

before, he had been informed by radio of his promotion to the rank of Marshal. The troops in general surrendered to anyone they could find willing to accept their surrender. It was an astonishing sight to see long lines of Germans driving themselves, in their own transport or in commandeered horse-carts, westwards in search of prisoner of war cages. Men who had, so short a time before, been fighting like tigers now seemed transformed into a cheerful and docile crowd, resigned to the acceptance of their fate.

The campaign which culminated in the battle of Tunis was noteworthy not only for the fact that it was the first wholly successful campaign against the Axis, the "end of the beginning" in Mr. Churchill's phrase, working up through checks and disappointments to the "battle without a tomorrow." It was remarkable also for the manner of its winning. We had produced in Tunisia a new instrument of victory in the form of the close collaboration between the Allies, a principle which was to be not only a battle-winning but a war-winning factor. The importance and the magnitude of this achievement tend now to be obscured by the fact that this spirit of Allied unity came into being so early and grew so rapidly that it seems to have a character of inevitability which reduces the unique value of its creation. The history of previous wars and previous coalitions demonstrates that this is far from being the case. It was not inevitable by any means that British and American troops should show, in the first battle they had fought together since 1918, such a whole hearted spirit of comradeship, nor that British and French, between whom the past three years had thrown many shadows, should recapture once more the same degree of trust and mutual respect which had animated the old alliance. The credit must go to the soldiers of all three nations and in a very large degree to General Eisenhower who by word and example inspired those efforts. My relations with General Eisenhower were of the happiest and I valued them both for personal reasons and from the point of view of the task in hand: he backed me up in every possible way and I knew that I could in all circumstances rely on his complete understanding, sympathy and support.

Besides this co-operation between the three nationalities involved there is also to be noted the degree of co-operation achieved between the three services. The battle of Tunis gave the fullest scope for a demonstration of this, for it was so designed and planned as to enable the Navy and Air Forces to play their full part and produce their full strength simultaneously with the supreme effort of the Army. They held the enemy in the "Tunisian tip" in a stranglehold while the Army finished them off. In this respect also the campaign marked the beginning of a collaboration which was to grow ever stronger until the final victory. The Naval Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean was Admiral Cunningham,* returning to the scene of his former triumphs. Air Chief Marshal Tedder was the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief. The Commander of the Tactical Air Force, Air Marshal Coningham, had established a joint headquarters with me.

* Now Admiral of the Fleet The Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope, K.T., G.C.B., O.M., D.S.O.

We shared the same mess, worked side by side, and had collaborated from the first days of the campaign until the day of final victory. It was thanks to him that the co-operation between the air and ground forces on the battlefield were so close and automatic.

The final victory in Africa was an unusually complete example of the battle of annihilation. Never before had a great army been so totally destroyed. A quarter of a million men laid down their arms in unconditional surrender; six hundred and sixty three escaped. Immense stocks of arms, ammunition and supplies of all natures were the booty of the victors. Our own casualties in the final battle were less than two thousand men. At 1415 hours on 13th May I sent the following signal to the Prime Minister:

"Sir, it is my duty to report that the Tunisian campaign is over. All enemy resistance has ceased. We are masters of the North African shores."

APPENDIX "A".

Directive to Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Command.

PART I.

Special Responsibilities.

1. Your prime and main duty will be to take or destroy at the earliest opportunity, the German and Italian Armies in Libya and Egypt together with all their supplies and establishments.

2. You will discharge or cause to be discharged, the duties enumerated below, without prejudice to the task given in paragraph 1, which is of paramount importance.

General Responsibilities.

3. You will command and be responsible for the administration of all Imperial Land Forces, and such Allied Forces as may be specifically placed under your command in the following territories:—

Egypt.

Libya.

Malta.

Palestine and Trans-Jordan.

Cyprus.

Syria (west of the Inter-Command boundary).

Iraq (west of the Inter-Command boundary).

Sudan.

Eritrea.

Your Eastern boundary (with Persia and Iraq Command) will be:—

Inclusive Malatya—exclusive Siverek—Ras El Ain—inclusive Haseche—Garat Motteb—thence Syrian-Iraqi Frontier to inclusive Abu Kemal—exclusive Kasr Muhaiwir thence a line due south to Saudi Arabian Frontier—thence exclusive Riyadh—inclusive Saiala.

4. You will also be responsible for the preparation of plans, when required, for the employment of land forces in the following territories:—

Italian territories in North Africa.

Turkey (in conjunction with C.-in-C., Persia and Iraq Command).