

APPENDIX " C."

23rd December, 1941:

HEADQUARTERS MALAYA COMMAND ORDER
No. 28.

The broad policy is to continue opposition to the enemy on the mainland to cover the arrival of our reinforcements.

5. 3 *Indian Corps*.—Will fight the enemy wherever met and will NOT give ground till forced to subject to the condition that the Corps must remain in being as a fighting formation.

It is of importance to cover Kuala Lumpur as long as possible owing to the large amount of material stored in that area.

The lateral road Jerantut—Raub—Kuala Kubu provides the main communication between East and West Malaya. This important factor should be given full consideration in the conduct of the battle.

6. It is the intention to withdraw the Kuantan garrison at a time to be decided later, dependent upon the development of operations elsewhere and upon climatic conditions. Preliminary arrangements will be put in hand forthwith.

7. On completion of the withdrawal of the garrisons from Kelantan and Kuantan, the role of the 9 *Indian Division* will be:—

(a) to protect the Line of Communication Gemas—Kuala Lipis.

(b) to prevent the enemy repairing and using the Line of Communication Kuala Lipis—Kuala Krai.

(c) to form a reserve in the area Raub—Bentong.

8. The 11 *Indian Division* should therefore, if forced to fall back from its present position, fight the enemy in South Perak under instructions to be issued by the Commander, 3 *Indian Corps*, who will ensure that the operations of the two divisions are co-ordinated.

9. The Commander, 3 *Indian Corps*, will also be prepared for landings on the west coast of Malaya. For this purpose a small naval flotilla is being formed and will be based on Port Swettenham.

10. *A.I.F.*—While retaining his main forces for the defence of the east coast, the Commander, *A.I.F.*, will at the same time make preliminary arrangements to deal with (a) an enemy advance down the main Kuala Lumpur—Singapore road (b) landings by small enemy forces on the west coast of Malaya.

11. *C.A.A.D.*—The *C.A.A.D.* will be prepared to provide the maximum possible *A.A.* protection for ships arriving with reinforcements while they are unloading.

12. *Singapore Fortress*.—The Commander, *Singapore Fortress*, will arrange for reconnaissance of the north shore of Singapore Island to select positions for the defence of possible landing places.

14. There must be NO unnecessary withdrawals.

15. Arrangements are being made by Headquarters Malaya Command to harass the enemy's communications.

Similar arrangements should be made by subordinate formations whenever the opportunity offers.

APPENDIX " D."

Subject:—

TACTICS.

Comd. 3 *Ind. Corps*.Comd. *A.I.F. Malaya*.Comd. *Singapore Fortress*.

1. The operations on land in Malaya have developed in a way which probably few of us anticipated to the full before the war started. There have been some normal attacks by formed bodies of the enemy, in which our adversaries have not shown up to any special advantage except that they have shown at times fanatical courage. But the operations have tended to develop more and more on guerrilla lines. The enemy is trying to dislodge us from our positions by flanking and encircling movements and by attacks on our communications. He has the advantage that he is far less dependent on his communications than we are, and also that, being rice-eaters, his soldiers are able to live on the country for longer periods than are ours. As I have said before, his Army is an Army of gangsters, relying for success more on weakening the morale of the troops than on any particular skill with his weapons. All reports go to show that, whereas his mortar fire is actually accurate but not very destructive, his small arms fire is generally wild and comparatively ineffective.

2. I believe that our young and inexperienced troops are now getting their second wind. I am confident that, if well led, they will prove their superiority over the enemy. We must play the enemy at his own game. It is developing into a guerrilla war, so let us also adopt guerrilla tactics. Formations should reduce their transport as far as possible by sending all vehicles which are not immediately wanted well to the rear. Every platoon and section should be taught to become both tank hunters and Japanese hunters. The object must be to destroy as many Japanese as possible and also to destroy the morale by constantly attacking him.

To do this we must have a good local intelligence organization. Every unit at least should have attached to it a Malay speaking and if possible Chinese speaking local European who should be able to build up a local intelligence organization. Some of these have already been made available: endeavours will be made to supply others on application.

3. While our policy for the present is to keep our forces in being as fighting formations this does not mean that casualties must always be avoided. Provided greater losses are inflicted on the enemy, casualties can and should be accepted within reasonable limits. The doctrine to be inculcated into every officer and man is that they must always be looking for a way of getting at the enemy. If they are cut off, they are well placed for attacking the enemy from behind, and should make every effort to do this before seeking to rejoin their own unit.

If on the other hand the enemy succeeds in getting behind us we must turn round and fight him. It is a guerrilla war and must be fought with guerrilla tactics.

A. E. PERCIVAL,
Lieutenant-General,
General Officer Commanding,
Malaya.

6th January, 1942.