

land at the beginning of the year with instructions to review the whole problem of retention of Italians and to make his own recommendations. That was the first intimation I had received from any source of the existence of any such instructions. The orders I had received were never easy to execute. My difficulties were increased by contrary instructions to one person and their non-disclosure to myself as responsible authority.

In August, 1942, approval was given for the figure of 500 retained Italians to be increased to 700. Since then 600 who had been hiding have been rounded up from country districts. It would be too optimistic to suggest that the country even now is clear of "embusqués."

#### ERITREA.

When the East Africa Command came into being, Eritrea formed part of it chiefly because of a political supposition in some minds that Eritrea and Ethiopia were indivisible.

Before the Command had been in existence for many weeks it became apparent that this arrangement was not workable, due to the military fact that Massawa was to be developed as a Middle East Base and that an American Air Repair and Assembly Plant was to be established at Gura. Both of these projects were being carried out mainly for Middle East requirements. On 1st February, 1942, Eritrea came once more under the command of General Headquarters, Middle East.

#### ANGLO-ETHIOPIAN Agreement.

Before entering Ethiopia, the Emperor made repeated attempts to obtain from His Majesty's Government a Treaty of Agreement establishing the relations between Great Britain and Ethiopia. Although His Majesty's Government found itself unable at that stage to enter into any such formal agreement, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made a pronouncement in Parliament on 4th February, 1941, which defined the British Government's intentions as regards the Emperor and his country's future. The text of this important pronouncement was as follows:

"His Majesty's Government would welcome the reappearance of an independent Ethiopian State and will recognise the claim of the Emperor Haile Selassie to the throne. The Emperor has intimated to His Majesty's Government that he will need assistance and guidance. His Majesty's Government agree with this view and consider that any such assistance and guidance in economic and political matters should be the subject of international agreement at the conclusion of peace. They re-affirm that they themselves have no territorial ambitions in Abyssinia.

In the meanwhile the conduct of military operations by Imperial Forces in parts of Abyssinia will require temporary measures of military guidance and control. These will be carried out in consultation with the Emperor, and will be brought to an end as soon as the situation permits."

In the letter formally communicating the text of this pronouncement to the Emperor, the Commander-in-Chief Middle East, General Sir Archibald P. Wavell, G.C.B., C.M.G., M.C., enlarged upon the final paragraph of the Secretary of State's pronouncement and explained the administrative machinery which he proposed to set up to enable him to fulfil the

obligations imposed upon him as the Commander of the Army in Occupied Enemy Territory.

These obligations entailed the establishment of a Military Administration to administer the country in collaboration with the Emperor during the interval which necessarily elapsed between the return of the Emperor to his Capital on 5th May, 1941, and the signing of the Agreement some nine months later.

In accordance with the promise implied in the final paragraph of Mr. Eden's pronouncement, it was decided as soon as military circumstances permitted, to put an end as far as possible to the measure of administrative control exercised by the Occupied Territories Administration on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief Middle East and subsequently on my behalf. The text of the Agreement which was to achieve this object was prepared by the Political Branch, East Africa Command, after many discussions with the Emperor, and was the subject of two visits to London by the then Chief Political Officer, Major-General Sir Philip Mitchell, K.C.M.G., M.C. As the result of these discussions the Agreement in its final form was presented by Sir Philip Mitchell to the Emperor in December, 1941. The Emperor raised a number of minor points but eventually accepted the text with only unimportant modifications and the Agreement, and its accompanying Military Convention, were signed with due formality on 31st January, 1942.

The ability and patience with which Sir Philip Mitchell conducted these negotiations during many months against continuous difficulties, the principal and most consistent of which was that an ell was demanded for every inch offered, were beyond praise.

As a result of this Agreement, direct British control in Ethiopia became limited to the Reserved Areas comprising a belt of territory 25 miles wide along the border of French Somaliland, an area occupied principally by Somalis adjoining the British Somaliland border; the territory occupied by the Franco-Ethiopian railway; the Ogaden; and a number of cantonments of which Addis Ababa, Harrar and Dire-dawa were the most important.

In August, 1941, our troops were withdrawn from Addis Ababa, care of the aerodrome there being taken over by the British Military Mission to Ethiopia.

#### PART IV.—OUTBREAK OF WAR WITH JAPAN AND ITS EFFECT ON EAST AFRICA COMMAND.

Japan's entry into the war and her early successes brought the threat of war to the East African coast. My immediate problems as a result of this were re-orientation of the Command dispositions with the object of strengthening the defence of the coast, with particular reference to the port of Mombasa; and the preparation of East African formations for service overseas. As a corollary to these problems, some withdrawal of troops commenced from Ethiopia and the Northern Frontier District of Kenya where their retention could not be described as essential for the main war effort.

Operations against Ethiopia had naturally caused the Command to face North. It had now to face East. There were few troops along the coast. The few Coast Defence guns were obsolete British ones or captured Italian ones. There was not one anti-aircraft gun in the whole Command. There were practically no British artillery personnel. The training and expan-