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# UNIT 1 PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD: WESTERN AND INDIAN

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## Contents

- 1.0 Objectives
- 1.1 Introduction
- 1.2 Phenomenology in Philosophy
- 1.3 Phenomenology as a method
- 1.4 Phenomenological Analysis of Knowledge
- 1.5 Phenomenological Reduction
- 1.6 Husserl's Triad: Ego, *Cogito*, *Cogitata*
- 1.7 Intentionality
- 1.8 Understanding 'Consciousness'
- 1.9 Phenomenological Method in Indian Tradition
- 1.10 Phenomenological Method in Religion
- 1.11 Let us Sum up
- 1.12 Key Words
- 1.13 Further Readings and References

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## 1.0 OBJECTIVES

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- To introduce the students to phenomenology in both Western and Indian traditions
- To illustrate the method used in philosophical systems concerning the human subjectivity and consciousness.

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## 1.1 INTRODUCTION

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Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) was a German philosopher, mathematician and physicist. His works are '*Logical Investigation* (1900), *Phenomenology and crisis of philosophy* (1910), *Ideas* (1913), *Cartesian Meditation* (1931), *Philosophy and Crisis of European Man*. Important contribution of Husserl is his notions of 'Intentionality, *Noema* and *Noesis*, *Epoche*, Life-world. His phenomenology revolutionized philosophy. We understand the reality from our own experience. Continental philosophy and hermeneutics evolved from phenomenology. Understanding reality as a method in philosophy is phenomenological. There are two features of phenomenology. First is all knowledge about reality or world must be the last analysis with our highly personal experience. This brings in the question of whether there is objective knowledge possible at all. Secondly, Phenomenology is concerned with meaning or perspective one has on objects.

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## 1.2 PHENOMENOLOGY IN PHILOSOPHY

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Phenomenology is a study of ‘appearances’ as they are experienced in one’s subjectivity. It is the study of structure of consciousness which are common to all consciousness. It examines the way in which phenomenology constituted “in” or “by” consciousness. Phenomenology is cognitive approach to the field of studying aiming at rigorous and interpersonal knowledge by way of describing the intentional act and intended object. Hume used ‘phenomenologism,’ to mean it as only impression. Husserl uses it differently. Kant used *phenomenon* and *neumena* as opposite in their conception, former meaning ‘things as it appears’ and the latter to mean ‘things as it is.’ Husserl’s usage was little closer to Kant yet different. Hegel also used this term, phenomenology. His famous book *phenomenology of spirit*, clearly shows that Hegelian notion is different in understanding although he used Kantian terminology. Bentham influenced Husserl by his, what is known as, descriptive psychology. His use of the word ‘phenomenology’ comes closer to Husserl’s. From the question of being, as in metaphysics, phenomenology moved to the concern of ‘meaningfulness of reality.’ The terms *phenomenon* and *phenomenology* derive from the Greek for “appearance”. *Phenomenon* refers to a thing or event that appears to human consciousness. *Phenomenology*, thus, is the study of manifestations. Edmund Husserl believed that as far as our knowledge of the world goes, all we can know is phenomena. Husserl agreed with Descartes that the one thing we can be certain of is our own conscious awareness.

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## 1.3 PHENOMENOLOGY AS A METHOD

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For Husserl European science in particular and Western society in general had lost direction. From the time of enlightenment, reason had increasingly bifurcated from man’s essential, ‘transcendental’, identity. He was convinced that we should return to ‘things themselves’. The method of approach he advocated for the attainment of these ends is called phenomenology. In his phenomenological method, Husserl succeeded in relocating reason as an integral, a priori, faculty of human consciousness. He allows human consciousness to ‘intuit’ its own essence. For Descartes, what one can be certain about existence is one’s own conscious awareness. Husserl agrees with this view of consciousness. He says, ‘if we want to build our conception of reality on rock-solid foundations, that this is the place to start’. (Magee 1998, 211) As Descartes begins by doubting everything but not doubting itself, Husserl believes that the study of mind should begin by setting aside all that is not given in consciousness: ‘all that does not belong to the mental state of the subject’. (Scruton 1994, 139)

The method Husserl introduces for this analysis or examination of things as they appear to our consciousness is called ‘phenomenology’. Husserl believes that the first step towards any attempt to understand the theoretical problems which he confronts have to appropriate access to phenomena themselves. Phenomenology thus evolves as a method of approaching phenomena in their pure state. Phenomena, for Husserl, is anything, imagined or objectively existing, ideal or real, that presents itself in any way to individual consciousness. Husserl’s aim is to develop a method that will not falsify these phenomena, but will allow them to be described as they appear – as things themselves. Thus, when Husserl recommends the return to things themselves, what he is recommending is a return

to an analysis of things as they appear to consciousness. Husserl thought that all sciences had evolved randomly and were made up of a combination of empirical act and theoretical supposition. Theoretically this hotchpotch was unacceptable: what was required was a clear account of the nature and the theories which were deemed central to scientific investigation. What was needed was a new method which could clearly identify the metaphysical presuppositions inherent in the sciences.

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## 1.4 PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE

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Philosophy is more a method than a preoccupation with knowing the reality. Epistemology is the study of the method of knowing. The word epistemology comes from two Greek words, namely, '*episteme*' (knowledge) and '*logos*' (science); that is to say, it is the science of the being as the knowing, or the science of human mind with respect to its aspect of knowing. In the past, it was called Noetics, Gnoseology, Higher Logic, Material Logic, Critical Logic, Applied Logic, and so on. Epistemology covers a wider spectrum of themes. Apart from laying the standards of truth, it treats the structure and the conditionings of the knowing mind, the very process of cognition, the accompanying states of mind, the role of sense organs in the cognitive process, the nature and limitations of human knowledge, etc. When people ordinarily say that they know something, most often, what they mean is that they believe, think, hope, opine, doubt or wish something. However, when a philosopher says he knows something, he means that he knows that thing beyond any doubt, with full certitude borne out of a thorough scientific investigation. Normally we say that knowing is an exclusive activity of human beings and inanimate things do not know. Although animals possess some 'intelligence', we say it is mere instinctual responses or conditions. Only humans have reason and deliberate activity of knowing. In knowing we create a sort of mental representation of a thing in the mind. A thing is said to be having a twofold existence, within and without the mind.

Husserl dedicated himself to a search for the very foundation of human knowledge. His first passion had been mathematics and he became gripped by a vision of a philosophy that provided the certainty found in mathematics. He wanted to create a philosophy that was a "rigorous science". Yet his focus was not on the so-called "objective" truths of empirical science, but on the "subjective" process of human thinking; not on so-called "facts" but on "phenomena", things as they appear to the mind.

For Husserl, all genuine knowledge rested on inner evidence. Knowledge, in the strictest sense, means it is inwardly evident that something is the case. Human acts must be fulfilling intuitions. In order to grasp this 'inner evidence', it is necessary to 'bracket' all that is inessential so that the essences of phenomena can speak for themselves. In order to grasp this 'inner evidence', says Husserl, it is necessary to 'bracket' all that is inessential so that the essence of phenomena can speak for itself. For Husserl the study of mind begins by setting aside all that is not given in consciousness. It begins by stripping our perceptions down to their simplest forms, shedding all our layers of habit and assumption. Husserl calls this kind of perception "bracketing". Since all we can know are things that appear to our consciousness, he said, let us ignore the questions that we

cannot answer and deal with those we can answer. The human mind understands the world by bringing it under certain concepts, and each concept presents an essence. These essences are not discovered by scientific inquiry and experiment, but are revealed to consciousness where they can be grasped by intuition. In order to grasp the true essence of things themselves we must clear the mind of all the debris that prevents intuition from forming. And it is only by “bracketing” all those presuppositions and prejudices which clutter our minds that we can approach the true essence of the object: that we can study what is left as an object of pure inner awareness.

For Husserl, the ultimate truth is that all we can know for certain is that we have pure consciousness. All objects and acts that appear to consciousness must be treated with circumspection: they must be kept under constant review. Before feelings, imaginings, fears, doubts, and even thought itself, there is pure consciousness – the transcendental ego. Thus, while Husserl seems to echo Descartes, in effect he goes beyond the *cogito*. For Descartes the only thing we can know with any certainty is that we are thinking things – “I think, therefore I am”. For Husserl, it is more the case that “I am, therefore I think”. Pure consciousness can be grasped by thought, but it is not synonymous with thought. For Husserl, in order to think, first we must be – we must have consciousness. (H. Spiegelberg “The Phenomenological Movement” Vol. 1 1865, pp.76-82.)

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## 1.5 PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION

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Phenomenological reduction, according to Husserl’s teachings, is the exclusion from consideration of everything. It is transcendent and anything else derived via scientific or logical inference. A phenomenologist would consider only what was immediately presented to consciousness. For Jean-Paul Sartre, what one suggested what one knows of a person or item are all that one can evaluate. An object, even a person, is only what one sees and experiences of that object. The rest, Husserl suggested, was “bracketed out” from judgment. Husserl referred to this suspension of judgment as *epoché*. As an example, via this theory, a colour seen by one individual is known only to and by that one person. Measuring it scientifically, comparing to other colours, etc., do not truly change that what the individual sees is the only thing consciousness comprehends. The colour experienced is the “*pure phenomena*”, the scientific data are held in suspension, or *epoché*. Only the phenomenological knowledge is certain, and then only to the individual.

Eidetic reduction is the abstraction of essences. The essence abstracted via eidetic reduction is the intelligible structure of the phenomena found in consciousness. The goal is to find the basic components of a phenomena. For example, a chair might include the colour, the materials used, and the shapes present in the structure. We apply basic, Platonic forms to all phenomena, according to Husserl. These basics allow us to communicate and describe a phenomena with some accuracy, though this lessens the original phenomena in some manner. Returning to the example of colour, one knows there are component colours. If one thinks too much about the mixture of colours, the colour viewed is devalued. Green is green, according to Husserl, not a mixture of blue and yellow subtractive. The scientific knowledge of colour is the universal form: there are agreed upon mathematical representations of colour. Still, colour is a personal and subjective phenomena, further complicated by differences in human senses, such as colour blindness.

Husserl was unable to come out of this transcendental suspension. The harmless “bracketing” of commonsense realities became the metaphysical thesis that they can have none but an “intentional” existence in and for consciousness. Husserl does not see that we cannot suspend a belief if the belief suspended is meaningless. (Findlay, *Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy*, 145)

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## 1.6 HUSSERL’S TRIAD: EGO, COGITO, COGITATA

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What a phenomenologist considers important is that which can be experienced via the human senses. After reduction and abstraction, what remains is what an individual knows, regardless of the scientific or transcendental data. After removing the transcendental and the scientific, what remains is the Phenomenological Residue of the phenomena. This residue exists in three forms: ego, *cogito*, and *cogitata*. Phenomenological Ego is the stream of consciousness in which one acquires meaning and reality from the surrounding environment. Husserl considered it a great mystery and wonder that a group of beings was aware of their existence, in effect human consciousness is the phenomenological result of introspection. By observing that “I can touch and see my being,” we recognize that we exist. The science proving we exist is not of value to human consciousness. The ego is always present, or nothing exists for the individual. *Cogito* or cogitations comprise all the acts of consciousness, including doubting, understanding, affirming, denying, etc. The ego exists only as a result of these cogitations and these cogitations continue only as long as we are self-aware. *Cogitata* are the subjects of thought or objects of consideration. One cannot deny or understand nothing — something must be under consideration for thought to occur. In the presence of nothing, there is no person, no individual.

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## 1.7 INTENTIONALITY

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It comes from two word “*in + tendare*” ‘*in*’ means towards. ‘*Tendare*’ means tending, tending towards. Husserl did not use it for first time but Avicena (Islamic) used this word and later on developed by scholastic philosophers. Intentionality is the power and the vitality of consciousness. He says physical objects have no intentionality. Only mental objects have intentionality. Physical objects have capacity to tend to its objects. Intentionality is stereological towards objects. Intentionality has direction in a way, object-orientedness. Physical objects are not oriented. Consciousness always refers to something. Consciousness is always conscious ‘of’ something. Consciousness must have an object always. He says “*ego cogito cogitatum*” I think something. So far philosophers said only I think but Husserl told that “I always think something.” What is that something is a different question altogether, but thinking is always about something. Consciousness is co-relational, not just relational. Descartes theory of consciousness is called container theory of consciousness as he says that consciousness is simply reflection of objects. Kant also says that mind has a role to play. Co-relational means it is reference theory of consciousness. For Husserl my mind is not simply reflecting.

Meaning, says Husserl, is neither in the mind, nor in the world alone, rather it is discovered by the *a priori* modes of intentionality. These intentional modes fall into three categories – perception, imagination, and signification. Intentionality is like a screen between consciousness and the world onto which objects and acts are projected. Without the screen objects and acts would not exist.



Intentionality, then is a conduit, a channel, between consciousness and phenomena. Consciousness itself cannot be grasped as itself because it is intentional: it is always directed towards that which is not consciousness: it is always looking away from itself. It is only by an analysis of intentionality that consciousness itself can be discovered. Thus, when we peel away the *encrustations* of preconditioning not only can we intuit the essence of things themselves but also the essence of consciousness – pure consciousness. To examine consciousness, we need to bracket out all objects and facts. What remains is “the transcendental ego”, which, for Husserl, is pure being - Absolute Being. It is important to realise that Husserl does not deny that the real world exists; rather that it is only realisable in virtue of the transcendental ego. Without pure consciousness, nothing is possible. Pure consciousness is before all acts and objects. It is only through pure consciousness that all other entities are known; and they are known as entities that appear in consciousness.

For Husserl the world and the entire field of objectivities would appear before us as being correlated with consciousness. Transcendental consciousness ‘constitutes’ the world. In spite of his insistence on methodological devices for phenomenology, Husserl’s followers and the philosophical scholarship have not been able to see their relevance for a phenomenological way of doing philosophy. H.L. Van Breda, Eugene Fink, J.N. Findlay, H. Spiegelberg and Merleau-Ponty are unanimous on the dubious philosophical value of these devices. (Rafy, 2010)

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## 1.8 UNDERSTANDING ‘CONSCIOUSNESS’

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Husserl’s view on the self is understood from the issues concerning the unity of consciousness. Hume says, “There are some philosophers, who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our SELF; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence.... For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, or heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.” (Hume 1978, 251-2). Reflection does not reveal a continuously existing self. It is a constantly changing stream of mental states. There is no impression of self. The idea or concept of self that we have of ourselves is problematic. For Hume, there are two problems of conscious unity: firstly, synchronic unity of consciousness and the distinction between subjects of experience; secondly, diachronic unity.

Kantian understanding agrees at one level with Hume on the question of self-awareness but goes in disagreement concerning the legitimacy of the concept of the self. The diverse experiences are unified by the self, as Kant says, “The thought that these representations given in intuition all together belong *to me* means, accordingly, the same as that I unite them in a self-consciousness, or at least can unite them therein... for otherwise I would have as multicoloured, diverse a self as I have representations of which I am conscious.” (Kant 1929, sec. B143). Kant brings in the notion of the self as unifier of experience. For him, it is legitimate to appeal to an ‘I’ that unifies experience since such a thing is precisely a condition of the possibility of experience. Without such a unifying self, experience would not be possible. The *I*, for Kant is *transcendental*. It is brought into the account as a condition of the possibility of experience.

Husserl claims that the self is experienced indirect intuition. He writes, “I exist for myself and am constantly given to myself, by experiential evidence, as ‘*I myself*.’ This is true of the transcendental ego and, correspondingly, of the psychologically pure ego; it is true, moreover, with respect to any sense of the word ego.” (Husserl 1960, sec. 33). For Kant the ‘I’ has a role in structuring experience but not given itself in experience. For Husserl the ‘I’ plays this structuring role and is also given in inner experience. The ego appears but not as (part of) a mental process. It’s presence is continual and unchanging. Husserl says that it is, “a *transcendancy within immanency*” (Husserl 1982, sec. 57). It is immanent in that it is on the subject side of experience; It is transcendent in that it is not an experience (or part of one).

Sartre understands that consciousness is empty and denies not only of sensory qualities but also our experiential awareness of an ego within consciousness. Sartre denies that the ego is given in pre-reflective experience, either in the content of experience (as an object) or as a structural feature of the experience itself (as a subject). As he puts it, “while I was reading, there was consciousness of the book, of the heroes of the novel, but the ‘I’ was not inhabiting this consciousness. It was only consciousness of the object and non-positional consciousness of itself.” (Sartre 1960, 46-7). Again, “When I run after a streetcar, when I look at the time, when I am absorbed in contemplating a portrait, there is no *I*.” (Sartre 1960, 48-9). For him, the self can appear to consciousness, but it is paradoxically experienced as something outside of, transcendent to, consciousness. With respect to unreflective consciousness, however, Sartre denies self-awareness. Sartre also denies that the ego is required to synthesise, or unite, one’s various experiences. Rather, as he sees it, the unity of consciousness is achieved via the objects of experience, and via the temporal structure of experience.

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## 1.9 PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD IN INDIAN TRADITION

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All classical Indian schools speak of consciousness, its intrinsic nature, its place in the causal processes, its relations to objects in the world, and the possibilities. Accordingly, their epistemological conceptions are shaped by their positions on consciousness. Key issues are whether it has forms of its own or assume content with reference to objects, its relation to objects in the world. Madhyamikas have anti-theoretical notion on it. Nyaya and Mimamsa take world-oriented theories, while Advaita vedanta speak of self as consciousness in a spiritual and mystical sense. Advaita is emphatic about the world-transcendent nature of consciousness. The only content of it is self-aware consciousness itself. The worldly content is viewed as an illusion and a deformation, a falling away from being conscious in itself. The relation is explained this way: With regard to the world, uninvolved witnessing is upheld as the state the least estranged from what consciousness is in itself. Samkhya and Yoga prefer a dualistic view of consciousness with regard to the nature of it. The world is contrary to the true nature of consciousness. They are separate realities. It is problematic how they are related at all. Nature ranges without break from luminous and malleable mentality to gross material elements. In this the mind is viewed as capable of presenting to the witnessing person of things that are continuous with the things represented. (Phillips 1998).

Yogacara deployed arguments similar to epistemological idealists. Theirs were also compared to Kant as held by Western scholars. Some even think that these Buddhist thinking is very closer to Husserl's phenomenology. There are lots of similarities between what is known as Husserl's description of *noesis* and *noema*, and Buddhist analysis of the *grahaka* and *grahya*. Husserl's *noesis* is the consciousness projecting its cognitive field. Yogacara's *grahaka* is similar to *noesis* as a cognitive grasper. *Noema* of western phenomenological tradition, which is understood as the constructed cognitive object, is similar to the cognitive grasped, *grahya* of the Buddhist tradition.

Husserl did play down the notions of causality. Yogacara developed complex systematic causal theories. These theories were considered as of great importance to Yogacara. In Western tradition the ontological realm was afforded at least sufficient to acknowledge its existence in their philosophical enquiry method. Whereas for Yogacara was critical of that particular motive in all its manifestations. Yogacara is a type of epistemological idealism. The purpose of its arguments was not to produce an ontological theory of reality. They insisted on shifting one's attention to the epistemological and psychological conditions of human cognitive activities that compel us to construct and attach to ontological theories. From being epistemological idealists they could extend their investigations to be critical realists.

Yogacara has the doctrine of types of consciousness (*manovijnana*)- visual, auditory, etc. Each consciousness is produced by the contact between its specific sense organ and a corresponding object. Consciousness depends on sensation. Enlightenment consists in bringing consciousness to an end, replacing with enlightened cognitive abilities (*jnana*). When consciousness ends, true knowledge begins. (Lusthaus, 1998)

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## 1.10 PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD IN RELIGION

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What is called the phenomenology of religion is a descriptive approach to the philosophy of religion. Meaning and understanding of what is religion is a primary issue in it. From the existing divergent beliefs and practices among various religions, the quest for the essence of religion is sought here. With an existential orientation, the concern is more towards our own mode of being in the world than about the question of ultimate being. So the issue is what it means to be religious with the faith and beliefs one has. From phenomenological perspective, philosophy of religion is merely a normative enterprise reflecting on the truth of religious beliefs with proofs and arguments for and against. Phenomenology of religion brackets such concerns and holds that religion is an observable phenomenon of human life. To understand better what is religion is to give descriptive analyses of that aspect of human experience and to give us deeper insight into the structures and functions of these widespread human activities. Phenomenologist approaches religion as a matter of belief and focuses attention of the essence or the common nature of religions.

For Kant, we can set forth the basic structures of our experience of the world although there can be metaphysical disputes about what the world really is. So, the subject matter is phenomenal rather than noumenal. In Husserlean method transcends the natural attitude by moving from fact to essence and by bracketing questions about the reality of the world as distinct from the mode of its givenness



in experience (the *epoche*). Kierkegaard says that reflection always emerge from within the concrete situatedness of human existence. It clarifies the possibilities that confront us. Phenomenological method in religion presupposes that theoretical reason cannot settle metaphysical disputes in all its modes and criticizes traditional method of philosophy of religion as engaging in unwarranted speculation on things that are undecidables. Even the debates in theology become theoretician's luxury in a realm of abstraction that is least bothered about the living God and the concrete concerns and inescapable choices of existing individuals.

From the objective question of what is religion? God? and so on, the phenomenological concern is towards What would it mean to be religious distinct from being irreligious? Phenomenological method here is looking more for meanings than facts; meanings as living; looking for what happens rather than what happened. As Phenomenology addresses itself to modes of our experience the focus is not just the subjective side of religion but on the 'object' of religious experience. In this sense, the concept of God or gods, for instance, not appropriate for religious 'objects' as the Buddha nature. This 'Buddhahood' is the being of all things and yet *anatta*, non-substance or no-self. Again, the highest experience of God or Brahman or Allah etc., is beyond the structure of subject-object experience. Hence the terms like 'sacred' 'holy' 'divine' 'power' 'other' become generic names for the 'object' of religion. Van der Leeuw stresses its remoteness. However frequently one encounters it, it never becomes usual or familiar, but remains a 'highly exceptional and extremely dangerous "Other"' ([1933] 1963 (1): 24). Accordingly, encounters with the sacred are accompanied by amazement, fear, and especially awe. Rudolf Otto's earlier study, *The Idea of the Holy* (1917), defines the holy as the *mysterium tremendum et fascinans* (overwhelming and fascinating mystery). The holy as mysterious is the 'object' of religion which is non-rational or ineffable in the sense of exceeding our conceptual apprehension. Calling it as *mysterium tremendum* evokes fear and dread and designates the sacred as wholly other. Yet as *fascinans*, it is uniquely attractive and fascinating. (Westphal, 1998)

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## 1.11 LET US SUM UP

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Phenomenology is not a unified doctrine as its main proponents - Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty - interpret it differently. Phenomenology is a method of philosophical investigation which results in a radical ontological revision of Cartesian Dualism. In phenomenology consciousness is intentional and directed onto objects. Phenomenologists interpret the intentionality to mean that subjects and objects are essentially interrelated. All consciousness is essentially consciousness of objects and all objects are essentially, if not explicitly, objects of consciousness.

As a method in arriving at knowledge, especially in dealing with research methodology in philosophy, phenomenology has a lot to contribute. Phenomenological method has a purpose of being descriptive and presuppositionless. It is descriptive of one's experience of the world by putting aside assumptions about the world's existence and character. And secondly, one seeks to describe particular, concrete phenomena. Phenomena are not contents of the mind; they all involve an experiencing subject and an experienced object. Phenomenological description aims to make explicit essential features implicit in the 'lived-world' - the world as we act in it prior to any theorizing about

it. The phenomenological method reveals that practical knowledge is prior to propositional knowledge - knowing that arises from knowing how.

As being presuppositionless it scrutinizes scientific and philosophical theories. The phenomenological reduction is as called by Husserl ‘bracketing’ or ‘the *epoché*’. It is to bring to our attention the realm of phenomena, the ‘lived-world’, the world as we experience it. Basic aim of phenomenological method is to explore how the world appears with a view to finding the experiential basis for, and meaning of, our belief that the world exists independently of our experience of it. Phenomena are our experiences of the world. One needs to remain neutral concerning the ontological status of that ‘world’. Phenomenological description can avoid theoretical assumption of reality. While theoretical entities may have a place in the natural sciences, they have no legitimate place in philosophical enquiry. Philosophy should not take scientific realism for granted.

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## 1.12 KEY WORDS

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<b>Phenomenology</b>	: It is a study of ‘appearances’ as they are experienced in one’s subjectivity.
<b>Bracketing (epoche)</b>	: For Husserl the study of mind begins by setting aside all that is not given in consciousness. It begins by stripping our perceptions down to their simplest forms, shedding all our layers of habit and assumption. Husserl calls this kind of perception “bracketing”.
<b>phenomenological reduction</b>	: According to Husserl it is the exclusion from consideration of everything. It is transcendent and anything else derived via scientific or logical inference.
<b>Cogito or cogitations</b>	: It comprises all the acts of consciousness, including doubting, understanding, affirming, denying, etc
<b>Cogitata</b>	: They are the subjects of thought or objects of consideration. One cannot deny or understand nothing — something must be under consideration for thought to occur. In the presence of nothing, there is no person, no individual.
<b>Intentionality</b>	: It is the power and the vitality of consciousness. Physical objects have no intentionality. Only mental objects have intentionality.

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## 1.13 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

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