

Fourteenth Army, would come under command of 11 Army Group from midnight 15th-16th November. 15 Indian Corps' Order of Battle would be :—

25 Indian Division.

26 Indian Division.

81 (West African) Division. (Provision of a third brigade under consideration.)

82 (West African) Division. (On arrival in Arakan.)

50 Indian Tank Brigade.

3 Commando Brigade.

Corps Troops.

The reason for this change was to free the Commander, Fourteenth Army, from responsibility for Arakan, in view of the important operations he was about to undertake in Burma.

108. On the 9th November, I issued orders for the formation of a command and staff for the lines of communication, to centralise the lines of communication under a separate Commander and thus relieve the Commander, Fourteenth Army, and Commander, 15 Indian Corps, of responsibilities for their rear areas. The new Line of Communication Command was to comprise the existing 202 and 404 Lines of Communication Areas and the Fort Hertz Area. The rear boundaries of Fourteenth Army and 15 Indian Corps were to be adjusted as the progress of operations dictated, in order to relieve the forward Commander of administrative responsibilities.

109. My third Operation Instruction dated the 9th November, was addressed to the Commander of 15 Indian Corps.

The general objects I gave to him were :—

(a) To clear Arakan to the line (inclusive) Akyab—Minbya as early as possible, in order to release troops for other purposes.

(b) To secure the area Chittagong—Cox's Bazaar.

The specific tasks were :—

(a) A land advance in Arakan down the Mayu Peninsula, the Kalapanzin Valley and the Kaladan Valley, to destroy or expel the Japanese within the area north of the general line Foul Point—Kudaung Island—Minbya. This advance was to start as soon as possible.

(b) An amphibious assault on Akyab Island about the 15th January, supported by the maximum sea and air bombardment.

(c) Consolidation to secure firmly the area north of the general line Akyab—Minbya.

110. My object in issuing the above Instruction was twofold :—

(a) To tie down and destroy in Arakan Japanese forces which might otherwise be used against Fourteenth Army.

(b) By destroying the Japanese forces in Arakan it would be possible to release forces for other operations which the Supreme Allied Commander was anxious to undertake.

*Operations from the 1st to the 12th November.*

111. *Arakan—15 Indian Corps.* 25 and 26 Indian Divisions continued their active patrolling and other minor operations with steady success. The leading brigade of 82 (West African) Division arrived to relieve troops in the Kalapanzin area.

81 (West African) Division continued its advance down the Kaladan in spite of considerable enemy resistance and reached the outskirts of Paletwa.

112. *Chindwin Front—33 Corps: (a) 5 Indian Division (Tiddim—Kalemyo Road).* It will be recalled that, at the end of October, 5 Indian Division having cut in behind the Japanese and launched a converging attack, was assaulting their positions at Vital Corner, while one brigade was carrying out a wide turning movement against Fort White. The beginning of November saw the capture of Vital Corner and the final breakdown of all enemy resistance northwards from Milestone 14 to Sialam Vum inclusive, the enemy suffering heavy casualties. We resumed our advance down the road and finally stormed Kennedy Peak, the 9,000 foot mountain just south of Milestone 15, on the 4th November after two attacks had failed. A sharp action was then fought for the positions dominating the road between Milestones 22 and 23. Point 8225 was successfully assaulted on the 7th November and Fort White occupied without further opposition. In spite of the mountainous country, tanks were able to play an important part in the fighting.

113. The brigade moving to outflank Fort White had, in the meantime, cleared the enemy from a 7,000 foot feature three miles down the Fort White—Falam track (Point 7480). Then, after an initial failure, they gained the main road and established a road-block near Milestone 25, where later they gained touch with the brigade advancing along the road itself. Stiff resistance was met at Vownalu Mual (Milestone 29), and again at Milestone 31 where we were held up for two days. However, on the 11th November the advance was resumed, Numbers 2 and 3 Stockades falling without opposition. Forward elements pressed on to Milestone 40, but the main body was delayed by stiff resistance east of Number 2 Stockade.

The third brigade of the Division was engaged during this period in blocking tracks, and a heavy toll was taken of the Japanese trying to escape by these routes.

114. *33 Corps: (b) 11 (East African) Division (Kabaw Valley and Chindwin).* Early in the month, the leading brigade, with tank support, cleared the enemy from all his positions south of Yazagyo and then inflicted further heavy casualties as he was successively driven out of positions further to south. The enemy next stood three miles north of Indainggyi (six miles north-east of Kalemyo) where his positions were only captured after all the defenders had been killed.

The brigade in support was following up closely, having sent detachments (a) to clear the track leading from the Kabaw Valley to Mawlaik and (b) to block the tracks from the west and thus destroy enemy parties escaping from 5 Indian Division in the Dolluang area.

Meanwhile the brigade pushing down the Chindwin had overcome strong resistance in the vicinity of Mawku and, on the 11th November, occupied Mawlaik. It then advanced astride the river.

11 (East African) Division reached Kalemyo on the 15th November, and thus ended this phase of the operations.