

8. A further point which was very clearly shown, is the strength of the German defensive system in the coastal regions, which confronts assaulting troops with the problem not dissimilar to that of the Western Front in the last war. Arising out of this is the need for far more effective methods of supporting the troops, unless it is quite certain that defences which dominate the landing places can be overrun by a surprise night assault. The methods whereby effective support can be given are not considered to include night bombing.

9. From the purely naval point of view the operation has taught us less, if only because the passage and landings went very largely according to plan. Although this was so, it is considered that the liberties that were taken in dispersing the force so widely on passage with so small a covering force, could not prudently be repeated. For example, the groups which sailed from Newhaven were vulnerable to attack from the east, and the L.S.Is. (Infantry Assault Ships) were exposed to a considerable risk from the time that they stopped to lower their boats until they returned to the English side of the Channel. The conclusion is that a substantially larger covering force should be employed in the future, because the enemy is less likely to be surprised again.

10. The Naval Forces were fortunate in as much as they sustained no damage from mines and no serious damage from coastal batteries. Until more experience is gained, however, it would be most unsafe to draw too firm a deduction from this for future operations.

11. The operation was interesting also as being perhaps the first occasion on which light naval forces (i.e., coastal craft and landing craft) manned almost entirely by the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, have been employed on a large scale and under conditions of extreme difficulty. They acquitted themselves well, but the small leavening of experienced officers of the Royal Navy who were employed in positions of control was an important factor in the results achieved.

12. I consider that the chief lessons of the operation are:—

(i) It was shown still to be possible to achieve tactical surprise in a cross-channel operation of some magnitude.

(ii) The comparatively small naval forces which took part in the operation sufficed to prevent the enemy from offering any surface opposition whatever, apart from that resulting from the chance encounter of Number 5 Group with German armed trawlers.

(iii) If it should be necessary to attempt a frontal attack on strongly defended enemy positions again, it will be essential to provide far more effective means of supporting the troops. In this particular operation I am satisfied that a capital ship could have been operated in the Dieppe area during the first two or three hours of the operation without undue risk.

(iv) The enormous possibilities of this type of operation for bringing about a decisive air battle were demonstrated.

13. Finally I venture to submit that, should it be decided to undertake further operations of this nature in the near future, my Staff and I may be afforded the opportunity to carry them out. While realising the force of the arguments in favour of giving other groups of officers a

turn, I feel that in time of war the overriding requirement is to get results, and this is more likely to be achieved by those who have gained first-hand experience. While every effort has been made to record the lessons we have learned, there is so much which cannot be set forth on paper and which can only be properly grasped by those who have had the advantage of direct personal experience.

(Sgd.) J. H. HALLETT.

*Captain, Royal Navy.*

NAVAL FORCE COMMANDER.

## OPERATION "JUBILEE."

### NAVAL FORCE COMMANDER'S NARRATIVE.

#### *The Passage.*

1. Generally speaking the assembly of the force and the passage were carried out in accordance with the plan and without any major incident. After clearing the gate H.M.S. QUEEN EMMA (Captain G. L. D. Gibbs, D.S.O., R.N.(Ret.)) leading Groups 1, 2 and 3, appeared to me to be proceeding at an excessive speed, and H.M.S. CALPE (Lieut.-Commander J. H. Wallace, R.N.) and the destroyers had some difficulty in taking station ahead. At 0016 when H.M.S. CALPE was abeam of H.M.S. QUEEN EMMA a signal was made informing her that she was ahead of station and instructing her to reduce to 18 knots. After this the destroyers formed ahead, and shortly afterwards altered course for the Western passage through the minefield. The Dan Buoys and the M.L. marking the entrance to this channel were only sighted about 2 minutes before H.M.S. CALPE entered the channel, no signals from the type 78 Beacon being received on account of a breakdown of H.M.S. CALPE'S R.D.F.\* However, H.M.S. CALPE and the destroyers of the 2nd Division successfully passed through the Western channel, but H.M.S. QUEEN EMMA with Groups 1, 2 and 3 in company, lost touch with the destroyers and passed through the Eastern channel, overtaking H.M.S. FERNIE (Lieut. W. B. Willett, R.N.) and certain groups of L.C.Ts.† and L.C.Ps.† but fortunately without any collisions.

2. A word of praise is due to the 9th and 13th Minesweeping Flotillas (Commander H. T. Rust, R.N. and Commander L. S. J. Ede, D.S.O., R.N.) who carried out the task allotted to them with efficiency and precision.

3. After passing through the minefield H.M.S. CALPE stopped in accordance with the plan, and subsequently signalled her position to H.M.S. QUEEN EMMA, H.M.S. PRINCE ALBERT (Lieut.-Commander H. B. Peate, R.N.R.) and H.M.S. GLENGYLE (Captain D. S. McGrath, R.N.), as these vessels respectively came in sight. H.M.S. CALPE then proceeded and stopped about one mile to seaward of the position in which H.M.S. GLENGYLE with Group 4 had stopped to lower their boats.

4. At about 0350 gun fire was observed to the E.S.E. which it was realised must be in the immediate vicinity of Group 5. At the time I considered this might be caused by an E-boat attack, but with the knowledge that

\* Admiralty footnote:—R.D.F.—Radar.

† Admiralty footnote:—L.C.T. = Landing Craft Tanks. L.C.P. = Landing Craft Personnel.