






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Intrusion Detection Systems

Simon Bennett

K2 Defender

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- A large, stylized blue arrow pointing to the right, positioned behind the list of topics.
- Why IDS?
 - Generations of IDS
 - Is Near Enough Good Enough?
 - Monitoring & Auditing – beyond traditional IDS




Why Intrusion Detection?

What is an IDS?

- A “Burglar Alarm” with CCTV
 - Door and window sensors
 - Motion Sensors
 - Temperature sensors
- Alerts on breaches in your electronic security policy

What types of things does an IDS do?

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- A large, stylized blue arrow pointing to the right, positioned behind the list of IDS functions.
- Detects Attacks
 - Detects Intrusion
 - Remains Passive
 - Retains traffic in its original state

- Defence in Depth – don't expose yourself to a single point of failure
- Firewalls and Anti-virus don't give 100% cover
- Collecting evidence for prosecution
 - Chain of custody
- Detecting “bad behaviour using good protocols”
- Internal Policy Breaches
 - Fraud
 - Breach of Chinese Walls



Generations of Intrusion Detection


The Formative Years



IDS Generations:

- 1) Host Based
- 2) Network Based
- 3) Hybrid Aggregated Sensor Systems

Generation 1: Host Based Intrusion Detection

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- A large, stylized blue arrow pointing from left to right, serving as a background for the list items.
- Securing the host in a pre-networked world
 - standard OS features
 - Orange Book Standard
 - 3rd party tools – Swatch & Tripwire
 - Still Relevant today
 - A philosophical alternative
 - As part of an overall system
 - Independent computers

Generation 2: Network Intrusion Detection

- Sense on the network rather than on individual hosts
- A Packet Sniffer that can perform analysis
- Origins: NID/NSM, Shadow

Generation 2: Network Intrusion Detection

- Today: Snort, NFR, RealSecure, Dragon, Cisco
- Technology
 - Majority are Signature Based
 - Some Protocol Based
 - Merging technologies
 - Statistical Based
 - Limited by original architecture

Are Generation 2 systems “Good Enough”?

No

NIDS have not kept up with increasingly sophisticated hacker techniques or the advancing complexity of networks and organisational needs

Are Generation 2 systems “Good Enough”?

NIDS have not completely kept up with the advancing complexity of networks and number of attacks

- 1) Switched Networks
- 2) Increasing numbers of attacks
- 3) False Positives
 - Pager alerts
- 4) False Negatives
- 5) Part of the problem
- 6) Slow scans & other stealth techniques
- 7) What does it all mean anyway?

Near Enough?

- Human factor ignored
- Too much data, too little information
- Point solutions: no system-wide overview
- No historical correlation
- Difficult to manage & maintain
- Poor balance between flexibility and ease of use



Generations of Intrusion Detection

3rd Generation IDS

The Solution:

Hybrid Aggregated Sensor Systems

- 1) Full “posture” coverage
- 2) Centralised Management & Control
- 3) Hybrid Detection Engine
- 4) Environmentally Aware
- 5) Statistical Detection Features
- 6) K2, Man Hunt & Silent Runner
- 7) Database Centric

Hitting the Mark. 3rd Generation IDS:

- Reduce False Positives
- Keep up with the pace
 - True Gigabit monitoring
 - Dealing with the Human Factor
- Eliminate False Negatives
- Detect Slow scans
- Explain what it means
- Are not part of the problem

Monitoring & Auditing Beyond Traditional Intrusion Detection

Beyond Traditional Intrusion Detection:

- 1) Differential Firewall Analysis
- 2) Monitoring Policy
- 3) Zero Day Analysis

Differential Firewall Analysis

- What was that again?
- “Watching the watchers”
- Double checking the rules
 - both directions
- “Clean room” audit of firewall rules

Differential Firewall Analysis: Why?

- Reduce risk, and protect against failure
- Firewalls are increasingly the target of attacks themselves
- Multiple vendor firewall roll-outs
 - are all your ACL's *really* the same?
- Self checking vulnerability patching
- The Increased Complexity of firewalls has resulted in an increased risk of a *failure of the rules engine itself*.

Monitoring Policy


Security Monitoring on the Internal Network

- IDS tends to be externally focussed
- Employees can use *your* resources to launch attacks!
- Although rarely discussed, internal fraud and IT misuse is often an organisation's biggest IT security problem
- IDS can help!



It is not a problem – until it happens to you....

- CBI survey:
 - 2/3 of British companies hit in last 12 months
 - Organised crime: 13% of incidents
 - Internal fraud: 11% of incidents
- Internal Fraud typically understated
- Market does not treat admission of weakness kindly



Security policy

- Investigation
 - Understand your security requirements
- Specification
 - Describe your security needs
- Implementation
 - Implement the policy




Security policy (cont.)

- Monitoring
 - Check that organisation abides by the security policy
- Enforcement
 - Enforce the security policy
- Revision
 - Update your security policy as it changes




No monitoring →
no enforcement and no revision



Zero Day Analysis

- 1) Analysis – beyond detection
- 2) When you have to know
- 3) Leveraging on white listing
- 4) The power of database
- 5) Ready, Aim...

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- A large, stylized blue arrow pointing to the right, positioned on the left side of the slide.
- Intrusion Detection Vendors have good intentions
 - Most current implementations however, fall short of the mark
 - Even so, most IDS systems are *under* utilised
 - A paradigm shift is required if true security is to be realised

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**Turning network data into
security knowledge**



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