

the railway system or to give any reliable estimate of their own civil and military demands in war. In the absence of reliable information from the Turkish General Staff it was estimated that, without the use of Izmir port, 2,500 to 3,000 tons a day would be the maximum import figure and that, after meeting Turkish requirements, both military and civil, not more than 500 to 1,000 tons could be relied on for British requirements; it was realised that import capacity would be considerably increased by the use of Izmir. These figures were inevitably guesswork, but were accepted as the basis of subsequent planning.

290. It was therefore decided in March that, to avoid concentrating in Turkey a larger force than could be subsequently maintained, the despatch of British forces would be phased. In the first phase twenty-five Royal Air Force squadrons would be sent, with an army component and two anti-tank regiments; in the second phase we would send twenty Royal Air Force squadrons, in the third phase three anti-tank regiments and five anti-aircraft regiments, and in the fourth phase, after Izmir port was opened, two armoured divisions. This plan was known as HARDIHOOD.

291. No. 3 Planning Staff was sent to Turkey in March to continue discussions on the operational employment of this force and to implement the programme of administrative planning required in Turkey for its reception and subsequent operation and maintenance. This was followed in March by a visit to Ankara by Air Marshal Sholto Douglas and in April by a visit by myself, in order to discuss the implications of the HARDIHOOD plan with Marshal Cakmak and the Turkish General Staff.

292. The maintenance requirements of the forces contained in the first three phases amounted to some 1,200 tons a day, or 200 tons a day in excess of the maximum capacity estimated to be available. We hoped, however, that the action we had taken and were continuing to take to improve the railways would enable the force to be maintained.

293. This action was mainly the provision of additional locomotives and wagons. We planned to earmark 100 locomotives and the equivalent of 2,500 15-ton wagons; of these 50 locomotives and 1,800 15-ton wagons were included in the Adana list and would be supplied when available; the remainder were to be held as a reserve in the Middle East. Action was also taken to build up a reserve supply of locomotive coal in the Middle East for use in Turkey should we have to maintain a force there. Holdings of Middle East railways were increased by 40,000 tons so that, in the event of Turkey coming into the war, it would be possible to divert incoming supplies direct to Turkish ports.

294. Further administrative preparations included pre-dumping of stores at certain selected places in Turkey and an extensive programme of airfield and base and lines of communication construction. Certain stores had already been pre-dumped in Turkey; for HARDIHOOD the number of dumps was increased from five to eleven, and dumping continued with a target of twenty-eight days for the first three phases of HARDIHOOD.

295. In the spring of 1943 there were sufficient airfields in Turkey to accommodate twenty-five Royal Air Force squadrons during the dry weather only; it was therefore necessary to undertake an extensive programme of development to accommodate forty-five squadrons, including sixteen heavy-bomber squadrons, under all-weather conditions. This work was divided between the Turks and the British Royal Engineer construction parties already in Turkey. The target date for completion of runways and hard-standings was 31st October, 1943; later, certain minimum technical and domestic accommodation would be necessary. In addition to these airfields the Turks undertook to provide fair-weather landing grounds at Milas and Mugla in South-West Anatolia.

296. In July, 1942, an advanced base had been reconnoitred in the Ulukisla-Cakmak area, but by the spring of 1943 very little construction had been done, although certain covered accommodation was available and all the necessary material was on the site. It was agreed to continue with the project, and representatives of No. 3 Planning Staff were instructed to prepare a key plan for the HARDIHOOD forces. Later, after reconnaissance of both areas, it was decided to locate the advanced base at Afyon Karahinsar, which was more suited to the increased forces of Plan HARDIHOOD than Ulukisla. Further planned development of the lines of communication included port depots at Mersin and Iskenderun, a Royal Air Force base maintenance unit at Cakmak and a road-rail transshipment point at Ulukisla. These proposals were submitted to the Turkish General Staff in early June. Turkish consent to the construction of the advanced base was not given until August, and then only on conditions which made it quite impossible to complete the project by the end of the year. Work had to be carried out by the Turks, under the supervision of only those British personnel already in Turkey, and it had to be disguised as commercial construction. Permission to start constructions of the port depots was not given until December.

297. Plans were also produced to extend the existing petrol installations at Iskenderun, to provide tankage at airfields, to build hospitals and to improve communications by the construction of a network of trunk telephone routes.

298. Our plans in all cases were delayed by the Turks, with the result that little progress had been made by the end of the year, and if it had been necessary to implement HARDIHOOD, the administration and maintenance of the forces would have presented an almost insuperable problem.

299. In September, as a result of decisions taken at the Quebec Conference, a new directive defining the operational and administrative commitment of my command was received, in which no provision was made for HARDIHOOD other than the construction parties already in Turkey. Our various construction programmes, however, were to continue and No. 3 Planning Staff was to remain in Turkey to maintain continuity in planning.

300. In October, 1943, as a result of instructions to the Middle East Defence Committee by the Chiefs of Staff, an invitation was extended to Turkey to enter the war. The Chiefs of Staff pointed out that should Turkey enter the