
UNIT 2 SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENTS

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2.0 OBJECTIVES

We know that we have the experience of two principles in our lives: the principle of permanence (substance) and the principle of change (accident). We go out of home to our college and come back to the same home after classes. We know that we are the same persons and that others call us by the same name. But we also undergo regular and constant changes with regard to weight, complexion, etc. These are facts that we experience, and all the metaphysical principles (especially substance and accident) are derived from and based on these factual experiences. Hence, in this Unit we shall study:

- Substance and its characteristics
- Accident and its characteristics

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Finite beings are composed of a relatively permanent principle which remains primarily the same throughout secondary changes, and secondary principles which may come and go without producing a change in the primary mode of being. The relatively permanent principle is called ‘substance’ and secondary principles are called ‘accidents’. The notions of ‘substance’ and ‘accident’ may be acquired from the analysis of an external experience. For instance, our external senses reveal to us an unripe orange as a concrete whole which is extended in space, green coloured, sour etc. The intellect conceives the qualities which may come and go, as determinations which affect something underneath these changes and are modified by them. The difference between the determinations and their subject is expressed by the notions ‘accidents’ and ‘substance’ which correspond to a reality existing in the extramental world. Taking these considerations into account we can define *substance as the being-in-itself of a finite essence which is the basic inner principle of permanence or continuity of that being which becomes*. A being is originally constituted by its act of existing and essence. It is posited as a limited but a real being which exists in itself autonomously as a substance. Being-in-itself and not in another

2.2 ETYMOLOGICAL MEANING

The term ‘substance’ is derived from the Latin ‘*substantia*’ which means ‘standing under.’ ‘*Substantia*’ is the equivalent rendering of the Greek ‘*ousia*’ of Aristotle (384-322 BCE). Substance, the first of Aristotle’s categories, signifies being as existing in and by itself, and serving as a basis for accidents. Nothing is more evident than that things change. A piece of wood may be hot or cold, lying flat or upright, yet it is still wood; but when it is completely burnt so as to be transformed into ashes and gases, it is no longer wood. The specific, radical characteristics by which we describe wood have totally disappeared. Thus, there are two kinds of changes: one affects the radical characteristics of things and the other in no way destroys these characteristics, and so does not affect it fundamentally. Therefore it is necessary to recognize in each thing, certain temporary principles and also a permanent principle which continues to exist. Its fundamental characteristic is to be in itself and by itself. In the history of metaphysics, the metaphysicians have variously interpreted this experience of change and permanence developing their own perspectives on substance.

2.3 DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE

In the West: Aristotle employs the term, substance, in criticizing Plato’s theory of forms. In his early work on ‘Categories,’ substance is given as the principal category. Substances are concrete individuals, like an individual man or an individual horse. Aristotle had also called this category ‘what it is’. The kinds, man, horse, etc., were called substance in a secondary sense. Later on, he dropped this view. Substance stands in contrast to other categories such as quality, place, and action, which tell us something about substance. In the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle further analyses concrete individuals as composites of matter and form. In Books Z and H, he argued substance as the individual form which was called substantial form in the middle ages. However, the ideas of substance as concrete individual, and as the ultimate substratum of attributes and of change, are never completely set aside. His cosmology postulated immaterial substance moving the celestial spheres, and an Unmoved Mover as the cause of all celestial motion. These immaterial substances were later smoothly integrated into medieval theology as angels and God respectively. Aquinas (1225-74) reconciled the teaching on consecrated bread and wine with the notion of substance, which are substantially changed into Christ’s body and blood through a supernatural action while continuing to look and taste like bread and wine, and thus their perceptible accidents remaining unchanged. It is the theory of ‘trans-substantiation’. In the same way, the humans (being of one species) are individuated by matter during life, but they lack this matter after death. However, they retain their identity and individuality, thanks to the distinguishing qualities of their earthly history.

Modern philosophers retained the idea of substance as that which exists independently. For **Descartes** (1596-1650), there are only three substances: self, world, and God. Substance is that which needs nothing else to exist. In the strict sense, there is only one substance which is totally independent, i.e., God. However, Descartes avoids pantheism by adding that we could also be called created substances that exist by the help of God. Extension is the attribute of the corporeal substance. It is one of the clear and distinct ideas.

Self: The self is the momentary act of thinking. Descartes did not intend to prove the existence of a substantial soul until he had introduced the idea of substance while speaking of God. One could not be deceived while believing that one thinks in the moment in which one thinks, but one could be deceived while believing that one's momentary act of thinking comes from a permanent subject or substantial soul. The substantial principle is not included in the clear and distinct idea of the thinking self. On the other hand, one tends to believe that all one's momentary instances of existing are connected in such a way, that if one is deceived in this matter then one is deceived by the author of nature, God Himself. Once one proves the existence of an infinitely good and wise God who can neither deceive nor be deceived, one can safely assert the existence of a substantial soul.

World: Descartes faced the problem of how to perceive material beings. The first difficulty: the mind is spiritual and that body and soul are not one consubstantial principle in human. Consequently, we do not immediately become conscious of our bodily reactions or of any other material thing. The second difficulty: the only way of arriving at a direct intuition is through consciousness, which presupposes identity between the subject and the object of knowledge. However, we live under the strong impression of a material world around us. The existence of the material world is beyond rational doubt, but not beyond hyperbolic doubt. It does not become totally certain until we know of the existence of God, who will not deceive us.

God: Proving God's existence is basic in Descartes' search for certainty. Descartes gives three arguments for the existence of God. *Argument from the Idea of the Perfect Infinite:* I conceive of God as "an infinite, independent, all-knowing, all-powerful substance, by which I myself and all other things, if they actually exist, have been created;" I, therefore, have the idea of the infinite. But the idea of infinity could not have been produced in my mind by the other ideas (of self and world too) which are finite. It is not by removing the limits that I form the idea of infinity, but it is by limiting the positive idea of infinity that I form the idea of the finite. Consequently, before I form any other idea I have the idea of infinity, which is a clear and distinct idea. It is as obvious as the idea of the thinking self, because I cannot conceive of anything finite unless I have an idea of the infinite. Therefore, since clear and distinct ideas must have objective value, there is actually something infinite which is perfect. Now this perfect being must exist, how else would I explain the origin of this idea in me? In other words, neither the external world nor I am perfect. The external world is not perfect because it is corporeal and changeable. I am not perfect because I doubt. Therefore, there must exist a perfect being who has put in me this idea of himself. *Argument from Contingency of the Thinking Self:* I must conceive of the thinking self as contingent, i.e., as non-necessary; otherwise it would not be a doubting self. But I could not have the idea of a contingent being unless I had a previous idea of the necessary, because contingency is the negation of necessity. This previous idea of the necessary is not formed through the idea of the contingent self, but is presupposed by the idea of the self. Here again the idea of the necessary is clear and distinct, and implies that there is something necessary. *Ontological Argument:* God is such a being that all perfections must be included in his essence. In other words, he must necessarily have all perfections. Since it is better to exist than not to exist, existence is a perfection which must be attributed to God. He, therefore, necessarily exists; in him essence and existence are the same. Descartes did not

add anything new to the ontological argument of Anselm, except that he called the idea of the greatest conceivable being, an innate one. And he added the simile of the valley and the mountain. "I cannot conceive a God unless as existing, any more than I can a mountain without a valley." For mountain and valley, whether exist or not, are inseparable. In the same way we cannot conceive God unless as existing.

Spinoza (1632-77) accepted Descartes' definition of substance, but he was more consistent than Descartes in his conception of substance. "By substance, I mean that which is in itself and conceived through itself; in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception." (*Ethics*, I, Def. II). Only God is such a substance. This substance is infinite and not finite. If it were finite, then it would have to be conceived along with something else which would limit it. Then it would cease to be a substance. An object which is not its own cause is dependent on another cause. That which is not dependent on another cause is a substance. No substance can depend on another substance. Hence, there is only one infinite substance.

For **Leibniz** (1646-1716) an object with proper parts depends on these parts to exist. The true substances are monads, which must be without parts or spatial extension. Therefore, the changes in monads are like mental events, and Leibniz viewed the world as a plurality of monads. These are simple substances which are not made up of parts. These monads are "the true elements of Nature, in fact, the elements of things." They have the following characteristics: 1. Monads are Real: They are real things, and not ideas. 2. Monads are simple: They cannot come to be except by creation, nor cease to be except by annihilation, while compound substances are produced by aggregation and separation of monads (generation and corruption). 3. Monads are Independent: There are a plurality of monads which are independent of one another and dependent on God alone. One monad cannot influence another. 4. Monads Enjoy Perception: All monads, which are simple substances, enjoy some measure of perception, though in different degrees. 5. Monads are dynamic: The monad is not inert. For, each simple substance has its own activity. 6. Monads are Representatives: Each monad is a "perpetual living mirror of the universe." Every individual substance expresses the whole universe in its own way. Though each monad mirrors the whole, it does it in its own unique way. Leibniz ranked all substances according to the degree of their knowing capacity: 1. *Inorganic substances* that have perception and appetite, but no apperception. 2. *Living substances below the level of human*, that have souls and therefore a certain degree of consciousness or apperception. 3. *Human*: Human is capable of apperception of both truths of fact and truths of reason. 4. *God*: God has the apperception of only truths of reason. God knows the last reason why all things come to be in his pre-established harmonious plan for the world. In God there is no appetite in the sense of desire for more perfection.

Locke (1632-1704) held that substance is an unknowable substratum, a 'something we know not what' supporting the qualities we perceive. He regarded persons not as immaterial souls, but as 'forensic' entities whose persistence is secured simply by the continuity of consciousness. **Berkeley** (1685-1753) attacked Locke's substratum in the case of material substances as absurd. Bodies are simply bundles of qualities, but he retained immaterial substances or souls. **Hume** (1711-76) dissolved the soul into a bundle of its perceptions. He ostensibly destroyed

the last remnants of traditional substance, and shifted the role of substance to perceptions which are the independently existing components of the universe. **Kant** (1724-1804) bound substance to the logical role of being a subject of predication. He argued for an eternally persisting substrate which is not an autonomous thing, but merely a necessary condition for the appearance of change.

In India: Substance is the substratum where actions and qualities inhere, and which is the co-existent material cause of the composite things produced from it. It is the substratum of all things. A substance is destroyed only by the destruction of its substratum. It is not destroyed either by its own effect or by its own cause. It means that the relation of the destroyer and the destroyed does not exist between two substances which have entered into the relation of effect and cause. Thus the Sutra states: “Substance is not annihilated either by effect or by cause” (VS I, 12). For Prasastapada, ‘substance is the main category, and all categories depend on it for their existence. So it is first named.’ Being the substratum of qualities, it is different from qualities. For instance, in the case of a white cloth, the white colour is experienced as a property residing in the substratum, cloth. Therefore, white colour and cloth are different in their essence. The word ‘property’ does not mean only qualities, but it is used in a wider sense and includes all the five kinds of properties (i.e., substance, quality, movement, the universal, and *visesha*), which subsist in their substrate by inherent relation. A substance does not possess qualities at the first moment of its production. If the qualities arise simultaneously with substances there cannot be any distinction between them, and if the qualities do not arise then substances would be free from qualities. Then the definition of substance, as that which possesses qualities, would be violated. To meet this difficulty, it is said that substance is the substrate of qualities either in the relation of intimate union (*samvaya sambandha*) or antecedent negation (*pragabhava*). Qualities inhere in a substance from the second moment of its production until its destruction. A substance is also the material cause of its composite product. For example, threads are the material cause of cloth made by their combination. Only substance is capable of producing an effect out of its stuff. These substances are nine: earth, fire, air, water, ether, time, space, spirit, and mind. The *Vaisesika* philosophy is pluralistic and realistic, but not materialistic since it admits spiritual substances. Out of the nine substances, the first five (i.e., earth, water, fire, air, and ether) are called physical, since each of them possesses a unique quality sensed by the external sense. Smell is the unique property of earth, and other substances have smell only if mixed up with some quantity of earth. There is smell in muddy water, but not in pure water. In the same way, taste is the property of water, colour of light, touch of air, and sound of ether. The substances – of earth, fire, water, and air – are both eternal and non-eternal. The atoms of earth, water, fire, and air are eternal as an atom is indivisible and can neither be produced nor destroyed. All others are non-eternal as they are produced by the combination of atoms and are subject to destruction. There are four kinds of atoms: earth, water, fire, and air, each having its own special quality. Ether is the fifth physical substance, the substratum of the quality of sound. The sound is perceived, but not ether. It is one and eternal as it is indivisible and does not depend on any other substance for its existence. It is all pervading as it has an unlimited dimension whose effect is perceived everywhere. Time and space are also eternal, all-pervading, imperceptible, infinite, partless, and indivisible. Time causes our cognitions of past, present, and future, and of ‘younger’ and ‘older.’ Space (*dik*) causes our cognitions of east and west, here and there, and near and far. There

are innumerable souls that are independent, individual, eternal, and all-pervading spiritual substance, the substratum of the quality of consciousness. The souls are divided into two: the individual and the Supreme. The Supreme is only one, the Creator of the world. The individual is internally perceived as possessing some quality when one says, ‘I am happy’, ‘I am sorry’, and so on. The individual is not one but many, being different in different bodies. Mind is an internal sense which is atomic, many, eternal, and imperceptible. Each self has a mind through which the self comes into contact with the objects. Its existence is inferred from the fact that the self must perceive internal states through an internal sense, just as it perceives external objects through external senses. Moreover, the mind is selective in the perception of external objects. We perceive colour, touch, taste, smell, and sound subsequently, even though all the external senses may be in contact with objects simultaneously, coming into contact with only one sense at a time.

2.4 KINDS OF SUBSTANCE

Primary and secondary substance: *Primary Substance* is every individual substance, e.g., a single inanimate body such as a bit of gold or a piece of paper; a single plant such as every rose, plantain, or tapioca; every single animal such as every cow, buffalo, goat, or elephant; a single human like Mother Theresa, Mahatma Gandhi, or Muhammad. *Secondary substance* is the substance expressed by the universal idea representing a class, e.g., human, animal, organism, body, substance, plant, fish, bird, etc. *Complete and incomplete substance:* *Complete substance* is that which possesses everything that its constitution and essence requires for its existence and for the proper functioning of its activities. Its nature demands no further union with a substantial co-principle. For instance, every human, consisting of body and soul, is a complete substance, capable of existing and of performing its natural functions of vegetancy, sentiency, and rational life; in the same way, every brute, plant, and inorganic body are complete substances. *Incomplete substance* requires to be conjoined with some other substantial co-principle so as to constitute a complete substance. Each substantial principle, taken alone, is insufficient to exist, or at least, is insufficient for all the functions of an individual of that particular species. For instance, the human soul alone without the body cannot perform the functions of vegetancy and sentiency. Human needs a material body for these functions. *Simple and composite substance:* *Simple substance* does not consist of entitatively distinct substantial parts. Such simple substances are also called pure spirits, such as angels or God. Complete substances of this kind are absolutely simple. However, one can also speak of certain substances as ‘naturally simple’ which consist of parts which are material and entitatively distinct, but naturally indivisible and inseparable. The ultimate physical components of the universe (like protons and electrons) would be ‘naturally simple’ in this sense. *Composite substance* is complete substance consisting of incomplete substantial principles, entitatively distinct among themselves in such a manner that their union results in a single, unified nature. The principles complement each other making a single being of natural functions through their union. Human, for instance, is a composite substance of body and soul. The soul does not inhere in the body as an accident inheres in its subject, nor does the body inhere in the soul, nor do they co-exist side by side as if each were independent of the other.

2.5 CHARACTERISTICS OF SUBSTANCE

We do not have a single coherent concept of substance. Hence, it is to be identified and separated into the following characteristic strands for a better understanding.

- a) *Independence*: The ontological primacy of substance arises chiefly from their independence, in their ability to subsist. Independence of substance excludes only dependence on a substratum, and not dependence on a cause (such as the ultimate cause). Hence there can be substances which are caused, i.e., created substances. Independence may be either absolute or relative. *Absolute independence* means that something exists not only *in* itself but also *of* itself. Such a being does not depend on anything else in any way whatsoever. Only God can be such a substance. *Relative independence* means that something exists *in* itself, but not *of* itself. It is in this sense that we speak of the independence of substance here. Strictly speaking, substance denotes only the substantial whole. Yet, essential parts which go to constitute this whole (e.g., body and soul) are also spoken of as substances. Although substance usually stands out independently as what is relatively persistent in contradistinction to its changing appearances, anything that exists in itself even if it lasts only for an instant ? is truly substance.
- b) *Survivability and permanence*: For something to change, it must exist before, during, and after the change. That is, it must survive it. Substance survives its accidents. There can be no substance without accidents. A substance is either material or spiritual. If material, it must have the accident of quantity. If spiritual, it must have the accidents of intellect and will. The subject of change (substance) thus ‘outlives’ its accidents, whatever ceased to be at the change. Experience provides us with numerous examples of this permanence and survival.

Substance and Nature: Nature is derived from the Latin participle *natus* ‘born’, a form of the verb *nasci*, ‘to be born’. The nature of a thing suggests what the thing is born for; what it is originated to do; what it exists to accomplish. The nature of a thing is its reality considered as equipment for action or operation. *It is the first or radical intrinsic principle of its rest and movement.* It is the basic, the radical, the fundamental principle of rest and movement in the body. A body is equipped with powers or faculties by means of which it operates or acts and is acted upon. These powers or faculties are the *proximate* principles of operation. We call nature the first or radical principle, to distinguish it from these proximate principles. Nature has powers and operates by means of powers. It is the first principle of the activity which proceeds from the powers which are the proximate principles of action. The relation between substance and nature can be explained in this way: As we have just seen, nature is the radical or the ultimate principle of all operations in a particular being. Different beings have specifically different activities. For instance, neither does iron act like gold, nor gold like iron, nor iron like radium, nor radium like argon, nor argon like hydrogen. As long as a thing is what it is, its activities remain specifically the same. The activities are determined by some principle within the thing itself. This ultimate intrinsic principle of activity is nature. Nature is Being-in-itself and not in another. Hence, substance is nature insofar as the former is also the ultimate principle of Being-in-itself.

2.6 ACCIDENTS

The original Aristotelian term (*symbebekos*) for predicamental accident meant ‘going along with’ or ‘occurring with’ something else. Size and colour, for example, go with or presuppose the bodies of which they are merely the modifications. They can change while the body’s nature remains the same. Sapling and tree do not differ in substance, in spite of change in size, shape, and colour. The same individual human passes through the different stages of embryo, foetus, childhood, youth, maturity, and old age, changing in many ways in size, shape, colour, activities, place, and time but remaining identical in substance. These accidental characteristics are really distinct from the substance, regardless of any consideration by the human mind. They are distinct realities that occur to, or belong to, a substance. The etymology of the Latin term *accidens*, ‘falling upon’ or ‘happening’ expresses it quite vividly.

2.7 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ACCIDENT

Dependence: Change, like that in colour or size, reveals the accidental character of such a thing, though it is not the essential trait of an accident. For, an accident may remain the same during the whole course of its subject’s existence, as do the intellectual faculties in a human. What necessarily distinguishes an accident from substance is the former’s dependent characteristic. Whatever being it has, it has through the being of something more basic, the substance. It is a nature too weak to have being just through itself. Whiteness cannot exist in reality except through a body that is white. It is called a nature, because it is conceptually intelligible. It is essence, because it is a potency to the being that corresponds to it. But it does not have its being in an independent unlike substance; it requires also a finite nature other than itself through which to receive and have its being. This dependence in the order of essence is the distinguishing trait of an accident. It is an essence that depends upon another essence in its very role of essence - as a potency to being. Because of this dependence, it is not at all on the same level as substance. It is an essence, not just through itself, but through a substantial essence. Redness is an essence only because a primary instance of essence, a body, can be red. It may be called an accidental essence, or an accidental nature; distinguishing it from essence meant absolutely, that is, from substance.

Inherence: The very nature of every accident is such that it is meant for being in something other than itself, that is, in a substance. It is an actuation of a potency. It is the accidental act of a subject. It actuates a substance in a secondary way. Redness, for instance, makes actually red a face that in itself was just able to blush. Accordingly, it actuates a potency to redness. The potency here is the substance. Redness is one of its accidental forms or acts. Every accident, then, is in a subject that is a substance, and every accident actuates a substance. Is every accident therefore an inherent form?

The more basic accidents, like quantity and qualities, are undoubtedly forms intrinsic to the thing they actuate. A colour inheres in a body, adding a new form to the thing’s intrinsic constitution. But do accidents such as where and when a thing is, add any inherent form? Although there seems to be no intrinsic addition to the reality of a pie when it is brought from the pantry into the dining room, still there is a real accidental difference accruing to it from the new and really

different place. Each category of accident is a supreme genus of being, an original mould into which the existential act is cast. One kind of accident, therefore, is not to be conceived as modelled on another. Accidents such as where and when, need not be expected to conform to the type found in quality. There is the possibility that some accidents may actuate a thing extrinsically, that is, without effecting any intrinsic change in its constitution, as in the case of the pie being in different places. If the non-inherent accidents presuppose the inherent ones, then accidents may be said in general to inhere, as substance is said to subsist. Yet, while every accident is dependent on and in this sense is in a substance, some accidents need not be inherent.

In the case of inherent accidents, the substance through which they have their being is the substance in which they inhere. By actuating their substance these accidents have their being through it. By making a body white, whiteness has its being as a modification of the body. In the case of participated existence, as has been seen, the situation is different. The existential act inheres in or actuates the essence it makes be. It belongs to that essence, it is an accident of that essence. But what it depends on primarily is an agent other than that essence. It is through another substance, the extrinsic efficient cause. The essence it actuates depends upon it for distinction from mere nothing. The existential act is accordingly prior to the corresponding essence. The predicamental accident, on the other hand, is subsequent to what it actuates, and so has its being through the nature in which it inheres. It requires also an efficient cause, for it involves new being. Its efficient cause may be the substance in which it inheres, as in the case of an act of intellection; or an agent other than that substance, as in the case of the electric plate heating the water. Unlike dependence, inherence is not necessarily required for an accident. Where and when a thing is, for instance, are really accidental to it, yet not inherent forms. They are in the thing in the sense of dependence on it in being; but they do not, like size or whiteness, add to the intrinsic constitution of the thing.

Being of a Being: Just as an accident may be termed a nature or an essence or a form, so it may be called a thing, or a quiddity, or a being in a secondary sense. These terms denote what exists primarily ? namely, a substance. A tree or a stone is unhesitatingly called a thing, but the term is applied only with misgivings to a colour, or a sound, or a size. Yet each of these is something. In some diluted sense, therefore, a colour or a sound is a thing. But any such accident is always a quiddity that belongs to another quiddity, the substance. In this sense it is a quiddity of a quiddity. In a corresponding secondary way, every accident may be termed a being, insofar as it is in some way. Since it has existence only through a substance, and belongs to a substance, it is rather a being of a being (*ens entis*).

Distinction of Accidental Being: Accidental existence is really distinct from substantial existence. Accidental existence is being in. In regard to real accidents this is a real distinction. The substantial being of a human really continues, while the accidental being of one's height and weight increase with years. The substantial being endures in reality without that accidental being. An accident really exists as a modification of a really existent substance. Only in real dependence upon substantial existence can the accidental existence be had. An identical existence cannot be really dependent and really independent in the same respect. The one has to be really distinct from the other.

In other words, accident is that which is not in itself but in another. It is a mode of being, but not autonomous. It does not exist in itself, but in another. Hence an accident is *whatever is added in anyway to another already primarily determined in its being*. Accidents are mainly of two kinds: Physical and Non-physical. *Physical Accident* is the real inner principle of a being which further perfects the being in which it inheres, e.g., the operations, habits, and faculties of an experiencing agent. *Faculties* are the agent’s proximate principle of action, e.g., intellect, will, memory. *Habits* are the lasting dispositions which by their innate or acquired presence make easier the work of the active powers, e.g., faculties. *Non-physical accident* is predicate which does not belong to the definition but says something more about a being, e.g., property and logical accident. *Property* is any positive predicate which is not a part of the definition but which necessarily flows from the definition, e.g., human’s laughing. *Logical accident* is any predicate which is neither a part of the definition nor necessarily flows from the definition, e.g., human’s singing.

Check Your Progress

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1) What do you understand by substance? What are its characteristics?

2) What do you understand by accident? What are its characteristics?

2.8 LET US SUM UP

Finite beings are composed of a permanent principle which remains the same throughout all changes. This permanent principle is called ‘substance’ and secondary principles are called ‘accidents.’ An accident is that which is not in itself but in another. It is a mode of being, but not autonomous. The Indian thinkers interpret substance as the substratum where actions and qualities inhere. For them, substance is the main category, and all categories depend on it for their existence. Qualities inhere in a substance from the moment of its production until its destruction. The main characteristics of substance are independence, survivability, and permanence. It is also distinct from nature which is the basic principle of action.

2.9 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

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