150. This advance by the enemy along the line of Gaps, the possession of these Gaps by him, thus giving him an open line of advance to the Central District, the fall of Bennets Hill, the isolation of the forces in Stanley, the deployment by the enemy of such superior forces and armament, the exhaustion after sixteen days of continuous battle with no reliefs for any individuals, our vulnerability to unlimited air attack, the impossibility of obtaining more ammunition for the few mobile guns I had remaining, the serious water famine immediately impending—these were the factors which led to the inevitable conclusion, namely, that further fighting meant the useless slaughter of the remainder of the garrison, risked severe retaliation on the large civilian population and could not affect the final outcome. The enemy drive along the North shore was decisive.

I asked Lt.-Colonel Stewart, the Officer Commanding i Middlesex Regt, how much longer in his considered opinion the men could hold the line now occupied. He replied "one hour."

The Commodore agreed with my conclusion.

At 1515 hours I advised H.E. The Governor and C.-in-C. that no further useful military resistance was possible and I then ordered all Commanding Officers to break off the fighting and to capitulate to the nearest Japanese Commander, as and when the enemy advanced and opportunity offered.

APPENDIX "B".

A SUMMARY OF APPROXIMATE CASUALTIES.

Officers.

Unit or Formation		Killed or Died of Wounds	Missing.	Wounded.	Total Strength.	
H.QRA 8 Coast Regt RA 12 Coast Regt RA			2 — — I	2 I —	3 3 1	33 6 19 16
5 A A. Regt R A . 1 Hong Kong Regt H K S R A 1965 Def Bty R A	· Y .	••	3	8 - 7	3 1	23 24 3
22 Field Coy R E	•		12	1 I	I	7 7 18
Middlesex Regt Canadian Staff Winnipeg Grenadiers		•	10 2 6 6	2 4 8 8	4 3 12 4	35 36 14 42 41
Royal Corps of Signals RAOC			6 3 1 3 2	4 — 2 —	7 5 1 3	17 15 7 15 24
RAMC Royal Army Dental Corps R.A P.C			- 2 - -			2 28 4 5 3
TE TE SE IN CI			13	1 6	13	5 89
			74	61	77	538