
UNIT 3 TRANSCENDENTAL NOTION OF BEING (BEING AND TRANSCENDENTALS)

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3.0 OBJECTIVES

In this Unit we will consider the following transcendentals:

- Oneness
- Truth
- Goodness
- Beauty

As we consider a being in its relation to its constitution, it is *one*. As we consider it in its relation to another, in relation to a knowing intellect, it is *true*. As we consider it in relation to an appetitive power (will), it is *good*. As we consider a being as a combination of truth and goodness, it is *beautiful*.

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The ‘transcendentals’ are often called attributes or ‘properties’ of Being. In the strict sense of the term, ‘property’ is some attribute which flows necessarily from an essence integrally constituted. As such, it is a positive entity adequately distinct from essence itself. Applying this to the notion of Being, it is evident that there can be no such properties of Being. For a property adequately distinct from Being must be non-being, which cannot be the attribute of anything. Hence, we can describe them as certain *inadequate and intrinsic supreme modes or attributes necessarily present in every being*. *Transcendental means the notion which applies to each and every being*. The transcendentals are not confined to any particular category or classification of Being as they ‘transcend’ or ‘go beyond’ all particular beings.

3.2 BEING AS ONE

One is that which is undivided in itself and divided from all others. Undivided in itself means that there is no need of comparing a thing with another in order to

speak of its oneness. A thing would be 'one' even if no other being were in existence or possible. For instance, God existed from eternity as the only one without the co-existence of any creature. Because a thing is undivided in itself it follows that it is *divided from all others*. Since a thing, according to the Principle of Identity, is what it is, it must primarily be undivided in itself. Then, since the thing, according to the Principle of Contradiction, cannot simultaneously be both itself and not itself, it must also be divided from every other. Hence a 'part' of a thing cannot truly be one as it is not actually divided from the other part. A part is united with the other part or parts to form the unity of the whole. The whole is one, not the part. One signifies interior indivision and distinction from other beings. The more easily divisible a being is, the less consistency it has in itself. The tendency to divisibility is an ontological weakness. It is a tendency to be no longer itself - to be alienated. In fact, every being tends to conserve its own *unity*, as it tends to conserve its own *being*.

Kinds of One: Perfectly One and Imperfectly One: *Perfectly One* is one of simplicity without any inner real distinction. A thing is 'simple' when it is not a 'compound'. A compound is a unit made up of a number of parts. In other words, a compound is one, and undivided in such a manner that it can be resolved into a number of components called its parts. Hence a compound is actually undivided (a unit) but divisible. On the other hand, what is 'simple' is neither divided nor divisible. Simplicity is defined as *the absence of composition in the reality of a being*. This definition is negative in form but positive in content. The reason for this negative form of the definition lies in the fact that what human perceives in this world is affected by composition in some way. Human arrives at the notion of simplicity by denying composition. Since it is some 'reality' which is devoid of composition, the definition is positive in content. The denial of composition in a being implies the affirmation of simplicity in that being. Since a simple being is undivided in itself and indivisible, there are two kinds of simplicity: *absolute and relative*. *Absolute simplicity* excludes all parts of whatever nature, be they real or conceptual. An absolutely simple being is not only actually undivided but also potentially indivisible, since it is devoid of all parts. A compound being is actually undivided (because it is a unit) but potentially divisible since it consists of parts, which make it to be a compound, and into which it can be divided. *Relative simplicity* excludes parts of one kind but has parts of another kind. The relatively simple being is indivisible in one respect but divisible in another. For instance, human has a composite nature consisting of body (matter) and soul (form). Human body is a compound made up of different parts (head, trunk, arms, legs, etc.); whereas human soul is simple because it does not consist of substantially different parts. Thus human possesses relative simplicity in the simple substance of one's spiritual soul; but in many other respects one is a composite being. In no case can human be absolutely simple. For, only God is absolutely simple. *Imperfectly One* is one of composition with a real distinction of the principles of a being, e.g., all corporeal beings. A being of this kind has parts within itself, but these parts are so united that they form a unit, a whole, and a totality. For instance, a human's body is composed of head, trunk, and extremities, and each of these consists of various minor parts. These parts are not separated from each other as they form an organism, and an organism is a whole or unit.

Convertibility of Being and One: Being and one are convertible. Being is one in so far as it is. Every being is one or a unit, and everything that is one or a unit

is a being. First, *every being is one or a unit*: Every being is either simple or compound in its nature. A being is simple when it does not consist of parts. It is compound when it consists of parts. Whatever is simple is actually and potentially undivided; for it has no parts into which it can be divided. Consequently, a simple being is undivided in itself and thus a unit or one. In the same way, a compound is a compound only insofar and only so long as its parts are united and not actually divided. Consequently, a compound being is undivided in itself and therefore a unit or one. Whether simple or compound, the being of every thing is characterized by indivision. In other words, every being is a unit or one. Secondly, *every unit or one is a being*: To be a unit or one means to have the unity of simplicity or the unity of composition. That presupposes that some thing has this unity of simplicity or unity of composition. Unity of simplicity necessarily implies the concept of a reality consisting of no parts. If the simple unit were not Being, it would be nothing, and nothing cannot be a unit of any kind whether simple or compound. Unity of composition necessarily involves the concept of a reality consisting of parts, and these parts must be real in the whole. Otherwise, they would be nothing, and ‘nothing’ cannot be distinguished into parts. From this it follows that Being and one are convertible as they are identical.

3.3 BEING AS TRUE

What is truth? This question is of central importance in the whole of philosophy, though different philosophers understood it differently. It was first explicitly considered in the didactic poem of Parmenides in which the goddess teaches the way of truth that is distinguished from mere opinion (*doxa*) which is fallible. Plato too contrasts opinion with truth. The myth of the cave describes the accessibility of the human mind to truth. Aristotle further reflected on truth and identified it as judgement. St. Augustine emphasized the necessary nature of truth which human reason discovers by the illumination from God who is the absolute, eternal, and changeless truth. For St. Thomas, truth is the “adequation of the intellect to the thing” (*adequatio intellectus et rei*). Descartes held God to be the guarantee of truth. Kant regarded truth as the “agreement with the laws of the intellect.” For Hegel it is the Absolute Idea. Heidegger understands it to be the discourse or revelation of Being, and for the *Logical positivists* it is nothing but verifiability. These concepts from the history of philosophy must have contributed to the development of the most known theories of truth such as the correspondence theory, coherence theory, performative theory, pragmatic theory, and semantic theory. Truth is correspondence insofar as it is a correspondence between the mind and the object. It is coherence insofar as the truth of a proposition is in some way dependent on another. It is performative insofar as it endorses or confirms a proposition. It is pragmatic insofar as it is useful, and it is semantic insofar as it signifies and relates the metalanguage to the object language which in turn is related to the concrete objects. Hence, *truth is correspondence between the mind and the object that implies mutual dependence on and confirmation of propositions which are useful and meaningful*. Besides being conformity or correspondence, truth also implies an original identity of Being and knowing. For Being is what is known truly. Knowing is true by its relation to Being. Hence truth is a relation of knowing to Being. What is this relation? This relation is a relation of *identity or conformity*. In *identity*, knowing is Being. When there is such an identity of Being and knowing, truth consists in the absence of the difference between knowing and the known Being. *Conformity* or

correspondence is the conformity or correspondence of the subject's affirmation and negation to what is and what is not. It is the same as the traditional definition of truth: '*truth is a conformity or correspondence between the mind and the object*'.

Kinds of Truth: *Logical Truth* is the conformity or correspondence of the intellect to the thing. Here the thing is prior, and the idea posterior. This relationship constitutes the true knowledge of a thing. It is clear that every being has its own peculiar entity and reality, independent of the intellect which thinks of it. Things are what they are even though no mind forms an idea of them. When a mind does form an idea of a thing in order to have some knowledge of it, this knowledge will either correspond ideally with the reality or will not. If it corresponds, it is true, otherwise it is false. The mind has knowledge of a thing when it forms ideas of its reality and unites them in a judgment which can be either affirmative or negative. It is opposed to falsity in judgement. *Moral Truth* is the due conformity or correspondence of expression and judgment (in speech, writing, etc.). When we make a judgment in our mind, regarding a certain fact, and then make a statement in speech which expresses this judgment in words, we have moral truth, because our speech agrees with our thought; but when our speech disagrees with our judgment, then there is moral falsity (falsehood, lie). Thus, when a person is called upon to 'say the truth', the person should state according to one's understanding of the matter what one judges to be the fact. One may be mistaken as to the real nature of this fact, but so long as one's verbal statement agrees with one's mental judgment, one says the truth, even though the statement does not agree with objective reality. On the other hand, if one's verbal statement is the opposite of one's judgment, one will be telling a lie, even though the falsehood happens to correspond to objective reality. Moral truth may be considered as a form of ontological truth viewed from the standpoint of an agreement between intellect and thing. The mind's knowledge is the standard in ontological truth with the conformity of the thing to it in order to be true. In moral truth too, the mind's knowledge is the standard to which the verbal statement must conform to be true. *Ontological Truth* is the conformity or conformability of things to the intellect. There is always conformity of things to some kind of intellect, at least to the divine intellect insofar as God knows whatever is. In this sense, everything is true and nothing is false. Everything is true insofar as it is. There are two kinds of ontological truth: exemplary ontological truth and identical ontological truth. *Exemplary ontological truth* is that in which the intellect possesses an idea of the being which is taken as the norm, the standard, or the pattern of a being. A being must agree with this idea. Insofar as the object agrees with the type-idea which the intellect has of this object, it is ontologically true. Ontological truth, thus, resides in *objects* as they must conform to the intellect and its idea of the object. For example: An artist desires to paint a picture of the Madonna. He has not seen her, but he has within his imagination an image or type which he intends to reproduce on the canvas. He paints the image. If the picture agrees with the image previously present in his mind, it would be ontologically true; because it is in conformity with the image as conceived before the painting was made. *Identical ontological truth* is the original identity of Being and knowing, of Being and truth. Being is the fundamental unity since both the object and the subject are Being. Hence, Being is an identification of Being and knowing, i.e., Being is self-knowledge, and knowledge is the self-presence of Being. Consequently, Being and truth are also convertible. Truth, as

an attribute of Being, is not nothing, but something. Something is Being and Being is something. Hence, Being is truth and truth is Being.

Ultimate Criterion of Truth: A criterion of truth is the rule or test by which we distinguish true judgments from the false ones. The final criterion, beyond which there is no appeal, is the ultimate criterion which is the internal, immediate, and objective evidence, or self-evidence. Objective evidence is that characteristic of reality whereby something becomes objectively manifest to the perceiving faculty. Objective evidence makes reality cognitively clear and intelligibly apparent to the intellect, like the luminosity of a shining body to one's eyes. It is the clear self-revelation of reality to the intellect, which is capable of forming a correct judgment by interpreting the reality as it exists in its objective being. Objective evidence is internal when the ground for our judgment is clearly perceived to lie in the reality affirmed by the judgments. Such, for example, would be the judgments, 'It is raining this afternoon', ' $2+2=4$ ', 'a circle is round', etc. Internal objective evidence is immediate when the reality interpreted (judgment) is directly present to the intellect or to the senses. In other words, the ultimate criterion of truth is the self-evidence (internal, immediate, objective evidence) of reality as it manifests itself to the intellect and is recognized by the intellect as such.

Ultimate Foundation of Truth: The ultimate foundation of truth, logical and ontological, consists in the essential conformity of all beings to the Divine Mind. For, logical truth depends on the positive elements of being present in a thing, as it is the conformity of the intellect to the thing. Its foundation is the being of the thing known. Ontological truth, since it is the conformity of the thing to the intellect, has its ultimate foundation in that intellect which is the ultimate foundation of the intrinsic reality of things. Such an intellect is the divine intellect, according to whose type-ideas all things have been created. Hence, the ultimate foundation of all truth is the divine mind.

Problem of Falsity: Falsity is the disconformity between thing and intellect. As there are three kinds of truth, so are there also three kinds of falsity: moral, logical, and ontological. Moral falsity is the disconformity of speech with thought or judgment. Logical falsity or error is the disconformity of the intellect to the thing. It is evident in all the mistakes, confused opinions, frequent corrections, changing views, and conflicting systems of thought. In the same way, is there also ontological falsity? There is no absolute ontological falsity. Since every being is ontologically true, there cannot be absolute ontological falsity. In order to be ontologically false in an absolute sense, it would be necessary that a being disagrees with every possible intellect. If it agreed with a single intellect, it would no longer be ontologically false, but ontologically true. Now, every being must always agree with the intellect of God who created it according to the type-idea in His intellect. Hence every being is ontologically true with regard to the ideas of God. However, there is a relative ontological falsity in relation to the human mind. For, we do not always succeed in making the products of our skill and art agree with the plan or type we have in our mind. Hence we can say that there is no ontological falsity in an absolute sense, but only in a relative sense with reference to human, in a limited manner.

3.4 BEING AS GOOD

As Being is one and true, it is also good. Good is the object of desire. Hence Aristotle gives this definition: “Good is what all desire”. When the good is attained, it is experienced as pleasant, enjoyable, and satisfying. But man experiences aversion no less than desire and pain no less than pleasure. Hence, good is always also coupled with its opposite evil. A being is good inasmuch as it is appetible or desirable. Goodness, then, consists in the appetibility or desirability of a being. Desirability presupposes something in a being which is good and on account of which it is actually desired or desirable. What a being desires or seeks as good in another, depends also on the sort of the individual the being is. For example, a magnet seeks iron, a plant seeks sunlight, a lion seeks food, a man seeks knowledge, etc. Hence, good consists in this, that something is suitable to a being. Now, all beings have a nature or essence as members of a class and as individuals. And each such nature has a very real and definite *purpose or end within itself* which it tends to bring to full completion and perfection. A being is perfect when it has everything that it is supposed to have according to the exigencies of its nature, i.e., when it has attained its full actualization, having as much reality as its nature demands. For example, man has the natural purpose of actualizing himself as a fully developed human person. In this way, each nature implies a specific natural tendency within itself, and all beings will be ‘good’ for it insofar as they suit its nature. Hence, we can define good as the suitability of a being for that which has or seeks it.

Kinds of Goodness: *Physical Goodness* is that which satisfies the demand of the nature of a being. Each being has its own specific and individual nature, and as such it has a very definite end and purpose. For example, a human person is supposed to have a head, a trunk, two arms, two legs, two eyes, two ears, etc. They are required if a person is to be considered physically good. *Moral Goodness* is that which satisfies the demands of the *moral law*. An action may be ontologically and physically very good but morally evil. For instance, a soldier defends one’s country in a just war. In an attack by the enemy, the one kills an enemy soldier with one’s rifle. On another occasion an enemy soldier comes toward the one carrying a flag of truce. The soldier kills the enemy soldier too with the rifle. In both cases human beings are killed. The action is ontologically good insofar as it is something. The action is also physically good insofar as it is physically successful. But the morality of the action is different in each action. In the first it is morally good as it is a justifiable homicide in defence of one’s country. In the second it is morally bad as it is murder ; for the moral law requires respect for the enemy with a flag of truce. *Ontological Goodness* is that which is good in its very being itself. Every being insofar as it is, is good. Every being is good insofar as it possesses a certain amount of reality. For its reality is suitable for the tendency of its own nature to be what it is, to perfect itself, and to retain its perfection. As beings are good in themselves by possessing their own being, they are capable of being desired and striven for, so as to perfect the nature of some other being. Ontological goodness is also called ‘transcendental’ or ‘metaphysical’ goodness, as it is also convertible with Being. The opposite of good is evil.

Problem of Evil: The problem of evil has always baffled the thinkers of every age, and it continues to be one of the most puzzling ones. Once, David Hume

raised the old Epicurean question: “Why is there any misery at all in the world? Not by chance, surely. From some cause then. Is it from the intention of the Deity? But he is perfectly benevolent. Is it contrary to his intention? But he is almighty”. “Why thus eternal punishment for the temporary offences of so frail a creature as man? Can any one approve of Alexander’s rage, who intended to exterminate a whole nation, because they had seized his favourite horse, Bucephalus?” God is absolute good. Hence it is impossible for him to be the author of evil. He cannot will evil, and no shadow of evil falls on him. ‘How can anything be or happen which is opposed to God and his goodness’? Or ‘how can a just, omnipotent and an infinitely good God create evil or permit evil’?

Some thinkers have abandoned the omnipotence of God in favour his goodness (J.S.Mill, William James, J.M.E.McTaggart and E.S.Brightman); others take as mere appearance (F.H.Bradley, B. Bosanquet, Absolutists, and Advaitins in India); for some others, evil is partially good insofar as it is instrumental to some higher good (G.W.Leibniz, R.A.Tsanoff); some others hold that natural and moral evils are inevitable in a morally directed world (F.R.Tennant and Mark Pontifex).

Kinds of Evil: There are two main kinds of evil: physical and moral. *Physical evil* is the privation of a perfection pertaining to the physical order. It is the privation of a physical good. Physical evil is an established fact in the world. Many beings lack some reality which they ought to have. Sickness and injuries deprive living beings of that physical integrity which they require. Beings are physically evil only insofar as some entity is missing in them. Whatever entity they possess is in itself good. For instance, a cancerous lung is a physical evil only because that portion of the body is infected, but the remaining parts are good. The rest of the body is not a physical evil. This privation is not an entity in itself, but something relative to an individual’s needs. *Moral evil* is the privation of a perfection pertaining to moral order. It is also evident that moral evil is present among humans. Sin is an undeniable fact. Crime is an everyday occurrence. However, it would be false to consider moral evil as a positively existing entity. In fact, the sinful action as an action is ontologically good, insofar as it is something. The action is also physically good if the action is performed in a manner conducive to the natural purpose of the act. But it is morally evil since this ontologically and physically good act is not in accordance with the requirements of the moral law. There is no morally evil entity here, but rather the defect or privation of an entity, namely, the defect of the proper relation between the act and demands of the law. Moral evil, therefore, does not consist in a positive entity or reality but in a privation that is relative.

Nature of Evil: *Evil is Relative:* Evil is the privation of perfection (good) which is due to a subject. Privation is to be distinguished from negation which is mere absence of perfection, which is not due to a subject. Negation indirectly asserts the existence of something positive. For example, when we say that this tree is not green, we indirectly imply that it has some colour other than green. It might be brown or yellow by virtue of which the term ‘green’ cannot be applied to it. In contrast, privation means the present absence of the quality of a thing, e.g., this man is blind. Of course, this man at the present time cannot see, but in future the man can be endowed with vision. In other words, privation of a perfection can be replaced by a positive quality. Now, if evil is the privation of perfection or good, then it means that in due course it will be replaced by the good. Hence evil is not absolute but relative.

Evil is Mystery: Gabriel Marcel makes a distinction between problem and mystery. A problem is a difficulty set before us quite detached from us and to which we respond with an increase in knowledge or technical skill. A problem may be solved. A mystery, in contrast, is that in which we participate and with which we are vitally involved. We cannot separate ourselves from a mystery as we can a problem, and no amount of increased knowledge or skill will dispel it. Mysteries are intrinsic to human existence and include life itself. In this way, evil is a mystery impenetrable by rational analysis. Even if we could arrive at a perfect theodicy, which accounts for the presence of evil in the world, we would still have to face evil. A perfect theodicy would not make the experience of evil less intense.

To sum up: We can explain in some detail *the fact* of evil. However, *the final cause* of evil is incomprehensible (Why is there evil?). A solution to the problem can be sought in those paradigms of the great personalities like Buddha and Jesus Christ who *accepted* evil and suffering in their own lives. Their acceptance had two consequences: they had to suffer evil, even unto death; death on a cross (in the case of Jesus). Secondly, it was their mission to save others from the same evil and suffering. It can be my own motto too: *accept evil and suffering in my life, but I will commit myself to liberate others from it.*

3.5 BEING AS BEAUTIFUL

According to Aquinas, “Beauty is that which pleases the mind when seen or apprehended.” *It is the splendour of order by which a being can delight a cognitive faculty.* It is a transcendental which is the result of the unity of the true and the good. Its essence consists in a combination of truth and goodness. The beautiful is the good insofar as it satisfies our striving. It is the true insofar as it satisfies our desire for knowledge. The beautiful is the true insofar as it coincides with the good. It is the good insofar as it coincides with the true. Hence, beauty is the unity of truth and goodness. Now both truth and beauty express a relationship of conformity with the intellect. In the same way, both goodness and beauty also express suitability for the appetite. Yet, beauty is distinct from both truth and goodness. As regards truth, beauty adds an element of pleasure to the conformity; whereas truth as such does not imply that pleasure is derived from it. For, sometimes truth can be very unpleasant. Regarding goodness, beauty expresses suitability for the appetite of the intellect, which comes to rest in its possession by contemplation; whereas goodness expresses suitability for appetite in general.

Characteristics of Beauty: *Beauty pleases:* Whatever is beautiful whether it be a poem, a painting, a melody, a piece of sculpture, or an architectural structure pleases, gratifies, and gives enjoyment. *Beauty gives disinterested pleasure:* The pleasure derived from beauty is called ‘aesthetic pleasure’. One experiences aesthetic pleasure when one derives pleasure from beholding it. If one owns a painting and takes pleasure in it because one knows one can sell it at an advantage, one does not have aesthetic pleasure. But if one is satisfied to contemplate and thus enjoy it, then one is enthralled with its beauty. There is beauty in the seas, in the stars, in the sunrise, in the waterfalls, and in the mountains. But there is no selfish enjoyment in these things. Things may taste and smell and feel good; but such pleasure is not the delight encountered in the enjoyment of the beautiful. Hence the primary object of beauty is not the pleasure derived from profit,

consumption, possession, or even use, but the pleasure aroused through the contemplation of the beautiful. The eye, the ear, and the imagination are the faculties properly engaged in the production of aesthetic delight. They are mainly perceptive in character. *Beauty gives disinterested intellectual pleasure:* The Intellect is necessary for the enjoyment of beauty. Human is the only animal that appreciates beauty. Brutes do not contemplate and enjoy the beauty of the flowers, the hills, the woods, the sunsets, etc. They are concerned with beautiful objects only insofar as they are of assistance to them in their struggle for existence. For, order, proportion, unity, appropriateness, and the agreement between the ideal and the real are the fundamental elements of beauty judged only by a rational being. Hence beauty must have an intelligible content.

Beauty gives a disinterested intellectual- sensuous pleasure: The intellect perceives beauty through the mediation of the senses. The intelligible must be perceived in a sensibly pleasing appearance in order to be beautiful. Hence the artists pleasantly impress the senses with images and plastic forms. Ideas alone, without the beauty of form, are found in science, mathematics, and philosophy. But no one considers them as the proper medium of beauty. We go to the artist for beauty and enjoyment. The ideas are to be clothed in a sensibly pleasing form before we can consider them to be beautiful. The scientist, the mathematician, and the philosopher can enlighten others with their insights and ideas, but they may not give them aesthetic delight. The artist may express the same ideas less exactly but clothing them in impressive forms or figures. The way of art is twofold: the idea may be first and then the form, or the form may be first and then the idea: true idealism and sound realism, the idealized real and the realized ideal. Beauty is the happy combination and fusion of idea and form, corresponding to the composite nature of human. Consequently there must be equilibrium between the intellectual and sensible elements. An overcharge of idea or a lack of form would mean a lack of beauty, abstractness, or too much intellectuality. In the same way, an overcharge of form or lack of idea would mean shallowness or extravagance. *Beauty gives a disinterested intellectual-sensuous pleasure due to the radiant perfection of a thing:* Beauty is not merely subjective in character as it has its foundation in the things themselves. We experience the delight of beauty in consequence of some objective factors present in the objects. It is the perfection of a thing manifested in a pleasing, happy manner. It is resplendent, radiant perfection. For just as light, splendour, radiance, and colour produce a pleasing impression on the eye, so also does beauty. Beauty pleases, as perfection and goodness are its fundamental properties.

Objective Factors of Beauty: Some of these factors are more general and others are particular. The general factors can be identified with the transcendental properties of Being such as unity, truth, and goodness. *Unity:* Beauty and unity are closely united. Unity is a perfection which aids the intellect in grasping the underlying meaning of things. *Truth:* There is also an intimate relation between beauty and truth. For beauty is also apprehended and understood like truth in everything beautiful. *Goodness:* There is also a close relation between beauty and goodness. Beauty satisfies, pleases, and delights. These characteristics of beauty have a natural reference to an appetency, and thus a delectable good. The element of goodness, in this way, is present in the beautiful.

Besides these general factors, there are also the following particular factors of beauty: integrity, proportion, and clarity. *Integrity:* The first one is integrity or

completeness. We enjoy beauty by contemplating on something as a whole. Any noticeable defect in a thing makes an unpleasant impression on the beholder. The mind is dissatisfied with this incomplete condition and makes an effort to restore the missing part in its imagination. We observe this when contemplating a dilapidated building, a damaged painting, a crippled body, an awkward dance, a melody out of tune, the badly memorized lines of a drama, etc.

Proportion: Proportion or balance is the index of a mind which works in an orderly fashion. The mind experiences aesthetic pleasure in detecting an orderly arrangement in what at first appears to be chaotic confusion. A mere jumble does not please. A heap of stones is not an aesthetic object. But if they are arranged in the orderly construction of a building, provided there be symmetry and balance in the arrangement, they form an object of beauty. In the same way, *unity without variety is not beautiful*; for in that case the energy of the perceptive faculty will be exercised in an unbroken, unrelieved strain. That would produce tension and fatigue, and not pleasure. *Variety without unity is also not beautiful*. For, then the mind's energy would be scattered and spent without being able to come to rest. That would disturb and hinder the normal, healthy, full, and vigorous activity of the faculties. Unity in variety, or one in many, acts like a focus bringing harmony into the manifold elements and making of them a simplified whole. This one in many facilitates the mind's activity, gives it a feeling of restful completeness, and thus produces in it the joy and delight so characteristic of beauty.

Clarity: Clarity or splendour is the third requirement. To be beautiful means to have a certain amount of compelling force. It must be impressive. It must possess a vivid presentation. It must attract and charm through its very appearance. That is why all the arts use contrast as an effective technique to set the splendour of beauty in a sharper light. The elements of aesthetic value then fairly leap into the central position of attention and thereby give the mind the proper perspective which enables it to survey the parts and the whole in a comprehensive glance. The opposite of beauty is ugliness.

Problem of Ugliness: Every being is beautiful insofar as it is. It means that every being has a form which is appropriate to it. Now anything with an appropriate form pleases when seen. Hence every being is beautiful. Now the problem is: What about all those things which we judge to be ugly? The answer is that, although everything is beautiful according to its own form, the human intellect is not always capable of perceiving this beauty. This incapacity may be accounted for certain subjective and objective reasons. *The subjective* reasons, such as the fashion of time or place, may pre-establish more or less arbitrary norms of beauty and refuse to consider objects from the objects' own worth. Everything that does not conform to our pre-conceived ideas of beauty is judged to be ugly. *Objective reasons* mainly flow from the nature of human knowledge. Appreciation of beauty requires contemplation of an object. If anything prevents an objective contemplation, human cannot see the beauty of the objects of perception. The following are some of the reasons that may prevent our intellect from an authentic contemplation of the objects: a) If an object has a certain defect, human's attention is more or less irresistibly drawn towards this defect. As a result, the intellect cannot come to rest in the contemplation of the perfections that remain in the object. The more striking the defect is, the more irresistibly the intellect is drawn to it. For instance, if a beautiful face suffers the loss of its nose, the face is considered to be ugly because we are prevented from paying

attention to the beauty which remains in the undamaged part of the face; b) Some beings remind us so much of others that we can consider them only as caricatures of the latter. For instance, the face of a monkey is generally thought to be ugly, because it resembles human so much that upon seeing the face of a monkey we unconsciously compare its face to that of human and conclude that the monkey is ugly; c) Human is so accustomed to many objects that their beauty no longer strikes the one. Hence such objects generally do not succeed in holding one's attention long enough to allow contemplation of their beauty. Yet when these objects are presented to human in a suitable setting so as to show forth their form in splendour, as is often done in advertisements, their beauty is sufficient to arrest human's attention.

Check Your Progress

Note: Use the space provided for your Answers.

1) What is truth? What are the main kinds of truth?

2) What is goodness? Do you agree with the statement that ontologically 'everything is good'?

3.6 LET US SUM UP

Transcendental means the notion which applies to each and every being. The transcendentals are not confined to any particular category of Being as they 'transcend' or 'go beyond' all particular beings. Thus, the 'transcendentals' are the invariant qualities of Being. In relation to Being, the concept 'transcendental' could be interpreted in a twofold manner ? Being as a transcendental and Being as possessing transcendentals. Being is a transcendental insofar as Being underlies, penetrates, transforms, and unifies all things, as the most underlying principle of all things. Being also possesses the transcendentals such as oneness, truth, goodness, and beauty. Where there is Being, these transcendentals are also invariably present. Being is all-pervading; hence, the transcendentals are also all-pervading. In this sense, every being rooted in Being is also one, true, good, and beautiful.

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