
UNIT 3 ORDINARY LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY

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3.0 OBJECTIVES

Ordinary language philosophy began with Ludwig Wittgenstein who wrote *Philosophical Investigations* in 1953 in which he presents a radical critique of his and Russell's earlier work. In this work he argues that language is basically imprecise but that is not a drawback, but merely one of its properties. Philosophy has for its activity the clearing up of conceptual puzzles, which the incorrect use of language brings about. The way out for all the metaphysical puzzles is to pay attention to the various functions of language. Wittgenstein and the later ordinary language philosophers believed that concern with language is not merely some preliminary to getting things straight, but is very close to the very business of philosophy. That is the reason why they concentrated their efforts heavily on analyzing ordinary language to see how it functions and what properties it has to aid dissolving philosophical puzzles. After Wittgenstein most of the philosophers in England have by and large tended to stay in the Wittgenstenian mold. The important names among them are Gilbert Ryle, Peter Strawson and J.L. Austine. Ryle attempts to show that the traditional mind- body problem arose through a series of logical errors in thinking about mental and physical phenomena. John Austin also from Oxford, held that ordinary language analysis was one among many ways of doing philosophy. He had an intrinsic interest in cataloging and tracing down different shades of meaning that represent different concepts. Peter Strawson, also an ordinary language philosopher claimed that in order to understand descriptive and denoting phrases it is necessary to understand that language is lived and spoken, not rigid and written down in logic texts.

The objective of this Unit is:

- to undertake a detailed study of the contributions of later Wittgenstein, Gilbert Ryle, J.L. Austine, and Peter Strawson towards ordinary language philosophy.

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Though analytic philosophy began doing philosophy as a comprehensive description of the whole of reality, it came to concern itself less and less with giving such a description and more and more with the analysis of particular concepts. Among these are the concepts of philosophy itself, of language, both artificial and natural, and of science. They turned more often toward attempts to understand our talk about the world than on attempts to understand the world. This made it inevitable for them to take a preoccupation with language. Three areas of concern about language may be singled out. The earliest was the concern to use words precisely so as to formulate problems clearly and unambiguously. The next was the construction of formal or artificial language. The last was the systematic analysis of ordinary or natural language as philosophers usually speak it. Using these three areas the history of analytic philosophy can be divided into five stages. The first stage is called early realism and analysis practiced by Moore and Russell, where they took upon themselves the task of digging out the meaning of a philosophic proposition by reformulating it so as to make it plain. This stage was followed by a concern for constructing formal languages. Russell's Logical atomism and Wittgenstein's *Tractatus – Logico - Philosophicus* were engaged in constructing a language whose syntax mirrored the relations of the basic entities of which the world was made up. The third stage attempts to abandon metaphysics as meaningless. This was achieved by constructing a formal language which is adequate for scientific purposes but not for metaphysics. The fourth stage concerns the performance of analyses of what philosophers usually say in natural languages, and is a repudiation of stages two and three. It was practiced by later Wittgenstein and Gilbert Ryle, who believed that philosophical problems could be dissolved by discovering the linguistic traps into which philosophers have fallen. The fifth and last stage was initiated by J.L.Austine and P.F.Strawson. Though both these philosophers were concerned with ordinary language philosophy, their concern was not confined to dissolving philosophical problems, but to the philosophical ambiance of the diversity, subtleties and nuances of language as well.

3.2 ORDINARY LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY: LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN

A few early positivists, especially Russell attempted to construct an 'ideal language' a language the terms of which are all precisely defined and the sentences of which unambiguously reveal the logical form of the facts to which they refer. Such a perfect language must rest upon atomic propositions. Therefore, the fundamental philosophical problem is to describe the structure of those atomic propositions. This stream of thought, popularly known as Logical Atomism, was strongly criticized by a group of philosophers led by Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein when he wrote *Tractatus-Logico- Philosophicus* was fully in agreement with Russell's theory that structure of language has an isomorphic representation of the reality and hence understanding language would resolve all the philosophical puzzles. What more, since reality was construed in terms of a logical structure, the language, which represents it too must be logically perfect. This he revised in to in his later writings. Later Wittgenstein came to realize that philosophers had made the mistake of trying to model their activities on those of scientists. Logical atomism, from its title to its contents reasserts that since Plato's time philosophers are in look out

for strict definitions for philosophical concepts. For example, take Socrates' endeavor to get a definition of *knowledge* from Theaetetus (as depicted in the dialogue *The Theaetetus*). Even though Theaetetus came up with various cases in which we would ordinarily be said to have knowledge, Socrates was not contented. Nothing less would content him than an attempt to state "the essence of knowledge", by offering a strict definition. This Wittgenstein feels is neither desirable nor possible. Instead we need to undertake a detailed examination of the cases in which people actually use the word *knowledge*, the special roles the word plays in our ordinary every day language. These divergent roles cannot be summed up in a brief formula, especially because the words that interest philosophers quite unlike scientists are words with a variety of jobs with no rigidly definable responsibilities. But without attempting for a formal definition how can we collect the various uses of a word under one single umbrella? Wittgenstein points out that if we observe a word we will find a complicated net work of similarities overlapping and criss - crossing: some times overall similarities, some times similarities of detail. Such a network, he calls a family. Consider the word *game*: board games, card games, football, ring-a- ring- a- roses, chess are all games. The family resemblances of these would reveal the essence of a game. The essence is expressed by grammar: grammar tells us what kind of object any thing is.

In his discussion on meaning, Wittgenstein concentrates on two principal temptations to which we commonly yield. First, regarding every word a name. This eventually leads us to postulate mysterious pseudo entities to serve as the objects of reference. The second temptation is to think that understanding a word or learning a word's meaning is some sort of mental process. In fact, Wittgenstein observes, if we keep clam and look without prejudice at the way words are actually used, the mystery of meaning will disappear.

To understand language we may better consider possible rather than actual languages, says Wittgenstein. The possible language Wittgenstein speaks of is something, which we could possibly use, in our ordinary affairs of life. He describes the mode of social behavior of a community (some times imaginary and not real community) and asks us to consider the sort of language, which would be useful within such a form of life. For example, a tutor working with his student teaches him to bring him a slate when he says slate! A pencil when he says pencil! and so on. But even in this simplified language words are not names. To understand the word *slate* is to grasp how it is used in a certain language-game, here the game of receiving and giving orders. Of course in order to obey the order of the tutor the pupil must understand ahead ostensive 'that this is a slate'. But such processes called 'learning the names of objects' are just preliminaries to the use of a language, not examples of it. 'Naming is not so far a move in the language-game' he writes, 'any more than putting a piece in its place on the board is a move in chess.'

What Wittgenstein attempts to assert is this that the meaning of a word, say *slate* does not consist in its name, but in the way it is used in a language. If the actual slate, the concrete physical object were part of the meaning of *slate*, we ought to be able to say things like 'I broke part of the meaning of the word 'slate''. Such a sentence is an obvious nonsense. Learning what labels to put on object is no more understanding a language than repeating what the teacher says, though

both labeling and repeating are useful exercises as preliminaries to understanding language.

Naming or ostensive definition has been given undue importance down the history of language studies because philosophers thought that pointing clears matters up. But Wittgenstein argues that there is no way of removing the risk of misunderstanding as we can misunderstand what somebody is pointing at. For example, if a teacher points to a yellow colored triangle and says yellow!, the pupil might conclude that he is telling him the name of a triangle.

Early positivist analysis of language had supposed that there must be an ultimate analysis of an expression's meaning, an analysis consisting of simple elements to which we would point in order to make that meaning perfectly clear. But alas! There are no simples in the sense that logical atomism requires them. Russell's logically proper names, the so-called ultimate constituents of the world are in fact not *simple* in the metaphysical sense. The correct conclusion, he thinks, is that there are no logically proper names. Deluded by the ultimate analysis offered by the ideal language we ask such questions as 'What is the real form of a proposition?' or 'What are the constituents of the ultimate language?' and are in turn held captive by this ideal. The first task, therefore, is to destroy the attractiveness of that ideal. "My critics", says Wittgenstein, "would accuse me to destroying what ever is great and important... but I am destroying nothing but houses of cards." These houses of cards any way could collapse on their own as soon as we come to understand the ways in which we actually use words like 'knowledge', 'propositions' names' etc. in our every day language.

In order to over come the temptation to suppose that understanding is a mental process, Wittgenstein points out that understanding involves processes that are both mental and physical. Though it is true that we will have mental images of the things we claim we understand, some thing else could always replace them. Again we could have the image say a formula to ourselves, and still not understand.

If understanding is not a mental process what is it? In his *Investigations* Wittgenstein sets out to discuss this though he does not come forth with a precise and definite answer. He absorbs the problem of understanding into a more general problem about 'psychological words.' While considering how do such words function Wittgenstein once again adopt a therapeutic method to cure us of our tendency to suppose that psychological words must name private experiences which we alone can know. The possibility of having private experiences opens up the possibility of a private language. According to Wittgenstein, the very idea of a private language is an unintelligible one. First of all a language by definition is, that which proceeds in accordance with rules. It uses names in accordance with these rules. But in a private language how can we assert that the names are used consistently according to the (implicit) rules? It is not enough to reply that 'they seem to me to be used consistently', for a criterion is used to assert what *seems to be the case is in fact the case*. In brief, there is no criterion for determining whether the so-called private language is being used consistently following the implicit rules and hence there is no such language.

This does not imply that words cannot refer to sensations. They do, and we talk about sensations every day. The question is how do we learn to use sensation words? When a child gets hurt the adults talk to him and teach him exclamations

to be uttered when he is in pain. Thus the child is taught new pain behavior. Does this amount to say that 'I am in pain' can be replaced by crying and moaning? Can crying and moaning be taken as uses of language? Yes, indeed, says Wittgenstein, for when one is in pain he need not express it in a statement. In fact judging is one of the very many ways in which we use language. Therefore, the question what does 'I am in pain' really mean has no single answer. We have always to take account of the context the language gave in which the words are uttered. The point Wittgenstein wants to stress here is that as far as psychological words are concerned it is not the case that one attempts to describe a state of mind when he utters such statements.

Substantiating Wittgenstein's appeal to ordinary language John Wisdom, a pupil of Wittgenstein says, the queer thing about philosophers is that they hold views, which from a strict logical point of view are obviously false. Their blatant refusal to accept the regular methods of dispute settling is because they disjoin from the ordinary language practices. The fact is that philosophers are dissatisfied with our ordinary usage and so will not accept as decisive an appeal to it. They are advocating a linguistic innovation: where we see a logical dispute, they see a conflict.

Deviating from ordinary language, therefore, would create metaphysical puzzles. Suppose a psychologist says, 'every body is neurotic'. In common parlance this proposition expresses an empirical discovery to the effect that more careful psychiatric observation will always reveal a neurosis like a pathologists discovery that every living organism has cancerous cells within it. But we should miss the whole point of the psychologist's statement if we were to reply thus; "that isn't true, only 14% of the population has a neurosis". Wisdom points out that the proposition 'every body is neurotic' is *a priori* and not empirical; here the psychologist is recommending that we change our way of using the word 'neurotic'. We can dispute what he says only by drawing attention to the inconvenient results of his verbal recommendations. This is exactly what philosophers do. Philosophical paradoxes are verbal recommendation, backed by unconscious motives.

Not all ex students of Wittgenstein look with kindness on the ordinary language philosophy. However, the philosophical scene at Oxford shows clear signs of Wittgenstein's influence. The best known of Oxford ordinary language philosophers is Gilbert Ryle.

3.3 GILBERT RYLE'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO ORDINARY LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY

Gilbert Ryle in his "Systematically Misleading Expressions" announced that the task of philosophy is the detection of the sources in linguistic idioms of current misconstructions and absurd entities. He argues that a great many of the expressions of every day life are, in virtue of their grammatical form, 'systematically misleading.' For example, a sentence like 'Mr. Pickwick is a fiction' is grammatically analogous to 'Mr. Pawar is a statesman.' Therefore, we are tempted to read it as if it were a description of a person - a person with the property of being fictitious. However the statement under consideration is not about a fictitious person, but rather about a person with odd properties, but real indeed. But if we are to take the statement as one describing Mr. Pickwick, then it would imply such propositions as 'Mr. Pickwick was born in such-and - such a year, which would go to contradict

the original assertion. "Paradoxes and antinomies are the evidence" he says, "that an expression is systematically misleading."

Just like in the above example, metaphysicians, taking the grammatical forms of statements at face value, are led to wrongly presume that a moral statement like 'Punctuality is a virtue' is grammatically parallel to 'Plato is a Philosopher'. It amounts to saying that like Plato, *punctuality* is a name. Therefore to avoid the misleading suggestions of every day speech the philosopher must learn to restate sentences the manner, which exhibits the form of the facts. Ryle held both that philosophy is therapeutic and that it has a positive task to reveal the real form of facts.

According to Ryle, philosophers have made a great many mistakes in speaking about minds because they spoke of things that belonged in one category as if they belonged in another entirely different one. The category to which a concept belongs is the set of ways in which it is logically legitimate to operate with it. But an explicit definition of category is not possible. This Ryle explains resorting to examples. In his "Categories" he gives the following example: consider the incomplete expression- "... is in bed." We can without absurdity insert *Jones* or *Socrates* in the gap the sentence frame leaves unfilled, but not *Saturday*. This is enough to prove that 'Jones' belongs to a different category from 'Saturday.' But this does not prove that *Jones* and *Socrates* belong to the same category for, there might be other sentence-frames into which *Jones* could be inserted but *Socrates* would not fit without absurdity. Indeed philosophers, Ryle points out, are led to distinguish between categories only because they light on unexpected antinomies, situations in which a category-distinction lies concealed. Criticizing the early analysts Ryle points out that those who defined philosophy as analysis overlooked the fact that category distinguishing involves ratiocination.

According to Ryle, every proposition has certain logical powers. But we are conscious only of a limited number of the logical powers of the propositions we use. At least we know how to use them in practice under ordinary circumstances. When propositions have something in common it is some times convenient to abstract this common factor as a concept. For Ryle a concept is merely a handy abbreviation for a family of propositions, a brief way of referring to the logical powers of all those propositions, which are similar in virtue of possessing a certain common factor.

Analyzing the logical powers of mental concepts, Ryle points out that though we work quite well with these concepts in our day to day life, we are confused when we try to discover the category to which such expressions belong. In order to overcome such puzzles we have to map the various mental concepts, determining their geographical position in a world of concepts. Ryle tries to destroy the official Cartesian myth that mental concepts are distinguishable from the physical in virtue of being private, non-spatial and knowable only by introspection. He says that it is a 'category mistake' to suppose that mental - conduct - expressions, say *intelligence*, name any entity what so ever. The function of the word *intelligence* is to describe human behavior, not to name an entity. It is a mistake to maintain with the idealist that in reality man is a ghost, or with the materialist that in reality he is a machine. The human being is neither a ghost, nor a machine, nor a ghost in a machine, he is a human being who sometimes behaves intelligently, some times stupidly, some times acts and some times is quiescent.

Often philosophers suppose that acting intelligently is synonymous with theorizing. But the fact is that, Ryle points out, theorizing is just one species of intelligent behavior, the species of 'knowing that'. Most intelligent action consists in 'knowing how', such as, knowing how to play chess, to speak French, to build a house etc. If we try to maintain that practice can be intelligent only when it is preceded by theorizing we are at once involved in an infinite regress. For example, if we suppose that cricket playing must be preceded by intelligent theorizing about cricket, there would be as much reason for supposing that intelligent theorizing must in turn be preceded by intelligent theorizing about theorizing and so on *ad infinitum*. Instead why don't we recognize that a form of activity is intelligent? Knowing how, therefore, concludes Ryle, is dispositional. To say we have a disposition is to assert that our conduct is law-like, that it follows a regular pattern.

Ryle has also attempted to resolve some of the problems in philosophical psychology. For instance, the problem how are we to overcome the apparently irresolvable dilemmas which beset the philosopher, like the familiar problem, how the world of science is related to the world of every day life. On the one hand we have physicists trying to tell us that things are really arrangements of electrons in space, neither colors, nor solid, nor sharply-defined, on the other we have before us the empirical world where chairs and tables are real, colored solid and so on. Ryle here tries to show that the conclusions of the physicist do not really conflict with our every day judgments. The supposed dilemma therefore, turns out to be no more than a difference in interest.

Check Your Progress I

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer.

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit.

- 1) How did Ryle destroy the Cartesian myth that mental concepts are private, non- spatial and arrived at by introspection?

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3.4 ORDINARY LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY: J.L AUSTINE

While Ryle did not engage in close linguistic analysis we have J.L.Austin, yet another Oxford intellectual who engaged himself in the nuances of ordinary language for its own sake. He stands in opposition to both Ryle and Wittgenstein in that he does not conceive of philosophical analysis as merely a puzzle-solving activity. He is interested in distinctions in language themselves, the study, analysis and cataloging of the tremendous variety of language is an end in itself for him. It is a kind of knowledge, which may be sought for its own sake rather than ridding ourselves of conceptual muddles, though it is of great use. Austin feels that the real job of Philosophy is to indicate the precise way in which various formulations

and meanings are related to different concepts and not merely different ways of talking about the same concepts.

At no time Austine believed that ordinary language is for all philosophical purposes the final court of appeal. However he believed that our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing in many generations. Hence with regard to every day practical affairs the distinctions which ordinary language incorporates are likely to be sounder than any of our armchair philosophical theories. Ordinary language exercises are to be neglected at our peril, if not the end-all, they are certainly the begin-all of philosophy.

Austin is never reluctant to admit that ordinary man's authority extends only to practical affairs. As a preliminary even though the philosopher is advised to track down the ordinary use of words, in the end he will be compelled to straighten them up to some degree. In cases where philosophers' interests out grow those of the ordinary man, it will be necessary to point to new terminology.

In opposition to Moore Austin tries to point out the subtlety of grammatical distinctions *ifs* and *cans* carry. Highlighting the subtle differences they carry while substituting for another, Austin argues, we better pay attention to these words since *if* and *can* are words, which constantly turn up in Philosophy. By studying such linguistic distinctions we become clearer about the phenomena they are used to differentiate. Ordinary language philosophy, Austine suggests, would better be called linguistic phenomenology.

Austin hoped to destroy two doctrines: 1) what we directly perceive are sense data and 2) propositions about sense data are incorrigible. However he does not seriously revise the general question why sense datum theory has had a long and honorable philosophical career. Instead he turns his attention to such questions as the function of the word *real*. *Real*, he says is not a normal word; it cannot stand alone as a description, as *pink* can. Hence he calls it substantive hungry. Such discriminations are highly relevant to the issues Austin is ostensibly discussing. In his symposium on "Other Minds" Austin points out that 'I know that' cases are the best examples of *descriptive fallacy*. Comparing *knowing* with *promising*, Austin argues that like promising, knowing too is a performative word. To say that *I know*, according to Austine, is not to describe my state, nor to take a pledge, but to give others my word or authority.

What is it for a proposition to be true? Obviously when it corresponds to facts; Austin tried to clarify the meaning of correspondence in terms of descriptive conventions which relate words to types of situations, and demonstrative conventions which correlate sentences with actual historical situations. To say of 'S is p' is true, is to say that the situation to which it refers is of the sort that it is conventionally described in the manner in which it is now being described.

In terms of the kind of acts they perform Austin distinguishes three modes of utterance: locutionary- act of using a sentence to convey a meaning, e.g., 'George is coming'. Illocutionary- act of using an utterance with a certain force, e.g., 'X warns us that George is coming.' Per locutionary- act of producing a certain effect by the use of a sentence e.g., when some body, without actually telling us that 'George is coming,' succeeds in warning us that he is on his way. Having made these distinctions, Austin impress us that elucidation is always of the total speech act, therefore, there is no question of analyzing the meaning as something

sharply distinguishable from the force of a statement as logical analysts thought there was. Stating and describing are merely two kinds of illocutionary acts. They carry no special significance with which philosophy has commonly endowed them. Similarly, *truth* and *falsity* are not names for relations or qualities as philosophers traditionally supposed them to be. They refer to a 'dimension of assessments' of the satisfactoriness of the words used in the statement in relation to the facts to which they refer. It follows that the standard philosophical distinction between factual and normative would also fade away side by side.

3.5 P.F. STRAWSON ON ORDINARY LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY

According to Strawson, Russell made two mistakes: first he over looked the fact that sentences can have a variety of uses and, second, he wrongly supposed that if a significant sentence is not being used to make a true statement it must be making a false statement. Strawson points out that Russell's trichotomy- true, false or meaningless collapses once we realize that a sentence can be meaningless, but is never true or false. Russell's *theory of description* begins from the presumption that since 'The king of France is wise' is neither true nor meaningless it must be false. Again, since it obviously does not describe 'the king of France' when there is no such person, it must really describe something else. Finally, Russell concludes that all propositions really ascribe predicates to logically proper names. But this solution has to meet the further complication that there are no such names. However we may recognize that the question whether the King of France is wise has a meaning is quite independent of the question whether there is in fact such a king. Secondly, the sentence is not used to assert that there is in fact a king of France. Routinely formal logicians have concentrated their attention on context-free sentences, which are in fact not ordinarily used. This explains why they have failed to distinguish between sentences and statements. Had they attended to sentences with words like "I" or phrases like 'round table', sentences, which can be used in an entirely different fashion, the difference between sentences and statements would have been bound to strike them forcibly.

This does not however, mean that Strawson is all opposed to formal systems. Formal systems are useful, he contends, in appraising context free discourse such as those in mathematics and physics. However, in order to cope up with ordinary discourse the formal logic must be supplemented with logic of every day discourse. The four logical norms, the conditional, negation, conjunction and disjunction are in fact abstractions from ordinary use of language. There are many kinds of entailment, Strawson points out, which formal logicians overlook. It is difficult for formal logic to have an effective deal of what is temporal and contextual. These limitations can be overcome with ordinary language logic. This kind of logic begins by asking questions like 'what are the conditions under which we use such- and – such expression? Though this logic is not so elegant or systematic as formal logic, it has to its credit high intellectual utility, richness through variety and complexity.

Check Your Progress II

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer.

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit.

1) Explain Austin's three modes of utterances

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2) Why does Strawson demand for ordinary language logic?

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3.6 LET US SUM UP

Ludwig Wittgenstein, when he wrote *Tractatus*, was fully in agreement with Russell's theory that the structure of language has an isomorphic representation of the reality and hence understanding language would resolve all the puzzles in philosophy. However, later Wittgenstein came to realize that philosophers have made the mistake of modeling their activities on those of scientists. Instead of searching for strict definitions of conceptual terms we need to examine how people use the word in their ordinary language. To understand a word is not to name it, but rather to grasp how it is used in a certain language. It is necessary that philosophers get over the attraction towards logically constituted ideal language.

After Wittgenstein most of the philosophers in England have, by and large tended to stay in the Wittgenstenian mold. The important names among them are Gilbert Ryle, J.L. Austine and Peter Strawsom. Ryle attempts to show that the traditional mind - body problem arose through a series of logical errors in thinking about mental and physical phenomena. Peter Strawson, also an ordinary language philosopher claimed that in order to understand descriptive and denoting phrases it is necessary to understand that language is lived and spoken, not rigid and written down in logic texts. John Austine, also from Oxford, held that ordinary language analysis was one among many ways of doing philosophy. He had an intrinsic interest in cataloguing and tracing down different shades of meaning that represented different concepts.

3.7 KEY WORDS

Ostensive definition	: Define a word by pointing the object which it names
Ordinary language	: Informal, everyday language
Private language	: a language that an individual would employ to assert one's private experiences.

Family resemblance	: the network of similarities of the various uses of a word in a particular language all brought under one umbrella.
Therapeutic method	: A method of analysis used not merely to describe, but to cure from some disease as well.
Idealists	: Those philosophers who maintain that ideas are the real entities.
Incorrigible propositions	: Propositions that are infallible.
Factual propositions	: Propositions conveying mere facts.
Normative propositions	: Propositions that involve norms.
Formal logic	: Logic that deals with abstract forms.

3.8 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

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3.9 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Answers to Check Your Progress I

1. Ryle says that it is a category - mistake to suppose that mental conduct expressions say, intelligence, name any entity what so ever. It is a mistake to maintain, with the idealist that in reality man is a ghost or with materialist that in reality he is a machine. Human being is neither a ghost, nor a machine, nor a ghost in a machine. He is a human being who acts at times intelligently and at other times stupidly.

Answers to Check Your Progress II

1. Locutionary – act of using a sentence to convey a meaning
 Illocutionary – act of using an utterance with a certain force
 Per locutionary – act of producing a certain effect by the use of a sentence.
2. According to Strawson we need logic of every day discourse as a supplement to formal logic to cope up with ordinary discourse. Apart from the four logical norms there are many kinds of entailment which formal logicians overlook. Further, formal logic cannot account for temporally and contextually presented statements.