

## APPENDIX A

27 Feb. 45.

ALLIED LAND FORCES SOUTH EAST  
ASIA OPERATION INSTRUCTION No. 12.

To:—Lieut.-General SIR WILLIAM SLIM, K.C.B.,  
C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C.

General Officer Commanding-in-Chief,  
Fourteenth Army.

Lieut.-General DAN I. SULTAN,  
Commanding General,  
Northern Combat Area Command.

Lieut.-General Sir PHILIP CHRISTISON,  
K.B.E., C.B., M.C.  
General Officer Commanding,  
15 Indian Corps.

Ref. Maps: Survey of India  $\frac{1}{4}$ " to 1 mile.

## OBJECT

1. To capture Rangoon before the monsoon.

## APPRECIATION

2. The battle for Mandalay is approaching its climax and large forces of the enemy are now concentrated in that area.

Fourteenth Army are attacking them from the north and are also encircling them from the west.

The Japanese intention is clearly to fight it out. This is borne out by the movements westwards of certain forces now east of the Irrawaddy.

The battle for Mandalay will therefore be slow; it will probably be grim; its outcome will nevertheless be certain.

3. To achieve our object it is first necessary to destroy the Japanese forces now in the Mandalay area.

This requires a concentrated effort by Fourteenth Army and N.C.A.C., both directed towards this common aim.

Only by this means shall we be able to capture Rangoon before the monsoon.

4. The withdrawal of formations of 15 Indian Corps must continue as planned.

## TASKS

5. *Fourteenth Army*

(a) Will destroy the Japanese forces now facing them in the Mandalay area.

(b) Will seize Rangoon before the monsoon.

6. *N.C.A.C.*

(a) Will secure with all speed the general area Kyaukme SS 90—Lashio.

(b) Will then turn S.W. to assist in the destruction of the enemy forces in the Mandalay area.

(c) After the battle of Mandalay, will exploit towards Loilem.

7. *15 Indian Corps*

(a) In general:—

(i) Will contain the maximum number of enemy forces with the resources at their disposal.

(ii) Operations will be developed so as not to call on air supply for maintenance.

(b) In particular:—

(i) Will destroy enemy forces in the An area.

(ii) Will operate towards Prome, as far as resources permit, from a bridgehead in the Taungup area.

8. This Operation Instruction supersedes all previous Operation Instructions.

## ACKNOWLEDGE.

Signed: OLIVER LEESE.

Lieutenant-General,

Commander-in-Chief,

Allied Land Forces, S.E.A.

## APPENDIX B.

JAPANESE FORMATIONS IN BURMA  
AT THE BEGINNING OF MAY, 1945,  
WITH ESTIMATED STRENGTHS.

## (A)—WEST OF RAILWAY CORRIDOR.

*28th Army.*

54 Division ... ..	5,500
55 Division (less 144 Regt. and portion Divisional troops) ...	4,800
72 Independent Mixed Brigade ...	1,600
153 Regiment, 49 Division ... ..	500
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	12,400
Non-Divisional troops ... ..	4,800
Air (ground) troops ... ..	500
Naval (shore-based) troops ... ..	500
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	18,200

(B)—EAST OF RAILWAY CORRIDOR, INCLUDING  
TENASSERIM COAST.*15th and 33rd Armies.*

4 and 16 Regts., 2 Division ...	1,000
15 Division ... ..	3,000
18 Division ... ..	2,900
31 Division ... ..	4,000
33 Division ... ..	2,500
49 Division (less 153 Regt.) ...	1,500
53 Division ... ..	2,500
144 Regt., 55 Division (plus proportion Divisional troops) ...	2,500
56 Division ... ..	3,500
24 Independent Mixed Brigade ...	3,000
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	26,400
Non-Divisional troops ... ..	29,000
Air (ground) troops ... ..	1,500
Naval (shore-based) troops ... ..	2,000
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	58,900