
UNIT 1 PERSONAL IDENTITY AND SELF

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1.0 OBJECTIVES

- To explore some of the philosophical issues related to personal identity and self.
- To appreciate how self and personal identity are preserved in spite of our bodily changes.

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Before asking ourselves questions like “What is my identity?” “How is my self preserved?”, we shall begin with a story. This story comes from Plutarch (46-126 ACE), which is often used to clarify the problem of identity and change. Theseus was a legendary king of Athens famous for many exploits, and appearing in works by many authors and on countless vases. The ship wherein Theseus and the youth of Athens returned from Crete had thirty oars and was preserved by the Athenians down to the time of Demetrius Phalereus. They took away the old planks as they decayed, putting in new and stronger timber in their place. This ship became a standing example among the philosophers; for the question of things that change. Some thinkers hold the view that the ship remained the same, while others contend that it was not the same. In the renewal process of the ship, there comes a point at which none of the original components remain. Is it then the same ship? Thomas Hobbes asks: If someone went around picking up the discarded parts and constructed a (new) ship with them, which would be the better candidate for being the original ship? This raises the question of whether an object, which has had all its component parts replaced, remains fundamentally the same.

This takes us to the issues related to personal identity and self. How do we preserve our identity through time and by gathering more experiences? Thereafter we proceed to reflect on some anthropological issues like the renewal of the cells in the body and the notion of personality, as the focus of our attention. Finally we indicate the relationship between the scientific notion of “centre of gravity” and that of the self and show that the self (and reality itself) is in fact a network of interrelating entities.

1.2 COUNTING THE UNCOUNTABLE

Pythagorean philosophy was the prime source of inspiration for Plato and Aristotle; the most influential philosophers in history. The school of Pythagoras (580-500 BCE) was every bit a religion as it was a school of mathematics. (For example, here are some of the rules he enjoined on his followers: To abstain from beans. Not to pick up what has fallen. Not to touch a white cock. Not to stir the fire with iron. Do not look in a mirror beside a light. Vegetarianism was strictly practiced probably because Pythagoras preached the transmigration of souls. The school of Pythagoras represents the mystic tradition in the scientific.) The Pythagorean philosophy may be understood better from this quote: “There are three kinds of men and three sorts of people that attend the Olympic Games. The lowest class is made up of those who come to buy and sell, the next above them are those who compete. Best of all, however, are those who come simply to look on. The greatest purification of all is, therefore, disinterested science, and it is the man who devotes himself to that, [sic.] the true philosopher, who has most effectually released himself from the ‘wheel of birth.’” (<http://www.math.tamu.edu/~don.allen/history/pythag/pythag.html>.)

Pythagoreans believed that all relations could be reduced to number relations. The assertion that “all things are numbers” aptly sums up their philosophy. This generalization stemmed from certain observations in music, mathematics, and astronomy. The Pythagoreans noticed that the vibrating strings produce harmonious tones when the ratios of the lengths of the strings are whole numbers and that these ratios could be extended to other instruments. They knew, as did the Egyptians before them, that any triangle whose sides were in the ratio 3:4:5 was a right-angled triangle. The so-called Pythagorean theorem, that the square of the hypotenuse of a right triangle is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides, may have been known in Babylonia, where Pythagoras traveled in his youth. The Pythagoreans, however, are usually credited with the first proof of this theorem. In astronomy, the Pythagoreans were well aware of the periodic numerical relations of the heavenly bodies. The *celestial spheres* of the planets were thought to produce a harmony called the music of the spheres. Pythagoreans believed that the earth itself was in motion. Greek mathematicians, as well as the Pythagoreans, believed that whole numbers and their ratios could account for geometrical properties.

The most eminent mathematician of the last century, Bertrand Russell, commended: “It is to this gentleman that we owe pure mathematics. The contemplative ideal – since it led to pure mathematics or contemplation – was the source of a useful activity. This increased its prestige and gave it a success in theology, in ethics, and in philosophy.” (Bertrand Russell, <http://www.math.tamu.edu/~don.allen/history/pythag/pythag.html>.) Mathematics, so honored, became the model for other sciences. *Thought* became superior to the senses; *intuition* became superior to observation.

Though modern science will not approve of all that Pythagoras’ stood for, it is evident that number played a very important role in the existence of reality as we know them. (Here it is important that the atomic number and the basic constants of nature may be alluded as examples.) In this unit, what we want to stress is the role of relationship and placement in the ordinary counting with numbers. The

zero, which is credited to Indians, is crucial at least in the counting system. What is significant is that the value of a number is based not only on its numerical value but on their positioning. Here zero constitutes an additional aspect of the number system and contributes to its meaning. Thus the number system that we use in our routine life enables us to appreciate the fact that it is the relationship and the sequencing between the entities that makes the system meaningful. Incidentally we may note that using finite numerals by humans have devised a way of reaching the infinite. From the above observation it is evident that, though number does matter, “pattern prevails and configuration counts” both in the numerical system and in the larger life system. This leads to questions on relationship with things and persons as well as to one’s own self: personal identity.

Check Your Progress I

Note: Use the space provided for your answer

1) Who claims that “all things are numbers”?

2) How is number system related to relationship and sequencing?

1.3 SOME ISSUES CONNECTED WITH PERSONAL IDENTITY

In philosophy, personal identity refers to the numerical identity of persons through time. In other words, the conditions under which a person is said to be identical to himself or herself through time are regarded collectively as one’s personal identity. Personal identity deals with questions that arise about ourselves by virtue of our being people (or, as lawyers and philosophers like to say, persons). Many of these questions are familiar ones that occur to everyone at some time: What am I? When did I begin? What will happen to me when I die? Others are more abstruse. Personal identity has been discussed since the origins of Western philosophy, and most major figures have had something to say about it.

The question regarding personal identity has addressed the conditions under which a person at one time is the same person at another time, known as personal continuity. This sort of analysis of personal identity provides a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the identity of the person over time. In the modern

philosophy of mind, this concept of personal identity is sometimes referred to as the diachronic problem of personal identity. The synchronic problem is grounded in the question of what features or traits characterize a given person at one time. Thus there is no single problem of personal identity, but rather a wide range of loosely connected questions (Wikipedia).

Who am I? We often speak of one's "personal identity" as what makes one the person one is. Your identity in this sense consists roughly of what makes you unique as an individual and different from others. Or it is the way you see or define yourself, or the network of values and convictions that structure your life. This individual identity is a *property* (or set of properties). Presumably it is one you have only contingently—you might have had a different identity from the one you in fact have—and one that you might have for a while and then lose: you could acquire a new individual identity, or perhaps even get by without one (Stanford Encyclopedia).

Personhood

What is it to be a person? What is necessary, and what suffices, for something to count as a person, as opposed to a non-person? What have people got that non-people haven't got? This amounts more or less to asking for the definition of the word person. In psychology (which historically is philosophically concerned with dualism), personal continuity, also called personal persistence, is the uninterrupted connection concerning a particular person of his or her private life and personality. Personal continuity is the union affecting the facets arising from personality in order to avoid discontinuities from one moment of time to another time. Personal continuity is an important part of identity; this is the process of ensuring that the quality of the mind are consistent from moment to the next, generally regarded to comprise qualities such as self-awareness, sentience, sapience, and the ability to perceive the relationship between oneself and one's environment. Personal continuity is the property of a continuous and connected period of time and is intimately concerned with a person's body or physical being.

Historically this question often arises out of the hope that we might continue to exist after we die—Plato's *Phaedo*, is a famous example. Whether this could happen depends on whether biological death necessarily brings one's existence to an end. Imagine that after your death there really will be someone, in the next world or in this one, who resembles you in certain ways. How would that being have to relate to you as you are now in order to *be* you, rather than someone else? What would the Higher Powers have to do to keep you in existence after your death? Or is there anything they could do? The answer to these questions depends on the answer to the Persistence Question.

What am I?

What sort of things, metaphysically speaking, are you and I and other human people? What is our basic metaphysical nature? For instance, what are we made of? Are we made up entirely of matter, just as stones are, or partly or wholly of something else? If we are made of matter, what matter is it? (Just the matter that makes up our bodies, or might we be larger or smaller than our bodies?) Where, in other words, do our spatial boundaries lie? More fundamentally, what fixes those boundaries? Are we substances—metaphysically independent beings—or

is each of us a state or an aspect of something else, or perhaps some sort of process or event?

How could I have been?

How different could I have been from the way I actually am? Which of my properties do I have essentially, and which only accidentally or contingently? Could I, for instance, have had different parents? Frank Sinatra and Doris Day might have had children together. Could I have been one of them? Or could they only have had children other than me? Could I have died in the womb before ever becoming conscious? Are there possible worlds just like the actual one except for who is who—where people have “changed places” so that what is in fact your career is mine and vice versa? Whether these are best described as questions about personal identity is debatable.

1.4 IDENTITY BASED ON CONSCIOUSNESS

John Locke considered personal identity (or the self) to be founded on consciousness and not on the substance of either the soul or the body. The chapter “On Identity and Diversity” in *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1689) has been said to be one of the first modern conceptualization of consciousness as the repeated self-identification of oneself. Through this identification, moral responsibility could be attributed to the subject and punishment and guilt could be justified, as critics such as Nietzsche would point out (Self-awareness 2010).

According to Locke, personal identity (the self) depends on consciousness, not on the particular substance nor on the soul. We are the same person to the extent that we are conscious of our past and future thoughts and actions in the same way as we are conscious of our present thoughts and actions. If consciousness is this “thought” which “that goes along with the substance ... which makes the same person”, then personal identity is only founded on the repeated act or experience of consciousness: “This may show us wherein personal identity consists: not in the identity of substance, but... in the identity of consciousness”. For example, one may claim to be a reincarnation of Plato, therefore having the same soul substance. However, one would be the same person as Plato only if one had the same consciousness of Plato’s thoughts and actions that he himself did (in his previous birth). Therefore, self-identity is not based on the soul. On the other hand, one soul may have various personalities (Self-awareness 2010).

Neither is self-identity founded on the body substance, argues Locke, as the body may change while the person remains the same. Even the identity of animals is not founded on their body: “animal identity is preserved in identity of life, and not of substance”, as the body of the animal grows and changes during its life. On the other hand, identity of humans is based on their consciousness. Take for example a prince’s mind which enters the body of a cobbler: to all exterior eyes, the cobbler would remain a cobbler. But to the prince himself, the cobbler would be himself, as he would be conscious of the prince’s thoughts and acts, and not those of the cobbler. A prince’s consciousness in a cobbler’s body: thus the cobbler is, in fact, a prince.

But this interesting border-case leads to this problematic thought that since personal identity is based on consciousness, and that only oneself can be aware

of his consciousness, exterior human judges may never know if they really are judging - and punishing - the same person, or simply the same body. In other words, Locke argues that you may be judged only for the acts of your body, as this is what is apparent to all but God; however, you are in truth only responsible for the acts for which you are conscious. This forms the basis of the insanity defense: one cannot be held accountable for acts from which one was unconscious - and therefore leads to interesting philosophical issues:

“Personal identity consists [not in the identity of substance] but in the identity of consciousness, wherein if Socrates and the present mayor of Queenborough agree, they are the same person: if the same Socrates waking and sleeping do not partake of the same consciousness, Socrates waking and sleeping is not the same person. And to punish Socrates waking for what sleeping Socrates thought, and waking Socrates was never conscious of, would be no more right, than to punish one twin for what his brother-twin did, whereof he knew nothing, because their outsides were so like, that they could not be distinguished; for such twins have been seen (Locke 1956).”

Therefore, Locke’s conception of personal identity is in fact founded on the “same continued consciousness”, which is also distinct from the soul since the soul may have no consciousness of itself. The problem of personal identity is at the center of discussions about life after death, and immortality (See next Unit). In order to exist after death, there has to be a person after death who is the same person as the person who died.

Check Your Progress II

Note: Use the space provided for your answer

1) What are some of the issues connected to personal identity?

2) Where does John Locke base identity?

1.5 ANTROPOLOGICAL INSIGHTS

After having studied some of the scientific insights that indicate the relationality of nature, we take up some specific human issues: that of the body and the self. Here too we attempt to indicate the focusing aspect of human being, that open ourselves to a interlacing and relational dimension of the human being.

10

Our Skin Sheds Itself...

Personal Identity and Self

Recently, *The New York Times* published an article which posited that whatever be one's age, the body is many years younger. In fact, even the middle aged may be just 10 years old or less, as far as the body cells are concerned. This arises from the fact that most of the body's tissues are under constant renewal and has been underlined by a novel method of estimating the age of human cells. Its inventor, a Swedish scientist, Jonas Frisen, believes that the average age of all the cells in an adult's body may turn out to be as young as 7 to 10 years. But Dr. Frisen, a stem cell biologist at the Karolinska Institute in Stockholm, has also discovered a fact that explains why people behave their birth age, not the physical age of their cells: a few of the body's cell types endure from birth to death without renewal, and this special minority includes some or all of the cells of the cerebral cortex.

In the scientific circles, it was a dispute over whether the cortex ever makes any new cells that got Dr. Frisen looking for a new way of figuring out how old human cells really are. Existing techniques depend on tagging DNA with chemicals but are far from perfect. Wondering if some natural tag might already be in place, Dr. Frisen recalled that the nuclear weapons tested above ground until 1963 had injected a pulse of radioactive carbon 14 into the atmosphere. Breathed in by plants worldwide and eaten by animals and people, the carbon 14 gets incorporated into the DNA of cells each time the cell divides and the DNA is duplicated.

Most molecules in a cell are constantly being replaced but the DNA is not. All carbon 14 in a cell's DNA is acquired on the cell's birth date, the day its parent cell divided. Hence the extent of carbon 14 enrichment could be used to figure out the cell's age, Dr. Frisen surmised. In practice, the method has to be used on tissues, not individual cells, because not enough carbon 14 gets into any single cell to signal its age. Dr. Frisen then worked out a scale for converting carbon 14 enrichment into calendar dates by measuring the carbon 14 incorporated into individual tree rings in Swedish pine trees.

Having validated the method with various tests, he and his colleagues have the results of their first tests with a few body tissues. Cells from the muscles of the ribs, taken from people in their late 30's, have an average age of 15.1 years, they say. The epithelial cells that line the surface of the gut have a rough life and are known by other methods to last only five days. Ignoring these surface cells, the average age of those in the main body of the gut is 15.9 years, Dr. Frisen found. Similarly, the human body constantly creates, from materials consumed, new component parts and cells as old cells die. The average age of cells in an adult body may be less than 10 years. (Nicholas Wade, "Your Body is Younger than you Think" <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/02/>)

This team then turned to the brain, the renewal of whose cells has been a matter of much contention. The prevailing belief, by and large, is that the brain does not generate new neurons, once its structure is complete, except in two specific regions, the olfactory bulb that mediates the sense of smell, and the hippocampus, where initial memories of faces and places are laid down. This consensus view was challenged a few years ago by Elizabeth Gould of Princeton, who reported finding new neurons in the cerebral cortex, along with the elegant idea that each day's memories might be recorded in the neurons generated that day.

Dr. Frisen's method enables all regions of the brain to be dated to see if any new neurons are generated. So far he has tested only cells from the visual cortex. He finds these are exactly of the same age as the individual, showing that new neurons are not generated after birth in this region of the cerebral cortex, or at least not in significant numbers. Cells of the cerebellum are slightly younger than those of the cortex, which fits with the idea that the cerebellum continues developing after birth. Another contentious issue is whether the heart generates new muscle cells after birth. The conventional view that it does not has recently been challenged by Dr. Piero Anversa of the New York Medical College in Valhalla. Dr. Frisen has found the heart as a whole is generating new cells, but he has not yet measured the turnover rate of the heart's muscle cells.

Thus the anthropological findings regarding our own bodies are interesting. On the average our body cells last about ten years. At the same time there are specific cells that last from the beginning of our life. This throws light on how dependent our bodies are on the changing cells. The interesting question that comes out of this investigation is: if our cells keep on changing, what gives us a permanent self or identity? Are our bodies like the ship of Theseus, which is given the same identity only by external observers?

The Centre, that Is the Self

What is a self? I will try to answer this question by developing an analogy with something much simpler, something which is nowhere near as puzzling as a self, but has some properties in common with selves. This leads us to investigate the phenomenon of self or personhood, using another scientific notion of "centre of gravity." In physics, the centre of gravity is an imaginary point in a body of matter where, for convenience in certain calculations, the total weight of the body may be thought to be concentrated. The concept is sometimes useful in designing static structures (e.g., buildings and bridges) or in predicting the behaviour of a moving body when it is acted on by gravity. (<http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9037797/centre-of-gravity>) The centre of gravity, a well-behaved Newtonian concept is not an atom or a subatomic particle or any other physical item in the world. It has no mass; it has no colour; it has no physical properties at all, except for spatio-temporal location. It is a fine example of what Hans Reichenbach would call an *abstractum*. It is a purely abstract object. It is a theorist's fiction. It is not one of the real things in the universe in addition to the atoms. But it is a fiction that has a neatly defined, well delineated and well behaved role within physics.

This theoretical abstractum is a robust and familiar idea. Consider a chair. Like all other physical objects, it has a centre of gravity. If you start tipping it, you can tell more or less accurately whether it would start to fall over or fall back in place if you let go of it. We're all quite good at making predictions involving centers of gravity and finding explanations about when and why things fall over. Place a book on the chair. It, too, has a centre of gravity. If you start to push it over the edge, we know that at some point it will fall. It will fall when its centre of gravity is no longer directly over a point of its supporting base (the chair seat). The key terms in it are all interdefinable. And yet it can also figure in explanations that appear to be causal explanations of some sort. We ask "Why doesn't that lamp tip over?" We reply "Because its centre of gravity is so low." Is this a causal explanation? It can compete with explanations that are clearly causal, such as: "Because it's nailed to the table," or "Because it's supported by wires."

We can manipulate centers of gravity. For instance, I change the centre of gravity of a water pitcher easily, by pouring some of the water out. So, although a centre of gravity is a purely abstract object, it has a spatio-temporal character, which I can affect by my actions. It has a history, but its history can include some rather strange episodes. Although it moves around in space and time, its motion can be discontinuous. For instance, if I were to take a piece of bubble gum and suddenly stick it on the pitcher's handle, that would shift the pitcher's centre of gravity from point A to point B. But the centre of gravity would not have to move through all the intervening positions. As an abstractum, it is not bound by all the constraints of physical travel.

Consider the centre of gravity of a slightly more complicated object. Suppose we wanted to keep track of the career of the centre of gravity of some complex machine with lots of turning gears and camshafts and reciprocating rods – the engine of a steam-powered unicycle, perhaps. And suppose our theory of the machine's operation permitted us to plot the complicated trajectory of the centre of gravity precisely. And suppose that we discovered that in this particular machine the trajectory of the centre of gravity was precisely the same as the trajectory of a particular iron atom in the crankshaft. Even if this were discovered, we would be wrong even to *entertain* the hypothesis that the machine's centre of gravity was (identical with) that of the iron atom. That would be a “category mistake”. A centre of gravity is *just* an *abstractum*. It's just a fictional object. But when I say it's a fictional object, I do not mean to disparage it; it's a wonderful fictional object, and it has a perfectly legitimate place within serious, sober physical science.

A self is also an abstract object, a theorist's fiction. The theory of the self may be regarded as part of psychology, phenomenology or hermeneutics, or soul-sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*). The physicist does an *interpretation* of the chair and its behaviour, and comes up with the theoretical abstraction of a centre of gravity, which is then very useful in characterizing the behaviour of the chair in the future, under a wide variety of conditions. The hermeneuticist or phenomenologist or anthropologist sees some rather more complicated things moving about in the world – human beings and animals –and is faced with a similar problem of interpretation. It turns out to be theoretically perspicuous to organize the interpretation around a central abstraction: each person has a *self* (in addition to a centre of gravity). In fact we have to posit selves for *ourselves* as well. The theoretical problem of self-interpretation is at least as difficult and important as the problem of other-interpretation. (<http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/selfctr.htm>.)

We propose that we take this analogy seriously. “Where is the self?” A materialist philosopher or neuroscientist might ask. It is a “category mistake” to start looking around for the self in the brain. Unlike centres of gravity, whose sole property is their spatio-temporal position, selves have a spatio-temporal position that is only grossly defined. Roughly speaking, in the normal case if there are three human beings sitting on a park bench, there are three selves there, all in a row and roughly equidistant from the fountain they face. Brain research may permit us to make some more fine-grained localizations, but the capacity to achieve *some* fine-grained localization does not give anyone grounds for supposing that the process of localization can continue indefinitely and that the day will finally come when we can say, “That cell there, right in the middle of hippocampus (or wherever) – that's the self.”

The chief fictional character at the centre of that autobiography is one’s narrative *self*. And if we still want to know what the self *really* is, we are making a “category mistake”. After all, when a human being’s behavioural control system becomes seriously impaired, it can turn out that the best hermeneutical story we can tell about that individual says that there is more than one character “inhabiting” that body. This is quite possible. All that is required is that the story doesn’t cohere around *one* self, *one* imaginary point, but coheres around *two* different (even conflicting) imaginary points.

We sometimes encounter psychological disorders, or surgically created disunities, where the only way to interpret or make sense of them is to posit in effect two centers of gravity, two selves. One isn’t creating or discovering a little bit of “ghost in the machine” stuff in doing that. One is merely creating another abstraction. It is an abstraction one uses as part of a theatrical apparatus to understand, predict, and make sense of, the behaviour of some very complicated things. The fact that these abstract selves seem so robust and real is not surprising. They are much more complicated theoretical entities than a centre of gravity. And remember that even a centre of gravity has a fairly robust presence, once we start playing around with it. But no one has ever seen or ever will see a centre of gravity. As David Hume noted, no one has ever seen a self, either. “For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.... If anyone, upon serious and unprejudiced reflection, thinks he has a different notion of *himself*, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continued, which he calls *himself*; though I am certain there is no such principle in me. (*Treatise on Human Nature*, I, IV, sec. 6.) Though the self is not empirically perceivable, we are aware of it and we are to some extent our own selves. Thus the self is an indicator of the relationship that involves our body and goes beyond it. Further, it is insightful to see the relationship between the self and one’s body. Obviously, without the material body, there is no centre of gravity and so without the physical body, there is no self. And the self may be visualized also as the “focusing centre” that deals with the interrelationship between various physical parts of the body. Since it is not itself physical, it can balance the web of relationship originating from various parts of the body. Thus the self may be seen as the best example of the relationality of reality.

1.6 CONCLUSION

Starting with Pythagoras, we saw the importance of numbers (monads) and then we took up some of the philosophical issues related to personal identity. Then we discussed two basic anthropological domains: renewing of our physical body approximately every ten years and the relationship of centre of gravity to the self. In all these undertakings, we have tried to illustrate that relationality is intrinsic to reality. The whole of the cosmos is interconnected, just like the human body, which through networking and interconnection form the person or self that we are.

Therefore, monadic understanding of ourselves as entities may be practical at times, but is definitely inadequate to cope with the complexities of contemporary times. We are the ever widening horizon of our consciousness, which includes definitely our physical entity and incorporates the intellectual, emotional and spiritual dimensions of being alive. In this sense we are not mere individuals, but patterns or relationships. We could very well describe ourselves as the nodes of the network or the focus of interactions.

From a religious point of view, it is easy to see that when Christians affirm God as love, they proclaim the essential relational nature of God. In the same sense, the doctrine of creation is essentially affirming an intrinsic relationship of dependence between the Creator and creation. In this sense without belittling the monadic dimension of reality, contemporary science rediscovers the love aspect of reality, which vibes very well with the deepest religious insights. We are truly bond to one another and to the Ultimate through the relationality of love. Humans are thus not individual entities but horizons that merge and fuse with similar horizons. Such an enhancing vision throws some light on our understanding of the self and personal identity. That is why The Buddha attacked all attempts to conceive of a fixed self, while stating that holding the view “I have no self” is also mistaken. This is an example of the middle way charted by the Buddha.

1.7 LET US SUM UP

In this unit we have elaborately dealt on personal identity and finally related the centre of gravity from physics to personal self in philosophy.

<p>Check Your Progress III</p> <p>Note: Use the space provided for your answer</p> <p>1) What is “centre of gravity”?</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>2) Give some differences between ‘self’ and ‘centre of gravity’?</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>

1.8 KEY WORDS

- Centre of gravity** : It is an imaginary point in a body of matter where, for convenience in certain calculations, the total weight of the body may be thought to be concentrated.
- Geisteswissenschaft** : (More frequently used in plural form *Geisteswissenschaften*). It is a traditional division of faculty in German Universities that would include subjects such as Philosophy, Theology, and Jurisprudence. Most of its subject matter would come under the much larger Humanities faculty in the typical English speaking University.

1.9 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

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