

Kyaukpyu during April was a fine performance, the extent of which can be gauged by the following figures for the transit traffic for the month :—

Personnel	51,320
Vehicles	2,172
Stores	34,090 tons

350. Finally, to put the scale of the developments described above into their proper proportion, I will quote yet a few more figures. It will be remembered that in April the average daily tonnage requirements of Fourteenth Army was 2,090 tons of which an average of 1,845 was delivered by air transport. The requirements of 15 Indian Corps were only 84 tons per day, made up as follows :—

Supplies	16 tons
Petrol, oil and lubricants	16 tons
Ammunition	8 tons
Ordnance	4 tons
Engineers	16 tons
R.A.F.	8 tons
Stocking, etc.	16 tons
			84 tons

Until I was finally compelled to take away all air supply from 15 Indian Corps, 16 tons daily was delivered by air and the rest by sea to Akyab and Kyaukpyu.

From these figures it can clearly be seen that the tremendous development of the Southern L. of C. was almost entirely for Fourteenth Army. The reason for and value of 15 Indian Corps' operations, which made this development possible, and thus their contribution to the reconquest of Burma is clear to see.

SECTION XXII (paras. 351-365) THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AIR LINES OF COMMUNICATION

The air supply situation in November, 1944: The organization of F.A.M.Os. and R.A.M.Os.: Opening of Chittagong air base: Formation and organization of C.A.A.T.O.: The switch to Akyab and Ramree Advanced Bases: The air supply situation in April, 1945: Airfield construction: Casualty evacuation: Situation after the capture of Rangoon.

351. The total inadequacy of the overland Northern L. of C., in spite of the enormous effort which was put into its improvement, resulted in the development to an unprecedented extent of the only practicable alternative, supply by air, which became the main channel for the supply and maintenance of the fighting forces in the field. The results achieved in the final stages of the campaign, during the rapid advance to Rangoon exceeded in scale anything done in any other theatre of operations or indeed in the history of warfare. While recognising that this system of the supply of an army in the field, and the organization required for it, are still in their infancy, and that much has still to be learned, it is clearly of the greatest value to give the closest examination to this, its first really large-scale and continuous practical employment.

352. It will be remembered from Part I that the original plans for Capital—the invasion of Central Burma by Fourteenth Army—were based on using air supply on a very large scale. In November, 1944, when I took over command, the average daily supply lift by air was 247 tons. The way in which this was handled is best shown in tabular form, giving the locations of the air supply bases and the proportion of the lift handled at each base.

Location	Squadrons	Rear Airfield Maintenance Organizations (R.A.M.Os.)	Average tons a day	Remarks
Imphal	194 R.A.F. 2 U.S.A.A.F. (C.C.) 3 U.S.A.A.F. (C.C.)	No. 1	31	2 Combat Cargo Sqn. U.S.A.A.F. moved from Sylhet to Imphal on the 21st November, 1944.
Kangla	436 R.C.A.F.	No. 2	—	Arrived November, but did not operate until December.
Tulihal	4 U.S.A.A.F.	No. 6	19	
Agartala	31 R.A.F. 62 R.A.F. (less det.)	No. 3	129	
Comilla	Det. 62 R.A.F.	No. 4	24	
Hathazari	Det. 1 U.S.A.A.F. (C.C.)	No. 5	44	
Total	Seven (plus) Squadrons	Six R.A.M.Os.	247 tons	

From the table it will be seen that three main airfield areas were involved; the Imphal area, which includes Kangla and Tulihal, the Comilla area with Agartala, and the Chittagong area with Hathazari.

353. A word on the R.A.M.Os. is perhaps necessary. These were Rear Airfield Maintenance Organizations which operated on the despatching airfields. With each R.A.M.O. there was one or more Air Despatch Com-