quently, even when cornered, he not only sells his life dearly, but will frequently commit suicide rather than surrender. The mopping-up of captured enemy positions is, therefore, a slow process, as every Japanese officer and man has usually to be ferreted out and killed. Since the crushing defeat inflicted on the enemy in the Imphal battle, and the failure of his lines of communication, there have been a few surrenders of unwounded men, but they are still rare.

13. To sum up, I would say that, although his discipline and training are good, the Japanese soldier has shown himself lacking in initiative and self-reliance when his leaders have been killed and he is faced with the unexpected. The very fact that surrender has now made its appearance, though on a very small scale, in an army where such a thing was undreamt of, is not without significance.

*The Outlook in November*, 1943.

14. Strategically, Burma is important for three reasons:—

(*a*) The only way in which we can, either now or in the immediate future, send help to China is through or over Burma.

(*b*) Burma is the principal area in which we can contain and destroy considerable Japanese forces.

(*c*) In our hands Burma provides a stepping stone for operations further east or south. In Japanese hands it is a base for operations against the eastern frontier of India.

15. As a result of decisions reached at the Quebec Conference, the Chiefs of Staff directed the Supreme Allied Commander to undertake operations in Burma with two objects:—

(*a*) The security and improvement of the air ferry route to China and the establishment of land communications with China.

(*b*) The close and continuous engagement of Japanese land and air forces, so as to cause attrition and diversion from the Pacific Theatre.

To execute these orders meant, of course, offensive operations whenever and wherever possible; but it was obvious that the main operations to secure Northern Burma, without which complete security of the China air route could not be ensured, would have to be launched from Imphal, Yunnan and Ledo.

16. As our resources were limited, it was essential to decide on the southern limits of such an offensive. Examination showed that only the capture of the Shwebo—Mandalay area would fulfil the instructions of the Chiefs of Staff but this was beyond our resources, either in troops or transport aircraft. Plans of a less ambitious nature which would obey the spirit of the instructions to the Supreme Allied Commander had, therefore, to be considered.

17. The plan generally approved at Quebec was:—

(*a*) The capture by Long-Range Penetration Forces of the Katha—Indaw area which would be then held by a division, flown in or moved overland across the Chindwin with light equipment.

(*b*) The capture of Mogaung—Myitkyina by Chinese-American forces from Ledo with possible exploitation southwards.

(*c*) An advance on Bhamo—Lashio by Chinese forces from Yunnan.

The plan which I had thought gave the best chance of success was made in September 1943, when the Commander-in-Chief, India, was still in command of the operations and I was G.O.C.-in-C., Eastern Army. This plan aimed at forcing a crossing of the Chindwin on the Imphal Front, and the introduction with the aid of airborne troops of a force of all arms, including tanks and medium artillery, into the Central Burma plain in the Ye-U area. A detailed examination of the many problems which such a plan created, among them the capacity of the Assam lines of communication, and the delays in the concentration programme caused by the breaching of the main railway line to Calcutta from the west by the Damodar River, showed that the launching of such an offensive before early March was not possible.

This plan was submitted to the British Chiefs of Staff, who preferred an airborne operation against Katha—Indaw because there would be closer support and co-operation with Chinese forces advancing south from Ledo and across the Salween. This plan, approved at the Cairo conference in November 1943, had eventually to be abandoned as the necessary transport aircraft were not forthcoming. It became necessary, therefore, to make a less ambitious plan.

18. It was not easy, within the means at our disposal, even partially to achieve the objects given by the Chiefs of Staff. After several alternatives had been examined and rejected, I submitted to the Supreme Allied Commander, in December, the following plan.

(*a*) An advance down the Kabaw Valley towards Kalewa—Kalemyo; the construction of an all-weather road, via Tamu, as far as possible towards Yuwa and Kalewa on the Chindwin.

(*b*) The use (initially) of three Long-Range Penetration Brigades in the Katha—Indaw area.

The objects I had in mind were:—

(i) To achieve a greater, though not complete measure of security for the China air route, by forcing the enemy further south.

(ii) To obtain greater freedom of action for offensive operations in 1944-45, when more resources might be expected.

(iii) To destroy the maximum possible number of Japanese land and air forces.

(iv) To gain some control of Upper Burma by the employment, in conjunction with our main forces and those of the Chinese Army in India (C.A.I.), of Long-Range Penetration Troops to confuse the enemy and inflict casualties.

19. This plan was approved by the Supreme Allied Commander and was referred by him to the Chiefs of Staff early in December. It depended for success not only on overcoming strong enemy defences in the Tiddim area, but also on progress in road construction. At the end of January, the Chiefs of Staff were told that we did not anticipate reaching the Kalewa—Kalemyo area before the monsoon. Actually the all-weather road of a two-way standard