

fell just outside the target area, but a number scored direct hits. The station was rendered completely unserviceable.

(c) *Dieppe/Bernaual le Grand*. The attack on this station on the night of 2nd/3rd June was completely successful. 104 aircraft dropped 607 tons of bombs. The majority of the eight or nine blast-wall protected buildings received direct hits, and the remainder suffered so many near misses that their subsequent operational value was negligible. In addition, the aerial masts were all demolished, and the two dispersed sites were also hit.

(d) *Cherbourg/Urville-Hague*. This station is now known to have been the headquarters of the German Signals Intelligence Service in North-Western France. The attack on this important W/T centre was made on 3/4th June by 99 aircraft dropping 570 tons of bombs. The results were remarkable, the centre of a very neat bomb pattern coinciding almost exactly with the centre of the target area. The photographic interpretation report may be quoted verbatim:

"The station is completely useless. The site itself is rendered unsuitable for rebuilding the installation, without much effort being expended in levelling and filling in the craters."

112. The success of this last attack on the Headquarters of the German Air Force Signals Intelligence must have been a major catastrophe for the enemy, and it may well be that it was an important contributory factor to the lack of enemy air reaction to the assault.

113. *Radio Counter-Measures*. On the night of 5/6th June in the opening phase of the assault, counter-measures against such installations as were still active were put into operation. These counter-measures covered five separate and distinct tasks:—

(a) a combined naval/air diversion against Cap d'Antifer:

(b) a combined naval/air diversion against Boulogne:

(c) a jamming barrage to cover the airborne forces:

(d) a V.H.F. jamming support for the first three counter-measures:

(e) feints for the airborne forces.

These various components of the counter-measure plan were inter-dependent and the results can, therefore, best be summarised by giving an indication of the enemy's reactions.

114. The most important fact concerning this reaction was that the enemy appeared to mistake the diversion towards Cap d'Antifer as a genuine threat; at all events, the enemy opened up, both with searchlights and guns on the imaginary convoy. Further, the V.H.F. jamming support which was flown by a formation of aircraft operating in the Somme area apparently led the enemy to believe that these aircraft were the spearhead of a major bomber force, as he reacted with twenty-four night fighters, which were active approximately three hours, hunting the "ghost" bomber stream.

115. The other counter-measures all fulfilled their purpose and it can be stated that the application of radio counter-measures immediately preceding the assault proved to be extraordinarily successful. Only three out of the total number of 105 aircraft employed on these operations were lost, and the crew of one of these aircraft was saved.

116. While it is not possible to state with certainty that the enemy was completely unaware of the cross-Channel movement of the assault forces, the success of the plan to disrupt his Radar cover and W/T facilities both by attacks and by the application of counter-measures, can be judged on the results obtained. In the vital period between 0100 and 0400 hours on 6th June, when the assault Armada was nearing the beaches, only nine enemy Radar installations were in operation, and during the whole night, the number of stations active in the "Neptune" area was only 18 out of a normal 92. No station between Le Havre and Barfleur was heard operating. Apart from the abortive reaction mentioned in paragraph 114, no enemy air attacks were made till approximately 1500 hours on D-Day, and this despite the presence of more than 2,000 ships and landing craft in the assault area, and despite the fact that very large airborne forces had, of necessity, been routed down the west coast of the Cherbourg Peninsula right over the previously excellent Radar cover of the Cherbourg area and the Channel Islands.

117. These results may be summarised as follows: the enemy did not obtain the early warning of our approach that his Radar coverage should have made possible; there is every reason to suppose that Radar controlled gunfire was interfered with; no fighter aircraft hindered our airborne operations; the enemy was confused and his troop movements were delayed.

118. Prior to the launching of Operation "Neptune" each service had almost complete freedom to use radio counter-measures, as desired. To eliminate any clash of interests when very large forces would be employed in confined areas, an inter-Service staff was set up at my Headquarters. The primary concern being to get the Armada safely across the Channel, it was agreed that for the 30-hour period immediately prior to the moment of assault, control should be vested in the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief; subsequently, control of radio counter-measures became my responsibility. The advisory staff with representatives of the three Services, assisted both the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief and myself.

Attacks on Military Facilities

119. As well as preparing the way for the assault forces by attacking the enemy's coastal defences and Radar system, it was planned to prepare the way further for the landing by reducing the enemy military potential, both in the assault and rear areas. Certain ammunition and fuel dumps, military camps and headquarters were considered suitable targets for attack, in order to fulfil this purpose.