

Lieut.-Colonel Maugham, representing Intelligence Branch, S.A.C.S.E.A.

Lieut.-Commander Galley, R.N., Flag Lieutenant to Admiral Moody.

2nd Officer Price, W.R.N.S., Secretary to the Mission.

325. The Mission arrived at Manila shortly after dawn on 17th August. The return journey, following the same route, was completed on 21st August, crossing occupied territory once again by night.

*Political Situation at Time of Surrender.*

326. At the time of the S.A.C.S.E.A. Mission's arrival at Manila, the visit of the Japanese Mission to obtain the surrender terms was still awaited. It was thought that some delay might have occurred arising out of the political confusion in Japan and the lack of communication facilities generally as the result of continuous and heavy bombing.

327. The general opinion in the South West Pacific Area appeared to be that the South East Asia Command Theatre was being far too precipitate in implementing the surrender terms which had not yet been agreed by the contracting parties. Furthermore, General MacArthur was adamant that any implementation of the surrender terms could only take place after the surrender terms had been formally agreed and signed by the Japanese Government either at Tokio or on board a ship in adjacent waters. This, it was calculated, would be at least a week after the presentation of the Allied terms to be collected by the Japanese Mission to Manila, to whom certain points would need clarification.

328. The Japanese Mission consisting of some eight Japanese officers arrived at Manila on the evening of August 19th, having flown in two Betty Bombers from Japan to Okinawa where they had transferred to a C.54. The Mission was led by Lt.-Gen. Kawaba Takashiro, Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Altogether, the representatives were a dejected looking gathering of very small men, clad in shabby and ill-fitting uniforms. They were treated with respect and allowed to wear their swords throughout their visit—an uncomfortable privilege, as each member was carrying a sword nearly as tall as himself. The members of the Mission were housed in the same building as the S.A.C.S.E.A. Mission—a partially repaired building in which they were granted the hospitality of the top floor, the least repaired of all. After a brief meal on arrival they were summoned to a conference at G.H.Q. where they were presented with the terms of surrender for explanation and transmission to their Government. On their part, they provided full details of their Order of Battle, strength of garrisons and the necessary information regarding Prisoner-of-War camps in various Theatres.

329. The Japanese Mission returned to Okinawa from Manila at midday on 20th August. No untoward events occurred during their visit to the Philippines, but such was the mixture of feeling within their own country at that time regarding the peace terms that they were shot at by their own fighters when leaving Japan for Okinawa. A similar reception was contemplated on their return to Japan, and, in consequence, they took the precaution of approaching Japanese territory in the dark.

330. There is little doubt in my mind that the Japanese Government, at the time of surrender, was up against some very strong opposition from certain fanatical factions. It was stated that in Singapore, before our occupation in September, a group of young Japanese officers had planned to fly to Tokio and there weed out what they considered to be the "corrupt elements" around the Throne, where defeatist policies, they held, had greatly influenced the Emperor.

331. The conference at Manila revealed an exceedingly interesting feature. Opinion in the South West Pacific Area apparently attributed a far higher value to the enemy's fighting qualities than was attributed to those Japanese whom we fought and defeated in Burma. It appeared that the morale and determination of the enemy forces in the metropolitan area was on a far higher level than that experienced in the outer regions of Japanese conquest, where forces had been virtually isolated for months and, in any case, were not directly involved in the defence of their homeland. For this reason, G.H.Q. Manila expected considerable opposition to their occupying forces in Japan proper, in the form of sabotage and other subversive activities by fanatical elements.

332. At this time, the American airborne division was standing by at Okinawa to fly into Japan. The ultimate figure for the build-up of U.S. Army Forces for occupation was put at some 18 Divisions together with the whole of the 5th Air Force, although it was not thought that this would include V.H.B. aircraft owing to the lack of suitable runways in Japan.

333. I think it is important to note the American attitude at that time towards the participation of Air Forces, other than American, in the initial occupation of Japan. General Kenney, Commanding General, Far Eastern Air Forces, was not disposed to discuss the occupation of Japan by Allied Air Forces, which he apparently regarded as unnecessary representation in a country where airfield facilities were limited. Furthermore, it seemed that any inclusion of British Air Forces in Japan would inevitably raise the question of Russian Air Forces in a similar role, to which the Americans were strongly averse in every way. On the other hand, the Americans favourably accepted the occupation of Hong Kong and elsewhere by our Air Forces, since they did not regard Hong Kong as their own problem. The fact that the British "Tiger Force" project for Okinawa was no longer contemplated, as the result of Japan's sudden surrender, also produced for the Americans a general feeling of relief, mainly on logistical grounds. The British airfield engineers, who were already in transit for "Tiger Force" constructional requirements, were delayed at the island of Quajalin in the Pacific, pending further instructions to proceed, and it was suggested to us that we might like to divert these forces for our own airfield requirements in Malaya and elsewhere.

334. Australia, however, let it be known that they had every intention of being represented in the forces of occupation of Japan. General MacArthur was informed, through General Blamey, that the Commonwealth proposed to provide a representative garrison for Japan, including three tactical squadrons of the Royal