

Arakan	55th Division less one regiment in the South West Pacific.
	213th Regiment of 33rd Division.
	2nd Battalion 214th Regiment (less one company) of 33rd Division.
Chin Hills and Atwin Yomas ...	33rd Division less detachments in Arakan.
Mawlaik exclusive to Homalin inclusive.	New Division less one regiment.
Hukawng	} 18th Division
Myitkyina	
Laukhaung	
Htawgaw	
Salween	56th Division.

29. Up to the 15th November the general picture on the enemy side appeared to be as follows:—

Arakan.—The Japanese were generally on the defensive, but had reacted somewhat to our advance down the main Mayu range and were attempting with no success to oust us from our forward positions there.

Chin Hills.—The Japanese had advanced. As already described, they occupied Falam on the 7th November, Haka on the 11th November, and Fort White on the 15th November, but their offensives in Manipur and Arakan were not to develop till later.

Chindwin.—The Japanese were moving forward to their pre-monsoon locations, and there were indications that the new Division was taking over more front than had originally been held by the 18th Division. There were then no indications that the Japanese intended to cross the Chindwin in force.

Hukawng Valley.—After a slow start (probably owing to being upset by the Chinese advance) Japanese reinforcements began to arrive in the Hukawng Valley about the 7th November.

Sumprabum Area.—Sumprabum was reinforced by the enemy to a strength of two companies about the 10th November, and at the same time the Japanese strength at Ninchangyang in the South Triangle was increased to five hundred.

Salween.—The likelihood of any large scale Japanese operation across the Salween seemed to have receded by the 1st November. It appeared, however, that contrary to their former practice, the Japanese now intended to hold the area which they had occupied North-East of Tengchung.

30. *The Civil Affairs Organisation in re-occupied Territories of Burma.*

This service has functioned satisfactorily throughout the period, in those parts of Burma under our control.

The only area where any notable advance and re-occupation by our forces of Burmese territory took place, was in that of the Chinese-American Task Force (C.A.T.F.) described above—i.e., towards the Hukawng Valley. As this became in fact an American zone, the question arose as to how the administration of civil affairs in these re-occupied territories should be organised. A small civil affairs organisation had been functioning in the American zone for some time, but it became necessary to expand this and put it on a proper basis. A conference

therefore was held (before the advance began) between the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Eastern Army, the (American) Commanding General of the C.A.T.F. and the (British) Chief Civil Affairs Officer, as a result of which a satisfactory solution was reached.

It was decided that a senior Civil Affairs Officer should be attached to the Headquarters of the C.A.T.F. as a political adviser, co-ordinator, and liaison officer with junior Civil Affairs officers and the local population. The Civil Affairs Section, which also had been started with the Rear Echelon at Delhi of the headquarters of the American Forces, was also to maintain close touch with my General Headquarters. These arrangements, and the fact that there is little difference between American and British ideas on the functions of Civil Affairs services, rendered the position of our Civil Affairs officers working under the C.A.T.F. perfectly satisfactory, and the work proceeded smoothly as the advance progressed.

31. *Internal Conditions in India.*

Peaceful conditions have continued throughout India, and there was no renewal during the period of any outbreaks like those of August, 1942. The possibility of disturbances occurring on the anniversary of these outbreaks was however guarded against in those areas where they were thought likely. On the approach of the 9th August, the anniversary of Mr. Gandhi's arrest last year, additional troops were placed at the disposal of the commanders concerned.

In addition, protective measures were taken on all the more important railways in the Central Command from the 7th to the 17th August.

32. *The Economic Emergency and Famine in Bengal.*

A far more serious internal problem, and one which may become dangerously acute if India's resources are still further taxed, was the economic one.

The causes of this, and the manner in which the problem is linked with military expansion and the support of the forces based on India, has been indicated elsewhere in the paragraphs dealing with long term administrative planning. Other factors in the civil sphere, such as the results of harvests, the loss of the rice imports from Burma, the hoarding of food grains and other commodities, difficulties of civil transportation, etc., have undoubtedly affected the situation in one way or another.

The outcome has been famine in certain parts of the country, notably those where the staple food is rice. In particular, Bengal