

5. The following forces are estimated to be the minimum required to provide for the security of other commitments in the circumstances anticipated:—

(a) *Eighth Army.*

One Armd. Div.
Two Armd. Bde. Gps.
One Army Tk. Bde.
Three Inf. Divs.
Three Inf. Bde. Gps.

(b) *Cyprus.*

One Armd. Regt.
One Armd. Car Regt.
One Inf. Div.
Six Inf. Bns.

(c) *Ninth Army.*

One Inf. Div.
One Inf. Bde. Gp.
Desert Force.

6. The remaining forces available for Tenth Army and for G.H.Q. Reserve are given in Appendix "B".*

7. D.I. is the day on which the code word for action under this instruction is issued by G.H.Q., M.E.F.

Intention.

8. Should an attack from the Caucasus develop, I intend from the start to stop the enemy as far forward as possible. The enemy will not in any event be allowed to establish himself south of the general line Pahlevi—Kasvin — Hamadan — Senna — Saqqiz — Rowanduz Gorge.

Method.

9. It is essential that, while inflicting the maximum loss and delay on the enemy, our own forces should not be depleted to such an extent that on reaching this line they cannot hold it. Defences in this area will therefore be completed as soon as possible (see para. 13 (b) below).

10. In the event of the Russians asking for help in the defence of the Caucasus and of an air striking force being provided, the maximum light and motorised forces will move as far forward as possible, into the Caucasus, but not north of the main Caucasus range, with a view to:—

(a) protecting the air striking force.

(b) preparing demolitions for delaying the enemy's advance into Persia.

Subsequent action will be as in para. 11 below.

11. In the event of no such striking force being provided, delay will be imposed on the enemy by:—

(a) Moving light forces with the utmost possible speed to the line of the River Araxes, between the Caspian Sea and the Turkish frontier, with a view to ensuring the demolition of all the bridges over the river and to acting as a screen to cover our concentration forward.

(b) Covering, as long as possible, the aerodromes in the area Pahlevi—Teheran—Hamadan.

(c) By thorough demolitions, as laid down in Operation Instruction No. 115 and in a joint directive dated 27th April, 1942, by the Commanders-in-Chief, and by early evacuation of valuable war materials.

(d) By holding positions in country unsuited to A.F.Vs. astride his main lines of advance.

(e) by counter-attacking whenever a suitable opportunity presents itself.

12. The boundary between Ninth and Tenth Armies will be (Ninth Army inclusive):—Malatya—excl. Karali Dagh (Karadja Dagh)—incl. Hasseche (El Haseke)—Garat Motteb—thence Syrian-Iraqi Frontier to Abu Kernal—Qasr Muhaiwir—thence a line due south to the frontier to Saudi Arabia.

13. The following action will be taken forthwith:—

(a) Preparation and stocking of landing grounds (in consultation with R.A.F. Iraq).

(b) Preparation of defences on the general line Pahlevi—Kasvin—Hamadan—Senna—Saqqiz—Rowanduz Gorge to be ready for operations in this area by four inf. divs., two armd. divs. and one motor bde. gp.

(c) Selection, preparation and stocking of the staging posts necessary for the movement of formations into Persia.

(d) Improvement of routes in Iraq and Persia for the passage of tank transporters.

(e) Development of the route to India *via* Kerman for the passage of troops.

14. The construction and stocking of the Persian base for the area Ahwaz—Andimeshk will henceforth have priority over the extension and improvement of the Shaiba base and the advanced base at Musaiyib.

Buildings at Shaiba and Musaiyib on which construction has begun or for which materials are on site will be completed. Otherwise material coming forward will be diverted to the construction of the Persian base to the scale, and with the order of priority as between installations laid down in M.E. letter dated 2nd May, 1942. Stocking will take place as soon as possible to the scale laid down in M.E. letter of 14th May, 1942, without waiting for the construction of covered accommodation except for small ordnance stores and spares. Every possible means of transportation will be made available for the carriage of material to Persian base sites, but the order of priority already laid down for the use of the Persian ports and transportation facilities; namely:—

(a) Port construction and transportation material.

(b) Aid-to-Russia stores.

(c) Essential Persian civil imports.

(d) Military stores and base construction material;

will be adhered to. Persian civil imports should be reduced to a minimum.

Though the Persian base is hereby given priority over the Iraq bases, it may well occur that material can be used in Iraq which cannot be used in Persia. Provided therefore no delay is caused to the construction of the Persian Base, extension may be continued in Iraq.

15. As a precaution against delay in the construction, stocking, and organisation of the Persian base it is essential to improve the communications between the Shaiba base and the Persian L. of C.

The Persian Railway at Khorramshahr will therefore be extended to the bank of the Shatt el Arab at Tanuma. This extension should terminate in a lighter wharf opposite the wharves at Margil so that stores can be rapidly transhipped across the Shatt el Arab from the