

The Allies employed in Italy a total of forty divisions of which eight were transferred to the Western front in 1943 and ten in 1944 and 1945, followed by three diverted to the Balkans. Like us the Germans never employed this whole force at once but the details of opposing strength at each stage of the campaign show the same advantage on the Allied side. In October, 1943, there were nineteen German to fifteen Allied divisions, and in December twenty-one to fifteen and a half. Next May the numerical balance shifted slightly in our favour with twenty-seven to twenty-three but with this minor superiority we were able to inflict such losses on the enemy that by August they had been obliged to reinforce to a total of twenty-five (and two Italian) against our twenty. When the final attack began in April, 1945, we had seventeen divisions to their twenty-three German and four Italian. Nor should we restrict our survey solely to the divisions contained in Italy, for our forces in that country represented such a threat to the whole of the southern coastline of Europe that strong garrisons had to be maintained in Southern France and the Balkans; in the summer of 1944, for example, the most critical moment of the war when the main effort of Great Britain and the

United States was launched against the beaches of Normandy, the presence of our forces in Italy tied down fifty-five divisions in the Mediterranean area.\*

It was the Germans, therefore, who were contained in Italy and not the Allies; the Italian campaign drained their strength more than ours. The reasons why the Germans decided to fight in Italy rather than withdraw to the Alps I have already discussed; they were not, or at least the more important were not, military reasons but political. Perhaps the future German historian, if he is as eager as his predecessors have always been to extol the virtues of Prussian military science, will admit the folly of protracted resistance in Italy and, throwing the blame on a megalomaniac Fuehrer, will seek consolation by pointing to the bravery and stubbornness in defence of the German soldier. He will be justified in so doing; but a still finer theme will be that of the historian who describes how that stubborn defence and the barrier of so many mountains and rivers were triumphantly overcome by the Allies.

\* Twenty-five in Italy, nineteen in the Balkans and eleven in the South of France.

#### APPENDIX " A "

##### NATIONALITIES IN ITALY

Troops representing the following nationalities served in the Allied Armies in Italy :

##### *Allied*

American<sup>1</sup>, French<sup>2</sup>, Polish, Nepalese, Belgian, Greek, Brazilian, Syro-Lebanese, Jewish, Yugoslav.

##### *Imperial*

British, Canadian, New Zealand, South African, Newfoundland, Indian, Ceylonese, Basuto, Swazi, Bechuana, Seychellois, Mauritian, Rodriguez Islanders, Caribbean, Cypriot.

##### *Co-Belligerent*

Italian.

#### APPENDIX " B "

##### ORDER OF BATTLE OF GERMAN FORCES IN ITALY AND SLOVENIA

*As at 3rd September, 1943*

##### I. MAIN BATTLE FRONT (Kesselring's Command)

*C.-in-C. South*

(Field-Marshal Kesselring)

*Tenth Army*

(Colonel-General Vietinghoff)

*XIV Panzer Corps* (General Hube)

16 Panzer Division

Hermann Goering Panzer Division

15 Panzer Grenadier Division

*LXXVI Panzer Corps* (General Herr)

29 Panzer Grenadier Division

26 Panzer Division

1 Parachute Division

*XI Flieger Corps* (General Student)

3 Panzer Grenadier Division

2 Parachute Division

##### 2. SARDINIA AND CORSICA

90 Panzer Grenadier Division

SS Assault Brigade " Reichfuehrer SS "

##### 3. NORTHERN ITALY (Rommel's Command)

*Army Group " B "*

(Field-Marshal Rommel)

*LXXXVII Corps* (General Lemelsen)

76 Infantry Division

94 Infantry Division

305 Infantry Division

24 Panzer Division

<sup>1</sup> Including a Negro division and a Japanese-American Regimental Combat Team.

<sup>2</sup> Including Algerian, Moroccan, Tunisian and Senegalese.