating in the fact that private agents fail to internalize the effect of their individual borrowing choices on interest rates. Taxes on debt play a similar role in models in which a pecuniary externality arises because borrowers fail to internalize that the value of their collateral depends on their own spending decisions (see Korinek 2010; Mendoza 2010; Bianchi 2011; and Bianchi, Boz, and Mendoza 2012).

The government is assumed to lack commitment and in the current model this lack of commitment opens the door to time inconsistency. For example, in period t the government would like to promise to repay next period to reduce the cost of borrowing, $1/q_t$. But in period $t + 1$ this particular incentive for repayment is no longer there, as $1/q_t$ was already determined in the previous period, and hence the government may no longer find it optimal to repay ex post. In what follows we will characterize optimal time consistent policies and, following the practice in the Eaton-Gersovitz literature, will restrict attention to optimal policies that are a time-invariant function of the minimum set of aggregate states of the competitive equilibrium of the economy.

The states appearing in the conditions of the competitive equilibrium listed in Proposition 1 are the endowment, y_t^T , and the stock of net external debt, d_t . Notice that the past real wage, w_{t-1} , does not appear in the compact form of competitive equilibrium conditions. The intuition for why this variable is irrelevant for determining the state of the economy is that, with the policy instruments at its disposal, the government can completely circumvent the distortion created by downward nominal wage rigidity.⁴

Because of lack of commitment, the current government takes the behavior of future governments, in particular, the policy function for the default decision, as given. Let $\hat{I}(y_{t+1}^T, d_{t+1})$ denote the default decision of the government in period $t + 1$. The period- t government understands that it can affect the default decision of the period- $t + 1$ by its choice of d_{t+1} . Taking into account that d_{t+1} is in the information set of period t and that y_{t+1}^T follows a first-order Markov process, we have that $E_t \hat{I}(y_{t+1}^T, d_{t+1})$ is a function of y_t^T and d_{t+1} . Thus, should the period- t government choose to honor its debts in period t , we can express equilibrium conditions (27) as

$$(28) \quad q_t = q(y_t^T, d_{t+1}).$$

This equation says that the period- t government internalizes that its choice of d_{t+1} affects the price of debt, that is, the government internalizes the dependence of the

⁴ We will show in Section V that when the government is not free to choose the path of the devaluation rate, the past real wage, w_{t-1} , reappears as a relevant state variable.

interest rate on the amount of borrowing. With this notation in hand, we can now state the problem of the benevolent government with lack of commitment as follows.

If the country is in good financial standing in period t , $I_{t-1} = 1$, the value of continuing to service the external debt, denoted $v^c(y_t^T, d_t)$, i.e., the value of setting $I_t = 1$, is given by

$$(29) \quad v^c(y_t^T, d_t) = \max_{\{c_t^T, h_t, d_{t+1}\}} \left\{ U\left(A(c_t^T, F(h_t))\right) + \beta E_t v^g(y_{t+1}^T, d_{t+1}) \right\}$$

subject to (25) and

$$(30) \quad c_t^T + d_t = y_t^T + q(y_t^T, d_{t+1})d_{t+1},$$

given d_t , where $v^g(y_t^T, d_t)$ denotes the value of being in good financial standing. Clearly, the optimal choice of h_t is $h_t = \bar{h}$. The value of being in bad financial standing in period t , denoted $v^b(y_t^T)$, is given by

$$(31) \quad v^b(y_t^T) = \max_{\{h_t\}} \left\{ U\left(A(y_t^T - L(y_t^T), F(h_t))\right) + \beta E_t \left[\theta v^g(y_{t+1}^T, 0) + (1 - \theta) v^b(y_{t+1}^T) \right] \right\},$$

subject to (25). Again, it is optimal to set $h_t = \bar{h}$.

In any period t in which the country is in good financial standing, it has the option to either continue to service the debt obligations or to default. It follows that the value of being in good standing in period t is given by

$$(32) \quad v^g(y_t^T, d_t) = \max \{ v^c(y_t^T, d_t), v^b(y_t^T) \}.$$

The government chooses to default whenever the value of continuing to participate in financial markets is smaller than the value of being in bad financial standing, $v^c(y_t^T, d_t) < v^b(y_t^T)$.

Let $D(d_t)$ be the default set defined as the set of tradable-output levels at which the government defaults on a level of debt d_t . Formally,⁵

$$(33) \quad D(d_t) = \{ y_t^T : v^c(y_t^T, d_t) < v^b(y_t^T) \}.$$

⁵ A well-known property of the default set is that if $d < d'$, then $D(d) \subseteq D(d')$. To see this, note that the value of default, $v^b(y_t^T)$, is independent of the level of debt, d_t . At the same time, the continuation value, $v^c(y_t^T, d_t)$ is decreasing in d_t . To see this, consider two values of d_t , namely d and $d' > d$. Suppose that d^* and c^{T*} are the optimal choices of d_{t+1} and c_t^T when $d_t = d'$, given y_t^T . Notice that given d^* , y_t^T , and $d_t = d$, constraint (54) is satisfied for a value of c_t^T strictly greater than c^{T*} , implying that $v^c(y_t^T, d_t) > v^c(y_t^T, d')$ for $d < d'$. This means that, for a given value of y_t^T , if it is optimal to default when $d_t = d$, then it must also be optimal to default when $d_t = d' > d$.

We can then write the probability of default in period $t + 1$, given good financial standing in period t , as

$$\Pr\{I_{t+1} = 0 | I_t = 1\} = \Pr\{y_{t+1}^T \in D(d_{t+1})\}.$$

Combining this expression, (12), and (28) yields

$$(34) \quad q(y_t^T, d_{t+1}) = \frac{1 - \Pr\{y_{t+1}^T \in D(d_{t+1}) | y_t^T\}}{1 + r^*}.$$

With $h_t = \bar{h}$, equations (29)–(34) are those of the Eaton-Gersovitz model as presented in Arellano (2008). We have therefore demonstrated that under optimal policy the equilibrium allocation in the economy with downward nominal wage rigidity is identical to the equilibrium allocation in the real economy of Arellano (2008). This establishes the following proposition.

PROPOSITION 2 (Decentralization): *Real models of sovereign default in the tradition of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) can be interpreted as the centralized version of the decentralized economy with default risk and downward nominal wage rigidity described in Definition 1 under optimal devaluation policy and optimal taxation of debt.*

A corollary of this proposition applies to economies without nominal rigidities. Specifically, real models of sovereign default in the tradition of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) can be interpreted as the centralized version of economies with decentralized markets for consumption and borrowing and default risk under optimal taxation of debt. We present the proof of this corollary in Appendix A. In other words, real models in the Eaton-Gersovitz family can be decentralized by means of a tax on foreign borrowing.

The preceding analysis fully characterizes the real allocation under optimal policy, as we have established that $h_t = \bar{h}$ at all times and that c_t^T and d_{t+1} are determined as in the Eaton-Gersovitz model, whose solution has been characterized (using numerical methods) in the existing related literature. It then remains to characterize the exchange rate policy that supports the optimal real allocation. This step will allow us to ascertain whether the model can capture the empirical regularity that defaults are typically accompanied by nominal devaluations, the Twin Ds phenomenon documented in Figure 1. The family of optimal devaluation policies is given by

$$(35) \quad \epsilon_t \geq \gamma \frac{w_{t-1}}{w^f(c_t^T)},$$

where $w^f(c_t^T)$ denotes the full-employment real wage, defined as

$$(36) \quad w^f(c_t^T) \equiv \frac{A_2(c_t^T, F(\bar{h}))}{A_1(c_t^T, F(\bar{h}))} F'(\bar{h}).$$

Given the assumed properties of the aggregator function $A(\cdot, \cdot)$, the full-employment real wage, $w^f(c_t^T)$, is strictly increasing in the absorption of tradable goods. To see that the family of devaluation policies given in equation (35) can support the optimal allocation, notice that because in the optimal-policy equilibrium $h_t = \bar{h}$ for all t , competitive equilibrium condition (23) implies that $w_t = w^f(c_t^T)$, for all $t \geq 0$. Combining this expression with (24) yields (35). One can further establish that any devaluation-rate policy from the family (35) uniquely implements the optimal-policy equilibrium. See Appendix B for a proof of this claim.

The optimal policy scheme features policy instrument specialization. Because the optimal devaluation policy ensures that the equilibrium real wage equals the full-employment real wage at all times, exchange rate policy specializes in undoing the distortions created by nominal rigidities. Recalling from the proof of Proposition 1 that τ_t^d is chosen to guarantee satisfaction of the private agent's Euler equation, it follows that tax policy specializes in overcoming the borrowing externality.

IV. The Twin Ds

The optimal devaluation policy, given in equation (35), stipulates that the government must devalue in periods in which consumption of tradables experiences a sufficiently large contraction. At the same time we know from the decentralization result of Proposition 2 that under optimal devaluation policy the default decision coincides with the default decision in real models in the Eaton-Gersovitz tradition. In turn, in this family of models default occurs when aggregate demand is depressed. Therefore, the present model has the potential to predict the joint occurrence of default and devaluation, that is, the Twin Ds phenomenon. The question remains whether for plausible calibrations of the model, the contraction in aggregate demand at the time of default is associated with large enough declines in the full-employment real wage to warrant a sizable devaluation. This section addresses this question in the context of a quantitative version of the model.

Conducting a quantitative analysis requires specifying an exchange rate policy. From the family of optimal devaluation policies given in (35), we select the one that stabilizes nominal wages. Specifically, we assume a devaluation rule of the form

$$(37) \quad \epsilon_t = \frac{w_{t-1}}{w^f(c_t^T)}.$$

For $\gamma < 1$, this policy rule clearly belongs to the family of optimal devaluation policies given in (35). The motivation for studying this particular optimal devaluation policy is twofold. First, it ensures no deflation in the long run. This property is appealing because long-run deflation is not observed either in wages or product prices. Second, the selected optimal devaluation policy delivers the smallest devaluation at any given time among all optimal policies that are nondeflationary in the long run. This means that if the selected devaluation policy delivers the Twin Ds phenomenon, then any other nondeflationary optimal devaluation policy will also do so.⁶

⁶In the calibrated version of the model studied below, the assumed devaluation rule produces an unconditional standard deviation of the devaluation rate of 29 percent per year. The average standard deviation of the devaluation rate across the 70 countries included in Figure 1 is 35 percent.

TABLE 1—CALIBRATION

Parameter	Value	Description
γ	0.99	Degree of downward nominal wage rigidity
σ	2	Inverse of intertemporal elasticity of consumption
y^T	1	Steady-state tradable output
\bar{h}	1	Labor endowment
a	0.26	Share of tradables
ξ	0.5	Elasticity of substitution between tradables and nontradables
α	0.75	Labor share in nontraded sector
β	0.85	Quarterly subjective discount factor
r^*	0.01	World interest rate (quarterly)
θ	0.0385	Probability of reentry
δ_1	−0.35	Parameter of output loss function
δ_2	0.4403	Parameter of output loss function
ρ	0.9317	Serial correlation of $\ln y_t^T$
σ_μ	0.037	Standard deviation of innovation μ_t
Discretization of state space		
n_y	200	Number of output grid points (equally spaced in logs)
n_d	200	Number of debt grid points (equally spaced)
n_w	125	Number of wage grid points (equally spaced in logs)
$[\underline{y}^T, \bar{y}^T]$	[0.6523, 1.5330]	Traded output range
$[\underline{d}, \bar{d}]^{float}$	[0, 1.5]	Debt range under optimal float
$[\underline{d}, \bar{d}]^{peg}$	[−1, 1.25]	Debt range under peg
$[\underline{w}, \bar{w}]^{peg}$	[1.25, 4.25]	Wage range under peg

Note: The time unit is one quarter.

A. Functional Forms, Calibration, and Computation

We calibrate the model to the Argentine economy. We choose this country for two reasons. First, the Argentine default of 2002 conforms to the Twin Ds phenomenon. Second, the vast majority of quantitative models of default are calibrated to this economy (e.g., Arellano 2008; Aguiar and Gopinath 2006; Chatterjee and Eyigungor 2012; Mendoza and Yue 2012). The time unit is assumed to be one quarter. Table 1 summarizes the parameterization. We adopt a period utility function of the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) type

$$U(c) = \frac{c^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1-\sigma},$$

and set $\sigma = 2$ as in much of the related literature. We assume that the aggregator function takes the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) form

$$A(c^T, c^N) = \left[a(c^T)^{1-\frac{1}{\xi}} + (1-a)(c^N)^{1-\frac{1}{\xi}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{\xi}}}.$$

Following Uribe and Schmitt-Grohé (2017), we set $a = 0.26$, and $\xi = 0.5$. We assume that the production technology is of the form

$$y_t^N = h_t^\alpha,$$

and set $\alpha = 0.75$ as in Uribe and Schmitt-Grohé (2017). We normalize the time endowment \bar{h} at unity. Based on the evidence on downward nominal wage rigidity reported in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016), we set the parameter γ equal to 0.99, which implies that nominal wages can fall up to 4 percent per year. We also follow these authors in measuring tradable output as the sum of gross domestic product (GDP) in agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, and manufacturing in Argentina over the period 1983:I to 2001:IV. We obtain the cyclical component of this time series by removing a quadratic trend.⁷ The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate of the AR(1) process (15) yields $\rho = 0.9317$ and $\sigma_\mu = 0.037$. Following Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012), we set $r^* = 0.01$ per quarter and $\theta = 0.0385$. The latter value implies an average exclusion period of about 6.5 years. Following these authors, we assume that the output loss function takes the form

$$L(y_t^T) = \max \left\{ 0, \delta_1 y_t^T + \delta_2 (y_t^T)^2 \right\}.$$

We set $\delta_1 = -0.35$ and $\delta_2 = 0.4403$. We calibrate β , the subjective discount factor, at 0.85. The latter three parameter values imply that under the optimal policy the average debt to traded GDP ratio in periods of good financial standing is 60 percent per quarter, that the frequency of default is 2.6 times per century, and that the average output loss is 7 percent per year conditional on being in financial autarky. The predicted average frequency of default is in line with the Argentine experience since the late nineteenth century (see Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano 2003). The implied average output loss concurs with the estimate reported by Zarazaga (2012) for the Argentine default of 2001. The implied debt-to-traded-output ratio is in line with existing default models in the Eaton-Gersovitz tradition, but below the debt levels observed in Argentina since the 1970s.

The assumed value of β is low compared to the values used in models without default, but not uncommon in models à la Eaton-Gersovitz (see, for example, Mendoza and Yue 2012). In Section VIC we consider values of β of 0.95 and 0.98 and show that the prediction of a Twin Ds phenomenon is robust to these changes. All other things equal, increasing β lowers the predicted default frequency. One way to match the observed default frequency without having to set β at a low value is to incorporate long-maturity debt. We pursue this alternative in Section VIA. The predicted dynamics of the model around default episodes (and in particular the model's predictions regarding the Twin Ds phenomenon) are similar in the model with one-period debt and a low β and in the model with long-maturity debt and a high value of β .

We approximate the equilibrium by value function iteration over a discretized state space. We assume 200 grid points for tradable output and 200 points for debt. The transition probability matrix of tradable output is computed using the simulation approach proposed by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2009).

⁷ The choice of a quadratic detrending method is motivated by the fact that the log of traded output in Argentina appears to grow faster starting in the 1990s. However, the cyclical component of y_t^T is similar under quadratic detrending, linear detrending, or HP(1600) filtering.

B. *Equilibrium Dynamics around a Typical Default Episode*

We wish to numerically characterize the behavior of key macroeconomic indicators around a typical default event. To this end, we simulate the model under optimal policy for 1.1 million quarters and discard the first 0.1 million quarters. We then identify all default episodes. For each default episode we consider a window that begins 12 quarters before the default date and ends 12 quarters after the default date. For each macroeconomic indicator of interest, we compute the median period-by-period across all windows. The date of the default is normalized to 0. Figure 3 displays the dynamics around a typical default episode. The model predicts that optimal defaults occur after a sudden contraction in tradable output. As shown in the upper-left panel, y_t^T is at its mean level of unity until three quarters prior to the default. Then a string of three negative shocks drives y_t^T 12 percent (or 1.3 standard deviations) below trend.⁸ At this point (period 0), the government finds it optimal to default, triggering a loss of output $L(y_t^T)$, as shown by the difference between the solid and the broken lines in the upper-left panel. After the default, tradable output begins to recover. Thus, the period of default coincides with the trough of the contraction in the tradable endowment, y_t^T . The same is true for GDP measured in terms of tradables. Therefore, the model captures the empirical regularity regarding the cyclical behavior of output around default episodes identified by Levy-Yeyati and Panizza (2011), according to which default marks the end of a contraction and the beginning of a recovery.

As can be seen from the upper-right panel of Figure 3, the model predicts that the country does not smooth out the temporary decline in the tradable endowment. Instead, the country sharply adjusts the consumption of tradables downward, by about 14 percent. The contraction in traded consumption is actually larger than the contraction in traded output so that the trade balance (not shown) improves. In fact, the trade balance surplus is large enough to generate a slight decline in the level of external debt. These dynamics seem at odds with the quintessential dictum of the intertemporal approach to the balance of payments according to which countries should finance temporary declines in income by external borrowing. The country deviates from this prescription because foreign lenders raise the interest rate premium prior to default. This increase in the cost of credit discourages borrowing and induces agents to postpone consumption.

Both the increase in the country premium and the contraction in tradable output in the quarters prior to default cause a negative wealth effect that depresses the desired consumption of nontradables. In turn the contraction in the demand for nontradables puts downward pressure on the price of nontradables. However, firms in the nontraded sector are reluctant to cut prices given the level of wages, for doing so would generate losses. Thus, given the real wage, the decline in the demand for nontradables would translate into involuntary unemployment. In turn, unemployment would put downward pressure on nominal wages. However, due to downward

⁸One may wonder whether a fall in traded output of this magnitude squares with a default frequency of only 2.6 per century. The reason why it does is that it is the sequence of output shocks that matters. The probability of traded output falling from its mean value to 1.3 standard deviations below mean in only 3 quarters is lower than the unconditional probability of traded output being 1.3 standard deviations below mean.




FIGURE 3. A TYPICAL DEFAULT EPISODE UNDER OPTIMAL EXCHANGE RATE POLICY

Notes: Median of all 25-quarter windows around a default event in a simulation of 1 million quarters. The default date is normalized to 0. Replication file typical_default_episode_opt.m.

nominal wage rigidity, nominal wages cannot decline to a point consistent with clearing of the labor market. To avoid unemployment, the government finds it optimal to devalue the currency sharply by about 35 percent (see the right panel in row 2 of Figure 3). The devaluation lowers real wages (left panel in row 3) which fosters employment, thereby preventing that a crisis that originates in the external sector spreads into the nontraded sector. The model therefore captures the Twin Ds phenomenon as an equilibrium outcome.

The large nominal exchange rate depreciation that accompanies default is associated with a sharp real depreciation of equal magnitude, as shown by the collapse in the relative price of nontradables (see the right panel in row 3 of Figure 3). The fact that the nominal and real exchange rates decline by the same magnitude may seem surprising in light of the fact that nominal product prices are fully flexible. Indeed, the nominal price of nontradables remains stable throughout the crisis, which may convey the impression that nominal prices in the nontraded sector are rigid. The reason why firms find it optimal not to change nominal prices is that the devaluation reduces the real labor cost inducing firms to cut real prices. In turn, the decline in the real price of nontradables is brought about entirely by an increase in the nominal price of tradables (i.e., by the nominal devaluation).

The predicted stability of the nominal price of nontradables is in line with the empirical findings of Burstein, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2005), who report that the primary force behind the observed large depreciation of the real exchange rate that occurred after the large devaluations in Argentina (2002), Brazil (1999), Korea (1997), Mexico (1994), and Thailand (1997) was the slow adjustment in the nominal prices of nontradable goods. A natural question is whether the devaluations observed around default events do qualify as large devaluations as defined by Burstein, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2005). This is indeed the case. The median devaluation across the aforementioned 5 large devaluation episodes is 63 percent (median of cumulative devaluations over 24 months, reported in Table 1 of Burstein, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo). The median devaluation across the 117 default events studied in this paper happens to be also 63 percent. This means that the devaluations that typically accompany defaults are large devaluations as defined by Burstein, in sense of Burstein, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo.⁹

Finally, the bottom-right panel of Figure 3 shows that the government increases the tax on debt prior to the default from 9 to 17 percent. It does so as a way to make private agents internalize an increased sensitivity of the interest rate premium with respect to debt. The debt elasticity of the country premium is larger during the crisis because foreign lenders understand that the lower is output the higher the incentive to default, as the output loss, that occurs upon default, $L(y_i^T)$, decreases in absolute and relative terms as y_i^T falls.

The predicted increase in the debt tax around the typical default episode is implicitly present in every default model à la Eaton-Gersovitz. However, because the literature has limited attention to economies in which consumption, borrowing,

⁹Figure 1 of the present study displays an excess median devaluation around default events of 48 percent. One may wonder why this figure is lower than the 63 percent reported above. The reason is that Figure 1 plots the excess devaluation, which is defined as the deviation of the median devaluation around default events from the unconditional median devaluation.




FIGURE 4. CAPITAL CONTROLS AND RESERVE REQUIREMENTS AROUND DEFAULT: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

Note: Own calculations based on data on capital controls from Fernández et al. (2016), left panel, and on data on reserve requirements from Federico, Vegh, and Vuletin (2014), right panel.

and default decisions are all centralized, such taxes never surface. By analyzing the decentralized version of the Eaton-Gersovitz economy, the present analysis makes their existence explicit.

It follows that the behavior of debt taxes around default provides a dimension, distinct from the Twin Ds phenomenon, along which one can assess the plausibility of the predicted default dynamics. The variable τ_t^d , which in the model abstractly refers to a tax on debt, can take many forms in practice. Here, we examine two prominent ones, namely, capital control taxes and reserve requirements. The first measure is based on annual data on an index of capital controls on inflows and outflows constructed by Fernández et al. (2016). The indices cover the period 1995 to 2013 for 91 countries. We combine this data with the default dates used in Figure 1. The intersection of the datasets on capital controls and default dates yields 22 default episodes in 17 countries. The left panel of Figure 4 displays the behavior of capital controls on inflows and outflows starting three years prior to the default date. For each default episode, the capital control index on outflows and inflows is normalized to unity in year -3 . The figure shows that on average countries tighten capital controls on both inflows and outflows as they move closer to default. The second empirical measure of borrowing restrictions we examine comes from a dataset on reserve requirements produced by Federico, Végh, and Vuletin (2014). The dataset contains quarterly observations on various measures of legal reserve requirements for 52 countries (15 industrialized and 37 emerging) covering the period 1970 to 2011. Of the 52 countries in the dataset, Federico, Végh, and Vuletin classify 30 as active users of reserve requirements as a macroprudential policy instrument. We cross the reserve requirement data for active users with the default dates used in Figure 1. This step delivers reserve requirement data for 14 default episodes in 8 different countries. The right panel of Figure 4 displays the median change in reserve requirements relative to year -3 . The figure shows that, on average, defaults are accompanied by a tightening of reserve requirements. Taken together, the empirical evidence examined here provides support for the predictions of the model above and beyond its ability to capture the Twin Ds phenomenon.

V. Default and Unemployment under Fixed Exchange Rates

In this section, we analyze optimal default under a fixed exchange rate. Despite the fact that the vast majority of defaults are accompanied by large devaluations, we believe that doing so is of interest because sovereign debt crises have been observed in countries that belong to a monetary union (Greece and Cyprus in the aftermath of the global contraction of 2008) and in countries with a unilateral currency pegs (Ecuador, 2008). Here, we characterize the behavior of a currency-peg economy under two polar assumptions about the country's ability to commit to repay its external obligations: lack of commitment and full commitment. The analysis of the latter case is motivated by the fact that the debt crises observed in the periphery of Europe were accompanied by bailouts. We begin with the imperfect commitment case, because it introduces only one change to the economy studied thus far, namely, optimal exchange rate policy is replaced by a fixed exchange rate. Formally, we now assume that

$$(38) \quad \epsilon_t = 1.$$

This policy specification is meant to capture a unilateral currency peg or a fully dollarized economy, but not necessarily membership in a monetary union. As we will argue below, in the case of the euro area, membership in the monetary union came with higher perceived abilities of union members to commit to repay.

A competitive equilibrium in the peg economy are stochastic processes $\{c_t^T, h_t, w_t, d_{t+1}, q_t\}$ satisfying (18), (19), (23), (25), (27),

$$(39) \quad w_t \geq \gamma w_{t-1},$$

and

$$(40) \quad (h_t - \bar{h})(w_t - \gamma w_{t-1}) = 0,$$

given processes $\{y_t^T, I_t\}$ and initial conditions w_{-1} and d_0 . Equilibrium condition (39) replaces (24) and equilibrium condition (40) replaces (26). Notice that equilibrium conditions (20), (21), and (22) are not included in the definition of equilibrium under a currency peg. It is straightforward to show, following the same arguments as those presented in the proof of Proposition 1, that one can find values for λ_t , τ_t^d , and q_t^d that ensure satisfaction of these three omitted equilibrium conditions given processes $\{c_t^T, h_t, w_t, d_{t+1}, q_t\}$ and a default policy process I_t .

The government is assumed to set policies in an optimal time-consistent fashion. Attention is restricted to equilibria in which decision rules are time-invariant functions of the payoff relevant state variables. In the competitive equilibrium of the fixed exchange rate economy, the payoff relevant state variables are y_t^T , d_t , and w_{t-1} . Note that now, contrary to what was the case in the optimal exchange rate economy, w_{t-1} , the lagged value of the real wage, is a state variable. This is so because when the nominal exchange rate is fixed, downward nominal wage rigidity results in downward real wage rigidity.

Consider first the value of continuing to service the debt for a government in good financial standing at the beginning of period t , denoted $v^c(y_t^T, d_t, w_{t-1})$. When a government chooses to continue to service its debts, it sets $I_t = 1$. Let $\hat{I}(y_{t+1}^T, d_{t+1}, w_t)$ denote the default policy function of the period- $t + 1$ government. The period- t government takes the default policy of the future government as given. But it does internalize the fact that its own choices of d_{t+1} and w_t influence the default decision of the period- $t + 1$ government and in this way affect the interest rate at which it can borrow. To see this latter point, use the default policy of the period- $t + 1$ government to eliminate I_{t+1} from (27). In the case that $I_t = 1$, this yields $q_t = \frac{E_t \hat{I}(y_{t+1}^T, d_{t+1}, w_t)}{1 + r^*}$. Using the facts that d_{t+1} and w_t are in the information set of period t and that y_t^T follows a first-order Markov process, we can rewrite this expression as

$$(41) \quad q_t = q(y_t^T, d_{t+1}, w_t).$$

The value of continuing to service the debt is then given by

$$(42) \quad v^c(y_t^T, d_t, w_{t-1}) = \max_{\{c_t^T, d_{t+1}, h_t, w_t\}} \left\{ U(A(c_t^T, F(h_t))) + \beta E_t v^g(y_{t+1}^T, d_{t+1}, w_t) \right\}$$

subject to (23), (25), (39), and

$$(43) \quad c_t^T + d_t = y_t^T + q(y_t^T, d_{t+1}, w_t) d_{t+1},$$

given d_t and w_{t-1} , where $v^g(y_t^T, d_t, w_{t-1})$ denotes the value function associated with entering period t in good financial standing, for an economy with tradable output y_t^T , external debt d_t , and past real wage w_{t-1} .

Next consider the value of being in bad financial standing in the peg economy in period t , denoted $v^b(y_t^T, w_{t-1})$. When the country is in bad financial standing, then $I_t = 0$. In this case equilibrium condition (19) implies that $d_{t+1} = 0$ and equilibrium condition (18) becomes $c_t^T = y_t^T - L(y_t^T)$. The value of being in bad financial standing in period t is then given by

$$(44) \quad v^b(y_t^T, w_{t-1}) = \max_{\{h_t, w_t\}} \left\{ U(A(y_t^T - L(y_t^T), F(h_t))) \right. \\ \left. + \beta E_t [\theta v^g(y_{t+1}^T, 0, w_t) + (1 - \theta) v^b(y_{t+1}^T, w_t)] \right\},$$

subject to (23), (25), and (39), given w_{t-1} .

The value of being in good standing in period t is given by

$$(45) \quad v^g(y_t^T, d_t, w_{t-1}) = \max \{ v^c(y_t^T, d_t, w_{t-1}), v^b(y_t^T, w_{t-1}) \}.$$

The values of default, continuation, and good standing, $v^b(y_t^T, w_{t-1})$, $v^c(y_t^T, d_t, w_{t-1})$, and $v^g(y_t^T, d_t, w_{t-1})$, respectively, depend on the past real wage, w_{t-1} . This is because under downward nominal wage rigidity and a suboptimal exchange rate policy, the past real wage, by placing a lower bound on the current real wage, can prevent the labor market from clearing, thereby causing involuntary unemployment and suboptimal consumption of nontradable goods.

The default set is defined as

$$(46) \quad D(d_t, w_{t-1}) = \{y_t^T : v^b(y_t^T, w_{t-1}) > v^c(y_t^T, d_t, w_{t-1})\}.$$

The price of debt must satisfy the condition that the expected return of lending to the domestic country equals the opportunity cost of funds. Formally,

$$(47) \quad \frac{1 - \Pr\{y_{t+1}^T \in D(d_{t+1}, w_t)\}}{q_t} = 1 + r^*.$$

The slackness condition (40) is not included in the constraints of the value function problems, (42), (44), and (45). The reason is that under optimal policy, the slackness condition will always be satisfied. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose, contrary to what we wish to show, that under the optimal policy $h_t < \bar{h}$ and $w_t > \gamma w_{t-1}$ at some date $t' \geq 0$. Consider now a perturbation to the allocation under the time-consistent optimal policy consisting in a small increase in hours at time t' from $h_{t'}$ to $\tilde{h}_{t'}$, where $h_{t'} < \tilde{h}_{t'} \leq \bar{h}$. Clearly, this perturbation does not violate the resource constraint, equation (43) when $I_t = 1$ and $c_t^T = y_t^T - L(y_t^T)$ when $I_t = 0$, since hours do not enter it. From (23) we have that the real wage falls to $\tilde{w}_{t'} \equiv \frac{A_2(c_{t'}^T, F(\tilde{h}_{t'}))}{A_1(c_{t'}^T, F(\tilde{h}_{t'}))} F'(\tilde{h}_{t'}) < w_{t'}$. Because A_1 , A_2 , and F' are continuous functions, the lower bound on the real wage, equation (39), is satisfied provided the increase in hours is sufficiently small. In period $t' + 1$, the wage constraint (39) is satisfied because $\tilde{w}_{t'} < w_{t'}$. We have therefore established that the perturbed allocation satisfies the restrictions of the optimal policy problems (42), (44), and (45). Finally, the perturbation is clearly welfare increasing because it raises the consumption of nontradables in period t' without affecting the consumption of tradables in any period or the consumption of nontradables in any period other than t' . It follows that an allocation that does not satisfy the slackness condition (40) cannot be a solution to the optimal policy problems described by (42), (44), and (45).

Next, we numerically characterize the equilibrium dynamics. The calibration of the model is as shown in Table 1. Relative to the case of optimal devaluations, the equilibrium under a currency peg features an additional state variable, namely the past real wage, w_{t-1} . We discretize this state variable with a grid of 125 points, equally spaced in logs, taking values between 1.25 and 4.25. This additional endogenous state variable introduces two computational difficulties. First, it significantly expands the number of points in the discretized state space, from 40,000 to 5 million. Second, it introduces a simultaneity problem that can be a source of nonconvergence of the numerical algorithm. The reason is that the price of debt, $q(y_t^T, d_{t+1}, w_t)$, depends on the current wage, w_t . At the same time, the price of debt determines consumption of tradables, which, in turn, affects employment and the

wage rate itself. To overcome this source of nonconvergence, we develop a procedure to find the exact policy rule for the current wage given the pricing function $q(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot)$ for each possible debt choice d_{t+1} . With this wage policy rule in hand, the debt policy rule is found by value function iteration. This step delivers a new debt pricing function, which is then used in the next iteration.

A. Typical Default Episodes with Fixed Exchange Rates

Figure 5 displays with solid lines the model dynamics around typical default episodes. The typical default episode is constructed in the same way as in the case of optimal devaluations. To facilitate comparison, Figure 5 reproduces from Figure 3 with broken lines the typical default dynamics under the optimal devaluation policy.

The top panels of the figure show that, as in the case of optimal exchange rate policy, default occurs after a string of negative output shocks and a significant contraction in tradable consumption. However, unlike the case of optimal devaluation policy, the contraction in aggregate demand leads to massive involuntary unemployment, which reaches almost 20 percent in the period of default. Involuntary unemployment is caused by a failure of real wages to decline in a context of highly depressed aggregate demand (see the left panel in row 3 of Figure 5). In turn, the downward rigidity of the real wage is due to the fact that nominal wages are downwardly rigid and that the nominal exchange rate is fixed.

The right panel in the third row of Figure 5 displays the behavior of the relative price of nontradables, p_t . A fall in p_t means that the real exchange rate depreciates as tradables become more expensive relative to nontradables. Under the optimal policy, the real exchange rate depreciates sharply around the default date, inducing agents to switch expenditure away from tradables and toward nontradables. This redirection of aggregate spending stimulates the demand for labor (since the non-traded sector is labor intensive) and prevents the emergence of involuntary unemployment. Under the currency peg, by contrast, the real exchange rate depreciates insufficiently, inducing a much milder expenditure switch toward nontradables, and thus failing to avoid unemployment. The reason why the relative price of nontradables is reluctant to decline under the peg is that real wages, and hence the labor cost faced by firms, stay too high due to the combination of downward nominal wage rigidity and a currency peg.

As in the case of optimal exchange rate policy, the default takes place in the context of an increase in the debt tax. This tightening in borrowing conditions aims to induce private borrowers to internalize the heightened sensitivity of the country interest rate to the level of debt.

One prediction of the model highlighted by the preceding analysis is that, all other things equal, defaults are characterized by larger recessions when they take place under fixed exchange rates than when they are accompanied by a devaluation. It is natural to ask whether this prediction is borne out in the data. One difficulty in addressing this question is that there are few cases in which default takes place in the context of a fixed exchange rate. The typical default falls into the Twin Ds category. A second difficulty is that the size of the contraction around default depends not only on the exchange rate regime, but also, among other factors, on the size of the shock that triggers the default. So, in principle, a default event with devaluation could be




FIGURE 5. A TYPICAL DEFAULT EPISODE UNDER A CURRENCY PEG

Notes: Median of all 25-quarter windows around a default event in a simulation of 1 million quarters. The default date is normalized to 0. Replication file typical_default_episode_opt_peg.m.




FIGURE 6. DEFAULT, DEVALUATION, AND UNEMPLOYMENT: ARGENTINA, CYPRUS, GREECE, AND ICELAND

Notes: Vertical line indicates the year of default. Own calculations based on data from INDEC (Argentina), Eurostat, and the Central Bank of Iceland.

associated with a larger recession than a default event with fixed exchange rates if the shock that triggered the former is sufficiently larger than the one that caused the latter. One way to at least partially control for this factor is to study default events with and without devaluation that happened around the same time and that were conceivably caused by a common set of external shocks. The Great Contraction of 2008 provides a suitable natural environment for this purpose. Following this global crisis, there have been two defaults that were not followed by a devaluation, namely Greece in 2012 and Cyprus in 2013, and one that was followed by a devaluation, namely Iceland in 2009. In addition, we include in the comparison the 2002 Argentine default because it is a recent well-studied event and because our model was calibrated using some long-run regularities of the Argentine economy. Figure 6 displays with a solid line the unemployment rate and with a broken line the nominal exchange rate around the default date, which is indicated with a vertical dotted line. In all four cases, default was associated with rising levels of unemployment. But the unemployment dynamics post default were different across peggers and nonpeggers. In Argentina and Iceland, the default cum devaluation was followed by an improvement in unemployment. By contrast, Greece and Cyprus, both of which stayed in the eurozone post default, experienced no decline in unemployment. We view this




FIGURE 7. DISTRIBUTION OF EXTERNAL DEBT

Notes: Debt distributions are conditional on being in good financial standing. Replication file *smooth_lad.m*.

evidence as consistent with the predictions of the model that devaluation around default reduces unemployment. We note however, that even in the two default episodes that conform with the Twin Ds phenomenon (Argentina and Iceland), we do observe a rise in unemployment around the default event. In this regard, we do not wish to claim that the proposed model can explain all sources of involuntary unemployment around default events. Rather, the focus of the present investigation is to suggest that exchange rate policy around default episodes matters for unemployment outcomes, and that this connection provides a rationale for the Twin Ds phenomenon.

B. Debt Sustainability under a Currency Peg

Figure 7 displays with a solid line the distribution of external debt under a currency peg, conditional on the country being in good financial standing. For comparison, the figure also displays, with a broken line, the distribution of debt under the optimal devaluation policy. Under a currency peg the economy can support less debt than under the optimal devaluation policy. The median debt falls from 0.6 (60 percent of tradable output) under the optimal devaluation policy to 0.2 (20 percent of tradable output) under a currency peg. This reduced debt capacity is a consequence of the fact that, all other things equal, the benefits from defaulting are larger under a currency peg than under optimal devaluation policy. The reason is that under a currency peg, default has two benefits. One is to spur the recovery in the consumption of tradables, since the repudiation of external debt frees up resources otherwise devoted to servicing the external debt. The second, related to the first, is to lessen the

unemployment consequences of the external crisis. Recall that in equilibrium c_t^T is a shifter of the demand for labor (see equation (23)). The first benefit is also present under optimal devaluation policy and is the one stressed in real models of default in the Eaton-Gersovitz tradition. But the second is not, for the optimal devaluation policy, by itself, can bring about the first-best employment outcome.

The model predicts that under fixed exchange rates, the country on average defaults twice per century. This default frequency is slightly lower than that predicted under the optimal exchange rate policy, which was targeted in the calibration to be 2.6 times per century. This result may be surprising in light of the fact that *ex ante* peggers have a stronger incentive to default. The explanation is that the higher incentive to default under a peg implies a steeper supply of funds. This, in turn, induces the country to borrow less in the stochastic steady state. And with a lower external debt, the country has a reduced need to default. In general, the model does not predict a sharp difference in the frequency of default across peggers and optimal floaters.

The prediction that in the long run peggers can sustain less debt than optimal floaters may seem at odds with the increase in external net liabilities observed in the periphery of Europe after the creation of the monetary union. However, the environment in which the periphery of Europe operated after the creation of the eurozone is not fully comparable with the peg-economy model due to the possibility of bailouts, which are ruled out in the model studied thus far, but, as actual events during the great contraction confirmed, were most likely present in peripheral Europe. The significant fall in the cost of borrowing together with a sharp rise in external debt observed upon accession to the monetary union is consistent with the hypothesis that accession came with the expectation of implicit debt guarantees. Figure 8 displays the joint behavior of external debt and country interest rates for the case of Greece.

It is then natural to ask how the possibility of bailouts should be expected to alter the debt distribution of peggers and, in particular, if under a plausible calibration of the model it could be possible that an economy with a currency peg and with access to bailouts could sustain more debt than an economy with optimal exchange rate policy but without access to bailouts. To capture the economic environment in the periphery of Europe following the creation of the eurozone (i.e., a peg with the possibility of bailouts), we now consider the polar case of an economy with a currency peg and the ability to commit to repay its external debt. To account for a residual repayment risk, we introduce an empirically realistic time varying country interest rate. This is a stylized way to capture an environment with partial and uncertain bailouts. A full treatment of bailouts is beyond the scope of the paper.

We set the parameters γ , σ , a , ξ , α , and \bar{h} as in the calibration of the baseline model (see Table 1). The remaining parameters are set to capture salient aspects of the Greek economy. In the economy with a currency peg and bailouts, we estimate the exogenous driving process (y_t^T, r_t) on quarterly Greek data from 1981:I to 2011:III. We assume that the vector $\left(\ln y_t^T, \ln \left(\frac{1+r_t}{1+r}\right)\right)$ follows a bivariate AR(1) process. Appendix D provides data sources, describes the construction of both time series, and displays the estimated bivariate driving process and its discretization. We set the steady-state value of the country interest rate, r , equal to 0.011, which is the mean of the time series for the Greek interest rate, and β equal to 0.985 to match




FIGURE 8. NET FOREIGN ASSETS TO GDP RATIO AND INTEREST RATES IN GREECE, 1980 TO 2011

Note: Own calculations based on data from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) for net foreign assets to GDP ratio, and from Bank of Greece and Eurostat for interest rates.

a debt-to-output ratio of about 90 percent, the value observed in 2006, before the onset of the great contraction.

In addition to the peg economy with implicit bailout guarantees, we consider two economies without bailouts, one with a currency peg and the other with optimal exchange rate policy. These two cases are the same as those displayed in Figure 7, but now calibrated to Greece. The economies without bailouts contain three additional parameters, θ , δ_1 , and δ_2 . We set θ to 0.01 to capture an average exclusion period of 25 years observed in Greece (Reinhart and Trebesch 2015). We pick δ_1 and δ_2 to match two moments in the floating exchange rate economy. The first target is a debt-to-output ratio of 11.9 percent, which is consistent with the value observed in Greece in 1995, prior to the eurozone project becoming a real possibility. The second target is an output cost of default of 5 percent, which is consistent with the panel estimates of Borensztein and Panizza (2009). In both of these economies, the interest rate is endogenous, so the driving force is the univariate version of y_i^T implied by the Greek bivariate process estimated above.

Figure 9 displays the distributions of external debt under the three environments. The figure illustrates the point that absent bailout guarantees, currency pegs can support less external debt than optimal exchange rate economies (this is the result stressed earlier in this section) but at the same time a currency peg with bailouts can support more debt than an optimal exchange rate economy without bailouts. In interpreting this prediction of the model, recall that although the calibration targets the average debt levels of the floating no-bailout and the currency-peg cum bailout economies, it does not target the average debt level of the peg economy without bailouts. The insight that emerges from this analysis is that the observed increase in external debt in the periphery of Europe upon accession to the eurozone can be rationalized in the context of the present model of the Twin Ds phenomenon once the possibility of bailouts is taken into account.

It is of interest to contrast the observed behavior of external debt in the periphery of Europe following the creation of the common currency area in 2000 with that of Ecuador, an economy that in the same year unilaterally adopted the US dollar as legal tender. The case of Ecuador is of particular interest because, contrary to the situation




FIGURE 9. BAILOUTS AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF EXTERNAL DEBT

Notes: The model is calibrated to Greece. Debt distributions are conditional on being in good financial standing. The distribution under the optimal float is truncated at 1 to preserve a comparable scale across the three densities.



FIGURE 10. NET FOREIGN ASSETS TO GDP RATIOS: GIPS VERSUS ECUADOR, 1990 TO 2011

Notes: GIPS is the mean of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. The dotted vertical line indicates the year in which Ecuador adopted the dollar and the GIPS adopted the euro.

Source: Own calculations based on data from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)

in Europe, dollarization was not accompanied with the expectation of implicit bailout guarantees on the part of the United States or other foreign institutions. Figure 10 displays the net external debt positions as a fraction of GDP of Ecuador and the mean across the GIPS countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) from 1990 to 2011. From the introduction of the euro until the eve of the Great Contraction (2000 to 2007), the GIPS countries display a fast accumulation of external debt from 20 to 100 percent of GDP. By contrast, over the same period Ecuador's external debt fell from 80 percent to 20 percent of GDP. The dynamics of external debt in Ecuador are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model in the case in which the adoption of a currency peg is not accompanied with implicit bailout guarantees.

VI. Sensitivity Analysis

This section extends the model to allow for long-maturity debt and imperfect pass-through. It also analyzes the robustness of the central results of the paper to increasing the value of the subjective discount factor, β .

A. Long-Maturity Debt

The baseline model assumes that debt carries a maturity of one period. In this section we present a version of the model with long-maturity debt and show that our findings are robust to this modification of the model.

The specification of long-maturity debt follows Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012). Assume that bonds have a random maturity. Specifically, with probability $\eta \in [0, 1]$ bonds mature next period and pay out one unit of the tradable consumption good. With probability $1 - \eta$ bonds do not mature and pay a coupon equal to $z > 0$ units of tradables. The country is assumed to hold a portfolio with a continuum of this type of bond. The realization of maturity is independent across bonds. Hence, if the country has d_t units of debt outstanding, a share η will mature each period with certainty and the remaining share $1 - \eta$ will not. The nonmaturing bonds trade at the price q_t per unit. Because a newly issued bond is indistinguishable from an existing bond that did not mature, the ex-coupon price of old bonds and new bonds must be equal. If the debtor does not default, d_t units of debt pay $[\eta + (1 - \eta)(z + q_t)]d_t$ units of tradable consumption. If the debtor defaults, the bond pays zero. Absent default, the expected maturity of this type of bond is $1/\eta$ periods. Thus, the random-maturity model allows for bonds of arbitrary maturity. Furthermore, it nests the perpetuity model of debt (e.g., Hatchondo and Martinez 2009) as a special case (for a proof, see Uribe and Schmitt-Grohé 2017).

The main difference between the models with long-maturity and short-maturity debt is that long-maturity debt results in a state-contingent payoff, which may provide hedging against income risk to the borrower. Specifically, the payoff on the long-maturity bond, $\eta + (1 - \eta)(z + q_t)$ depends on q_t , which is state contingent. In particular, in periods of low endowment, q_t is likely to be low, resulting in an ex post low interest rate paid by the borrower. Because periods of low income are associated with low consumption, the long-maturity bond provides insurance against income risk. By contrast, the payoff on a one-period bond is unity and hence non-state-contingent, providing no insurance against income risk. Therefore, one should expect

that all other things equal, the borrower will hold more debt if debt is long term rather than short term.

To embed this asset structure into the economy with downward nominal wage rigidity presented in Section II, consider first the household's problem. The household's sequential budget constraint is now given by

$$(48) \quad \begin{aligned} P_t^T c_t^T + P_t^N c_t^N + P_t^T [\eta + (1 - \eta)(z + q_t^d)] d_t \\ = P_t^T \tilde{y}_t^T + W_t h_t + (1 - \tau_t^d) P_t^T q_t^d d_{t+1} + F_t + \Phi_t, \end{aligned}$$

where q_t^d now denotes the domestic price of long-maturity debt in period t . The optimality condition for the choice of debt becomes

$$(1 - \tau_t^d) q_t^d \lambda_t = \beta E_t \lambda_{t+1} [\eta + (1 - \eta)(z + q_{t+1}^d)],$$

where, as before, λ_t/P_t^T denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the household's sequential budget constraint, now equation (48). All other optimality conditions associated with the household's problem are unchanged.

The firm's problem and the conditions characterizing the labor market are unaffected by the introduction of long-maturity debt. We continue to assume that in periods in which the country is in bad standing ($I_t = 0$), the government confiscates any payments of households to foreign lenders and returns the proceeds to households in a lump-sum fashion. The resulting sequential budget constraint of the government is

$$(49) \quad f_t = \tau_t^d q_t^d d_{t+1} + (1 - I_t) [\eta + (1 - \eta)(z + q_t^d)] d_t.$$

Consider now the participation constraint of foreign lenders. Let q_t denote the price of debt charged by foreign lenders. Then, q_t must satisfy the condition that the expected return of lending to the domestic country equal the opportunity cost of funds. Formally,

$$I_t \left[q_t - \frac{E_t I_{t+1} [\eta + (1 - \eta)(z + q_{t+1})]}{1 + r^*} \right] = 0.$$

The market-clearing condition for traded goods takes the form

$$c_t^T = y_t^T - (1 - I_t) L(y_t^T) + I_t \{ q_t d_{t+1} - [\eta + (1 - \eta)(z + q_t)] d_t \}.$$

A competitive equilibrium in the economy with long-term debt is a set of stochastic processes $\{c_t^T, h_t, w_t, d_{t+1}, \lambda_t, q_t, q_t^d\}$ satisfying (19), (20), (22), (23), (24), (25), (26),

$$(50) \quad c_t^T = y_t^T - (1 - I_t) L(y_t^T) + I_t \{ q_t d_{t+1} - [\eta + (1 - \eta)(z + q_t)] d_t \},$$

$$(51) \quad (1 - \tau_t^d) q_t^d \lambda_t = \beta E_t \lambda_{t+1} [\eta + (1 - \eta)(z + q_{t+1}^d)],$$

$$(52) \quad I_t \left[q_t - \frac{E_t I_{t+1} [\eta + (1 - \eta)(z + q_{t+1})]}{1 + r^*} \right] = 0,$$

given processes $\{y_t^T, \epsilon_t, \tau_t^d, I_t\}$ and initial conditions w_{-1} and d_0 .

When the government can choose ϵ_t and τ_t^d freely, stochastic processes $\{c_t^T, h_t, d_{t+1}, q_t\}$ can be supported as a competitive equilibrium if and only if they satisfy the subset of equilibrium conditions (19), (25), (50), and (52), given processes $\{y_t^T, I_t\}$ and the initial condition d_0 . The proof mimics the one for Proposition 1, except that the proof that the Euler equation (51) holds must be modified. The reason is that now future values of q_t^d appear on the right-hand side of (51). We proceed as follows. In states in which the country is in good standing, set $q_t^d = q_t$. In states in which the country is in bad standing, set $q_t^d = q^{\text{autarky}}$, where q^{autarky} is an arbitrary positive constant. Then, in any state, pick τ_t^d residually so as to satisfy the Euler equation (51). This is possible because at this point we know the processes I_t, λ_t, q_t^d , and q_t .

An important implication of the fact that the analog to Proposition 1 continues to hold is that w_{t-1} is not a payoff-relevant state variable. Thus, as in the model with short-maturity debt, in the model with long-maturity debt the only payoff-relevant state variables are y_t^T and d_t . The time-consistent optimal policy problem can be cast as follows. If the country is in good financial standing in period t , $I_{t-1} = 1$, the value of continuing to service the external debt, denoted $v^c(y_t^T, d_t)$, is

$$(53) \quad v^c(y_t^T, d_t) = \max_{\{c_t^T, h_t, d_{t+1}\}} \left\{ U(A(c_t^T, F(h_t))) + \beta E_t v^g(y_{t+1}^T, d_{t+1}) \right\}$$

subject to (25) and

$$(54) \quad c_t^T + [\eta + (1 - \eta)(z + q(y_t^T, d_{t+1}))]d_t = y_t^T + q(y_t^T, d_{t+1})d_{t+1},$$

where $v^g(y_t^T, d_t)$ denotes the value of being in good financial standing. As in the model with short-maturity debt, the optimal choice of h_t is $h_t = \bar{h}$. The value of being in bad financial standing in period t , denoted $v^b(y_t^T)$, is given by

$$(55) \quad v^b(y_t^T) = \max_{\{h_t\}} \left\{ U(A(y_t^T - L(y_t^T), F(h_t))) + \beta E_t [\theta v^g(y_{t+1}^T, 0) + (1 - \theta)v^b(y_{t+1}^T)] \right\},$$

subject to (25). Again, it is optimal to set $h_t = \bar{h}$. The value of being in good standing in period t is given by

$$(56) \quad v^g(y_t^T, d_t) = \max \{v^c(y_t^T, d_t), v^b(y_t^T)\}.$$

The government chooses to default whenever the value of continuing to participate in financial markets is smaller than the value of being in bad financial standing, $v^c(y_t^T, d_t) < v^b(y_t^T)$. Letting $D(d_t)$ denote the default set we have

$$(57) \quad D(d_t) = \{y_t^T : v^c(y_t^T, d_t) < v^b(y_t^T)\}.$$

In equilibrium the pricing function of debt, $q_t = q(y_t^T, d_{t+1})$ and the policy function for debt, $d_{t+1} = d(y_t^T, d_t)$, must satisfy the participation constraint of foreign lenders:

$$(58) \quad q(y_t^T, d_{t+1}) = E \left\{ \frac{\left[\eta + (1 - \eta) \left(z + q(y_{t+1}^T, d(y_{t+1}^T, d_{t+1})) \right) \right] I(y_{t+1}^T, d_{t+1})}{1 + r^*} \middle| y_t^T \right\},$$

where $I(y^T, d)$ equals unity if $y^T \in D(d)$ and equals 0 otherwise.

Because under optimal time-consistent policy $h_t = \bar{h}$ at all times, we obtain, by the same arguments presented in the short-maturity debt model, that the family of devaluation policies that support the optimal time-consistent allocation is given by equation (35). It follows, in turn, that under the optimal exchange rate policy the equilibrium is identical to that of the real economy with long-maturity debt studied in Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012). This insight allows us to employ the following procedure to investigate whether the Twin Ds phenomenon obtains in equilibrium in the economy with long-maturity debt: first, compute the real allocation in the Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) economy. Associate the resulting process for c_t with c_t^T in the present model. Second, compute the process for the full-employment wage as $w_t^f = [\alpha(1 - a)/a](c_t^T)^{1/\xi}$. Finally, use the optimal devaluation policy (37) to obtain the process for the optimal devaluation rate.

The long-maturity debt economy has two additional parameters that need to be calibrated: η , which governs the average maturity of debt, and z , which measures the coupon rate. We follow Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) and set $\eta = 0.05$ and $z = 0.03$. The assumed value for η implies that the average maturity of debt is five years. With the exception of β , δ_1 , and δ_2 , all structural parameters and the discretized driving process are the same as in the short-maturity debt model (see Table 1). Here we set $\beta = 0.969$, $\delta_1 = -0.18319$, and $\delta_2 = 0.24558$ with the intent to match the same targets as in the short-maturity debt economy, namely, an average debt-to-traded-GDP ratio in periods of good financial standing of 60 percent per quarter, a default frequency is 2.6 times per century and an average output loss while in bad financial standing of 7 percent. We are able to hit the first two targets but fall slightly short of the third. The average output loss in equilibrium is 5 percent per period.

Figure 11 displays with a solid line the behavior of the long-maturity debt economy around a typical default episode. For comparison it reproduces, with a broken line, the typical default dynamics in the economy with short-maturity debt from Figure 3. The figure shows that the predicted dynamics in both economies are fairly similar. In particular, in the economy with long-maturity debt the government finds it optimal to accompany the default with a large devaluation of at least 45 percent. It follows that the model with long-maturity debt continues to predict the Twin Ds phenomenon as an optimal outcome.

The main role of the large devaluation at the time of default is to limit the decline in final consumption by reducing the decline in nontraded consumption. Absent a devaluation, the decline in traded absorption would spill over to the nontraded sector and hence to nontraded consumption. Final consumption is predicted to decline on




FIGURE 11. A TYPICAL DEFAULT EPISODE UNDER OPTIMAL EXCHANGE RATE POLICY IN THE ECONOMY WITH LONG-MATURITY DEBT

Notes: The typical default dynamics are computed as medians of 25-quarter windows centered on default events occurring in a simulated times series of 1 million quarters. The default date is normalized to 0.

average 5.1 percent in a default episode when debt has a long maturity and 4.2 percent when debt has a short maturity. In the data, across 86 defaults over the period 1975 to 2013, the median decline in final consumption is 5.1 percent over the three-year period leading up to and including a default event.¹⁰ This suggests that the model explains well the observed decline in consumption that occurs in a typical default episode.

B. Incomplete Exchange Rate Pass-Through

Thus far, we have assumed that the law of one price holds for tradable goods, $P_t^T = P_t^{T*} \mathcal{E}_t$. In this section, we will relax this assumption.

Continue to assume that P_t^{T*} is constant and normalized to unity. Let

$$\pi_t^T \equiv \frac{P_t^T}{P_{t-1}^T}$$

denote the domestic gross rate of inflation of tradable goods. Then, under the assumption of complete pass-through tradable inflation would equal the devaluation rate, that is, $\pi_t^T = \epsilon_t$. We introduce incomplete pass-through by imposing the following law of motion for π_t^T ,

$$(59) \quad \pi_t^T = (\epsilon_t)^\eta (\pi_{t-1}^T)^{1-\eta}$$

with $\eta \in (0, 1]$. According to this expression, tradable prices display short-run deviations from the law of one price, in the sense that a 1 percent devaluation in period t leads to an increase in the domestic price of tradables of η percent in period t , which is less than 1 percent. This friction could be a consequence of nominal product price rigidity in the traded sector with pricing to market as in open-economy versions of the New Keynesian models. A full-blown formulation of such an environment would be of interest, but is beyond the scope of this paper. In the long run there is perfect pass-through in the sense that a 1 percent devaluation in period t , all other things equal, leads asymptotically to a 1 percent increase in the domestic price of tradables. The smaller is η the more incomplete is pass-through. The present formulation nests the case of perfect pass-through when $\eta = 1$.

The remaining elements of the model are unchanged. Then, we have that under incomplete pass-through a competitive equilibrium is a set of stochastic processes $\{c_t^T, h_t, w_t, d_{t+1}, \lambda_t, q_t, q_t^d, \pi_t^T\}$ satisfying

$$(18) \quad c_t^T = y_t^T - (1 - I_t)L(y_t^T) + I_t[q_t d_{t+1} - d_t],$$

$$(19) \quad (1 - I_t)d_{t+1} = 0,$$

$$(20) \quad \lambda_t = U'(A(c_t^T, F(h_t)))A_1(c_t^T, F(h_t)),$$

¹⁰The source for the consumption data is WDI. The cyclical component of consumption is the logarithmic deviation from a quadratic trend. We exclude all countries with fewer than 30 years of consumption data. The resulting panel contains 86 default events.

$$(21) \quad (1 - \tau_t^d) q_t^d \lambda_t = \beta E_t \lambda_{t+1},$$

$$(22) \quad I_t(q_t^d - q_t) = 0,$$

$$(23) \quad \frac{A_2(c_t^T, F(h_t))}{A_1(c_t^T, F(h_t))} = \frac{w_t}{F'(h_t)},$$

$$(25) \quad h_t \leq \bar{h},$$

$$(27) \quad I_t \left[q_t - \frac{E_t I_{t+1}}{1 + r^*} \right] = 0,$$

$$(59) \quad \pi_t^T = (\epsilon_t)^\eta (\pi_{t-1}^T)^{1-\eta},$$

$$(60) \quad w_t \geq \gamma \frac{w_{t-1}}{\pi_t^T},$$

and

$$(61) \quad (h_t - \bar{h}) \left(w_t - \gamma \frac{w_{t-1}}{\pi_t^T} \right) = 0,$$

given processes $\{y_t^T, \epsilon_t, \tau_t^d, I_t\}$ and initial conditions w_{-1}, d_0 , and π_{-1}^T . One can readily establish that Proposition 1 continues to hold under the present formulation of incomplete pass-through. This means that the optimal time-consistent policies of c_t^T, h_t, d_{t+1}, q_t , and I_t are the same as in the model with perfect pass-through.

The family of optimal devaluation policies now takes the form

$$(62) \quad \epsilon_t \geq \left[\gamma \frac{w_{t-1}}{w^f(c_t^T)} (\pi_{t-1}^T)^{\eta-1} \right]^{1/\eta},$$

where the full-employment real wage, $w^f(c_t^T)$, continues to be given by $w^f(c_t^T) = \frac{A_2(c_t^T, F(\bar{h}))}{A_1(c_t^T, F(\bar{h}))} F'(\bar{h})$. The expression above shows that all other things equal, the more incomplete is pass-through (i.e., the smaller is η), the larger is the minimum devaluation required to maintain full employment in response to a contraction in c_t^T .

We continue to study the member of the family of optimal devaluation policies that fully stabilizes the nominal wage (i.e., the rule that implies that $W_t = W_{t-1}$ for all t). This policy rule now takes the form

$$(63) \quad \epsilon_t = \left[\frac{w_{t-1}}{w^f(c_t^T)} (\pi_{t-1}^T)^{\eta-1} \right]^{1/\eta}.$$

Because under full employment we have that $P_t^N F'(\bar{h}) = W_t$ and because under the specific optimal devaluation rule considered W_t is constant, it follows that P_t^N is also constant in equilibrium. So it continues to be true that even though the nominal




FIGURE 12. THE NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE DURING A TYPICAL DEFAULT EPISODE UNDER OPTIMAL EXCHANGE RATE POLICY AND IMPERFECT PASS-THROUGH

price of nontradables is fully flexible, in equilibrium it behaves as if it was perfectly sticky.

Figure 12 compares the behavior of the level of the nominal exchange rate during a typical default episode in the economy with perfect pass-through (the solid line, reproduced from Figure 3) and in the economy with imperfect pass-through (the broken line). In this latter case the parameter η takes the value 0.5. The figure shows that the nominal depreciation that takes place at the time of default is about twice as large under imperfect pass-through than under perfect pass-through. It follows that the Twin Ds phenomenon is more pronounced the lower the degree of pass-through.

C. Patience and the Twin Ds

The calibration of the model features a value of β of 0.85. As mentioned earlier, this value is commonplace in the quantitative default literature, but low relative to the values used in closed-economy business-cycle studies. Here, we explore the sensitivity of the emergence of the Twin Ds as an optimal outcome to increasing the value of β . Figure 13 displays the predicted nominal exchange rate under optimal exchange rate policy around the typical default episode for three values of β , 0.85, 0.95, and 0.98. In all cases, the model predicts that defaults are accompanied by large devaluations. In this sense, the Twin Ds prediction is robust to making households more patient. Indeed, the Twin Ds phenomenon is predicted to be more pronounced as β increases. The reason is that as agents become more patient, the costs of default (the output loss and financial autarky), which apply for a random period of time, have a larger present discounted value. As a result, it takes a deeper




FIGURE 13. PREDICTED TWIN DS AND PATIENCE

contraction in output for the country to choose to default. In turn, the larger the contraction, the larger the devaluation necessary to ensure that the real wage falls to the level that clears the labor market.

VII. Conclusion

Sovereign defaults typically coincide with large devaluations of the domestic currency. In addition, the dynamics of the nominal exchange rate around defaults resemble more a one-time devaluation than a switch to a permanently higher rate of devaluation. For this reason, the typical devaluation around default does not seem to be driven by the objective of generating a higher stream of seigniorage revenue. Furthermore, the fact that the majority of the default episodes observed since the 1970s involved economies in which much of the debt was either denominated in units of foreign currency or indexed discourages an explanation in which the chief objective of a devaluation is to deflate the real value of interest-bearing liabilities.

This paper proposes an explanation of the joint occurrence of default and devaluation in which the latter serves to correct a misalignment in relative prices. This explanation is motivated by the fact that in fixed exchange rate economies, contractions are characterized by a lack of downward adjustment in private nominal wages in spite of rising unemployment. A prominent example is the debt crisis in the periphery of Europe following the Great Contraction of 2008.

We formalize this explanation by embedding downward nominal wage rigidity into the Eaton-Gersovitz model of default. In this framework, default occurs in the context of highly depressed aggregate demand. In turn, weak demand for final products lowers the demand for labor, which puts downward pressure on real wages. In

the absence of a devaluation, the required fall in the real wage necessitates a decline in the nominal wage. But this is ruled out by downward nominal wage rigidity. Thus, to avoid the emergence of large involuntary unemployment, the government chooses to combine the default with devaluation. For plausible calibrations of the model, the minimum devaluation rate consistent with full employment is found to be over 40 percent.

By contrast, under a fixed exchange rate the government is unable to reduce the real value of wages by devaluing the domestic currency. Thus, default episodes are predicted to be accompanied by involuntary unemployment. Under plausible calibrations of the model, the unemployment rate increases by about 20 percentage points around the typical default.

Finally, the combination of nominal rigidities and a fixed exchange rate introduces an additional incentive to default into the Eaton-Gersovitz model. This incentive originates from the fact that the resources set free by default boost domestic demand and thus reduce slack in labor markets. Because of these elevated incentives to default, the model predicts that, in the long run, fixed exchange rate economies can support less external debt than economies with optimally floating rates.

APPENDIX

A. Decentralization from Real to Real

In Section III, we demonstrated the decentralization of the Eaton-Gersovitz model to a competitive economy with downward nominal wage rigidity. We established that debt taxes and devaluation policy make the decentralization possible. Consider now the question of decentralizing the standard Eaton-Gersovitz model to a real competitive economy. To make the competitive economy real, suppose that nominal wages are fully flexible ($\gamma = 0$). In this case, the devaluation rate, ϵ_t , disappears from the set of competitive equilibrium conditions. Specifically, ϵ_t drops from conditions (24) and (26). The economy thus becomes purely real, and exchange rate policy becomes irrelevant. However, clearly debt taxes are still necessary to establish the equivalence between the optimal-policy problem and the standard default model, as they guarantee the satisfaction of the private-sector Euler equation (21). We therefore have the following result.

PROPOSITION A.1 (Decentralization to a Real Economy): *Real models of sovereign default in the tradition of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) can be decentralized to a real competitive economy via debt taxes.*

This result is of interest because it highlights the fact that debt taxes are present in all default models à la Eaton and Gersovitz even though they do not explicitly appear in the centralized analysis.

B. Implementability of the Optimal-Policy Equilibrium

This appendix shows that any member of the family of devaluation policies (35) uniquely implements the optimal-policy equilibrium. We first prove that under any

such exchange rate rule, the equilibrium involves full employment at all times. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that there is some period t such that $h_t < \bar{h}$ in equilibrium. Then, by the slackness condition (26), we have that $w_t = \gamma w_{t-1}/\epsilon_t$. Combining this expression with (35), we get that

$$w_t \leq w^f(c_t^T).$$

Now, using equations (23) and (36) we can write

$$\begin{aligned} w_t &= \frac{A_2(c_t^T, F(h_t))}{A_1(c_t^T, F(h_t))} F'(h_t) \\ &> \frac{A_2(c_t^T, F(\bar{h}))}{A_1(c_t^T, F(\bar{h}))} F'(\bar{h}) \\ &= w^f(c_t^T). \end{aligned}$$

The inequality holds because of the assumed properties of the functions $A(\cdot, \cdot)$ and $F(\cdot)$ and because $h_t < \bar{h}$. The two expressions above are clearly contradictory. We have therefore established that under every exchange rate rule belonging to (35), the equilibrium must involve full employment. Because none of the remaining equilibrium conditions listed in Definition 1 depend on the devaluation rate, any possible nonuniqueness cannot be induced by the monetary policy rule. In particular, if the real allocation in the Eaton-Gersovitz model is unique, so it is when implemented with the devaluation rule (35).

C. Optimal Devaluation Policy without Debt Taxes

In the model of Section II, continue to assume that borrowing is decentralized, but suppose now that the government cannot set debt taxes optimally.

Thus, the only policy instrument at the planner's disposal is exchange rate policy. In general, the case without debt taxes is significantly more complex and potentially intractable. The reason is that without a fiscal instrument used to induce private agents to internalize the borrowing externality, the model may display multiple equilibria. The possibility of nonuniqueness is identified in Kim and Zhang (2012) and formally established in Ayres et al. (2015). (This multiplicity problem is not present in most of the existing default models (e.g., Arellano 2008; Aguiar and Gopinath 2006; Chatterjee and Eyigungor 2012; Mendoza and Yue 2012; etc.) because as demonstrated by Proposition A.1 in Appendix A, by centralizing both the default and borrowing decisions, these models implicitly assume the availability of optimal debt taxes.) We can show, however, that in the case in which the intra- and intertemporal elasticities of substitution equal each other ($\xi = 1/\sigma$), the full-employment devaluation policy is optimal even when the planner does not have access to debt taxes.

To see this, assume that debt taxes are not part of the set of policy instruments available to the government. Suppose then that the process $\{\tau_t^d\}$ is exogenous and

arbitrary. In this case, Proposition 1 does not hold anymore and one must expand the set of constraints of the optimal-policy problem stated in equation (29) to include competitive equilibrium conditions (20)–(22) as constraints. This is because τ_t^d can no longer be set residually to ensure the satisfaction of these constraints. But clearly, there are no longer guarantees that the solution to the expanded optimal-policy problem will feature $h_t = \bar{h}$ for all t , because the right-hand side of equation (20) in general depends on h_t . Notice that even if the government cannot set debt taxes optimally, it could still achieve full employment at all times by appropriate use of the devaluation rate. But the resulting allocation would in general be suboptimal. However, in the case in which the intra- and intertemporal elasticities of consumption substitution are equal to each other ($\xi = 1/\sigma$), full employment reemerges as optimal. This is because in this case competitive equilibrium condition (20) is independent of h_t .

We have therefore established that full employment is optimal even if debt taxes are not available to the planner. The case $\xi = 1/\sigma$ is indeed quite relevant. As argued in the calibration of the model presented in Section IVA, empirical estimates of the intratemporal elasticity of substitution suggest that ξ is close to 0.5. At the same time, the typical value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution used in quantitative business-cycle analysis for emerging countries is also 0.5, or $\sigma = 2$.

It follows immediately that when $\xi = 1/\sigma$, the family of optimal devaluation policies is given by expression (35). This means that large contractions in the domestic absorption of tradable goods will be accompanied by devaluations under the optimal exchange rate policy. Thus, if in any of the possibly many equilibria default takes place during aggregate contractions (as is the case in the equilibrium selected by Kim and Zhang 2012), the economy without optimal debt taxation policy will continue to predict the Twin Ds phenomenon as an optimal outcome.

D. Exogenous Driving Processes in the Calibration to the Greek Economy

To estimate the exogenous joint stochastic process for traded output and the country interest rate, we use data over the period 1981:I to 2011:III. We proxy traded output with an index of industrial production instead of using sectoral GDP data, as we did in the case of Argentina, because Greece did not produce such data between 1991 and 1999. Specifically, we use the index of total manufacturing production (2005 = 100, seasonally adjusted) from the OECD. We remove a quadratic time trend from the natural logarithm of the series to obtain the cyclical component, y_t^T . The real interest rate in terms of tradables, r_t , is obtained from the following relationship: $1 + r_t = (1 + i_t)E_t \left[\frac{\mathcal{E}_t P_t^{T*}}{\mathcal{E}_{t+1} P_{t+1}^{T*}} \right]$, where i_t denotes the nominal interest rate in terms of national currency, \mathcal{E}_t denotes the nominal exchange rate defined as units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency, P_t^{T*} denotes the foreign-currency price of tradables, and E_t denotes the expectations operator conditional on information available in period t . The source for \mathcal{E}_t is Eurostat (code ert_h_eur_q). We measure P_t^{T*} by the German consumer price index published by the OECD. We measure i_t as follows. For the period 1981:I to 1992:III it is the overnight interest rate published by the Bank of Greece. For the period 2001:I to 2011:III we proxy i_t by the interest rate on ten-year Greek treasury bonds published by Eurostat

(code irt_lt_mcby_q). For the period 1992:IV to 2000:IV, we measure i_t as the average of the two interest rates above. We proxy $E_t \left[\frac{\mathcal{E}_t P_t^{T*}}{\mathcal{E}_{t+1} P_{t+1}^{T*}} \right]$ by the one-period ahead forecast of $\frac{\mathcal{E}_t P_t^{T*}}{\mathcal{E}_{t+1} P_{t+1}^{T*}}$ implied by an estimated AR(2) process for this variable. We then estimate the following bivariate AR(1) process

$$(A.1) \quad \begin{bmatrix} \ln y_t^T \\ \ln \frac{1+r_t}{1+r} \end{bmatrix} = A \begin{bmatrix} \ln y_{t-1}^T \\ \ln \frac{1+r_{t-1}}{1+r} \end{bmatrix} + \epsilon_t,$$

where ϵ_t is an i.i.d. random vector with mean zero and variance covariance matrix Ω . Estimation via OLS yields

$$(A.2) \quad A = \begin{bmatrix} 0.90 & -0.20 \\ -0.06 & 0.62 \end{bmatrix}, \Omega = \begin{bmatrix} 0.000551 & -0.000003 \\ -0.000003 & 0.000059 \end{bmatrix}, \text{ and } r = 0.011.$$

We discretize this driving process using 21 equally spaced points for $\log(y_t^T)$ in the interval $[-0.2002, 0.2002]$ and 11 equally spaced points for $\log(1+r_t)/(1+r)$ in the interval $[-0.0386, 0.0386]$. As in the baseline case we use the method of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2009) to obtain the transition probability matrix. The resulting state space consists of 197 distinct pairs for $(\log(y_t^T), \log(1+r_t)/(1+r))$.

In the economies with lack of commitment to repay and either optimal exchange rate policy or a peg, the source of uncertainty is traded output, y_t^T . (The real interest rate, r_t , is endogenously determined.) We use the same grid for $\ln(y_t^T)$ as in the case with bailouts and take the transition probability matrix of $\ln(y_t^T)$ to be the marginal transition probability matrix of $\ln(y_t^T)$ implied by the transition probability matrix for $(\ln y_t^T, \ln(1+r_t)/(1+r))$.

REFERENCES

- Aguiar, Mark, Manuel Amador, Emmanuel Farhi, and Gita Gopinath.** 2013. "Crisis and Commitment: Inflation Credibility and the Vulnerability to Sovereign Debt Crises." Unpublished.
- Aguiar, Mark, and Gita Gopinath.** 2006. "Defaultable Debt, Interest Rates and the Current Account." *Journal of International Economics* 69 (1): 64–83.
- Arellano, Cristina.** 2008. "Default Risk and Income Fluctuations in Emerging Economies." *American Economic Review* 98 (3): 690–712.
- Ayres, Joao, Gaston Navarro, Juan Pablo Nicolini, and Pedro Teles.** 2015. "Sovereign Default: The Role of Expectations." Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Working Paper 723.
- Bianchi, Javier.** 2011. "Overborrowing and Systemic Externalities in the Business Cycle." *American Economic Review* 101 (7): 3400–26.
- Bianchi, Javier, Emine Boz, and Enrique Mendoza.** 2012. "Macroprudential Policy in a Fisherian Model of Financial Innovation." *IMF Economic Review* 60 (2): 223–69.
- Borensztein, Eduardo, and Ugo Panizza.** 2009. "The Costs of Sovereign Default." *IMF Staff Papers* 56 (4): 683–741.
- Burstein, Ariel, Martin Eichenbaum, and Sergio Rebelo.** 2005. "Large Devaluations and the Real Exchange Rate." *Journal of Political Economy* 113 (4): 742–84.
- Burstein, Ariel, Martin Eichenbaum, and Sergio Rebelo.** 2007. "Modeling Exchange Rate Passthrough after Large Devaluations." *Journal of Monetary Economics* 54 (2): 346–68.
- Calvo, Guillermo A.** 1988. "Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations." *American Economic Review* 78 (4): 647–61.

- Chatterjee, Satyajit, and Burcu Eyigungor.** 2012. "Maturity, Indebtedness, and Default Risk." *American Economic Review* 102 (6): 2674–99.
- Corsetti, Giancarlo, and Luca Dedola.** 2016. "The Mystery of the Printing Press: Monetary Policy and Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 14 (6): 1329–71.
- Da Rocha, José-María, Eduardo-Luis Giménez, and Francisco-Xavier Lores.** 2013. "Self-Fulfilling Crises with Default and Devaluation." *Economic Theory* 53 (3): 499–535.
- Du, Wenxin, and Jesse Schreger.** 2015. "Sovereign Risk, Currency Risk, and Corporate Balance Sheets." Unpublished.
- Eaton, Jonathan, and Mark Gersovitz.** 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis." *Review of Economic Studies* 48 (2): 289–309.
- Eichengreen, Barry, Ricardo Hausmann, and Ugo Panizza.** 2005. "The Pain of Original Sin." In *Other People's Money: Debt Denomination and Financial Instability in Emerging Market Economies*, edited by Barry Eichengreen and Ricardo Hausmann, 13–47. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Federico, Pablo, Carlos A. Végh, and Guillermo Vuletin.** 2014. "Reserve Requirement Policy over the Business Cycle." National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 20612.
- Fernández, Andrés, Michael W. Klein, Alessandro Rebucci, Martín Schindler, and Martín Uribe.** 2016. "Capital Control Measures: A New Dataset." *IMF Economic Review* 64 (3): 548–74.
- Gali, Jordi, and Tommaso Monacelli.** 2005. "Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Volatility in a Small Open Economy." *Review of Economic Studies* 72 (3): 707–34.
- Hatchondo, Juan Carlos, and Leonardo Martínez.** 2009. "Long-Duration Bonds and Sovereign Defaults." *Journal of International Economics* 79 (1): 117–25.
- Hatchondo, Juan Carlos, Leonardo Martínez, and Horacio Saprizá.** 2010. "Quantitative Properties of Sovereign Default Models: Solution Methods Matter." *Review of Economic Dynamics* 13 (4): 919–33.
- Kim, Yun Jung, and Jing Zhang.** 2012. "Decentralized Borrowing and Centralized Default." *Journal of International Economics* 88 (1): 121–33.
- Kollmann, Robert.** 2002. "Monetary Policy Rules in the Open Economy: Effects on Welfare and Business Cycles." *Journal of Monetary Economics* 49 (5): 989–1015.
- Korinek, Anton.** 2010. "Regulating Capital Flows to Emerging Markets: An Externality View." Unpublished.
- Kriwoluzky, Alexander, Gernot J. Müller, and Martin Wolf.** 2014. "Exit Expectations in Currency Unions." Unpublished.
- Krugman, Paul.** 1979. "A Model of Balance-of-Payments Crises." *Journal of Money, Credit and Banking* 11 (3): 311–25.
- Lane, Philip R., and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti.** 2007. "The External Wealth of Nations Mark II: Revised and Extended Estimates of Foreign Assets and Liabilities, 1970–2004." *Journal of International Economics* 73 (2): 223–50.
- Levy-Yeyati, Eduardo, and Ugo Panizza.** 2011. "The Elusive Cost of Sovereign Defaults." *Journal of Development Economics* 94 (1): 95–105.
- Mendoza, Enrique G.** 2010. "Sudden Stops, Financial Crises, and Leverage." *American Economic Review* 100 (5): 1941–66.
- Mendoza, Enrique G., and Vivian Z. Yue.** 2012. "A General Equilibrium Model of Sovereign Default and Business Cycles." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 127 (2): 889–946.
- Moussa, Racha.** 2013. "Debt Denomination, Exchange-Rate Regimes, and Sovereign Default." Unpublished.
- Na, Seunghoon, Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé, Martín Uribe, and Vivian Yue.** 2018. "The Twin Ds: Optimal Default and Devaluation: Dataset." *American Economic Review*. <https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141558>.
- Reinhart, Carmen M.** 2002. "Default, Currency Crises, and Sovereign Credit Ratings." *World Bank Economic Review* 16 (2): 151–70.
- Reinhart, Carmen M., Kenneth S. Rogoff, and Miguel A. Savastano.** 2003. "Debt Intolerance." *Brookings Papers On Economic Activity* 2003 (1).
- Reinhart, Carmen M., and Christoph Trebesch.** 2015. "The Pitfalls of External Dependence: Greece, 1829–2015." National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 21664.
- Schmitt-Grohé, Stephanie, and Martín Uribe.** 2009. "Finite-State Approximation Of VAR Processes: A Simulation Approach." Unpublished.
- Schmitt-Grohé, Stephanie, and Martín Uribe.** 2016. "Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity, Currency Pegs, and Involuntary Unemployment." *Journal of Political Economy* 124 (5): 1466–1514.
- Sunder-Plassmann, Laura.** 2013. "Inflation, Default, and the Denomination of Sovereign Debt." Unpublished.

- Uribe, Martín, and Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé.** 2017. *Open Economy Macroeconomics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Yun, Tack.** 2014. "Inflation and Exchange Rate Crises: Endogenous Default of Monetary Policy." Unpublished.
- Zarazaga, Carlos E.** 2012. "Default and Lost Opportunities: A Message from Argentina for Euro-Zone Countries." Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Economic Letter 7.

This article has been cited by:

1. Lu Yang, Lei Yang, Xue Cui. 2023. Sovereign default network and currency risk premia. *Financial Innovation* 9:1. . [[Crossref](#)]
2. M.L. Kobielarz. 2023. Bailout dynamics in a monetary union. *Journal of International Economics* 142, 103751. [[Crossref](#)]
3. Albrecht Ritschl. 2023. Knut Borchardt – Brecht-Schüler, Skeptiker, Krisenhistoriker. *Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik* 24:1, 145-150. [[Crossref](#)]
4. MIKHAIL CHERNOV, MAGNUS DAHLQUIST, LARS LOCHSTOER. 2023. Pricing Currency Risks. *The Journal of Finance* 78:2, 693-730. [[Crossref](#)]
5. Huanhuan Zheng. 2023. Sovereign debt responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. *Journal of International Economics* 72, 103766. [[Crossref](#)]
6. Samuel Hurtado, Galo Nuño, Carlos Thomas. 2023. Monetary Policy and Sovereign Debt Sustainability. *Journal of the European Economic Association* 21:1, 293-325. [[Crossref](#)]
7. Giovanni Bonaccolto, Nicola Borri, Andrea Consiglio. 2023. Breakup and default risks in the great lockdown. *Journal of Banking & Finance* 147, 106308. [[Crossref](#)]
8. Dejanir H Silva. 2023. Optimal Fiscal Consolidation Under Frictional Financial Markets*. *The Economic Journal* 144. . [[Crossref](#)]
9. Si Guo, Yun Pei. 2023. The impact of sovereign defaults on lending countries. *Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting* 60:1, 345-374. [[Crossref](#)]
10. Mikhail Chernov, Drew Creal, Peter Hördahl. 2023. Sovereign credit and exchange rate risks: Evidence from Asia-Pacific local currency bonds. *Journal of International Economics* 140, 103692. [[Crossref](#)]
11. Diego Anzoategui. 2022. Sovereign spreads and the effects of fiscal austerity. *Journal of International Economics* 139, 103658. [[Crossref](#)]
12. Wenxin Du, Jesse Schreger. 2022. Sovereign Risk, Currency Risk, and Corporate Balance Sheets. *The Review of Financial Studies* 35:10, 4587-4629. [[Crossref](#)]
13. Tai-kuang Ho, Ya-chi Lin, Kuo-chun Yeh. 2022. The Borchardt Hypothesis: A Cliometric Reassessment of Germany's Debt and Crisis during 1930-1932. *The Journal of Economic History* 82:3, 691-726. [[Crossref](#)]
14. Yuta Saito. 2022. A Note on Time Inconsistency and Endogenous Exits from a Currency Union. *Games* 13:2, 21. [[Crossref](#)]
15. Patrick Augustin, Valeri Sokolovski, Marti G. Subrahmanyam, Davide Tomio. 2022. In sickness and in debt: The COVID-19 impact on sovereign credit risk. *Journal of Financial Economics* 143:3, 1251-1274. [[Crossref](#)]
16. Nicolas Maeder. 2022. Would an Earlier Inception of OMT by the ECB Have Prevented the 2012 Greek Default?. *SSRN Electronic Journal* 31. . [[Crossref](#)]
17. Javier Bianchi, Guido Lorenzoni. The prudential use of capital controls and foreign currency reserves 237-289. [[Crossref](#)]
18. James S. Costain, Galo Nuno, Carlos Thomas. 2022. The Term Structure of Interest Rates in a Heterogeneous Monetary Union. *SSRN Electronic Journal* 130. . [[Crossref](#)]
19. Javier Bianchi, Jorge Mondragon. 2021. Monetary Independence and Rollover Crises. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 137:1, 435-491. [[Crossref](#)]
20. Grace Weishi Gu. 2021. SOVEREIGN DEFAULT, TRADE, AND TERMS OF TRADE. *Macroeconomic Dynamics* 25:6, 1346-1380. [[Crossref](#)]

21. Robert A. McDowall. 2021. Sovereign default and capital controls. *Review of International Economics* 29:4, 1025-1045. [[Crossref](#)]
22. Joseph Bitar. 2021. The Monetary Crisis of Lebanon. *Review of Middle East Economics and Finance* 17:2, 71-96. [[Crossref](#)]
23. Carlo Galli. 2021. Self-fulfilling debt crises, fiscal policy and investment. *Journal of International Economics* 131, 103475. [[Crossref](#)]
24. Markus Kirchner, Malte Rieth. 2021. Sovereign Default Risk, Macroeconomic Fluctuations and Monetary–Fiscal Stabilization. *IMF Economic Review* 69:2, 391-426. [[Crossref](#)]
25. Alain Monfort, Fulvio Pegoraro, Jean-Paul Renne, Guillaume Roussellet. 2021. Affine Modeling of Credit Risk, Pricing of Credit Events, and Contagion. *Management Science* 67:6, 3674-3693. [[Crossref](#)]
26. Yasin Kürşat Önder, Enes Sunel. 2021. Inflation-default trade-off without a nominal anchor: The case of Greece. *Review of Economic Dynamics* 39, 55-78. [[Crossref](#)]
27. Xuan Wang. 2021. Bankruptcy Codes and Risk Sharing of Currency Unions. *SSRN Electronic Journal* 22. . [[Crossref](#)]
28. Markus Kirchner, Malte Rieth. 2021. Sovereign Default Risk, Macroeconomic Fluctuations and Monetary–Fiscal Stabilization. *SSRN Electronic Journal* 72. . [[Crossref](#)]
29. Yasin Kürşat Önder, Enes Sunel. 2021. Default or Depreciate. *SSRN Electronic Journal* 104. . [[Crossref](#)]
30. Laura Sunder-Plassmann. 2020. Inflation, default and sovereign debt: The role of denomination and ownership. *Journal of International Economics* 127, 103393. [[Crossref](#)]
31. Kris James Mitchener, Gonçalo Pina. 2020. Pegxit pressure. *Journal of International Money and Finance* 107, 102191. [[Crossref](#)]
32. Patrick Augustin, Mikhail Chernov, Dongho Song. 2020. Sovereign credit risk and exchange rates: Evidence from CDS quanto spreads. *Journal of Financial Economics* 137:1, 129-151. [[Crossref](#)]
33. Patrick Augustin, Valeri Sokolovski, Marti G. Subrahmanyam, Davide Tomio. 2020. In Sick and in Debt: The COVID-19 Impact on Sovereign Credit Risk. *SSRN Electronic Journal* . [[Crossref](#)]
34. Siming Liu, Hewei Shen. 2020. Sovereign Default and Labor Market Dynamics. *SSRN Electronic Journal* 69. . [[Crossref](#)]
35. Tiago Tavares. 2019. Labor market distortions under sovereign debt default crises. *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control* 108, 103749. [[Crossref](#)]
36. Alexander Kriwoluzky, Gernot J. Müller, Martin Wolf. 2019. Exit expectations and debt crises in currency unions. *Journal of International Economics* 121, 103253. [[Crossref](#)]
37. Dmitry Kuvshinov, Kaspar Zimmermann. 2019. Sovereigns going bust: Estimating the cost of default. *European Economic Review* 119, 1-21. [[Crossref](#)]
38. Joost Roettger. 2019. Discretionary monetary and fiscal policy with endogenous sovereign risk. *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control* 105, 44-66. [[Crossref](#)]
39. Francisco Roldán. 2019. Aggregate Demand and Sovereign Debt Crises. *SSRN Electronic Journal* . [[Crossref](#)]
40. Pasquale Della Corte, Alexandre Jeanneret, Ella Patelli. 2019. A Credit-Based Theory of the Currency Risk Premium. *SSRN Electronic Journal* 59. . [[Crossref](#)]
41. Xuan Wang. 2019. When Do Currency Unions Benefit from Default?. *SSRN Electronic Journal* . [[Crossref](#)]
42. Giovanni Bonaccolto, Nicola Borri, Andrea Consiglio. 2019. Breakup and Default Risks in the Eurozone. *SSRN Electronic Journal* . [[Crossref](#)]

43. Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger, Michał L. Kobielaż, Burak R. Uras. 2018. Sovereign default, exit and contagion in a monetary union. *Journal of International Economics* **113**, 1-19. [[Crossref](#)]
44. Nicola Borri, Kirill Shakhnov. 2017. Global Risk in Long-Term Sovereign Debt. *SSRN Electronic Journal* . [[Crossref](#)]