

supply of these types. Immediate measures of economy, salvage, repair and control of issues were taken, with the result that demands on India were progressively and markedly decreased. Some idea of the effort needed to achieve this result may be gained from the fact that, in four months, no fewer than 97,200 covers and 51,700 tubes were backloaded for reconditioning.

439. During March, complaints were received from Fourteenth Army regarding the unsatisfactory condition of replacement tank engines that had been reconditioned in Base Workshops in India. This situation was aggravated by the fact that we could not await the delivery of new engines which were on order from America. No fewer than 101 Grant, 47 Stuart and 68 Sherman engines had to be delivered early in April, to refit the two tank brigades for their drive on Rangoon. The majority of these engines were in the west of India, and it was obvious that they could not now be issued without overhaul and test. By agreement with India Command, a senior R.E.M.E. officer was flown to Kirkee to supervise and accelerate the tests. By means of special rail, sea and air transport arrangements, combined with the fortunate arrival of some Sherman engines from America, the demand was met in full and in time.

440. The supply of 25-pr. H.E. ammunition caused anxiety early in 1945, since 500,000 rounds had had to be backloaded from India for the European theatre. Fortunately stocks in my depots were high at that time and supply for the succeeding months was met by backloading from Ceylon, giving priority in manufacture to the reconditioning of existing stocks and by speeding up indigenous production.

The only other serious ammunition shortage was in 3.7-in. A.A. H.E., fuze 117. This was due to the increasingly extensive use of these guns in a ground rôle. The heavy ammunition expenditure thus incurred was only met by using up all existing stocks in India, and by greatly increasing provision action.

SECTION XXVII (paras. 441-447) CIVIL AFFAIRS STAFF (BURMA)

The separation of Civil Affairs Staff (Burma) and H.Q. Allied Land Forces, South-East Asia; The transport problem: Stores for Civil Affairs: The necessity for integration of Civil Affairs and Military Staffs.

441. It is possible that no country has suffered more extensively from the destruction of war than Burma. Twice has the area which constitutes the heart of the whole country's life and economy been fought over, and between these periods of fighting it was subject to a sterile and damaging occupation. As Commander-in-Chief, therefore, my responsibility for restoring civil life behind the battle area by means of Military Government was a heavy one.

442. When my Advanced Headquarters moved from Delhi to Barrackpore at the end of November, 1944, the shortage of accommodation at the new site made it necessary to leave the Civil Affairs Staff behind. This proved most unfortunate, even though Civil Affairs interests were represented at my Headquarters

by a senior officer. For a very heavy burden was thrown on the former, particularly with regard to transport, workshops, signals, and the operation of railway and inland water transport, just at a moment when the Army was seriously short of these services for its own operational needs. It was not until the Chief Civil Affairs Officer and his staff rejoined my Headquarters in March, 1945, that integration began and developed to mutual advantage. The Civil Affairs Staff is a military organization and an integral part of the Staff as a whole and can only function properly as such. This fact is sometimes lost sight of both by the military Staff proper and the Civil Affairs Staff themselves. If this close integration does not exist, Civil Affairs cannot be expected to plan adequately, nor to produce their own requirements, with the result that the Army in the end is compelled to take on commitments which it has not foreseen and is not equipped to perform.

443. Without attempting to give a full account of the rehabilitation and organization of Burma after its progressive recapture, I intend to give some account of a few aspects of the subject. How this responsibility increased with our advance is shown by the fact that in November, 1944, we had 66 Civil Affairs officers operating in Burma. In May, 1945, we had 1,915. We were at first desperately short of experienced men for this work, and what was eventually accomplished in 1945 under the leadership of Major-General H. E. Rance reflected the greatest credit on all concerned.

444. The provision of transport for civil relief purposes was a matter of difficulty. Since no special provision had been made by the United Kingdom against Civil Affairs (Burma) demand for a total of about 7,000 vehicles, all their essential requirements had to be provided out of Army stocks. By the beginning of May, 1945, some 1,900 new vehicles, the maximum that could be spared, had been allocated for this purpose. This transport was organized into three groups. No. 1 Transport Group had one company operating in Arakan, one in the Fourteenth Army sector, forward of Mandalay, and one earmarked for Rangoon. No. 2 Group had a company working in Northern Combat Area Command, where two more companies were being raised. No. 3 Group had a company on the Manipur Road—Imphal run, while new companies were being raised at Toungoo and Myingyan. Nevertheless, with only five companies actually in operation at the end of the period, the relief supplies handled between November, 1944, and May, 1945, totalled over 13,000 tons.

445. While the Civil Affairs stores tonnage was small, Civil Affairs Staff (Burma) were allotted a tonnage on the L. of C. and sent it forward under their own arrangements. As larger areas of Burma were liberated, a new system was introduced, with effect from the 1st February, 1945, whereby all Civil Affairs Staff (Burma) stores were demanded and called forward through military channels. The internal movement of Civil Affairs stores, especially in North Burma, presented several problems, owing to the paucity of communications and the shortage of transport. The communication system developed for the supply of the advancing armies did not correspond with that