

- 0345 Gunfire between 075° and 085°.
 0351 S.N.O.L.(A) to RYSA—Contact P.221 and escort her to sanctuary.
 0415 Occasional flashes bearing 090°.
 0421 From C.E.N.T.F. to BROKE—Report progress.
 0430 BULOLO position—260° 13 miles Caxine.
 0435 From B WHITE flight to S.N.O.L.(B)—Have been landed on A WHITE Beach request instructions.
 0435 From S.N.O.L.(C)—Matifou defences apparently not taken.
 0435 From C.T. 168 to A.M.L.O. B WHITE—260 men 2nd Battalion apparently landed A WHITE Beach.
 0456 From Control B Sector—Serials 1 to 68 despatched. Serials 44 to 52 appear to have landed A WHITE. Difficulty with L.C.M.*, only 5 L.C.M. disembarked from W.2. Shackles of lifting gear bent.
 0500 BULOLO manœuvring to close B Beaches.
 0515 From BROKE to C.E.N.T.F.—MALCOLM damaged, two boilers out of action. Searchlights on Brise Lames Est very troublesome. Have made three attempts to find entrance. Am making another attempt with BROKE. Entrance would be easier if searchlights could be put out of action.

57. At 0600, BROKE reported that she had berthed alongside in Algiers harbour and was landing troops, and a few minutes later that she had little difficulty in entering.

58. At 0632, BROKE reported that a submarine was leaving harbour. This was attacked and forced to dive by aircraft from VICTORIOUS, and STORK and two A/S vessels were detached to search for it.

59. At this time news from shore was very scarce. The landing of the 11th Brigade at A Sector appeared to be going well; and General Mast, Commanding Algiers Division, was reported at Sidi Ferruch to be offering full co-operation and urging that our forces should push on to Algiers without delay. On the other hand it was known that Cap Matifou had not yet surrendered; and at 0625 WILTON, who was in support of landing craft at SCRAMBLE landings, reported that she was under fire from Fort Duperre. No hits were made and WILTON withdrew to the westward, joining patrol at B Beaches until the military situation clarified.

60. At 0827, the welcome news that Maison Blanche aerodrome had been captured was received. At 1000 the aerodrome was reported serviceable, and a few minutes later a squadron of Hurricanes flown from Gibraltar landed on. Although the R.A.F. did not formally take over the defence of Algiers until D+2, R.A.F. fighters were operational on D day and D+1. This helped materially to supplement the extremely efficient air support given by the hard-pressed fighters and squadrons of R.A.A.†

61. At 0856, information was received that tanks were concentrating and moving along the road from Algiers in the direction of Maison Blanche. Three of these tanks subsequently

returned to the harbour in an effort to dislodge BROKE; she had, however, made good her withdrawal before they came into action.

62. The unloading of M.T. was proceeding very slowly. B GREEN Beach had to be abandoned owing to the swell and general unsuitability. B WHITE had to be restricted to a width of 100 yards. C Beach was a lee shore, and felt the full effects of the slight swell, and many landing craft broached to.

63. At 0930, BROKE requested bombing of the battery on Jetée du Nord to cover her intended withdrawal at 1030, as her position was becoming untenable. Bomber support was also called for urgently on Fort Duperre at 1030. R.A.A. was asked to fulfil these commitments.

64. At 0934, a Martlet landed on Blida aerodrome and reported a friendly reception.

65. At about 1000, BROKE left harbour. The battery on Jetée du Nord was bombed most successfully at 1030. Twelve hits were obtained on this small target and severe damage was done to the buildings and living quarters in the fort. BROKE was engaged by a number of batteries on her way out and was badly damaged. ZETLAND went to her aid, steering between her and Cap Matifou battery. This was successfully bombarded, hitting the control tower and putting the range-finder out of action. ZETLAND then stood by BROKE.

66. I consider that much credit is due to Captain H. St. J. Fancourt, R.N., Commanding Officer "Terminal" Force, for his courage and determination in pressing on with the attack after the initial repulse of his ships, and also to Lieutenant J. V. Wilkinson, Commanding Officer, H.M.S. ZETLAND, for the gallant and skilful manner in which he took his ship to the rescue of BROKE.

67. At 1130, Blida aerodrome was occupied by the military. One Ju.88 was sighted over B Sector at this time.

68. Shortly after 1300, Fort Duperre was bombed by naval Albacores. Subsequent reports say that the bombing broke the resistance of the defenders and the Commandos were able to take possession of the fort unopposed at 1515.

69. In response to urgent calls for support from F.O.O.7, Cap Matifou battery and Fort d'Estrées were bombarded by BERMUDA and bombed by naval aircraft almost simultaneously between 1400 and 1530. Both bombing and bombardment were most successful, and having driven the defenders underground, the Commandos occupied the forts without opposition.

70. At about 1600, the military situation did not appear to H.Q. Ship to be progressing favourably. 11th British Brigade in A Sector had reached all its objectives, but 168th U.S. R.C.T.* from B Sector was held up in high ground, to the west of Algiers, and Fort L'Empereur was reported as being strongly held. As a result, the 6 Royal West Kents were ordered to land to give additional weight to the attack. This order was subsequently cancelled. 39th U.S. R.C.T. from C Sector advancing on Algiers from the east were held up by shelling from Hussein Dey areas and

Admiralty footnotes:—

* L.C.M.—Landing Craft, Mechanised Vehicles.

† R.A.A.—Rear-Admiral Air.

Admiralty footnote:—

* R.C.T.—Regimental Combat Team.