

## 97. Attacks on Coastal Batteries for period 10th April-5th June.

## (a) Inside Assault Area

Force	Sorties	Bombs
A.E.A.F. ... ..	1,755	2,886.5 tons
U.S. Eighth Air Force ... ..	184	495 × 60-lb. R.Ps.
R.A.F. Bomber Command ... ..	556	579.0 tons
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	2,495	5,904 tons
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		495 × 60-lb. R.Ps.

## (b) Outside Assault Area

Force	Sorties	Bombs
A.E.A.F. ... ..	3,244	5,846 tons
U.S. Eighth Air Force ... ..	1,527	4,559 tons
R.A.F. Bomber Command ... ..	1,499	6,785 tons
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	6,270	17,190 tons
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Total for the period 10th April to 5th June, 1944—8,765 sorties, 23,094 tons of bombs and 495 × 60-lb. R.Ps.

98. Of these attacks, one of the most outstanding was that carried out by 64 Lancasters of R.A.F. Bomber Command, with 7 Mosquitoes acting as a Pathfinder Force. During this raid, on the night of 28th-29th May, 356

tons of H.E. bombs were dropped on the coastal battery at St. Martin de Varreville, with excellent results. These results, reported by A.P.I.S. Medmenham, after a photographic reconnaissance sortie made on 29th May, were confirmed by a captured German report made by the troop commander of the battery. The two reports are given below for comparison.

*Photographic Reconnaissance Report.*

A heavy concentration of craters is seen in the target area with excellent results.

## Damage to Casemates:

- No. 1. Five very near misses, all within 45 feet. Casemate walls damaged.
- No. 2. Damaged by at least five near misses.
- No. 3. Destroyed and no longer identifiable; six near misses.
- No. 4. Excavation undamaged.

## Damage to Command Post:

Demolished by a direct hit and five near misses or probable hits.

## Damage to Accommodation:

Personnel shelters in rear of each emplacement all indistinguishable amidst the craters.

99. Effective attacks were also carried out by aircraft of R.A.F. Bomber Command against the six-gun battery at Morsalines, and by Marauders of the United States Ninth Air Force on the batteries at Houlgate, Ouistreham and Point de Hoe.

100. Out of forty sites allotted to A.E.A.F., thirty-seven were attacked, sixteen out of eighteen in the assault area and twenty-one out of twenty-two outside. Of these, nine in the area and fourteen outside received hits on one or more emplacements. Forty-eight sites were allotted to R.A.F. Bomber Command, fourteen of which were outside. Hits on essential elements were secured on five batteries in the area and nine outside. Of the fifty-two targets allotted to the United States Eighth Air Force,

*Captured German Report.*

The position is covered with craters . . . .

Several direct hits with very heavy bombs were made on No. 3 shelter (casemate) which apparently burst open and then collapsed. . . . The rest of the shelters remain undamaged.

. . . the iron equipment hut which contained signals apparatus, the armoury, the gas chamber and artillery instruments received a direct hit, and only a few twisted iron girders remain.

. . . the men's canteen received several direct hits and was completely destroyed. The messing huts, containing the battery dining room, the kitchen and clerks' office, were completely destroyed by near misses. A concrete-built hot shower bath was completely destroyed by a direct hit; as well as the nearby joiner's shop.

thirty-two of which were in the assault area, only six sites in the area and sixteen outside were attacked. Some of the batteries were allotted to two commands.

101. In addition to the targets listed in the plan, many other coastal defence targets in and out of the area were attacked as targets of opportunity.

102. During the hours of darkness preceding the actual assault, a tremendous air bombardment was directed on to the batteries which could not be destroyed within the assault area, aimed at neutralising them during the critical assault period. This the attacks succeeded in doing. Details of the effort employed are given in Part III (c) of this Despatch.