

School of Computer Science and Statistics

A distributed deployment model for Encrypted Client Hello

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Supervisor: Dr Stephen Farrell

April 2024

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master in Computer Science (MCS)

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A distributed deployment model for Encrypted Client Hello

Ted Johnson, Master in Computer Science University of Dublin, Trinity College, 2024

Supervisor: Stephen Farrell

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Acknowledgements

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TED JOHNSON

University of Dublin, Trinity College April 2024

Contents

Αŀ	Abstract													
Αc	knov	vledger	ements	iii										
1	Intro	ntroduction												
	1.1	Motiva	ration	. 1										
	1.2	Projec	ct Objectives	2										
	1.3	Resear	rch Contributions	3										
2	Bac	kgroun	nd	4										
	2.1	Transp	port Layer Security	4										
		2.1.1	Digital Certificates	5										
		2.1.2	TLS 1.3 Handshake	6										
		2.1.3	Extensions	6										
	2.2	The D	Domain Name System	7										
		2.2.1	Name Resolution Process	7										
		2.2.2	DNS Over HTTPS	8										
		2.2.3	The HTTPS Resource Record	8										
	2.3	B Encrypted Client Hello												
		2.3.1	Hybrid Public Key Encryption	9										
		2.3.2	Split Mode Deployment	9										
	2.4	Traffic	c Analysis	9										
		2.4.1	Correlation Attacks	9										
		2.4.2	Countermeasures	10										
	2.5	Summ	nary	. 10										
3	Des	ign		11										
	3.1	Proble	em Overview	. 11										
	3.2	Distrib	bution Mechanism	. 12										
		3 2 1	DNS Publication Schema	12										

		3.2.2	TLS Server Co-operation									•		13
	3.3	Traffic	Obfuscation					 •		i	 •	•		13
		3.3.1	Normalisation					 •				•	•	13
		3.3.2	Pacing and Mixing	 ٠									ė	13
	3.4	Summa	ary	 ·		 •		 ٠	 	ė		•		14
4	Impl	lement	ation											15
	4.1	Simula	tion	 ٠									ė	15
		4.1.1	Virtualisation	 •									ě	15
		4.1.2	Networking	 •									ě	16
	4.2	DNS S	erver										•	17
	4.3	TLS S	erver	 •									ě	19
		4.3.1	Peer Communication	 •									ě	20
		4.3.2	Web Server	 •									ě	21
	4.4	TLS C	lient	 ٠						•			ė	22
		4.4.1	curl						 	•				23
		4.4.2	Mozilla Firefox						 	•				23
		4.4.3	Google Chrome	 •									ě	24
	4.5	Summa	ary	 ė		 ٠		 •	 	ė		•		24
5	Resu	ults and	d Discussion											26
	5.1	Data (Collection						 	i		•	•	26
	5.2	Evalua	tion						 	i		•	•	26
		5.2.1	Performance	 ٠									ě	27
		5.2.2	Security	 •					 				ė	28
	5.3	Limita	ions	 ٠									ě	28
		5.3.1	Load Balancing	 •					 				ė	28
		5.3.2	Traffic Padding	 •					 				ė	29
	5.4	Summa	ary	 ė				 ٠	 	ė	 •	•		29
6	Con	clusion												30
	6.1	Learnir	ıgs						 	•			i	30
	6.2	Future	Work						 	•			i	30
	6.3	Reflect	ion	 ě	i i	 •		 •	 	<u>.</u>			i	30
Bil	bliog	raphy												32
Α1	. Cod	e Listiı	ıg											33

List of Figures

1.2.1 Project timeline	3
2.1.1 TLS certificate chain of trust	6
2.1.2 Basic TLS 1.3 handshake	7
2.2.1 Example DNS name resolution process	7
2.3.1 Example ECH Split Mode deployment	9
3.1.1 Example distributed ECH deployment	12
3.3.1 Diagram of various traffic metrics useful in correlation attacks	13
4.4.1 Screenshot of curl output when accessing tcd.example.com	24
4.4.2 Screenshot of Mozilla Firefox when accessing tcd.example.com	25
4.4.3 Screenshot of Google Chrome when accessing tcd.example.com	25
5.1.1 TODO wireshark	27
5.2.1 TODO performance graph	27
5.2.2 TODO security graph using entropy or something	28

List of Listings

4.1.1 Building OpenSSL from source inside build.img with DebVM	16
4.1.2 Connecting QEMU virtual machines using a network bridge	16
4.1.3 Static bridge network configuration using systemd	17
4.1.4 Generating a new self-signed root CA X.509 certificate using OpenSSL	17
4.2.1 Signing a new X.509 certificate for ns.example.com using OpenSSL	18
4.2.2 DNS over HTTPS configuration using BIND 9	18
4.2.3 Zone file for example.com zone with distributed ECH	19
4.3.1 Generating a new WireGuard key pair for tcd.example.com	20
4.3.2 Configuring a WireGuard network interface using systemd	20
4.3.3 Static WireGuard network configuration using systemd	21
4.3.4 Generating a new ECH key pair for tcd.example.com using OpenSSL	21
4.3.5 Distributed ECH NGINX configuration for tcd.example.com	22
4.3.6 Rudimentary script to shroud legitimate WireGuard communication	23
4.4.1 Command to use ECH-enabled curl on QEMU virtual machines	23

1 Introduction

Encrypted Client Hello (ECH) is a proposed extension to the Transport Layer Security protocol version 1.3 (TLS 1.3) which has begun to see implementation and adoption on the Internet [1, 2]. ECH seeks to allow encryption of the ClientHello message, which can contain potentially sensitive information such as the Service Name Indication (SNI) and Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) extensions. This is partially achieved through serving many private domains behind a common provider to form an anonymity set that conceals the true domain requested by the client.

Due to this, ECH introduces significant centralisation to the Internet. This paper presents a practical model for the distributed deployment of ECH amongst several co-operating TLS servers, where each server operates both as the origin server of its own domains as well as an ECH provider for other participating servers. The model addresses a number of implementation challenges, predominately related to ensuring the security of the protocol is not compromised and minimising the performance impact to the connection while strengthening service availability.

Included in this paper is a review of the background technology and concepts relevant to the discussion of the deployment model. This is followed by a study of the model's design and the complications which influenced it. We then see how this design can be implemented within a practical scenario and discuss some of its deployment considerations. In the subsequent chapter, an analysis and criticism of both the results taken from this implementation and the design as a whole is used to assess the quality of the solution. Finally, I conclude the report with a summary of the work completed and delineate where future contributions could best benefit the further development of the deployment model.

1.1 Motivation

Mark Nottingham has previously cautioned against the introduction of centralisation through Internet standards [3]. Of particular relevance to ECH is his highlight of the adverse effect centralisation can have on infrastructure resilience and service availability through

reliance on a single entity. This is especially detrimental to ECH where the effectiveness of its anonymity set grows with the number of private domains served by a single provider. Nottingham also writes on susceptibility of centralisation to stifle innovation and induce an unhealthy monoculture which may result in less overall technological progress and robustness of the ECH protocol.

Additionally, allowing entirely independent servers to co-operate from across the Internet to provide ECH support for each other enables several distinct organisations to work together to offer improved privacy for their users without the requirement for co-located servers nor the dependence of any on the availability on another. Consider here global networks of whistleblower services, investigative journalists and human rights non-profit organisations who share an interest in protecting the confidentiality of their members and users from persecution and retaliation.

For these reasons, the development of a model for the distributed deployment of ECH across several co-operating providers is a key step towards its application in <perilous> scenarios and broad adoption throughout the Internet.

1.2 Project Objectives

The objectives of this research project can be summarised with the following question: "How can Encrypted Client Hello be deployed fairly amongst co-operating Transport Layer Security servers to reduce network centralisation without compromising the security of the protocol?" This task is composed of the following objectives:

- 1. Identify principal challenges and appropriate solutions. Before development can begin proper, we must first understand the environment the system would operate in and explore the technical and logistical issues it might face to determine the dominant criteria for design. We accomplish this through research and experimentation of the functioning of the protocol and its surrounding technologies.
- 2. Design, evalute and contrast deployment models. An iterative development process is used to produce a series of incrementally improved skeletal prototypes, with the goal to rapidly design and test for functionality guided by the design criteria and results of previous work as heuristics.
- 3. Analyse model implementations through simulation. Promising design solutions are fleshed out into full implementations within deterministic, reproducible and quantifiable simulated environments, where security and performance implications can be easily isolated and compared. It is expected that unforeseeable practical challenges and considerations are to be unveiled during this work.

4. Conclude findings. <Learnings from comparisons> <As part of this, a prototype script is to be compiled from the implementation snippets>

In preparation for undertaking this project, I had produced the Gantt chart included in Fig. 1.2.1 to help gauge my progress during the four months of work. While I found more emphasis has been placed on implementation, the overall task structure of the timeline has been followed reasonable well.



Figure 1.2.1: Predicted timeline of project as of the 7th of December, 2023

1.3 Research Contributions

This work provides evidence for the viability of the distributed deployment of ECH between co-operative TLS servers. It supports its argument that the deployment model presented does not compromise the security of the protocol and minimises impact to network performance though analysis of the data produced by implementations within simulated networking environments. Additionally, an evaluation of several traffic masking and normalisation techniques is given to serve as the bases for further work on disrupting traffic correlation attacks applicable to ECH and elsewhere. Finally, the delivered project may also contribute academic value as a deterministic, reproducible tutorial on the deployment and operation of ECH using commonplace software and tooling.

2 Background

This chapter offers an overview of the technology and concepts needed to understand the context and relevance of the work within the broader world. The review is conducted predominately through a networking, security and privacy perspective to best highlight the aspects pertinent to the distributed deployment of ECH. This chapter also represents the bulk of the effort put into investigating and studying the functioning of ECH while identifying and experimenting with different deployment models.

The contents of this chapter include a high level description of the Transport Layer Security protocol and the Domain Name System with a more detailed look at the components that enable ECH functionality. This is followed by an inspection of ECH itself, its security properties and the mechanisms which allow for distributed deployment. Finally, we survey how a variety of traffic analysis techniques that can be used to infer sensitive information from patterns in network activity, as well as the countermeasures which exist to mask these patterns.

2.1 Transport Layer Security

Transport Layer Security (TLS) is a cryptographic protocol proposed by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) which enables secure network communication over public networks. Applications and services can establish an encrypted communication channel to transmit private information such that confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of the data can be ensured. TLS is commonly used to protect Internet traffic, having seen widespread adoption and several revisions since its original inception in 1999, superseding the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) specification previously defined by Netscape Communications from 1994 [4–6].

TLS is designed to operate on top of a reliable transmission protocol between a client and server, such as the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) when used over the Internet. In order to prevent eavesdropping, tampering and message forgery, TLS includes a number of security features based on a number of cryptographic mechanisms:

Confidentiality: All service and application data exchanged between the client and server is encrypted as to make it indecipherable to any intermediate party which might be intercepting their communication. For example, consider the importance of protecting customer passwords and banking information when accessing financial services.

Data integrity: In a similar manner, cryptographic properties are used to guarantee transferred data cannot be modified during transmission. This is critical for safeguarding against input manipulation in consequential situations, such as while conducting a monetary transaction.

Authentication: TLS provides the ability for both participants to verify the identity of the other, ensuring privileged communication is only performed with the intended recipient. Such a condition is fundamental for establishing trust and confidence in sensitive environments, as is required when interacting with online financial institutions.

TLS 1.3 is the latest defined standard for the protocol, having been published in August 2018 and contributing to the deprecation of TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 in March 2021 [7, 8]. <deployment stats>. It introduces many major changes to TLS 1.2, including the addition of a zero round trip time resumption (0-RTT) mode, further encryption and optimisation of the handshake and removal of outdated cryptographic algorithms and security mechanism with all key exchanges now providing forward secrecy. A change of particular relevance to ECH is the encryption of the digital certificate received by the client to authenticate the server.

2.1.1 Digital Certificates

TLS uses digital certificates to make assertions on the identity of entities within the network using a chain of trust model, and are of particular significance during the exchange of public keys. <what public key used for> <"the TLS connection handshake would be susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks"> <therefore trust must be established>

<chain of trust model is a hierarchical structure of certificates, Fig 2.1.1> <ensures each certificate in the chain is issued by a trusted Certificate Authority (CA)> <root ca is inherently trusted> <These certificates contain public key, parent name, signature and other metadata>

<root ca typically installed by operating system> <it is possible to add your own> <typically only server is authenticated, it sends its cert and public key during the handshake> <its certificate is verified by the client>




Figure 2.1.1: <>

2.1.2 TLS 1.3 Handshake

<the tls handshake is a procedure executed between the client and server to complete establishment> <tls 1.3 was designed to improve the security and performance of the handshake over 1.2 while reducing overall complexity> <Fig. 2.1.2> <application data>

<The handshake consists of a number of required and optional messages with some plain and others encrypted:>

ClientHello: <cli>enthello contents+purpose>

ServerHello: <serverhello contents+purpose>

Certificate: <optional certificate, now encrypted>

Finished: <finish protocol>

<in addition to these, the handshake offers extensions>

2.1.3 Extensions

<to remain adaptable, tls 1.3 permits numerous extensions to be inserted during the handshake for additional features and capabilities> <some are mandatory in 1.3 and others are very commonly used> <examples: ems, sni, alpn... and problems they solve> <wider




Figure 2.1.2: <>

range of use cases and accommodating evolving requirements> <examples: ech, ...> <problems> <greasing>

2.2 The Domain Name System

<history of ip, why dns needed> <the domain name system (dns) was introduced to add
alphanumeric domain names> <originally a big host file> <it now operates as a
decentralised hierarchical naming system accessible by networked devices> <registration
consists of a number of entities registrars, registrants, registries> <name server>

2.2.1 Name Resolution Process

<consists of root ns, tld ns, authoritative ns> <Fig. 2.2.1> <stub resolver queries local recursive resolver> <if not cached, asks root-tld-etc>




Figure 2.2.1: <example dns query resolution process for www.example.com>

2.2.2 DNS Over HTTPS

<security was previously not a concern as the information was considered public> <passive
attacks considered bad [todo]> <introduction of dot> <introduction of doh>

2.2.3 The HTTPS Resource Record

<these days a number of resource records exist for more advanced functionality and
adaptability> <new rr have been added to support performace and some fixes[https-rr]>
<this has also allowed additional data to be accociated with a host> <ech uses this as the
primary mechanism to transmit echconfig out-of-band to clients>

2.3 Encrypted Client Hello

<why need ech> <what ech is "Encrypted Client Hello (ECH) is a proposed extension for TLS 1.3 which has begun to see implementation and adoption on the Internet [1, 2]"> <what ech does "ECH seeks to allow encryption of the ClientHello message, which can contain potentially sensitive information such as the Service Name Indication (SNI) and Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) extensions." <how ech does this "This is partially achieved through serving many private domains behind a common provider to form an anonymity set that conceals the true domain requested by the client.">

The client-facing server first generates an ECH encryption key pair and some associated metadata. This public key and metadata, referred to as an ECH configuration or ECHConfig, may then be shared out-of-band to ECH-enabled clients though secure means like DoH. A client may then use this to construct a ClientHello message, named the ClientHelloOuter, holding unremarkable values for the client-facing server along side an encrypted ClientHello, named the ClientHelloInner, itself holding the real values for a private domain. To establish a TLS connection to the origin server of this domain, the client sends the ClientHelloOuter to the client-facing server, which decrypts and relays the contained ClientHelloInner to the origin server, which itself completes the TLS handshake with the client through the client-facing server.

<in this way, the true domain is concealed>

2.3.1 Hybrid Public Key Encryption

<much like tls itself, the ech extension uses public key cryptography> <shown to be secure>[9] <HPKE explanation>

2.3.2 Split Mode Deployment

<ech defines two modes of network topology> <shared mode is when the client-facing
server and backend server are co-located, and is not of interest to us> <split mode is when
the client-facing server and backend server are in different boxes pysically separateed>

<Fig. 2.3.1>




Figure 2.3.1: <>

<this is useful for x,y,z...> <distributed deployment explanation (as opposed to centralised and decentralised)> <however it is susceptible to attacks>

2.4 Traffic Analysis

<what is traffic analysis> <traffic analysis techniques that can be used to infer sensitive
information from patterns in network activity> <exploits information unintentionally leaked
by the system aka side-channel attack> <example of the act of communication being
information itself> <there are a lot of other techniques that can be used: packet
inspection>

2.4.1 Correlation Attacks

<is a large category of attacks identified by correlating communication patterns> <can be
used to break anonymity, very relevant to ech split mode> <examples: timing, packet size,
packet count, packet rate+pattern>

2.4.2 Countermeasures

<to disrupt the patterns> <effectiveness against practicality> <examples: morphing, mixing/pacing and padding, normalisation>

2.5 Summary

<tl><tls and dns continue to evolve with shifting requirements> <ech has been enabled due to this, which allows for the encryption of the clienthello> <ech split mode permits the client-facing server to be pysically separate from the backend server> <this reveals potentially attack surface through traffic correlation, which must be distributed with various countermeasures>

3 Design

<this disseration aims to serve as a guide for security researchers and service operator on the viablity of distributed ech> <during the course of this project, a system design was formulated and iteratively refined> <the main parts of the design considered are its deployment schema and protecting traffic>

<in this chapter, we will study the determined solution as well as the challenges that
motivated its design> <this consists of a overview of purposed system followed by an
examination of its individual components>

3.1 Problem Overview

<ech split mode serves as a bases for distributed deployment, but makes no attempt to address the implications of servers being operated by separate organisations and located across a public network> <to do so, we must consider a number of challenges faced by this situation to enable co-operation and secure functioning> <this paper purposes a loose network of tls servers all acting as ech providers for each other which proxy connections to the true origin server, as depicted in Fig. 3.1.1>




Figure 3.1.1: <>

<the design challenges can be split into two topics, mechanism for distribution and traffic obfuscation> <the distribution mechanism deals with a couple designs for the a dns publication schema so compatible clients follow the above process, and the networking required for tls servers to communicate with each other> <this considers load distribution, echconfig and stream proxying over a virtual private network>

3.2 Distribution Mechanism

<distribution is based on two parts> <first, clients need to be able to select from several
options provided by a dns query> <second, co-oerating tcp servers need to be able to
forward connections to each other based on the decrypted ClientHelloInner>

3.2.1 DNS Publication Schema


<one approach: shared echconfig with round robin A resource records> <load is evenly distributed across servers because client uses round robin on selected A rrs> <but requires shared secrets between all servers as there is no way to specify which ech key is associated with which host> <another approach: using alternative endpoints to associate ech keys with individual servers> <load is evenly distributed across servers due to matching priority> <unfortunately more fine-grained load distribution is not possible without srv resource records adoption> <we can replicate this using a dynamic dns service, where records are regularly substituted such that load is distributed across servers in a fair manner>

3.2.2 TLS Server Co-operation

<tl><tls servers are physically separate from each other and must communicate over the same network as the client when forwarding the client connection> <to do this, a virtual private network is established between participating servers> <servers still listen for normal tls connections on 443 port of the public interface as well as ech-enabled connection> <ech split mode connections have their ClientHelloInner decrypted and private domain mapped to the actual origin> <cli>clients connection is forwarded over a virtual private network to the origin server> <the origin server listening on the vpn interface completes the tls handshake with the client through the provider>

3.3 Traffic Obfuscation

<ech is susceptible>[10] <correlation attacks in low-latency systems like web browsing and
video streaming compared to high-latency like email>[11] <rx/tx timing> <packet
lengths> <traffic patterns> [12]



<traffic obfuscation techniques lead "to disrupt the patterns">

3.3.1 Normalisation

<shannon and perfect secrecy: removal of all identifying features> <injection of dummy traffic to fill bandwidth gaps> <impracticality in civilian environments due to required bandwidth>

3.3.2 Pacing and Mixing

<while not perfect, many practical techniques exist to mask traffic with minimal impacts>
<padding packets themselves to prevent packet length correlation> [13] <to disrupt timing-based correlation attacks, delays and slotting (aka pacing) can be used> <to disrupt deep packet inspection, other packet-based correlation attacks (traffic patterns), traffic</p>

mixing can be used> [14, 15] <a simple technique is packet duplication, where a similar packet is sent to every peer>

3.4 Summary

<it fulfills the desired design criteria> <we use dns https rrs to distributed load across multiple ech providers> <separate echconfigs can be used be each server as the ech key is associated with the server> <an alternative strategy exists that is more robust but requires shared echconfig> <a virtual private network between co-operating servers is used to allow peer communication> <ech split mode is vulnerable to correlation attacks> <but techniques exist to defend against attacks>

4 Implementation

Hello, here is some text without a meaning. This text should show what a printed text will look like at this place. If you read this text, you will get no information. Really? Is there no information? Is there a difference between this text and some nonsense like "Huardest gefburn"? Kjift — not at all! A blind text like this gives you information about the selected font, how the letters are written and an impression of the look. This text should contain all letters of the alphabet and it should be written in of the original language. There is no need for special content, but the length of words should match the language.

4.1 Simulation

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4.1.1 Virtualisation

```
ssh-keygen -N "" -t ed25519 -f ssh.key
2 debvm-create -h builder -o builder.img -r unstable -z 2GB -k ssh.key.pub -- \
       --include ca-certificates, build-essential, dh-autoreconf, git, e2fsprogs \
       --include libpsl-dev,libpcre3-dev,libz-dev,libnghttp2-dev
6 qemu-img create build.img 2G
  debvm-run --image builder.img --sshport 2222 --graphical -- \
       -display none -drive file=build.img,format=raw,if=virtio,readonly=off &
9 debvm-waitssh 2222
10
11 ssh -o NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost=yes -i ssh.key -p 2222 root@127.0.0.1 "
     mkfs.ext4 -L build /dev/vdb
12
      mount /dev/vdb /mnt
13
14
      git clone -b ECH-draft-13c https://github.com/sftcd/openssl.git /mnt/src/openssl
15
       cd /mnt/src/openssl
16
      ./config --prefix=/mnt/openssl --openssldir=/mnt/openssl
17
18
      make -j8
      make -j8 install
19
20
      cd / && umount /mnt
21
      shutdown now"
22
23 Wait
```

Listing 4.1.1: TODO builder

4.1.2 Networking

Hello, here is some text without a meaning. This text should show what a printed text will look like at this place. If you read this text, you will get no information. Really? Is there no information? Is there a difference between this text and some nonsense like "Huardest gefburn"? Kjift — not at all! A blind text like this gives you information about the selected font, how the letters are written and an impression of the look. This text should contain all letters of the alphabet and it should be written in of the original language. There is no need for special content, but the length of words should match the language.

```
sudo ip link add name br0 type bridge
sudo ip addr add 172.0.0.1/24 dev br0
sudo ip link set dev br0 up

debvm-run --image host.img -- \
-device virtio-net-pci,netdev=net1,mac=00:00:00:00:00:01 \
-netdev bridge,id=net1,br=br0
```

Listing 4.1.2: TODO br0

Hello, here is some text without a meaning. This text should show what a printed text will look like at this place. If you read this text, you will get no information. Really? Is there no information? Is there a difference between this text and some nonsense like "Huardest gefburn"? Kjift – not at all! A blind text like this gives you information about the selected

font, how the letters are written and an impression of the look. This text should contain all letters of the alphabet and it should be written in of the original language. There is no need for special content, but the length of words should match the language.

```
1 [Match]
2 MACAddress=00:00:00:00:00:01
3
4 [Network]
5 DNS=172.0.0.254
6 Address=172.0.0.5/24
7
8 [Route]
9 Gateway=0.0.0.0
10 Destination=0.0.0.0/0
11 Metric=9999
```

Listing 4.1.3: TODO /etc/systemd/network/00-br0.network contents

Hello, here is some text without a meaning. This text should show what a printed text will look like at this place. If you read this text, you will get no information. Really? Is there no information? Is there a difference between this text and some nonsense like "Huardest gefburn"? Kjift — not at all! A blind text like this gives you information about the selected font, how the letters are written and an impression of the look. This text should contain all letters of the alphabet and it should be written in of the original language. There is no need for special content, but the length of words should match the language.

```
LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/mnt/openss1/lib64 /mnt/openss1/bin/openss1 req -x509 \
-newkey ec -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:secp384r1 -days 3650 -nodes \
-keyout /keys/root.key -out /keys/root.crt -subj '/CN=example.com'
```

Listing 4.1.4: TODO root ca

Hello, here is some text without a meaning. This text should show what a printed text will look like at this place. If you read this text, you will get no information. Really? Is there no information? Is there a difference between this text and some nonsense like "Huardest gefburn"? Kjift — not at all! A blind text like this gives you information about the selected font, how the letters are written and an impression of the look. This text should contain all letters of the alphabet and it should be written in of the original language. There is no need for special content, but the length of words should match the language.

4.2 DNS Server

Hello, here is some text without a meaning. This text should show what a printed text will look like at this place. If you read this text, you will get no information. Really? Is there no

information? Is there a difference between this text and some nonsense like "Huardest gefburn"? Kjift – not at all! A blind text like this gives you information about the selected font, how the letters are written and an impression of the look. This text should contain all letters of the alphabet and it should be written in of the original language. There is no need for special content, but the length of words should match the language.

```
LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/mnt/openssl/lib64 /mnt/openssl/bin/openssl req \
-newkey ec -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:secp384r1 -nodes \
-keyout /keys/dns.key -out /keys/dns.csr -subj '/CN=ns.example.com'

LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/mnt/openssl/lib64 /mnt/openssl/bin/openssl x509 -req \
-CA /keys/root.crt -CAkey /keys/root.key -days 3650 -CAcreateserial \
-extfile <(printf 'subjectAltName=DNS:ns.example.com') \
-in /keys/dns.csr -out /keys/dns.crt
```

Listing 4.2.1: TODO dns

Hello, here is some text without a meaning. This text should show what a printed text will look like at this place. If you read this text, you will get no information. Really? Is there no information? Is there a difference between this text and some nonsense like "Huardest gefburn"? Kjift — not at all! A blind text like this gives you information about the selected font, how the letters are written and an impression of the look. This text should contain all letters of the alphabet and it should be written in of the original language. There is no need for special content, but the length of words should match the language.

```
tls tlspair {
       key-file "/keys/dns.key";
2
       cert-file "/keys/dns.crt";
3
4 };
6 options {
       directory "/var/cache/bind";
7
8
       recursion no;
       dnssec-validation auto;
       allow-transfer { none; };
10
       listen-on { any; };
11
       listen-on port 443 tls tlspair http default { any; };
^{12}
13 };
14
zone "example.com" {
      type master;
       file "/var/lib/bind/db.example.com";
17
18 };
```

Listing 4.2.2: TODO /etc/bind/named.conf contents

Hello, here is some text without a meaning. This text should show what a printed text will look like at this place. If you read this text, you will get no information. Really? Is there no

information? Is there a difference between this text and some nonsense like "Huardest gefburn"? Kjift – not at all! A blind text like this gives you information about the selected font, how the letters are written and an impression of the look. This text should contain all letters of the alphabet and it should be written in of the original language. There is no need for special content, but the length of words should match the language.

```
$TTL 3600

2 IN SOA dns root.dns 2024040100 3600 600 86400 600

3 IN NS dns

4 dcu.ech.example.com. IN A 172.0.0.2

5 tcd.ech.example.com. IN A 172.0.0.5

7 ucd.ech.example.com. IN A 172.0.0.8

8 dcu.example.com. IN HTTPS 1 dcu.ech.example.com. ech=<DCU ECHConfig>
10 dcu.example.com. IN HTTPS 1 tcd.ech.example.com. ech=<TCD ECHConfig>
11 dcu.example.com. IN HTTPS 1 ucd.ech.example.com. ech=<UCD ECHConfig>
12 tcd.example.com. IN HTTPS 1 dcu.ech.example.com. ech=<UCD ECHConfig>
13 tcd.example.com. IN HTTPS 1 tcd.ech.example.com. ech=<TCD ECHConfig>
14 tcd.example.com. IN HTTPS 1 tcd.ech.example.com. ech=<TCD ECHConfig>
15 tcd.example.com. IN HTTPS 1 ucd.ech.example.com. ech=<UCD ECHConfig>
16 ucd.example.com. IN HTTPS 1 dcu.ech.example.com. ech=<UCD ECHConfig>
18 ucd.example.com. IN HTTPS 1 tcd.ech.example.com. ech=<TCD ECHConfig>
19 ucd.example.com. IN HTTPS 1 ucd.ech.example.com. ech=<UCD ECHConfig>
19 ucd.example.com. IN HTTPS 1 ucd.ech.example.com. ech=<UCD ECHConfig>
19 ucd.example.com. IN HTTPS 1 ucd.ech.example.com. ech=<UCD ECHConfig>
```

Listing 4.2.3

Hello, here is some text without a meaning. This text should show what a printed text will look like at this place. If you read this text, you will get no information. Really? Is there no information? Is there a difference between this text and some nonsense like "Huardest gefburn"? Kjift — not at all! A blind text like this gives you information about the selected font, how the letters are written and an impression of the look. This text should contain all letters of the alphabet and it should be written in of the original language. There is no need for special content, but the length of words should match the language.

4.3 TLS Server

4.3.1 Peer Communication

Hello, here is some text without a meaning. This text should show what a printed text will look like at this place. If you read this text, you will get no information. Really? Is there no information? Is there a difference between this text and some nonsense like "Huardest gefburn"? Kjift — not at all! A blind text like this gives you information about the selected font, how the letters are written and an impression of the look. This text should contain all letters of the alphabet and it should be written in of the original language. There is no need for special content, but the length of words should match the language.

```
wg genkey | tee /keys/tcd/wg.key | wg pubkey > /keys/tcd/wg.key.pub
```

Listing 4.3.1: TODO host wg

Hello, here is some text without a meaning. This text should show what a printed text will look like at this place. If you read this text, you will get no information. Really? Is there no information? Is there a difference between this text and some nonsense like "Huardest gefburn"? Kjift — not at all! A blind text like this gives you information about the selected font, how the letters are written and an impression of the look. This text should contain all letters of the alphabet and it should be written in of the original language. There is no need for special content, but the length of words should match the language.

```
1 [NetDev]
2 Name=wg0
3 Kind=wireguard
4
5 [WireGuard]
6 ListenPort=51820
7 PrivateKey=<TCD WireGuard Private Key>
8
9 [WireGuardPeer]
10 PublicKey=<DCU WireGuard Public Key>
11 AllowedIPs=172.0.1.2/32
12 Endpoint=172.0.0.2:51820
13
14 [WireGuardPeer]
15 PublicKey=<UCD WireGuard Public Key>
16 AllowedIPs=172.0.1.8/32
17 Endpoint=172.0.0.8:51820
```

Listing 4.3.2: TODO host wg

Hello, here is some text without a meaning. This text should show what a printed text will look like at this place. If you read this text, you will get no information. Really? Is there no information? Is there a difference between this text and some nonsense like "Huardest gefburn"? Kjift – not at all! A blind text like this gives you information about the selected

```
1  [Match]
2  Name=wg0
3
4  [Network]
5  Address=172.0.1.5/24
```

Listing 4.3.3: TODO host wg0

font, how the letters are written and an impression of the look. This text should contain all letters of the alphabet and it should be written in of the original language. There is no need for special content, but the length of words should match the language.

4.3.2 Web Server

Hello, here is some text without a meaning. This text should show what a printed text will look like at this place. If you read this text, you will get no information. Really? Is there no information? Is there a difference between this text and some nonsense like "Huardest gefburn"? Kjift — not at all! A blind text like this gives you information about the selected font, how the letters are written and an impression of the look. This text should contain all letters of the alphabet and it should be written in of the original language. There is no need for special content, but the length of words should match the language.

```
LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/mnt/openss1/lib64 /mnt/openss1/bin/openss1 ech \
-public_name tcd.example.com -pemout /keys/tcd/key.ech
```

Listing 4.3.4: TODO host+site tls

Hello, here is some text without a meaning. This text should show what a printed text will look like at this place. If you read this text, you will get no information. Really? Is there no information? Is there a difference between this text and some nonsense like "Huardest gefburn"? Kjift – not at all! A blind text like this gives you information about the selected font, how the letters are written and an impression of the look. This text should contain all letters of the alphabet and it should be written in of the original language. There is no need for special content, but the length of words should match the language.

```
1 stream {
       ssl_preread on;
2
       ssl_echkeydir /keys/tcd;
       server {
4
           listen 172.0.0.5:443;
5
6
           proxy_pass $backend;
7
       }
       map $ssl_preread_server_name $backend {
8
           dcu.example.com 172.0.1.2:443;
9
           ucd.example.com 172.0.1.8:443;
10
       }
11
12 }
13
  http {
14
       server {
15
           root /site/tcd;
16
17
            server_name tcd.example.com;
           listen 172.0.1.5:443 ssl;
18
           http2 on;
19
            ssl_certificate /keys/tcd/tcd.crt;
20
            ssl_certificate_key /keys/tcd/tcd.key;
^{21}
22
            ssl_protocols TLSv1.3;
           location / {
23
                ssi on;
24
                index index.html index.htm;
25
           }
       }
27
28 }
```

Listing 4.3.5: TODO nginx

Hello, here is some text without a meaning. This text should show what a printed text will look like at this place. If you read this text, you will get no information. Really? Is there no information? Is there a difference between this text and some nonsense like "Huardest gefburn"? Kjift — not at all! A blind text like this gives you information about the selected font, how the letters are written and an impression of the look. This text should contain all letters of the alphabet and it should be written in of the original language. There is no need for special content, but the length of words should match the language.

4.4 TLS Client

```
tc qdisc replace dev enp0s6 root netem slot 100ms 200ms

tcpdump -i wg0 -nnqt ip and src 172.0.1.5 | while read _ _ _ dst _ len; do

[ "172.0.1.2" != "${dst%.*}" ] &&

dd if=/dev/urandom bs=$len count=1 >/dev/udp/172.0.1.2/1234 &

[ "172.0.1.8" != "${dst%.*}" ] &&

dd if=/dev/urandom bs=$len count=1 >/dev/udp/172.0.1.8/1234 &

done
```

Listing 4.3.6

4.4.1 curl

Hello, here is some text without a meaning. This text should show what a printed text will look like at this place. If you read this text, you will get no information. Really? Is there no information? Is there a difference between this text and some nonsense like "Huardest gefburn"? Kjift — not at all! A blind text like this gives you information about the selected font, how the letters are written and an impression of the look. This text should contain all letters of the alphabet and it should be written in of the original language. There is no need for special content, but the length of words should match the language.

```
LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/mnt/openssl/lib64 /mnt/curl/bin/curl \
--verbose --cacert /keys/root.crt --ech hard \
--doh-url https://ns.example.com/dns-query https://tcd.example.com
```

Listing 4.4.1: TODO curl

Hello, here is some text without a meaning. This text should show what a printed text will look like at this place. If you read this text, you will get no information. Really? Is there no information? Is there a difference between this text and some nonsense like "Huardest gefburn"? Kjift — not at all! A blind text like this gives you information about the selected font, how the letters are written and an impression of the look. This text should contain all letters of the alphabet and it should be written in of the original language. There is no need for special content, but the length of words should match the language.

4.4.2 Mozilla Firefox




Figure 4.4.1: <TODO>

4.4.3 Google Chrome

Hello, here is some text without a meaning. This text should show what a printed text will look like at this place. If you read this text, you will get no information. Really? Is there no information? Is there a difference between this text and some nonsense like "Huardest gefburn"? Kjift – not at all! A blind text like this gives you information about the selected font, how the letters are written and an impression of the look. This text should contain all letters of the alphabet and it should be written in of the original language. There is no need for special content, but the length of words should match the language.

4.5 Summary




Figure 4.4.2: <TODO>




Figure 4.4.3: <TODO>

5 Results and Discussion

Hello, here is some text without a meaning. This text should show what a printed text will look like at this place. If you read this text, you will get no information. Really? Is there no information? Is there a difference between this text and some nonsense like "Huardest gefburn"? Kjift — not at all! A blind text like this gives you information about the selected font, how the letters are written and an impression of the look. This text should contain all letters of the alphabet and it should be written in of the original language. There is no need for special content, but the length of words should match the language.

5.1 Data Collection

Hello, here is some text without a meaning. This text should show what a printed text will look like at this place. If you read this text, you will get no information. Really? Is there no information? Is there a difference between this text and some nonsense like "Huardest gefburn"? Kjift – not at all! A blind text like this gives you information about the selected font, how the letters are written and an impression of the look. This text should contain all letters of the alphabet and it should be written in of the original language. There is no need for special content, but the length of words should match the language.

5.2 Evaluation




Figure 5.1.1: <>

5.2.1 Performance




Figure 5.2.1: <>

5.2.2 Security

Hello, here is some text without a meaning. This text should show what a printed text will look like at this place. If you read this text, you will get no information. Really? Is there no information? Is there a difference between this text and some nonsense like "Huardest gefburn"? Kjift — not at all! A blind text like this gives you information about the selected font, how the letters are written and an impression of the look. This text should contain all letters of the alphabet and it should be written in of the original language. There is no need for special content, but the length of words should match the language.




Figure 5.2.2: <>

5.3 Limitations

Hello, here is some text without a meaning. This text should show what a printed text will look like at this place. If you read this text, you will get no information. Really? Is there no information? Is there a difference between this text and some nonsense like "Huardest gefburn"? Kjift — not at all! A blind text like this gives you information about the selected font, how the letters are written and an impression of the look. This text should contain all letters of the alphabet and it should be written in of the original language. There is no need for special content, but the length of words should match the language.

5.3.1 Load Balancing

Hello, here is some text without a meaning. This text should show what a printed text will look like at this place. If you read this text, you will get no information. Really? Is there no information? Is there a difference between this text and some nonsense like "Huardest

gefburn"? Kjift – not at all! A blind text like this gives you information about the selected font, how the letters are written and an impression of the look. This text should contain all letters of the alphabet and it should be written in of the original language. There is no need for special content, but the length of words should match the language.

5.3.2 Traffic Padding

Hello, here is some text without a meaning. This text should show what a printed text will look like at this place. If you read this text, you will get no information. Really? Is there no information? Is there a difference between this text and some nonsense like "Huardest gefburn"? Kjift — not at all! A blind text like this gives you information about the selected font, how the letters are written and an impression of the look. This text should contain all letters of the alphabet and it should be written in of the original language. There is no need for special content, but the length of words should match the language.

5.4 Summary

Hello, here is some text without a meaning. This text should show what a printed text will look like at this place. If you read this text, you will get no information. Really? Is there no information? Is there a difference between this text and some nonsense like "Huardest gefburn"? Kjift — not at all! A blind text like this gives you information about the selected font, how the letters are written and an impression of the look. This text should contain all letters of the alphabet and it should be written in of the original language. There is no need for special content, but the length of words should match the language.

6 Conclusion

<this research has been a first effort to create a distributed ech deployment model> <we
have seen background> <we have seen design> <we have seen implementation> <we have
seen results>

<in this final chapter, present key learnings> <then outline future work> <finish with a
reflection of the project as a whole>

6.1 Learnings

<ECH Split Mode topology permits distributed deployment> <a href="https://www.ntmons.com/ht

6.2 Future Work

<shared dns publication strategy (with ech key rotation)> <dynamic traffic flow analysis for load balancing (instead of just distribution)> <more in-depth study on disrupting traffic correlation attacks> <test deployment on actual hardware with realistic traffic>

6.3 Reflection

<what i think went well> <reliable, reproducable and deterministic virtual environment test bed> <functioning distributed ech prototype> <if i was to do this again, what would i change> <dedicate more time to theoretical instead of practical (e.g. got firefox working but unsure if actually compatible with spec> <however, the work completed is still applicable to future effort>

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A1 Code Listing

<what this code is in relation to project> <why it was created> <it does this that and the
other thing> <requirements>

```
#!/bin/bash
3 hash sudo ip ssh ssh-keygen debvm-create debvm-run debvm-waitssh || exit 1
4 msg() { printf "\n\033[1;33m$@\033[0m\n"; }
5 pkill qemu-system-x86
7 # Parse provided config
8 dir="$1"
9 network_cfg="$(<"$2")" || exit 1</pre>
  server_cfgs="$(<"$3")" || exit 1
read -d "" domain dns_host dns_mac dns_ip <<< "$network_cfg"
  mkdir -p "$dir" || exit 1
  # Generate SSH keypair
   [ -f "$dir/ssh.key" ] && [ -f "$dir/ssh.key.pub" ] || {
    msg "Generating ssh keypair for VMs..."
     ssh-keygen -N "" -t ed25519 -f "$dir/ssh.key" || exit 1
18
19
  # Setup host network bridge
  sudo ip link show br0 1>/dev/null 2>&1 || {
    msg "Creating network bridge br0..."
     sudo ip link add name br0 type bridge || exit 1
     sudo ip addr add 172.0.0.1/24 dev br0 | | exit 1
  [ -z "$(ip link show br0 up)" ] && {
    msg "Bringing up network bridge br0..."
     sudo ip link set dev br0 up || exit 1
29
30
31 # Generate build with builder
32 [ -f "$dir/builder.img" ] || {
```

```
msg "Generating builder.img..."
33
     debvm-create -h builder -o "$dir/builder.img" -r unstable -z 2GB -k
     --include ca-certificates, build-essential, dh-autoreconf, git, e2fsprogs \
35
       --include libpsl-dev,libpcre3-dev,libz-dev,libnghttp2-dev || exit 1
   [ -f "$dir/build.img" ] || {
38
     msg "Generating build.img:"
     cmds="
41
    # Format and mount build.img
42
     mkfs.ext4 -L build /dev/vdb || exit 1
    mount /dev/vdb /mnt || exit 1
44
45
    # Build OpenSSL patched with ECH support
46
     git clone -b ECH-draft-13c https://github.com/sftcd/openssl.git /mnt/src/openssl \
      && cd /mnt/src/openssl || exit 1
48
     ./config --prefix=/mnt/openssl --openssldir=/mnt/openssl || exit 1
49
    make -j8 || exit 1
    make -j8 install || exit 1
51
52
     # Build curl patched with ECH support
53
     git clone -b ECH-experimental https://github.com/sftcd/curl.git /mnt/src/curl \
      && cd /mnt/src/curl || exit 1
55
     autoreconf -fi || exit 1
56
    CPPFLAGS=-I/mnt/openssl/include LDFLAGS=-L/mnt/openssl/lib64 ./configure \\
       --prefix=/mnt/curl --with-openssl --enable-ech --enable-httpsrr || exit 1
58
    LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/mnt/openss1/lib64 make -j8 || exit 1
59
    make -j8 install || exit 1
60
61
     # Build NGINX patched with ECH support
62
     git clone -b ECH-experimental https://github.com/sftcd/nginx.git /mnt/src/nginx \
63
      && cd /mnt/src/nginx || exit 1
     ./auto/configure --prefix=/mnt/nginx \\
65
       --with-cc-opt=-I/mnt/openssl/include --with-ld-opt=-L/mnt/openssl/lib64 \\
66
       --with-stream_ssl_module --with-stream_ssl_preread_module \\
67
       --with-http_ssl_module --with-http_v2_module || exit 1
68
     LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/mnt/openss1/lib64 make -j8 || exit 1
69
    make -j8 install || exit 1
70
     sed 's/\\/usr\\/sbin\\/nginx\\\/mt\\/nginx\\/sbin\\/nginx -c \\/site\\/nginx.conf
     → -p \\/site\\/nginx/' \\
      /mnt/src/nginx/debian/nginx-common.nginx.service > /mnt/nginx/nginx.service | |
72
       \hookrightarrow exit 1
     >>/mnt/nginx/nginx.service echo '
     [Service]
74
     Environment=LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/mnt/openss1/lib64' || exit 1
75
```

```
76
77
      # Graceful shutdown
      cd / && umount /mnt || exit 1
78
      shutdown now"
79
      echo "$cmds"
81
     qemu-img create "$dir/build.img" 2G || exit 1
82
     debvm-run --image "$dir/builder.img" --sshport 2222 --graphical -- \
83
        -display none -drive file="$dir/build.img",format=raw,if=virtio,readonly=off &
      debvm-waitssh 2222 | exit 1
85
      ssh -o NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost=yes -i "$dir/ssh.key" -p 2222
      \rightarrow root@127.0.0.1 "$cmds" || exit 1
88
89
   # Generate base VM image
   [ -f "$dir/base.img" ] || {
     msg "Generating base.img:"
92
      cmds="
      # Mount build.img
95
     mount -o ro /dev/disk/by-label/build /mnt || exit 1
96
98
      # Install some debugging tools
     apt-get --yes install vim dnsutils iproute2 || exit 1
99
100
      # Generate CA root and DNS key+certificate
101
     mkdir -p /keys || exit 1
102
     LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/mnt/openss1/lib64 /mnt/openss1/bin/openss1 req -x509 \\
103
       -newkey ec -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:secp384r1 -days 3650 -nodes \\
104
        -keyout /keys/root.key -out /keys/root.crt -subj '/CN=root.$domain' || exit 1
105
     LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/mnt/openssl/lib64 /mnt/openssl/bin/openssl req \\
106
        -newkey ec -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:secp384r1 -nodes \\
107
        -keyout /keys/$dns_host.key -out /keys/$dns_host.csr -subj
108
        → '/CN=$dns_host.$domain' || exit 1
     LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/mnt/openss1/lib64 /mnt/openss1/bin/openss1 x509 -req \\
109
        -CA /keys/root.crt -CAkey /keys/root.key -days 3650 -CAcreateserial \\
110
       -extfile <(printf 'subjectAltName=DNS:$dns_host.$domain,IP:$dns_ip') \\</pre>
111
       -in /keys/$dns_host.csr -out /keys/$dns_host.crt || exit 1
112
      chmod +r /keys/{root,$dns_host}.key || exit 1"
113
114
     for server_cfg in $server_cfgs; do IFS=, read host _ ip _ sites <<< $server_cfg
115
       cmds="$cmds
116
117
       # Generate $host WireGuard and ECH keypair
       mkdir -p /keys/$host || exit 1
118
       wg genkey | tee /keys/$host/wg.key | wg pubkey > /keys/$host/wg.key.pub || exit 1
119
```

```
LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/mnt/openssl/lib64 /mnt/openssl/bin/openssl ech \\
120
          -public_name $host.$domain -pemout /keys/$host/key.ech"
121
        for site in ${sites//,/}; do
122
          cmds="$cmds
123
          # Generate $site.$domain key+certificate
124
          LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/mnt/openssl/lib64 /mnt/openssl/bin/openssl req \\
125
            -newkey ec -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:secp384r1 -nodes \\
126
            -keyout /keys/$host/$site.key -out /keys/$host/$site.csr -subj
127
            → '/CN=$site.$domain' || exit 1
          LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/mnt/openssl/lib64 /mnt/openssl/bin/openssl x509 -req \\
128
            -CA /keys/root.crt -CAkey /keys/root.key -days 3650 -CAcreateserial \\
129
            -extfile <(printf 'subjectAltName=DNS:$site.$domain,IP:$ip') \\</pre>
130
            -in /keys/$host/$site.csr -out /keys/$host/$site.crt || exit 1
131
          chmod +r /keys/$host/$site.key || exit 1"
132
        done
133
      done
135
      cmds="$cmds
136
137
      # Graceful shutdown
      cd && umount /mnt || exit 1
138
      shutdown now"
139
140
     echo "$cmds"
141
     debvm-create -h base -o "$dir/base.img" -r unstable -z 1GB -k "$dir/ssh.key.pub"
142
        --include ca-certificates, wireguard, libpsl5, libpcre3, libnghttp2-14 || exit 1
143
     debvm-run --image "$dir/base.img" --sshport 2222 --graphical -- \
144
        -display none -drive file="$dir/build.img",format=raw,if=virtio,readonly=on &
145
     debvm-waitssh 2222 || exit 1
146
      ssh -o NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost=yes -i "$dir/ssh.key" -p 2222
      → root@127.0.0.1 "$cmds" | exit 1
     wait.
148
149
150
   # Set DNS server configuration
151
   cmds="
   # Install dependencies
   apt-get --yes install bind9 || exit 1
154
155
   # Configure BIND9 for DoH usage
   >/etc/bind/named.conf.options echo '
   tls tlspair {
158
     key-file \"/keys/$dns_host.key\";
159
     cert-file \"/keys/$dns_host.crt\";
161 };
162 options {
```

```
directory \"/var/cache/bind\";
163
     recursion no;
164
     dnssec-validation auto;
165
     allow-transfer { none; };
166
     listen-on { any; };
167
     listen-on port 443 tls tlspair http default { any; };
168
   };' || exit 1
169
170
  # Configure BIND9 to be dns.example.com
>/etc/bind/named.conf.local echo '
173 zone \"$domain\" {
     type master;
174
     file \"/var/lib/bind/db.$domain\";
176 };' || exit 1
177
# Configure BIND9 with RRs for dns.example.com
>/var/lib/bind/db.$domain echo '
180 \$TTL 60
181 @ IN SOA $dns_host root.$dns_host 2007010401 3600 600 86400 600
$dns_host IN A $dns_ip"
  for server_cfg in $server_cfgs; do IFS=, read host _ ip _ sites <<< $server_cfg
     cmds="$cmds"$'\n'"$host.ech IN A $ip"
     for site in ${sites//,/}; do
186
       for p_server_cfg in $server_cfgs; do IFS=, read p_host _ <<< $p_server_cfg</pre>
187
         [ "$host" != "$p_host" ] && {
           cmds="\cmds"$'\n'"$site IN HTTPS 1 $p_host.ech ech='\$(tail -2)
189
            }
190
       done
191
     done
192
   done
193
   cmds="$cmds' || exit 1"
194
195
   declare "${dns_host}_cmds=$cmds"
196
197
   # Set TLS servers configuration
   for server_cfg in $server_cfgs; do IFS=, read host _ ip wg sites <<< $server_cfg
199
     cmds="
200
     # Install dependencies
201
     apt-get --yes install wireguard tcpdump || exit 1
202
203
     # Configure WireGuard
204
     >/etc/systemd/network/00-wg0.netdev echo '
205
     [NetDev]
206
     Name=wg0
207
```

```
Kind=wireguard
208
      [WireGuard]
209
      ListenPort=51820
210
     PrivateKey='\"\$(cat /keys/$host/wg.key)\"'"
211
     for p_server_cfg in $server_cfgs; do IFS=, read p_host _ p_ip p_wg _ <<<</pre>
212
      [ "$host" != "$p_host" ] && {
213
          cmds="$cmds
214
          [WireGuardPeer]
          PublicKey='\"\$(cat /keys/$p_host/wg.key.pub)\"'
216
          AllowedIPs=$p_wg/32
217
          Endpoint=$p_ip:51820"
219
       }
      done
220
      cmds="$cmds' || exit 1
221
     >/etc/systemd/network/00-wg0.network echo '
222
      [Match]
223
     Name=wg0
224
      [Network]
225
     Address=$wg/24' || exit 1
226
227
     # Configure NGINX
228
     mkdir -p /site/nginx/logs || exit 1
229
     >/site/nginx.conf echo '
230
     pid /run/nginx.pid;
231
     worker_processes 1;
232
     events { worker_connections 1024; }
233
234
     # ECH client-facing server as proxy for each WireGuard peer
235
     stream {
236
       log_format basic \"\$remote_addr [\$time_local] \$protocol \$status \$bytes_sent
237
        → \$bytes_received \$session_time\";
       access_log logs/access.log basic;
238
       ssl_preread on;
239
       ssl_echkeydir /keys/$host;
240
       server { listen $ip:443; proxy_pass \$backend; }
241
       map \$ssl_preread_server_name \$backend {"
242
     for p_server_cfg in $server_cfgs; do IFS=, read _ _ p_wg p_sites <<<
243
      for p_site in ${p_sites//,/ }; do
244
          cmds="$cmds $p_site.$domain $p_wg:443;"
245
       done
246
     done
247
      cmds="$cmds
248
       }
249
     }
250
```

```
251
      # ECH backend server listening only through WireGuard
252
     http {"
253
     for site in ${sites//,/ }; do
254
       cmds="$cmds
255
        server {
256
         root /site/$site;
257
          server_name $site.$domain;
258
         listen $wg:443 ssl;
         http2 on;
260
         ssl_certificate /keys/$host/$site.crt;
261
          ssl_certificate_key /keys/$host/$site.key;
          ssl_protocols TLSv1.3;
263
          location / { ssi on; index index.html index.htm; }
264
       3"
265
      done
      cmds="$cmds
267
     }' || exit 1"
268
269
270
     for site in ${sites//,/}; do
       cmds="$cmds
271
       # Generate $site index.html
272
       mkdir -p /site/$site || exit 1
       >/site/$site/index.html echo '\
274
       <!doctype html>
275
        <html lang=en>
276
277
          <head>
            <meta charset=utf-8>
278
            <title>$site.$domain</title>
279
          </head>
280
          <body>
281
            <img src=\"/image.png\" width=\"300\" height=\"300\">
282
            >
283
              Welcome to <b>$site.$domain</b><br/>
284
             Got here via <i><!--# echo var=\"remote_addr\" --></i>
285
            286
            <u1>
287
              SNI: <!--# echo var=\"ssl_server_name\" -->
288
              HTTP host: <!--# echo var=\"http_host\" -->
289
              ALPN protocol: <!--# echo var=\"ssl_alpn_protocol\" -->
            291
            <form action=\"/pkglist\">
292
              <input type=\"submit\" value=\"Download pkglist\" />
293
            </form>"
294
       for p_server_cfg in $server_cfgs; do IFS=, read p_host _ p_ip _ p_sites <<<
295
```

```
cmds="$cmdsSites on $p_host ($p_ip):"
296
          for p_site in ${p_sites//,/ }; do
297
            cmds="$cmds<br/><a href=\"https://$p_site.$domain\">$p_site.$domain</a>"
298
            [ "$site" = "$p_site" ] && cmds="$cmds *" || true
299
          done
300
          cmds="$cmds"
301
        done
302
        cmds="$cmds
303
          </body>
304
        </html>' || exit 1
305
        ln -s /mnt/src/openssl/doc/images/openssl-square-nontransparent.png
306
        → /site/$site/image.png || exit 1
        ln -s /var/lib/apt/lists/deb.debian.org_debian_dists_unstable_main_binary-amd64_|
307
           Packages /site/$site/pkglist || exit 1"
     done
308
309
      cmds="$cmds
310
      # WireGuard traffic padding service
311
     >/site/padding.sh echo '#!/bin/bash
312
      tc gdisc replace dev enp0s6 root netem slot 100ms 200ms
313
      tcpdump -i wg0 -nnqt ip and src $wg | while read _ _ _ dst _ len; do"
314
     for p_server_cfg in $server_cfgs; do IFS=, read _ _ p_wg _ <<< $p_server_cfg
315
        cmds="$cmds
        [\"$p_wg\"!= \"\${dst%.*}\"] && dd status=none if=/dev/urandom bs=\$len
317
        \rightarrow count=1 >/dev/udp/p_wg/12345 \&"
318
     done
      cmds="$cmds
319
     done' || exit 1
320
      >/site/padding.service echo '
321
      [Unit]
     After=network-online.target
323
      [Service]
324
     ExecStart=/site/padding.sh
325
     Restart=always
326
      [Install]
327
      WantedBy=multi-user.target' || exit 1
328
      chmod +x /site/padding.sh || exit 1
329
330
      # Install services
331
      cp /site/padding.service /mnt/nginx/nginx.service /etc/systemd/system || exit 1
332
      systemctl daemon-reload && systemctl enable padding nginx || exit 1"
333
334
     declare "${host}_cmds=$cmds"
335
336
   done
337
   # Generate all VM images in parallel
338
```

```
port=2222
   for cfg in "$dns_host,$dns_mac,$dns_ip" $server_cfgs; do IFS=, read host mac ip _
    port="$((port+1))"
341
      [ -f "$dir/$host.img" ] || {
342
        msg "Generating $host.img:"
343
344
        cmds_var="${host}_cmds"
345
        cmds="
346
        # Mount build.img
347
        >>/etc/fstab echo 'LABEL=build /mnt ext4 defaults 0 0' || exit 1
348
        mount -o ro /dev/disk/by-label/build /mnt || exit 1
349
350
        # Useful aliases
351
        >~/.profile echo '
352
        alias openssl=\"LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/mnt/openssl/lib64 /mnt/openssl/bin/openssl\"
        alias curl=\"LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/mnt/openss1/lib64 /mnt/curl/bin/curl\"
354
        echo \"dig +https @dns.example.com tcd.example.com https\"
355
        echo \"curl --verbose --cacert /keys/root.crt --ech hard --doh-url
356
        → https://dns.example.com/dns-query https://tcd.example.com\"
        ' || exit 1
357
358
        # Configure networking
        hostnamectl set-hostname $host || exit 1
360
        sed -i 's/base/$host/g' /etc/hosts || exit 1
361
        >/etc/systemd/network/00-br0.network echo
        [Match]
363
        MACAddress=$mac
364
        [Network]
365
        DNS=$dns_ip
366
        Address=$ip/24
367
        [Route]
368
        Gateway=0.0.0.0
369
        Destination=0.0.0.0/0
370
        Metric=9999' || exit 1
371
372
        # Execute $host-specific commands
        ${!cmds_var}
374
375
        # Graceful shutdown
376
        cd && umount /mnt || exit 1
377
        shutdown now"
378
379
        echo "$cmds"
380
        cp "$dir/base.img" "$dir/$host.img" || exit 1
381
        debvm-run --image "$dir/$host.img" --sshport "$port" --graphical -- \
382
```

```
-display none -drive file="$dir/build.img",format=raw,if=virtio,readonly=on &
383
        debvm-waitssh "$port" || exit 1
384
        ssh -o NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost=yes -i "$dir/ssh.key" -p "$port"
385
        \rightarrow root@127.0.0.1 "$cmds" || exit 1
      } &
386
   done
387
   wait
388
389
   port=2222
   for cfg in "$dns_host,$dns_mac" $server_cfgs; do IFS=, read host mac _ <<< $cfg
391
      sleep 1
392
     port="$((port+1))"
393
394
        msg "Booting up host $host..."
395
        debvm-run --image "$dir/$host.img" --sshport "$port" --graphical -- \
396
          -display none -drive file="$dir/build.img",format=raw,if=virtio,readonly=on \
          -device virtio-net-pci,netdev=net1,mac=$mac -netdev bridge,id=net1,br=br0 &
398
        debvm-waitssh "$port" || exit 1
399
        msg "Host $host is up and running"
400
        echo "ssh -o NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost=yes -i '$dir/ssh.key' -p $port
401
        → root@127.0.0.1"
        wait
402
        msg "Host $host has shutdown"
     } &
404
405 done
406 Wait
407 killall debvm-run qemu-system-x86_64
```