

reported heavy casualties. A concentration of tanks was also believed to be forming in this area. Unloading of M.T. at C Sector practically stopped, due to the rising wind and swell, and was proceeding very slowly at other sectors. It was therefore with considerable relief that the following signal was received from General Ryder at 1658: "Darlan wishes to negotiate immediately. He will not deal with any Frenchman. Recommend that arrangements for Algiers be presented. Resistance of Navy in isolated batteries has been severe. Resistance of Army has been token".

71. At dusk the first Axis air attack developed. Ships at C Sector were the objectives of dive and torpedo bombers. H.M.S. COWDRAY was hit and seriously damaged. U.S.S. LEEDSTOWN's steering gear was put out of action by a hit on the stern and U.S.S. EXCELLER suffered minor damage from a near miss. I had previously ordered screening ships to cover concentration of shipping with smoke and this undoubtedly prevented more serious casualties. One enemy aircraft was shot down.

72. Unloading of M.T.s had to be stopped during the night due to the heavy swell and rising wind which caused large casualties to landing craft at all sectors.

73. At 2200, H.M.S. SPEY arrived with American soldiers from the damaged THOMAS C. STONE. They had left their ship 140 miles N.W. of Algiers in landing craft, escorted by H.M.S. SPEY, in a spirited attempt to take part in the assault. Weather and breakdowns necessitated abandoning the landing craft on passage.

74. I wish particularly to draw your attention to the courageous decision of Captain O. R. Bennehoff, Commanding U.S.S. THOMAS STONE, to send his landing craft and troops off on a journey of 140 miles to their beaches under the escort of the only A/S vessel then available to screen his ship, and also to the fine display of seamanship and determination given by Commander H. G. Scott, R.N., Commanding Officer, H.M.S. WISHART, in towing the helpless U.S.S. THOMAS STONE safely to Algiers in spite of bad weather and the perils of air and submarine attacks.

75. At 0500, I proceeded to Algiers harbour in BULOLO, berthing alongside at 0700. On the way round BULOLO was attacked twice by single Ju. 88s; the first attack was unobserved, but in the second attack the enemy plane received a hot reception from the close-range weapons, and after complaining of his rough handling crashed into the sea.

76. An enthusiastic reception was given to us by the large crowd assembled on the dock side and on the road overlooking the harbour.

77. At 0800, all shipping was ordered into Algiers Bay. This concentration of shipping was attacked by about 30 Ju. 88s at 1630. Twelve of these were shot down by Spitfires who were directed by visual control from BULOLO.

The Assault on Bougie and Djidjelli.

78. At 1700 10th November, the slow assault convoy sailed for Bougie, consisting of the M.T. ships GLENFINLAS (Commodore), STANHILL, URLANA, and OCEAN

VOLGA, escorted by H.M. Ships ROBERTS, BLYSKAWICA, SAMPHIRE, PENSTEMON, HOY, INCHOLM and RYSA. The fast assault convoy consisting of L.S.I.s KARANJA, MARNIX and CATHAY escorted by H.M. Ships SHEFFIELD, TYNWALD, BRAMHAM, CADMUS, ALBACORE, ROTHER and SPEY, sailed at 2000.

79. The oiler DEWDALE left Algiers at 1800 10th November, having been delayed by oiling ships. H.M.S. MULL of the slow assault convoy escort remained behind to escort her to Bougie. DEWDALE and MULL arrived Bougie at 0600 11th November.

80. At 2310, L.S.I. AWATEA escorted by BICESTER and WILTON sailed for the assault on Djidjelli. STRATHNAVER had been detailed to carry out this task but had developed engine-room defects which restricted her speed; R.A.F. Commandos, stores and petrol had been transferred to AWATEA during the day.

It was then intended that STRATHNAVER should accompany the fast assault convoy to Bougie but she was not able to get away in time.

81. The Armistice at this time had not been signed, but I had been assured of a friendly reception. The Commandos for the assault of coast defence batteries were not despatched. Information was received after the assault shipping had sailed that the landing at Bougie might be opposed and in consequence I sent a signal to that effect to the Naval Commander, Captain N. V. Dickinson, R.N. On receipt of this signal at about midnight, Captain Dickinson ordered all landings to take place on D WHITE Beach, this beach being outside the range of shore batteries.

82. At 0345, H.M.S. SHEFFIELD (C.S. 10) left the fast assault convoy and acted independently to give surface cover to the assault.

83. H.M.S. ROBERTS escorted by PENSTEMON and SAMPHIRE parted company from the slow assault convoy when off Cap Carbon and stood off prepared to bombard.

84. At 0445, L.S.I.s stopped in the release position (105° Cap Carbon 7). Troops for the assault had been embarked in L.S.I.s MARNIX and CATHAY. KARANJA's boats were despatched to ferry CATHAY's assault troops ashore. The assault flight left for D WHITE Beach at 0530 from MARNIX and at 0600 from CATHAY. First troops landed at about 0615.

85. At 0609, KARANJA, MARNIX and CATHAY followed up astern of the assault flight, being swept in by ALBACORE, SPEY and CADMUS, and stopped one mile off D WHITE Beach.

86. At dawn, Force "O", consisting of H.M. Ships ARGUS, SCYLLA, CHARYBDIS, escorted by VANOC and WRESTLER, were off Bougie and provided a continuous fighter patrol off the beaches. The direction of fighters was carried out by TYNWALD. It was the intention that Fleet Air Arm fighters should provide fighter cover until the R.A.F. Spitfires could be established at Djidjelli aerodrome—the nearest suitable aerodrome to Bougie. H.M.S. ARGUS had been hit by a bomb at 1717/10 and had only 7 Seafires serviceable. At dawn, I ordered H.M.S. AVENGER, at the time in Algiers with engine