UNIT 3 WESTERN PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS ON HUMAN PERSON

Contents

3.0 OBJECTIVES

After having understood what philosophical anthropology is, in this unit we have the general objective of generally introducing the students to philosophical anthropology in Western Philosophy. In spite of some generalizations we want to see how we understand human person from a Western perspective. We also want to study in detail Marechal's understanding of human person as openness to the unlimited.

3.1 INTRODUCTION

What we shall be busy with, in this section, is to take a brief critical look at some views on what human being is, as presented by various thinkers. We shall note what seems to be of value in their ideas and will particularly dwell upon the liberative and oppressive dimensions of their conceptions. This will pave the way for the final section where, in the form of concluding remarks based mainly on Joseph Marechal.

3.2 PLATO AND COMPANY

We remember Plato's philosophical anthropology from Ancient Western philosophy. For him, the human being is primarily a spirit or a soul. The body was nothing but a prison-house into which her/his real self has been locked on account of some crime committed in the fore-life. In his imagery of the two steeds and the cave, he denounced the "body". He calls for the human being to ever rise above the limitations and the oppressiveness of the body and try, as far, as possible to be those pure spirits that they were meant to be. They were to learn

how to rise from mere "opinions" about changeable things of this world to the contemplation of the perfect and unchanging ideal forms in that world shining with light, our true home and natural state which we had forfeited due to that original fault. It should be clear that St. Augustine's understanding of original sin and Adam's fall derives much inspiration from Plato, consciously or not. So, too, that "despising of the things of this world and the loving of the things of heaven" was, thanks to him, to become so characteristic a principle in traditional spirituality. St. Augustine, admittedly, did improve things somewhat by making the body not so much the prison-house of the soul, but its instrument (he preferred the word "mind" to the more traditional soul – which is significant enough in itself.) The great advantage of the Platonic dichotomy (revived in modern times by Descartes , and with a vengeance) is that it provided an easy demonstration of the after-life. Death was seen as nothing more than the moment when the soul was finally set free from the body-prison (there is a play on words n the Greek *soma-sema*). After-life, for the Greeks, was a question of the immortality of the soul, a natural quality or attribute of the spiritual soul of human being. However, there would be no such things as a resurrection of the body – that would be quite ridiculous. Why drag the prison-house back into the whole process of liberation? Whatever, in this conception, the human person is primarily a soul which has a body – somehow like the way "I" wear a shirt. If these people were not quite clear as to exactly how the "body" and "soul/mind" were actually united or were able to inter-act, they seemed pretty clear that they were as distant and opposed to each other as chalk and cheese (more so: after all, both chalk and cheese are material things).

3.3 ARISTOTLE AND COMPANY

According to this rival school, "body" and "soul" are not to be conceived as two complete beings in conflict with each other, but as two principles of being complementing each other. In fact, as we have mentioned already, the human person is a composite not of "body" and "soul" but of prime matter and the human soul which, as substantial form, "informs" the former. Hence we have the traditional scholastic definition of the human person as an "animal rationale" (a rational animal, a neat and clear cut definition according to genus and specific differences): the human being (homo) is an animal but what characterizes her/him from other animals of the same genus is the fact that s/he and s/he alone can reason, is endowed with the faculty of abstract thought. Compared to the Platonic conception, this is a much balanced understanding of human being. The material, the bodily is not passed over in embarrassment and regret but is assigned a positive role in human life and activity.

3.4 THE HEGELIAN AND MARXIAN VIEW

For the German philosopher, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770 –1831), the absolute idealist, the state is the only true individual. "It has supreme right over the individual whose supreme duty it is to be a member of the state". Those individuals whose will fails to identify with the larger will of the state become alienated and alienation of individuals breaks up the organic unity of the state. There are individuals who appear to have imposed their individuality on the course of history. They have been able to do so only because their will to personal liberty has been consonant with the larger historical movements of the time.

Hegel distinguishes between what he terms formal freedom and substantial freedom. Formal freedom, the sort of freedom of the individual and is negative. It merely expresses the will of rebellious individuals against oppressive authority. What is needed is a positive sense of freedom. This is only possible within a social context and when the individual is part of the larger life of the Mind or Spirit of the People. The moral system of the state is rational because Mind's dialectic has led history to this point. The choice to follow this moral system thus corresponds with reason and is a greater freedom than choice making based on individual whim.

When Marx prefers to speak of human being as "a worker" he is, in effect, underscoring in an even more vivid manner (in my opinion) this essential integration that there is in the human person. For Marx, the human being is the human being not just when s/he reasons, but when s/he incarnates her/his reasoning capacity in some productive output, in some creative self-expression (work). If it is true that Marx was to err on the other side of the coin (he was to overvalue the manual work as against intellectual, artistic or organisational work), this way of speaking does bring out more vividly the essential link between thought and action, spirit and matter. The true human being, for Marx, is not the armchair philosopher, busily rationalising her/his animality in abstract thought, but the worker who applies her/his reasoning ability to some concrete project.

Check Your Progress I

Note: Use the space provided for your answer

1) How does Plato understand the human person in relation to body and soul?

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

2) How does Marx view the human being?

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

3.5 KANT AND NEO-THOMISM

Under this section we deal with the understanding of human beings in Karl Rahner, Teilhard de Chardin and Joseph Marechal, who are all neo-scholastics or neo-Thomists. Before going to study them a brief understanding of Human Person according to Immanuel Kant (1724 –1804) may be called for, since the neo-Thomistic Philosophers refer to Kant indirectly.

Kant's Transcendental Self: philosophy is forced to accept that there is a level of self that is *noumenon*, a thing-in-itself, that is a precondition of perception and understanding but itself beyond perception and understanding. This is the transcendental self. This is a level of self awareness that is over and above the categories of normal philosophies. It is similar to "I" in Descartes' "I think". Kant's "*practical reason*" relies on the transcendental self. Since the laws of nature are by his definition predetermined, man subjected exclusively to the laws of nature would have no freedom. So Kant postulates a transcendental freedom, an idea that the inner self is not bound by the laws of nature.

Kant's Critical Philosophy asserts that anthropological notions like morality, freedom and immortality are not accessible to pure reason. They are not therefore a valid basis for morality. This does not mean that moral action is beyond definition. Kant still seeks an objective and universal basis for ethics through practical reason. Practical reason assists in identifying what best to do, not what is. Actions are determined by imperatives which take into consideration the means and the end of the action. Some actions are based on hypothetical imperatives: "If I do this, in this way, then these will be the consequences..." But Kant also postulates that there is a higher, universally applicable imperative which should be the basis of truly moral action, the categorical imperative.

Kant had already established that everything in nature works according to predetermined laws. Rational beings alone have a will and have free choice of action. For Kant, the only good action is that which is done out of pure reverence for universal law. One form of his categorical imperative of duty is expressed as follows: "Act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a Universal Law of Nature." To act morally is always a struggle between duty and desire.

Karl Rahner

One of the greatest theologians and thinkers of this age, the German thinker has two major philosophical works to his credit. The titles of each of these studies may be taken as two separate and complimentary definitions of the human being: Spirit in the World and Hearers of the Word. Human being, for Rahner, is Spirit – but not spirit in the usual understanding as the contrary (if not contradictory) of matter, but in the sense of that which is able to transcend the World and to make metaphysics. Human being, then, is Spirit but Spirit of such nature that it is meant to be in the World. The World is defined as Spirit, s/he is that mysterious Spirit that must be involved with the World in order to be that unique type of Spirit that s/he is. This would seem to be a very well balanced understanding of the human condition. Not only are "matter" and "spirit" not seen as the absolute antithesis of each other, but their inter-dependence in the human person is brought out. From this it follows that the human being is also (or called to be, rather) Hearer of the Word. As we shall see later, by courtesy of Maréchal (one of Rahner's major mentors), there is in the human person a dynamic drive, an unquenchable longing for the Unlimited Being (God). But, precisely because we are not "pure spirit" but "spirit in the world", the world becomes necessarily the "locus of the theological event', that is, if God freely decides to speak to human being, s/he must do so in the context of the world, in history. Hence, the human being must be on the alert to listen to a possible word spoken to her/him by God in the world. This is how her/his relentless dynamism unto God is to be existentially

lived out. And, if God freely decides not to speak to human beings any word, then human beings would attain the fullest self-realisation by listening to God's silence. No doubt we are reminded of Marcel's observation that "I" am incarnate in the world through my body: the stress is not so much on how two principles come together in the make-up of human person but how integrated s/he is into the reality of the world around her/him.

Teilhard de Chardin

The poet-mystic-philosopher-theologian-scientist, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, reads a thought-clinching and fine summary "definition" of human being from his study of the human phenomenon, down the ages: "Man in evolution becomes conscious of itself." Whereas in its first phase, when the level of complexity was not sufficient enough to enable consciousness to emerge, evolution was directed by cosmic forces and natural laws (ultimately ordained by the Creator), once the goal of that phase had been attained (hominisation), the emergence of human being), an essentially different type of dynamism entered the picture. Now as human being (and thereby consciousness) came on the scene, the path of evolution would be traced out by conscious decision and commitment. Here is another conception of human being which well integrates the two dimensions of her/his being while, at the same time underscoring her/his dignity and responsibility in this world. It may be useful to recall here that, for Teilhard, matter was but "solidified spirit". True, the Frenchman often expressed himself in poetic language, but even a random perusal of his writings should make it clear to us that he intended a very literal core to this image. He never subscribed to the traditional unbreachable abyss between unconscious-matter and conscious-spirit. For him, it is all a question of complexity. Once matter attains a certain threshold of complexity, consciousness emerges. He feels no need for a separate ingredient (be it soul or whatever) to enter the composition to make such consciousness possible.

To sum up so far: Modern European languages are built on ideas and roots taken from ancient Greek and so it is inevitable that some of the slants and biases of the Hellenistic world should have entered into our everyday life through our usage of such words. When we use the word "man", we are, in effect, saying that what is most characteristic of human reality is that s/he has a mind (Latin *mens* – of the Sanskrit *manas*, whence our own *manushya* and its derivatives). The incarnate dimension of this "mind" is by-passed. So also, when we talk of "spirituality", are we not implying that what matters in human development is the cultivation of her/his "spirit"? On the other hand, the world human suggests a more integrated insight: it reminds us that we are *humus* (Latin), earth plus *mens* – earthy minds. This is a conception that comes very close to Rahner's "Spirit in the World".

In the next section we study in detail the position of Joseph Marechal regarding the human person.

Check Your Progress II

Note: Use the space provided for your answer

1) How does Karl Rahner see human being?

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

2) How does Teilhard view the relation between matter and spirit?

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

Joseph Marechal "The human race has passed from a rather static concept of reality to a more dynamic, evolutionary one." (Desbruslais 1997) It is a comment that we should keep in mind whenever we set about elaborating any theory or world-view. Why, as the same document goes on to say, governments must take a "dynamic" concept of the common good as their norm and goal? In other words, our conception of the human person and his/her condition should envision both not as static, finished products but as dynamic, active beings. In fact, this conviction has led some contemporary thinkers to suggest that we use the world "becomings" rather than "beings" to refer to reality. Somehow, rightly or wrongly, the former world has a too static connotation.

Another important consideration to be kept in mind (also upheld and underscored – more or less – in the same document) is to ensure that one's understanding of reality (especially the human reality) is such that a recognition of God and of human being's eternal vocation should in no way lead to a neglect of our responsibilities to this world. Our vision of human being should be one which brings out clearly that though we are not meant to have a lasting home on this earth, there is an inherent and integral link between religion as well as the hope of eternal life and our responsibilities to society, to the building up of structures that contribute to making all people more fully human, more fully alive.

All this is nothing but a more explicit spelling out of what the previous section has been leading us to. Our convictions on this issue, which owe much to the inspiration of the Belgian philosopher, Joseph Maréchal, eminently fulfill these requirements. We have made good use of Maréchal in these reflections. I am going to fall back on this insightful thinker here too. His *Le point de départ de la mtaphysique* (*cahier* V) has been a shot in the arm of neo-Thomistic thinkers and has had repercussions far beyond that school or its interests. The "transcendental philosophy" of people like Karl Rahner, Emerich Coreth and Bernard Lonergan own their inspiration to him and echoes of Maréchal can be picked up in many contemporary philosophical writings.

Joseph Maréchal (1878-1944), a Belgian professor of philosophy at Louvain from 1919 to 1935, continued along these lines, taking of where Kant had ended. (The sub-title of the famous fifth cahier is "Thomism in Confrontation with the Critical Philosophy", i.e., of Kant). In effect Maréchal's contention was that Kant's philosophical perspectives – brilliant and revolutionary thought they might have been in his time – were seriously hampered by his rather static understanding of the process of human knowing. Had he been able to glimpse our "intellectual dynamism", the great sage of Königsberg would have realised how the great concerns of philosophy need not be banished from metaphysics.

3.6 MARÉCHAL 'S ANALYSIS OF INTELLECTUAL DYNAMISM

Our method – retracing Maréchal 's approach of the fifth cahier in our own words – will be to follow through, to its utmost consequences, the journey which our intellect drives us by its inner dynamism. We will discover that it is relentlessly driving us far beyond the immediate data of our senses, far beyond the things it seems to be solely interested in, to a final goal which is the ultimate and implicit goal of our intellectual, volitional and personal strivings. At the end we shall see that, since it is a quest for this goal which is the most basic drive in us, we could attempt an inspiring, insightful and dynamic definition of the human reality in terms of this goal. The starting-point of the whole process of transcendental analysis will be the intellectual activity of the Direct Judgement – the immediate affirmation or denial that something directly perceived exists – for this is the most basic of all intellectual acts (Desbruslais 1997).

Direct Judgement as a Metaphysical Fact

By Direct Judgement is meant, as we have just said, the immediate affirmation or denial that something exists – in which case it is always concerned about something observable that we have experienced through the senses. For instance, "This is a table", "This is not a horse", are Direct Judgements. But "God exists" or "There is no such thing as a soul" are not Direct Judgements for they are not immediate affirmations or denials. Rather, they are conclusions from other more immediate affirmations or experiences. Now, no one can deny that Direct Judgement exists for, to do so, one would have to make a Direct Judgement. "There is no such thing as a Direct Judgement" is an immediate denial that something exists (viz. Direct Judgement). Direct Judgement, then, is an undeniable, existential fact – we are forced to admit that it exits. Direct Judgement, in scholastic terminology, is a metaphysical fact (i.e. absolutely certain and undeniable).

Direct Judgement as a Movement, a Dynamic Process

A little deep reflection on our experience of knowing should make this clear. We want to know. We are not indifferent to knowing or not knowing. Avidya, ignorance, is a state repugnant to human being. We want to get out of it. We know full well that it is not always an easy thing to attain truth, to get to know. But that doesn't bother us. We are prepared to struggle, to strive, to argue in our attempt to know. Knowledge is not just something that "happens to" us, that drops into our indifferent laps. Every bit of knowledge we come by is the result of a definite wish, a real conquest, a conscious effort on our part. Knowledge is

a sure but determined process, a dynamic movement whereby we advance from ignorance, through various stages, towards certainty. My intellect, therefore, is dynamic.

The Affirmation in Direct Judgement Experiences a Limit

Every Direct Judgement is couched in the form, "This is X", or "This is not X". In other words, in every Direct Judgement we say two kinds of things about something: WHAT it is (its essence, its "this-ness") and THAT it is (its existence). Furthermore, again a little reflection should make it clear that I don't recognise these two elements merely juxtaposed side by side. Rather, I experience that the "is" element is actually limited by the "this" element (i.e. I experience the limitation of existence by essence). After all, "this-ness" (what a thing is, its essence) is, by its very nature, a kind of limitation. To be this means not to be that. For example, to be a cow means to be just a cow and not a non-cow (and there are millions of things that are excluded by this restriction). Essence is, then, a limiting in itself. But "to be" (the "is" element, existence) does not imply any limitation by itself: "to be" means just to be and the only thing it opposes itself to, or cuts itself off from, is "not to be", i.e., nothing. When I make an existential judgement and say This is, I am expressing, in effect, that the unlimitedness of "to be" is, in this situation, restricted to being the "to be" of just this particular essence. In other words, the dynamic movement of my intellect experiences a limit, a check to its movement.

Intellect as Tending towards the Unlimited Being

What is important, here, is to be aware of just where and how I experience this limit. It is not that I am feeling dissatisfied with being confronted, here and now, with a limited essence, with finding just much of a particular essence (quantitatively and qualitatively) and therefore am "reaching out" towards the discovery of a "bigger and better" cow or table or whatever. No, what I am experiencing is the limitation of existence, of "to be". Thus I am tending towards the unlimited existence. Recognition of a limit means a tendency to go beyond that limit. Now we have seen that existence does not imply any limitation in itself. If existence is limited, it is limited by something other than, outside of, itself – essence, as we have seen. In other words, I am tending towards pure existence, absolute and unlimited existence, unrestrained by any essence (Desbruslais 1997).

The Unlimited Existence, Ultimate End of My Intellectual Dynamics, Really Exists

We cannot argue, from the mere fact that we are tending towards or reaching out to something, that this thing actually exists. How, then do we establish that the Unlimited Being, final and ultimate goal of my intellectual dynamism really exists? We attempt at one solution.

By starting from the reality of the observable world: Either we accept that the world around us, and concerning which we make our Direct Judgements, is real (as scholastic realists do) or we hold ourselves back from our natural inclination to do so (as Kantians and others of their like do). If we accept its reality (because, for instance, we find no valid reason enough to doubt our spontaneous and natural tendency to "take it" as real, or because we find the objective reality of the external worlds is the only reasonable explanation to account for the "intentional" nature

of our affirmations), then there is no problem in proceeding to our conclusion. For the Unlimited Being has emerged as the ultimate end of my intellectual activity and the limited beings of my daily experience are only proximate ends, stepping stones, on my way to the Unlimited. Now, if the proximate, intermediary ends of my intellectual dynamism are real, all the more reason that the Ultimate End should be real for intermediary, proximate ends derive their meaning and force from the Ultimate and Final End. On the other hand, if we are dealing with Kantian agnostics, then – according to Maréchal – we could reason as follows. Such people accept the immanent objects as the proximate end of my intellectual activity but do not go so far as to admit the real status of an exterior world nor go so far as to grand that our knowing can reach them as they are "in themselves". But, if one is willing to accept, categorically enough, that the immanent object is real, one must – logically and honestly – accept the reality of the Unlimited Being inasmuch as it is one of the constitutive conditions of our proximate object.

3.7 TOWARDS A DYNAMIC "DEFINITION" OF HUMAN PERSON

A "dynamic" definition of human being would be one which attempts to "define" (let's not forget that we're dealing with a mystery and so a full-fledged "definition" ever evades us) the human reality in terms of our basic anthropological drive. Many eminent personages of various professions have tried to do this. For instance, Freud has seen a "will to pleasure" as fundamental in human being, whereas Nietzsche would situate it rather in the "will to power." Joseph Donceel derives from a perusal of Maréchal the following view, which suggests an alternative understanding of human dynamism. "Man", he writes, "is an embodied loving affirmation of God." It should be clear how this follows from the metaphysical analysis of human activity that we have just made. And, if we remember that "the will follows the intellect", as per the experience-proven old scholastic adage, there is in us not only an intellectual dynamism for God the Unlimited Being (and this spurs on all our intellectual activity), there follows hard on the heels of this, a volitional dynamics, (i.e. of the will) which hungers after God the Unlimited Good (which, in turn, triggers off all our volitional activity). Furthermore, our intellect and will, inasmuch as they are embodied, can only attain their ultimate goal (in this life at any rate) in and through limited, material and created realities. There is, then, a total human dynamism for God as a result of which all else becomes infinitely precious but relative (precisely because they derive their meaning and status from Her/him and are our only real and actual means of encountering God here and now). Herein lies the metaphysical basis for the Augustinian dictum, "We are made for you, O God, and, oh, how weary we are till we rest in you.," as we have already remarked. This is equally the metaphysical ground for Ignatius Loyola's "indifference" as also the ideal of "finding God in all things", so dear to the mystics. Maréchal, among other others, show us how to give a solid basis to many sayings and aphorisms which would otherwise be but nice pious platitudes.

3.8 HUMAN SEARCH FOR MEANING

It is the unanimous opinion of many an observer of the human reality today that it is the "will to meaning" that is at the heart of our psyche – an idea that meshes well with Maréchal 's findings. Human being, the hermeneutical animal (i.e. the

meaning-seeking animal), seeks to draw from reality some overall and underlying direction, some vision of how all things hold together and when s/he cannot do this, s/he becomes prey to all that anxiety, stress and neurosis that seem to be so characteristic of the hectic life in today's world (this is more true of the West, but "it is coming to India, too", as the oft-repeated refrain has it). Rollo May confirms this comment of ours by drawing attention to the deep-seated sense of futility and despair that many people in the West feel (especially youth). He concludes that "the principle problem of [mental] patients today is emptiness" and goes on to elaborate:

The human being cannot live in a condition of emptiness for long; if s/he is not growing toward something, s/he does not merely stagnate; the pent-up potentialities turn into morbidity and despair, and eventually into destructive activities … A human being is not empty in the static sense … The experience of emptiness … gradually comes from people feeling that they are powerless to do anything effective about their lives or the world they live in. Maréchal not only shows us wither we are growing toward in the depths of our being. He also indicates, implicitly, how action in the world can be effectively harnessed to the attaining of precisely that self-same end.

Finally, we may adduce the testimony of Victor Frankl in his writings on his horrific experiences in a Nazi death camp. We can summarise Frankl's views in two main theses, as expressed in Gordon Allort's preface to the former's Man's Search for Meaning: (i) several forms of neurosis can be traced to "the failure of the sufferer to find meaning and a sense of responsibility in his existence", (ii) "to live is to suffer and to survive is to find meaning in suffering." Perhaps the last point somewhat overstates the issue, but we can let it pass. Frankl frequently alludes to what he calls "the last of the human freedoms" which no one can ever take away from us – "the freedom to choose one's attitude in any given set of circumstance, to choose one's way." And Frankl never seems to wary of quoting Nietzsche's inspiring phrase: "He who has found a Why to live for, can cope with any How."

3.9 HUMAN BEING IN THE EXISTENTIALIST PHILOSOPHY

Existentialism in the broader sense is a 20th century philosophy that is centered upon the analysis of existence and of the way humans find themselves existing in the world. The notion is that humans exist first and then each individual spends a lifetime changing their essence or nature. In simpler terms, existentialism is a philosophy concerned with finding self and the meaning of life through free will, choice, and personal responsibility. The belief is that people are searching to find out who and what they are throughout life as they make choices based on their experiences, beliefs, and outlook. And personal choices become unique without the necessity of an objective form of truth. An existentialist believes that a person should be forced to choose and be responsible without the help of laws, ethnic rules, or traditions. Existentialism takes into consideration some of these basic concepts like: Human free will; Human nature is chosen through life choices; A person is best when struggling against their individual nature, fighting for life; Decisions are not without stress and consequences; There are aspects of life that are not rational and Personal responsibility and discipline is crucial.

In Existentialist thinkers, the traditional distinction between soul and body is completely eliminated; thus the body is a lived-through experience that is an integral part of man's existence in its relationship with the world. According to Jean Paul Sartre, "In each project of the For-itself, in each perception the body is there; it is the immediate Past in so far as it still touches on the Present which flees it." As such, however, the body is not reduced to a datum of consciousness, to subjective representation. Consciousness, according to Sartre, is constant openness toward the world, a transcendent relationship with other beings and thereby with the in-itself. Consciousness is existence itself, or, as Karl Jaspers says, it is "the manifestation of being." In order to avoid any subjectivistic equivocation, Martin Heidegger went so far as to renounce the use of the term consciousness, preferring the term Dasein, which is more appropriate for designating human reality in its totality. For the same reasons, the traditional opposition between subject and object, or between the self and the nonself, loses all sense in his existentialist understanding of human person. Dasein is always particular and individual. It is always a self; but it is also always a project of the world that includes the self, determining or conditioning its modes of being (For details see the Unit 2.2).

All of the Existentialists are in agreement on the difficulty of communication; i.e., of well-grounded intersubjective relationships. Karl Jaspers has perhaps been the one to insist most on the relationship between truth and communication. Truths are and can be different from existence. But if fanaticism and dogmatism (which absolutize a historical truth) are avoided on the one hand while relativism and skepticism (which affirm the equivalence of all truths) are avoided on the other, then the only other way is a constant confrontation between the different truths through an always more extended and deepened intersubjective communication.

Jean Paul Sartre, however, denies that there is authentic communication. According to him, consciousness is not only the nullification of things but also the nullification of the other person as other. To look at another person is to make of him a thing. This is the profound meaning of the myth of Medusa. Sexuality itself, which Sartre holds to be an essential aspect of existence, fluctuates between sadism and masochism, in which either the other person or oneself is merely a thing. On this basis, the intersubjective relationship is obviously impossible. In this context we can understand Sartre's claim that human being is "a useless passion" and "Hell is other people" (From his novel, "No Exit")

Gabriel Marcel, another existentialist, refer to problem and mystery and for him, human being is basically a mystery (Unit 3.3). Marcel makes a clear distinction between "being" and "having." He then relates it to our human body. "My body, insofar as it is my body, is both something that I have and something that I am, and cannot be adequately accounted for using either of these descriptions alone. I can look at my body in a disassociated manner and see it instrumentally. However, in doing so, in distancing myself from it in order to grasp it qua object, qua something I have, it ceases to be "my" body. I can have "a" body, but not "my" body.

Check Your Progress III

Note: Use the space provided for your answer

1) What is the starting point of transcendental analysis of Marechal?

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

2) How does Marechal show that the final goal of our intellect, the Unlimited Existence really exist?

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

3.10 LET US SUM UP

We have analysed numerous views on the human person from the main Western philosophical perspectives and elaborately studied that of Joseph Marechal, which sees human being as an essential openness to the Ultimate.

3.11 KEY WORDS

Logotherapy : Victor Frankl's method of treating patients by which one discovers the meaning of one's suffering, enabling one to cope with life and its pain better.

Transcendental analysis : Marechal' intellectual analysis starting with direct judgement indicating the existence of the Unlimited existence.

Dialectic : A process of arriving at truth through the conflict of opposing forces. The process especially associated with Hegel of arriving at the truth by stating a thesis, developing a contradictory antithesis, and combining and resolving them into a coherent synthesis.

Noumenon : In the philosophy of Kant, an object as it is in itself independent of the mind, as opposed to a phenomenon.

3.12 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

Bandyopadhyay, Tirthanath. *Man : An Essay in Philosophical Anthropology*. Calcutta, India: Papyrus, 1988.

Bogliolo, Luigi, and S. Karotemprel. *Philosophical Anthropology : A Complete Course in Scholastic Philosophy*. 2 vols. Calcutta: Firma KLM, 1984.

Desbruslais, Cyril. *The Philosophy of Human Person*, Pune: Jnana-Deepa Vidyapeeth, 1977.

Frankl, Viktor E. *Man's Search for Meaning : An Introduction to Logotherapy*. 3rd ed. A Touchstone Book. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984.

Grunwald, Armin, Mathias Gutmann, and Eva M. Neumann-Held. *On Human Nature : Anthropological, Biological, and Philosophical Foundations Wissenschaftsethik Und Technikfolgenbeurteilung*. Bd. 15. Berlin ; New York: Springer, 2002.

Mann, Jesse Aloysius, and Gerald F. Kreyche. *Reflections on Man; Readings in Philosophical Psychology from Classical Philosophy to Existentialism*, under the General Editorship of Jesse A. Mann [and] General F. Kreyche. New York: Harcourt, 1966.

Pandikattu, Kuruvilla. *The Human Search: Issues in Philosophical Anthropology.* New Delhi: Serials Publications, 2011.