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# UNIT 1 CĀRVĀKA

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## 1.0 OBJECTIVES

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The systems of Indian philosophy are mainly divided into two groups – the heterodox (nāstika) and orthodox (āstika). Those systems of philosophy which do not accept the validity of Veda are called the heterodox systems or nāstikas and those which accept the validity of Veda are called the orthodox systems or āstikas. Cārvāka, Jainism and Buddhism are nāstika or heterodox systems. In this unit you are expected to understand the teachings of Carvaka on:

- metaphysics
- self or soul
- denial of God or any transcendental being
- epistemology
- way of life

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## 1.1 INTRODUCTION

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The first school of thought to be considered is Indian materialism or Cārvāka darśana. This is one of the oldest non-Vedic schools. Cārvāka accepts Bṛhaspati as their teacher. The significance of the name 'Cārvāka' applied to this is not very clear but some scholars opine that Cārvāka was the name of the disciple to whom the doctrine was first communicated by its founder. However, the word Cārvāka literally means 'sweet-tongued' (cāru – vāka). This name is significant in so far as it stands for a doctrine which is superficially very attractive as it advocates the acquisition of pleasure (kāma) and wealth (artha).

The original works of the Cārvāka school are lost. The knowledge about this system is gathered from works by the Hindus, Jains, and Buddhists. The views of Cārvāka makes it clear that in India, only spiritualism was not advocated but materialism was equally vigorous. Matter as ultimate reality was first envisaged by Bṛhaspati Laukya of the Rg Veda. However in its primary stage Indian materialism was mingled with scepticism and agnosticism. Bṛhaspati gave it a distinct form.

In its earlier stage, Cārvāka believed in 'svabhāva vāda'. It traced the general characteristic of an object to itself and not to any other extraneous agent. It rejected the idea that nature reveals any divine or transcendental power working behind it. Fire is hot; water is cold and air is temperate to the touch. Who could have brought such distinctions into being? The answer given by Cārvāka is that these are the very essence of each object. In other words, things are what they are and their nature by itself explains all the variety of the universe and the order that is noticeable in it. The Cārvākas do not believe in the existence of any invariable cause of an event. According to them, observing two things together does not mean that one is the cause of the other. Because we observe fire and smoke, can we come to the conclusion fire is the cause of smoke? Is it possible to say that if there is smoke fire is inevitable and it was so in the past when I was not born and will be so when I am dead? However, the information gathered about this school is extremely meager. Mostly we get to know about this system through refutations from its opponents. Sarva darśana samgraha does contain a chapter on this system but even here it is very brief and the information that we can gather is nothing more than what we can gather from other sources. Cārvāka is also known as Lokāyāta meaning that the system is restricted to the world of commonsense. Since most of the schools of Indian philosophy refer to Cārvāka only while criticizing its materialistic tenets we cannot help thinking that these schools may be exaggerating the weak points of the doctrine and/or misinterpreting the tenets.

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## **1.2 CĀRVĀKA METAPHYSICS**

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Being positivistic Cārvāka claims that perception or pratyaksa is the only means of valid knowledge. Therefore, only what is perceivable is the object of knowledge for Cārvāka. Whatever is not perceivable is rejected as a figment of our imagination. On this ground, matter is the only reality and the world is constituted of only four basic categories, namely, earth, water, fire and air, which are all physical and given in perception. Ether or space is not accepted as the fifth element because it is not perceivable. Matter is both the material and efficient cause of the universe and matter they say has always existed and will always exist. All beings, animate or inanimate are the products of these elementary principles of matter. That matter is the ultimate reality is implied from Bṛhaspati's dictum 'out of matter come forth life.'

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## **1.3 SELF OR SOUL IN THE CĀRVĀKA VIEW**

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The most important doctrine in the Cārvāka system is that perception (pratyaksha) is the only means of valid knowledge. Since there is no entity called 'soul' as distinct from the body, as given in perception, there is no place for such an entity in this system. According to Cārvāka, when the four forms of matter, namely, earth, water, fire and air combine in a peculiar way, there results what we call a body. Life breath (prāna) and consciousness are present only in such a body. This body is the soul and there is nothing permanent or eternal apart from the body. There is no life-breath or consciousness in the minute particles (kana) of matter, which are the basic constituents

of matter, when they are in a disjointed state. At that time, they remain in a lifeless and insentient state. However, due to that very peculiar and mutual combination or mixture of these elements, there appears life-breath and consciousness. Thus what we call soul is nothing but the conscious body. In other words, consciousness or mind is an epi-phenomenon, a by-product of matter. Such a by-product is possible because qualities not possessed by the elements individually, may arise in the aggregate constituted of them. For example, an intoxicating quality arises from the mingling of yeast and other ingredients, though this quality is not possessed by the ingredients when they exist by themselves. To quote: 'sarvasiddhāntasārasaṁgraha.' "That intelligence which is found to be embodied in modified forms of the non-intelligent elements is produced in the same way in which the red colour is produced from the combination of betel, areca-nut and lime" Thought is a function of matter. Since consciousness is a property of the body, with the dissolution of the body consciousness disappears and each of its constituent elements is mingled with its kind leaving behind only ashes and dust. Transmigration, retribution etc. are meaningless words.

Cārvāka reinforces the above idea with the following analysis. They say that both in common usage and in the scriptures the self is revealed in as awareness involving the 'I' as the doer (kartr), experiencer (bhoktr) or seer (drashttr). In an awareness involving the 'I' generally the body itself is revealed as the doer, experiencer and seer. The Cārvāka says that body is the atman which is characterized by such attributes as implied in expressions like 'I am stout' 'I am young' 'I am an adult', etc. We have no experience of the separate existence of body and soul. When we say 'I am writing', the self is revealed as the doer. If one is writing while sitting in one's house, then the self is revealed as being in the house. This 'self in the house' is nothing but the body. In a statement like, 'I see the moon while sitting inside my room', 'I' is revealed as the seer and also that 'I' is in the room. This 'I' is nothing but the body who is revealed as the seer. And also as one who is in the room. This 'I' is nothing but the body. In another instance like 'I fell in the pit and suffered much pain', 'I' is revealed as the experiencer, and the 'I' that fell is nothing but the body. Therefore only the body is the self. Thus, analyzing the different cases of awareness involving the 'I', the Cārvākas consider only the body as the self.

The later followers of the system propounded three more views to account for the cause of consciousness. According to some thinkers consciousness is possible only because of the senses. According to another view, the agency was ascribed to the vital power or prana i.e. life, and in the third, mind (manas), was considered to be the agent of knowledge. Though life and mind were considered to be distinct from the body, their distinct existence was not admitted.

The Cārvāka view that there is no self distinct from the body has naturally provoked the keenest controversy. Ātman occupies an important place in other systems of philosophy and hence all the systems here argued against the Cārvāka view. Some of the important arguments against the Cārvāka are given below. Firstly, the opponent of Cārvāka says that if consciousness is a property of the body, it should be either an essential property or an accidental property of the body. If it were an essential property, then it would be inseparable from the body. Then, consciousness should last as long as the body lasts. But that is not the case as we find in the case of fainting and dreamless sleep. If consciousness is only an accidental property of the body then there is a need of an agency (upādhi) to produce consciousness. If so, then we cannot ascribe consciousness wholly to the body. Again, when one wakes up after a dream, he is able to own the dream experience but if he saw himself as a tiger in the dream he will

disown the dream body. Many scholars say that even if we accept that consciousness is always associated with a physical body, it is not possible to say that consciousness ceases to be when the organism breaks up. They say that it may continue in some other manner. Even though this contention cannot be proved, it is said that a doubt is sufficient to reject the Cārvāka stand. Again, even though consciousness is always associated with the body, it is not possible to say that one is the property of the other. To take an example, the eye cannot see in absolute darkness, but for that reason can we say that visual perception is a property of light? Similarly we can say that body is a condition for consciousness to manifest itself. The most important point against the Cārvāka view is, can we see other's dreams, feelings, thoughts, pain, pleasure, etc. as we can see their body? A person's dreams, feelings, etc. are immediately known to that person himself but the others can only see his body without knowing his feelings. The form or complexion of the body can be seen by all those who meet him. Taking another example, the feeling of a toothache as experienced by a patient is not the same as what is known by his dentist. The opponents of Cārvāka say that these facts prove that consciousness is not a property of the physical body but of something else or it is an independent principle which finds its expression in the body.

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## 1.4 DENIAL OF GOD OR ANY TRANSCENDENTAL BEING

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As pointed out earlier, the system believes in only what is validated by perception or pratyaksha, and hence there is no place for anything transcendental. It recognizes neither a God who controls the universe nor a conscience which guides man. All the other systems of Indian philosophy insist on ethics and a way of life with a belief in life-after-death. But Cārvāka rejects any such life-after-death which entails that good conduct gets rewarded while wrong doing meets with punishment. Cārvāka rejecting any higher life advocates that man is here to enjoy sensual pleasure. They claim that nature is indifferent to good and bad. The sun shines equally on the good and the evil. Cārvāka says that majority of men believe in deities because of their weakness. There is no heaven or hell, what is there is only this world where we live.

The Cārvāka does not believe in any God as a creator. If there is a God who is omniscient, omnipotent and compassionate, why does he not remove all doubts about his existence in all beings? God cannot be said to be the judge of our merits and demerits. If we believe him to be the judge, he would be guilty of partiality and cruelty. Therefore Cārvāka says that it is better not to have a god than to have a cruel one. There is no such god as the supreme author and governor of this world, but the only god is the earthly king, the ruler of a state, the arbiter of right and wrong in the society.

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## 1.5 CĀRVĀKA EPISTEMOLOGY

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According to Cārvāka knowledge is located in the body. They prove this by the rule of 'presence in presence and absence in absence.' The colour of flower is present only when the flower is present, not otherwise. In other words, it is a fact that the colour of the flower is located in the flower, when there is no flower. This is the fact of conforming to presence and absence. Similarly, we find between body and knowledge, there is conformity to agreements in presence and absence. No one can deny that when the body ie., sense organ is present, knowledge is also present and when the sense organ is absent, knowledge is also absent. When the visual sense organ is intact there will be the ability to see while when one is blind, there is no ability to see. Thus

by this agreement in presence and absence between sense organ and knowledge it is proved that all knowledge is located only in the sense organ. It is necessary here to clarify that Cārvāka is not accepting ‘presence in presence and absence in absence’ as an argument. Since they do not admit the validity of inference, but Cārvāka establishes this only through perception.

The doctrine of ‘consciousness of matter’ (bhūta – caitanya vāda) is another name for “consciousnesses of sense organs” (indria-caitanya-vāda) because for Cārvāka sense organs are admitted to be made of forms of matter like earth, fire, water and air. The objection that is raised against the doctrine of consciousness of matter is as follows. The opponents of this view say that we often recollect in old age what happened in boyhood. This fact cannot be explained if the doctrine of consciousness of matter is accepted. Recollection is the effect caused by the earlier impressions, which are stored in consciousness. But on a bhūta-caitanya-vāda the impressions can be located only in the sense-organs and due to the dissolution of the atoms of matter; the sense-organs of boyhood no longer exist in the old age. Therefore the impressions which were located in the sense organs must have been destroyed. However, following the Cārvāka view, this objection can be answered. Firstly, Cārvāka does not believe in the relation of causality. Therefore their answer to such an objection would be to say that nothing which was not experienced through perception can be admitted. Therefore, according to the Cārvāka view, an impression is not the cause of recollection. Recollection has as its object a thing previously perceived. Therefore no unknown thing is presented. Because of the peculiarity of nature, different things with different forms and in different places and at different times are produced. For this there is no need to admit any cause.

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## 1.6 KNOWLEDGE IN THE CĀRVĀKA VIEW

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According to Cārvāka knowledge is generally divided into two classes, viz, apprehension (anubhava) and recollection (smaraṇa). Apprehension is again divided into two classes, namely, perception and assumption (kalpanā). Perception is knowledge acquired by the five sense organs – visual, gustatory, olfactory, cutaneous and auditory which get the knowledge of colour, taste, smell, touch and sound respectively. Valid knowledge or pramāṇa is the knowledge of objects which are not contradicted by a subsequent knowledge. Sense organs are the instruments of valid knowledge. Thus, according to Cārvāka, all other forms of knowledge like inferential knowledge and verbal testimony are invalid. Since all forms of knowledge except perception are invalid, they are of the nature of assumption. Cārvāka advances some arguments to prove that both inference and verbal knowledge are invalid.

Inference is the process by which we claim one proposition to be true or false on the basis of other propositions. Inference may be either deductive or inductive, but Cārvāka rejects inference itself and hence does not recognize this distinction. As far as the problem of knowledge is concerned, the Cārvāka regard, the deductive, inductive patterns of inference as inextricably bound up with each other. The Cārvāka says that the deductive pattern like –

All men are mortal

Socrates is a man.

Therefore Socrates is mortal

cannot be accepted because unless we know that the propositions, ‘All men are mortal’ and ‘Socrates is a man’ are true, we cannot say that Socrates is mortal. At this point let us examine the inductive pattern of inference to see if the universal proposition ‘All men are mortal’ is valid. In induction, a universal proposition is justified on the basis of particular propositions. That is, by noticing that particular men, x, y, z, are mortal we conclude that all men are mortal. However, according to Cārvāka, this is a leap in the dark. This universal proposition is unwarranted because all we are entitled to know is that, so far, all men have been mortal. Drawing a universal conclusion is to presume that the future will be like the past. But there is nothing in our experience which can justify such a conclusion. Thus, the inferred proposition ‘All men are mortal’ cannot be reliable knowledge. If this proposition is itself not reliable, there is no scope for any deductive inference. The next criticism of Cārvāka against deductive inference is that it is a case of ‘*petitio principii*’ or arguing in a circle or begging the question. Thus, to assert that all men are mortal is at the same time to assert that Socrates is mortal since Socrates is classified as a man. So ‘Socrates is mortal’ gives us no knowledge or information not already contained in the original proposition.

The general objection to the above criticism of the Cārvāka is that ‘All men are mortal’ is ascertainable because there is an invariable concomitance that is perceived between man and mortality. To take another example, we can say, “where ever there is smoke, there is fire” because there is an invariable concomitance or connection (*vyāpti*) between smoke and fire. But the Cārvāka does not accept any claim about invariable concomitance because it goes beyond what is perceived and is perceivable. Universal truths, they say, cannot be asserted because they have no foundation in our perceptual experience. We have no grounds in our experience for going from statements of limited perceived instances to unlimited, unrestricted universal generalizations. Considering the above views of the Cārvāka against inference, it is necessary for us to examine if the Cārvāka can successfully avoid drawing inferences at all. It is easy to see that it is not possible to avoid the use of reason or inference. To take an example, in order to teach his doctrine, the materialist must use language. Language is to utter certain noise (by way of words) and the hearer infers from the noise the meaning and content of what the materialist is saying. This is possible only when the hearer relies on his memory for the meaning of words. Thus, although he Cārvāka denies inference at the theoretical level, he himself cannot help employing inference in his every day living in the midst of men.

Again, we can say that Cārvāka generalizes that perception is reliable because he observes that most cases of perception are reliable. Now, let us grant that perception is a reliable source of knowledge, yet, on what ground can we say that perception alone is a reliable source of knowledge. The most important criticism on this view of the Cārvāka comes from the Sāmkhya thinkers. They ask the question as to how anyone who rejects inference can come to know that a man is ignorant or in doubt or in error. Ignorance, doubt and error in other men cannot possibly be discovered by perception. This must be inferred from conduct or speech. Now we must turn to the Cārvāka critique on testimony. The Cārvāka says that testimony is a reliable source of knowledge only when we presume that those who give this knowledge are honest and trustworthy. On what grounds do we know that some one is always honest and trustworthy? Someone who has been honest so far may be otherwise in future. Hence, according to Cārvāka, verbal testimony is not reliable. It is not a source of valid knowledge. Thus, for Cārvāka verbal knowledge is also a form of assumption because we can rely on it only after it is known perceptually.

So far as testimony is concerned, most importantly, Cārvāka was eager to refute the validity of Vedic statements. They denounced the authority of the Vedas in very bitter terms. Cārvāka says that the Vedic statements are tainted by the three faults of untruth, self-contradiction and tautology. Cārvākas says that many sacrifices were advocated because it was a source of livelihood for the Brahmins, and they do not have any validity or truth in them. For example, the Vedas say that any one desirous of heaven should perform the asvamedha sacrifice. But no one knows whether there is any world to which one goes after death. Since heaven is not attained while one is living, there is no way to ascertain whether any man has ever attained heaven. The other example taken by the Cārvāka is the statement that performance of a yagna or sacrifice by name putreshti will give a son to a childless couple. This again, the Cārvāka says, can never be verified as true. In some cases, after the performance of this sacrifice a son may be born but that would be due to reasons other than the performance of the yagna. Surely, everyone who performs the yagna will not beget a son. These statements so far as they convey their meaning, are to be taken as traditional heresay, (aitihya,) and not as a source of valid knowledge. The validity of a statement depends on the perception of the objects referred to by it. The things spoken of by the Vedas are totally unfit to be perceived. The validity of the Vedas which speak of extra-ordinary things is not possible at all. Cārvāka makes it clear that there is no statement that can be called valid by itself or svatahprāmāṇya.

Having given their views on the invalidity of inference and verbal testimony, Cārvāka thinkers proceed to show that other sources of knowledge as accepted by Mimamsa are also invalid. They say that the knowledge gained by postulation is of the nature of assumption. One takes to postulation only on being aware that a certain accepted meaning is unjustifiable in any other way. In such cases even the knower himself is aware that his knowledge is a kind of assumption. It is of the form 'I presume such a meaning'

According to the Mimāṃsaka, when sacrifices like Asvamedha etc are performed, a kind of adṛṣṭa or merit is procured by the person who performs it. This adṛṣṭa or merit is proved by postulation. In other words though the sacrifice which is an act (kriya) will be short lived the merit produced by it will last till one attains heaven. This type of knowledge is arrived by postulation. But can this be called valid asks Cārvāka., This they say can be nothing more than traditional heresay which is nothing but an assumption.

Now coming to non-existence or abhava, it is known by the pramana called non-apprehension or anupalabdhī. In the Cārvāka view non-existences are absolutely unreal. Therefore, in this view, the knowledge of non-existence would be nothing but assumption. Thus in this view, inference, comparison, verbal testimony, postulation and non-apprehension have not been accepted as sources of valid knowledge. Therefore according to Cārvāka perceptual knowledge which is not contradicted is the only source of valid knowledge.

Carvaks consider the mind as one of the five sense organs. Unlike Nyaya-Vaisesika who considers the mind as a separate sense organ to experience pleasure and pain, Cārvāka says that there is no separate sense organ called 'mind'. So strictly speaking there is no mental perception. They explain the experience of feelings as follows. The sense organ called skin (tvac) is uniformly present everywhere, both outside and inside the body. According to this view that part of the sense organ called 'skin' which is situated inside the body would be the mind or the internal sense organ. The Cārvākas

think that with the help of such a sense organ, people experience pleasure and pain. In many cases, pleasure or pain is produced due to the experience of a particular type of touch and its substratum is the inside skin. In other words pleasure is a kind of tactual experience. So also pain too is a kind of tactual experience resulting in some kind of knowledge. Similarly desire and aversion would also be of the nature of knowledge. When we realise that something is the means to get our desires, we get our desires fulfilled, i.e., the *ishta-sadhana* takes us to getting the desired effect. When something we know is harmful we have the feeling of aversion. The substratum of all these is also the sense organ. On this view the knowledge of recollection is also produced with help of the sense organ. Recollection never has for its object an unknown thing. Due to different kinds of physical stimulation people recollect things previously experienced. However, there is no general rule that one type of stimulation results in the recollection of one particular object. There is no cause- effect relation. Each individual will be inspired by a particular modification to recollect some experience depending on certain factors. Therefore uniformly, by framing a general rule, no cause- effect relation can be established between the modification of the sense organ and the recollection.

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## 1.7 ILLUSION IN THE CĀRVĀKA VIEW

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Cārvāka explains the nature of illusory knowledge by subscribing to the theory of *asatkhyāti* – i.e., awareness of the non-existent. When shell is mistaken for silver, there is illusion. Due to bad light or distance the non-existent silver is perceived and hence what is revealed is actually non-existent and unreal. But in some other cases of illusion, what is revealed is not unreal. For example, a man travelling in a fast moving train sees the lamp post and the trees standing on the sides also moving at the same speed. Here the relation alone is illusory not the objects. That is to say, the speed is related to the train but not to the post or the trees. The man in illusion associates the speed with the objects which are real but are stationary. Hence, in this case it is only the relation which is wrongly perceived.

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## 1.8 THE WAY OF LIFE

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Cārvāka does not believe in any spiritual values. Of the four *purusārthas* or human values, Cārvāka rejects the two values of ‘Dharma’ and ‘Moksha’. Therefore, the human effort is only for the attainment of sensual pleasure (*kāma*) and wealth (*artha*), which is the means to get pleasure. Briefly said, it is crude Hedonism. Cārvāka is aware that pleasure is often accompanied by pain. They say that no one throws the grain because it has the husk. Does one stop plucking a lotus because there is thorn; does one stop eating fish because there is bone and scales? A wife or child who creates heaven on earth, when they depart there is bound to be pain. But the life of one with no love in his heart is also miserable and barren. Cārvāka admits that there is sorrow everywhere – in king’s palaces and beggar’s huts. Still this world of ours is not full of misery. The amount of pleasure is greater than pain. If it were not so, why would people desire to live and get frightened to die? It is important to enjoy the pleasure and to avoid pain, which is invariably associated with it. We should not forego pleasure for the fear of pain. According to Cārvāka, one’s aim in life should be to get maximum amount of pleasure. The advice is to make the best of a bad bargain, and to enjoy. Sometime we wonder if really there could have been any system, which asked man to be just selfish without even being useful to the society in which he lives. It is easy to think of a system without the ideal of ‘Moksha’ but to think of any system without ‘Dharma’ is really difficult.



**Check Your Progress I**

**Note:** a) Use the space provided for your answer.

b) Check your answer with those provided at the end of the unit.

1) What is the Metaphysical position of the Cārvāka

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2) Why do they reject any discussion on God?

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3) Explain the theory of illusion according to the Cārvāka

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**1.9 LET US SUM UP**

In conclusion, it can be said that Cārvāka materialism was surely an attempt to break away from the asceticism and dogmatism that was being encouraged during their time. It also points to the freedom of thought that was possible. While we appreciate the atmosphere of free thinking that was prevalent in Indian philosophical thinking, we cannot help wondering if Cārvāka really gave no place to reasoning and ethics. It is quite possible that they rejected only such reasoning which others thought was sufficient to establish the existence of God, transmigration of the soul and so on. Coming to ethics, is it believable that a teacher of the calibre of Brahaspati did not even insist on certain basic human values and instead advocated that man could live like a beast? Since most of our knowledge about Cārvāka is based exclusively on the works of other schools, which are more interested in discrediting and debasing the system than in presenting an objective account of its tenets, may be, what we know about Cārvāka is only a caricature. So one wonders if the Cārvāka really advocated crude Hedonism of the form – eat, drink and be merry.

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## 1.10 KEY WORDS

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- Hedonism:** Hedonism is a school of philosophy which argues that pleasure has an ultimate importance and is the most important pursuit of humanity.
- Caricature:** A caricature refers to a portrait that exaggerates or distorts the essence of a person or thing to create an easily identifiable visual likeness.

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## 1.11 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

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## 1.12 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

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### Answers to Check Your Progress I

- 1) Being positivistic Cārvāka claims that perception or pratyaksa is the only means of valid knowledge. Therefore, only what is perceivable is the object of knowledge for Cārvāka. Whatever is not perceivable is rejected as a figment of our imagination. On this ground, matter is the only reality and the world is constituted of only four basic categories, namely, earth, water, fire and air, which are all physical and given in perception. Eather or space is not accepted as the fifth element because it is not perceivable. Matter is both the material and efficient cause of the universe and matter they say has always existed and will always exist.
- 2) As pointed out earlier, the system believes in only what is validated by perception or pratyak?a, and hence there is no place for anything transcendental. It recognizes neither a God who controls the universe nor a conscience which guides man. All the other systems of Indian philosophy insist on ethics and a way of life with a belief in life-after-death. But Cārvāka rejects any such life-after-death which entails that good conduct gets rewarded while wrong doing meets with punishment. Cārvāka rejecting any higher life advocates that man is here to enjoy sensual pleasure. They claim that nature is indifferent to good and bad. The sun shines equally on the good and the evil. Cārvāka says that majority of men believe in deities because of their weakness. There is no heaven or hell, what is there is only this world where we live.

- 3) Cārvāka explains the nature of illusory knowledge by subscribing to the theory of *asatkhyāti* – i.e., awareness of the non-existent. When shell is mistaken for silver, there is illusion. Due to bad light or distance the non-existent silver is perceived and hence what is revealed is actually non-existent and unreal. But in some other cases of illusion, what is revealed is not unreal. For example, a man travelling in a fast moving train sees the lamp post and the trees standing on the sides also moving at the same speed. Here the relation alone is illusory not the objects. That is to say, the speed is related to the train but not to the post or the trees. The man in illusion associates the speed with the objects which are real but are stationary. Hence, in this case it is only the relation which is wrongly perceived.