

## PHASE II.

17.—(a) In Phase II Eighth Army, less two divisions, will take up positions in the area north and north-east of the Wadi Natrun and form front facing north-west in a position to strike at the flank and rear of an enemy's advance on Cairo or Alexandria.

(b) Two divisions will withdraw on Alexandria and come under command Deltaforce.

18. *Thinning out Delta*.—Installations and troops not required for the immediate support of the fighting formations will begin thinning out. Detailed instructions will be issued separately.

19. *G. H. Q.*.—During Phase II G. H. Q., less Tactical G. H. Q., will move to Palestine. Instructions for the move will be issued separately.

20. *Command*.—(a) If C.-in-C. is exercising command from Tactical H.Q. Eighth Army, Deltaforce will come under command Eighth Army.

(b) If C.-in-C. is exercising command from Tactical G. H. Q., B. T. E. and Deltaforce will remain under G. H. Q.

21. *Delta Garrison*.—All available forces in the Delta will be mobilised. The defences of the Delta will be manned, full use being made of all combatant personnel in the Delta by B. T. E. and Deltaforce within their own areas. These personnel will include all fighting troops arriving in the Delta from Eighth Army, unless they have been specially routed to other commands or formations. Where units are thus appropriated, G. H. Q., M. E. F. will be informed without delay.

22. *Nile L. of C. Area*.—Nile L. of C. Area will be formed under command B. T. E. with H.Q. located at Wasta.

23. *Boundaries*.—(a) Boundary between Eighth Army and Nile L. of C. Area (inclusive Nile L. of C. Area) Ras Zafarana—Beni Suef—excluding Fayoum.

(b) The southern boundary of Eighth Army [para. 10 (d)] will be cancelled and Eighth Army will take over the responsibility for all the desert north of the northern boundary of Nile L. of C. Area. [Vide para. 23 (a).] The existing rear boundary of Eighth Army [para. 10 (a)] will be extended as follows:—from Kafr Dawud—exclusive Raiyah el Beharira (6084)—thence Mudit Drain to 616828—thence southwards along west edge of cultivation to inclusive Abusir Pyramids to inclusive Hawamdiya (641798)—then exclusive R. Nile.

24. *Traffic Control*.—Steps will be taken now to ensure that adequate arrangements are made for the control of traffic.

A survey of the likely bottlenecks and focal points will be carried out and plans made for the laying on of control posts and the dissemination of information to these posts.

## PHASE III.

25. If Phase III occurs Eighth Army [less the two divisions mentioned in para. 17 (b) above], will withdraw to the area Giza—Wasta—Gebel Qatrani and form front facing north and north-west with its right on high ground west of Mena and left towards the Fayoum.

26. *F. D. L.'s Eighth Army*.—F. D. L.'s will be on general line Abu Rauwash (6281)—Gebel el Khashab (6180) thence south-west

towards Gebel Qatrani (5777) and will include the protected observation posts being prepared by B. T. E. (*vide* para. 13 above).

27. *Cairo Bridgehead*.—Defences will be held to give depth to the position, but will remain under command B. T. E.

28. *Command*.—Eighth Army, B. T. E. and Deltaforce will be under the direct command of Tactical G. H. Q. from where the C.-in-C. will be controlling the operations. Tactical G. H. Q. will remain at Cairo.

## ADMINISTRATION.

29. *Policy for withdrawal of installations*.—

(a) In Phase I no units or personnel will be moved so long as their services are needed by the fighting troops.

(b) In Phase II installations in the Alexandria Area will be closed down.

(c) In Phase III installations in the Cairo Area will be closed down.

Detailed instructions are being issued separately.

30. *Maintenance*.—On withdrawal from El Alamein position, maintenance arrangements will be as follows:—

(a) By rail from Canal Area depots *via* Tanta, with railhead in first instance at Damanhur.

An Advance Base will be opened at Tanta under G. H. Q. arrangements on advent of Phase II.

(b) Eighth Army. From railheads or base depots in Cairo, supplemented as and when necessary by Nile Valley L. of C.

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*Appreciation of the Situation in the Western Desert.*

El Alamein, 1445 hours,  
27th July, 1942.

*Object.*

1. The defence of Egypt by the defeat of the enemy forces in the Western Desert.

*Factors.*

2. *Comparison of Strength*.—Table A\* shows a rough comparison on a brigade group basis, based on what we now know of the enemy's present strength and his reinforcement schedule. From this it seems that the enemy will hardly be able to secure a decisive superiority over us in the first half of August, provided we fight united, since the Germans would begin any offensive with an inferiority of about three infantry brigade groups and possibly 40 per cent. superiority in armour. The enemy may also be inferior in artillery. It would seem that, though the Axis forces are strong enough for defensive action, they are hardly strong enough to attempt the conquest of the Delta except as a gamble and under very strong air cover. There remains for the Axis to use one German Air Landing Division, but this is taking over I.S. duties in Greece and Crete and seems unlikely to be an asset. It might, however, be used to redress the balance at a decisive moment. Throughout August the anticipated

\* Not reproduced.