UNIT 3 PROCESS PHILOSOPHY

Contents

3.0 OBJECTIVES

The primary objective of this unit is to introduce one of the contemporary trends in Western philosophy namely Process Philosophy. The objective is fourfold: to discuss the shift of emphasis from becoming to being that took place in modernity; the positive factors that accentuated the development of a philosophy of organism; the methodological shift that Whitehead calls for in view of the latter and to discuss the essential features of Process Philosophy. We will focus on its Western and Eastern contexts and the pioneers of this trend and the chief features of this approach in philosophy. Last part of the unit discusses some of the notional clarifications, such as creativity, prehension, actual entity, etc.

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The chief advocate of process philosophy, a trend of philosophy in the twentieth century is Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947), a British Mathematician, Scientist and philosopher. Whitehead addressed it as 'philosophy of organism'. For Whitehead any reality is constituted of two poles, a physical pole and a mental pole. And what is primary is not being but becoming. For Whitehead reality is process and God is no exemption to metaphysical principle, God is also a subject of becoming. Such a position was so radical and has invited so many criticism even from the religious circles. Whitehead's methodology is more attuned to East.

3.2 THE *SITZ IM LEBEN* OF PROCESS PHILOSOPHY

Many factors contributed to its development. The early Greek thinking was more sensitive to the question of being and becoming and they were reluctant to follow a univocal approach to being and becoming. They accommodated both

categories as facts of existence. Western philosophy, arguably from the Middle Ages, is a metaphysics of being. This emphasis upon 'being' determined with its own impacts the largest part of Western metaphysics not only in the Middle Ages, but in modernity as well. Thus the struggle between being and becoming is not a feature of 'classical' philosophy alone. We see a revival of it very clearly in Hegel's dialectical way of philosophizing. Hegel unites being and becoming in a unique way in his thought. Nietzsche emphasized the reality of becoming. He considered reality itself as an endless Becoming (*Werden*). He believed that there is no final state of the universe; that the world is in a constant state of flux, always changing and becoming. Nietzsche holds that the world is a world of becoming and there is no being. A world of being is merely a world of appearances. The shift of emphasis from being and becoming in the early Greek thought to being in medieval and early modernity and again to becoming which characterises present day thinking. The East in general always maintained its primacy for being, except in the case of Buddhism.

However, the growth and development that one observes in nature is fascinating. It reveals a more profound truth that the fundamental characteristic of nature is not permanence but dynamism and activity. Whitehead's experience and the result of his analysis went against the general understanding of Western philosophy. For Whitehead, the enquiry into the nature of reality is as important as an enquiry into the fundamental reality in nature: what is primordial - being or becoming? The question of being and becoming can be considered as two sides of the same coin: the first raises the question what is the fundamental reality in nature; and the second, what is the nature of this fundamental reality.

Whitehead's shift from being to becoming recalls to mind of a more primordial shift that occurred in Greek philosophy from becoming to being, which was accentuated in modernity. One can say that the development of Process philosophy can be understood as a reaction to the modern philosophizing which maintained a univocal approach to the question of being. Process Philosophy will give us an opportunity to discuss modernity and the emergence of scientific materialism.

Scientific Materialism

Philosophy of being was the result of the "marriage" between science and philosophy that resulted in a static outlook of nature. This development in the course of history paved the way for a metaphysics of being which culminated in the modern scientifico-mechanistic understanding of nature and reality. Greek philosophy had in itself the potency to develop a static conception of nature and reality, which ultimately paved the way for developing a philosophy of being or a materialistic outlook of nature and reality in modernity at the cost of becoming. However, it is to be added that though one can identify traces of materialism already in Greek philosophy it was modernity and its materialistic outlook together with the Newtonian Mechanistic outlook that is in the background of the development of Process Philosophy.

Modern philosophers have given a new orientation to their ontological quest by introducing a new language and new thought pattern of ideas. Whitehead's philosophy at its inception was a reaction to the mathematico-mechanistic perspective of nature that dominated his own age. The material outlook of nature has passed through two major stages: one with Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo, and the other with Descartes, whereby nature was seen through the eyes of

mathematics and science. If one is to identify a third stage that brought this process to its zenith it is the mechanization of the universe by Newton. Amidst the great service Newtonian thought rendered to modern thinking and developments it had its own flip side as well. It was Newton who gave a final stroke to the mathematico-mechanistic vision of the universe. From the very beginning Whitehead distanced himself from scientific materialism. Whitehead's goal was to construct an alternative all-inclusive cosmological scheme. With this goal in view Whitehead undertook a historical survey of the scientific development to establish the various impacts of reigning cosmology on thought. It is over against this scientific materialism of the modern epoch that Whitehead developed his organic philosophy. A remarkable characteristic of nature is that we experience the whole as a flux, i.e., changing or becoming with the lapse of time.

It was this mechanistic mode of thinking that prevailed during Whitehead's philosophical development that he inherited from tradition. Whitehead soon realized that it was his vocation to extricate philosophy from this false metaphysical perspective. He wanted to overcome the 'bifurcation of nature,' and the mathematico-mechanistic perspective of nature. Nevertheless, it was no easy task. Whitehead's purpose was to construct a cosmological doctrine that avows to include what is important for science as well as for its critics. The fundamental position enjoyed by inorganic matter in the scientific outlook is replaced by an organic synthesis in the philosophy of organism.

Whitehead's critique of materialism emphasized and advocated a metaphysic of static being against which Whitehead developed his metaphysics of becoming. Whitehead's objective was to develop a metaphysical system that would account for the total experience of human beings. The other two ideas that arrested the attention of the people were concerned with notions of transition or change. They were the doctrine of conservation of energy and the doctrine of evolution. However, we do not go into the details of these theories. For the moment it suffices to understand that the first theory has to do with the notion of quantitative permanence underlying change, and the latter was concerned with the emergence of new organisms as the outcome of chance (SMW 101). This had tremendous repercussions on the general train of thought. We see science is taking up a new orientation which is neither purely physical, nor purely biological. It becomes the study of organisms.

3.3 AN INEVITABLE SHIFT IN METHODOLOGY

Whitehead's exploration of scientific materialism brought out its inadequacy to account for the complete human experience. Therefore, Whitehead's objective was to develop an alternative metaphysics that would account for all dimensions of human experience. And Whitehead rightly divined that the first step to achieve this goal was a methodological shift. Whitehead was a mathematician and scientist during the first half of his life. The then circulated picture of the universe, namely, the mathematico-mechanistic mode of thinking based on the Newtonian science and philosophy was not very promising. Thus, a shift from pure science to a joint venture undertaken with the help of the necessary means available to him, namely, science and philosophy was inevitable. The nature of the physical universe for science was a static-mechanistic one. Contrary to the existing model of the universe Whitehead wanted to develop a picture of the universe more truthful to human experience. Whitehead observed that any reconstruction of cosmology

should take into account the rich variety of human experience and should be in accord with the modern scientific developments.

3.4 PHILOSOPHY OF ORGANISM

A distinctive feature of the philosophy of organism is its attempt to combine philosophy and modern science into a "speculative synthesis." It attempts to formulate a comprehensive vision of the world. The philosophy of organism was thus proposed as an alternative to the "scientific materialism", which dominated the modern epoch of thought. Whitehead's alternative metaphysics proposed a theory of an indefinite plurality of 'actual entities'. What is emphasized in the organic philosophy is an 'absolute no' to the materialistic outlook on nature. In the organic philosophy, nature is characterised by 'creative advance'; static nature becomes a 'structure of evolving process'; the theory of simple location is substituted with a 'process of prehensive unification'; the absoluteness of matter is replaced with 'creativity'; and the traditional notion of substance (act) and potentiality are re-configured as actuality and eternal objects, respectively. Philosophy is no more the discourse of the static substance but rather of the dynamic organism.

From Being to Beingness in Becoming

In the previous section we saw that Whitehead's attempt was to reinstate the metaphysics of becoming which was neglected in the modern period. The primary objective of this section will be to clarify the fundamental characteristics of the Whiteheadian actual entity.

The chief characteristic of Whitehead's philosophy is that it has made a radical shift from philosophy of being to a philosophy of becoming. For him, "actual is a process, and is not describable in terms of the morphology of a "stuff" (PR 41). What does he mean by it? An actual occasion cannot be taken as some kind of stuff which exists or which is antecedent to its process. The fundamental fact about any actuality or that which constitutes any actuality is its process. Without process there is no actuality. For Whitehead an actual entity *is* (exists) only 'in the becoming' (*Leclerc* 71). The following quotes of Whitehead are self-explanatory: "The aim of the philosophy of organism is to express a coherent cosmology based upon the notions of 'system,' 'process,' 'creative advance into novelty,' 'res vera,' (in Descartes sense), … as ultimate agents of stubborn facts" (PR 128).

"This doctrine of organism is the attempt to describe the world as a process of generation of individual actual entities, each with its own absolute self-attainment. This concrete finality of the individual is nothing else than a decision referent beyond itself. The 'perpetual perishing' (Locke II, XIV, I) of individual absoluteness is thus foredoomed. But the 'perishing' of absoluteness is the attainment of 'objective immortality'" (PR 60).

The germs of Whitehead's philosophy of becoming can be traced back to his earlier writing. From the very beginning Whitehead expressed his opposition to the static outlook on nature. This is clear from the terms he used such as 'passage of nature' in the earlier writings and 'process', 'creative advance', in his later works (PNK 61). "All things are involved in the creative advance of the Universe, that is, in the general temporality which affects all things, even if at all times they remain self identical" (AI 143). However, only at a later stage does he use the term process to denote the fundamental nature of reality.

The Fundamental Principle of Becoming

Whitehead's philosophy of becoming argues against certain principles that traditional philosophy held as very fundamental. Whitehead, again and again, expresses his opposition to the static notion of nature and reality. For him, "the foundation of all understanding of sociological theory … is that no static maintenance of perfection is possible. This axiom is rooted in the nature of things. Advance or Decadence are the only choices offered to mankind. The pure conservative is fighting against the essence of the universe" (AI 274). This statement as such needs further clarification. Three metaphysical principles come to our aid.

First, "the very essence of real actuality – that is, of the completely real – is process" (AI 274). Therefore, one can understand any actuality only in terms of its becoming and perishing. The second metaphysical principle is the principle of individuality. It concerns the doctrine of harmony. Whitehead identifies this individual endurance with what Descartes has designated by *realitas objectiva*. Whitehead is arguing against the Aristotelian doctrine of primary substances: "no individual primary substance can enter into the complex of objects observed in any occasion of experience. The qualifications of the soul are thus confined to universals" (AI 280). For Whitehead, this is a misconception of reality.

The individual, real facts of the past lie at the base of our immediate experience in the present. They are reality from which the occasion springs, the reality from which it derives its source of emotion, from which it inherits its purposes, to which it directs its passions. At the base of experience there is a welter of feeling, derived from individual realities or directed towards them. Thus for strength of experience we require to discriminate the component factors, each as an individual 'It' with its own significance (AI 280).

Whitehead's point about individuality recalls another characteristic of the metaphysics of becoming. For Whitehead, the "ultimate metaphysical truth is atomism. The creature is atomic" (PR 35). It is a natural corollary of Whitehead's position that there is no continuity of becoming but only becoming of continuity. We have already seen that becoming is the becoming of each actual entity and what constitutes extensive continuity is their succession. Here the point is that the continuously extensive world is not itself an actual entity, but is a multiplicity of actual entities, which by their succession constitute a unity. Therefore, continuous extensiveness is not a metaphysical feature of an actual entity (Leclerc 75).

Thirdly, Whitehead's philosophy of organism is based on the fundamental unity of being, which his principle of relativity explicates. Furthermore, Whitehead's idea of universal relatedness is developed in defiance of Aristotle's above cited dictum that 'a substance is not present in another subject'. On the other hand, the principle of relativity in clear-cut terms states that 'an actual entity is present in other actual entities' (PR 50). Whitehead maintains that the philosophy of organism is devoted to elucidate the notion of "being present in another entity" (PR 50). These three fundamental principles of becoming do not stand isolated, but rather form an integral unity. The first principle which emphasizes becoming goes very well with the second that underscores infinite possibilities and their unity that is stressed in the third principle. It is the principle of becoming and the inter-dependent nature of the individual actualities that make the metaphysics of becoming. Therefore, it is right to say that each actual occasion exemplifies

an identity of being and becoming (Canevi 186). Nevertheless, since we are attuned to a metaphysics of being it is hard to comprehend a metaphysics of becoming. In fact, becoming itself is enigmatic.

3.5 FUNDAMENTAL REALITY IN WHITEHEAD

It is equivalent to 'what is the fundamental substratum of the universe'? What is remarkable here is that it is the same question as that of the "to be", that the philosophers asked from the very beginning. The philosophy of organism is distinctive by the following fundamental notions: actual occasion, prehension, nexus and the ontological principle.

Actual Occasion: the Dynamic Subject

Whitehead's theory of actual occasion is the foundation stone of his attempt to "construct a system of ideas which brings the aesthetic, moral, and the religious interests into relation with those concepts of the world" (PR xii). His aim was a speculative philosophy which he defined as "the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted" (PR 3). In the preface to his *Process and Reality*, Whitehead tells us what he means by an actual entity: "An actual entity is a '*res vera*' in the Cartesian sense of that term; it is a 'Cartesian substance,' not an Aristotelian primary substance" (PR xiii). Therefore, by the term actual entity Whitehead means what we understand by subject or self. He uses the terms subject and actual entity synonymously (PR 122; Johnson 17). For Whitehead, actual entities "are the final real things of which the world is made up. There is no going behind actual entities to find anything more real" (PR 18). In its primary sense actual occasion signifies the general metaphysical category of '*that* which is" (Leclerc 1958, 53). In the tradition of philosophy, it is the equivalent of *ousia* in Aristotle, substance in Descartes, monad in Leibniz, etc. Whitehead's theory of actual entity stresses "change, permanence, the interaction of creative individuals, God and value" (Johnson 12). All actual entities are having two poles: a physical pole and a mental pole. In his view God is also an actual entity, having two poles. And God cannot be made an exemption to metaphysical principles.

The Theory of Concrescence

The word concrescence literally means a 'growing together'. In using this word Whitehead's primary purpose was to analyze the coming to be of each moment of human experience. He wanted to explain the structure of becoming. How does each moment of our experience come into existence and constitute the fundamental reality, i.e., the actual occasion? The theory of concrescence explains the internal constitution of an actual entity. Each actual occasion is a process in the Whiteheadian perspective and the theory of concrescence exposes the "beingness" of this process. Concrescence is defined by Whitehead as "the name for the process in which the universe of many things acquires an individual unity in a determinate relegation of each item of the 'many' to its subordination in the constitution of the novel 'one'" (PR 211). This definition in a nutshell elucidates the whole philosophy of organism. It is observed that the theory of concrescence "constitutes his ontology, his theory of nature, essential properties, and relations of any actual entity" (Hosinski 46).

Whitehead has used the notion of 'concrescence' in order to signify the unity of both physical and conceptual prehensions. "The integration of the physical and mental side into a unity of experience is a self-formation which is a process of concrescence, and which by the principle of objective immortality characterises the creativity which transcends it" (PR 108). Further analysis of the theory of concrescence can only be done in light of the theory of prehension, which is a necessary correlative of the former.

The Concept of Prehension

The principle of prehension is the foundational basis for the Whiteheadian philosophy of process. It is the theory that substantiates his claim that "the nature is a structure of evolving processes. The reality is the process" (SMW 72). The word prehension comes from the root '*prehendere*' meaning 'grasp or seize' (Hosinski 59). In the concrescence of an actuality what occurs is the prehension of the data. In other words, in the growing together of an actuality (concrescence) what is actualised is the seizing or grasping (prehension) of data. Thus, it can be said that any explication of the becoming or the formation of the actual occasion must take into account these two concepts together. The importance of the concepts of concrescence and prehension can be elucidated from the statement Whitehead makes in the categories of explanation. "[T]he first analysis of an actual entity, into its most concrete elements, discloses it to be a concrescence of prehensions, which have originated in its process of becoming. All further analysis is an analysis of prehensions" (PR 23). Theories of concrescence and prehension account for the constitution of an actual occasion. One may also say that prehension is a process of unifying. In itself an actual occasion is whole and undivided. However, Whitehead does admit that for the purpose of rational analysis we have to distinguish several phases of this becoming, namely the receptive, the responsive, and the integrative, which happen in a logically successive sequence.

Satisfaction

The notion of "satisfaction" has to do with an entity's moment of receiving individuality. It can be observed that the moment of satisfaction is not merely a component factor in the process of concrescence but it is the final and sublime moment in the process of 'concrescence'. In other words, all the process of concrescence was just in view of this moment of 'satisfaction'. Whitehead writes, that each actual entity "is a process of 'feeling' the many data, so as to absorb them into the unity of one individual satisfaction" (PR 40). It is the moment where a 'concrete actuality' is formed out of the process of concrescence. It is the end result of concrescence and where the process of concrescence ceases with regard to that particular actuality. It is the outcome of the process. Whitehead writes: "An actual entity is a process in the course of which many operations with incomplete subjective unity terminate in a completed unity of operations, termed the 'satisfaction'. This satisfaction is the contentment of the creative urge by the fulfilment of its categoreal demands" (PR 219). In 'satisfaction' the process of concrescence reaches its completion and as such it is the terminal point of concrescence.

The Eternal Objects: Pure Potentials for Actual Occasion

The eternal object is one of the three formative elements in the constitution of an actual occasion, and the other two remain Creativity and God. For

Whitehead, "[a]ny entity whose conceptual recognition does not involve a necessary reference to any definite actual entities of the temporal world is called an 'eternal object'" (PR 44). He continues that "[a]n eternal object is always a potentiality for actual entities; but in itself, as conceptually felt, it is neutral as to the fact of its physical ingression in any particular actual entity of the temporal world. Potentiality is the correlative of the givenness" (PR 44). The first question to be discussed is why are they called eternal objects? It is because they are not subject to becoming and change and are objects in the sense that they are given (Leclerc 1985, 306). Moreover, Whitehead calls them 'eternal objects' to differentiate them from their historical presuppositions. Eternal objects or these transcendent entities (ideals) are called 'universals' in traditional philosophy. Eternal objects are the "pure potentials" (PR 23) of the universe and on account of the realization of these pure potentials actual entities differ from each other.

Creativity: the Metaphysical Ultimate in Whitehead

Every philosophical system needs an ultimate as the final reference point in its foundation and thus to avoid infinite regress. "In all philosophic theory there is an ultimate which is actual in virtue of its accidents. It is only then capable of characterisation through its accidental embodiments and apart from these accidents is devoid of actuality. In the philosophy of organism this ultimate is termed 'creativity'" (PR 7).

The ultimate is that without which one cannot think anything at all. No creativity means no reality. What one cannot think away is creativity. Creativity is described as the most general characteristic feature that all actualities have in common. In the categoreal scheme of Whitehead it is described as the "universal of universals characterizing ultimate matter of fact" (PR 21). What does it mean? Here "characterising" shall not be taken in the sense of creativity as an eternal object, not even the "thinnest" or "most abstract" of all eternal objects.

Creativity is the ultimate in the sense that without creativity there is no reality at all. This points to the complexity as well as the primordial role that creativity plays in the metaphysical system. At the same time, it recalls also the limitation it bears as the Ultimate of the system that it alone cannot account for the "complete fact", but is in need of another principle, namely God. Creativity is the dynamic principle which is active in the self-creative process of an actual occasion. This underlying and substantial activity has no existence of its own, for existence presupposes determination. In the Whiteheadian system this role is assigned to God. Creativity is beyond all temporal determinations and characterisations, being foundational to the metaphysical system. By being the ultimate descriptive notion, describing the nature of things, it is also the ultimate explanatory principle.

If one understands creativity in Thomistic terms, it accounts only for the preservance of the world in the sense of why the world continues to exist. However, it does not account for the existence itself; creativity has no existence apart from actual entities. In the same way "actual entities cannot exist except as instances of creativity; they cannot be meaningfully separated from the ultimate metaphysical principle" (Garland 370).

3.6 GOD AND THE METAPHYSICS OF BECOMING

Another sphere of philosophizing where one observes the originality of Process Philosophy is Whitehead's understanding of God. He was critical of both mechanistic and anthropomorphic views of God, which primarily expressed a static outlook of God, thereby making a way for his metaphysics of becoming in the philosophy of God. Whitehead deals with the question of God, and on rational grounds. It is also emphasized that Whitehead's system is incomplete without a proper philosophy of God.

God and the Metaphysical Principles

Whitehead identifies three conceptions of God that gained a wider acceptance and exerted considerable influence. "God in the image of an imperial ruler, God in the image of a personification of moral energy, [and] God in the image of an ultimate philosophical principle" (PR 342). He associates these three strains of thought respectively with the Roman Caesars, the Hebrew prophets, and Aristotle. In Whitehead, the Aristotelian view of God as "unmoved mover" is replaced by a God who is very much involved in the world; in fact, for him, God becomes a "Moved Mover" (Oomen 108) and "a fellow sufferer" (PR 351).

Whitehead criticizes both Descartes and Leibniz for introducing God arbitrarily into their system. Referring to Descartes' conception of bodily substances he says: "Descartes tells us that they are sustained by God, but fails to give any reason why God should care to do so" (FR 24). Coming to Leibniz we see that the monads are windowless, however, this isolated nature of monads is mitigated in their relation to God (AI 133). Whitehead comments that "no reason can be given why the supreme monad, God, is exempted from the common fate of isolation. Monads, according to this doctrine, are windowless for each other. Why do the monads have windows towards God, and why has God windows towards them?" (AI 134) For Whitehead, God is no exception "to all metaphysical principles, invoked to save their collapse. He is their chief exemplification" (PR 343).

Whitehead's concept of God is based on the fundamental assumption that there is uniformity in the fundamental laws of the universe. Therefore, the same structure must be applicable to God. Whitehead maintained that God's existence is not generically different from other actual entities. God is an actual entity, but he is "primordial." Actual means having 'existence' in the fullest sense. On the grounds of his principle that God cannot be made an exception to metaphysical principles, Whitehead applies to God many of the categories that apply to actual occasions.

The Primordial Nature of God

The Primordial nature of God corresponds to the mental or conceptual pole of any actual entity. It "is abstracted from his commerce with particulars, and is therefore devoid of those impure intellectual cogitations which involve propositions. It is God in abstraction, alone with himself. As such it is a mere factor in God, deficient in actuality" (PR 34). Moreover, Whitehead defines the primordial nature of God as "the non-temporal act of all-inclusive unfettered

valuation" (PR 31). God in his primordial nature is deficient in actuality. His primordial nature "shows forth God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of Nature and of a Finite Spirit". In the primordial nature God is 'bodiless' and as the first creature of creativity God is locked in his conceptual aloneness (Kraus 170).

The Consequent Nature of God

Whitehead's conception of God was not fully worked out, in his early works. It receives a more detailed explication in PR. Whitehead finds that God's nature is not exhausted by the primordial nature. Moreover, a notion of God limited to his primordial nature alone will not do justice to his basic contention that God is an actual entity. Thus, Whitehead recognises in God a consequent nature, which corresponds to the physical pole of any actual entity. God, being an actual entity, bears and expresses all the characteristics of an actual entity. Thus, with every actual entity God is endowed with a conceptual as well as a physical prehension (consequent nature). "Analogously to all actual entities, the nature of God is dipolar. He has a primordial nature and a consequent nature. The consequent nature of God is conscious; and it is the realisation of the actual world in the unity of his nature, and through the transformation of his wisdom. The primordial nature is conceptual, and the consequent nature is the weaving of God's physical feelings upon his primordial concepts (PR 345)."

Following are the chief characteristics of the Consequent Nature of God:

1. God's consciousness and knowledge: "the consequent nature of God is conscious …" (PR 345).

2. The finitude of the consequent nature: "One side of God's nature is constituted by … Conceptual experience can be infinite, but it belongs to the nature of physical experience that it is finite" (PR 345).

3. The consequent nature as everlasting: "The primordial nature of God is eternal, but the consequent nature is everlasting." Everlasting in the Whiteheadian sense means "the property of combining creative advance with the retention of mutual immediacy" (PR 346). Here 'everlasting' means involving a creative advance that the earlier elements are not lost while at the same time new ones are added which remain with God forever (Cobb 1971, 223).

Moreover, Whitehead understands God as the Principle of Limitation in the sense that it is God who gives structure and order to the universe. In the Whiteheadian understanding God is the source of potentiality and source of novelty and the wisdom that permeates the universe. Whatever position one may take with regard to Whitehead's understanding of God it is true that Whitehead has presented a way to think the God question anew. He has brought out some relevant insights concerning God and religion. Nevertheless, it highlights the tension between the classical view of God and the one Whitehead drew up. In this context only, one can see some of the criticism raised against Whitehead or process theodicy. Whitehead wanted to make God relevant in the modern world, but in his attempt to make God relevant, by a vision of God that is more attuned to modern world and science and metaphysics, the identity of the notion "God" is attenuated, in light of the classical perspective. The point is that he does not pay adequate attention to the religious sensitivity and the milieu in which the meaning of the term God originated. Nevertheless, whatever his critics might say, it is deemed

necessary to add that one cannot conclude that Whitehead's notion of God is a failure.

3.7 LET US SUM UP

In this unit our attempt was to introduce Process Philosophy. For this we focused primarily on the context which necessitated a shift in the way of philosophizing. Moreover, we try to explain fundamental concepts of Whiteheadian metaphysics of becoming or Process Philosophy. Whitehead himself does not call his philosophy Process, but this name was given to his philosophy by others. Now there is a trend in theology which is known as Process theology which is developed from having insights from process philosophy. For Process philosophy what is primary is process or becoming rather than being. This same view he applies in the case of God as well, which has invited much criticism.

3.8 KEY WORDS

Philosophy of Organism : It is an attempt to combine philosophy and modern science into a "speculative synthesis." It attempts to formulate a comprehensive vision of the world "harmonising the thoroughness and universality of philosophical questioning with the state of knowledge attained by modern science"

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