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Confucius and Kant: The Ethics of Respect

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Delineating a theory of ethics which entails successful practical applications has long been a challenge to the best philosophical minds of both East and West. Thus, it is encouraging to note that two of the most outstanding ethical philosophers, although from diverse times and backgrounds, set forth doctrines for positive social interaction with a common foundation. The solutions to the problems of human relationships proposed by Confucius in sixth-century B.C. China and Immanuel Kant in Enlightenment Europe both revolve around the seminal concept of respect as the root of any system of ethics, as well as the *sine qua non* of moral practice.

For Confucius, this concept of respect is expressed by the character *jen*, what *ought* to occur when two people come together. Although usually translated as "humanity" or "humaneness," when applied in the *Analects*, *jen* seems to indicate an attitude of respect toward self and others which qualifies the individual for inclusion within the civilized human group and, indeed, makes that social group possible at all. Kant employs the phrases respect for persons and principle of humanity in reference to a remarkably similar concept. He deems human beings to be worthy of respect in terms of the a priori concept of reason, their rationality *qua* human beings.

The major point of divergence between the Confucian and the Kantian assessment of ethical foundations involves the precise means by which this respect is inculcated. For Confucius the social framework defines the accepted range of respectful conduct toward others. Respect is due to persons in accordance with dynamic social roles, as encompassed in the Five Relationships. To distinguish this from Kant's respect for persons, we may designate it respect for personae (in the original Latin sense of *persona* as the mask worn by the actors in a drama to indicate the roles being portrayed). For Kant the imperative of ethics to respect others derives from our shared rational nature—reason confers personhood. In both cases, however, moral conduct stipulates a respectful attitude, either hierarchically (as in Confucius) or universally (as in Kant), which is the very underpinning of ethics and social interaction.

To clarify the moral focal point of respect, the following analysis deals with the parallels in the Confucian and Kantian systems. The consideration of the fundamental concepts supportive of respect proceeds through *li/duty*, *tao/moral law*, and *i/judgment*. The culminating realization of these concepts is personified in the *chün-tzu* of Confucius and Kant's ideal of the good will, each serving as the model of virtue in its respective system. Each also is a guide to the final stage of moral refinement, as a social being for Confucius and a rational being for Kant. Finally, a synthesis of the two systems allows one to transcend the limitations of both.

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I. THE QUEST FOR THE MORAL LIFE IN CONFUCIUS

Some basic insights on intrasocial behavior patterns were made available to Confucius by tradition: the hierarchical model of family relationships; the intertwining of duties and respect in the Five Relationships, rooted in *hsiao* and supported by *li*; the interdependence and cooperation demanded by an agricultural economic base. All converged toward the shared end of social stability. Out of these elements Confucius fashioned his ethical philosophy—but he also brought his own resources to the task of interpreting and remolding tradition into the foundation of a highly successful philosophy of positive social interaction. Confronted by a society in transition, Confucius sought to reverse the potentially disastrous trends by eliciting the deeper meanings of tradition. His reforms were to come from within—within the state, within the family, and, most importantly, from within the individual.

Confucius' own pronouncement as to the method of his life's work was addressed to a disciple: "Ssu, I believe you look upon me as one whose aim is simply to learn and retain in mind as many things as possible. . . . No; I have one (thread) upon which I string them all" (AXV,2).¹ Much scholarly discussion has been expended in an effort to determine the meaning of this cryptic remark.² An alternative approach is to disregard what Confucius in fact had in mind, which will always elude our grasp, and concentrate instead on finding out what he *could* have intended. What one concept in his work could fulfill the function of being a unifying thread, running beneath the surface of his thought as the very core of all positive social interaction?

Upon close examination, this thread seems to be none other than respect. Another passage in the *Analects* bears out this interpretation as it reports on the primary teaching concerns of Confucius: "The Master took four subjects for his teaching: culture, conduct of affairs, loyalty to superiors and the keeping of promises" (VII,24). In each case respect plays a decisive role, is the underlying "thread"—Why discuss culture if it is not first an object of respect? Why follow ritual if respect for it is lacking? Why be loyal to superiors in the absence of respect for authority? Finally, why bother to keep one's promises if there is no respect for the person to whom the promise had been made or no self-respect in honoring one's word?

The term employed most often by Confucius to convey the essence of his moral philosophy is *jen*. Here, once again, respect predominates. As noted earlier, many possible translations have been suggested for *jen*, ranging from benevolence and compassion to humaneness and good will. The most popular translation has been love. Nonetheless, the true meaning of this Confucian concept involves more than an emotional appeal. As pointed out by Kant, even love can go astray, can prove unreliable; hence, it is unsuitable as a universal principle.³

If we examine the etymological roots of *jen* ('man' plus 'two', the plural), it becomes clear that any adequate translation must include a sense of human

interaction. It must be able to convey that the “focus is on man himself and what he can morally accomplish in relation to others … affectionate concern in varying degrees, for humanity.”⁴ Regarding the quality which is capable of sustaining human interaction at an appropriately moral peak, respect once more fits the criterion, and is even cited in the *Analects*. The “educated man” is described as one who “Wears an air of respect” and behaves properly toward parents, prince, and friends (AI,7). Such behavior patterns are deemed to be of greater importance than the superficial knowledge of ritual performance. It is not so much what is done as the attitude with which it is undertaken that is noteworthy, specifically, a respectful attitude.

The root of broader social interaction is discussed in these same terms: it is the reciprocal cultivation of respect toward and for others and self. When asked how to encourage people to be “respectful and loyal,” Confucius replied: “Approach them with dignity and they will respect you. Show piety towards your parents and kindness towards your children, and they will be loyal to you. Promote those who are worthy, train those who are incompetent; that is the best form of encouragement” (AII,20). The consequences of ignoring this charge are equally far-reaching: “If a gentleman is frivolous [irresponsible and unreliable in his dealings with others], he will lose the respect of his inferiors and lack firm ground upon which to build his education” (AI,8).

Confucius put these theoretical prescriptions into practice in his own life, thus providing a firm link to Kantian thought as he fulfills Kant’s demand that true theory prove itself in practical implementation. Confucius insisted upon this same point, and did not hesitate to criticize those who overemphasized the theoretical. Above all, he was a practical man—“Chu Wen Tzu used to think thrice before acting. The Master hearing of it said, Twice is quite enough” (AV,19).

Thus *jen* serves as the thread which underlies all virtues in the Confucian system of ethics and is a social version of Kant’s respect for persons. To validate this theory in practice, it is necessary to provide a more in-depth investigation of the many forms under which respect is made manifest in (a) family and social roles or personae, (b) with regard to moral law or *tao*, and (c) in the model of the moral being. *Li* and *i* both exemplify and provide concrete support for *jen*, while the *chün-tzu* is its personification.

A. Respect for Personae in Family and Social Roles—Li

Perhaps the most fundamental expression of respect, and its corresponding responsibilities, is to be found in the structure of the Chinese family and social life. Acting on the assumption that we are indeed social beings, Confucius sought to provide a framework for the social fabric by defining the roles of social personae. To accomplish this he drew upon the existing code of *li*, the “cultural setting” within which *jen* can be realized; *li* encompasses “the *convention* that defines the form and possibilities of moral actions.”⁵ It provides the context of social stability.

Reliance upon *li* seemed particularly crucial in view of the political conditions prevailing in the time of Confucius. The lines of authority had been obscured, while the existing social system was inadequate for coping with the increasing complexity of interrelationships: “Increased sophistication did not bring ethical advance, but retrogression The conditions of the time in general fostered the idea that only a fool would keep his word or act in any manner except that which his own selfish interest dictated.”⁶ In contrast to this rootless anarchy, *li* offered stabilizing roots to society, sunk deep into the soil of tradition. Confucius reinterpreted and revitalized tradition to meet the moral needs of the times, thereby satisfying his own definition of a teacher: “He who in reanimating [‘warming up’] the Old can gain knowledge of the New” (AII,11). Morality and courtesy were made mutually reinforcing. A simplified and formalized means of participating in tradition, *li* was also a symbol of one’s worthiness for respect through a commitment to underlying social and moral values. In a very practical sense, respect was indicative of a “respect for the reality of the situation, the background and the possibility that furnish the contexts for successful moral performance.”⁷

The extravagant claims for the efficacy of *li* seem justified only when one considers its function of defining society. Without the establishment of boundaries no interaction, social or otherwise, can hope to succeed. For example, in the absence of net and lines, the game of tennis would be a mere exercise in anarchy; a type of interaction may result, but certainly not one which could be described accurately as a tennis interaction. Chinese tradition, and Confucius following in its wake, looked to the family as the primary organ for instilling rules and drawing the lines for socially acceptable behavior. The need for limits was deemed particularly crucial for the young, to provide them with rules for dealing with future experiences. The Five Relationships supplied just such a set of social definitions, delineating the degrees of respect due to and the levels of responsibility corresponding to the various social personae.

As critics have been quick to point out, the emphasis upon *li* carried with it the ever-present danger of degenerating into a superficial observance of prescriptions, engendering the letter but not the spirit of morality. It is undeniable that such degeneracy did occur as Confucianism became institutionalized. However, we would do well to inquire about the source of this degeneration—was it due to an intrinsic weakness in the Confucian principle, or to the lack of adherence to that same principle? An examination of the *Analects* removes the onus from the Confucian principle of *li*, as a functional expression of respect, and places it instead on the ineptness of later practitioners. No one seemed more aware of the possible perversion of *li* than Confucius himself. He is careful to warn us that, divorced from its moral intention, from *jen* or respect, *li* is meaningless: “‘Filial sons’ nowadays are people who see to it that their parents get enough to eat. But even dogs and horses are cared for to that extent. If there is no feeling of respect,

wherein lies the difference?" (AII,7). Ritual is the means to the end of inculcating respect for personae, which alone is an end in itself, is intrinsically moral (see AXIX,17).

Apart from providing practical experience with social role models and interactions, the family also supplied more formalized education tending to the same end. The rich resources of tradition are again consulted: "To cultivate oneself by learning and skill is like polishing gold and carving jade. This is important because as even gold and jade need polishing, so human beings need discipline and training."⁸ This training proceeded with more than mere affection. Respect had a primary role to play. "Parental strictness and dignity mingled with tenderness will usually lead boys and girls to a feeling of respect and carefulness and so arouse filial piety . . . where there is merely love without training this result is never achieved."⁹ A form of life is taught with the aim of producing the "well-adjusted individual" who is the key component of a stable community; such an individual is "capable of taking his place as a happy and useful member of society." Confucius considered intellectual cultivation of little worth if not accompanied by emotional balance.¹⁰

The advice of a Confucian scholar to his own family well reflects the function of education for Confucius: "learning should be like planting trees. In spring men appreciate the flowers; in autumn they gather the fruit."¹¹ To extend the metaphor further, the family plants the trees in its offspring and the flowers are enjoyed by society at large, while the fruit belongs to both the group and the individual (its seeds being planted in turn to yield a new set of seedlings, thereby insuring continuity in the orchard). Hence, the interests of individual, family, and society are protected by a judicious pruning of the young saplings.¹² Respect for personae, once inculcated by the family, makes a smooth transition into the wider community, and the sense of oneness with the family group readily translates into a sense of oneness with society. "To act with sincerity and filial righteousness even when offended by others, to lose one's body for the protection of the whole family, and to sacrifice oneself in order to save the nation: the superior man does not regret such acts."¹³

The hierarchical emphasis is significant here. Were this to be weakened, the entire system would be seriously threatened. A historical case of just such a threat did in fact arise, namely, the doctrine of universal love (*chien ai*) advocated by Mo Tzu. Given the hierarchical ordering of respect, the Confucian forces raised strong opposition to Mo Tzu's concept, insisting instead upon the "doctrine of love with distinctions (*ai yu ch'a teng*)" (as based on the twentieth chapter of the *Doctrine of the Mean, Chung Yung*). Mencius criticized the universal love concept as both unnatural and unworkable (VIIA,46). Only when love begins in the confines of the family will its influence properly radiate into society, just as the single pebble thrown into the water engenders a circle of ripples—its influence will be felt in due proportion to the distance from the point of entry. Thus,

universal love was not only rejected as a moral principle by the Confucians, but was actually judged to be a principle of immorality, due to its attack upon the very roots of morality, the five relationships.¹⁴

The structure of the Chinese language itself reflects the traditional concerns with social distinctions, personal pronouns being assigned on the basis of hierarchical ranking in society.¹⁵ From this long-standing recognition of the close interrelationship between linguistic and social expressions was derived the doctrine of the Rectification of Names (*Ching ming*), which demanded that behavior patterns conform to role designations, that is, that the conduct of the individual fulfill the requirements of the social role or *persona*. The rules of performance are contained within the name itself, and need only be elicited by the “actor.” If this procedure is properly carried out the father will give a good performance as a father, the son as a son, and so forth. Most importantly, the external role must reflect our internal disposition; we do not merely play a role, we *are* the role.

From this insight it follows that successful government depends on getting ‘the right sort of people’ (AXIII,11), letting “personality . . . come into play” (AXIII,17). The reference to personality is significant here, for it indicates that positive social interaction requires more than working within the structures of the five relationships and the limiting conditions of *li*. These indeed constitute the complex root system of Confucian ethics, but they are but the means to a higher end, the organic growth of society which rises above the soil of tradition. However, if the roots are to provide nourishment for the individual branches of society, a means of channeling that nourishment is essential. This task is met by the trunk of Confucian ethics, the Moral Law of *tao* which utilizes *i* to implement ethical theory in moral practice.

B. Respect for the Moral Law/Tao: I

The training received within the family prepares the individual by granting a basic understanding of the social personae and their interrelationships within the framework of *li*. Nonetheless, in order to apply the insights and directives of *li* correctly, individual judgment must be cultivated. *Li* functions to “help one find the mean and to adhere to it,”¹⁶ specifying the limits of ethical behavior, of what is and is not socially acceptable conduct. Yet the Mean itself is identified through *i*, our acquired sense of what is right.

In tribute to the pivotal role played by *i*, some interpreters have recognized it as the single thread referred to by Confucius (as discussed earlier).¹⁷ *I* has been described as imparting “an actuating import to *jen* and *li*.¹⁸ If *i* is “the self-knowledge and knowledge of the Way,”¹⁹ then the Way itself must be the guide for cultivating the moral sense. In the Analects, *tao* represents both a concrete way of life and an abstract principle of conduct. It is both the universal Way of Heaven and the way of human beings. The order of nature is reflected in human nature. “To prefer it is better than only to know it. To delight in its is better than

merely to prefer it" (AVI,18). *I* seals our preference for *tao*, while delight comes with the fullness of *jen*.

Tao, as revealed by *i*, provides a universal and unwavering standard for judgment. In the terminology of ethics, Confucius exemplifies a deontological or rule-oriented approach, as is borne out in the *Analects*. The moral individual "in his plans thinks of the Way; he does not think how he is going to make a living." Whether one means of livelihood leads to wealth and another to poverty should be a matter of complete indifference; "the progress of the Way" alone should be considered in choosing between the two (AXV,31). "A gentleman takes as much trouble to discover what is right as lesser men take to discover what will pay" (AIV,16). Even ancestor worship ought to be undertaken, not from any hope of tangible rewards from the spirits, but rather as a moral expression of respect.²⁰

Where expediency reigns in the state "continual discontent" is aroused, straining social stability (AIV,12). Among people "who are capable of spending a whole day together without ever discussing questions of right or wrong, but who content themselves ['Satisfy their consciences'] with performing petty acts of clemency," the guidance of *tao* is indeed lacking (AXV,16). *I*, in its rejection of the profit motive, represents 'the doing of what is right' as "the Confucian Moral Point of View."²¹ It is the conscious decision to adhere to the correct Way based solely on the fact that it is correct. Without *i*, none of the other Confucian virtues (*li* and *jen* specifically) could be realized, for it serves as the general "standard of evaluation," bestowing meaning upon one's acts.²² Its presence or absence decisively determines one's character, even one's persona (see AXVII,23).

Two components have been discerned in *i*. The first of these, "subjective self-knowledge of good truth (or the way)," has already been discussed as the universal standard of *tao*. The second component is the sense of "a potential state or situation which needs a fitting action to make it a moral state or situation."²³ This aspect of *i* reveals an element of particularity in *tao* itself. In this regard Max Weber has characterized Confucian thought as "more rationalist and sober, in the sense of the absence and the rejection of all non-utilitarian yardsticks, than any other ethical system, with the possible exception of J. Bentham's."²⁴

Weber's characterization is in obvious conflict with the earlier reference to the deontological orientation of Confucius. In fact, both are correct to some extent, due to the unique approach of Confucius to ethics as the continuum of theory and practice. Although committed to *i* as grounded in universal *tao*; Confucius also recognizes the particularization of the universal—theory directs practice, but practice in turn informs and refines theory. The pivot between the two is individual judgment, an acquired talent embodied in *i*: "To learn this ability to relate the universal to the particular is precisely the secret of learning *yi*, the learning of which, of course, requires an understanding of the meaning of one's life and the meaning of truth and goodness of unity and totality."²⁵ Individual meaning in life, as defined by *li*, is mediated by the ultimate meaning of universal

tao (truth, goodness, unity). But the Way is a “Way of action,”²⁶ involving the practical application of ‘theoretic principles’. *I*’s primacy in the *Analects* (XVII,23) is justified, for it adds an essential dimension to respect: “a sense of rightness as relating to the concrete problematic situation that calls for moral action inspired by *jen*.²⁷ To merely absorb learning (of *li*, the social roles) is insufficient; correct implementation of learning demands individual input, by way of judgment. Hence, “‘He who learns but does not think is lost.’ He who thinks but does not learn is in great danger” (AII,15).

Flexibility, fitting the principle to the action, is the key to *I*. Knowing the limits of applicability for theory is as important as knowing when it can be applied. The end result is “an action in accordance with a judgment of the relevance of moral rules to concrete situations, within the setting of a cultural lifestyle.”²⁸ The Confucian concept of *ching-ch’uan* epitomizes this flexibility and the search for appropriateness in conduct. The moral individual does not become attached to unrealistic standards, but remains open to new contingencies (AIV,10). *Ching-ch’uan* denotes in *ching* ‘an invariable rule, a standard of conduct; constant recurring’ and in *ch’uan* ‘exigency, circumstances; that which is irregular and opposed to *ching*.²⁹ Taken together they convey the recognition that, while theory may apply in the majority of cases, in certain instances the principles have exceeded their limitations, if only temporarily. “We are in effect making a *ruling*, a judgement that the apparently relevant rule does not apply to the present case”³⁰ (See AXIII,18).

These judgments illustrate the Doctrine of the Mean, which advises following the rules in a “‘more or less’ (*ch’ā-pu-to*) way.”³¹ *I* supplies the balancing agent for the specific case. The parallels with Aristotle’s Golden Mean have often been noted. In both instances moderation is put forth as the safest course between equally objectionable extremes of indifference (amorality) and overindulgence (fanaticism). “When natural substance prevails over ornamentation [“when nature prevails over culture”] you get the boorishness of the rustic. When ornamentation prevails over natural substance, you get the pedantry of the scribe. Only when ornament and substance are duly blended do you get the true gentleman” (AVI,16).

Although “the moral power of the Middle Use” is rare (AVI,27), it can be cultivated through rigorous efforts on the part of the individual practitioner. Creel observes that Confucius “seems to have hoped that Heaven would, as we say, ‘help those who help themselves’.”³² Self-reliance is emphasized in Confucian ethics: “A man can enlarge his Way; but there is no Way that can enlarge a man” (AXV,28). Any progress in the Way has to be ours alone. Confucius practiced these principles on his own students, demanding them to think for themselves and suiting his instruction to their individual needs.³³ The autonomy of the moral agent conditions the need for creativity. The practice of *i* develops an individual of “creative insights” who is capable of responding

appropriately to concrete situations of moral import, and yet is able to “preserve the totality of goodness and justice.”³⁴

The search for the Way encompasses a lifetime of steady progress, until morality becomes second nature (although, in fact, *jen* is our true nature). After years of cultivating *i* within, Confucius apparently had reached this point in his own life; his judgment had attained the desired refinement when moral standards had been fully internalized. The process began, he reports, at age fifteen as he “set my heart upon learning,” after which he had his feet “planted . . . firmly upon the ground” at thirty; by forty he “no longer suffered from perplexities.” At fifty he “knew what were the biddings of Heaven,” and he “heard them with a docile ear” by the age of sixty. However, it was not until his seventieth year that he “could follow the dictates of my own heart; for what I desired no longer overstepped the boundaries of right” (AII,4).

The Confucian theory of law provides an apt illustration of the social implementation of *i*, with its qualities of practicality, flexibility, and individual judgment. The emphasis upon rules and punishments in the state merely encourages utilitarian (profit-oriented) responses, in opposition to the recommended devotion to moral law in *tao*. Government by regulation and chastisements leads to a loss of self-respect in the people, while government by “moral force” and ritual instills them with self-respect and attracts them to the ruler (AII,3). It is said that “Where gentlemen think only of punishments, the commoners think only of exemptions [*hui*, “amnesties, immunities, exemptions, as opposed to what is ‘lawful and proper’”] (AIV,11).

Hence, in direct conflict with those who call for “law and order” (in Chinese tradition, the school of law, *fa chia*), Confucian theory foresees the conjunction of “law and disorder.” The problem with inflexible civil laws and social rules is that they exclude individual judgment, which alone can make theory relevant to practice. Under the influence of Confucian concepts, the overwhelming tendency in Chinese civilization pointed away from cold codes of legalism and toward the cultivation of individuals who could spontaneously work within the limits of positive social interaction.

C. The Personification of Jen/Respect: The Chün-tzu

Combining the firm grounding in *li* with judgments of applicability in *i*, the full realization of *jen* becomes possible. The aim of producing a social being, instructed about the boundaries of social roles and able to cultivate the faculty of judgment with regard to those boundaries, culminates in the consummate social being. Nourished by the roots of tradition, as conveyed by Moral Law and the Mean, the full flowering and fruit of the Confucian system of ethics is found in the *chün-tzu*, the concrete model of moral conduct.

The practical demands of life in the social realm often necessitate action in the absence of explicit rules. In preparation for such inevitable circumstances, the

chün-tzu is trained to confidently bring forth the appropriate moral judgment from the depths of a well-cultivated personality. *I* makes *li* relevant, but the ultimate standard of relevancy can be none other than *jen* itself, the virtue of virtues, as “an awareness of self-realization and self-justification.”³⁵ Here the concept of respect is inner-directed.

If successful moral practice of ethical (*tao*) and social (*li*) theory is attainable only by cultivating individual judgment, we can best implement this program by examining modes of judgment in moral practitioners. Hence moral role models are instructive. In this regard the *chün-tzu* ideal receives great attention from Confucius, while he only infrequently mentions the divine sage (*sheng jen*). And yet the sage is ranked far beyond the *chün-tzu* and is the epitome of perfected virtue. This strategy can be traced to the practical unattainability of the sage ideal for most people (AVII,25). The *chün-tzu*, on the other hand, presents us with a functional role model which indeed may be realized to some extent. Although the sage is “a standard of inspiration,” the *chün-tzu* is “a standard of aspiration.”³⁶

Six essential qualities of the *chün-tzu*, as described in *Analects*, have been identified by W. Scott Morton: (1) resoluteness (*yung*,³ ‘bold’), (2) mildness (*jang*,⁴ ‘yield’), (3) a sense of balance (*shu*,⁴ ‘reciprocity’), (4) faithfulness (*hsin*, ‘good faith’), (5) self-criticism (*kuo*,⁴ “going beyond or ‘over the line’”), and (6) autonomy (‘independence’). Above all, the *chün-tzu* is an individual “who has achieved a harmonious combination of such qualities as morality, education, and refinement.”³⁷ This is a person who has achieved a mastery in *li* and its application through *i*, whose behavior evidences respect for social roles, for Moral Law, and for self. This is an integrated being, an informed moral agent, capable of drawing upon the resources of family training and moral cultivation, and whose moral example could refine even barbarians (AIX,13).

Hence, the two currents of *li* and *i* attain their finest realization in the *chün-tzu*, melding into one’s character as both public and private practitioner of virtue (AV,15). He “takes the right as his material to work upon and ritual as the guide in putting what is right into practice” (AXV,17). The requirements of harmonizing theory and practice entail adherence to the Rectification of Names (*Ching ming*): “The gentleman who ever parts company with Goodness does not fulfill that name” (AIV,5). As “an embodiment” of a ‘cultural life style’” the *chün-tzu* respects *li* in family and social roles.³⁸ The sense of social hierarchy structures behavior, but it is the quality of the behavior, a respectful quality, which distinguishes it. “‘A true gentleman, even in his thoughts, never departs from what is suitable to his rank’” (AXIV,27,28). He exudes dignity and pride (AXIII,26;XV,21).

I is fully in evidence in the *chün-tzu* ideal. A “man of fixed principles” (AVII,25), this is nonetheless a person “who when he sees a chance of gain, stops to think whether to pursue it would be right; when he sees that (his prince) is in danger, is ready to lay down his life; when the fulfilment of a promise is exacted, stands by what he said long ago” (AXIV,13). *Tao* occupies the attention of the

chün-tzu: “the gentleman studies, that he may improve himself in the Way” (AXIX,7). Conversely, absence of this pursuit is telling: “He who does not understand the Will of Heaven cannot be regarded as a gentleman” (AXX,3).

The nonutilitarian emphasis of *i* is central to the conduct of the *chün-tzu*, particularly in the role of the state official. No mere shell of a blindly obedient subject (the stereotype of imperial Confucianism), the *chün-tzu* undertakes a defense of right (*i*) even in opposition to the ruler for “From a gentleman consistency is expected, but not unthinking fidelity” (AXV,36). He is “conciliatory but not accommodating” (that is, “ready to sacrifice principles to agreement”) (AXIII,23). Theory and practice merge in his being: “A gentleman is ashamed to let his words outrun his deeds” (AXIV,29).

Flexibility likewise is a keynote of the *chün-tzu* ideal. Such a person will “bear in mind the necessity of deferring to others” when circumstances warrant it (AXII,20). The *chün-tzu*, therefore, is “easy to serve,” in that expectations extend only to the abilities of the server, yet “difficult to please,” in his unwavering adherence to the Way (AXIII,25). Confucius quotes the saying ‘If the water is deep, use the stepping stones; if it is shallow, then hold up your skirts’ (AXIV,42). That is, suit your actions to the concrete conditions at hand. The Mean supplies the flexible standard of action. Hence, balance is among the qualities of the *chün-tzu* identified by Morton. The inclusion of both boldness and mildness in these qualities is indicative of the Mean in action: “a veritable *centre-danse* of opposites and balanced qualifications.”³⁹ This same balance requires education to encompass both intellectual and emotional maturity. The end product is an autonomous moral agent, “in harmony with but not identical to others.”⁴⁰ Fitness for judgment follows from this. Enthusiasm and independence of mind are crucial (AVII,8).

Nonetheless, creativity and absolute autonomy bear the potential for anarchy. Moral smugness, thinking we have reached our goal and thus need not strive any farther, is the very antithesis of *jen*. Ongoing self-criticism, rather than criticism of others, is recommended (AXIV,31). Moral behavior entails a continuous process, ever renewing its claims upon us: “The demands that a gentleman makes are upon himself; those that a small man makes are upon others” (AXV,20; see also XV,18 and XIX,5). Thus, Confucian ethics provides us with “the essential of all morality, mental honesty, integrity of mind—the only attitude which does not close the door to truth.”⁴¹ It is an attitude of respect directed within, self-respect and respectability. The *chün-tzu* “neither grieves nor fears . . . On looking within himself he finds no taint; so why should he either grieve or fear?” (AXII,4).

When *li* and *i* as theory have been translated into practice, and internalized to instill spontaneous virtue, one may be said to have realized the virtue of virtues, *jen*. It is the encompassing sense of respect integrating tradition, Moral Law, and individual personality. *Jen* functions as supreme principle of moral action. Beyond being the ‘mind of man’, *jen* is within the process of self-cultivation, the “active dynamic relationship between men and all things.”⁴² Translated by

Waley as the Good, it is “in an extremely wide and generous sense . . . the display of human qualities at their highest.”⁴³ Here alone “one need not avoid competing with one’s teacher” (AXV,35).

The *chün-tzu* is dedicated to *jen* in this sense, for to be one means to persevere in the way (AIV,5). And yet *jen* supercedes the ideal: one may be a *chün-tzu* but lack *jen*, however those who possess *jen* are invariably *chün-tzu* (AXIV,7). *li* is internalized (AXII,1); respect for *li* is also a matter of self-respect. The dynamic striving involved is described by Confucius’ disciple Yen Hui:

Step by step the Master skillfully lures one on. He has broadened me with culture, restrained me with ritual. Even if I wanted to stop, I could not. Just when I feel that I have exhausted every resource, something seems to rise up, standing out sharp and clear (AIX,10).

Finally, *jen* fulfills itself as the ideal of humanity, of respect for human beings, by reiterating the social dimensions of human existence: “the original Confucian idea of *jen* as human beings living together in society.”⁴⁴ The Principle of Reciprocity applies in this context: “As for Goodness—you yourself desire rank and standing; then help others to get rank and standing. You want to turn your own merits to account; then help others to turn theirs to account—in fact, the ability to take one’s own feelings as a guide—that is the sort of thing that lies in the direction of Goodness” (AVI,28).

If Confucian theory as a whole is to remain consistent, the Principle of Reciprocity, along with the often quoted formula ‘Never do to others what you would not like them to do to you’ (AXV,23), cannot be interpreted in utilitarian terms of protecting our own interests by means of others. How, then, can Confucius claim this as the “single saying that one can act upon all day and everyday”? The seeming conflict dissolves in view of the respect concept, as brought up from the depths of *jen* through self-cultivation, the realization of the mutual concerns held by all social beings *qua* social and *qua* human. Each individual is, in some sense, equally deserving of respect, above and beyond the hierarchical distinctions of social *personae* (AXX,2). This is *jen* as the ideal of humanity.

II. THE SYNTHESIS OF CONFUCIAN AND KANTIAN ETHICAL THEORY

For purposes of comparison to and synthesis with the Confucian system of ethics, our discussion here of Kantian philosophy need only be cursory. It is noteworthy that others have recognized the parallels between Kantian and Chinese thought; Friedrich Nietzsche described Kant as “der grösse Chinese von Königsberg” (the great Chinese from Königsberg).⁴⁵ The three main elements of the program for positive social interaction reappear in Kant: (a) the roots of respect, in this case directed at persons as rational beings rather than social *personae*; (b) respect for the moral law, a product of reason as guided by judgment; and (c) the ideal of moral conduct in the good will, personifying respect through the principle of humanity.

A. Respect for Persons: The Community of Rational Beings

Rationality provides the common context of human interaction for Kant, just as *li* does for Confucius. Deemed the essence of human nature, Kant drew upon the rich resources of reason the way Confucius drew upon *jen*. In Confucian thought, education, social training and cultivation, serves to elicit this nature (in the original Latin sense of education as “bringing out what was in men”⁴⁶), while for Kant the innateness and *a priori* character of reason precludes education as a tool. Reason also is able to identify the content and method of approach in morality: “What we have to do in order to remain in the path of duty (according to the rules of wisdom) reason instructs us by her rules, and her teaching suffices for attaining the ultimate end.”⁴⁷ For Confucius, however, the experiences acquired within the family and within society are a catalyst for recognition of duty. Here reason and nature exist, not in conflict (as in Kant’s duality of the sensible and intelligible spheres) but in a continuum.⁴⁸ Being derived directly from reason, duty for Kant has no need of the complex social framework of the five relationships to train the individual. The light of reason tells us all we need to know for moral performance to take place.

Nonetheless, as in the case of *li*, adherence to duty demands dual considerations—acting “*according to duty*” (fulfillment of superficial conduct, mere “legality”) as well as acting “*from duty*.” The latter entails the attitude of respect for the moral law. Moral necessity, as conveyed by reason, constitutes the sense of obligation accomplished by *li* in Confucian thought: “We stand under a *discipline* of reason, and in all our maxims we must not forget our subjugation to it, or withdraw anything from it, or by an egoistical illusion detract from the authority of the law (even though it is given by our own reason).”⁴⁹

Due to the primacy of respect, Kant joins the Confucians in condemning the impracticality of universal love. Kant criticizes misinterpretations of the New Testament injunction to “Love God above all and thy neighbor as thyself,” insisting that emotional inclination is not the subject here, but rather “practical [that is, moral] love.” “To love God means in this sense to like to do His commandments, and to love one’s neighbor means to like to practice all duties toward him . . . [one] cannot require that we have this disposition [love] but only that we endeavor after it.” To command the emotion of love as a moral duty is contradictory, although respect can be so commanded.⁵⁰ Elsewhere, Kant defends his use of the term respect as more than “an obscure feeling;” it is something “self-wrought by a rational concept,” a consciously willed attitude in response to the moral law.⁵¹

More specifically, respect must be directed toward human beings: “Respect always applies to persons only, never to things.”⁵² Here we have the Kantian respect for persons which parallels Confucian respect for *personae*: “the idea of personality awakens respect; it places before our eyes the sublimity of our own nature (in its [higher] vocation).”⁵³ For Kant, respect wells up from the sense of

participation in a community of rational beings, just as in Confucian theory respect results from our experience as social beings in a hierarchy.

The value of human beings arouses a sense of inherent dignity, in contrast to an interest in mere “market value.”⁵⁴ Similarly, Confucius declares “‘He who is truly wise never wastes a man’” (AXV,7). Thus, Confucius and Kant share the concept of universality of respect for human beings in accordance with their guiding model—rational nature in Kant and social nature in Confucius, a community of individuals as opposed to individuals in a community.

B. Respect for Moral Law: The Categorical Imperative

A guide for the application of moral law is as important to Kant as it is to Confucius. *I* serves this function for Confucius; in Kant, the formula of the Categorical Imperative is called into service. Central to both *i* and the Categorical Imperative is a regard for “the ‘oughtness’ of a situation”;⁵⁵ the sense of the Right. Respecting the Moral Law, like following *tao*, entails a non-utilitarian commitment as well as the pivotal element of judgement. Yet the greatest divergences between the theories of Kant and Confucius also occur in these areas, particularly with regard to the Confucian Mean and its flexibility of standards. These stand in sharp contrast to the universal quality and rigidity of Kant’s laws. Here, then, Confucian thought makes its most significant contribution to the synthesis, firmly linking theory and practice.

Like *tao*, Kantian Moral Law elicits moral Respect. Both also demonstrate the moral way. Moral Law is the veritable “stage of morality”, and respect for it is “the sole and undoubted moral incentive”, even “morality itself.”⁵⁶ The most telling distinction between Kant’s Moral Law and Confucian *tao* is the alienation of the former from nature. Moral Law “points to a pure intelligible world” as “the fundamental law of supersensuous nature.”⁵⁷ It presents to us an order transcending that of nature. In Confucian theory, however, a continuum of natural order and moral order is posited. Despite the Kantian transcendence of nature in Moral Law, the Categorical Imperative takes as its model the universality of natural law: “Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”⁵⁸

In view of these references to law, the deontological emphasis of Kant comes as no surprise. Duty alone must be dominant in our thoughts and actions: only Moral Law “precludes all inclination from having a direct influence on the will.”⁵⁹ All other considerations, happiness in particular, must be subordinated: “the state in which I consciously prefer to do my duty, when there is a conflict between certain of my ends and the moral law of duty, is not merely a better state; it is the only condition that is good in itself.”⁶⁰

The practical applicability of Moral Law’s theoretical directives is not as clearly drawn in Kant as in Confucius. This situation seems due not so much to a lack of the pivotal sense of judgement as to a weaker assessment of its nature and

of nature in general. Kant clearly is aware of the role of judgement as the vital link between theory and practice: “To the intellectual concept that contains the rule, an act of judgement must be added whereby the practitioner distinguishes whether or not something is an instance of the rule.” Thus far Kantian judgement parallels Confucian *i*. However, for Kant judgement is a “natural gift,” which may or may not be bestowed on the theoretician at birth.⁶¹ Kant’s *a priori* propensities, as evidenced in our possession of both reason and Moral Law, prevent him from entertaining the possibility of developing moral judgement, as recognized by Confucius. By his own guidelines, Kant would seem to be either deficient in judgement himself or merely dealing with an incomplete theory in denying the cultivation of judgement. If his theory is incomplete, Confucian concepts will eminently rectify that problem, and a synthesis of the two systems supports the theory-practice continuum.

Kant’s problems with judgement also are the source of his objectionable inflexibility.⁶² No exceptions to the moral maxims churned out through the Categorical Imperative are allowed, precisely because of their source in the irrevocable force of reason. Concrete experience cannot possibly challenge rational pronouncements: “All is lost if empirical and therefore accidental conditions of the applications of the law are turned into conditions of the law itself, and thus a practice calculated for an outcome probable in line with *past* experience is made master of the self-existing theory.”⁶³

Kant’s rigid stance is traceable to his view of nature. The “role of judgement” in applying the Categorical Imperative includes the instructions: “ask yourself whether, if the action which you propose should take place by a law of nature of which you yourself were a part, you could regard it as possible through your will.”⁶⁴ This assessment of nature was heavily influenced by Newtonian science, with its view of a mechanized interplay of universal and necessary laws, its revelations of the underlying rational principles of nature’s inner workings. How unlike it is to *tao*, which operates by the dynamic interchange of yin and yang, the Mean. The Confucian sense of ongoing balance is lacking in the Kantian universe, replaced by unchallenged eternal truths. Kant consciously sets out to frame a science of morality, on the Newtonian model, a “hard” science; the Confucian *Weltanschauung* presents us with a “soft science,” better suited to the analysis of complex interactions and more empirically oriented.

Perhaps this difference in perspective accounts for the uneasiness Kant voices with regard to respect: “one only reluctantly gives way to it as regards man . . . we want to be free of the awesome respect which so severely shows our own unworthiness.”⁶⁵ The tension and aura of internal conflict surrounding respect is not found in Confucian thought. It may well be Kant’s own unconscious testimony to the unnatural inflexibility of the exclusively rational ‘ought’, a standard no mortal can ever fulfill. In the assumed duality of human nature, Kant detects a seething rebellion against reason, plotted by the “beast within.”

For Confucius, on the other hand, human nature is at one with itself, is *jen*. Hence, we can put our trust in it, given the proper training and opportunity for individual cultivation.

Despite the variability in the talent for judgment, Kant upholds the autonomous character of the moral agent: “The *autonomy* of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws and of duties conforming to them.”⁶⁶ The will both legislates and is subject to Moral Law, serving as a creative expression of character. Nonetheless, the degree of creativity is less than that in Confucian theory. In the final analysis, both Kant and Confucius require the vindication of ethical theory in moral practice: “the pursuit of a certain effect of our will would be no duty if the effect were not also possible in experience (whether conceived as complete or as constantly approaching completion).”⁶⁷ Ought implies can. To approve in words without giving proof in deeds is to lack merit (AIX,23).

The consequences of Kantian inflexibility and Confucian flexibility (*ching-ch'uan*) become clear in the respective approaches to law in society. As indicated earlier, Confucians were suspicious of written codes, preferring a system “of men, not of laws,” which relied upon individual cultivation. The opposite view is held by Kant: “The best constitution is that in which not Men but Laws exercise power.”⁶⁸ The lines are firmly drawn here. Kant entrusts the application of moral law to our innate sense of reason, while Confucius advocates the cultivation of a sense of judgment which is guided by experience and fitted to concrete cases.

C. The Ideal of the Good Will: The Principle of Humanity

As seen in the Confucian system, the culmination of respect as a functional principle of positive social interaction comes in the moral role model. Respect for persons and for the moral law is fully embodied in Kant's good will: “Nothing in the world—indeed nothing even beyond the world—can possibly be called good without qualification except a *good will*.”⁶⁹ As concrete guides to the ideal, both Confucius and Kant agree to the use of models of virtue. The inner sense of worthiness, self-respect, must supercede all utilitarian concerns. Only then can the good be projected in terms of human beings and society as a whole, in adherence to the principle of humanity.

The individual with a good will, the will to act on and from moral considerations, strives to realize the qualities of a rational being just as the *chün-tzu* is the consummate social being. Enlightenment is one term Kant applies to describe such a person who has effected “release from his self-incurred tutelage” by daring to put into practice the dictates of an autonomous reason.⁷⁰ Confucius identifies three “Ways of the true gentleman”—happiness, lack of perplexity, and absence of fear (AXIV,30). In Kant these become worthiness for happiness, adherence to reason, and fearlessness.⁷¹

The ongoing quest for moral perfection benefits by a recourse to models of

virtue in both Kant and Confucius. “By the mere habit of frequently looking upon actions as praise-worthy or blame-worthy, a good foundation would be laid for righteousness in the future course of life.”⁷² The same habit-formation is the objective of Confucian ethics. The ultimate and the accessible models are differentiated in both philosophers. Confucius admires the divine sage, while extensively discussing the *chün-tzu*. Kant draws a similar distinction between the absolute perfection of holiness, possible only for divine beings, and that which is appropriate to finite beings in duty. Although we ought to strive to act ‘as if’ we were completely rational, Kant realized this to be beyond the capacities of mere humans, compounded as we are of a dual sensible/intelligible nature. “If a rational creature could ever reach the stage of thoroughly liking to do all moral laws, it would mean that there was no possibility of there being in him a desire which could tempt him to deviate from them, for overcoming such a desire would always cost the subject sacrifice and requires self-compulsion, i.e., an inner constraint to do that which one does not quite like to do.”⁷³ Compare this stance to the account by Confucius of his own moral development (see earlier), which culminated in a spontaneous adherence to *tao*.

Moral models can come from all human sources, “even a humble plain man in whom I perceive righteousness in a higher degree than I am conscious of in myself, *my mind bows* whether I choose or not.” As embodiments of the moral law such people demand our respect.⁷⁴ In fact, “no idea does more to lift the human spirit and to fan its enthusiasm than the very idea of a pure moral character . . . the revelation of divine tendencies within himself deep enough to fill him with sacred awe, at the magnitude and sublimity of his true destiny.” If made a principle of education (as it was by Confucius), Kant predicts it would soon result in an improvement of our moral status.⁷⁵ Imitation of the moral models alone entitles us to a legitimate sense of self-worth: “all claims of self-esteem which precede conformity to the moral law are null and void.”⁷⁶

Nor is Confucian self-criticism lacking in the Kantian ideal of the good will. Our striving for perfection never really ends, but merely draws us on to ever greater heights. All of our actions must continue under the close scrutiny of the will: “The violation of one’s duty even without taking into consideration the disadvantages that follow, directly affects the mind of the agent and makes him reprehensible in his own eyes.”⁷⁷ This will is both legislator and subject of the moral law, and we must be ever wary of this dual role, so that we do not delude ourselves with visions of sovereignty. In this regard, reason acts as a balancing force between the two roles.⁷⁸

The use of others as models, in addition to fostering expressions of respect, bolsters the general principle of respect for persons. Under the form of the principle of humanity, the practical imperative underlying the Categorical Imperative itself, we are enjoined to “Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means

only.”⁷⁹ Respect for others is conjoined with self-respect. A similar principle is put forth by Confucius: “A gentleman is not an implement,” either to himself or to others (AII,12).

Kant’s principle of humanity supplements the Confucian concern with the goal of a stable society by broadening the field of positive social interaction into the progressive dynamism of the future. Moral behavior is motivated by respect for the Moral Law which, by its involvement with human beings, posits “the idea of the highest good possible” as a cooperative effort.⁸⁰ The concept of a community of rational beings, each an autonomous moral agent in the self-legislating exercise of will and judgment, culminates in a “*realm of ends*,” “the systematic union of different rational beings through common laws.”⁸¹ Ultimately, following the upward progress of the species, all human beings will participate in this realm:

The history of mankind can be seen in the large, as the realization of Nature’s secret plan to bring forth a perfectly constituted state as the only condition in which the capacities of mankind can be fully developed, and also bring forth that external relation among states which is perfectly adequate to this end.⁸²

This plan of progress insures the dignity, respectability, and self-respect due to each individual as simultaneously an end in himself or herself, and an actively collaborating means to the end of human good—the principle of humanity as theory fully realized in practice.

By a synthesis of Kantian and Confucian concepts, therefore, ethical theory becomes practical *and* relevant to the dynamic movement of society. Combining the recognition of social roles offered by *li* with the universality of reason in Kant, the roots of an organic theory-practice continuum receive a firm grounding. Respect is directed to both persons and *personae*. Respect for the Moral Law, as *tao* or the Categorical Imperative, conveys the essential nourishment of these roots. Moreover, it takes account of the need for individual judgment or *i* in determining the applicability of moral directives. This process is given a more sophisticated analysis by Confucius, with the flexible balancing of the Mean, thereby overcoming the deficiencies of Kant’s rigid architectonic.

The flowering of the moral system occurs in the respectful imitation of models of virtue in the *chün-tzu* or good will. Society reaps the fruit in terms of positive interaction, while the individual benefits from self-cultivation and self-respect. Here again Confucius improves on Kant by injecting the optimism of ongoing progress for the individual, so that we need not rely solely on the *a priori* resources of reason or the inborn talent of judgment. In a realistic assessment of human nature or *jen*, Confucius acknowledges the complexity of human life which requires more than an appeal to reason alone. The guidance of social institutions and interpersonal experiences supplement rationality.

Ultimately, the experience of the moral being can be integrated into, and inform, ethical theory, improving the chances for success in the self-legislation of the autonomous moral agent. Implementation of the principle of humanity

benefits both individual and society; if protects human dignity on both a personal and a universal scale. This is most forcefully projected in Kant's unique contribution: his vision of ongoing progress in an encompassing community of rational beings, who thus also become perfect social beings, which is the cosmopolitan ideal.

NOTES

1. All references to the *Analects* (denoted by "A," followed by book and chapter numbers) are taken from Arthur Waley's translation (New York: Random House, 1938).
2. Waley interprets this "one thread" as "loyalty to superiors; consideration for the feelings of others, 'not doing to them anything one would not like done to oneself,'" p. 105. This is not far removed from respect.
3. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. Lewis White Beck (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1956), p. 84. In *On the Old Saw: That May be Right in Theory but It Won't Work in Practice*, Kant remarks "The fact that historical experience until now has not yet proved the doctrines of virtue successful may well be due to the wrong premise" (trans. E. B. Ashton (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1974), p. 55). The right premise seems to be respect, in its multiple expressions.
4. Antonio S. Cua, "The Concept of Paradigmatic Individuals in the Ethics of Confucius," contained in *Invitation to Chinese Philosophy: Eight Studies*, ed. Arne Naess and Alastair Hannay (Oslo: Scandinavian University Books, 1972), p. 45.
5. Ibid., pp. 44, 46.
6. H. G. Creel, *Chinese Thought from Confucius to Mao Tse-tung* (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1957).
7. Cua, "The Concept of Paradigmatic Individuals," p. 44.
8. Teng Ssu-Yu's introduction to his translation of *Family Instructions for the Yen Clan: Yen-Shih Chia-Hsun*, the oldest extant text of its kind, dating from the sixth century A.D. The author, Yen Chih-T'ui, himself a scholar, intended the work for the edification of his family members, "so that his descendants might speak elegantly without using slang and act sensibly without being obstinately conservative." The Confucian leanings are much in evidence. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968), pp. xxvi, 1.
9. Yen, *Family Instructions*, p. 3.
10. Creel, *Chinese Thought*, p. 32.
11. Yen, *Family Instructions*, p. x.
12. Yen, referring to his parents, reports "They gave us good advice, asked about our particular interests, criticized our defects and encouraged our good points—always zealous and sincere," p. 2. He also cites a case in which parental discipline was lacking, leading to disastrous results. A young prince, overindulged by his parents, developed a bad character, including "ignorance in distinguishing differences in rank." Eventually he was executed at age fourteen (pp. 6–7). The rotten fruit had to be eradicated before it spoiled the entire crop.
13. Yen, *Family Instructions*, p. 135.
14. Wing-tsit Chan, "The Evolution of the Confucian Concept of Jen," *Philosophy East and West* 4 (January, 1955): 302.
15. Over one hundred separate terms exist in the Chinese language to describe and differentiate family relationships, most of which have no correlates in English. Fung Yu-lan, "The Philosophy at the Basis of Traditional Chinese Society," in *Ideological Differences and World Order*, ed. F. S. C. Northrop (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1971), pp. 23–24. Distinctions are made between siblings on the basis of age, and encompassing terms to indicate brothers or sisters in general are nonexistent. See Hajime Nakamura, *Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples*, trans. and ed. Philip P. Wiener (Honolulu, Hawaii: East-West Press, 1969), p. 266.

¹ Wu-hsin Individual and State in Ancient China: Essays on Four Chinese Philosophers

17. Howard D. Smith, *Confucius* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), p. 158.
18. Cua, "The Concept of Paradigmatic Individuals," p. 46.
19. Chung-ying Cheng, "On Yi as a Universal Principle of Specific Application in Confucian Morality," *Philosophy East and West* 24 (July, 1972): 275.
20. Olga Lang, *Chinese Family and Society* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1946), p. 19.
21. Cua, "The Concept of Paradigmatic Individuals," p. 44.
22. Cheng, "On Yi," p. 270.
23. Ibid., p. 272.
24. Creel, *Chinese Thought*, pp. 38–39.
25. Cheng, "On Yi," p. 271.
26. Creel, *Chinese Thought*, p. 34.
27. Cua, "The Concept of Paradigmatic Individuals," p. 45.
28. Ibid., p. 45.
29. Ibid., p. 50.
30. Mencius provides a case in point, not recommending "that we break the rule, but rather that we act according to *ch'üan*, the *exigency* of the situation. An exigent situation demands urgent and swift attention. . . . It is an exception to the rule only in the sense that the rule, deemed apparently relevant, does not apply to the situation of this sort" Cua, "The Concept of Paradigmatic Individuals," p. 52. The case in Mencius is as follows:

Shun-yu K'un said, "Is it a rule of propriety that men and women should not touch hands when they give or receive things?" Mencius said, "It is a rule of propriety." "If someone's sister-in-law is drowning, should he rescue her with his hand?" Mencius said, "He who does not rescue his drowning sister-in-law is a wolf. It is a rule of propriety for men and women not to touch hands when giving or receiving things, but it is a matter of expediency to rescue one's drowning sister-in-law with hands."

Trans. Wing-tsit Chan in *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 75.

31. Lang, *Chinese Family*, p. 346.
32. Creel, *Chinese Thought*, p. 36.
33. Kung-hsi to Confucius: "When Yu asked, 'When one hears a maxim, should one at once put it into practice?' you said 'You have a father and elder brother alive.' But when Ch'i asked, 'When one hears a maxim, should one at once put it into practice', you said 'When you hear it, put it into practice.' I am perplexed, and would venture to ask how this was. The Master said, Ch'i is backward; so I urged him on. Yu is fanatical about Goodness, so I held him back" (AXI, 21).
34. "A man of *yi*, therefore, must be a man of creative insights who is able to make appropriate moral judgements in particular situations, judgements which will preserve the totality of goodness and justice." Cheng, "On *yi*," p. 272.
35. Cheng, "On Yi," p. 273.
36. Cua, "The Concept of Paradigmatic Individuals," p. 42.
37. W. Scott Morton, "The Confucian Concept of Man: The Original Formulation," *Philosophy East and West* 31 (January, 1971): 71–73. Rubin, p. 23.
38. Cua, "The Concept of Paradigmatic Individuals," p. 42.
39. Morton, "The Confucian Concept of Man," p. 72.
40. Rubin, *Individual and State in Ancient China*, p. 41.
41. Miles Menander Dawson, *The Basic Thoughts of Confucius: The Conduct of Life* (New York: Garden City Publishing Company, 1939), p. 12.
42. Chan, "The Evolution of the Confucian Concept of Jen," p. 319.
43. Waley, *Analects*, p. 28.
44. Chan, "The Evolution," p. 316.
45. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* (Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1964), p. 134.
46. Morton, "The Confucian Concept of Man," p. 75.
47. Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace," trans. Lewis White Beck and included in his edition, *On History* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1963), p. 118.
48. Chung-ying Cheng, "Dialectic of Confucian Morality and Metaphysics of Man," *Philosophy*

East and West 21 (April, 1971): 118. For a discussion on the function of thinking in Chinese philosophy see Waley, *Analects*, p. 44.

49. Kant, *Critique*, pp. 84–85.
50. Kant, *Critique*, p. 86.
51. Immanuel Kant, *Foundation of the Metaphysic of Morals*, trans. Lewis White Beck (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1959), p. 17, note 2.
52. Kant, *Critique*, p. 79.
53. Kant, *Critique*, p. 90.
54. Kant, *Foundation*, p. 53.
55. Cua, "The Concept of Paradigmatic Individuals," p. 45.
56. Kant, *Critique*, pp. 78, 81, 87.
57. Kant, *Critique*, p. 44.
58. Kant, *Foundation*, p. 39.
59. Kant, *Critique*, p. 83.
60. Kant, *Old Saw*, p. 50.
61. Kant, *Old Saw*, p. 41.
62. An example of Kantian inflexibility is shown in the following case: You are living in Germany during the Second World War, and have undertaken the protection of some persecuted Jews. A Nazi officer arrives at the door and demands to know if you are hiding any Jews. Under Kant's universal standards, which include the maxim always to tell the truth, you cannot lie. No exceptions are allowed. Somewhat paradoxically, telling the truth to the Nazi falls under the principle of respect for persons, in that we cannot treat him as a mere means to the end of saving the Jews. I am indebted to Professor Steven Schwarzchild of Washington University for this dramatic example, which apparently is derived from Kant's discussion of an almost identical case in *Über ein Vermeintes aus Menschenliebe zu Lügen*.
63. Kant, *Old Saw*, p. 43. An interesting Kantian note is sounded by Waley in this comment: "The success of Confucianism ... was due in a large measure to the fact that it contrived to endow compromise with an emotional glamour." p. 36.
64. Kant, *Critique*, p. 72.
65. Kant, *Critique*, p. 80.
66. Kant, *Critique*, p. 33.
67. Kant, *Old Saw*, p. 42.
68. Kant's *Philosophy of Law*, trans. W. Hastie, as included in *The Great Legal Philosophers*, ed. Clarence Morris (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1976), p. 260.
69. Kant, *Foundations*, p. 9.
70. Immanuel Kant, "What is Enlightenment?", trans. Lewis White Beck, in *On History*, p. 3. The motto of the Enlightenment is quoted in this essay as 'Sapere aude', 'Have courage to use your own reason.'
71. "Only one who is himself enlightened is not afraid of shadows"; Kant, "What is Enlightenment?" p. 10. See also *Old Saw*, p. 45.
72. Kant, *Critique*, p. 158.
73. Kant, *Critique*, pp. 84, 86.
74. Kant, *Critique*, pp. 79, 81.
75. Kant, *Old Saw*, p. 54.
76. Kant, *Critique*, p. 76.
77. Kant, *Old Saw*, p. 55.
78. Kant, *Critique*, p. 85.
79. Kant, *Foundations*, p. 51.
80. Kant, *Old Saw*, pp. 46–47.
81. Kant, *Foundations*, p. 51.
82. Kant, "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View," trans. Lewis White Beck, p. 21; "An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?", trans. Robert E. Anchor, p. 137. Both included in *On History*.