
UNIT 3 NOT MIRRORS BUT MAPS (KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS- HABERMAS, MESOCOSM)

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3.0 OBJECTIVES

This unit explores the contributions of Jürgen Habermas, a second generation critical theorist and one of the most distinguished contemporary social and political philosopher, whose influence spans the fields of philosophy, political science, law, literature, communication, religion and international relations. The main emphasis of this module would be on the epistemological foundations of Habermas' theory of communicative action. *Knowledge and Human Interests* (1968; 1987) is one of Habermas' seminal works that contains a very strong argument for a theory of knowledge as social theory. Habermas also emphasizes emancipatory intent in *Knowledge and Human Interests*. In his most famous work, *The Theory of Communicative Action* (1984; 1987), the emphasis shifts to consensus through a process of rational argumentation among communicatively competent social actors. From this module, you would be able to evaluate the paradigm shift in Habermas' thought from an emphasis on human interests which was founded on the paradigm of a conscious subject to that of a universal pragmatics, in which language becomes the paradigm.

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Jürgen Habermas, a German philosopher, is a leading second generation critical theorist and a well known philosopher in the contemporary scene. He has inherited the philosophical lineage from the pioneers of the Frankfurt school like Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Walter Benjamin, and Erich

Fromm who were instrumental in bringing critical theory into prominence. Critical social theory or Critical theory is the name of the philosophical doctrine of the Frankfurt school otherwise known as Institute for Social Research (Institut für Sozialforschung), a movement founded in 1932 by Max Horkheimer, Karl Wittfogel, Friedrich Pollock, and Leo Lowenthal, and funded by Felix Weil, which later included Theodor Adorno, Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, Walter Benjamin, Karl Korsch and Frank Borkenau. Officially, the Frankfurt school was attached to the Frankfurt University. The abundant academic and publicistic output of the school covered multifarious domains of humanities, science, philosophy, empirical sociology, musicology, social psychology, history of the Far East, the soviet economy, psychoanalysis, theory of literature and law. Habermas took critical theory in a positive direction from that of a sheer social critique to that of a theory of transformation of public sphere, discourse ethics, and communicative action oriented towards achieving a rationally motivated consensus. Habermas' attempt to reorient critical theory is based on strong epistemological foundations given by Kant, Hegel and Marx.

3.2 CHARACTERISTIC TRAITS OF THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL

Though the origins of critical social theory/critical theory were Marxian, the Frankfurt theorists did not treat Marxism as the sole contender for the role of a critique of the society. They incorporated many non-Marxist strands of thought like that of Kant, Hegel, Freud, Mead, Durkheim, and Austin. The Frankfurt School was critical of politics. The critical theory was in agreement with Lukacs and Korsch regarding reification as the 'epitome of the problems of the modern world.' The critical theorists took a broader view as affecting all strata of the society. *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1947; 2002) written jointly by Horkheimer and Adorno dwelt upon the travails of the period after Enlightenment which was expected to bring about drastic changes in the entire fabric of the society. But, reason which ascended the throne of arbiter during the Enlightenment, became more and more instrumental and great political and social renaissance expected of it failed to fructify. This was a crushing disappointment for the staunch supporters of the Enlightenment. Adorno and Horkheimer also lamented the rapid increase in industrialization with less and less emphasis on values. The society which was envisioned as free and fair with the reason at the helm gave way to a society ruled by science and technology which called itself value-neutral. Horkheimer was particularly critical of viewing social sciences from a scientific angle because he felt that natural sciences aimed only at the end-result, whereas social sciences were highly conscious of the means of observation as historical. The point of variance with Marxism stemmed from Horkheimer's acceptance of the functional value of theory and its autonomy. In order to avoid reductionism, Horkheimer was against the traditional pairing of concepts like 'phenomena' and 'essence', 'subject' and 'object', 'base' and 'superstructure'. Hence, he emphasized the need for constant mediation.

The Frankfurt theorists were apprehensive about over-emphasis on logical necessity and technological rigour because both can abet authoritarian tendencies as was the case with religious authority till the dawn of the Enlightenment. Horkheimer foresaw totalitarian symptoms in the scientific-instrumental approach of the epoch sans any humane face. Critical theorists indicted the mass media for its destructive influence on culture, art, and the society. They followed Nietzsche in criticizing

sensus communis. They also bitterly criticized the social apathy, which allowed professional bureaucracy to manipulate the masses. This applied equally to both Fascist and Communist totalitarian regimes and Western democracies. Aesthetic and nomological disciplines accommodate varied interpretations whereas science aims at structured explanations without any room for any preponderance. The Frankfurt theorists were not in favour of stringent scientific framework in social sciences, which emphasized the methodology of the sciences and treated human activity as observable phenomena. Critical theorists argued that excessive objectivation of human activities could lead to a controlled environment which could be manipulated to suit the needs of a chosen few. At one stage, science became the measuring frame for even social activities as the only form of legitimation. Science abstracted knowledge from society and created an idea that it was independent of any social grounding. Leszek Kolakowski cites Horkheimer:

Perception cannot be isolated from its social genesis; both it and its objects are social and historical products. The individual observer is passive vis-a-vis the object, but the society as a whole is an active element in the process, unconsciously so. The facts ascertained are partly determined by the collective praxis of human beings who have devised the methods used to observe the facts. Objects are partly the product of concepts and of collective praxis.

Critical theory viewed society not as a natural necessity thrust upon the people. Rather, it viewed society as a mosaic of subjective, objective, and inter-subjective modes of understanding. The dynamic social processes are not irrevocable and can be altered. Critical theory scrutinized social categories. In the words of Horkheimer:

Critical thought is motivated today by the endeavour genuinely to transcend the situation of tension, to remove the opposition between the purposiveness, spontaneity, and rationality of the individual and the labour conditions on which the society is based. It implies that man is in conflict with himself until he recovers this identity.

Unlike other theories, critical theory acknowledged the possibility of its own judgements being coloured by established beliefs of the society in which it is housed. But it also emphasizes the power of reason to critically reflect upon the customs, manners, and beliefs prevalent in the society. Habermas applies this trait in the debate aimed at norm formation. Critical theory views social progress as the end of the intellectual progress. This would strip the social life of its quasi-natural 'external' character and makes it an inalienable part of the lifeworld. For this to become a reality, subject-object-society relationship must be redefined.

Critical theory is a critique of the existing society in the Marxian sense, a tirade against market-oriented capitalistic political system which was perpetrated in the name of democracy. Even in democracies which hold the best hopes for human freedom and expression, monetary considerations are synonymous with success. People seek external sources to quench their thirst for recognition and affirmation of identity. The Frankfurt School accepts the need for material resources. But its critique is about the institutionalization of the purposive rational action as the most coveted form of social action in liberal democracies. Frankfurt school opposes the manipulating tendencies of the market, which are rampant in liberal democracies.

Check Your Progress I

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer.

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit.

1) What are the characteristic traits of the Frankfurt school?

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2) What is the significance of the term ‘critical’ in critical theory?

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3.3 CRITICAL THEORY: INFLUENCE OF GERMAN IDEALISM

The critical theorists were strongly influenced by the German idealists thinkers such as Kant, Hegel, and Marx are discussed. Kant’s philosophical program was to crown philosophy as the Emperor of sciences and so he ventured into an analysis of the cognitive faculty. He sought to make philosophy the highest arbiter, by mapping the limits of reason. By laying down the rules governing the most fundamental function of understanding Kant superseded other disciplines, at least in his ingenuity, by making philosophy ontologically prior. Habermas, who labelled Kant *maitre penseur*, i.e., the magician of the false paradigm, criticized Kant for arrogating authority to philosophy, as if only philosophy had the sole right to probe into the operations of the mental faculty and draw the limits of knowledge. Habermas conceded Richard Rorty’s claim that the role of philosophy could only be that of a stand-in interpreter and social critique. The Kantian enterprise of defining the limits of pure and practical reason and aesthetic judgment redefined the subject-object relation.

What Kant did was undoubtedly a critical analysis of the traits of the cognitive faculty with the intention of revamping the whole system. Kant’s critical inquiry into the structures of understanding benefitted all disciplines. But, philosophy became more speculative. Kant’s own schemata became a double-edged weapon in turning philosophy against itself. In this light, Hegel’s critique is centred upon the monological primacy accorded to the subject, by Kant, even though the object was not relegated to the sidelines. Hegel felt that this would restrict the creativity of the faculty of reason. Kant’s emphasis on the subject led to transcendental philosophy. Instead, Hegel suggested “immanent critique” which involves constant revision of concepts with emphasis on continuous refinement. ‘This path of alternating criticism and amendment is the ‘dialectical’ way of the

Phenomenology of Spirit, where each position establishes itself as superior to its predecessor purely through the force of argument.’ Marx criticized Hegel for neglecting the social factors in the conception of the subject, experience, and knowledge in which errors are viewed as merely intellectual. The maladies afflicting a society have to be eliminated successively and each stage has its residue of contradictions. Marx’s contention was that the prognosis and diagnosis of the problem should be found in social reality. Habermas writes as follows:

The theory gives an account both of the content in which it itself arises (its *Entstehungszusammenhang*), along with all the inadequacies of existing conceptions and reality, and of its context of effective application (its *Vervendungszusammenhang*) as a guide for changing what exists.

Habermas appreciated the importance of Kant’s critical philosophy, categorical imperative, practical reason and an understanding of the role played by the external world in the knowledge episode. For Hegel, the transition of consciousness which includes the social is from a lesser to a more advanced stage. ‘Philosophy only arrives at a retrospective understanding’. In the famous image of the preface to the Philosophy of Right, Hegel writes: “The Owl of Minerva flies only at the dusk.” Thus, Hegel subsumed social critique in his dialectic. The reason would finally deliver the society from all contradictions. For Marx, unmasking of the irrationality imbedded in the society was the prime task and transformation ensued only in its aftermath. For Hegel, thought must be reconciled with a rational reality. For Marx, thought should unmask existent irrationality and guide its transformation.’ Marxism has to evaluate both levels of contradictions; in the historical realm in the society as well as the conceptual framework of the individuals. Kortian says:

“If it tries to abandon the first level and to develop a ‘science’ of society which would make no reference to conceptions and aspirations as integral to or partially constitutive of our institutions, then it just becomes just another would be positive science.”

Habermas disagrees with Marx on setting aside theories after a critique and espouses an approach, which is reflective and evaluative. Thus, he turns to Kant and Hegel. Habermas charts a divergent course by advocating plurality of interests, which prompts knowledge claims. His transcendental inquiry leads to a theory of communicative competence, which underlies an unadulterated urge to communicate. Hence, language becomes the paradigm.

Garbis Kortian calls critical theory a metacritique because of its critique of presuppositions, even its own. The ‘meta’ is valid only if the critique does not fasten itself to any absolute standpoints. Hegel’s enterprise was to deconstruct the structure of presuppositions. Kortian says, ‘positive concepts which take over words from ordinary language epitomize these presuppositions which, according to Hegel, are so ‘well-known’ precisely because they are not ‘known’.’ This knowledge is ‘phenomenal knowledge’ (*erscheinendes Wissen*), which is the object of Phenomenology. Hegel, in stressing the speculative experience as the experience of absolute knowledge, criticized Kant for treating knowledge as the tool for arriving at the truth. Hegel claimed that the medium or instrument of knowing incorporated into the process could not be abstracted from it. Hegel wrote, “... Or if, representing knowledge as a medium, we learn the law of its refraction, it is likewise of no avail to substract the refraction from the result...”

In Hegel's critique of Kant, a distinct metacritical moment is palpable and his speculative experience is far more incisive though culminating in the cul de sac of the absolute knowledge. 'In speculative thinking, the negative moment of reflection belongs to the content itself, and is the positive, both as its immanent movement and determination and as the whole of this moment and determination.' While the phenomenal understanding processes external data, the speculative experience internally scrutinizes the content and the passive subject-object relationship is abandoned for a dynamic interface in the historical manifestation of reason. The *Aufhebung* of the difference between the phenomenal and the truth produces speculative experience. Truth is the philosophical knowledge, which is the self-reflective reconstruction of the phenomenal knowledge objectified by the transcendental-absolute concept. This is the absolute knowledge. But Marx's polemic against Hegel led to the dissociation of the whole project and also the project of the whole; i.e. 'the moment of recognition and appropriation of (*anerkennung* and *annignung*) the phenomenalized totality of the absolute concept in its otherness.'

The Frankfurt school gladly accepted the metacritique. Horkheimer added the social dimension to the Hegelian dialectics. Adorno especially employed metacritique ruthlessly to denounce any attempt at foundational enterprise in philosophy. He was unsparing of Hegel for capitulating his dialectic in the Absolute. For Adorno, the dialectic is unending and its function is to continue unearthing falsity which alone is the unprevaricated truth. Horkheimer and Adorno called such a process materialism, which denotes the nexus between the dialectic and the socio-historic relationships. These relationships serve as millstones around the neck and prevent emancipation as envisioned in the Enlightenment. Hegel attributes this 'pre-supposition of the unachieved end' to Kantian 'ought to be' or duty (*Sollen*).

Critical theory envisages emancipation as a product of both socio-historical reality and the subjective perseverance of the human understanding. The introspection, the retrospection, and the deintellectualization of the theory and the deobjectivization of the praxis were at the top of the agenda for the Frankfurt theorists. The method recommended by Habermas was practical discourse, which propagates dialogical-dialectical understanding. Habermas also introduces the concept of interest into the process of rationalization. This interest is the one, which furthers the appetite for emancipation. Enlightenment confronts the problems of reason, dogmatism, and decision. The will to decide reasonably sets in motion the interest in emancipation.

Check Your Progress II

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer.

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit.

- 1) Explain the contributions of Kant, Hegel and Marx to the epistemological foundations of critical theory and how they are related to each other.

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2) Elucidate Habermas' critique of Kant, Hegel and Marx.

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3.4 KNOWLEDGE AS SOCIAL PRACTIS

Habermas accepted, in principle, Horkheimer's and Adorno's critique of the Enlightenment reason for fostering technical interests intent on domination. Reason, which was considered to be the acme of emancipatory power, lost its supremacy to the methodology of the sciences. Reason and science became increasingly identified with each other. For Marx, any social critique could only be practical with the intent of abolishing false consciousness thereby facilitating social emancipation. Reason, being the bedrock of communication, performs a meaning generating function. A consensus on mutually accepted conventions is imperative to understand meanings attributed to actions. Habermas accepts the idea of praxis bereft of technical stigma fastened to it but comprising of social aims not infused extrinsically but gained by virtue of its own rationality. In this context, Richard Rorty says, "Either all justifications, whether in matters of knowledge or morals, appeals to social practices or to illusory foundations."

Social practice, for Habermas, is the starting point of any inquiry. It is classified into labour (purposive rational action) and interaction (communicative action). While technical and practical interests drive both natural sciences as well as the historical-hermeneutical sciences, respectively, the reason which operates can never be termed neutral because of the guiding aims of their activity. While the former is identified with activity that involves domination and achieving the desired ends, the latter is linked to preserving and enlarging the domain of understanding. Habermas argues that interests drive all cognitive activities. This interest operates in three spheres of 'media' – work, language, and authority corresponding to the natural, historical-hermeneutical, and social sciences respectively. In self-reflection, interest and cognition coincide and 'emancipative reason' takes shape.

The irony of how science has become the paradigm for all knowledge claims in a stark reversal of the Kantian project led Habermas to distinguish between scientific temper and scientific method. The emphasis on purposive activity in a capitalistic society leads to an understanding of social practice as a system of commercial exchange and not human interaction. Politics becomes a pawn in the hands of the market aided by technological forms of control. Thus, science and technology becomes an ideology wedded to the technical model of social control. Human activity loses the element of moral autonomy. Habermas argues that only a return to 'praxis' in the form of communicative action could lead to lessened social control.

3.5 COMMUNICATIVE RATIONALITY

Scientific-technical or purposive-instrumental rationality revels in discovering the secrets of the external world and helps humans establish a mastery over it. Thus,

it becomes a purpose-oriented and goal-directed rationality. Communicative rationality is concerned with transactions in the sphere of exchange of thoughts, ideas, and meaning-forming activity, which is the bedrock of any learning process, which instrumental rationality does not take cognizance of. Communicative rationality aims at social rationalization, social integration, and socialization. These are protracted discursive, justificatory and redeemable processes in which arriving at a conclusion is not the culmination. Purposive rationality is concerned with truth claims. Though the reflective element in the scientific-technical activity cannot be doubted it is affirmed only in the success or the efficiency of the action performed. In the case of communicative action, success or failure of the action is immaterial if the process of communication is authored under the canopy of reflection. What is coveted is the potential for unconstrained consensus purely based on the force of rational argumentation. Communicative rationality is situated upon the reflective competence of the interacting subjects to justify and defend a thesis through the force of reason. This presupposes a common-shared lifeworld of meanings, which acts as the transcendental binding force. Purposive rationality takes the lifeworld for granted ignoring its historical situatedness while communicative rationality derives its strength from intersubjective communicative action.

Habermas criticizes Kant for dividing the domain of knowledge into science, morality, and art and anointing pure reason, practical reason, and judgment to govern respective domains. Though Habermas accepts the inherent relation between various concepts of reason, ironically, he had to resort to demarcating reason into purposive rational and communicative rational. It becomes imperative for Habermas to separate them because science applies a different standard of rationality and it would condemn moral-ethical and aesthetic to the irrational. Since social sciences have to explain social processes that are invariably associated with human activity, the method of validation of claims is possible only through argumentation, which Habermas describes as the systematic way of adducing reasons and grounds for the justification of validity claims. Habermas, in order to distinguish the domains of science and social sciences recommends theoretical discourse in the case of the former and practical discourse in the case of the latter. As Habermas reiterates, his idea of practical discourse is not identical to moral discourse but the validation of normative validity claims, i.e. not only what is right but also what makes it right. This is where justification, discursivity, and redeemability of the validity claims surface. This makes the process of argumentation rational. Another reason for Habermas to choose argumentative technique for expounding his theory of communicative action is its pragmatic character. A formal linguistic framework is required in an 'ideal speech situation', which presupposes linguistic competence of the interlocutors.

Habermas distinguishes the archaic from modern world-views and forms of understanding associated with them. The modern interpreters are prejudiced when analyzing the archaic world-views. Habermas claims that though the archaic world-views cannot be completely divested of any rationality, the claims were not always rationally articulated. He says that the modern understanding is far more dialogical and accommodative. There is little or no separation between culture, religion, science and various symbolic practices in the archaic understanding. There is a need for demythologization and denaturalization of the society and only then would socialization be possible. The concept of validity claims and their justification is possible only in a society with shared meanings with common linguistic framework.

The problems of truth and morality have to be released from the narrow perspective of justification on survival instinct and self-preservation. Dialogue or argumentation is not possible in an atmosphere foreboding violence or anarchy. The term society itself symbolizes a rational community with mutually agreed upon laws to be administered for various social acts and conventions to be adhered. The transition to language from symbolism must have been prompted by a need to communicate. The natural expressive impulse that manifested in various pictorial and other symbolic artefacts must have been a substitute for the undeveloped linguistic apparatus.

3.6 HABERMAS' EMPHASIS ON ARGUMENTATION

Habermas classifies social action into four types. They are: 1) Teleological action 2) Dramaturgical action 3) Normatively regulated action and 4) communicative action. Teleological action is result-oriented. Dramaturgical action is expressive in nature. Normatively regulated action is governed by norms. Communicative action leads to consensus through a rational discourse. Communicative action stresses the need for asserting validity claims concerning subjective, objective and intersubjective spheres. Validity claims typically involve truthfulness for the subjective, truth for the objective and rightness for the intersubjective spheres. In order to strengthen communicative action, Habermas stipulates comprehensibility, discursivity, redeemability and justifiability as the constituent elements of a debate aimed at achieving understanding and consensus. Habermas' method of argumentation for norm formation presupposes:

- 1) a competence on the part of the participants
- 2) a will to engage in a fair discourse
- 3) receptive to others views and welcoming criticism
- 4) readiness to alter one's views when proved untenable
- 5) conscious reflective discursive enterprise

This in nutshell is an "ideal speech situation". The justification for any argumentation lies in the discursivity and redeemability of validity claims. Habermas, after proceeding from the communicative action, which establishes understanding, aims at providing emancipatory thrust with the help of a communicative ethics, which is the boundary condition of a practical discourse. Moral-ethical aspects are problematized only in a practical discourse.

Check Your Progress III

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer.

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit.

- 1) Explain how knowledge could be equated with social praxis.

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2) Describe communicative rationality.

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3.7 LET US SUM UP

- This unit attempts to provide an understanding of how Habermas' was influenced by the German idealists such as Kant, Hegel and Marx in constructing epistemological scaffolding for his vast philosophical enterprise.
- In this unit, Habermas' major contributions in the form of communicative reason, communicative action, rational argumentation, metacritique and consensus are analyzed.

3.8 KEY WORDS

Critical Social Theory/Critical Theory	: a critique of existing social and political structures
Praxis	: socio-cultural practices
Consensus	: agreement
Communicative Rationality	: reason aimed at achieving understanding and consensus
Purposive-Instrumental Rationality	: reason aimed at achieving success
Lifeworld	: the world that we live, understand through language and experience

3.9 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

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3.10 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Answers to Check Your Progress I

- 1) Critical theory was para-Marxist in its outlook but freely incorporated ideas of Kant, Hegel, Freud, Nietzsche, Weber, and others. The Frankfurt school was critical of the politics of hatred and conformity. Critical theory identified reification as the ‘epitome of the problems of the modern world.’ Critical theory is also a critique of the existing society in the Marxian sense, a tirade against market-oriented capitalistic political system which was perpetrated in the name of democracy.
- 2) Critical theory viewed society not as a natural necessity thrust upon the people. Rather, it viewed society as a lifeworld, a mosaic of subjective, objective, and intersubjective social processes. The social processes are not irrevocable and can be altered. Critical theory critically evaluated society by analyzing its categories. Unlike other theories, critical theory acknowledged the possibility of its own judgements being coloured by established beliefs of the society in which it is housed. But it also believes in the critical power of reason to rise above and scrutinize the customs, manners, and beliefs prevalent in the society.

Answers to Check Your Progress II

- 1) Kant performed a critical analysis of the limits of the cognitive faculty with the intention of revamping the whole system of philosophy. What Kant did benefitted all disciplines because his inquiry was critical. Kant reconciled empiricism and rationalism in his critical philosophy. Hegel’s critique of Kant is centred upon Kant’s emphasis on the primacy of the subject. This severely restricted the creativity of the mind. Kant’s emphasis on the subject led to a transcendental philosophy. Instead, Hegel suggested “immanent critique” which involves constant revision of concepts with emphasis on continuous refinement through a dialectical process of history. Marx criticized Hegel for neglecting the social factors in the conception of the subject, experience, and knowledge in which errors are viewed as merely intellectual. The maladies afflicting a society have to be eliminated successively and each stage has its residue of contradictions. Marx’s contention was that the prognosis and diagnosis of the problem should be found in social reality.
- 2) Habermas criticizes Kant for unilaterally dividing the domain of knowledge into science, morality, and art and anointing pure reason, practical reason,

and judgment to govern their respective domains. Habermas differs from Hegel who subsumes social critique in his dialectic in which reason finally delivers the society from all contradictions. Social praxis cannot be a purely speculative metaphysical enterprise. According to Habermas, Marxism fails to evaluate both levels of contradictions; in the historical realm in the society as well as the conceptual framework of the individuals.

Answers to Check your Progress III

- 1) Social practice, for Habermas, is the starting point of any inquiry. He divides social practice into labour (purposive rational action) and interaction (communicative action). While technical and practical interests drive both natural sciences as well as the historical-hermeneutical sciences, respectively, the reason which operates can never be termed neutral because of the guiding aims of their activity. While the former indulges in activity that involves domination and achieving the desired ends, the latter engages in preserving and enlarging the domain of understanding among the humans to improve communication. Habermas argues that interests drive all cognitive activities. This interest operates in three spheres of 'media' – work, language, and authority corresponding to the natural, historical-hermeneutical, and social sciences respectively. In self-reflection, interest and cognition coincide and it is in this realm that 'emancipative reason' takes shape.
- 2) Communicative rationality is concerned with transactions in the sphere of exchange of thoughts, ideas, and meaning-forming activity, which is the bedrock of any learning process, which instrumental rationality does not take cognizance of. The aim of communicative rationality is social rationalization, social integration, and socialization. These are protracted discursive, justificatory and redeemable processes in which arriving at a conclusion is not the culmination. Communicative rationality is situated upon the reflective competence of the interacting subjects to justify and defend a thesis through the force of reason.