
UNIT 3 AQUINAS

Contents

- 3.0 Objectives
- 3.1 Introduction
- 3.2 Life and Works
- 3.3 Faith and Reason
- 3.4 Philosophy of Knowledge
- 3.5 Philosophy of God
- 3.6 Philosophy of the World
- 3.7 Philosophy of Human
- 3.8 The Problem of Evil
- 3.9 Moral Philosophy
- 3.10 Let Us Sum Up
- 3.11 Key Words
- 3.12 Further reading and references
- 3.13 Answers to Check Your Progress

3.0 OBJECTIVES

The Thomistic philosophy has made an influential imprint in the successive philosophical trends. The Medieval philosophy remains incomplete without discussing the role of Aquinas in philosophical quench. In order to instil the spirit of Medieval philosophy in the minds of the students, this unit discusses the important philosophical contribution of Aquinas. This unit aims at:

- exploring the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas
- reflecting on his arguments for the existence of God
- comprehending his views on world and human

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274, *San Tommaso d'Aquino*) is Italian Dominican theologian, the foremost medieval Scholastic. He is known as 'Angelic doctor', (*doctor angelicus*), 'Dean of Medieval Scholastic Theologians', 'Founder of Father of scholasticism', 'Universal Doctor', 'Second Augustine', and 'Prince of Scholastics'. He developed his own conclusions from Aristotelian premises, notably in metaphysics, creation, and Providence. His doctrinal system and the explanations and developments made by his followers are known as Thomism. Although many modern Roman Catholic theologians do not find Thomas altogether congenial, he is nevertheless recognized by the Roman Catholic Church as its foremost Western philosopher and theologian.

3.2 LIFE AND WORKS

Thomas Aquinae was born about 1225 at Roccasecca, near Aquino, Naples as the youngest son of a large Italian aristocratic family. He began his schooling in the great Benedictine abbey at Monte Cassino, and from 1239-44 he was a student at the University of Naples. In 1244 he joined the Dominican friars, a relatively new religious order devoted to study and preaching; by doing so he antagonized his family, who seem to have been counting on his becoming abbot of Monte Cassino. When the Dominicans ordered Aquinas to go to Paris for further study, his family had him abducted *en route* and brought home where he was kept for almost two years. Near the end of that time his brothers hired a prostitute to try to seduce him but Aquinas angrily chased her from his room. Having impressed his family with his high-minded determination, in 1245 Aquinas was allowed to return to the Dominicans, who again sent him to Paris, this time successfully.

Aquinas' works are enormously voluminous. As a theologian he was responsible in his two masterpieces, the *Summa Theologiae* (Synopsis of Theology) and the *Summa contra Gentiles* (against the Errors of the Infidels) and for the classical systematization of Latin theology. And as a poet he wrote some of the most gravely beautiful Eucharistic hymns in the church's liturgy. The *Summa Theologiae* expounds his mature thought at even greater strength. These encyclopaedic works, though theological in intent, and largely in subject matter, contain much material that is philosophical in method and content. The earliest of Aquinas' theological synthesis, his commentary on the Four Books of Sentences of Peter Lombard (1100-1160), bishop of Paris is the least philosophically rewarding to read. Matter of philosophical interest can be found even in Aquinas' commentaries on the Bible, such as his exposition of the Book of Job. His dense, lucid and passionless Latin, which though condemned as barbaric by Renaissance later, can serve as a model of philosophical discourse. His first service to philosophy was to make the works of Aristotle known and acceptable to his Christian colleagues, against the lifelong opposition of conservative theologians like Bonaventure who were suspicious of a pagan philosopher filtered through Muslim commentaries.

At the University of Paris, Aquinas first encountered Albert the Great, a man of enormous and indiscriminating erudition who quickly became his most influential teacher and eventually his friend and supporter. When Albert moved on to the University of Cologne in 1248, Aquinas followed him there, having declined Pope Innocent IV's extraordinary offer to appoint him abbot of Monte Cassino while allowing him to remain a Dominican. He newly started on a gigantic project of commenting on Aristotle's works. His teaching career was brought to an end by ill health in 1273, after a year at the University of Naples where he had begun his career as an undergraduate. He died at Fossanova on March 7, 1274 while journeying to Lyons to take part in the Council which was to unite the Greek and Latin Churches.

3.3 FAITH AND REASON

From the beginning of Christian philosophy, we can notice a steady exploration on the relation between faith and reason. We see Thomas a more systematic and complete analysis in his *Summa Theologiae*. According to him, philosophy and other human sciences rely simply on 'the natural light of reason'. The philosopher should then leave out his researches all data from revelation, in the sense that he must work out his conclusions by the light of human reason alone. The theologian,

though he uses human reason, submits himself to what has been revealed to man by God. It follows, then, that the principal difference between theology and philosophy lies in the fact that the theologian receives his principles as revealed and considers the objects with which he deals as revealed or as deducible from what is revealed, whereas the philosopher apprehends his principles by reason alone and considers the objects with which he deals, not as revealed but as apprehensible and apprehended by the natural light of reason. Faith and reason do not contradict; truths of faith and truths of reason come from God who is the Truth. God as source of all truth, he communicates it to us directly by revelation and indirectly by giving us the power by which we acquire it. Science acquired in the former manner would be divine, while science derived from experience and reason is human. It is impossible that there should exist a contradiction between truths of natural order and truths of the supernatural order.

Faith renders valuable service to reason by elevating the mind in its natural functioning. Reason, in turn, renders a valuable service to faith by the role it plays in theology. Reason can come to the aid of faith in various ways. For example, it can establish certain preambles of faith, such as the existence and unity of God; and it can prove many truths about creatures which faith presupposes. Reason can also use philosophy to refute doctrines contrary to the faith. Philosophy helps theology in as much as it enables the theologian to deduce scientific conclusions from articles of faith. Theology serves philosophy in as much as it acts as a guide or as light upon the path of the philosopher, showing him fields of research and asking him to be convinced of the limitations of his powers.

3.4 PHILOSOPHY OF KNOWLEDGE

The Thomistic theory of knowledge is largely Aristotelian. In the first place, let it be clearly underlined that for Thomas, sensation is the act of the total human person, body and soul and not an act of the soul using the body. Next, there are no innate or in-born ideas to be found in man: all his ideas come to him, ultimately, through the senses, though he may develop and reason about them until he reaches conclusions that go beyond the immediate evidence of his senses.

Sensation gives us knowledge of particulars, not of universals. Animals have sensation and they can only know particular elements like men, saucers of milk. They cannot apprehend universals; they cannot form a universal concept of man or milk as such. It is all a question of particular experiences and concrete memory-pictures of particular experience of the past. Each act of sensation yields a phantasm or image in the imagination and this presents the material object as perceived by the senses. Man, however, does not stop there. In and through this particular, material sense impression, he apprehends the universal and the abstract. How does he do this? After all, even though sensation is an activity of the total human composite, the spirit cannot be immediately acted upon by what is material; the intellectual activity, proper to the spiritual soul, cannot be set in motion by a material phantasm.

Thomas uses the phrase “active intellect” to designate the intellect from the point of view of the function. The active intellect is not a part of intellect, much less a second intellect in man. It is nothing but man’s intellect viewed under its function of rendering the sensible species intelligible. Aquinas says that it *illuminates* the phantasm and abstracts from this particular sensible species the universal intelligible species.

His use of the word ‘illumination’ to describe the characteristic activity of the active intellect should not lead us to think that he was postulating some special help from God to bring this about. He means that the active intellect abstracts the universal element in itself, producing the impressed species on the passive intellect. To abstract means to insolate intellectually; to consider one aspect of a thing, leaving out (ignoring, not denying) other aspects. Since, the active intellect, as such, is purely active, it cannot impress, the universal on itself, this it does on the passive intellect and the reaction to this impression is the concept in the full sense of the word.

Finally, it must be added, that when we affirm a universal concept of a particular thing, we are performing a valid enough operation, for we merely affirm the *id quod* of the concept as being objective (i.e. its meaning: when we apply the concept ‘man’ to John, we are affirming that he is a rational animal). We do not, in any way, mean to say that there is any identity as regards the *modus quo* (i.e. the mode by which the concept and the object respectively exist: the one is abstract and universal whereas the other is concrete and particular).

3.5 PHILOSOPHY OF GOD

There were many illustrious thinkers, mystics and saints who had held, before Thomas, that the knowledge of God’s existence is naturally innate in man. (E.g. John Damascene, Eastern monk and theological doctor of the Greek and Latin churches whose treatises on the veneration of sacred images placed him in the forefront of the 8th-century Iconoclastic Controversy, and whose theological synthesis made him a pre-eminent intermediary between Greek and medieval Latin culture).

Aquinas would say that this is, at most, confused and vague. St Thomas did not live in a world where large scale and systematic atheism was common, but he felt it necessary to establish proofs for God’s existence in so far as this was not a self-evident truth. As a matter of fact, after raising the question “is there a God?” Aquinas’ first reply is “it seems that there is no God. However, we must admit that the reasons adduced by Thomas are characteristically abstract and speculative.

The “Five Ways”

Accordingly, Thomas proceeds to designate “the five ways (*Quinque Viae*) in which we can prove that there is a God.” Each of these ways starts out with some phenomenon taken from the observable world and then, by way of some particular application of the principle of causality. In his view, we infer the existence of God from his creation; we can prove it only by the *a posteriori* method. Rejecting the ontological argument of Anselm, Aquinas makes use of a number of proofs employed by Aristotle, Augustine, Arabian philosophers and presents the arguments in five ways in the *Summa Theologiae*.

1. **The argument from Movement (Motion/Change):** The first proof invites us to consider the reality of movement that we experience in the world. Movement means passage from potency to act. Anything that moves is moved by something else. An infinite series of moving movers is impossible. We, therefore, have to arrive at the concept of an unmoved mover and this unmoved mover is God.
2. **The argument from Efficient Causality:** Passing from the element of passivity observed in all inferior causes (whatever is changed or moved, is changed or moved by another), he takes up their activity and comes to the first efficient

cause. This proof takes up the fact of efficient causality. Everything that happens has a cause, and this cause in turn has a cause, and so on pointing in a first cause. Aquinas excludes the possibility of an infinite series of secondary causes and concludes that there must be a first cause, this first cause is God.

3. **The argument from Possibility and Necessity:** there is the fact of contingency, implicit in our observation of things that are 'springing up and dying away'. This shows that they are contingent rather than necessary beings. A necessary being must be postulated as the source of the existence of contingent or possible beings.
4. **The argument from Degrees of Perfection:** There is the gradation observed in all things. We judge some beings to be higher in being than others. He maintains that the presence of such degrees of perfection imply the existence of a best, a truest, a supreme being which is the cause of all relative values and perfections and is itself pure perfection.
5. **The argument from the Order in the Universe:** There is the proof from finality, based on the purposiveness in nature to a claim of a divine designer. Natural bodies appear to operate towards some end or purpose and from this it is argued that there must be an intelligent being by whom everything is given an end that relates to things as a whole.

The first three ways, especially the third way, are known as cosmological arguments. The fourth way is known as teleological argument. Having established that God does exist, Thomas busied himself with the question of *what* God is. He says that we cannot know God's essence (What He is). We can only know his existence (that he is). But this does not mean any agnosticism. He accepts the negative way as a valid method for understanding God. Thus he invites us to deny any predicate that would involve imperfections, such as body. As we deny of God all these predictions, we slowly begin to get a clear idea of that which belongs to him alone. Furthermore, when we deny a predicate of God, we do not really mean to say that he lacks all perfections expressed in that predicate, only that he infinitely exceeds that limited perfection in its richness. Finally, St Thomas would say that the most appropriate name for God is "**he who is,**" the name he was supposed to have given to Moses at the burning bush (Ex 3:14).

The Doctrine of Analogy

Aquinas devised the doctrine of analogical predication as the possible way for man to speak of God. Words can be used in *three ways*: *univocally*, *equivocally* and *analogically*. When we apply a word to several things in the same sense: that is a *univocal use* of the word. If our words about God were meant univocally, we would reduce him to the level of created things. In *equivocation* we use the same word in two quite different senses. There is a third way between these two: *the way of analogy*. When the word 'good' is applied both to a created being and to God, it is not being used univocally in the two instances. God is not good in identically the same sense in which human being may be good. Nor do we apply the epithet 'good' to God and humans *equivocally*. According to Aquinas the predication 'good' is allied to creator and creature neither univocally nor equivocally but *analogically*.

Check Your Progress 1

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer.

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit

1) How does Aquinas explain the relation between Faith and Reason?

.....

.....

.....

.....

3) What are the Classical proofs for the Existence of God according to Aquinas?

.....

.....

.....

.....

3.6 PHILOSOPHY OF THE WORLD

As Augustine, Aquinas shows that the only way in which finite and contingent beings could proceed from God would be through creation. This creation would entail being made out of nothing, *ex nihilo*. Here, Aquinas adds a precision. Making “out of nothing” is not to be taken to mean that “nothing” was some kind of a material out of which God fashioned the world: it merely means that, at first, there was nothing and then there was something. Furthermore, creation is a particular prerogative of God alone. It cannot be attributed to, or shared by him with any creature. Creation involves bridging the infinite gulf between non-being and being. Now a creature, precisely because it is finite, cannot bridge this gulf.

3.7 PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN

The human person is that which is the most perfect in all of nature. It is a being subsisting in a rational nature. The person is not the same as Nature. It is the perfection of *who-ness* that makes a person. It is this perfection which makes Thomas to describe as ‘that which is most perfect in all of Nature’. It is ironic that what is most perfect in all of Nature is often the cause of what is the most abominable in all of Nature.

For Aquinas, sensation is an activity of the total human composite and not an act of the soul, using the body as its instrument as Augustine would hold. The union of body and soul is not something unnatural, not a kind of punishment due to some fault in a previous state. The soul of man has no innate ideas: it needs a body in order to have sensation and to think. The union of soul and body is not to the detriment of the soul but to its good. Furthermore, there is only one substantial form in man and this is his human soul which confers on him his bodiliness. It includes his vegetative and sensitive functions together with his rationality.

The theory of the substantial union of the human composite ensures man's unity but does not it overdo it. Aquinas has made his famous distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic dependence. The purely sensitive soul of an animal is totally dependent on the body for all its operations. Hence when the body, on which it totally, intrinsically depends, perishes or corrupts, the sensitive soul of the animal cannot but corrupt too. But man has a rational soul which does not always depend on the body for all its actions. It has a subsistent form and so is only extrinsically dependent on matter. Hence, when the body corrupts, the soul is not affected.

3.8 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

Aquinas, following Augustine, defined evil as privation, i.e. the lack of a due perfection. Evil, then, is not a positive entity and so is not creatable. Hence, there is no necessity to seek a creator for it, either in God who is all good and so would not create what is evil or in some evil principle as the Manichaeans had done. Not that Aquinas wished to say that evil as an illusion does not exist. It is meant that evil does not exist as something positive on its own: it is just the absence of something that is supposed to be in a creature. He goes on to say that evil cannot be positively willed, as such, by even a human will. For the object of the will is always good, real or apparent.

In trying to account for evil, Aquinas distinguishes between two kinds of evil. Physical Evil: Evil which is failure, defect or absence in the structure or processes of a thing is called physical evil (*malum poenae*). It is also called natural evil as when someone falls ill or loses a limb, etc. Thus hunger, death, blindness, lameness, deformity, etc are the examples of physical evil. Moral evil: Evil which is defect and failure of a free will to measure up to the standard of what its conduct should be (right and good) is called moral evil (*malum culpae*). It is sin and any such imperfection which approximates to sin. This evil occurs when people fail to do what they ought to do (acts of omission) or as when someone does what simply should not be done (acts of commission).

3.9 MORAL PHILOSOPHY

Aquinas follows Aristotle in asserting: man is by nature a social animal. Human society is the flowering of human nature. Aquinas expresses this most beautifully in Latin: *naturaliter homo homini amicus est* (by nature, man is a friend to man).

Aquinas accepted Aristotle's position that human ethical behaviour is based upon the nature of human as a social animal. But for Aquinas, this was insufficient. Man is much more than a social animal. He is a being created in the image of the Creator. And that image is the image of a person who is at once intelligent and free. Like God the creator, man is a person, he is intelligent and free.

Thomistic ethics has vertical and horizontal dimensions. To define the human person as a social animal is to link him horizontally to every other human person with whom he lives in community. To define the human person as a being, created in the image of God, is to link him vertically to the infinite, creative Being. This dimension, which is absent in Aristotle adds richness to the ethics of Thomas.

Aquinas sees ethics as having two principal topics: first, the ultimate goal of human existence and second, how that goal is to be won, or lost. *Summa Theologiae*, sometimes called the Treatise on Happiness, develops an argument to establish the existence and nature of a single ultimate end for all human action, or, more strictly,

the kind of behaviour over which a person has ‘control’. He develops an argument designed to show that a human being necessarily seeks everything for its own ultimate end, that is, happiness.

Aquinas argues that the often unrecognized genuine ultimate end for which human beings exist is God, who is perfect goodness personified and perfect happiness. It is the ultimate end with which they may exist is the enjoyment of the end for which they exist. That enjoyment is fully achieved only in the beatific vision, which Aquinas conceives of as an activity. Since the beatific vision involves the contemplation of the ultimate (first) cause of everything, it is, whatever else it may be, also the perfection of all knowledge and understanding.

What makes an action morally bad is its moving the agent not toward, but away from the agent’s ultimate goal. Such a deviation is patently irrational and Aquinas’ analysis of the moral badness of human action identifies it as fundamentally irrationality. In this as in every other respect, Aquinas’ ethics is reason-centred.

His normative ethics is based not on rules but on virtues; it is concerned with dispositions first and only then with actions. In addition to the moral virtues (cardinal virtues) in all their various manifestations, he also recognizes intellectual virtues that, like the moral virtues, can be acquired by human effort. On the other hand, the supreme theological virtues of faith, hope and charity cannot be acquired but must be directly ‘infused’ by God.

Passions, virtues and vices are all intrinsic principles or sources of human acts. However, there are extrinsic principles as well, among which is law in all its varieties. Consequently, Aquinas moves on in *Summa Theologiae* to his Treatise on Law, a famous and original treatment of the subject. The best-known feature of the treatise is the concept of natural law. Law in general is ‘a kind of rational ordering for the common good, promulgated by the one who takes care of the community’, and ‘the precepts of natural law are to practical reasoning what the first principles of demonstrations are to theoretical reasoning . . . All things to be done or to be avoided pertain to the precepts of natural law, which practical reasoning apprehends naturally as being human goods’.

Human laws of all kinds derive or should derive from natural law, which might be construed as the naturally knowable rational principles underlying morality in general. ‘From the precepts of natural law, as from general, indemonstrable principles, it is necessary that human reason proceed to making more particular arrangements which are called human laws, provided that they pertain to the definition of law already stated’. As a consequence of this hierarchy of laws, Aquinas unhesitatingly rejects some kinds and some particular instances of human law, for example: ‘A tyrannical law, since it is not in accord with reason is not unconditionally a law but is, rather, a perversion of law’. Even natural law rests on the more fundamental ‘eternal law’, which Aquinas identifies as divine providence, ‘the very nature of the governance of things on the part of God as ruler of the universe’.

Check Your Progress 2

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer.

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit

1) How does Aquinas explain the Union of Body and Soul?

2) How does Aquinas try to account for Evil?

3.10 LET US SUM UP

Contemporary historical scholarship in Thomistic philosophy is of a high standard. Aquinas and other medieval and scholastic figures have also benefited from a general rise of interest in the history of philosophy and by no means are all who now study Christian medieval thought themselves Catholics or even theists.

Future trends are difficult to predict in any detail but if there is a future and if it resembles the past even in broad outline, then the tide of interest in the thought of Aquinas will rise and fall as before. To some extent this will reflect the intellectual condition of the Roman Catholic Church and that of the colleges, seminaries and universities established to serve it. As was noted, however, Aquinas and Thomism are not the preserve of Catholics only. Indeed, there is a growing interest among philosophers trained wholly or partly in analytical philosophy.

3.11 KEY WORDS

Analogy

: Analogy is an inference or an argument from one particular to another particular, as opposed to deduction and induction where at least one of the premises or the conclusion is general. Analogy plays a significant role in problem solving, decision making, perception, memory, creativity, emotion, explanation and communication. It lies behind basic tasks such as the identification of places, objects and people, for example, in face perception and facial recognition systems. Specific analogical language comprises exemplification, comparisons, metaphors, similes, allegories, and parables.

Soul

: Soul is the immaterial part of a person. It is usually thought to consist of one's thoughts and personality, and can be synonymous with the spirit, mind or self. The soul is often thought to live on after the person's death.

3.12 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

Copleston, Fredrick. *A History of Philosophy*. Vol.1. New York: Image Books, 1962.

Kenny, Anthony. *A Brief History of Western Philosophy*. United Kingdom: Blackwell Publishers, 1998.

Martin, Walsh. *A History of Philosophy*. London: Geoffrey Champion, 1985.

Masih, Y. *A Critical History of Western Philosophy*. New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1994.

Mondin, Battista. *A History of Medieval Philosophy*. Bangalore: Theological Publications in India, 2005.

Russell, Bertrand. *History of Western Philosophy*. London: Routledge, 1999.

3.13 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

1. According to Aquinas, philosophy and other human sciences rely simply on 'the natural light of reason'. The philosopher should then leave out his researches all data from revelation, in the sense that he must work out his conclusions by the light of human reason alone. The theologian, though he uses human reason, submit himself to what has been revealed to man by God. It follows, then, that the principal difference between theology and philosophy lies in the fact that the theologian receives his principles as revealed and considers the objects with which he deals as revealed or as deducible from what is revealed, whereas the philosopher apprehends his principles by reason alone and considers the objects with which he deals, not as revealed but as apprehensible and apprehended by the natural light of reason. Faith and reason do not contradict; truths of faith and truths of reason come from God who is the Truth. God as source of all truth, he communicates it to us directly by revelation and indirectly by giving us the power by which we acquire it. Science acquired in the former manner would be divine, while science derived from experience and reason is human. It is impossible that there should exist a contradiction between truths of natural order and truths of the supernatural order.
2. Thomas Aquinas makes use of a number of proofs employed by Aristotle, Augustine, Arabian philosophers and presents the arguments in five ways to prove the existence of God. They are **1. The argument from Movement (Motion/Change):** The first proof invites us to consider the reality of movement that we experience in the world. Movement means passage from potency to act. Anything that moves is moved by something else. An infinite series of moving movers is impossible. We, therefore, have to arrive at the concept of an unmoved mover and this unmoved mover is God. **2. The argument from Efficient Causality:** Passing from the element of passivity observed in all inferior causes (whatever is changed or moved, is changed or moved by another), he takes up their activity and comes to the first efficient cause. This proof takes up the fact of efficient causality. Everything that happens has a

cause, and this cause in turn has a cause, and so on pointing in a first cause. Aquinas excludes the possibility of an infinite series of secondary causes and concludes that there must be a first cause, this first cause is God. **3. The argument from Possibility and Necessity:** there is the fact of contingency, implicit in our observation of things that are 'springing up and dying away'. This shows that they are contingent rather than necessary beings. A necessary being must be postulated as the source of the existence of contingent or possible beings. **4. The argument from Degrees of Perfection:** There is the gradation observed in all things. We judge some beings to be higher in being than others. He maintains that the presence of such degrees of perfection imply the existence of a best, a truest, a supreme being which is the cause of all relative values and perfections and is itself pure perfection. **5. The argument from the Order in the Universe:** There is the proof from finality, based on the purposiveness in nature to a claim of a divine designer. Natural bodies appear to operate towards some end or purpose and from this it is argued that there must be an intelligent being by whom everything is given an end that relates to things as a whole.

Check Your Progress 2

1. For St Thomas, the union of body and soul is not something unnatural, not a kind of punishment due to some fault in a previous state. The soul of man has no innate ideas: it needs a body in order to have sensation and to think. The union of soul and body is not to the detriment of the soul but to its good. Furthermore, there is only one substantial form in man and this is his human soul which confers on him his bodiliness. It includes his vegetative and sensitive functions together with his rationality. The theory of the substantial union of the human composite ensures man's unity but does not overdo it.
2. In trying to account for evil, Aquinas distinguishes between two kinds of evil. Physical Evil: Evil which is failure, defect or absence in the structure or processes of a thing is called physical evil (*malum poenae*). It is also called natural evil as when someone falls ill or loses a limb, etc. Thus hunger, death, blindness, lameness, deformity, etc are the examples of physical evil. Moral evil: Evil which is defect and failure of a free will to measure up to the standard of what its conduct should be (right and good) is called moral evil (*malum culpae*). It is sin and any such imperfection which approximates to sin. This evil occurs when people fail to do what they ought to do (acts of omission) or as when some one does what simply should not be done (acts of commission).