

charge to fire 2 hours after release. It was released at 1655Z, as was verified by the Commanding Officer. At 1840Z—1½ hours after release—by which time, from log readings and revolutions taken by SEANYMPH, X.8 was distant 3½ miles from the position of release, the charge detonated astern with tremendous force. This caused such damage to X.8 as to flood the "wet and dry" compartment, distorting the doors to this compartment, fracturing pipes, and generally causing such damage to the craft that she was no longer capable of diving. The explosion also caused a number of lights to be broken in SEANYMPH.

49. It is not clear why the second explosion caused such damage at an apparent range of 3½ miles while the first explosion, only 1,000 yards away, did none. Both charges had been dropped in approximately the same depth of water (180 fathoms). It may be that only partial detonation occurred in the first charge, which had been set to "safe." Whatever the reason the force of the second explosion would appear to have illustrated the efficiency of the charges. I find it hard to believe that the explosion was in fact 3½ miles away; but whatever the horizontal range was, there is no doubt about the depth of water, so that in any event the result of the explosion was indeed remarkable.

50. The 17th September was the first day (D-3) on which the transfer of crews was to take place if the weather permitted; but the weather had deteriorated and by the evening the wind was from the south-west, force 4, with a sea and swell of 4-5, and it was too rough to make the change-over.

51. The P.R. on the 15th September had shown no change in the disposition of the targets, and submarines were so informed by signal on 17th September, which also confirmed the Target Plan as No. 4. Further information on the nets round LUTZOW and the A/S* net across Langfiord was also passed by signal this day.

18th September.

52. X.8 informed SEANYMPH at daylight of the full particulars of her damage; and as she could now serve no useful purpose in the operation and, if sighted on the surface, might compromise it, the Commanding Officer, H.M.S. SEANYMPH, decided to embark her crew and scuttle her. In anticipation of the possibility of just such a situation, Admiral (Submarines) had transmitted a signal on 16th September, informing the Commanding Officer, H.M.S. SEANYMPH, that if he considered it necessary in the interests of the general security of the operation as a whole to scuttle X.8, such action would have his full approval.

53. By 0345Z the crew had been embarked from X.8 and the craft sunk in position 71° 41.5' N. 18° 11' E.

54. I consider that the Commanding Officer of X.8 acted correctly in releasing the side charges when it became apparent that they were flooded, and that the Commanding Officer, H.M.S. SEANYMPH's decision to sink X.8, to avoid compromising the operation, was the correct one.

55. After sinking X.8, SEANYMPH proceeded to the north of 73° North to report by W/T.

56. At 0555 SYRTIS, having transmitted the signal reporting the loss of X.9, set course for her patrol area. SYRTIS's signal was never received, and it was not until the 3rd October, when Admiral (Submarines) received SYRTIS's signal timed 2001A/2nd, that it was known that X.9 had broken adrift from her tow and had not been seen since 16th September, and therefore had not taken part in the attack.

57. Weather conditions had improved slightly by dusk on the 18th, and at 2015Z STUBBORN, in position 70° 57' N. 20° 35' E., decided to transfer the operational crew to X.7. The change-over was successfully completed by 2124Z. The remaining submarines with X-craft in tow—TRUCULENT with X.6, THRASHER with X.5 and SCEPTRE with X.10—decided that the weather was still too bad to effect the transfer.

58. at 2128Z STUBBORN, on going ahead after changing over the crews, parted her tow. The main tow had already parted, on the 15th September, and with the auxiliary tow also parted, it was necessary to use a 2½-inch wire spring. Some difficulty was experienced in passing this, but at 2345Z STUBBORN went ahead, only to find that the pin of the screw shackle of X.7's end of the tow had come adrift and the tow had to be passed afresh. It was not until 0125Z on 19th September that STUBBORN was able to go ahead with X.7 in tow.

19th September.

59. At 0855 on 19th September, Admiral (Submarines) received SEANYMPH's signal reporting the scuttling of X.8 and that she was herself returning to Lerwick. Although SEANYMPH now had no X-craft to recover, I decided she could still assist in the recovery of other craft or might be required to proceed on patrol to intercept enemy forces should they be "flushed" by the X-craft attack and try to escape to the southward. SEANYMPH was therefore ordered to patrol in the vicinity of position 71° 25' N. 17° 16' E., until the 21st September, when she was to proceed to her patrol sector to assist in the recovery of X-craft. I decided not to inform the other submarines taking part that X.8 had been scuttled, as to do so might have had a slightly dampening effect, nor to alter the Target Plan though it meant that LUTZOW (who was the target for X.8) would not be attacked.

60. SCEPTRE and SYRTIS made their landfalls from the vicinity of their ordered landfall positions during the day and THRASHER, TRUCULENT and SCEPTRE (the weather having moderated since the previous evening) all successfully transferred their crews after dark.

61. At 1843Z SYRTIS from position 71° 03' 40" N. 22° 13' E. sighted a submarine bearing 308°, 2 to 3 miles, which dived five minutes later. From an analysis of track charts and other patrol reports, this was probably a U-boat.

20th September: Day D.

62. The position now was that the operational crews of the four X-craft still remaining had all been transferred successfully. TRUCULENT, THRASHER, SCEPTRE and SYRTIS—the latter with no X-craft—had all made successful landfalls and were in their patrol sectors. STUBBORN, who had been delayed by parting

Admiralty footnote—

* A/S—anti-submarine