Week 8: MDP and Value Iteration

COMP90054 – AI Planning for Autonomy

Key concepts

- Markov Decision Processes (MDPs)
- Solving MDPs:
  - Value Iteration

Classical Planning vs. MDPs

Classical Planning	Markov Decision Processes (MDPs)
Set of states S	Set of states S
Initial state s_0	Initial state s_0
Action A(s)	Action A(s)
Transition function s' = f(a, s)	***Transition probabilities $P_a(s'\|s)$***
Goals $S_G \subseteq S$	***Reward function r(s, a, s') (positive or negative)***
Action costs c(a, s)	
	Discount factor $0 \leq \gamma \leq 1$ (prefer shorter plans over longer plans)

Non-deterministic

Solution: Minimise the cost

maximize the reward

$$S \xrightarrow{a\ (P=0.2)} s1$$

$$S \xrightarrow{a\ (P=0.8)} s2$$

Task 1: Model the Grid MDP example with a formal discounted-reward MDP model

(3x 4)

S, s_0, A(s), $\boldsymbol{P_a(s'|s)}$, ***r(s, a, s')***, γ

$S = \{ \langle x,y \rangle \mid x = \{0, 2, 3\}, y = \{0, 2\} \}$

$S_0 = \langle 0, 0 \rangle$

$A = \{$ North, South, East, West $\}$



Task 1: Model the Grid MDP example with a formal discounted-reward MDP model

S, s_0, A(s), $\boldsymbol{P_a(s'|s)}$, ***r(s, a, s')***, γ



- **North:**
  - move up: P = 0.8
  - slip right: P = 0.1
  - slip left: P = 0.1

Task 1: Model the Grid MDP example with a formal discounted-reward MDP model



Solving MDPs?

Bellman equations

For discounted-reward MDPs the Bellman equation is defined recursively as:

$0 \leq \gamma \leq 1$

$$\underbrace{Q(s,a)}_{\text{expected reward of action } a \text{ in state } s} = \sum_{s' \in S} \underbrace{P_a(s'|s)}_{\text{the probability of action } a} \, [\underbrace{r(s,a,s')}_{\text{immediate reward}} + \underbrace{\gamma V(s')}_{\text{discounted future reward}}]$$

$$V(s) = \max_{a \in A(s)} Q(s,a)$$

expected value of being in state s and acting optimally

Solving MDPs? Value Iteration

- Set V_0 to arbitrary value function; e.g., $V_0(s) = 0$ for all s.
- Set V_{i+1} to result of Bellman's **right hand side** using V_i in place of V:

$$V_{i+1}(s) := \max_{a \in A(s)} \sum_{s' \in S} P_a(s'|s) \; [r(s,a,s') + \gamma \; V_i(s')]$$

Workshop Problem

Consider two football-playing robots: Messi and Suarez.

They play a simple two-player cooperate game of football, and you need to write a controller for them. Each player can pass the ball or can shoot at goal.

The football game can be modelled as a discounted-reward MDP with three states: $Messi$, $Suarez$ (denoting who has the ball), and $Scored$ (denoting that a goal has been scored); and the following action descriptions:

- If Messi shoots, he has 0.2 chance of scoring a goal and a 0.8 chance of the ball going to Suarez. Shooting towards the goal incurs a cost of 2 (or a reward of -2).
- If Suarez shoots, he has 0.6 chance of scoring a goal and a 0.4 chance of the ball going to Messi. Shooting towards the goal incurs a cost of 2 (or a reward of -2).
- If either player passes, the ball will reach its intended target with a probability of 1.0. Passing the ball incurs a cost 1 (or a reward of -1).
- If a goal is scored, the only action is to return the ball to Messi, which has a probability of 1.0 and has a reward of 2. Thus the reward for scoring is modelled by giving a reward of 2 when **leaving** the goal state.

The following diagram shows the transition probabilities and rewards:



Workshop Problem

	Iteration 0	Iteration 1	Iteration 2	Iteration 3
V(Messi)	0			
V(Suarez)	0			
V(Scored)	0			

The following diagram shows the transition probabilities and rewards:



$\gamma = 1$

S = { Messi, Scored, Suarez }

Iteration 0: Set $V_0(s) = 0$ for all s

Workshop Problem

	Iteration 0	Iteration 1	Iteration 2	Iteration 3
V(Messi)	0	-1		
V(Suarez)	0			
V(Scored)	0			

The following diagram shows the transition probabilities and rewards:



- Set V_{i+1} to result of Bellman's **right hand side** using V_i in place of V:

$$V_{i+1}(s) := \max_{a \in A(s)} \sum_{s' \in S} P_a(s'|s)\,[r(s,a,s') + \gamma\, V_i(s')]$$

s = Messi

s' = Suarez/Scored

a = shoot/pass

$\boldsymbol{\gamma} = \mathbf{1}$

Iteration 1: $V_1(Messi) = -1$

- shoot

$$P_{shoot}(Scored \mid Messi)\,[r(Messi, shoot, Scored) + \gamma V_0(Scored)] + P_{shoot}(Suarez \mid Messi)\,[r(Messi, shoot, Suarez) + \gamma V_0(Suarez)]$$

$$= 0.2[-2 + 1 \times 0] + 0.8[-2 + 1 \times 0] = -0.4 - 1.6 = -2$$

- pass

$$P_{pass}(Suarez \mid Messi)\,[r(Messi, pass, Suarez) + \gamma V_0(Suarez)]$$

$$= 1 \times [-1 + 1 \times 0] = -1$$

max

Workshop Problem

The following diagram shows the transition probabilities and rewards:



	Iteration 0	Iteration 1	Iteration 2	Iteration 3
V(Messi)	0	-1		
V(Suarez)	0	-1		
V(Scored)	0			

- Set V_{i+1} to result of Bellman's **right hand side** using V_i in place of V:

$$V_{i+1}(s) := \max_{a \in A(s)} \sum_{s' \in S} P_a(s'|s)\,[r(s,a,s') + \gamma\, V_i(s')]$$

s = Suarez

s' = Messi/Scored

a = shoot/pass

$\boldsymbol{\gamma} = \mathbf{1}$

Iteration 1: $V_1(Suarez)$

- shoot

$P_{shoot}(Scored \mid Suarez)[r(Suarez, shoot, Scored) + \gamma V_0(Scored)]$

$+ P_{shoot}(Messi \mid Suarez)[r(Suarez, shoot, Messi) + \gamma V_0(Messi)]$

$= 0.6 \times [-2 + 1 \times 0] + 0.4 \times [-2 + 1 \times 0] = -1.2 + -0.8 = -2$

- pass

$P_{pass}(Messi \mid Suarez)[r(Suarez, pass, Messi) + \gamma V_0(Messi)]$

$= 1 \times [-1 + 1 \times 0] = -1$

Workshop Problem

	Iteration 0	Iteration 1	Iteration 2	Iteration 3
V(Messi)	0	-1		
V(Suarez)	0	-1		
V(Scored)	0	2		

- Set V_{i+1} to result of Bellman's **right hand side** using V_i in place of V:

$$V_{i+1}(s) := \max_{a \in A(s)} \sum_{s' \in S} P_a(s'|s)\,[r(s,a,s') + \gamma\, V_i(s')]$$

Iteration 1: $V_1(Scored)$

- return

The following diagram shows the transition probabilities and rewards:



s = Scored

s' = Messi

a = return

$\gamma = 1$

Workshop Problem

	Iteration 0	Iteration 1	Iteration 2	Iteration 3
V(Messi)	0	-1	-2	
V(Suarez)	0	-1		
V(Scored)	0	2		

- Set V_{i+1} to result of Bellman's **right hand side** using V_i in place of V:

$$V_{i+1}(s) := \max_{a \in A(s)} \sum_{s' \in S} P_a(s'|s)\, [r(s,a,s') + \gamma\, V_i(s')]$$

Iteration 2: $V_2(Messi)$

- shoot

- pass

The following diagram shows the transition probabilities and rewards:



Workshop Problem

The following diagram shows the transition probabilities and rewards:



	Iteration 0	Iteration 1	Iteration 2	Iteration 3
V(Messi)	0	-1	-2	
V(Suarez)	0	-1	-1.2	
V(Scored)	0	2		

- Set V_{i+1} to result of Bellman's **right hand side** using V_i in place of V:

$$V_{i+1}(s) := \max_{a \in A(s)} \sum_{s' \in S} P_a(s'|s)\,[r(s,a,s') + \gamma\, V_i(s')]$$

Iteration 2: $V_2(Suarez)$

- shoot

- pass

Workshop Problem

	Iteration 0	Iteration 1	Iteration 2	Iteration 3
V(Messi)	0	-1	-2	
V(Suarez)	0	-1	-1.2	
V(Scored)	0	2	1	

- Set V_{i+1} to result of Bellman's **right hand side** using V_i in place of V:

$$V_{i+1}(s) := \max_{a \in A(s)} \sum_{s' \in S} P_a(s'|s)\,[r(s,a,s') + \gamma\, V_i(s')]$$

Iteration 2: $V_2(Scored)$

- return

The following diagram shows the transition probabilities and rewards:



Workshop Problem

	Iteration 0	Iteration 1	Iteration 2	Iteration 3
V(Messi)	0	-1	-2	
V(Suarez)	0	-1	-1.2	
V(Scored)	0	2	1	

The following diagram shows the transition probabilities and rewards:



- Set V_{i+1} to result of Bellman's **right hand side** using V_i in place of V:

$$V_{i+1}(s) := \max_{a \in A(s)} \sum_{s' \in S} P_a(s'|s)\,[r(s,a,s') + \gamma\, V_i(s')]$$

Iteration 3: $V_3(Messi)$ $S = Messi,\ s' = Scored / Suarez$

- shoot $P_{shoot}(Scored \mid Messi)\,[r(Messi, shoot, Scored) + \gamma V_2(Scored)]$

$+\ P_{shoot}(Suarez \mid Messi)\,[r(Messi, shoot, Suarez) + \gamma V_2(Suarez)]$

$= 0.2[-2 + 1 \times 1] + 0.8[-2 + 1 \times -1.2] = -0.2 + 0.8 \times -3.2 = -2.76$

- pass

$P_{pass}(Suarez \mid Messi)\,[r(Messi, pass, Suarez) + \gamma V_2(Suarez)]$

$= 1 \times [-1 + 1 \times -1.2] = -2.2$

Workshop Problem

The following diagram shows the transition probabilities and rewards:



	Iteration 0	Iteration 1	Iteration 2	Iteration 3
V(Messi)	0	-1	-2	-2.2
V(Suarez)	0	-1	-1.2	
V(Scored)	0	2	1	

- Set V_{i+1} to result of Bellman's **right hand side** using V_i in place of V:

$$V_{i+1}(s) := \max_{a \in A(s)} \sum_{s' \in S} P_a(s'|s)\,[r(s,a,s') + \gamma\, V_i(s')]$$

Iteration 3: $V_3(Suarez)$

- shoot

$P_{shoot}(Scored \mid Suarez)[r(Suarez, shoot, Scored) + \gamma V_2(Scored)]$

$+ P_{shoot}(Messi \mid Suarez)[r(Suarez, shoot, Messi) + \gamma V_2(Messi)]$

$= 0.6[-2 + 1 \times 1] + 0.4[-2 + 1 \times -2] = -0.6 + -1.6 = -2.2$

- pass

$P_{pass}(Messi \mid Suarez)[r(Suarez, pass, Messi) + \gamma V_2(Messi)]$

$= 1 \times [-1 + 1 \times -2] = -3$

Workshop Problem

The following diagram shows the transition probabilities and rewards:



	Iteration 0	Iteration 1	Iteration 2	Iteration 3
V(Messi)	0	-1	-2	-2.2
V(Suarez)	0	-1	-1.2	-2.2
V(Scored)	0	2	1	0

- Set V_{i+1} to result of Bellman's **right hand side** using V_i in place of V:

$$V_{i+1}(s) := \max_{a \in A(s)} \sum_{s' \in S} P_a(s'|s)\,[r(s,a,s') + \gamma\, V_i(s')]$$

Iteration 3: $V_3(Scored)$

- return $P_{return}(Messi \mid Scored)\,[r(Scored, return, Messi) + \gamma V_2(Messi)]$

$= 1 \times [2 + 1 \times -2] = 0$

Workshop Problem

	Iteration 0	Iteration 1	Iteration 2	Iteration 3
V(Messi)	0	-1	-2	-2.2
V(Suarez)	0	-1	-1.2	-2.2
V(Scored)	0	2	1	0

The following diagram shows the transition probabilities and rewards:



If we only have 3 iterations, what actions did we take to maximise the reward?

Messi Pass
Suarez Shoot
Scored Return

Workshop Problem

	Iteration 0	Iteration 1	Iteration 2	Iteration 3
V(Messi)	0	-1	-2	-2.2
V(Suarez)	0	-1	-1.2	-2.2
V(Scored)	0	2	1	0

When to stop the iteration?

The iteration is stopped when Δ reaches some pre-defined threshold θ

(when the largest change in the values between iterations is ”small enough”)

Algorithm – Value iteration

Input: MDP $M = \langle S, s_0, A, P_a(s' \mid s), r(s, a, s') \rangle$
Output: Value function V

Set V to arbitrary value function; e.g., $V(s) = 0$ for all s

Repeat
  $\Delta \leftarrow 0$
  For each $s \in S$
    $\underbrace{V'(s) \leftarrow \max_{a \in A(s)} \sum_{s' \in S} P_a(s' \mid s)\, [r(s, a, s') + \gamma\, V(s')]}_{\text{Bellman equation}}$
    $\Delta \leftarrow \max(\Delta, |V'(s) - V(s)|)$
  $V \leftarrow V'$
Until $\Delta \leq \theta$