

Group, established his Base Map Depot close to Bayeux, and the Chief Engineer, Communications Zone, a depot not far from the two landing beaches "Utah" and "Omaha". The Assistant Deputy Engineer, Ninth U.S.A.A.F. placed his depot first at Carentan and later at Rennes, in order to be close to the main American Base Map Depot. These depots formed the normal source of supply for the allied air formations then gathering on the Continent. Some loss of maps by enemy action occurred during the stocking of depots, but this loss was made good from reserves held in the United Kingdom.

464. Squadrons of both air forces had carried with them overseas sufficient maps to cover any operations they might undertake during the fortnight after their landing, and ground personnel were similarly equipped. It was expected that the depots would, by that time, be able to meet any demands made upon them. Both British and American systems of map supply had been well practised in the United Kingdom and there was no reason to suppose that they would not work successfully overseas; yet late in August, Headquarters, British Second Tactical Air Force complained of delays in filling their demands, and the map depot of the Ninth U.S.A.A.F. was also unable to obtain all it required from Communications Zone base depots. In both cases the difficulty had to be overcome by flying supplies from the United Kingdom.

465. The rapid advance of the Allied armies through France and Belgium during August and the beginning of September created an embarrassing situation in regard to the supply of maps. In the planning stage, it was not expected that by D+90, the Allied Armies would have passed beyond the River Seine. By that date they were, in fact, virtually along the line of the River Scheldt. Thus there arose, long before the forecast planning date, an immediate demand for maps of all kinds and scales covering Belgium, Holland and Germany, most of which were then either concentrated in the base depots, in the United Kingdom or in transit from America.

466. The problem was acute. To move stocks already in the base depots would have taken too long. To print in the field the full quantity required was not practicable except for certain large-scale topographic maps produced on mobile presses. There was, therefore, no alternative but to draw upon reserve stocks in the United Kingdom and fly them as rapidly as possible to where they were most urgently needed.

467. Moreover, the rapidity of the advance had deprived the printing agencies of three valuable months. Reserve stocks of certain sheets, notably those of Germany on a scale of 1/100,000 were extremely low and since they were being demanded in quantity by armies no less than by air force, new stocks of these sheets most urgently required had to be printed as rapidly as possible in the United Kingdom by as many reproduction agencies as could be pressed into service.

468. The air lift for these maps was arranged by CATOR and the maps were flown to airfields close to Paris and Brussels where they were distributed direct to air formations, often within a few hours of their having been printed, and almost before the ink was dry upon them.

469. Although the crisis was surmounted satisfactorily, I have little doubt that a serious hitch might have occurred, and I feel that very careful consideration should be given to the question of whether some modifications in the map supply organisation should not be made (see paragraph 473 et seq.).

470. By an arrangement between the United States and British forces, the "lion's share" of the design, production and supply of general and special maps for use by the air forces under my command fell to the Directorate of Military Survey, War Office and the various Survey Directorates working in conjunction with that office. Their indefatigable co-operation, and also that of the reproduction agencies of both countries was of the utmost assistance. British resources were augmented in the United Kingdom by those of the 660th Engineer Topo (Avn) Battalion, United States Army and the 942nd Engineer Topo (Avn) Battalion, forming part of the Eighth United States Army Air Force, which produced special maps for all commands within the Allied Expeditionary Air Force.

471. The Map and Survey Section of the G-3 Division of your Headquarters also extended their help to me, and on one occasion supplied additional staff from No. 13 Map Reproduction Section of the packing and distribution of "Top Secret" maps.

472. The theatre policy for the supply of maps to a United States Army Air Force is described in Appendix VIII of the Survey Staff Manual, issued by the Chief of Engineers, United States Army, Washington, dated 1st June, 1944. It stipulates as a requirement, in amplification of United States Army regulations, 300-15, a map depot for an air force, such as the Ninth United States Army Air Force, which would draw its maps in bulk from the Engineer, Communications Zone.

473. In the light of experience it is clear that this depot should have been stocked, before leaving the United Kingdom, with sufficient maps to last for a much longer period of the campaign than its initial phases. It would then have been less dependent upon the ability of the Engineer, Communications Zone, to meet immediately such demands as were made upon him. Alternatively, had some of the bulk stocks held by the Engineer, Communications Zone, been marked before shipment for immediate delivery to the Ninth United States Army Air Force Base Depot, the storage would not have been so great.

474. The British Second Tactical Air Force was dependent for its map supply on the Map Depots controlled by the Director of Survey, 21 Army Group. In particular, Nos. 83 and 84 Groups, Royal Air Force, drew their map stocks from the map depots of the British and Canadian Armies to which they were respectively affiliated. By the middle of August, the Air Officer Commanding British Second Tactical Air Force had decided to form a map depot at his headquarters from which these groups, in an emergency, drew those maps they required, which could not be supplied by the armies. In October, the Director of Survey, 21 Army Group, in conference with all concerned, supported this change of policy, and recommended also that the Groups, too, should