Disruption of Enemy Radar Cover and W/T Facilities.

103. The enemy Radar cover on the Western Front was complete from Norway to the Spanish border. This cover was obtained by a chain of coastal stations, each composed of a number of installations. The density of these stations was such that there was a major site, containing an average of three pieces of equipment, every ten miles between Ostend and Cherbourg. This coastal chain was backed by a somewhat less dense inland system and by numerous mobile installations. The attached map* shows the location of the principal enemy Radar sites and the coverage of this Radar Chain.

104. The scale and variety of equipment in this Radar organisation was such that completely to destroy the system by air attack alone would have been a formidable proposition. This, however, was not necessary—the destruction of certain vital Radars and the comprehensive jamming of others could so gravely interfere with the operation of the system as almost to make it useless. I therefore decided to attack Radar stations between Ostend and the Channel Islands in accordance with the following principles:—

(*a*) Radar installations which could not be jammed electronically, or were difficult to jam, should be destroyed:

(*b*) Radar installations capable of giving good readings on ships and of controlling coastal guns should be destroyed:

(*c*) Radar installations likely to assist the enemy in inflicting casualties to airborne forces should be destroyed:

(*d*) Two targets outside the assault area were to be attacked for every one attacked in the area.

The attacks had a dual purpose. They aided both current air operations and naval operations in the Channel, and they prepared for the assault by blinding the enemy.

105. On 10th May, 1944, a series of attacks was begun against the long range aircraft reporting stations, and on 18th May, on the installations used for night fighter control and the control of coastal guns. On 25th May, 42 sites were scheduled for attack. These sites included 106 installations; at D-3, fourteen of these sites were confirmed destroyed.

106. To conserve effort, I then decided, three days before D-Day, to restrict attacks to the twelve most important sites; six were chosen by the naval authorities and six by the air authorities. These twelve sites, containing thirty-nine installations, were all attacked in the three days prior to D-Day.

107. Up to D-Day, 1,668 sorties were flown by aircraft of A.E.A.F. in attacks on Radar installations. Typhoons in low level attacks flew 694 sorties and fired 4,517 × 60-lb. R.Ps. Typhoons and Spitfires made 759 dive-bombing sorties, dropping 1,258 × 500-lb. bombs and light and medium bombers dropped 217 tons of bombs. In addition, the sites and equipment were attacked with many thousands of rounds of cannon and machine-gun fire.

108. These Radar targets were very heavily defended by flak and low level attacks upon them demanded great skill and daring. Pilots of the R.A.F. Second Tactical Air Force were mainly employed and losses among senior and more experienced pilots were heavy. There is no doubt, however, that these attacks saved the lives of countless soldiers, sailors and airmen on D-Day. The following details of some of the successful attacks made during the last three days before the assault, show the outstanding results obtained by Typhoon and Spitfire pilots in low level attacks pressed home to very close range.

(*a*) *Cap de la Hague/Jobourg.* This site was attacked by rocket firing Typhoons of 174, 175 and 245 Squadrons, Second Tactical Air Force, on 5th June, and 200 × 60-lb. R.Ps. were fired. The "Hoarding", an installation used for long range aircraft reporting, was destroyed. Three of the attacking aircraft were destroyed by flak.

(*b*) *Dieppe/Caudecote.* This site was attacked by 18 R.P. Typhoons of 198 and 609 Squadrons, Second Tactical Air Force, on 2nd June. 104 × 60-lb. R.Ps. were fired, with the result that the "Hoarding" was destroyed and the "Freya" and "Wuerzburg" installations, used for medium range aircraft reporting, night fighter control and control of coastal guns, were damaged. One of the Typhoons was destroyed by flak.

(*c*) *Cap d'Antifer.* This station was attacked several times. On 4th June, 23 Spitfires of 441, 442 and 443 Squadrons, Second Tactical Air Force, dive-bombed with 23 × 500-lb. M.C. instantaneous bombs; nine direct hits were scored. The "Chimney" and one "Giant Wuerzburg" were destroyed, and other installations damaged.

109. In addition to the attacks on the enemy Radar stations, attacks were also made on the most important of his navigational beam stations and on certain special W/T stations.

110. *Navigational Stations.* There were two enemy radio navigational stations important to the assault area, one at Sortosville, south of Cherbourg, and the other at Lanmeur, near Morlaix. Both of these stations were attacked, the first target being destroyed and the second rendered unserviceable, at least temporarily.

111. *W/T Stations.* Four W/T stations of the highest importance were subjected to attack by R.A.F. Bomber Command. These attacks were triumphs of precision bombing and completely achieved their object. Details of these attacks are given below.

(*a*) *Boulogne/Mt. Couple.* This large installation contained about 60 transmitters. The first attack was unsuccessful, but two nights later, 31st May/1st June, in an attack by 105 heavy bombers dropping 530 tons of bombs, at least 70 heavy bombs were placed on the target, which is some 300 yards long and 150 yards wide. Only a negligible fraction of the transmitters on this site survived the attacks, a maximum of three being subsequently identified in operation.

(*b*) *Beaumont Hague/Au Feure.* This installation was attacked on the night of 31st May/1st June by 121 aircraft; 498 tons of bombs were dropped and good results were obtained. The main concentration of bombs

* Maps not reproduced.