From c960951f91874d09ac0f94ee5016eb8bf57fcb1b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jonathan Leitschuh Date: Mon, 3 Oct 2022 21:21:05 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Cherrypick - 47afa2c8a29e2cf925238af1ad7c76fba282793f to 7.5 release vuln-fix: Zip Slip Vulnerability This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability. This change does one of two things. This change either 1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip. OR 2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`. For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`. The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory. It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object. For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`; however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`. Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') Severity: High CVSSS: 7.4 Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip) Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh Bug-tracker: https://github.com/JLLeitschuh/security-research/issues/16 Co-authored-by: Moderne --- testng-core/src/main/java/org/testng/JarFileUtils.java | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/testng-core/src/main/java/org/testng/JarFileUtils.java b/testng-core/src/main/java/org/testng/JarFileUtils.java index c0bb86f5b0..b86d9debf8 100644 --- a/testng-core/src/main/java/org/testng/JarFileUtils.java +++ b/testng-core/src/main/java/org/testng/JarFileUtils.java @@ -76,6 +76,10 @@ private boolean testngXmlExistsInJar(File jarFile, List classes) throws if (Parser.canParse(jeName.toLowerCase())) { InputStream inputStream = jf.getInputStream(je); File copyFile = new File(file, jeName); + if (!copyFile.toPath().normalize().startsWith(file.toPath().normalize())) { + throw new IOException("Bad zip entry"); + } + copyFile.getParentFile().mkdirs(); Files.copyFile(inputStream, copyFile); if (matchesXmlPathInJar(je)) { suitePath = copyFile.toString();