

afforded by the Royal Navy at all times to the troops under my command. Without that help it would have been impossible to make any progress. The Royal Navy carried and escorted the Allied troops and, pending the arrival of anti-aircraft guns, took over the duties of anti-aircraft protection under the most difficult circumstances. The naval staff, particularly Captain Maund, R.N., and Commander Hubback, R.N., worked in intimate and unflagging co-operation with my own staff: I owe these officers a deep debt of gratitude for their ever close and cordial assistance.

15. Relations with the French were most happy throughout. The loyalty and efficiency displayed by General Bethouart were of the highest order. It was a very great pleasure to be so closely associated with so fine an officer.

16. Major-General Fleischer and the troops of the 6th Norwegian Division under his command co-operated at all times willingly and effectively with the Allied forces. Without that co-operation the British and French troops engaged on the mainland would have been faced with a number of additional difficulties.

17. The period of planning and of consultations with the Royal Navy and with the Allied Forces threw a great strain and weight of responsibility upon my General Staff. The establishment of a base and the supply and movement of troops with limited and difficult means of transportation made equally heavy demands upon my Administrative Staff and Services. All these demands were met in a most praiseworthy manner. All concerned displayed powers of improvisation of the highest order.

18. I would draw special attention to the fine work of my General Staff Officer (First Grade), Colonel A. B. Dowler and of my A.A. and Q.M.G., Colonel J. F. W. Allen, M.C. These officers were faced with unusual problems and responsibilities. They dealt with them all in a truly admirable manner.

19. That I once commanded an Allied Force containing such fine troops, British, French and Polish alike, will for ever remain a source of great pride to me.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

P. J. Mackesy,

Major-General.

APPENDIX " B ".

REPORT ON OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN NORWAY.

13th May to 8th June, 1940.

The following report was submitted to the Secretary of State for War on 19th June, 1940, by Lieutenant-General C. J. E. Auchinleck, C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., O.B.E.

Receipt of Instructions.

1. On the evening of 28th April I was summoned by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (General Sir E. Ironside) to the War Office and informed by him that I, with part of the 4th Corps Staff, would be required to go to Narvik in the immediate future. I returned to

my headquarters at Alresford and arranged for an advanced headquarters to be established in the War Office.

2. For the next week, my staff were fully employed collecting and collating information concerning Northern Norway and the existing situation in that theatre.

In this task they received every possible assistance from the staff of the different departments and branches of the War Office.

3. On the 6th May, I received my instructions from the Secretary of State for War. These instructions were to the effect:—

(a) That the object of His Majesty's Government was to secure and maintain a base in Northern Norway from which it would be possible:—

- i. To deny iron ore supplies to Germany via Narvik.
- ii. To interfere with ore supplies to Germany from Lulea in Sweden.
- iii. To preserve a part of Norway as a seat of Government for the Norwegian King and Government.

(b) That the forces assembled for this purpose were under the command of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Cork and Orrery; the Military Commander Major-General Mackesy being subordinate to him, and that this system of unified command was to remain in being until such time as His Majesty's Government decided to terminate it and revert to the usual system of having independent commanders of the sea and land forces.

(c) That I was appointed G.O.C.-in-C. designate of the Anglo-French land forces and of the British Air Component in the theatre of Operations.

(d) That I was to proceed to the area with an officer detailed by the Chief of the Air Staff and in conjunction with the Earl of Cork and Orrery, report for the information of the Chiefs of Staff, the forces required to attain the objects outlined in sub-paragraph (a), and the area which should be occupied.

(e) That I was to consider the possibility of shipping any iron ore now at Narvik to the United Kingdom, and of resuming a supply of iron ore from Swedish mines at Gallivare, and to report on the feasibility and desirability of repairing the railway from Narvik to the Swedish frontier.

4. I received also an instruction from General Sir John Dill, Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff, to the effect that it was the intention of the C.I.G.S. that I should take over command of the Anglo-French forces when His Majesty's Government decided to end the system of unified command, but that, if on arrival in the Narvik area, local conditions appeared to me to necessitate the step, I was to assume command of the Anglo-French troops, placing myself under Admiral of the Fleet Lord Cork and Orrery.

5. Before leaving London I appreciated the situation in Northern Norway in the light of such information as was available on the spot, and informed the C.I.G.S. that in my view, the implications of the objects given to me were:—

(a) The establishment of aerodromes necessary for the effective operation of an air component. These would include one at