

## APPENDIX " G. "

MINUTES OF CONFERENCE HELD AT  
HEADQUARTERS, WESTFORCE.

1515 HOURS. 25TH JANUARY, 1942.

Present.—G.O.C. (Lieut.-General PERCIVAL).  
G.O.C. 3 Indian Corps (Lieut.-General Sir LEWIS HEATH).  
Comd. Westforce (Major-General GORDON BENNETT).  
Comd. II Indian Division (Major-General KEY).

1. Comd. II Indian Division reported that the force at Batu Pahat had been heavily engaged all the morning and that the coast road had been blocked near Senggarang.

2. Comd. Westforce reported that the situation at Kluang was confused but that we were still holding the Kluang road junction and he believed the counter attack carried out by the Sikhs had been successful.

3. The following decisions were taken:—

(a) Order the Batu Pahat Garrison to withdraw at once and link up with 53 Infantry Brigade in the Senggarang area.

(b) Westforce to withdraw to-night to the general line S. Sayong Halt—S. Benut. This position to be held until the night 27-28th January at least. Subsequent withdrawals to take place to positions, to be laid down in advance, which would in turn be held for a minimum fixed period and longer if possible.

(c) Movement of Eastforce and II Division to conform to that of Westforce, under orders to be issued by 3 Indian Corps.

(d) In view of a possible threat to the Pontian Kechil area Comd. Westforce to hold a good battalion in reserve, whenever possible, which could be made available to move rapidly to that flank.

K. S. TORRANCE,  
*Brigadier,*  
*General Staff, Malaya Command.*

Advance H.Q.M.C.  
26th January, 1942.

## APPENDIX " H "

PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT BY G.O.C. MALAYA  
FEBRUARY, 1942

The battle of Malaya has come to an end and the battle of Singapore has started. For nearly two months our troops have fought an enemy on the mainland who has had the advantage of great air superiority and considerable freedom of movement by sea.

Our task has been both to impose losses on the enemy and to gain time to enable the forces of the Allies to be concentrated for this struggle in the Far East. Today we stand beleaguered in our island fortress.

Our task is to hold this fortress until help can come—as assuredly it will come. This we are determined to do.

In carrying out this task we want the help of every man and woman in the fortress. There is work for all to do. Any enemy who sets foot in our fortress must be dealt with immediately. The enemy within our gates must be

ruthlessly weeded out. There must be no more loose talk and rumour-mongering. Our duty is clear. With firm resolve and fixed determination we shall win through.

## APPENDIX " J "

LETTER RE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCORCHED  
EARTH POLICY ON SINGAPORE ISLAND

It is of the utmost importance that no material of military value should be allowed in any circumstances to fall into the hands of the enemy. In the past, mistakes have been made owing to the responsibility for carrying out the destruction when the time comes not being clearly defined.

2. The policy approved by the Chiefs of Staff as regards Singapore is that as much surplus material as possible should be disposed of at once, either by removal or destruction, provided this can be done without destroying public " morale." As regards the rest, every possible preparation must be made at once and detailed schemes drawn up. Destruction by explosion or fire is normally calculated to destroy morale.

3. Responsibility for preparation and execution of schemes will rest on the military authority who is responsible for the dump, depot, or establishment concerned, i.e., Comd. H.Q. (Head of service concerned) will be responsible for Command installations; formation H.Q. for dumps or depots under their control.

4. Food stocks, medical stores, hospital equipment and water supply installations will NOT be destroyed.

5. As regards the orders to put these schemes into effect, if time permits the order will be given by me. It will be readily realised, however, that in the turmoil and confusion of an attack on Singapore it may not be possible to issue any order. Responsible authorities must therefore ensure that there are always on the spot day and night sufficient personnel with a reliable commander who will in the last resort and failing my orders act on his own initiative to ensure that the policy of His Majesty's Government is carried out.

A. E. PERCIVAL,  
*Lieutenant-General,*  
*General Officer Commanding, Malaya.*

Adv. H.Q.M.C.  
1st February, 1942.

## APPENDIX " K "

MALAYA COMMAND OPERATION INSTRUCTION  
No. 40

*Ref. Map Johore and Singapore 1/25,000*

1. Enemy attacked Western Area in strength 9th February and succeeded in penetrating to the East of Tengah aerodrome. A party of the enemy is reported to have blocked the road Hong Kah Village 6917—road junction 6313 in rear of 44 Ind. Inf. Bde.

2. A.I.F. Malaya have been ordered to withdraw to and hold the line S. Kranji—Bulim Village 6919—S. Jurong. 6/15 Bde. has been placed under comd. of A.I.F. Malaya.

3. Should it be impossible to hold the enemy on the line mentioned in para. 2 above, G.O.C.