
UNIT 1 *PRAMANAS*–I

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1.0 OBJECTIVES

- To familiarize the students with the sources of knowledge (*Pramanas*) from Eastern and Western perspectives; and
- To encourage them to explore the various issues connected to perception.

1.1 INTRODUCTION

After asking, “Can I know?” the next question is obviously “How do I know?” or the sources of knowledge. Obviously the external world is the primary source of our knowledge, which does not rule out the role of the knower. This complex issue of how we come to know has been treated insightfully and comprehensively in Western Philosophy. Indian Philosophy speaks of the sources of knowledge (or *Pramanas*), which are meant by which we can come to know and to know what. We shall, however, overlook the controversy in Indian philosophy regarding their number, whether one could consider them as one (as in Carvakas), two (as in Buddhism and Vaisesika), three (as in Samkhya), four (as in Nyaya), five (as in Mimamsa), six (as in Vedanta and Kumarila’s Mimamsa, etc., upto no less than ten. Whether a way of arriving at knowledge is to be considered genuine or not is certainly not an idle question, but whether such a way is implied in another way is, according to us, not so important. Many schools differ from others regarding the number of such ways sometimes because they do not consider certain ways to be genuine, but, often times, because they consider certain ways to be implied in others and therefore not independent sources of knowledge. We shall elaborate only those ways which both in the West and in the East consider important. In this particular unit our main focus is on the first source of knowledge, that is, perception.

1.2 PRAMANAS AS SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

Pramana (“sources of knowledge,” “measure”) is an epistemological term in Indian and Buddhist philosophies referring to the means by which a person obtains accurate and valid knowledge (*Prama*, *pramiti*) of the world. In obtaining *Prama*, or correct knowledge, *Pramana* forms one part of a *triputi* (trio): *Pramata*, the subject, the knower; *Pramana*, the means of obtaining the knowledge; *Prameya*, the object, the knowable.

The three principal means of knowledge are perception, inference, and word. Perception (*pratyaksa*) is of two kinds, direct sensory perception (*anubhava*) and such perception remembered (*smṛti*). Inference (*anumana*) is based on perception, but is able to arrive at conclusions that may not be directly open to perception. The word (*sabda*) is, in the first place, the Veda, which is considered to be inherently valid. Some philosophers broaden this to include the statements of reliable persons (*apta-vakya*) in the concept of *sabda*, and add two more means of obtaining knowledge, analogy (*upamana*), which enables one to grasp the meaning of a word by analogy of the meaning of a similar word, and circumstantial implication (*arthapatti*), which appeals to common sense.

Buddhism and Jainism also pursue an understanding of how correct knowledge can be obtained. While rejecting the authority given by Hinduism to the *Vedas*, they rely on religious texts of their own as a partial source of knowledge. In Buddhism, the two most important scholars of *Pramana* are Dignaga and Dharmakirti, author of *Pramana-varttika*.

Advaita Vedanta, accepts various categories of *Pramanas*: *Pratyaksa*—the knowledge gained by means of the senses. *Anumana*—(“measuring along some other thing,” or “inference”), the knowledge gained by means of inference. *Upamana*—the knowledge gained by means of analogy. *Upamana* (“comparison”), a means of having knowledge of something, in which observance of its similarities to another object provides knowledge of the relationship between the two. For example, when the meaning of a word is unknown, for example, “*gavaya*” (Sanskrit: “wild ox”), the similarity of the name to the word *gaus* (“cow”) will provide knowledge that “*gavaya*” is in the bovine family. *Arthapatti*—(“the incidence of a case”), the knowledge gained by circumstantial implication, superimposing the known knowledge on an appearing knowledge that does not concur with the known knowledge. *Sabda* or *Agama*—the knowledge gained by means of texts such as *Vedas* (also known as *Aptavakya*, *sabda Pramana*)

So in this chapter we shall follow the order usually given by authors writing on Indian Epistemology, integrating theories and insights of Western Schools of Philosophy and adding our own comments and reflections. Note, in this respect, that where as we, in the first chapter, already made it clear that what we mean by ‘to know’ (or ‘knowledge’) is essentially to know truly and reasonably, Indian Philosophers distinguished between ‘*jnana*’ (or *Buddhi*) – unfortunately often translated into English as ‘knowledge’ – which can be either true or false, and ‘*Prama*’ which is necessarily true (and which, therefore, corresponds more to what we are calling ‘knowledge’). *Pramanas*, are

therefore, strictly speaking, ways or means to obtain *Prama*, true knowledge. But, in point of fact, at is often meant by the term is ways and means, or source, of knowledge which can be either true or false. So to avoid confusion we shall reserve 'knowledge' only to essentially true knowledge (*Prama*) and use 'cognition' to stand for that which can be either true or false (*jnana* or *Buddhi*).

1.3 PERCEPTION (*PRATYAKSA*)

Sense-experience is certainly one of the ways of how we come to know. It is not only just one way, but certainly the chronologically first and most basic way of man's coming to know anything at all. Certain philosophers maintain that this is not the case since of certain things we have 'innate ideas' independently of any sense-experience. We shall discuss this topic later. Generally speaking all schools of philosophy, except for certain forms of Western Rationalism, accept sense-experience (perception) to be genuine means of knowledge – even though, dependently on their respective psychology, they explain its 'mechanism' differently. There are some who maintain that only sense experience is genuine source of knowledge, thus denying any knowledge of what is not sense-perceptible or at least, of what is not verifiable or falsifiable by sense observation (empiricism). Some others maintain that our knowledge of God, and religious language, though possible, take their origin from sense-experience. It is clear how both of these positions affect – though in a different way – our understanding of religious faith and belief. We shall limit ourselves to certain important points.

It is not difficult to say that since our senses often deceive us – a question already raised in the introduction - the senses, or sense-experience, are not always a reliable source of knowledge. The fact of this possible deception simply proves that it is not the senses which 'know,' it is humans who know, by means of their senses. We have already pointed out that knowledge, all knowledge, implies a judgment. And in passing this judgment, we can certainly err – not because, however of any radical unreliability of the senses but because of some extrinsic factors like hastiness in judgment, ignorance of some physical fact, etc. And what is more, even if we accept the fact that, contrary to what common sense-experience, qualities of objects (like colour and sound) are quantities (e.g. measurable wave lengths), the sense organs have still to be presumed to be reliable to produce regular wave-lengths (through the nerve systems) so as to be correctly 'interpreted' and known by the brain and to be 'measured' on the appropriate instrument.

But one big lesson we can learn from rationalism, especially of the idealistic type, is that sensations are not simply passive registering of the sense data. A lot of active 'interpretation' on the part of the knower - by his reasoning faculties – takes place in every act of perception. If, as we have just said, it is humans who know (and not the senses), all that goes into the making of humans, goes into perception, and understanding of the reality. Many things which we think are mere objects of sense (e.g. space.) is human 'construction'. They may be originating in the senses and from sense-experience, but they are, in fact, rationally 'built up'. And not only their reasoning faculties, but their emotions, etc., colour the picture they draw of the world around them. This is a very important point to be mentioned here.

1.4 THE SENSE-ORGANS AND *PRATYAKSA*

Indian Philosophy speak of external and internal senses. The external ones – to which correspond five kinds of external perceptions – are the visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory and gustatory. The internal one, in Indian Psychology, is the *Manas* or *Antahkarana*. It is the perception of myself seeing, of myself hearing, etc. it is operative also in the perception of external objects – when I perceive something, I perceive myself as perceiving the object – but the immediate object of perception by the *manas* is the ‘myself’. Of course, those who deny a ‘self’ or those who reduce it simply to a chain of perceptions (empiricists of all kinds, both in the West and in the East) do not pose it such an internal sense. (This is an instance where one’s epistemology is fashioned by one’s psychology.) Those who do either posit it or account for the perception of the self either through inference or some kind of higher perception. This internal sense corresponds to the ‘central sense’ in medieval Western Philosophy by which we are aware of ourselves and of our activities, are able to distinguish between our different sensations and activities and integrate the data of the external sense. In this way we can refer to a common, definite object of sense perception.

Check Your Progress I

Note: Use the space provided for your answer

1. What are some of categories of *Pramanas* that Advaita Vedanta accept?

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2. What is ‘manas’ or ‘antahkarna’?

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1.5 *PRATYAKSA* IN INDIAN TRADITION

According to the Carvaka school, *pratyaksa* or perception is the only source of knowledge; i.e., what cannot be perceived through the senses must be treated as non-existent. They refute all other sources of knowledge. They admit only four elements; i.e., earth, water, air and fire. We experience all the four through perception. So, perception is the only authority. There is no space because we cannot perceive any such element. The world of common sense perception is the only world that exists. Again, the physical body is the self of an individual. There is no mind, no consciousness, no soul, over and above

the physical body. We do not perceive mind or soul. Hence they are unreal. Even consciousness is a by-product and epiphenomenon of matter. "Matter secretes mind as liver secretes bile." A particular combination of elements produces consciousness though the elements separately do not possess it. It is similar to the red colour being produced from the combination of betel leaf, areca nut and lime, none of which is red.

For the Jainas, Perceptual knowledge which is ordinarily called immediate, and admitted to be relatively so by Jainism and therefore included in mediate knowledge. Pure perception in the sense of mere sensation cannot rank the title of knowledge. It must be given meaning and arranged into order by conception or thought. Perceptual knowledge is therefore regarded as mediate since it presupposes the activity of thought. Mediate knowledge is divided into *mati* and *shruta*. *Mati* includes both perceptual and inferential knowledge. *Mati jnana* springs in the following order.

- (1) *Avagraha*-Is the first kind of knowledge produced from the contact of sense organs with the objects.
- (2) *Iha*-This follows *avagraha* and in it the soul is able to appreciate the qualities of the visible object.
- (3) *Avaya*-In this we come to know definitely about the object
- (4) *Dharand*-In this the full knowledge about the object leaves an impression upon the mind of the man.

The Vaibhasikas accept the presence of the external things and conceive them as subject to perception. According to Vaibhasika that is *Pramana* by which direct knowledge is possible. The *Pramanas* are two types: *Pratyaksa* (perception) and *anumana* (inferential). Both these *Pramanas* are known as *samyagjnana* (right knowledge) and it is by these that all the *purusharthas* are attained. *Pratyaksa* is the knowledge devoid of imagination and error. This knowledge is of four types.:

- (1) *Indriya jnana*—This is the knowledge attained through senses.
- (2) *Mano vijnana*—in this knowledge there is the sensual knowledge in the form of *samanantara pratyaya* after the knowledge through senses. This *samanantara pratyaya* is a mental modification in the absence of which there is no knowledge even after continued seeing. Thus *mano vijnana* is born of both the object and the consciousness.
- (3) *Atma samvedana*—It is the manifestation of *chitta* and its *dharma*s are like pleasure and pain in their real form. This is attribute less, without error and of the nature of self-realisation
- (4) *Yogic jnana*—It is the ultimate knowledge of the things perceptible through various *Pramanas*. The object of *pratyaksa* is *svalaksana*. *Svalaksana* is that object in which there is difference in the form of knowledge by the presence and absence of its contact. It is by it that a thing has the capacity to do anything. Hence it is said to be *paramartha satya*.

The Sautrantikas do not admit that the external objects have no existence and all knowledge is in the consciousness. Nor do they believe like the Vaibhasikas that we know anything by direct perception. As opposed to

Justification of Knowledge

Vaibhasikas, the Sautrantikas maintain that we have no direct perception of the external objects but only the knowledge of their appearance. It is by the distinction in these appearances which are the basis of the knowledge. Hence they are in the mind itself, though the things which they represent as external objects are not known by their perception, but by the inference based upon the mental modifications aroused by them. This view is known as *Bahyanumeyavada*. It is representationalism or indirect realism.

According to Yogachara the physical world has no existence apart from consciousness. Even if the existence of anything outside consciousness is admitted it cannot be known. Vijnanavadins believe that all things external to mind are mental modifications. Thus the knowledge of the external things is impossible. Hence the thing which appears to be external; should be taken as a mental concept.

Vaisesika recognises only two *Pramanas*- perception and inference and reduces comparison and verbal testimony to inference. For Nyaya philosophy, Perception is divided into ordinary (*Laukika*) and extra-ordinary (*Alaukika*). In ordinary perception knowledge results from the contact of the sense organs with the external objects (*bahya*). Extraordinary perception has three distinctions - perception of classes (*samanyalaksana*), complication (*jnana laksnana*) and intuitive (*yogaja*). The Naiyayika maintains two stages in perception- *Nirvikalpa* (indeterminate) and *Savikalpa* (determinate). Gautama, accepts this distinction of perception.

Samkhya believes in 'representative perception'. In knowledge the internal organ mediates the *purusa* and objects when an object comes within the range of vision, the internal organ is so modified as to assume the form of an object. The modification of the internal organ into an object is called *vrutti* or mode. Knowledge means that mode as illuminated by the light of *purusa*. Illumination is a constant feature of perceptual knowledge. The modes vary in accordance with the objects presented.

According to Kumarila Bhatta, valid knowledge is that which provides the experience of an unknown object, that which is not contradicted by other knowledge and which is free from other defects. The Mimamsakas uphold *svatah pramanya vada* or self validity of knowledge. Knowledge is valid by itself. The conditions of freedom from defects and non-contradiction being satisfied, all knowledge arises as self-valid. Coherence and self-consistency is the nature of valid knowledge. Both Prabhakara and Kumarila regard knowledge itself as *Pramana* or means of knowledge. Jaimini admits three *Pramanas*- perception, inference and testimony. Prabhakara adds two more—comparison and implication. Kumarila further adds non-apprehension.

According to Vedanta, there are three *Pramanas*- Perception (*pratyaksa*), Inference (*tarka*), and Scripture (*sruti*). In perception the subject and object become identical because in fact both are the same consciousness. The subject and the object remain separate due to the covering of ignorance. But by the direct union of *Antakarana* through the sense it takes the form of the object and shines in the form of that particular object illumined by the self due to the removal of the covering of ignorance. According to Advaita, in the perception of an external object, the mind goes out through the sense organ, say the 'eyes' and reaches the place of the object, say a 'pot' and assumes the shape of the pot which modifies into the thought 'pot'. This modification

is known as *vr̥tti*. The pervasion of *vr̥tti* removes the veil of ignorance (*vr̥ttivyāpti*) and the pervasion of reflected consciousness illumines the object (*phalavyāpti*), which is expressed as ‘This is a pot’. The capacity of the mind to illumine an object is because of the reflection of Consciousness (Brahman) in the mind. The knowledge of experiences like happiness, sorrow etc that occur in the mind without the aid of sense organs is known by the ‘witness consciousness.’ There is a mental modification internally that is expressed as ‘I am happy’ etc. The knowledge of self or Brahman cannot be gained by perceptual cognition since Brahman can never be objectified. When we say, words reveal Brahman, *vr̥ttivyāpti* alone functions and not *phalavyāpti*, since Brahman is self-evident luminous being, hence the knowledge of Brahman is known as *svārūpa-jñāna* or knowledge of nature of self as opposed to *vr̥tti-jñāna* or empirical knowledge.

Theory of Erroneous perception

An object perceived differently is said to be invalid cognition in which again the three factors operate namely, the knower, the known and the instrument of knowledge. The famous example oft-quoted by Advaita School is one seeing rope as ‘snake’. The reason for this erroneous perception may be due to defect in the perceiver, in the instrument of perception, in the environment (dim light), in the object etc. The analysis of the process of erroneous cognition by Advaita School is known as ‘Indescribable Error’ (*Anirvachaniya khyati*). It is imperative to understand the mechanism of error, since for Advaita, bondage is an error superimposed on Brahman due to self-ignorance and hence knowledge alone is the means to liberation. Based on the indescribable theory of error, the rope-ignorance creates a ‘snake’ here ignorance is the material cause of ‘snake’. The rope is the substratum on which ‘snake’ is superimposed and hence rope is the transfigurative material cause of ‘snake’. The perceiver of ‘snake’ superimposes the characteristics of snake is frightened and tries to run away. On rise of rope-knowledge, the ‘snake’ vanishes and the person ‘feels’ saved. In this instance, there is no sorrow but still one experiences grief because of lack of knowledge of reality (rope-knowledge). Advaitin states, in the same manner, the world of plurality is superimposed on non-dual Brahman due to ignorance, plurality is cause of sorrow, on wake of Brahman-knowledge plurality vanishes (just as the ‘snake’ vanished) and one realises the non-dual nature of self and ‘attains’ bliss. Ramanuja admits three *Pramanas*- perception, inference and verbal testimony. He rejects *nirvikalpa* stage of perception. In Dvaita epistemology the process of knowing is explained as a mode of the internal organ. Knowledge always points to a complex or qualified object. Truth is defined as correspondence with outside reality.

Indeterminate and determinate perception

Indeterminate (*Nirvikalapa*) and determinate (*savikalapa*) perception are also spoken of by philosophers and mystics. We mention this distinction both because the terms often recur in Indian Philosophical literature and because it serves to bring out a point which we insisted upon earlier, namely, that every perception, indeed every act of knowledge (*Prama*) entails judgment. Unlike some commentators, we do not understand this to be a distinction between two kinds of perception but rather as an insightful analysis of the two stages in the process of any act of perception. At first I perceive something vaguely without being able to say what exactly it is that I am perceiving.

This is the indeterminate perception. It is only when I perceive what the thing, when I am able to say what it is, that I can say that I am really determinately perceiving it. And this, of course, entails judgment. So normally perception starts off as indeterminate and ends as determinate.

1.6 NORMAL (*LAUKIKA*) AND SUPRA-NORMAL (*ALAUKIKA*) PERCEPTION

This is a very intriguing distinction and it is worth giving some thought. Besides the normal perception, Indian philosophy speaks of a supranormal one. It is supranormal because where as the normal perception is due to the ‘contact’ (*sannikarsa*) of the sense organ with the object, the latter is not, and yet it is still considered to be a ‘direct’ apprehension of the object and therefore a perception.

This supranormal perception is of three kinds: the first is the (direct) apprehension of the ‘universal’ in the object, e.g. of the “cowness” in the cow. The second is the perception of an object which is not proportionate to the sense-organ by which it is normally perceived. For example, on a hot day I see a picture of the sea and I feel cool. Now the usual explanation given to this is that the sight experience is associated with a past experience of coolness so as to produce, as it were, a two-fold sensation (the visual and the tactile). Illusion, according to some, can be explained in this way. I see a rope in the dark and I perceive a snake. The presented object (rope) is mistaken for the represented object (the snake of a past experience) due to this association. In some mystical literature, we come across authors who speak of, for example, ‘touching’, ‘smelling’, and ‘tasting’ spiritual realities. Some commentators understand this as symbolic language, but others do not fail to speak, in this context, of ‘spiritual faculties’ – distinct both from mere intellectual knowledge on the one hand and from ordinary sense perception on the other.

The third is more intriguing. It is yogic (*yogaja*) perception to recondite or subtle things, in remote places or times including the past and future, due to an intense illumination of the mind obtained in deep concentration. It is intriguing because all schools of Indian philosophy, including the ‘heterodox’ ones, claim that such a supranormal perception is possible (it is *paramartika* perception of Jainism, the bodhi of the Buddhist, the *Kaivalya* of Samkhya – yoga and the *aparoksanubhuti* of Vedanta). It is interesting, in fact, to compare and contrast in this respect, for example what Patanjali and Christian mystic St. John of the Cross have to say on the matter. Both speak of the power of knowing and foretelling future events, of knowing the exact time of one’s death, of knowing and reading other people’s minds, and of a certain kind of “knowing all things”, etc. St. John of the Cross, speaking of the power of knowing events happening in one’s absence, remarks that such “knowledge derives from the illumined and purified spirit of those who have reached perfection or are close to it.”

We could interpret all this in a variety of ways – apart from dismissing it as “just talk”. We could, for example, interpret this kind of perception – together with other phenomena which, it is claimed, usually accompany it like supra human strength, ability to go without food or drink for an extra ordinary length of time, etc., as a symbolic description of the powers of the perception

of the deeper (or higher) levels of human consciousness. Today we often hear of a “sixth sense” or even, more generally still of “extra sensory perception” (ESP). Claims are being made that experiments scientifically conducted, are proving that the range of human perception is much wider and deeper than hitherto commonly supposed.

Check Your Progress II

Note: Use the space provided for your answer

1. What is determinate (*savikalapaka*) perception?

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2. What is supranormal perception?

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3. Which are the three kinds of supranormal perception?

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1.7 PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS FOR PERCEPTION

In the next section, we elaborate on the philosophical basis for perception, as outlined in an article in *Wikipedia* (2010). The philosophy of perception is concerned with the nature of sensory experience, the status of what is given in such experience, and in particular, with how beliefs or knowledge about the (physical) world can be accounted for and justified on that basis systematically, internalist and externalist accounts can be formulated and distinguished.

Internalism assumes the objects or basis of perceptual knowledge to be aspects of an individual’s mind, e.g. mental states, which in principle the individual can always have access to. In contrast, externalism states that this basis of perception need not entail mental states or experience at all, but is constituted by aspects of the world which is truly external to the individual.

A central question to the philosophy of perception concerns what constitutes the immediate objects of perception. Contrary to the position of naïve realism—

which can be identified with the ‘everyday’ impression of physical objects existing independently of the observer and constituting what is perceived—certain observations are put forward which suggest otherwise. The latter comprise perceptual illusions, hallucinations, and the relativity of perceptual experience, but also insights from the field of science.

The most common belief about perception, probably universal in childhood, is naïve realism, in which people believe that what they perceive are things in themselves. Common people carry this belief into adult and professional life. In this form, naïve realism is not strictly a theory but rather an axiom on which our day-to-day thought and language is based. In a sense it is transparently clear. If I see a chair it is a chair that I see. When philosophers say that this may be, in fact, mistaken, there has been a subtle change in the meaning of the word see (or perceive) that is necessary for a scientific account of how the brain works but unfortunately is not made clear by new philosophical terminologies. This leads to talking at cross-purpose. That childhood naïve realism is indeed a belief that normally encounters a humbling experience of even showing the absurdity of such a belief. So philosophically, it is very difficult to sustain naïve realism.

However, outside philosophy modified forms of naïve realism maybe implicitly assumed and defended. Thomas Reid in the eighteenth century realised that sensation was composed of a set of data transfers but declared that these were in some way transparent so that there is a direct connection between perception and the world. This idea is called direct realism and has become popular in recent years. Direct realism does not clearly specify the nature of the bit of the world that is an object in perception, especially in cases where the object is something like a silhouette (*Wikipedia*). Wittgenstein’s picture theory of language also points to such a direct realism.

Philosophically and neurologically, when we analyse the succession of data transfers that are involved in perception, we become aware of complex functions of the brain, where the final set of events occur. Perception would then be some form of brain activity and somehow some part of the brain would be able to perceive signals provided by some other part of the brain. This concept is known as indirect realism or representative realism. According to this theory, we can only be aware of external objects by being aware of representations of objects in the brain. This idea was held by John Locke and Nicolas Malebranche. The common argument against indirect realism, as noted by *Wikipedia*, is that it implies a homunculus with an infinite regress (a perceiver within a perceiver within a perceiver...). However, as long as each stage of sensory processing achieves a different task a finite regress is perfectly possible. The real problem here probably relates not so much to issues of infinite regress as to basic ontological issues raised by Leibniz, Locke, Hume, Whitehead and others, which fall beyond the scope of this unit.

Direct realism and indirect realism are known as ‘realist’ theories of perception because they hold that there is a world external to the mind. Direct realism holds that the representation of an object is located next to, or is even part of, the actual physical object. On the other hand, indirect realism holds that the representation of an object is brain activity. Direct realism proposes some as yet unknown direct connection between external representations and the mind while indirect realism requires the resolution of the actual process of

representation by the brain.

Apart from the realist theories of perception there are also anti-realist theories. There are two varieties of anti-realism: idealism and skepticism. Idealism holds that reality is limited to mental qualities and so is not real. Skepticism challenges our ability to gain knowledge of any reality external to our mind. So the question of the reality of the world outside just does not arise. One of the most influential proponents of idealism was Bishop George Berkeley who maintained that everything was mind or dependent upon mind. David Hume is probably the most influential proponent of skepticism.

A third theory of perception attempts to find a middle path between realist and anti-realist theories. Called enactivism, this theory posits that reality arises as a result of the dynamic interplay between an organism's sensory motor capabilities and its environment. Instead of seeing perception as a passive process determined entirely by the features of an independently existing world, enactivism suggests that organism and environment are structurally coupled and codetermining.

In this section various ways of relating perception to the world outside are considered: internalism, externalism, naïve realism, direct realism, indirect realism, idealism, scepticism and enactivism. Rather than going into the merits of these theories, we limit ourselves to briefly describing them. Our main concern is that considering perception as the primary source of knowledge of reality, takes us to the philosophical question of the nature of reality.

Check Your Progress III

Note: Use the space provided for your answer

1. What is naïve realism?

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2. What is enactivism?

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1.8 LET US SUM UP

After understanding what are *Pramanas* we have elaborately dealt with perception and then we have seen the philosophical basis for it.

1.9 KEY WORDS

- Enactivism** : The theory which posits that reality arises as a result of the dynamic interplay between an organism's sensory motor capabilities and its environment.
- Homunculus** : A diminutive and fully-formed human. It is used, generally, in various fields of study to refer to any representation of a human being.
- Naïve realism** : The belief that what they perceive are things in themselves. In other words the simple belief that there is a reality outside and we can perceive it as it is using our sense organs.
- Pramana** : (“sources of knowledge,” “measure”) is an epistemological term in Indian and Buddhist philosophies referring to the means by which a person obtains accurate and valid knowledge (*Prama*, *pramiti*) of the world.
- Pratyaksa** : Perception or knowledge through sense organs.
- Qualia** : A property (such as redness) as it is experienced as distinct from any source it might have in a physical object.

1.9 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

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