

Report

v. 1.0

Customer  
Term Structure



Smart Contract Audit

# Term Structure

29th August 2023

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# 1 Changelog

#	Date	Author	Description
0.1	29.08.23	A. Zveryanskaya	Initial Draft
0.2	29.08.23	A. Zveryanskaya	Minor revision
1.0	29.08.23	A. Zveryanskaya	Release

## 2 Introduction

All modifications to this document are prohibited. Violators will be prosecuted to the full extent of the U.S. law.

The following document provides the result of the audit performed by ABDK Consulting (Mikhail Vladimirov and Dmitry Khovratovich) at the customer request. The audit goal is a general review of the smart contracts structure, critical/major bugs detection and issuing the general recommendations.

Term Structure is a decentralized bond protocol powered by zkTrue-up, a platform that enables peer-to-peer lending and borrowing with fixed interest rates.



# 3 Project scope

We were asked to review:

- Original Code
- Code with Fixes

Files:

/		
	EvacuationVerifier.sol	Governance.sol
	TsbFactory.sol	TsbToken.sol
	Viewer.sol	ZkTrueUp.sol
/lib		
	Utils.sol	Struct.sol
	Operations.sol	CustomError.sol
	Checker.sol	Bytes.sol
interfaces/		
	IZkTrueUp.sol	IWETH.sol
	ITsbToken.sol	ITsbFactory.sol
	IGovernance.sol	IFlashLoanReceiver.sol
		AggregatorV3Interface.sol

# 4 Methodology

The methodology is not a strict formal procedure, but rather a selection of methods and tactics combined differently and tuned for each particular project, depending on the project structure and technologies used, as well as on client expectations from the audit.

- **General Code Assessment.** The code is reviewed for clarity, consistency, style, and for whether it follows best code practices applicable to the particular programming language used. We check indentation, naming convention, commented code blocks, code duplication, confusing names, confusing, irrelevant, or missing comments etc. At this phase we also understand overall code structure.
- **Entity Usage Analysis.** Usages of various entities defined in the code are analysed. This includes both: internal usages from other parts of the code as well as potential external usages. We check that entities are defined in proper places as well as their visibility scopes and access levels are relevant. At this phase, we understand overall system architecture and how different parts of the code are related to each other.
- **Access Control Analysis.** For those entities, that could be accessed externally, access control measures are analysed. We check that access control is relevant and done properly. At this phase, we understand user roles and permissions, as well as what assets the system ought to protect.
- **Code Logic Analysis.** The code logic of particular functions is analysed for correctness and efficiency. We check if code actually does what it is supposed to do, if that algorithms are optimal and correct, and if proper data types are used. We also make sure that external libraries used in the code are up to date and relevant to the tasks they solve in the code. At this phase we also understand data structures used and the purposes they are used for.



We classify issues by the following severity levels:

- **Critical issue** directly affects the smart contract functionality and may cause a significant loss.
- **Major issue** is either a solid performance problem or a sign of misuse: a slight code modification or environment change may lead to loss of funds or data. Sometimes it is an abuse of unclear code behaviour which should be double checked.
- **Moderate issue** is not an immediate problem, but rather suboptimal performance in edge cases, an obviously bad code practice, or a situation where the code is correct only in certain business flows.
- **Minor issues** contain code style, best practices and other recommendations.



# 5 Our findings

We found 23 major, and a few less important issues. All identified Major issues have been fixed.



Fixed 192 out of 207 issues

# 6 Major Issues

## CVF-2. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** Bytes.sol

**Recommendation** It would probably be cheaper to implement this function via the "Identity" precompile. This would also make the code much simpler.

**Client Comment** *Implemented a customized slice function for each OpType. Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/libraries/Bytes.sol*
- *comment: implemented customized slice function for each chunk size*

10    `function slice(`

## CVF-5. FIXED

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** Operations.sol

**Description** These checks actually ensure consistency of the code, not data. Doing them at run time is waste of gas.

**Recommendation** Consider either removing them or replacing with asserts.

**Client Comment** Removed them.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/libraries/Operations.sol*
- *line: function 147, 153, 160, 167, 174, 183, 190, 196*

```
213 if (offset != REGISTER_PUBDATA_BYTES) revert  
    ↪ ReadRegisterPubDataError();  
  
221 if (offset != DEPOSIT_PUBDATA_BYTES) revert ReadDepositPubDataError  
    ↪ ();  
  
229 if (offset != WITHDRAW_PUBDATA_BYTES) revert  
    ↪ ReadWithdrawPubDataError();  
  
237 if (offset != FORCE_WITHDRAW_PUBDATA_BYTES) revert  
    ↪ ReadForceWithdrawPubDataError();  
  
247 if (offset != AUCTION_END_PUBDATA_BYTES) revert  
    ↪ ReadAuctionEndPubDataError();  
  
255 if (offset != CREATE_TS_BOND_TOKEN_PUBDATA_BYTES) revert  
    ↪ ReadCreateTsbTokenPubDataError();  
  
262 if (offset != WITHDRAW_FEE_PUBDATA_BYTES) revert  
    ↪ ReadWithdrawFeePubDataError();  
  
270 if (offset != EVACUATION_PUBDATA_BYTES) revert  
    ↪ ReadEvacuationPubDataError();
```



## CVF-8. FIXED

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** Config.sol

**Description** Using block numbers to measure time is unreliable. Average block time could change in the future.

**Recommendation** Consider using block timestamps instead.

**Client Comment** Switched to using `EXPIRATION_PERIOD = 14 days` for calculate expiration time.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/libraries/Config.sol*
- *line: 38*

47    `uint256 internal constant BLOCK_PERIOD = 15 seconds;`

## CVF-9. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** Config.sol

**Description** This constant is field-dependent.

**Recommendation** Consider making it explicit

**Client Comment** Switched to using the constant value `SCALAR_FIELD_SIZE` to represent the `bn254` field prime.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/libraries/Config.sol*
- *line: 87*

88    `uint256 internal constant INPUT_MASK = (type(uint256).max >> 3);`



## CVF-10. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** IFlashLoanReceiver.sol

**Recommendation** A good practice is to revert in case on an unsuccessful operation, rather than return false. Returning without revert doesn't guarantee that the state wasn't changed.

**Client Comment** Removed return value and switched to using try/catch in flashloan function.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/interfaces/IFlashLoanReceiver.sol*
- *line: 20*

21    `/// @return Boolean indicating if the operation was successful`

## CVF-12. FIXED

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** EvacuationVerifier.sol

**Description** In case  $p.X \geq q$ , this code return a G1Point instance whose "x" coordinate equals to  $p.X$ , i.e.  $\geq q$ .

**Recommendation** Consider using  $p.X \% q$  instead.

**Client Comment** Used the new version (0.7.0) of snarkJS to check the field of proof.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*

63    `return G1Point(p.X, q - (p.Y \% q));`



## CVF-16. FIXED

- **Category** Flaw
- **Source** EvacuationVerifier.sol

**Description** A bug in 'negate' function allows invalid inputs to the verify function.

**Recommendation** Consider checking the proof structure elements to be in the proper range.

**Client Comment** Used the new version (0.7.0) of snarkJS to check the field of proof.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*

276 `Pairing.negate(proof.A),`

## CVF-17. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** Governance.sol

**Description** Unchained initializers should be used to prevent double initialization of common base contracts.

**Client Comment** Used unchained initializers.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

38 `__UUPSUpgradeable_init();  
__AccessControl_init();`

## CVF-18. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** Rolluper.sol

**Description** The number of committed blocks is read from the storage twice.

**Recommendation** Consider reading once and reusing.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/rollup/RollupFacet.sol*
- *line: 396, 416*

45 `if (_getStoredBlockHash(Utils.getCommittedBlockNum()) != keccak256(  
    abi.encode(lastCommittedBlock)))`

62 `ZkTrueUpStorage.getStorage().committedBlockNum += uint32(newBlocks.  
    length);`



## CVF-19. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** Rolluper.sol

**Description** The expression "ZkTrueUpStorage.getStorage()" is calculated multiple times.

**Recommendation** Consider calculating once and reusing.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/rollup/RollupFacet.sol*
- *line: 396, 415, 416*

```
52     ZkTrueUpStorage.getStorage().storedBlockHashes[  
      ↵ lastCommittedBlock.blockNumber] = keccak256(
```

```
61     ZkTrueUpStorage.getStorage().committedL1RequestNum =  
      ↵ committedL1RequestNum;  
     ZkTrueUpStorage.getStorage().committedBlockNum += uint32(newBlocks.  
      ↵ length);
```

## CVF-20. FIXED

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** Rolluper.sol

**Description** There is no check to ensure that the "committedBlocks" and "proof" arrays are of the same length. In case the "proof" array longer, extra element are silently ignored.

**Recommendation** Consider adding appropriate length check.

**Client Comment** Used a new struct to wrap them.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/rollup/RollupFacet.sol*
- *line: 66*

```
68     function verifyBlocks(RolluperStruct.StoredBlock[] memory  
      ↵ committedBlocks, RolluperStruct.Proof[] memory proof)
```



## CVF-21. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** Rolluper.sol

**Description** Updating the same storage variable on every loop iteration is suboptimal.

**Recommendation** Consider updating once after the loop.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/rollup/RollupFacet.sol*
- *line: 700*

```
91 ZkTrueUpStorage.getStorage().executedL1RequestNum += pendingBlocks[i  
    ↵ ].storedBlock.l1RequestNum;
```

## CVF-22. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** Rolluper.sol

**Description** The expression "ZkTrueUpStorage.getStorage()" is calculated multiple times.

**Recommendation** Consider calculating once and reusing.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/rollup/RollupFacet.sol*
- *line: 699, 700*

```
91 ZkTrueUpStorage.getStorage().executedL1RequestNum +=  
    ↵ pendingBlocks[i].storedBlock.l1RequestNum;
```

```
97 ZkTrueUpStorage.getStorage().executedBlockNum = executedBlockNum;
```



## CVF-23. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** Rolluper.sol

**Description** The expression "ZkTrueUpStorage.getStorage()" is calculated multiple times.

**Recommendation** Consider calculating once and reusing.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/rollup/RollupFacet.sol*
- *line: 107, 108, 109*

115        **delete** ZkTrueUpStorage.getStorage().storedBlockHashes[  
    ↳ committedBlockNum];

120    ZkTrueUpStorage.getStorage().committedBlockNum = committedBlockNum;  
          ZkTrueUpStorage.getStorage().committedL1RequestNum -=  
    ↳ revertedL1RequestNum;

123    ZkTrueUpStorage.getStorage().verifiedBlockNum =  
    ↳ committedBlockNum;



## CVF-24. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** Rolluper.sol

**Recommendation** Consider replacing the "publicDataOffsets" array is an array of public data chunk IDs. This would make the numbers smaller and would allow simplifying the code.

**Client Comment** Used *chunkIdDeltas* array to replace *publicDataOffset*.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/rollup/RollupFacet.sol*
- *line: 441, 442*

```
219 if (offset % Config.CHUNK_BYTES != 0) revert RolluperError.  
    ↪ InvalidOffset(offset);  
220 uint256 chunkId = offset / Config.CHUNK_BYTES;
```



## CVF-25. FIXED

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** Rolluper.sol

**Description** EncodePacking variable-length data structures is not injective and may lead to collisions, particularly as the input is under user control.

**Recommendation** Consider using regular 'encode'

**Client Comment** Switched to using encode.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/rollup/RollupFacet.sol*
- *line: 408, 637, 730*

```
278     processableRollupTxHash = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(  
      ↪ processableRollupTxHash, pubData));
```

```
292 bytes memory pubData = abi.encodePacked(commitmentOffset, newBlock.  
      ↪ publicData);
```

```
371 pendingRollupTxHash = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(  
      ↪ pendingRollupTxHash, pubData));
```

## CVF-32. FIXED

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** TsbFactory.sol

**Description** Unchained initializers should be used here to prevent double initialization of base contracts.

**Client Comment** Used unchained initializers.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

```
49 __UUPSUpgradeable_init();  
50 __AccessControl_init();  
__ReentrancyGuard_init();
```



## CVF-34. FIXED

- **Category** Flaw
- **Source** Verifier.sol

**Description** In case  $p.X \geq q$ , this code return a G1Point instance whose "x" coordinate equals to  $p.X$ , i.e.  $\geq q$ .

**Recommendation** Consider using  $p.X \% q$  instead.

**Client Comment** Switched to the new version (0.7.0) of snarkJS to check the field of proof.  
*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/verifier/Verifier.sol*

63    `return G1Point(p.X, q - (p.Y % q));`

## CVF-38. FIXED

- **Category** Flaw
- **Source** Verifier.sol

**Recommendation** Proof elements should be checked to be valid curve points.

**Client Comment** Switched to the new version (0.7.0) of snarkJS to check the field of proof.  
*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/verifier/Verifier.sol*

296    `Proof memory proof;`



## CVF-39. FIXED

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** ZkTrueUp.sol

**Description** Unchained initializers should be used to prevent double initialization of base contracts.

**Client Comment** Used unchained initializers. Diamond:

- *status: no existed*

53    `__UUPSUpgradeable_init();  
__AccessControl_init();  
__ReentrancyGuard_init();`

## CVF-40. FIXED

- **Category** Flaw
- **Source** ZkTrueUp.sol

**Recommendation** These values should be checked to be a valid curve point, otherwise collisions are possible when calculating the TS address.

**Client Comment** Added the *babyJubjub* library to validate curve points.  
Diamond:

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/account/AccountFacet.sol*
- *line: 175*

108    `uint256 tsPubKeyX,  
uint256 tsPubKeyY,`



## CVF-41. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** ZkTrueUp.sol

**Description** Here implicit underflow check introduced by compiler is used to enforce an important business-level constraint. Such approach is a bad practice as it makes code harder to read and more error-prone.

**Recommendation** Consider adding an explicit “require” statement to ensure the collateral amount is sufficient.

**Client Comment** Added underflow check.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/loan/LoanLib.sol*
- *line: 49, 62, 63*

```
246 loan.collateralAmt -= amount;
```

```
274 loan.collateralAmt -= collateralAmt;
```

## CVF-42. FIXED

- **Category** Overflow/Underflow
- **Source** ZkTrueUp.sol

**Description** The multiplication here is performed in 128 bits, which could lead to overflow.

**Recommendation** Consider multiplying in 256 bits.

**Client Comment** Switched to *uint256*.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/flashLoan/FlashLoanFacet.sol*
- *line: 47*

```
356 premiums[i] = (amounts[i] * flashLoanPremium) / Config.  
    ↵ FLASH_LOAN_PREMIUM_BASE;
```



# 7 Moderate Issues

## CVF-3. FIXED

- **Category** Bad naming
- **Source** Operations.sol

**Description** In Circom code this is known as "req type".

**Recommendation** Consider using consistent naming.

**Client Comment** Used *OpType* to replace *ReqType* in *circom*.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*

16    `enum OpType {`

56    `uint8 internal constant OP_TYPE_BYTES = 1;`

## CVF-4. FIXED

- **Category** Bad naming
- **Source** Operations.sol

**Description** These operations are named differently in Circom code.

**Recommendation** Consider using consistent naming.

**Client Comment** Revised "CREATE\_TS\_BOND\_TOKEN" to "CREATE\_TSB\_TOKEN". Corresponding revisions have already been implemented on the circuit side.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/libraries/Operations.sol*
- *line: 17, 35, 36, 38*

17    `NOOP,`

35    `ADMIN_CANCEL_ORDER,`  
`USER_CANCEL_ORDER,`

38    `CREATE_TS_BOND_TOKEN,`



## CVF-6. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** Storage.sol

**Description** Solidity allows hash expressions in constant values.

**Recommendation** Consider replacing hardcoded values with a hash expressions currently specified in comments.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

```
13 // bytes32(uint256(keccak256("governance.storage")) - 1)
  bytes32 private constant STORAGE_SLOT =
  0x1c03ec2fe6acf7b94b95c87bd1c750db913cc1fec10e1e766e5eb2c5f8b774f7;

69 /// @dev STORAGE_SLOT = bytes32(uint256(keccak256("zktrueup.storage
  ↵ ")) - 1)
70 bytes32 private constant STORAGE_SLOT =
  0xecdc3de15f62012ce8edb075e3ee0791091ec6b6b4f92c08b9f351e31a4a4ee0;

139 // bytes32(uint256(keccak256("tsbfactory.storage")) - 1)
140 bytes32 private constant STORAGE_SLOT =
  0xfa1372ca0be757cf045d81950fdc803be135140e80156400b9c6ec5a1960c006;
```

## CVF-7. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** Struct.sol

**Description** Storing offset deltas instead of offsets would allow using a narrower type.

**Client Comment** in CVF-24 change to use *chunkIdDeltas* to replace this and also change to use *uint16* because the max chunk number is 1152.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/rollup/RollupStorage.sol*
- *line: 30*

```
52 uint32[] publicDataOffsets;
```



## CVF-11. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** EvacuationVerifier.sol

**Description** This compiler version requirement is inconsistent and even incompatible with compiler version requirements in other files.

**Recommendation** Consider using consistent compiler version requirements across the code base.

**Client Comment** Aixed to ^0.8.17.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*

14    `pragma solidity ^0.6.11;`

## CVF-13. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** EvacuationVerifier.sol

**Description** This check never fails as it duplicates another check performed inside assembly block.

**Recommendation** Consider refactoring.

**Client Comment** Used the new version (0.7.0) of snarkJS.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*

83    `require(success, "pairing-add-failed");`

## CVF-14. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** EvacuationVerifier.sol

**Description** This check never fails as it duplicates another check performed inside assembly block.

**Recommendation** Consider refactoring.

**Client Comment** Used the new version (0.7.0) of snarkJS.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*

103

```
require(success, "pairing-mul-failed");
```

## CVF-15. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** EvacuationVerifier.sol

**Description** This check never fails as it duplicates another check performed inside assembly block.

**Recommendation** Consider refactoring.

**Client Comment** Used the new version (0.7.0) of snarkJS.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*

134

```
require(success, "pairing-opcode-failed");
```



## CVF-27. INFO

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** Rollupper.sol

**Description** This formula assumes that the withdrawal amount fits into uint128, which could be wrong for very cheap tokens, or token with very many decimals.

**Recommendation** Consider not relying on such assumptions.

**Client Comment** We have switched to using uint256 for a portion of amount, while maintaining uint128 for collateral and debt amounts. This approach is aimed at packing storage efficiently and saving gas.

*Diamond:*

- *status: info*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/rollup/RollupFacet.sol*
- *line: 755, 779, 801, 807, 862*

```
350     amount = SafeCast.toUint128(((withdrawReq.amount * (10**  
    ↪ decimals)) / (10**Config.SYSTEM_DECIMALS)));  
  
355     amount = SafeCast.toUint128(  
        ((forceWithdrawReq.amount * (10**decimals)) / (10**  
    ↪ Config.SYSTEM_DECIMALS))  
  
490 uint128 increaseDebtAmt = SafeCast.toUint128((auctionEnd.debtAmt *  
    ↪ 10**decimals) / 10**Config.SYSTEM_DECIMALS);  
  
492 uint128 increaseCollateralAmt = SafeCast.toUint128(  
        (auctionEnd.collateralAmt * 10**decimals) / 10**Config.  
    ↪ SYSTEM_DECIMALS  
  
522 uint128 l1Amt = SafeCast.toUint128(  
        ((withdrawFee.amount * (10**assetConfig.decimals)) / (10**Config  
    ↪ .SYSTEM_DECIMALS))  
);  
  
548 uint128 l1Amt = SafeCast.toUint128(  
        ((evacuation.amount * (10**assetConfig.decimals)) / (10**Config.  
    ↪ SYSTEM_DECIMALS))  
);
```

## CVF-28. FIXED

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** Rolluper.sol

**Description** The function actually never returns false.

**Recommendation** Consider either returning nothing or changing the code to actually return false for non-existing requests.

**Client Comment** Refactored the function to return either true or false.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/rollup/RollupFacet.sol*
- *line: 302*

381    `/// @return isExisted Return true is the request is existed in the  
    ↳ L1 request queue, else return false`

## CVF-29. FIXED

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** Rolluper.sol

**Description** The function actually never returns false.

**Recommendation** Consider either returning nothing or changing the code to actually return false for non-existing requests.

**Client Comment** Refactored the function to return either true or false.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/rollup/RollupFacet.sol*
- *line: 315*

397    `/// @return isExisted Return true is the request is existed in the  
    ↳ L1 request queue, else return false`



## CVF-30. FIXED

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** Rolluper.sol

**Description** The function actually never returns false.

**Recommendation** Consider either returning nothing or changing the code to actually return false for non-existing requests.

**Client Comment** Refactored the function to return either true or false.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/rollup/RollupFacet.sol*
- *line: 328*

413    */// @return isExisted Return true is the request is existed in the  
    ↳ L1 request queue, else return false*

## CVF-31. FIXED

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** Rolluper.sol

**Description** The function actually never returns false.

**Recommendation** Consider either returning nothing or changing the code to actually return false for non-existing requests.

**Client Comment** Refactored the function to return either true or false.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/rollup/RollupFacet.sol*
- *line: 341*

429    */// @return isExisted Return true is the request is existed in the  
    ↳ L1 request queue, else return false*



## CVF-33. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** Verifier.sol

**Description** This compiler version requirement is inconsistent and even incompatible with compiler version requirements in other files.

**Recommendation** Consider using consistent compiler version requirements across the code base.

**Client Comment** Switched to Solidity ^0.8.17.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/verifier/Verifier.sol*

14    `pragma solidity ^0.6.11;`

## CVF-35. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** Verifier.sol

**Description** This check never fails as it duplicates another check performed inside assembly block.

**Recommendation** Consider refactoring.

**Client Comment** Switched to snarkJS version 0.7.0; this resolved the issue.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/verifier/Verifier.sol*

83    `require(success, "pairing-add-failed");`

## CVF-36. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** Verifier.sol

**Description** This check never fails as it duplicates another check performed inside assembly block.

**Recommendation** Consider refactoring.

**Client Comment** Switched to snarkJS version 0.7.0; this resolved the issue.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/verifier/Verifier.sol*

103    `require(success, "pairing-mul-failed");`

## CVF-37. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** Verifier.sol

**Description** This check never fails as it duplicates another check performed inside assembly block.

**Recommendation** Consider refactoring.

**Client Comment** Switched to snarkJS version 0.7.0; this resolved the issue.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/verifier/Verifier.sol*

134    `require(success, "pairing-opcode-failed");`



## CVF-43. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** ZkTrueUp.sol

**Description** The original error message is lost here.

**Recommendation** Consider including it into the error as a parameter.

**Client Comment** Incorporated returned data into the error log.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/libraries/Utils.sol*
- *line: 41*

621   **if** (!success) **revert** ZkTrueUpError.TransferFailed();



## CVF-44. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** ZkTrueUp.sol

**Recommendation** The “10\*\*decimals” value could be precomputed and stored in the asset config.

**Client Comment** Used decimals to enhance the intuitiveness and readability.

*Diamond:*

- *status: info*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/loan/LoanFacet.sol*
- *line: 364, 374*

```
698 repayAmt = (normalizedCollateralPrice * loan.collateralAmt) / 10**  
    ↪ collateralAsset.decimals <
```

```
704 uint256 normalizedRepayValue = (normalizedDebtPrice * repayAmt) /  
    ↪ 10**debtAsset.decimals;
```

```
712 uint256 repayToCollateralRatio = (Config.LTV_BASE *  
    ↪ normalizedRepayValue * 10**collateralAsset.decimals) /
```

```
733     10**collateralAsset.decimals) /
```

```
752     (liquidationFactor.protocolPenalty * normalizedRepayValue * 10**  
    ↪ collateralAsset.decimals) /
```

```
859     (ltvThreshold * normalizedCollateralPrice * loan.collateralAmt *  
    ↪ 10**debtAsset.decimals) /
```

```
861     10**collateralAsset.decimals;
```

```
898 return uint256(price) * 10** (18 - decimals);
```



## CVF-45. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** ZkTrueUp.sol

**Description** The expression “`10**collateralAsset.decimals`” is calculated several times.

**Recommendation** Consider calculating once and reusing.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- `status: fixed`
- `path: contracts/zkTrueUp/loan/LoanFacet.sol`
- `line: 394, 421`

```
698 repayAmt = (normalizedCollateralPrice * loan.collateralAmt) / 10**  
    ↪ collateralAsset.decimals <  
  
712 uint256 repayToCollateralRatio = (Config.LTV_BASE *  
    ↪ normalizedRepayValue * 10**collateralAsset.decimals) /  
  
733     10**collateralAsset.decimals) /  
  
752     (liquidationFactor.protocolPenalty * normalizedRepayValue * 10**  
    ↪ collateralAsset.decimals) /
```



## CVF-46. INFO

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** ZkTrueUp.sol

**Description** In ERC-20 the “decimals” property is used by UI to render token amounts in a human-friendly way. Using this property in smart contracts is discouraged.

**Recommendation** Consider treating all token amounts as integers.

**Client Comment** During the liquidation process, liquidators repay the debt tokens and receive collateral tokens of equivalent value. Consequently, the converted amount must be calculated using decimals.

*Diamond:*

- *status: info*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/loan/LoanFacet.sol*
- *line: 364, 374*

```
698 repayAmt = (normalizedCollateralPrice * loan.collateralAmt) / 10**  
    ↪ collateralAsset.decimals <  
  
704 uint256 normalizedRepayValue = (normalizedDebtPrice * repayAmt) /  
    ↪ 10**debtAsset.decimals;  
  
712 uint256 repayToCollateralRatio = (Config.LTV_BASE *  
    ↪ normalizedRepayValue * 10**collateralAsset.decimals) /  
  
733 10**collateralAsset.decimals) /  
  
752 (liquidationFactor.protocolPenalty * normalizedRepayValue * 10**  
    ↪ collateralAsset.decimals) /  
  
793 uint128 l2Amt = SafeCast.toUint128((amount * 10**Config.  
    ↪ SYSTEM_DECIMALS) / 10**decimals);  
  
859 (ltvThreshold * normalizedCollateralPrice * loan.collateralAmt *  
    ↪ 10**debtAsset.decimals) /  
  
861 10**collateralAsset.decimals;  
  
895 uint8 decimals = AggregatorV3Interface(priceFeed).decimals();  
  
898 return uint256(price) * 10**(18 - decimals);
```



## CVF-47. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** ZkTrueUp.sol

**Recommendation** Using the free memory pointer is redundant, as this function never returns control. Just use memory starting from zero address instead.

**Client Comment** Removed the free memory pointer.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

```
936 let ptr := mload(0x40)
```

## CVF-68. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** Operations.sol

**Recommendation** In Circom code time is 64 bits. Consider using consistent time format.

**Client Comment** Switched to `uint32 (bytes4)` as the consistent time format.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

```
61 uint8 internal constant TIME_BYTES = 4;
```

## CVF-69. FIXED

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** IWETH.sol

**Description** There is no such function in the WETH contract.

**Client Comment** Removed this funciton.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/interfaces/IWETH.sol*

```
25 function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external;
```



## CVF-70. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** EvacuationVerifier.sol

**Description** In case "p.X" is not zero and "p.Y % q" is zero, this code returns "G1Point(p.X, q)" which is not a valid point.

**Recommendation** Consider returning "G1Point(p.X, 0)" in such a case.

**Client Comment** Switched to snarkJS version 0.7.0; this resolved the issue.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/verifier/EvacuVerifier.sol*

```
62 if (p.X == 0 && p.Y == 0) return G1Point(0, 0);
      return G1Point(p.X, q - (p.Y % q));
```

## CVF-71. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** Rolluper.sol

**Description** Governance address is read from the storage twice.

**Recommendation** Consider reusing.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/rollup/RollupFacet.sol*
- *line: 600, 601, 606*

```
238 IGovernance governance = IGovernance(Utils.getGovernanceAddr());
```

```
244 GovernanceStruct.AssetConfig memory baseTokenConfig = IGovernance(
    ↳ Utils.getGovernanceAddr())
```



## CVF-72. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** Rolluper.sol

**Description** This logic looks very suspicent as it allows evacuating the same account multiple times.

**Client Comment** *This function needs to be used with system recovery function. In the future, we will add the function for ending evacuation mode and restarting the contract. The indicated code snippet can only be executed after the evacuation mode has been triggered and all L1 requests have been consumed during this mode. It is necessary to update the status as false after we consume all requests, allowing us to restart the system. If needed, users will be able to trigger the evacuation mode again after the system restarts.*  
*Diamond:*

- *status: info*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/rollup/RollupFacet.sol*
- *line: 724-726*

```
365 } else if (opType == Operations.OpType.EVACUATION) {  
    Operations.Evacuation memory evacuation = Operations.  
        ↪ readEvacuationPubdata(pubData);  
    ZkTrueUpStorage.getStorage().evacuated[evacuation.accountId][  
        ↪ evacuation tokenId] = false;
```

## CVF-73. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** Rolluper.sol

**Description** Performing several token transfer in a single transaction is a bad idea. If one of the transfers will fail for whatever reason, the other transfers will get reverted.

**Recommendation** Consider increasing pending balances instead.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/rollup/RollupFacet.sol*
- *line: 827, 833, 839*

```
535 _transfer(assetConfig.tokenAddr, payable(treasuryAddr), treasuryAmt)
    ↵ ;
    _transfer(assetConfig.tokenAddr, payable(insuranceAddr),
    ↵ insuranceAmt);
    _transfer(assetConfig.tokenAddr, payable(vaultAddr), vaultAmt);
```

## CVF-74. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** Verifier.sol

**Description** In case "p.X" is not zero and "p.Y % q" is zero, this code returns "G1Point(p.X, q)" which is not a valid point.

**Recommendation** Consider returning "G1Point(p.X, 0)" in such a case.

**Client Comment** Switched to snarkJS version 0.7.0; this resolved the issue.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/verifier/Verifier.sol*

```
62 if (p.X == 0 && p.Y == 0) return G1Point(0, 0);
```



## CVF-75. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** Viewer.sol

**Description** The code checks if the id is greater or equal rather than ‘greater’.

**Recommendation** Consider making the comment consistent with the code.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/rollup/RollupLib.sol*
- *line: 199*

68   `/// @notice Check whether the request id is greater than the current  
    →    request number`

## CVF-76. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** ZkTrueUp.sol

**Description** There is no way for a liquidator to specify the maximum “repayAmt” value, the minimum “liquidatorRewardAmt” value, and the minimum ratio between these two values. Thus, liquidation outcome could appear to be much worse than the liquidator expected.

**Recommendation** Consider adding extra arguments for liquidation bounding conditions.

**Client Comment** Updated the *liquidate* function to include *repayAmt* as a parameter. This gives the liquidator the flexibility to choose their repayment amount, as long as it doesn’t surpass the *maxRepayAmt*.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/loan/LoanFacet.sol*
- *line: 105*

325   `_transferFrom(debtAsset.tokenAddr, sender, repayAmt, msg.value);`

329   `_transfer(collateralAsset.tokenAddr, payable(sender),  
    →    liquidatorRewardAmt);`



## CVF-77. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** ZkTrueUp.sol

**Description** This also covers the case when collateral value cannot cover repay value. In such case liquidation is not profitable. However, for the protocol, liquidation with a discount (i.e. when liquidator repays part of the debt and received full collateral) could be better than no liquidation.

**Recommendation** Consider covering this case as well.

**Client Comment** Enhanced the function, now enabling liquidators to determine the repayAmt if  $0 < \text{repayAmt} \leq \text{maxRepayAmt}$ .

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/loan/LoanFacet.sol*
- *line: 366*

```
716 // casel: if collateral value cannot cover protocol penalty and full
    // liquidator reward
    // in this case, liquidator reward = all collateral, and protocol
    // penalty = 0
    // liquidatorRewardAmt = totalCollateralAmt, and protocolPenaltyAmt
    // = 0
    if ( $\text{repayToCollateralRatio} + \text{liquidationFactor.liquidatorIncentive} >$ 
        // maxLtvRatio)
        return ( $\text{repayAmt}$ ,  $\text{loan.collateralAmt}$ , 0);
```



## CVF-78. FIXED

- **Category** Overflow/Underflow
- **Source** ZkTrueUp.sol

**Description** Overflow is possible when converting to “uint128”.

**Recommendation** Consider using safe conversion.

**Client Comment** Added SafeCast to check if the value has overflow issue.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/loan/LoanFacet.sol*
- *line: 408, 417*

730 liquidatorRewardAmt = **uint128(**

751       **: protocolPenaltyAmt = uint128(**



# 8 Minor Issues

## CVF-96. INFO

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** Bytes.sol

**Recommendation** Consider specifying as "`^0.8.0`", unless there is something special about this particular version. Also relevant for: Operations.sol, Storage.sol, CustomError.sol, Checker.sol, Struct.sol, Utils.sol, Config.sol, IZkTrueUp.sol, IFlashLoanReceiver.sol, IGovernance.sol, IPoseidonUnit2.sol, ITsbFactory.sol, ITsbToken.sol, IVerifier.sol, IWETH.sol, TsbToken.sol, Governance.sol, Rolluper.sol, TsbFactory.sol, Viewer.sol.

**Client Comment** Some OZ's dependencies are over 0.8.0 like:

- `@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/AddressUpgradeable.sol (^0.8.1)`
- `@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/proxy/utils/Initializable.sol (^0.8.2)`
- `@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/proxy/ERC1967/ERC1967UpgradeUpgradeable.sol (^0.8.2)`

Diamond:

- status: info

3    `pragma solidity ^0.8.17;`

## CVF-97. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** Bytes.sol

**Description** These comments are redundant, as potential overflow would be caught by Solidity compiler.

**Recommendation** Consider removing these comments.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/libraries/Bytes.sol*

38 // NOTE: theoretically possible overflow of (\_offset + 4)

44 // NOTE: theoretically possible overflow of (\_start + 0x4)

53 // NOTE: theoretically possible overflow of (\_offset + 20)

61 // NOTE: theoretically possible overflow of (\_start + 20)

69 // NOTE: theoretically possible overflow of (\_offset + 2)

76 // NOTE: theoretically possible overflow of (\_start + 0x2)

85 // NOTE: theoretically possible overflow of (\_start + 0x10)

94 // NOTE: theoretically possible overflow of (\_offset + 16)



## CVF-98. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** Storage.sol

**Recommendation** This library should be moved into a separate file named "GovernanceStorage.sol".

**Client Comment** Moved the library to a separate file.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

12    **library** GovernanceStorage {

## CVF-99. FIXED

- **Category** Documentation
- **Source** Storage.sol

**Description** The number format of these fields is unclear.

**Recommendation** Consider documenting.

**Client Comment** *fixed and remove maxLtvRatio, healthFactorThreshold because of they are constant and defined in Config.sol.*

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/libraries/Config.sol*
- *line: 20, 26*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/flashLoan/FlashLoanStorage.sol*
- *line: 12, 13*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/loan/LoanStorage.sol*
- *line: 54, 55*

28   **uint16** healthFactorThreshold;

30   **uint16** halfLiquidationThreshold;

32   **uint16** maxLtvRatio;

34   **uint16** flashLoanPremium;



## CVF-100. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** Storage.sol

**Recommendation** The key type should be "IERC20".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/token TokenNameStorage.sol*
- *line: 28, 30*

42 `mapping(address => uint16) toTokenId;`

44 `mapping(address => bool) isPaused;`

## CVF-101. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** Storage.sol

**Description** Asserting a constant value looks weird.

**Recommendation** Consider removing this line.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

51 `assert(STORAGE_SLOT == bytes32(uint256(keccak256("governance.storage  
↳ "))) - 1));`



## CVF-102. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** Storage.sol

**Recommendation** This library should be moved into a separate file named "ZkTrueUpStorage.sol".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

68 `library ZkTrueUpStorage {`

## CVF-103. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** Storage.sol

**Recommendation** The type of this field should be "IGovernance".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

74 `address governanceAddr;`

## CVF-104. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** Storage.sol

**Recommendation** The type of this field should be "ITsbFactory".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

76 `address tsbFactoryAddr;`



## CVF-105. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** Storage.sol

**Recommendation** The type of this field should be "IWETH9".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/address/AddressStorage.sol*
- *line: 18*

78 `address wETHAddr;`

## CVF-106. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** Storage.sol

**Recommendation** The type of this field should be IPoseidonUnit2".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/address/AddressStorage.sol*
- *line: 20*

80 `address poseidonUnit2Addr;`

## CVF-107. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** Storage.sol

**Recommendation** The type of this field should be "IVerifier".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/address/AddressStorage.sol*
- *line: 22*

82 `address verifierAddr;`

## CVF-108. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** Storage.sol

**Recommendation** The type of this field should be "EvacuationVerifier" or an interface extracted from it.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/address/AddressStorage.sol*
- *line: 24*

84 `address evacuationVerifierAddr;`

## CVF-109. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** Storage.sol

**Recommendation** The type of this field should be "Rolluper" or an interface extracted from it.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

86 `address rolluperAddr;`

## CVF-110. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** Storage.sol

**Recommendation** This library should be moved into a separate file named "TsbFactoryStorage.sol".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

138 `library TsbFactoryStorage {`

## CVF-111. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** Storage.sol

**Recommendation** The type of this field should be "IGovernance".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

144 `address governanceAddr;`



## CVF-112. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** Storage.sol

**Recommendation** The type of this field should be "IZkTrueUp".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

146 `address zkTrueUpAddr;`

## CVF-113. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** Storage.sol

**Recommendation** The values type should be "ITsbToken".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/tsb/TsbStorage.sol*
- *line: 16*

149 `mapping(uint48 => address) tsbTokens;`

## CVF-114. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** CustomError.sol

**Recommendation** This library should be moved into a separate file named "GovernanceError.sol".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

12 `library GovernanceError {`



## CVF-115. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** CustomError.sol

**Description** These libraries contain only errors.

**Recommendation** Consider removing the libraries and moving the errors to the top level.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

12    **library** GovernanceError {

36    **library** ZkTrueUpError {

88    **library** RolluperError {

150    **library** TsbFactoryError {

168    **library** TsbTokenError {



## CVF-116. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** CustomError.sol

**Recommendation** These errors could be made more useful by adding the problematic values as error parameters.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *comment: move to corresponding file*

14 `error InvalidFundWeight();`

16 `error InvalidHalfLiquidationThreshold();`

18 `error InvalidLiquidationFactor();`

20 `error InvalidZeroAddr();`

52 `error LoanIsNotExist();`

54 `error InvalidZeroAddr();`

104 `error InvalidZeroAddr();`

106 `error InvalidAccountId();`

120 `error BaseTokenAddr IsNotMatched();`

122 `error MaturityTimeIsNotMatched();`

136 `error PendingRollupTxHashIsNotMatched();`

160 `error InvalidZeroAddr();`



## CVF-117. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** CustomError.sol

**Recommendation** This library should be moved into a separate file named "ZkTrueUpError.sol".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

36    `library ZkTrueUpError {`

## CVF-118. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** CustomError.sol

**Recommendation** These errors could be made more useful by adding as error arguments the original return data of the failed transaction.

**Client Comment** Switched to using try/catch and renamed Error name to *ExecuteOperationFailedLogString* and *ExecuteOperationFailedLogBytes*.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/flashLoan/IFlashLoanFacet.sol*
- *line: 14, 16*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/libraries/Utils.sol*
- *line: 26*

64    `error FlashLoanExecuteFailed();`

66    `error TransferFailed();`



## CVF-119. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** CustomError.sol

**Recommendation** This library should be moved into a separate file named "Rolluper-Error.sol".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

88 `library RolluperError {`

## CVF-120. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** CustomError.sol

**Recommendation** This library should be moved into a separate file named "TsbFactoryError.sol".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

150 `library TsbFactoryError {`

## CVF-121. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** CustomError.sol

**Recommendation** This library should be moved into a separate file named "TsbToken-Error.sol".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

168 `library TsbTokenError {`



## CVF-122. FIXED

- **Category** Bad naming
- **Source** Checker.sol

**Recommendation** Should be "nonZeroAddr" or "notZeroAddr" but not "noneZeroAddr".

**Client Comment** Switched to *notZeroAddr*.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/libraries/Utils.sol*
- *line: 78*

38    `function noneZeroAddr(address addr) internal pure {`

## CVF-123. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** Struct.sol

**Recommendation** This library should be moved into a separate file named "ZkTrueUp-Struct.sol".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

11    `library ZkTrueUpStruct {`

## CVF-124. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** Struct.sol

**Description** These libraries contain only structs.

**Recommendation** Consider removing the libraries and moving the struct to the top level.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

11 `library ZkTrueUpStruct {`

35 `library RolluperStruct {`

76 `library GovernanceStruct {`

## CVF-125. FIXED

- **Category** Bad naming
- **Source** Struct.sol

**Description** It is unclear whether this is the lender or the debtor account.

**Recommendation** Consider renaming.

**Client Comment** Removed this in the Loan struct. The reason is that the loan is mapped by the key of `loanId`, which is packed by `accountId`, `maturityTime`, `debtTokenId`, and `collateralTokenId`.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

21 `uint32 accountId;`



## CVF-126. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** Struct.sol

**Recommendation** This library should be moved into a separate file named "Rolluper-Struct.sol".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

35    **library** RolluperStruct {

## CVF-127. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** Struct.sol

**Recommendation** This library should be moved into a separate file named "GovernanceStruct.sol".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

76    **library** GovernanceStruct {



## CVF-128. FIXED

- **Category** Documentation
- **Source** Struct.sol

**Description** The number format of these fields is unclear.

**Recommendation** Consider documenting.

**Client Comment** Added comments.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/protocolParams/ProtocolParamsFacet.sol*
- *line: 11-15*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/laon/LoanStorage.sol*
- *line: 6-15*

```
79 uint16 treasury;
80 uint16 insurance;
uint16 vault;
```

```
96 uint16 ltvThreshold;
uint16 liquidatorIncentive;
uint16 protocolPenalty;
```

## CVF-129. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** Struct.sol

**Recommendation** The type of this field should be "IERC20".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/token/TokenFacet.sol*
- *line: 13*

```
90 address tokenAddr;
```



## CVF-130. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** Struct.sol

**Recommendation** The type of this field should be "AggregatorV3Interface".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/token/TokenFacet.sol*
- *line: 14*

91 `address priceFeed;`

## CVF-131. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** Utils.sol

**Recommendation** The return type should be "IGovernance".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

16 `function getGovernanceAddr() internal view returns (address  
    ↳ governanceAddr) {`



## CVF-132. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** Utils.sol

**Recommendation** The return type should be "ITsbFactory".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

22    `function getTsbFactoryAddr() internal view returns (address  
    ↳ tsbFactoryAddr) {`

## CVF-133. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** Utils.sol

**Recommendation** The return type should be "IWETH9".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/address/AddressFacet.sol*
- *line: 48*

28    `function getWETHAddr() internal view returns (address wETHAddr) {`

## CVF-134. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** Utils.sol

**Recommendation** The return type should be "IVerifier".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/address/AddressFacet.sol*
- *line: 62*

34    `function getVerifierAddr() internal view returns (address  
    ↳ verifierAddr) {`

## CVF-135. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** Utils.sol

**Recommendation** The return type should be "EvacuationVerifier" or an interface extracted from it.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/address/AddressFacet.sol*
- *line: 69*

40    `function getEvacuationVerifierAddr() internal view returns (address  
    ↳ verifierAddr) {`



## CVF-136. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** Utils.sol

**Recommendation** The return type should be "IPoseidonUnit2".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/address/AddressFacet.sol*
- *line: 56*

46    **function** getPoseidonUnit2Addr() **internal view returns** (**address**  
    ↳ poseidonUint2Addr) {

## CVF-137. INFO

- **Category** Readability
- **Source** Config.sol

**Description** Using different denominators for fixed point numbers of the same width in the same code base makes code harder to read.

**Recommendation** Consider using the same denominator, namely 10000.

**Client Comment** *Each denominator represents a unique meaning in the respective variables.*

*Diamond:*

- *status: info*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/libraries/Config.sol*
- *line: 15, 20, 23, 26, 29*

15 `uint16 internal constant FUND_WEIGHT_BASE = 10000;`

20 `uint16 internal constant HEALTH_FACTOR_THRESHOLD = 1000;`

23 `uint16 internal constant LTV_BASE = 1000;`

26 `uint16 internal constant MAX_LTV_RATIO = 1000; // 100%`

29 `uint16 internal constant FLASH_LOAN_PREMIUM_BASE = 10000;`



## CVF-138. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** Config.sol

**Description** Solidity compiler is smart enough to calculate hash expression at compile time.

**Recommendation** Consider using hash expressions rather than hardcoded hash values when initializing constants.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

58    `/// @notice Hash of empty string = keccak256("")  
bytes32 internal constant EMPTY_STRING_KECCAK = 0  
    ↳ xc5d2460186f7233c927e7db2dcc703c0e500b653ca82273b7bfad8045d85a470  
    ↳ ;`

## CVF-139. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** Config.sol

**Recommendation** This library should be moved into a separate file named "InitialConfig.sol".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/libraries/InitialConfig.sol*

111 `library InitialConfig {`

## CVF-140. FIXED

- **Category** Readability
- **Source** Config.sol

**Recommendation** "0.5e4" would be more readable.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/libraries/InitialConfig.sol*
- *line: 12*

113    `uint16 internal constant INIT_TREASURY_WEIGHT = 5000; // 50%`

## CVF-141. FIXED

- **Category** Readability
- **Source** Config.sol

**Recommendation** "0.1e4" would be more readable.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/libraries/InitialConfig.sol*
- *line: 15*

116    `uint16 internal constant INIT_INSURANCE_WEIGHT = 1000; // 10%`

## CVF-142. FIXED

- **Category** Readability
- **Source** Config.sol

**Recommendation** "0.4e4" would be more readable.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/libraries/InitialConfig.sol*
- *line: 18*

119    `uint16 internal constant INIT_VAULT_WEIGHT = 4000; // 40%`

## CVF-143. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** Config.sol

**Recommendation** USD amounts are usually represented as a number of cents. I.e. the value should be "10000e2".

**Client Comment** *The token prices from Chainlink are based on US dollars. Therefore, it is more convenient to use US dollar here, and it is not necessary to use such a small unit in this variable.*

*Diamond:*

- *status: info*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/libraries/InitialConfig.sol*
- *line: 22*

123    `uint16 internal constant INIT_HALF_LIQUIDATION_THRESHOLD = 10000; //`  
      `↪ 10000 USD`

## CVF-144. FIXED

- **Category** Readability
- **Source** Config.sol

**Recommendation** "0.8e3" would be more readable.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/libraries/InitialConfig.sol*
- *line: 25*

126    `uint16 internal constant INIT_LTV_THRESHOLD = 800; // 80%`

## CVF-145. FIXED

- **Category** Readability
- **Source** Config.sol

**Recommendation** "0.925e3" would be more readable.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/libraries/InitialConfig.sol*
- *line: 28*

129    `uint16 internal constant INIT_STABLECOIN_PAIR_LTV_THRESHOLD = 925;`  
      `↖ // 92.5%`

## CVF-146. FIXED

- **Category** Readability
- **Source** Config.sol

**Recommendation** "0.05e3" would be more readable.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/libraries/InitialConfig.sol*
- *line: 31, 37*

132 `uint16 internal constant INIT_LIQUIDATOR_INCENTIVE = 50; // 5%`

138 `uint16 internal constant INIT_PROTOCOL_PENALTY = 50; // 5%`

## CVF-147. FIXED

- **Category** Readability
- **Source** Config.sol

**Recommendation** "0.03e3" would be more readable.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/libraries/InitialConfig.sol*
- *line: 34*

135 `uint16 internal constant INIT_STABLECOIN_PAIR_LIQUIDATOR_INCENTIVE =`  
    `↪ 30; // 3%`



## CVF-148. FIXED

- **Category** Readability
- **Source** Config.sol

**Recommendation** "0.015e3" would be more readable.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/libraries/InitialConfig.sol*
- *line: 40*

141    `uint16 internal constant INIT_STABLECOIN_PAIR_PROTOCOL_PENALTY = 15;`  
      `↳ // 1.5%`

## CVF-149. FIXED

- **Category** Readability
- **Source** Config.sol

**Recommendation** "0.0003e4" would be more readable.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/libraries/InitialConfig.sol*
- *line: 43*

144    `uint16 internal constant INIT_FLASH_LOAN_PREMIUM = 3; // 0.03%`



## CVF-150. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** AggregatorV3Interface.sol

**Description** This interface was copied from ChainLink code base.

**Recommendation** Consider importing it from ChainLink via NPM.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*

8 `interface AggregatorV3Interface {`

## CVF-151. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** IZkTrueUp.sol

**Recommendation** This interface should be moved into a separate file named "RolluperEvent.sol".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

14 `interface RolluperEvent {`

## CVF-152. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** IZkTrueUp.sol

**Description** Unlike names of the other interfaces, this name doesn't have the "I" prefix.

**Recommendation** Consider using a consistent naming schema.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

14 `interface RolluperEvent {`



## CVF-153. FIXED

- **Category** Bad naming
- **Source** IZkTrueUp.sol

**Recommendation** Events are usually named via nouns, such as "Commit", "Verification", "Execution" etc.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/rollup/IRollupFacet.sol*
- *line: 61, 65, 69, 73, 107*

18   **event** BlockCommitted(**uint32** blockNumber, **bytes32** commitment);

22   **event** BlockVerified(**uint32** blockNumber);

26   **event** BlockExecuted(**uint32** blockNumber);

30   **event** BlockReverted(**uint32** blockNumber);

47   **event** UpdateLoan(

## CVF-154. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** IZkTrueUp.sol

**Recommendation** The "blockNumber" parameter should be indexed.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/rollup/IRollupFacet.sol*
- *line: 61, 65, 69, 73*

18 `event BlockCommitted(uint32 blockNumber, bytes32 commitment);`

22 `event BlockVerified(uint32 blockNumber);`

26 `event BlockExecuted(uint32 blockNumber);`

30 `event BlockReverted(uint32 blockNumber);`

## CVF-155. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** IZkTrueUp.sol

**Recommendation** The "accountId" and "tokenId" parameters should be indexed.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/rollup/IRollupFacet.sol*
- *line: 83, 85*

37 `event Evacuation(address indexed accountAddr, uint32 accountId,  
→ uint16 tokenId, uint128 amount);`



## CVF-156. FIXED

- **Category** Bad naming
- **Source** IZkTrueUp.sol

**Description** The word "New" in the name is redundant.

**Recommendation** Consider renaming to just "L1Request".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/rollup/RollupLib.sol*
- *line: 39*

63    **event** NewL1Request(



## CVF-157. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** IZkTrueUp.sol

**Recommendation** Events are usually named via nouns, such as "Registration", "Withdrawal", etc.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/account/AccountLib.sol*
- *line: 37, 51, 58, 66*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/loan/ILoanFacet.sol*
- *line: 46, 58, 73, 105*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/rollup/IRollupFacet.sol*
- *line: 81, 90*

```
84 event Register(address indexed accountAddr, uint32 accountId,  
    ↵ uint256 tsPubX, uint256 tsPubY, bytes20 tsAddr);  
  
98 event Withdraw(address indexed accountAddr, uint32 accountId, uint16  
    ↵ tokenId, uint128 amount);  
  
104 event ForceWithdraw(address indexed accountAddr, uint32 accountId,  
    ↵ uint16 tokenId);  
  
109 event UpdateTsbFactory(address indexed oldTsbFactoryAddr, address  
    ↵ indexed newTsbFactoryAddr);  
  
116 event Liquidate()  
  
129 event Redeem()  
  
142 event AddCollateral()  
  
154 event RemoveCollateral()  
  
169 event Repay()  
  
194 event EvacuationActivated();
```



## CVF-158. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** IZkTrueUp.sol

**Recommendation** The "accountId" parameter should be indexed.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/account/AccountLib.sol*
- *line: 37, 51, 58, 66*

```
84 event Register(address indexed accountAddr, uint32 accountId,
    ↵ uint256 tsPubX, uint256 tsPubY, bytes20 tsAddr);
```

```
91 event Deposit(address indexed accountAddr, uint32 accountId, uint16
    ↵ tokenId, uint128 amount);
```

```
98 event Withdraw(address indexed accountAddr, uint32 accountId, uint16
    ↵ tokenId, uint128 amount);
```

```
104 event ForceWithdraw(address indexed accountAddr, uint32 accountId,
    ↵ uint16 tokenId);
```

## CVF-159. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** IZkTrueUp.sol

**Recommendation** The "oldTsbFactoryAddr" is redundant, as its value could be derived from the previous events.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

```
109 event UpdateTsbFactory(address indexed oldTsbFactoryAddr, address
    ↵ indexed newTsbFactoryAddr);
```



## CVF-160. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** IZkTrueUp.sol

**Recommendation** The type of parameters should be "ITsbFactory".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

109    `event UpdateTsbFactory(address indexed oldTsbFactoryAddr, address  
  ↳ indexed newTsbFactoryAddr);`

## CVF-161. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** IZkTrueUp.sol

**Recommendation** The type of this parameter should be "IERC20".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/tsb/TsbFacet.sol*
- *line: 49*

132    `address underlyingAssetAddr,`

## CVF-162. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** IZkTrueUp.sol

**Recommendation** The type of these parameters should be "IERC20".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/account/AccountFacet.sol*
- *line: 45, 64*

204 `address tokenAddr,`

214 `address tokenAddr,`

## CVF-163. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** IZkTrueUp.sol

**Recommendation** The type of the "tokenAddr" parameters should be "IERC20".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/account/AccountFacet.sol*
- *line: 86, 109*

221 `function withdraw(address tokenAddr, uint128 amount) external;`

227 `function forceWithdraw(address tokenAddr) external;`



## CVF-164. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** IZkTrueUp.sol

**Recommendation** The type of this argument should be "ITsbToken".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/tsb/TsbFacet.sol*
- *line: 54*

239 `address tsbTokenAddr,`

## CVF-165. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** IZkTrueUp.sol

**Recommendation** The argument type should be "ITsbFactory".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

297 `function setTsbFactory(address tsbFactoryAddr) external;`

## CVF-166. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** IZkTrueUp.sol

**Description** This function should be declared in an interface.

**Recommendation** Consider removing it.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

377 `receive() external payable;`



## CVF-167. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** IFlashLoanReceiver.sol

**Recommendation** The type of this argument should be "IERC20".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/interfaces/IFlashLoanReceiver.sol*
- *line: 22*

24 `address[] calldata assets,`

## CVF-168. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** IFlashLoanReceiver.sol

**Recommendation** It would be more efficient to pass a single array of structs with three fields, rather than three parallel arrays. This would also make the length check unnecessary.

**Client Comment** We adopted the practice of separate array usage from other protocols like AAVE to enhance simplicity and user convenience.

*Diamond:*

- *status: info*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/interfaces/IFlashLoanReceiver.sol*
- *line: 22-24*

24 `address[] calldata assets,  
uint128[] calldata amounts,  
uint128[] calldata premiums,`



## CVF-169. INFO

- **Category** Bad naming

- **Source** IGovernance.sol

**Recommendation** Events are usually named via nouns, such as "BaseTokenWhitelisting", "TsbTokenWhitelisting", "TreasuryAddr", etc.

**Client Comment** Switched to using *BaseTokenWhitelisted*, *TsbTokenWhitelisted*, *TreasuryAddr*, *InsuranceAddr*, *VaultAddr*. Other event names like *Set...* remain the same as they are intuitive.

*Diamond:*

- *status: info*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/token/ITokenFacet.sol*
- *line: 22, 27, 32, 37, 43, 50*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/protocolParams/IProtocolParamsFacet.sol*
- *line: 25, 29, 33, 37*

```
16 event WhitelistBaseToken(  
27 event WhitelistTsbToken(  
36 event SetTreasuryAddr(address indexed treasuryAddr);  
40 event SetInsuranceAddr(address indexed insuranceAddr);  
44 event SetVaultAddr(address indexed vaultAddr);  
49 event SetIsStableCoin(address indexed tokenAddr, bool indexed  
    ↪ isStableCoin);  
54 event SetPaused(address indexed tokenAddr, bool indexed isPaused);  
59 event SetPriceFeed(address indexed tokenAddr, address indexed  
    ↪ priceFeed);  
64 event SetMinDepositAmt(address indexed tokenAddr, uint128 indexed  
    ↪ minDepositAmt);  
68 event SetFlashLoanPremium(uint16 indexed flashLoanPremium);  
72 event SetFundWeight(GovernanceStruct.FundWeight indexed fundWeight);
```

(76, 81)



## CVF-170. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** IGovernance.sol

**Recommendation** The type of the "tokenAddr" parameters should be "IERC20".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/token/ITokenFacet.sol*
- *line: 22, 27, 32, 37, 43*

```
17 address indexed tokenAddr,  
28 address indexed tokenAddr,  
49 event SetIsStableCoin(address indexed tokenAddr, bool indexed  
    ↪ isStableCoin);  
54 event SetPaused(address indexed tokenAddr, bool indexed isPaused);  
59 event SetPriceFeed(address indexed tokenAddr, address indexed  
    ↪ priceFeed);  
64 event SetMinDepositAmt(address indexed tokenAddr, uint128 indexed  
    ↪ minDepositAmt);
```

## CVF-171. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** IGovernance.sol

**Recommendation** The type of the "priceFeed" parameter should be "AggregatorV3Interface".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/token/ITokenFacet.sol*
- *line: 32*

59    **event** SetPriceFeed(**address indexed** tokenAddr, **address indexed**  
    → priceFeed);



## CVF-172. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** IGovernance.sol

**Recommendation** The type of the "tokenAddr" arguments should be "IERC20".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/token/ITokenFacet.sol*
- *line: 64, 69, 74, 79, 88*

```
93 function setPaused(address tokenAddr, bool isPaused) external;
```

```
98 function setPriceFeed(address tokenAddr, address priceFeed) external
    ↪ ;
```

```
103 function setIsStableCoin(address tokenAddr, bool isStableCoin)
    ↪ external;
```

```
108 function setMinDepositAmt(address tokenAddr, uint128 minDepositAmt)
    ↪ external;
```

```
146 function getValidToken(address tokenAddr)
```

```
154 function getTokenId(address tokenAddr) external view returns (uint16
    ↪ tokenId);
```

```
169 function getAssetConfig(address tokenAddr)
```



## CVF-173. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** IGovernance.sol

**Recommendation** The type of the "priceFeed" argument should be "AggregatorV3Interface".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/token/ITokenFacet.sol*
- *line: 69*

98    **function** setPriceFeed(**address** tokenAddr, **address** priceFeed) **external**  
       $\hookrightarrow$  ;



## CVF-174. FIXED

- **Category** Documentation
- **Source** IGovernance.sol

**Description** The number format of the "uint16" values is unclear.

**Recommendation** Consider documenting.

**Client Comment** Added comments.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/flashLoan/IFlashLoanFacet.sol*
- *line: 49-51*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/loan/ILoanFacet.sol*
- *line: 164-165*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/loan/ILoanFacet.sol*
- *line: 184*

112    `function setFlashLoanPremium(uint16 flashLoanPremium) external;`

121    `function setHalfLiquidationThreshold(uint16 halfLiquidationThreshold  
    ↳ ) external;`

177    `function getLiquidationConfig() external view returns (uint16  
    ↳ maxLtvRatio, uint16 halfLiquidationThreshold);`



## CVF-175. FIXED

- **Category** Documentation
- **Source** IGovernance.sol

**Description** The number format of the returned values is unclear.

**Recommendation** Consider documenting.

**Client Comment** Added comments.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/loan/ILoanFacet.sol*
- *line: 184*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/flashLoan/IFlashLoanFacet.sol*
- *line: 55-56*

177    **function** getLiquidationConfig() **external view returns** (**uint16**  
    ↳ maxLtvRatio, **uint16** halfLiquidationThreshold);

181    **function** getHalfLiquidationThreshold() **external view returns** (**uint16**  
    ↳ halfLiquidationThreshold);

193    **function** getFlashLoanPremium() **external view returns** (**uint16**  
    ↳ flashLoanPremium);



## CVF-176. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** ITsbFactory.sol

**Recommendation** The type of the "tsbTokenAddr" parameters should be "ITsbToken".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/tsb/ITsbFacet.sol*
- *line: 27*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/tsb/TsbLib.sol*
- *line: 19, 25*

```
14 event TsbTokenCreated(address indexed tsbTokenAddr, uint16
    ↪ underlyingTokenId, uint32 maturity);
```

```
20 event TsbTokenMinted(address indexed tsbTokenAddr, address indexed
    ↪ accountAddr, uint256 amount);
```

```
26 event TsbTokenBurned(address indexed tsbTokenAddr, address indexed
    ↪ accountAddr, uint256 amount);
```



## CVF-177. INFO

- **Category** Bad naming
- **Source** ITsbFactory.sol

**Recommendation** Events are usually named via nouns, such as "TsbToken", "Mint", or "Burn".

**Client Comment** *TsbToken will conflict with the TsbToken contract name. TsbTokenMinted, and TsbTokenBurn are used to distinguish mint and burn event in general ERC20 smart contract.*

Diamond:

- *status: info*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/tsb/ITsbFacet.sol*
- *line: 27*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/tsb/TsbLib.sol*
- *line: 19, 25*

```
14 event TsbTokenCreated(address indexed tsbTokenAddr, uint16
    ↵ underlyingTokenId, uint32 maturity);
```

```
20 event TsbTokenMinted(address indexed tsbTokenAddr, address indexed
    ↵ accountAddr, uint256 amount);
```

```
26 event TsbTokenBurned(address indexed tsbTokenAddr, address indexed
    ↵ accountAddr, uint256 amount);
```



## CVF-178. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** ITsbFactory.sol

**Recommendation** The return type should be "ITsbToken".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/tsb/ITsbFacet.sol*
- *line: 66*

39 ) **external returns (address tsbTokenAddr);**

87 **function getTsbTokenAddr(uint16 underlyingTokenId, uint32 maturity)**  
    **→ external view returns (address tsbTokenAddr);**



## CVF-179. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** ITsbFactory.sol

**Recommendation** The type of the "tsbTokenAddr" arguments should be "ITsbToken".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/tsb/ITsbFacet.sol*
- *line: 72, 79, 89, 94*

```
46  address tsbTokenAddr,  
56  address tsbTokenAddr,  
65  function balanceOf(address account, address tsbTokenAddr) external  
    ↪ view returns (uint256);  
75  address tsbTokenAddr  
81  function activeSupply(address tsbTokenAddr) external view returns (  
    ↪ uint256);  
92  function getUnderlyingAsset(address tsbTokenAddr) external view  
    ↪ returns (address underlyingAsset);  
97  function getMaturityTime(address tsbTokenAddr) external view returns  
    ↪ (uint32 maturityTime);
```



## CVF-180. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** ITsbFactory.sol

**Recommendation** The return type should be more specific.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/tsb/ITsbFacet.sol*
- *line: 89*

92    `function getUnderlyingAsset(address tsbTokenAddr) external view  
→ returns (address underlyingAsset);`

## CVF-181. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** ITsbToken.sol

**Recommendation** The return type should be "ITsbFactory".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

25    `function tsbFactory() external view returns (address);`



## CVF-182. INFO

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** ITsbToken.sol

**Recommendation** The return type should be more specific.

**Client Comment** *Removed this function. The underlying asset can be obtain from token-Info.*

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

28    `function underlyingAsset() external view returns (address);`

## CVF-183. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** ITsbToken.sol

**Recommendation** The type of the "\_underlyingAsset" should be more specific.

**Client Comment** *Resolved.*

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/interfaces/ITsbToken.sol*
- *line: 31*

39    `function tokenInfo() external view returns (address _underlyingAsset  
 ↵ , uint32 _maturityTime);`



## CVF-184. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** IWETH.sol

**Description** These functions are common for all ERC20 tokens.

**Recommendation** Consider inheriting from IERC20 instead of declaring these functions here.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/interfaces/IWETH.sol*
- *line: 12*

15    **function** approve(**address** guy, **uint256** wad) **external returns (bool)**;

17    **function** transferFrom(

23    **function** balanceOf(**address** guy) **external returns (uint256)**;

## CVF-185. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** TsbToken.sol

**Recommendation** The type of this variable should be "ITsbFactory".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

16    **address public immutable tsbFactory;**



## CVF-186. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** TsbToken.sol

**Recommendation** The type of this variable should be "IERC20".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/tsb/TsbToken.sol*
- *line: 24*

18 `address public immutable underlyingAsset;`

## CVF-187. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** TsbToken.sol

**Recommendation** The type of this argument should be "IERC20".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/tsb/TsbToken.sol*
- *line: 36*

30 `address underlyingAsset_;`



## CVF-188. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** TsbToken.sol

**Recommendation** The type of the “\_underlyingAsset” return value should be “IERC20”.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/tsb/TsbToken.sol*
- *line: 75*

69    `function tokenInfo() external view returns (address _underlyingAsset  
    ↳ , uint32 _maturityTime) {`

## CVF-189. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** EvacuationVerifier.sol

**Recommendation** This library should be moved into a separate file named “Pairing.sol”.

**Client Comment** Switched to snarkJS version 0.7.0; this resolved the issue.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*

16    `library Pairing {`



## CVF-190. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** EvacuationVerifier.sol

**Recommendation** By convention, field names start with lower case letters.

**Client Comment** *Switched to snarkJS version 0.7.0; this resolved the issue.*

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*

18    `uint256 X;`  
      `uint256 Y;`

23    `uint256[2] X;`  
      `uint256[2] Y;`



## CVF-191. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** EvacuationVerifier.sol

**Recommendation** This commented code should be removed.

**Client Comment** Switched to snarkJS version 0.7.0; this resolved the issue.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*

```
47  /*
50   // Changed by Jordi point
    return G2Point(
        [108570469990230571359445707622328294813707563595785180869905
         ↪
        19993285655852781,
        1155973203298638710799100402139228578392581286182119253091740
         ↪
        3151452391805634],
        [84956539231234314176049732474892724384181905872636001487702
        80649306958101930,
        4082367875863433681332203403145435568316851327593401208105741
         ↪
        076214120093531]
    );
*/

```

## CVF-192. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** EvacuationVerifier.sol

**Recommendation** This value should be a named constant.

**Client Comment** Switched to snarkJS version 0.7.0; this resolved the issue.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*

```
61  uint256 q =
     ↪ 218882428718392752222464057452572750886963111572978236626890378
     ↪
     94645226208583;
```



## CVF-193. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** EvacuationVerifier.sol

**Description** The only part of this contract that is specific to the evacuation feature is the verification key.

**Recommendation** Consider extracting generic logic from this contract into a separate abstract base contract.

**Client Comment** Switched to snarkJS version 0.7.0; this resolved the issue.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*

199    **contract** EvacuationVerifier {

## CVF-194. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** EvacuationVerifier.sol

**Recommendation** This value should be a named constant.

**Client Comment** Switched to snarkJS version 0.7.0; this resolved the issue.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*

264    **uint256** snark\_scalar\_field =  
    ↳ 218882428718392752222464057452572750885483644004160343436982041  
    ↳  
    86575808495617;



## CVF-195. FIXED

- **Category** Readability
- **Source** EvacuationVerifier.sol

**Recommendation** Should be "else return".

**Client Comment** Switched to snarkJS version 0.7.0; this resolved the issue.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*

286    `return 0;`

## CVF-196. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** EvacuationVerifier.sol

**Recommendation** This could be simplified to: `return verify(inputValues, proof) == 0;`

**Client Comment** Switched to snarkJS version 0.7.0; this resolved the issue.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*

304    `if (verify(inputValues, proof) == 0) {  
 return true;  
} else {  
 return false;  
}`



## CVF-197. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** Governance.sol

**Description** The functions “\_setupRole” and “\_grantRole” do exactly the same.

**Recommendation** Consider using the same function for both roles.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/initializer/zkTrueUpInit.sol*
- *line: 56-61*

55    \_setupRole(DEFAULT\_ADMIN\_ROLE, adminAddr);  
      \_grantRole(Config.OPERATOR\_ROLE, operatorAddr);

## CVF-198. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** Governance.sol

**Description** The expression "GovernanceStorage.getStorage()" is calculated several times.

**Recommendation** Consider calculating once and reusing.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/initializer/zkTrueUpInit.sol*
- *line: 81-90, 93-108, 123-136*

```
58 GovernanceStorage.getStorage().healthFactorThreshold = Config.  
    ↪ HEALTH_FACTOR_THRESHOLD;  
  
65 GovernanceStorage.getStorage().fundWeight = initFundWeight;  
  
68 GovernanceStorage.getStorage().halfLiquidationThreshold =  
    ↪ InitialConfig.INIT_HALF_LIQUIDATION_THRESHOLD;  
  
71 GovernanceStorage.getStorage().flashLoanPremium = InitialConfig.  
    ↪ INIT_FLASH_LOAN_PREMIUM;  
  
79 GovernanceStorage.getStorage().liquidationFactor =  
    ↪ initLiquidationFactor;  
  
88 GovernanceStorage.getStorage().stableCoinPairLiquidationFactor =  
    ↪ initStableCoinPairLiquidationFactor;  
  
91 GovernanceStorage.getStorage().treasuryAddr = treasuryAddr;  
  
93 GovernanceStorage.getStorage().insuranceAddr = insuranceAddr;  
  
95 GovernanceStorage.getStorage().vaultAddr = vaultAddr;  
  
99 GovernanceStorage.getStorage().tokenNum = newTokenId;  
100 GovernanceStorage.getStorage().toTokenId[Config.ETH_ADDRESS] =  
    ↪ newTokenId;  
GovernanceStorage.getStorage().assetConfigs[newTokenId] =  
    ↪ GovernanceStruct.AssetConfig({  
  
112     GovernanceStorage.getStorage().assetConfigs[newTokenId]
```



## CVF-199. FIXED

- **Category** Documentation
- **Source** Governance.sol

**Recommendation** Consider explaining why overflow is impossible here.

**Client Comment** Added comments.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/initializer/zkTrueUpInit.sol*
- *line: 124*

98    `uint16 newTokenId = getTokenNum() + 1;`

## CVF-200. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** Governance.sol

**Description** Here a value just written into the storage, is read back from the storage.

**Recommendation** Consider reusing the written value.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/initializer/zkTrueUpInit.sol*
- *line: 129*

112    `GovernanceStorage.getStorage().assetConfigs[newTokenId]`



## CVF-201. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** Governance.sol

**Description** The expression "GovernanceStorage.getStorage()" is calculated several times.

**Recommendation** Consider calculating once and reusing.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/initializer/zkTrueUpInit.sol*
- *line: 126, 128, 129*

124    GovernanceStorage.getStorage().tokenNum = newTokenId;  
GovernanceStorage.getStorage().toTokenId[tokenAddr] = newTokenId;  
GovernanceStorage.getStorage().assetConfigs[newTokenId] =  
    ↗ assetConfig;



## CVF-202. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** Governance.sol

**Recommendation** The type of the "tokenAddr" arguments should be "IERC20".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/token/TokenFacet.sol*
- *line: 51, 61, 72, 82, 101, 115*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/token/TokenLib.sol*
- *line: 50, 65, 86, 96, 104*

```
138 function setPaused(address tokenAddr, bool isPaused) external
    ↪ onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {

147 function setPriceFeed(address tokenAddr, address priceFeed) external
    ↪ onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {

157 function setIsStableCoin(address tokenAddr, bool isStableCoin)
    ↪ external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {

166 function setMinDepositAmt(address tokenAddr, uint128 minDepositAmt)
    ↪ external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {

246 function getValidToken(address tokenAddr)

268 function getAssetConfig(address tokenAddr)

346 function getTokenId(address tokenAddr) public view returns (uint16
    ↪ tokenId) {

367 function _getValidTokenId(address tokenAddr) internal view returns (
    ↪ uint16 tokenId) {
```



## CVF-203. INFO

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** Governance.sol

**Description** These events are emitted even if nothing actually changed.

**Client Comment** They are *admin function and no critical effect although no change*.  
*Diamond:*

- *status: info*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/token/ITokenFacet.sol*
- *line: 22, 27, 32, 37*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/protocolParams/IProtocolParamsFacet.sol*
- *line: 25, 29, 33, 37*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/loan/ILoanFacet.sol*
- *line: 115, 120*

```
141 emit SetPaused(tokenAddr, isPaused);  
151 emit SetPriceFeed(tokenAddr, priceFeed);  
160 emit SetIsStableCoin(tokenAddr, isStableCoin);  
169 emit SetMinDepositAmt(tokenAddr, minDepositAmt);  
176 emit SetFlashLoanPremium(flashLoanPremium);  
185 emit SetFundWeight(fundWeight);  
194 emit SetHalfLiquidationThreshold(halfLiquidationThreshold);  
212 emit SetLiquidationFactor(liquidationFactor, isStableCoinPair);  
220 emit SetTreasuryAddr(treasuryAddr);  
228 emit SetInsuranceAddr(insuranceAddr);  
236 emit SetVaultAddr(vaultAddr);
```



## CVF-204. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** Governance.sol

**Recommendation** The type of the "priceFeed" argument should be "AggregatorV3Interface".

**Client Comment** Removed this as it is a constant value in the config file.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/token/ITokenFacet.sol*
- *line: 69*

147    **function** setPriceFeed(**address** tokenAddr, **address** priceFeed) **external**  
    *↳ onlyRole(DEFAULT\_ADMIN\_ROLE)* {

## CVF-205. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** Governance.sol

**Description** This is basically a constant value.

**Recommendation** Consider not returning it.

**Client Comment** Removed this as it is a constant value in the config file.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*

278    */// @return maxLtvRatio The maximum LTV ratio*



## CVF-206. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** Governance.sol

**Recommendation** It is a good practice to put a comment into an empty block to explain why the block is empty.

**Client Comment** Added comments.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

373    `function _authorizeUpgrade(address) internal view override onlyRole(  
    ↳ DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {}`

## CVF-207. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** Rolluper.sol

**Recommendation** It would be more efficient to pass a single array of structs with two fields, rather than two parallel arrays. This would also make the length check unnecessary.

**Client Comment** Wrapped the data to struct VerifyingBlock.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/rollup/RollupFacet.sol*
- *line: 66*

68    `function verifyBlocks(RolluperStruct.StoredBlock[] memory  
    ↳ committedBlocks, RolluperStruct.Proof[] memory proof)`



## CVF-208. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** Rolluper.sol

**Recommendation** This check should be done before the loop, as the final value of the "verifiedBlockNum" variable could be calculated in advance.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/rollup/RollupFacet.sol*
- *line: 648*

79    `if (verifiedBlockNum > Utils.getCommittedBlockNum())`

## CVF-209. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** Rolluper.sol

**Description** The expression "pendingBlocks[i]" is calculated several times.

**Recommendation** Consider calculating once and reusing.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/rollup/RollupFacet.sol*
- *line: 687, 694, 696, 697*

90    `_executeOneBlock(pendingBlocks[i], i);  
ZkTrueUpStorage.getStorage().executedL1RequestNum += pendingBlocks[i  
    ↳ ].storedBlock.l1RequestNum;  
emit BlockExecuted(pendingBlocks[i].storedBlock.blockNumber);`



## CVF-210. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** Rolluper.sol

**Description** The expression "pendingBlocks[i].storedBlock" is calculated twice.

**Recommendation** Consider calculating once and reusing.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/rollup/RollupFacet.sol*
- *line: 696, 697*

```
91 ZkTrueUpStorage.getStorage().executedL1RequestNum += pendingBlocks[i
    ↪ ].storedBlock.l1RequestNum;
emit BlockExecuted(pendingBlocks[i].storedBlock.blockNumber);
```

## CVF-211. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** Rolluper.sol

**Recommendation** This check should be done before the loop, as the final value of the "executedBlockNum" variable could be calculated in advance.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/rollup/RollupFacet.sol*
- *line: 682*

```
95 if (executedBlockNum > Utils.getVerifiedBlockNum())
```



## CVF-212. FIXED

- **Category** Documentation
- **Source** Rolluper.sol

**Description** These returned values are not documented.

**Recommendation** Consider documenting.

**Client Comment** Added comments.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/rollup/RollupFacet.sol*
- *line: 872*

175 ) **internal view returns** (RolluperStruct.StoredBlock **memory**  
    ↳ storedNewBlock) {

206     **bytes32** processableRollupTxHash,  
      **uint64** processedL1RequestNum,  
      **bytes memory** commitmentOffset

291 ) **internal pure returns** (**bytes32** commitment) {

## CVF-213. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** Rolluper.sol

**Recommendation** Consider replacing this array with a bit mask.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/rollup/RollupFacet.sol*
- *line: 451*

208     **bytes memory** commitmentOffset



## CVF-214. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** Rolluper.sol

**Recommendation** Variable name usually starts with a lower case letter.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/rollup/RollupFacet.sol*
- *line: 599*

```
237 Operations.CreateTsbToken memory CreateTsbTokenReq = Operations.  
    ↪ readCreateTsbTokenPubData(rollupData);
```

## CVF-215. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** Rolluper.sol

**Description** Here "pubdta" is packed only to be immediately repacked into a larger array.

**Recommendation** Consider packing all at once.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/rollup/RollupFacet.sol*
- *line: function 873*

```
292 bytes memory pubData = abi.encodePacked(commitmentOffset, newBlock.  
    ↪ publicData);
```

```
295     abi.encodePacked(  
         previousBlock.stateRoot,  
         newBlock.newStateRoot,  
         newBlock.newTsRoot,  
         newBlock.timestamp,  
         pubData  
     )
```



## CVF-216. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** Rolluper.sol

**Description** These functions are very similar.

**Recommendation** Consider merging them into one.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/rollup/RollupFacet.sol*
- *line: 222, 656, 671*

308 `function _verifyOneBlock(RolluperStruct.StoredBlock memory`  
    `↳ committedBlock, RolluperStruct.Proof memory proof)`

322 `function _verifyEvacuationBlock(bytes32 commitment, RolluperStruct.`  
    `↳ Proof memory proof) internal view {`

## CVF-217. FIXED

- **Category** Readability
- **Source** Rolluper.sol

**Recommendation** Consider explicitly requiring that the commitment is a field element.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/rollup/RollupFacet.sol*
- *line: 667*

312 `if (proof.commitment[0] & Config.INPUT_MASK != uint256(`  
    `↳ committedBlock.commitment) & Config.INPUT_MASK)`

323 `if (proof.commitment[0] & Config.INPUT_MASK != uint256(commitment) &`  
    `↳ Config.INPUT_MASK)`



## CVF-218. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** Rolluper.sol

**Recommendation** This check should be moved to the calling code to avoid reading multiple times the current number of executed blocks.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/rollup/RollupFacet.sol*
- *line: 691*

```
337 if (executeBlock.storedBlock.blockNumber != Utils.  
    ↪ getExecutedBlockNum() + blockNum + 1)  
    revert RolluperError.InvalidExecutedBlockNum(executeBlock.  
    ↪ storedBlock.blockNumber);
```

## CVF-219. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** TsbFactory.sol

**Description** The functions “\_setupRole” and “\_grantRole” basically do the same.

**Recommendation** Consider using once of these two functions.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

```
62 _setupRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, adminAddr);  
_grantRole(OPERATOR_ROLE, operatorAddr);  
_grantRole(ZKTRUEUP_ROLE, zkTrueUpAddr);
```

## CVF-220. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** TsbFactory.sol

**Recommendation** The return type should be "ITsbToken".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

83 ) **external** virtual onlyRole(OPERATOR\_ROLE) **returns** (**address**  
    ↳ tsbTokenAddr) {

## CVF-221. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** TsbFactory.sol

**Description** Deploying a separate contract for each token is suboptimal.

**Recommendation** Consider deploying a minimal proxy for a shared implementation as described in ERC-1167 (<https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1167>).

**Client Comment** Based on our business logic, deploying contracts separately could be more efficient due to the following reasons: 1. The contracts are relatively simple, meaning that cost reduction would be minimal. Direct deployment can reduce gas fees for future calls. 2. Unlike the Uniswap Pair contract, which needs to manage an unlimited number of cloned contracts, we maintain a limited number of child contracts.

*Diamond:*

- *status: info*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/tsb/TsbFacet.sol*
- *line: 57*

90 tsbTokenAddr = **address**(**new** TsbToken(name, symbol,  
    ↳ underlyingAssetAddr, maturityTime));



## CVF-222. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** TsbFactory.sol

**Recommendation** The type of the "tsbTokenAddr" arguments should be "ITsbToken".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/tsb/TsbFacet.sol*
- *line: 110, 118, 125, 132, 139, 147*

```
102    address tsbTokenAddr,  
  
116    address tsbTokenAddr,  
  
130    function balanceOf(address account, address tsbTokenAddr) external  
        ↪ view returns (uint256 balance) {  
  
142    address tsbTokenAddr  
  
150    function activeSupply(address tsbTokenAddr) external view returns (  
        ↪ uint256 totalSupply) {  
  
157    function getUnderlyingAsset(address tsbTokenAddr) external view  
        ↪ returns (address underlyingAsset) {  
  
164    function getMaturityTime(address tsbTokenAddr) external view returns  
        ↪ (uint32 maturityTime) {
```

## CVF-223. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** TsbFactory.sol

**Description** These events duplicate events emitted by TSB tokens.

**Recommendation** Consider not emitting them.

**Client Comment** *It make our server can subscribe this factory contract only instead of each token contract.*

*Diamond:*

- *status: info*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/tsb/TsbLib.sol*
- *line: 42, 52*

107    **emit** TsbTokenMinted(tsbTokenAddr, to, amount);

121    **emit** TsbTokenBurned(tsbTokenAddr, from, amount);

## CVF-224. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** TsbFactory.sol

**Recommendation** The return type should be "IERC20".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/tsb/TsbFacet.sol*
- *line: 139*

157    **function** getUnderlyingAsset(**address** tsbTokenAddr) **external view**  
      **↳ returns** (**address** underlyingAsset) {



## CVF-225. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** TsbFactory.sol

**Recommendation** The return type should be "ITsbToken".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/tsb/TsbFacet.sol*
- *line: 110*

174    `function getTsbTokenAddr(uint16 underlyingTokenId, uint32 maturity)  
    ↳ public view returns (address tsbTokenAddr) {`

## CVF-226. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** TsbFactory.sol

**Recommendation** The return type should be "IGovernance".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

188    `function _getGovernanceAddr() internal view returns (address  
    ↳ governanceAddr) {`



## CVF-227. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** TsbFactory.sol

**Recommendation** It is a good practice to put a comment into an empty block to explain why the block is empty.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

200 `function _authorizeUpgrade(address) internal view override onlyRole(  
 ↪ DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {}`

## CVF-228. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** Verifier.sol

**Recommendation** This library should be moved into a separate file named "Pairing.sol".

**Client Comment** Switched to snarkJS version 0.7.0; this resolved the issue.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

16 `library Pairing {`

## CVF-229. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** Verifier.sol

**Recommendation** By convention, field names start with lower case letters.

**Client Comment** Switched to snarkJS version 0.7.0; this resolved the issue.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

18 `uint256 X;  
uint256 Y;`



## CVF-230. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** Verifier.sol

**Recommendation** This commented code should be removed.

**Client Comment** Switched to snarkJS version 0.7.0; this resolved the issue.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

```
47   /*
50    // Changed by Jordi point
      return G2Point(
        [108570469990230571359445707622328294813707563595785180869905
         ↪
         19993285655852781,
         ↪
         115597320329863871079910040213922857839258128618211925309174
         ↪
         03151452391805634],
        [849565392312343141760497324748927243841819058726360014877028
         ↪
         0649306958101930,
         ↪
         4082367875863433681332203403145435568316851327593401208105741
         ↪
         076214120093531]
      );
*/
```

## CVF-231. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** Verifier.sol

**Recommendation** This value should be a named constant.

**Client Comment** Switched to snarkJS version 0.7.0; this resolved the issue.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

```
61  uint256 q =
     ↪ 218882428718392752222464057452572750886963111572978236626890378
     ↪
     94645226208583;
```



## CVF-232. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** Verifier.sol

**Recommendation** This value should be a named constant.

**Client Comment** Switched to snarkJS version 0.7.0; this resolved the issue.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

264    `uint256 snark_scalar_field =  
    ↳ 21888242871839275222464057452572750885483644004160343436982041  
    ↳  
    86575808495617;`

## CVF-233. FIXED

- **Category** Readability
- **Source** Verifier.sol

**Recommendation** Should be "else return".

**Client Comment** Switched to snarkJS version 0.7.0; this resolved the issue.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

286    `return 0;`

## CVF-234. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** Verifier.sol

**Recommendation** "This could be simplified to: return verify(inputValues, proof) == 0;"

**Client Comment** Switched to snarkJS version 0.7.0; this resolved the issue.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

```
304 if (verify(inputValues, proof) == 0) {  
    return true;  
} else {  
    return false;  
}
```

## CVF-235. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** Viewer.sol

**Recommendation** The argument type should be "IZkTrueUp".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

```
19 constructor(address payable _zkTrueUp) {
```

## CVF-236. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** ZkTrueUp.sol

**Description** The functions “\_setupRole” and “\_grantRole” basically do the same.

**Recommendation** Consider using once of these functions.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/initializer/ZkTrueUpInit.sol*
- *line: 57-61*

```
77 _setupRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, adminAddr);
    _grantRole(Config.COMMITTER_ROLE, operatorAddr);
    _grantRole(Config.VERIFIER_ROLE, operatorAddr);
80 _grantRole(Config.EXECUTER_ROLE, operatorAddr);
```

## CVF-237. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** ZkTrueUp.sol

**Description** The expression “ZkTrueUpStorage.getStorage()” is calculated several times.

**Recommendation** Consider calculating once and reusing.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/initializer/ZkTrueUpInit.sol*
- *line: 66, 70-74, 120*

- 82 ZkTrueUpStorage.getStorage().governanceAddr = governanceAddr;  
ZkTrueUpStorage.getStorage().wETHAddr = wETHAddr;  
ZkTrueUpStorage.getStorage().poseidonUnit2Addr = poseidonUnit2Addr;  
ZkTrueUpStorage.getStorage().verifierAddr = verifierAddr;  
ZkTrueUpStorage.getStorage().evacuationVerifierAddr =  
    ↳ evacuationVerifierAddr;  
ZkTrueUpStorage.getStorage().rolluperAddr = rolluperAddr;
- 89 ZkTrueUpStorage.getStorage().accountNum = Config.  
    ↳ NUM\_RESERVED\_ACCOUNTS;
- 98 ZkTrueUpStorage.getStorage().storedBlockHashes[0] = keccak256(abi.  
    ↳ encode(genesisBlock));



## CVF-238. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** ZkTrueUp.sol

**Recommendation** The type of the “tokenAddr” arguments should be “IERC20”.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/account/AccountFacet.sol*
- *line: 45, 64, 86, 109*

```
110 address tokenAddr,  
130 address tokenAddr,  
144 function withdraw(address tokenAddr, uint128 amount) external  
    ↪ virtual nonReentrant {  
158 function forceWithdraw(address tokenAddr) external {  
471 function getPendingBalances(address accountAddr, address tokenAddr)  
    ↪ external view returns (uint128 pendingBalance) {  
596 address tokenAddr,  
614 address tokenAddr,  
634 address tokenAddr,  
915 function _getValidToken(address tokenAddr)
```

## CVF-239. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** ZkTrueUp.sol

**Recommendation** The type of this argument should be "ITsbToken".

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/tsb/TsbFacet.sol*
- *line: 73*

195 `address tsbTokenAddr,`

## CVF-240. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** ZkTrueUp.sol

**Recommendation** It would be more efficient to pass a single array of structs with two fields, rather than two parallel arrays. This would also make the length check unnecessary.

**Client Comment** We adopted the practice of separate array usage from other protocols like AAVE to enhance simplicity and user convenience.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/flashLoan/FlashLoanFacet.sol*
- *line: 38, 39*

345 `address[] calldata assets,`  
`uint128[] calldata amounts,`



## CVF-241. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** ZkTrueUp.sol

**Recommendation** The argument type should be “ITsbFactory”.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

373    `function setTsbFactory(address tsbFactoryAddr) external onlyRole(  
    ↳ DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {`

## CVF-242. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** ZkTrueUp.sol

**Recommendation** It is a good practice to put a comment into an empty block to explain why the block is empty.

**Client Comment** Resolved.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no exsited*

531    `receive() external payable {}`

## CVF-243. FIXED

- **Category** Overflow/Underflow
- **Source** ZkTrueUp.sol

**Description** Phantom overflow is possible here, i.e. a situation when the final calculation result would fit into the destination type, but some intermediary calculation overflows.

**Recommendation** Consider using the “mulDiv” function.

**Client Comment** Switched to ‘mulDiv’.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/loan/LoanFacet.sol*
- *line: 374, 375, 394, 409, 421*

```
698 repayAmt = (normalizedCollateralPrice * loan.collateralAmt) / 10**  
    ↪ collateralAsset.decimals <
```

```
704 uint256 normalizedRepayValue = (normalizedDebtPrice * repayAmt) /  
    ↪ 10**debtAsset.decimals;
```

```
712 uint256 repayToCollateralRatio = (Config.LTV_BASE *  
    ↪ normalizedRepayValue * 10**collateralAsset.decimals) /  
    normalizedCollateralPrice /  
    loan.collateralAmt;
```

```
731 ((maxLtvRatio + liquidationFactor.liquidatorIncentive) *  
    normalizedRepayValue *  
    10**collateralAsset.decimals) /  
    Config.LTV_BASE /  
    normalizedCollateralPrice
```

```
752 (liquidationFactor.protocolPenalty * normalizedRepayValue * 10**  
    ↪ collateralAsset.decimals) /  
    Config.LTV_BASE /  
    normalizedCollateralPrice
```



## CVF-244. FIXED

- **Category** Overflow/Underflow
- **Source** ZkTrueUp.sol

**Description** Phantom overflow is possible here.

**Recommendation** Consider using the “mulDiv” function.

**Client Comment** Switched to ‘mulDiv’.

*Diamond:*

- *status: fixed*
- *path: contracts/zkTrueUp/loan/LoanLib.sol*
- *line: 107, 111, 112*

```
859 (ltvThreshold * normalizedCollateralPrice * loan.collateralAmt *  
     ↪ 10**debtAsset.decimals) /  
860 (normalizedDebtPrice * loan.debtAmt) /  
10**collateralAsset.decimals;
```

## CVF-245. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** ZkTrueUp.sol

**Recommendation** It is a good practice to put a comment into an empty block to explain why the block is empty.

**Client Comment** Added comments.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

```
927 function _authorizeUpgrade(address) internal view override onlyRole(  
     ↪ DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {}
```



## CVF-246. FIXED

- **Category** Bad naming
- **Source** ZkTrueUp.sol

**Description** This function delegates to a “rolluper”, not “rollup”.

**Recommendation** Consider renaming.

**Client Comment** Renamed to *deledateCall* and added an address parameter. Moved *FlashLoan* and *Rolluper* to the other contracts for delegate call.

*Diamond:*

- *status: no existed*

931    `function _delegateRollup() internal {`





# ABDK Consulting

## About us

Established in 2016, is a leading service provider in the space of blockchain development and audit. It has contributed to numerous blockchain projects, and co-authored some widely known blockchain primitives like Poseidon hash function.

The ABDK Audit Team, led by Mikhail Vladimirov and Dmitry Khovratovich, has conducted over 40 audits of blockchain projects in Solidity, Rust, Circom, C++, JavaScript, and other languages.

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