

Fifth Army was in charge of the detailed planning for the administration, which they considered to fall into four phases. Initially supplies had to be built up in the area of Naples, and a loading programme and convoy schedules had to be organised. Then, in the assault, the force would have to be maintained over the beaches and beach dumps built up. In the next phase maintenance would continue in the same way, but it was hoped that the port of Anzio could be used. Finally, when the bridgehead force linked up with the main front, maintenance would obviously be discontinued over the beaches and would be resumed through the normal channels.

The planning and the accumulation of supplies worked according to plan and when on 22nd January fine weather and calm seas enabled the unloading to be done without difficulty it was found that the dumps could be built up well inland and not just on the beaches as originally considered.⁽¹⁾ Bad weather on D plus 2 prevented use of one beach, supplies for which were thereafter diverted to another. Anzio harbour had not been demolished at all; it was found to be usable in all weathers and its capacity was rapidly increased by our har-

bour engineers.⁽²⁾ Despite the bad weather that on two occasions caused hold-up and dislocation in the unloading, until the end of January a daily average of 7,400 tons was discharged.

When, in early February, it became apparent that the maintenance of a force at Anzio would have to continue for a much longer time than had originally been considered, new steps had to be taken. Thereafter special Liberty ships were loaded in North Africa and sailed to Naples; there they were top-loaded with any special items needed in the bridgehead to which they sailed when called forward by the authorities there. These ships, however, were too large to be berthed in Anzio harbour, and had instead to discharge into smaller craft; and this fact, coupled with bad weather, lack of craft and the constant enemy fire entailed a very considerable drop in the rate of unloading and caused a serious backlog of Liberty ships waiting at Naples to be called forward. Under these circumstances severe economy was exercised by the troops in the bridgehead in order to cut down their requirements, and more stores than hitherto were carried there on loaded cargo trucks in Landing Ships, Tank; at the same time A.F.H.Q. was able to lay its hands on some more craft for us and these factors enabled us to build up supplies to so satisfactory a position that, in May, we were able to cut down on shipping requirements. When the troops at Anzio broke out of their bridgehead there were ample reserves of supplies to support them.

(1) One novel expedient was tried in the administration of the Anzio bridgehead and, contrary to the Navy's expectations, fully justified itself. Every day a number of American 2½ ton cargo trucks were loaded with 5 tons of supplies at Naples and were driven on board Landing Ships, Tank which then sailed for Anzio. On arrival there the trucks were driven direct to dumps and unloaded. Empty trucks were loaded with salvage and then taken back to Naples in the returning ships. Great flexibility was achieved in this way, and large quantities of supplies needed in an emergency could be provided within 72 hours of the emergency arising.

(2) Its initial capacity was for four Landing Ships, Tank, and three Landing Craft, Tank. Ten days later it could berth eight Landing Ships, Tank, eight Landing Craft, Tank and five Landing Craft, Infantry at the same time.

APPENDIX "L"

NOTES ON THE AIR IMPLICATION OF AN ASSAULT ON THE ITALIAN MAINLAND— NAPLES AREA

TO AIR COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

1. *Distance from Fighter Bases*

For the purpose of these notes it is assumed that the assault will be made in the Salerno area which is the nearest point that an assault can be made to our air bases.

2. *Distances to Salerno*

| | |
|----------------|-----------|
| Milo (Trapani) | 226 miles |
| Gerbini | 224 .. |
| Reggio | 184 .. |
| N.E. Sicily | 178 .. |
| Vibo Valentia | 152 .. |

3. *Fighter Performance (including 10 minutes combat)*

| | |
|--|-----------|
| P-38 with one long range tank | 350 miles |
| A-36 with one long range tank | 200 .. |
| Spitfire with one long range tank (90 gal.) | 180 .. |
| P-39 and P-40F with long range tanks (75 gal.) | 150 .. |
| Beaufighter | 300 .. |