UNIT 2 ANALYTICAL METHOD: WESTERN AND INDIAN

Contents

2.0 OBJECTIVES

- To introduce to the students philosophical discussions on meaningfulness of word, sentence in language used.

- To give an overall picture of analytical tradition both in the West and in India on the question of language and reality.

- To enable students to cull out from the philosophies of language analytical method used in sorting out philosophical problems.

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Generally any philosophical analysis is a method of inquiry. Analysis is normally understood as assessing complex systems through simpler elements. In philosophical analysis we do seek the complex thought pattern by breaking them into simpler components. Analytic philosophy was a leading philosophical tradition and a dominant branch of philosophy in the West in the 20th century. Having emerged and dominated the English speaking world for decades, analytical tradition steadily grew to influence the continental philosophy. From the beginning of Indian philosophical tradition there had been issues related to meaning of terms, sentences and the meaningfulness of language. This we may consider in par with the 20th century discussion in the West on language and reality.

2.2   ANALYSIS IN HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

Analytical method has a long history in philosophy, although it became prominent at the start of the twentieth century. In classical Greek, the term 'analysis' denoted the activity of taking something apart and became a model for explanations of complex structures in reference to parts. In Descartes, the idea of analysis reappeared with the reference to identify the simple natures as characteristic of one's subject-matter. (Arnauld, A.; Descartes, R.). In John Locke's account of complex ideas in terms of their constituent simple ideas the analysis found a place. Moving from the Cartesian analysis of 'ideas' to the analysis of our capacities for understanding and judgement, Kant's position is 'Transcendental Analytic.' In the further development of idealist tradition, we find in Hegel a shift from the method of analysis to the method of dialectic. (Baldwin 1998)

G. E. Moore appropriately calls for a return to the method of analysis breaking the idealistic trend of dialectics. He maintained that 'a thing becomes intelligible first when it is analysed into its constituent concepts' (Moore 1899: 182). Moorean conception of analysis inspired Russell in his analytical programme. Logical positivists developed the method further in their anti-metaphysical project. Russell's development of logical theory paved a way for analysis as legitimate philosophical inquiry. Expanding the philosophical inquiries beyond the logical positivist's position, analytical philosophy included the analysis of structures of language and thought. From the conception of linguistic analysis the central concern of analytical philosophy became language and meaning. Frege and Quine forwarded arguments for and against the methods of analysis. Brentano's approach to psychology was explicitly analytical, which enables us to understand Husserl's programme of phenomenological analysis. American pragmatist, C.S. Peirce wrote that 'the only thing I have striven to do in philosophy has been to analyse sundry concepts with exactitude' (Passmore [1957] 1968: 104).

By 1945 most analytical philosophers had abandoned any commitment to simple meanings and basic certainties, and that the positivist thesis that philosophy could only be analytical philosophy was also soon rejected. They rested only on the assumption that methods of analysis can clarify conceptual and epistemological relationships that would contribute to dissipation of philosophical problems. Quine questioned the assumption that there is a clear distinction (the 'analytic/synthetic' distinction) between logic and other disciplines and the assumption that there is a single chain of justification from observation to more speculative claims about the world (Quine 1953). For him we find only a complex network of interdependent relationships and our understanding of each other, and in particular of each other's utterances, is generally underdetermined by our observations of each other. Quine earlier pointed to the holistic structure of our language and beliefs. Rorty viewed that Quine's writings signalled the end of analytical philosophy (Rorty 1980). Yet, analytical philosophy still survives by retreating to the pre-positivist position of analysis as an ingredient of philosophical inquiry, involving inference and justification that connect concepts, beliefs and statements. Analytical philosophy made a remarkable expansion, both geographically and disciplinary, with the acceptance and use of its methods in outside Europe and in areas of philosophy such as ancient philosophy and Marxism. (Baldwin 1998).

Recently analytical philosophy turned its attention to philosophy of religion. Early thinkers had anti-metaphysical trend where religious claims were considered as

unverifiable or as part of a language game. After 1950s Plantinga contributed to epistemology of religion and Swinburne has worked extensively in natural theology. Analytical tradition now covers range of topics from traditional theistic concerns to objections to theism. (Wehinger 2010)

2.3 CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS

The theory of conceptual analysis holds that concepts are the fundamental objects of philosophical inquiry. Accordingly, insights into conceptual contents are expressed in necessary 'conceptual truths' (analytic propositions) which could be obtained by two methods: (1) direct *a priori* definition of concepts; (2) indirect 'transcendental' argumentation. John Locke's doctrines of general ideas and definitions had an element of analysis in decompositions of complex general ideas into sets of simple ideas. Further analysis had its root in Locke's distinction between 'trifling' and 'instructive,' universally certain propositions and in his distinction between 'intuitive' and 'demonstrative' knowledge. In his *Critique of Pure Reason,* Kant makes three crucial sets of distinctions; between 'analytic' and 'synthetic' propositions, between *a priori* (necessary, experience-independent) and a posteriori (contingent, experience-dependent) truths, between proofs by empirical methods and 'transcendental' proofs. (Hanna 1998)

2.4 ANALYSIS AS A METHOD

Explanation of a whole by referring to its parts, becomes a gist of analysis. Although in physical science the decomposition of a whole into its parts is well understood, analysis in philosophy needs certain clarification. In logical analysis the inferential significance of a statement in its logical form depends on the simple logical constants in the statement. Logical analysis of a statement can lead one to discern the presence of logical constants which are not apparent in the surface structure of the statement. For instance, in Russell's famous illustration, "The present King of France is bald." For Russell, a statement's logical analysis revealed the 'constituents' of the proposition expressed by the statement. Complex claims to knowledge are justified by reference to simpler items of evidence. In empiricist tradition, all evidence is perceptual evidence. Analysis of perceptual evidence unravels the complexity of beliefs. Phenomenological analyses are not mere introspective descriptions of appearance but are meant to bring out the priorities within different modes of consciousness. (Baldwin 1998).

Russell develops his theory of descriptions into a theory of 'logical fictions.' It implies that our ontological commitments are less extensive than it is supposed. For both Moore and Russell philosophy is not just analysis. Wittgenstein brought out the paradigmatic exercise in logical analysis with the assumption that 'A proposition has one and only one complete analysis' (*Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* 1922: 3.25). From the Vienna circle, the positivists analysis rested on the beliefs that 'what is left over for philosophy… is only a method: the method of logical analysis' (Carnap 1932: 77). For them the proper task of the philosopher is to engage in logico-epistemological analysis. It clarifies the questions about the world with the answers based on scientific observation and experiment. In the explicitly anti-metaphysical contexts of logical positivism we find the transition from 'philosophical analysis' to 'analytical philosophy.' The former is conceived of as an important method of inquiry while the latter restricts genuine philosophy to analysis. (Baldwin 1998).

Analytic method in philosophy has diverse concerns from logic, epistemology and language. The developments within analytic tradition show this. Concerns of the analytic philosophers ranges from aesthetics to ethics to history of philosophy. There is no definition in terms of a certain set of doctrines or method for analytical philosophy. From the early days of analytical tradition there was no shared methodological approach among philosophers. Even after the linguistic turn there was no methodological constraint on the philosophers to adopt. In post-Quinean period we find concerns of analytical tradition on metaphysics, mind, religion, etc. Amidst the diversity of doctrine and methods analytical philosophy is a method of philosophizing. It emphasized argument, rationality and sought clarity. (Wehinger 2010)

Method in Conceptual Analysis

In any conceptual analysis, the theory is as follows: A concept is a general content possessing intrinsic, individuating structures and relations (an intension), and having a corresponding application either to sets of actual or possible objects (an extension), or to other concepts. Secondly, a concept is the meaning of a predicate-expression; and all such words have meanings only in the context of whole sentences used (first and foremost) in making statements in ordinary discourse. Thirdly, every true proposition expressing conceptual interconnections is necessary and analytic. Fourthly, purely conceptual inquiry produces important a priori knowledge. This knowledge is expressed in analytic propositions known to be true either by (a) direct definitional analysis of conceptual contents, or by (b) indirect 'transcendental' arguments. Fifthly, all fundamental philosophical errors arise from misunderstandings of concepts, and can be corrected only by proper conceptual analyses. Therefore, from the above understanding on the concept and knowledge, concepts are understood as playing a role as universals. They ontologically depend upon ordinary language and not otherworldly. Concepts have necessary relations to one another. Concepts govern the ways we think about all things and other concepts. Thus not only all philosophical truths, but also all philosophical errors, are conceptual. The two methods of conceptual analysis - definitional and transcendental - must be employed not merely as means of philosophical insight but also for the unmasking and diagnosis of conceptual confusions. (Hanna 1998)

2.5 ANALYSIS IN LOGICAL ATOMISM AND LOGICAL POSITIVISM

In the beginning of 20th century G.E. Moore and Betrand Russell opposed the British idealism. Moore's *A Refutation of Idealism* (1903) and Russell's (along with A.N. Whitehead) *Principia Mathematica* became influential for analytical method. It aimed at reconstructing ambiguous or misguiding terms of our language by means of the ideal language of predicate logic. It tried to develop a foundation that logic and mathematics could be based on. Gottlob Frege's logical tools were adopted well by Russell. (Wehinger 2010)

Logical positivist like Alfred Jules Ayer endorsed the ideal of scientific knowledge. The goal was to reconstruct, on the basis of empirical observation and by means of formal logic, our statements about the world. The logical positivists dismissed as meaningless those statements for which such a reconstruction was not possible and that were not tautologically true. The logical positivists thus embraced a

verificationist criterion of meaning. Only verifiable statements can be meaningful. (Wehinger 2010)

2.6 ANALTIC METHOD IN ETHICS

Moral philosophy has traditionally been divided into normative ethics and meta-ethics. Normative ethics concerns judgments about what is good and how we should act. Meta-ethics, with which, 'analytic ethics' is typically identified, seeks to understand such judgments. The questions before analytic ethics are: are they factual statements capable of being literally true or false? Or are they commands or expressions of attitude, capable only of greater or lesser appropriateness or efficacy? The former leads to cognitivism where the focus is on the facts of moral judgments. The latter leads to non-cognitivism. The cognitivists question whether they are discovered from experience or they are like mathematical facts. The noncognitivists argue that moral judgments are not fact-stating and that they are only signals of our feelings or commitments, or are imperatives of conduct. Concerning the moral judgments another question is whether they are subjective or objective. Analytic ethics is concerned about the meaning of moral terms. It offers specific insights into morality and contributes to our understanding of the functions of thought and language. (Railton 1998)

In ethics some like Hume, stressed the role of sentiment and others like Kant stressed reason for the faculty involved in moral judgments. Ordinary moral practice or the external force as a standard for moral judgment was discussed. After analytical philosophy, especially after G.E. Moore, questions of meaning got separated from substantive questions, moral concepts discussed in non-moral terms (for example, 'Good' = 'Conducive to happiness'). Good cannot be analytically reduced to a natural property. Logical positivists divided cognitively significant propositions into two categories, the analytic, knowable a priori because tautological, and the synthetic, knowable a posteriori by empirical means. Loyal to the positivist bifurcation, A.J. Ayer (1936) concluded that moral judgments expressed not cognitively significant propositions, but emotions. (Railton 1998)

2.7 LANGUAGE ANALYSIS

In post-world war period in the West, many did not want to return directly to old-fashioned metaphysics. They extended the analytical techniques to normative aspects of language. In Wittgenstein's writings there was a hope to end philosophical perplexities. In the writings of Ryle, Austin, Strawson and other 'ordinary language' philosophers there was still old metaphysical questions like status of the mind, appearances and universals.

After 1960s Analytical philosophy was no longer confined to the logico-epistemological analyses of Russell and the logical positivists. It has a much broader concern with language. Russell, Moore and early Ludwig Wittgenstein, thought that such *logical* or *conceptual analysis*—in the sense of a reconstruction of language with the tools of logic—would eventually yield the simple, unanalyzable building bricks of reality, a view called *logical atomism*. Later this emphasis on conceptual analysis turned into a move towards language as the primary object of enquiry. This *linguistic turn* asserted that a philosophical explanation can only be achieved by way of an analysis of language. (Wehinger 2010)

Frege's sense/refernce distinction was significant in this context. Frege's philosophy of language was brought into the mainstream of analytical philosophy through Carnap's writings. Dummett's claim that the distinctive feature of analytical philosophy is the priority it assigns to the philosophy of language. The sentences are true only in virtue of the nonlinguistic thoughts they express. His 'theory of meaning' and of Donald Davidson are to be seen against 'theorizing' of Wittgenstein's later writings. There are those who argue for the alternative priority of mind over language employ the methods of logical and epistemological analysis characteristic of previous analytical philosophers. They threatened to bring about the 'end of analytical philosophy.' (Baldwin 1998)

Ordinary language philosophy emerged after the fall of logical positivism. From the Moorean common sense approach towards philosophical problems, which argued that the philosopher's starting point had to be the ordinary meaning of propositions, ordinary language philosopher stressed the need for not replacing the meaning but to elucidate the ordinary meaning of the statements in accordance with common sense. Later Wittgenstein's influence for the ordinary language movement is worth mentioning. He questioned the idea of an ideal language in favour of a plurality of what he called *language games*, each of which functions according to its own rules. He put the linguistic turn of logical positivists into practice. He was convinced that traditional philosophical problems arise only if we do not use words in accordance with the rules of the corresponding language game. Accordingly, the philosopher's task was to cure such misuse of language. (Wehinger 2010)

2.8   WITTGENSTEIN AND ANALYTICAL METHOD

In his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein presents a logical atomist picture of reality and language. The world is full of independent facts. Each is composed of some combination of simple objects. Each object has a distinctive logical shape which fits it to combine only with certain other objects. These objects are named by the basic elements of language. Each name has the same logical shape. An elementary sentence is a combination of names. If it is true it will be a picture of the isomorphic fact formed by the combination of the named objects. Ordinary sentences are misleading in their surface form. When analysed these would reveal the real complexity implicit in them. These deep truths about the nature of reality cannot be properly said but can only be shown. The picture theory of meaning: In each individual sentences, one needs to understand that each says one thing but is essentially either true or false. The sentence is complex and has components which represent elements of reality. The truth or falsity of the sentence then depends on whether these elements are or are not assembled into a fact. When we properly understand the nature of our language we see that we cannot formulate the supposed sentences in the first place.

Picture Theory: Picture theory is the earlier position of Wittgenstein. According to this theory, the ontological structure of the world which is logical has its parallel in the structure of the language. The names being basic constituents of the propositions which are either true or false as expressed in the logic of language have a correspondence to the structure of the world. That which can be logically represented in the language is a possible state of affairs in the world. The logical necessity of propositions determines the states of affairs in the world.

Language Game: Language game theory is expressed in the *Investigations*. The language game theory moves from the foundations of logic to the nature of the world. The shift therefore is from the limited understanding of language, language of the natural sciences to the language of wider forms of life. It is no longer one view of language rather languages within the language. A sentence / proposition does presuppose a 'language game', but a language game will be only a small segment of the whole of language. It is the use, employment of particular word in the given language game which gives rise to meaning. The language game theory therefore, is the understanding that the language is determined by rules which are particular to the form-of-life.

Later i his *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein changes his previous position presenting language not as a fixed and timeless framework but as an aspect of vulnerable and changeable human life. He changed the idea that words naming simple objects were incoherent, and instead introduced the idea of 'language games'. When a language is taught words and actions are interwoven. To understand a word is to know how to use it in everyday life. He abandoned also solipsism and favoured the view that there are many selves, aware of and cooperating with each other in their shared world.

In presenting the contrasting views in his earlier and later writings, Wittgenstein contributed to analytical tradition that philosophical puzzles often arise out of language. Philosophical insight is not to be gained by constructing quasi-scientific theories of puzzling phenomena. It is to be achieved by seeking to be intellectually honest. (Heal 1998)

2.8 QUINE'S ANALYTICAL METHOD

Quine insisted upon a close connection or alliance between philosophical views and those of the natural sciences. Philosophy is an activity within nature wherein nature examines itself. Quine takes account of the theoretical as well as the observational facets of science. The unit of empirical significance is not simple impressions (ideas) or even isolated individual observation sentences, but systems of beliefs. Quine proposes a new conception of observation sentences, a naturalized account of our knowledge of the external world, including a rejection of a priori knowledge. Quine confines logic to first-order logic and clearly demarcates it from set theory and mathematics. They are internal to our system of beliefs that make up the natural sciences. The language of first-order logic serves as a canonical notation in which to express our ontological commitments. Our ontological commitments should be to those objects to which the best scientific theories commit us.

The theory of reference is sharply demarcated from the theory of meaning. Quine is the leading critic of notions from the theory of meaning, arguing that attempts to make the distinction between merely linguistic (analytic) truths and more substantive (synthetic) truths has failed. They do not meet the standards of precision which scientific and philosophical theories adhere to and which are adhered to in the theory of reference. He explores the limits of an empirical theory of language and offers a thesis of the indeterminacy of translation as further criticism of the theory of meaning. The picture theory of meaning: In each individual sentences, one needs to understand that each says one thing but is essentially either true or false. The sentence is complex and has components which represent elements of reality. The truth or falsity of the sentence then

depends on whether these elements are or are not assembled into a fact. When we properly understand the nature of our language we see that we cannot formulate the supposed sentences in the first place. (Orenstein 1998)

Quine challenged the logical positivists' distinction between analytic and synthetic truths and the verification of scientific claims. He rejected the method of conceptual analysis. He proposed a holistic account of meaning. Meaning of a statement cannot be fixed once and for ever. It depends on the relation it has with other statements within a language. Through his ontological relativity, he claimed that reference is inscrutable.

2.9   ANALYSIS IN INDIAN TRADITIONS

From the ancient Vedic period onwards debates on language and linguistic theories has received much attention in philosophical issues. Especially in the grammatical works we find explicit philosophical reflections. For instance, Tamil grammatical work of Tolkappiyar, known as *Tolkappiyam* and Sanskrit *Ashtadhyi* of Panini, contain not just literary norms and notions but have deeper insights on language and reality. Bhartrhari is a celebrated philosopher of language in the ancient period. His Treatise on Sentences and words and his development of theory of *sphota* are worth mentioning. For him *sphota* is a linguistic entity distinct from a word's sounds. Classical Nyaya philosophers joined the group and developed a strong philosophy of language in Indian tradition. These Indian philosophers of language debated mainly on i) the search for minimal meaningful units, and (ii) the ontological status of composite linguistic units. In the ancient period, with the grammarians, search for the meaningful units was given much attention. In the later period the linguistic reflection was more on the ontological status of composite linguistic units. (Bronkhorst 1998)

The Meaning of 'meaning'

'Artha' is used to denote 'meaning.' Meaning can be the meaning of words, sentences as well as nonlinguistic gestures and signs. Various Indian theories of meaning, testify to the differences prevailing among philosophical schools with regard to their ontological and epistemological positions, their focus on a certain type of discourse, and the ultimate purpose in theorizing. Meaning can be primary, secondary, suggested or intended meaning. When a verbal cognition results from the primary signification function of a word, the object or content of that cognition is called primary meaning. When a verbal cognition results from the secondary signification function of a word, the object or content of that cognition is called secondary meaning. When a verbal cognition results from the suggestive signification function of a word, the object or content of that cognition is called suggested meaning. When a verbal cognition results from the intentional signification function of a word, the object or content of that cognition is called intended meaning. With this realistic ontology in mind, Nyaya-Vaisesika argue that if the relation between a word and its *artha* were a natural ontological relation, there should be real experiences of burning and cutting in one's mouth after hearing words like *agni* ('fire') and *asi* ('sword'). Therefore the relationship between a word and the object must be a conventional one (*samketa*), the convention being established by God as part of his initial acts of creation. It is through this established conventional relationship that a word reminds the listener of its meaning.

Mimamsa school developed a full-scale theory of ontology and an important theory of meaning. The Vedic scriptural texts are eternal and uncreated and they are meaningful. In this system the relationship between a word and its meaning is innate and eternal. For various schools of Buddhism, language relates only to a level of conceptual constructions, which have no direct relationship to the actual state of the world. Theravada and the Vaibhasikas argued that a word refers to a thing which, in reality, is nothing but a composite entity made up of components which are momentary and in a continual flux. The components, the momentary atomic elements (*dharma*), are presumed to be more real, but words do not refer to this level of reality. Thus language gives us a less than true picture of what is out there. Other schools of Buddhism, such as Vijnavada, reduced everything to fleeting states of consciousness (*vijnjna*). From this point of view, the objects referred to by words are more like fictions (*vikalpa*) or illusions (*maya*). (Deshpande 1998)

Meaningfulness and Ontological Status of Linguistic Units

From the Vedic tradition of giving etymological explanation to names and terms related to their sacrificial practice and utterances, *mantras,* Vedic search for meaning of linguistic unit had begun. In Yaska's *Nirukta,* etymological treatise, only nouns and adjectives are said to be etymologically explained where as verbal forms could not be. Panini's grammar furnishes stems and affixes on the basis of a semantic input, and these stems and affixes are subsequently joined together and modified, where necessary, so as to yield words and sentences . For Panini these ultimate meaningful constituents are really meaningful than the 'surface forms.' Panini's *sutra* 1.2.45, recognizes three meaningful entities, namely verbal roots, nominal stems and suffixes. He indicates that words and sentences are considered to have a composite meaning. (Bronkhorst 1998)

The ontological status of linguistic units is answer the questions like whether words and sentences really exist. If so, how can they, given that the phonemes that constitute them do not occur simultaneously? Since, moreover, simultaneous occurrence is a condition for the existence of collective entities, do individual phonemes exist? They, too, have a certain duration, and consist therefore of parts that do not occur simultaneously. For the Sarvastivadins of Buddhism *dharmas* constitute all that is. There are three *dharmas,* namely, phonemes (*vyanjanakayas*), words (*namakaya*) and sentences (*padakaya*). These are exiting entities but momentary. For Patanjali too phonemes and words are eternal. In Bhartrhari this notion played a vital role as he held that more comprehensive totalities are more real than their constituent parts. During the period of Patanjali and Bhartrhari the discussion was centered on the linguistic unit as meaning-bearer. The meaningless individual phonemes came to be separated from that of meaningful words, grammatical elements (stems and affixes) and sentences. In Bhartrhari's philosophy of language linguistic units and the 'objects' they refer to are treated parallel. (Bronkhorst 1998)

Sphota Theory

Patanjali and Bhartrhari use the word *sphota* to refer to linguistic entities conceived of as different from the sounds that reveal them. For Patanjali, the *sphota* does not necessarily convey meaning; he uses the term also in connection with individual phonemes. For Bhartrhari, the *sphota* is a meaning-bearer, different from the sounds that manifest it. For him *sphota* might be a mental entity or the universal residing in the manifesting sounds. *Sphota* as meaning-

bearing or not, became point of contention and discussion rather than the question what exactly *sphota* is. The question of meaningfulness of a sequence of phonemes each without meaning, had been answered variously. According to some, a sequence of sounds can express meaning; they have to show how it does so. Others hold that this is not possible; they solve the problem by postulating the existence of the *sphota*. In his *Slokavarttika,* Kumarila Bhatta of Mimamsa tradition gives the classical expositions of both these positions. Bhatta accepts the eternal existence of individual phonemes. Though the constituent phonemes of a word are not pronounced simultaneously, they are remembered together the moment the last phoneme is uttered. Mandana Misra in his *Sphotasiddhi* protests against the idea of the combined memory of the phonemes that constitute a word. The *sphota* is directly perceived: it is gradually revealed by the phonemes. In the sixteenth century, Nagesa Bhatta through his various treatises dealt on *sphota* doctrine. The *Sphotavada* enumerates eight types of *sphota*: (1) phoneme, (2) word, (3) sentence, (4) indivisible word, (5) indivisible sentence, (6) phoneme-universal, (7) word-universal, (8) sentence-universal. These *sphota*s are primarily meaning-bearers. Nagesa affirms the idea that only sentences really exist, that words and grammatical elements are no more than imaginary. The sentence-*sphota* is most important. During Nagesa's period again, the conflict existed between the two major issues of grammar namely, the search for minimal meaningful units on the one hand, and the ontological status of composite linguistic units on the other. For Nagesa, finally, only the sentence is 'real', rather than words and smaller grammatical elements. Grammar is concerned with the smallest identifiable meaningful elements and the way they combine to form larger units. (Bronkhorst 1998)

Sentence-meaning

Most schools of Indian philosophy have an atomistic view of meaning and the meaning-bearing linguistic unit. A sentence is put together by combining words and words are put together by combining morphemic elements such as stems, roots and affixes. The word-meaning may be viewed as a fusion of the meanings of stems, roots and affixes, and the meaning of a sentence may be viewed as a fusion of the meanings of its constituent words. Beyond this generality, different schools have specific proposals. Prabhakara proposes that the words of a sentence already convey contextualized/connected meanings (*anvitabhidhana*) and that the sentence-meaning is not different from a simple addition of these inherently connected word-meanings. The Naiyayikas and the Bhatta propose that the words of a sentence taken by themselves convey uncontextualized/ unconnected meanings, and that these uncontextualized word-meanings are subsequently brought into a contextualized association with each other (*abhihitanvaya*). Therefore, sentence-meaning is different from word-meanings, and is communicated through the concatenation (*samsarga*) of words rather than by the words themselves. This is also the view of the early grammarians such as Patanjali and Katyayana. For the later grammarian-philosopher Bhartrhari, however, there are no divisions in speech acts and in communicated meanings. He says that only a person ignorant of the real nature of language believes the divisions of sentences into words, stems, roots and affixes to be real. Such divisions are useful fictions and have an explanatory value in grammatical theory, but have no reality in communication. In reality, there is no sequence in the cognitions of these different components. The sentence-meaning becomes an object or content of a single flash of cognition (*pratibha*). (Deshpande 1998)

All schools of Indian Philosophy accept the true cognition as characterised by 'self-consistency' (*samvada*) and 'uncontradictability' (*abadhitatva*). Of course uncontradictability does not mean as 'not being contradicted by another true cognition,' but being in coherence with other known truths. Logical Positivist theory of the West, which reduces 'truth' only to coherence of a proposition with a set of other propositions previously accepted as true, is not found in Indian traditions. In upholding the theory of truth there are two major trends among Indian systems. That the Truth is either 'self-validitating' (*svatah-Pramanyavada*), or to be validated by something other than itself (*paratah-Pramanyvada*). Samkhya, Mimamsa and Vedanta uphold the truth to be *svatah-pramanya*. Nyaya-Vaisesika speak of *paratah-pramanyatva* of Truth.

2.10 LET US SUM UP

In Indian philosophy of Language, grammarians were interested in language and cognition. Nyaya-Vaisesikas were primarily interested in logic, epistemology and ontology. They argued that a valid sentence was a true picture of a state of reality. For Mimamsa, meaning had to be eternal, uncreated and unrelated to a person's intention. The Buddhists aimed at showing the emptiness of everything, including language and they demonstrated how language fails to portray reality.

2.11 KEY WORDS

Picture Theory : Early Wittgenstein's theory that language pictures reality.

Sphota **Theory** : Indian theory of meaning that refers to linguistic entities conceived of as different from the sounds that reveal them. *Sphota* is primarily meaning-bearers.

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