Galla and Somali tribesmen were employed. Although they were not skilful agents they produced useful information.

All information received in Nairobi was quickly sifted and signalled on by the quickest means to the small Intelligence Branch which worked at Advanced Force H.Q. This information often proved of inestimable value.

Intelligence Officers worked in the field and employing agents were often joined by so many volunteers that they became leaders of bands of Patriot scouts, and as such played an active part in the operations.

112. The question of security had necessarily to receive close attention in view of the Italian civil population which remained in the various towns which were captured. Security personnel were moved immediately in rear of the leading troops and as soon as a town was entered they established security control. In addition, they often had to carry out various administrative and political duties until the arrival of the appropriate staffs. To maintain wireless security it was necessary to have a regular system of changing code names and stencil ciphers. The organisation of these changes over such a wide front which lacked normal means of communication required careful preparation.

As the situation demanded, Censorship offices were opened to deal not only with letters from the troops and communications to the Press but also to censor enemy civilian and Prisoners of War correspondence.

I consider that one of the main reasons why our intelligence was better than the enemy's was because of our better security organisation.

113. Particular attention was paid to propaganda which, though under the general direction of Cairo, had necessarily to be evolved locally to a great extent on account of the delay in communications. Great use was made of locally-prepared pamphlets dropped on enemy troops. My policy in these pamphlets was to ensure that all enemy troops knew what was happening in the operations in Italian East Africa, to encourage the Somali and Eritrean troops to desert and return to their homes before they were taken as prisoners of war, and to incite Abyssinians to throw off the yoke of the Italian. Considerable success was achieved; many desertions and several surrenders were directly due to the pamphlets, while reports showed that the Italians were always very concerned about our activities in this direction in lowering the morale of their troops.

News for the troops was not neglected, news sheets being prepared and issued regularly, while in Mogadiscio and Addis Abeba Italian and vernacular newspapers were started to keep the local population informed of world news.

114. *Engineers.*

Until January, 1941, the Engineer troops were employed on defensive positions, principally on the Tana and at Wajir; on construction or improving and maintaining the roads or tracks running fanwise from Nairobi to Lokitaung, Marsabit, Wajir, Garissa and Bura; and providing water supplies in the base areas and along the Lines of Communication, by deep-well boring.

During the period immediately preceding the advance to the Giuba four floating bridges were built over the Tana, two at Garissa and two at Bura.

115. From the crossing of the Giuba onwards the L. of C. lengthened so rapidly that very little transport could be spared for engineer materials from the carriage of rations, petrol and ammunition. Consequently most of the engineer work depended upon finding materials on the line of advance and fortunately, the enemy usually left ample materials to repair his demolitions.

Italian engineer stores at Mogadiscio and at Addis Abeba in particular saved invaluable time and transport. Near Mogadiscio three road bridges and one railway bridge over the 200ft. wide Uebi Scebeli were destroyed by the enemy and rebuilt from materials left in his engineer park at Afgoi; which provided also an excellent bridge, portable in light parts, which was later used to replace the demolished road bridge over the Auasc River. At Addis Abeba also sufficient of this equipment was found to provide a 220ft. bridge at Ponte Malcasa and a considerable reserve for future needs.

116. Engineer work on the advance from Mogadiscio to Addis Abeba consisted mainly of the clearing of minefields and road blocks, and making deviation causeways across streams where bridges had been demolished, followed by bridge construction.

Apart from the pontoon bridges over the Tana and the Giuba, upwards of 70 bridges from 25′ to 220′ in length, in single or multiple spans, were built, almost all of captured Italian material. This process is still going on.

117. The most notable engineer task in the operations northwards from Marsabit, and probably of the whole campaign, was the construction of a new road 180 miles long from Marsabit via Kalacha and east of the Huri Hills to Mega climbing 4,000 feet in the last 20 miles. This new road made a vital all-weather link to replace the track across the Chalbi Desert to North Horr, Dukana and Ganciaro over which the advance of the 1st S.A. Division had been made, but which is impassable after rain. The new road was built in six weeks under most trying conditions across lava debris thrown out by the numerous volcanoes in the region. The heat of the sun and reflected heat from the hard basalt boulders made work extremely arduous in the daytime, and heat radiated from the rock allowed little relief for several hours after sunset.

118. In the south during the preparatory period Road Construction companies, covered only by very light forces, drove broad roads through the bush 70 miles forward from both Garissa and Bura on our front line, the River Tana, and water-boring units were also at work right forward at this stage. In quite a number of the preliminary operations auto-patrols from the Road Construction companies moved forward just behind the most advanced troops. This plan proved of the greatest assistance in maintaining the speed of the advance.

119. No service pattern bridging equipment arrived from the United Kingdom in time to be used in this operation.

This was not unexpected in view of shipping difficulties. Locally designed pontoon bridging, assault boats and S.B.G. bridges were therefore made in Kenya and South Africa and a "Bridge Coy" was improvised from lorry chassis for their carriage to the Giuba. Because of a shortage of steel plates of suitable