

370. Our rapid advance through France forced the enemy to abandon his launching sites in the Pas de Calais; in consequence there was no flying bomb activity over the United Kingdom after the 9th September for a period of ten days. When it recommenced, the launching was from carrier aircraft, chiefly Heinkel III, operating over the North Sea. The scale of activity of these air-launched flying bombs was never heavy; nevertheless a fully organised

defence scheme, involving nine squadrons of fighters, had to be maintained to combat the menace.

371. The scale of the bombing attacks on the launching and ancillary sites and also on large constructional sites believed to be associated with preparations for launching large rocket projectiles is shown in the figures given below:—

*"Crossbow" Operations*

*Period 14th June to 31st August, 1944*

<i>Force</i>	<i>Aircraft attacking</i>	<i>Tons of Bombs</i>
<i>A.E.A.F. :—</i>		
14th–30th June ...	1,005	1,335
1st–31st July ...	246	419
1st–31st August ...	—	—
	<hr/> 1,251	<hr/> 1,754
<i>R.A.F. B.C. :—</i>		
14th–30th June ...	4,050	17,773
1st–31st July ...	5,833	26,487
1st–31st August ...	4,384	21,385
	<hr/> 14,267	<hr/> 65,645
<i>U.S. Eighth Air Force :—</i>		
14th–30th June ...	1,835	4,709
1st–31st July ...	1,401	3,639
1st–31st August ...	869	2,329
	<hr/> 4,105	<hr/> 10,677

372. It is very difficult to estimate the success of these counter attacks; the number of flying bombs launched per day varied considerably, as also did the number and location of the sites used. It can, however, be stated that these attacks hampered and kept in check the launching rate; the average number launched per day over the period 13th June to 31st August was 95 against the estimated possible number of 6,000 per day, had the German plan not been upset by Allied bombing. It has already been noted that the air bombing in the preparatory period was so successful in countering the enemy's preparations for the use of the flying bomb, that it was no longer a direct threat to the preparations for, or the carrying out of the Allied assault and subsequent land operations. In the event, the flying bomb was launched mainly as a "terror" weapon against the civilian population of Southern England and not as a counter to the plans for the invasion of the Continent. I do not propose, therefore, to make any wider comment beyond emphasising the cost to the invasion operations by virtue of the diversion of available air effort that had to be made in order to secure this degree of immunity. An indication of the scale of this diversion is given by the statistics in the paragraphs above. Another less calculable cost was the fact that a number of Tempest and Mustang fighters—which had been allocated to re-arm squadrons in Second British Tactical Air Force—had to be transferred to A.D.G.B. for duties on flying bomb interception patrols. We thus lost the use of these very valuable and latest type of fighters over the battlefield.

*Operation "Market"—First Allied Airborne Army.*

373. On 17th September, airborne forces of the First Allied Airborne Army, comprising United States 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions, 1st British Airborne Division and a Polish Parachute Brigade were dropped and landed in the Eindhoven—Nijmegen—Arnhem areas of Holland. The lift of these airborne forces exceeded that made during the initial landings on the Continent. The operation was designed to facilitate an advance by the northern group of armies up to and over the rivers Waal and Lower Rhine. With this end in view, the chief objectives of the airborne troops were the bridges at Arnhem and Nijmegen.

374. The initial drops were successful, being carried out accurately and with very few casualties. During the subsequent nine days, as weather permitted, reinforcements and supplies were flown in to the airborne troops and to the supporting ground troops which had linked up with them. Despite an heroic struggle by the troops of the 1st British Airborne Division the bridge at Arnhem, although secured initially, could not be retained. The bridge at Nijmegen, however, was secured and the operation paved the way for a subsequent advance up to the river Waal and beyond. It provided many lessons for the future and marked a definite step in the evolution of airborne operations.

375. The planning for and execution of these operations, which were carried out under the code name "Market", was the work of the First Allied Airborne Army, to which the opera-