UNIT 4   PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

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4.0   OBJECTIVES

The objective of this Unit is to introduce the Linguistic Turn in Contemporary Philosophy (this title suits better than 'Philosophy of Language') through its leading figures, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein. By the end of this Unit you should be able:

- To have a basic knowledge of and the relation between logical, linguistic and analytical turns in twentieth century western philosophy;

- To be familiar with the life and works of Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein;

- To have a critical view of Wittgenstein's earlier philosophy as in the *Tractatus*;

- To understand the key concepts as given in the *Philosophical Investigations*;

- To have a critical understanding of Wittgenstein's earlier and later thoughts

4.1   INTRODUCTION

Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, at least in the English speaking world, is characterised by linguistic and logical turns. Due to the enormous success of science and technology in the 20th century, it was felt that science had taken over much of the territory formerly occupied by philosophy. Since the task of acquiring knowledge about the world has been taken over by science, the only task that remained for philosophy was to clarify meaning. As Moritz Schlick, put it, "Science should be defined as the 'pursuit of truth' and Philosophy as the 'pursuit of meaning." Moreover, new and more powerful methods of logic had been developed in the twentieth century that promised to solve or dissolve some of the perennial philosophical problems, through logical analysis of language. In spite of the differences linguistic philosophers shared the following convictions: (1) philosophical problems are not problems about the world, but what we say about the world; they are logical and not empirical; (2) they are to be first be clarified and then solved or dissolved through a process of logical analysis of language; and (3) the rest of the problems are pseudo-problems and are not worth worrying about.

4.2 GOTTLOB FREGE

Life and Works

Gottlob Frege, (1848-1925) a German philosopher and mathematician, is the father of modern logic and one of the founding figures of analytic and linguistic philosophy. He taught at the University of Jena, in Germany. Frege's goal was to show that most of mathematics could be reduced to logic, in the sense that the full content of all mathematical truths could be expressed using only logical notions and that the truths so expressed could be deduced from logical first principles using only logical means of inference. He tried to articulate an experience and intuition independent conception of reason. He held that what justifies mathematical statements is reason alone; their justification proceeds without the benefit or need of either perceptual experience or intuition.

His important works are:

1. *Begriffsschrift* (Conceptual Notation) (1879) presents his logic;

2. *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik* (The Foundations of Arithmetic) (1884), outlines the strategy he is going to employ in reducing arithmetic to logic and then goes on to provide the reduction with a philosophical rationale and justification;

3. *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik* (Basic Laws of Arithmetic) (volumes 1, 1893, and 2, 1903), seeks to carry out the programme in detail.

Essays: *Funktion und Begriff* ('Function and Concept') 1891, '*Über Sinn und Bedeutung'* ('On Sense and Reference') 1892, '*Über Begriff und Gegenstand'* ('On Concept and Object') 1892 and '*Der Gedanke: eine logische Untersuchung'* ('Thoughts: A Logical Investigation') 1918.

Language and Logic

To ground his views about the relationship of logic and mathematics, Frege conceived a comprehensive philosophy of language. He translated central philosophical problems into problems about language: for example, faced with the epistemological question of how we are able to have knowledge of objects which we can neither observe nor intuit, such as numbers, Frege replaces it with the question of how we are able to talk about those objects using language and philosophy becomes linguistic. Instead of asking questions such as "What is number or time?" we should better ask "How the word number or time is used?" Arguing for the Primacy of Sentences, he held that meaning of a word can be found only in the context of a proposition. According to him, it is the operation of sentences that is primary: the explanation of the functioning of all parts of speech is to be in terms of their contribution to the meanings of the whole sentence. In philosophical analysis of language, the logical is to be separated from the psychological. We should not confuse explanations with psychological accounts of the mental states of speakers, unshareable aspects of individual experience.

Sense and Reference

In his essay 'On Sense and Reference' (1892), Frege considered whether the 'sense' of an expression - what it is that we know when we understand the

expression - is simply identical to what it designates (the 'reference'). In the case of a singular term its reference is the object denoted by the term, whereas its sense is determined by the way that object is presented through the expression. Frege was motivated to introduce the sense-reference distinction to solve certain puzzles: (1) the apparent impossibility of informative identity statements and (2) the apparent failure of substitution in contexts of propositional attitudes. As for (1), the statements 'the morning star is the evening star' and the 'morning star is the morning star' differ in cognitive value, which would be impossible if the object designated constituted the only meaning of a singular term. The sense-reference distinction allows one to attribute different cognitive values to these identity statements if the senses of the terms flanking the identity sign differ, while still allowing the objects denoted to be one and the same. Regarding (2), the sentences 'John believes that the morning star is a body illuminated the by the Sun' and 'John believes that the evening star is a body illuminated by the Sun' may have different truth values, although the one is obtained from the other by substitution of a co-referential terms.

4.3   BERTRAND RUSSELL

Life and Works

Bertrand Arthur William Russell (1872 - 1970) was a British philosopher, logician, essayist, and social critic, best known for his work in mathematical logic and analytic philosophy. Russell's various contributions were also unified by his views concerning both the centrality of scientific knowledge and the importance of an underlying scientific methodology that is common to both philosophy and science. In the case of philosophy, this methodology expressed itself through Russell's use of logical analysis. Russell often claimed that he had more confidence in his methodology than in any particular philosophical conclusion. He made significant contributions, not just to logic and philosophy, but to a broad range of other subjects including education, history, political theory and religious studies. In addition, many of his writings on a wide variety of topics in both the sciences and the humanities have influenced generations of general readers. After a life marked by controversy, including dismissals from both Trinity College, Cambridge and City College, New York, Russell was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1950. In addition to numerous articles, he wrote over ninety books, both technical and popular, on a wide range of topics. Also noted for his many spirited anti-war and anti-nuclear protests, Russell remained a prominent public figure until his death at the age of 97.

Russell's most important writings include "On Denoting"(1905), "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description"(1910), "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism"(1918, 1919), "Logical Atomism"(1924), *The Analysis of Mind* (1921), and *The Analysis of Matter* (1927). Two of his best selling works are *The Problems of Philosophy* (1912) and *A History of Western Philosophy* (1945).

Logical and Linguistic Turn

According to Russell, "every philosophical problem, when it is subjected to the necessary analysis and purification, is found either to be not really philosophical at all, or else to be, in the sense in which [I am] using the word, logical." ("Logic as the Essence of Philosophy," 1914). Russell's central assumption

through most of his life was that there was a necessary link between the nature of language and the truths of metaphysics. Since language is capable of describing the world and expressing true propositions about it, then there must be, he argued, some correspondence between the logical structure of language and the necessary structure of reality. Although the later analysts would be decidedly anti-metaphysical, Russell enthusiastically believed that the new, powerful tools of modern logic he had developed would let us put metaphysics on a sound foundation at last.

In his view, the philosopher's job is to discover a logically ideal language that will exhibit the true nature of the world in such a way that the speaker will not be misled by the surface structure of natural language. According to him, the primary function of language is to represent facts. It was Russell's belief that by using the new logic of his day, philosophers would be able to exhibit the underlying "logical form" of natural language statements. A statement's logical form, in turn, would help philosophers resolve problems of reference associated with the ambiguity and vagueness of natural language. A proposition will be true if it corresponds to a fact and false if it doesn't. What is needed is a logical language where this correspondence can be set out clearly. "In a logically perfect language the words in a proposition would correspond one by one with components of the corresponding fact, with the exception of such words as 'or', 'not', 'if, 'then', which have a different function.'' This correspondence is revealed by the parallel activities of analyzing complex propositions down to their simplest components (called "atomic propositions") and likewise analyzing facts down to their simplest components (which he called "atomic facts").

While the logical structure of language provides us with the logical form of the world, a metaphysics of this sort cannot tell us what particular things exist. This can only be accomplished by an appeal to experience. The more Russell tried to get clear on the sort of facts we can actually know, his position became increasingly difficult to hold.

Knowledge by Acquaintance and Description

According to Russell one can distinguish the two kinds of knowledge in terms of their respective objects. One has knowledge by acquaintance of things, and by description of propositions. Knowledge by acquaintance is neither true nor false and knowledge by description is either true or false. According to Russell, all knowledge of truths ultimately rests on knowledge by acquaintance. Although I can know one truth by inferring it from something else I know, not everything I know can be inferred in this way. We can avoid a regress of knowledge by holding that at least some truths are known as a result of acquaintance with those aspects of the world that make the corresponding propositions true. When one knows a particular shade of colour by acquaintance, for example, the colour is directly and immediately 'before' one's consciousness. There is nothing 'between' the colour and oneself. By contrast, one might know truths about Gandhiji but one's access to such truths is only through inference from other things one knows about the contents of history books and the like. There is a spatio-temporal gap between us and Gandhiji.

According to Russell, all knowledge by description ultimately depends upon knowledge by acquaintance. But if knowledge by acquaintance does not involve the possibility of error because it does not have as its object something that

can be true or false, how can it give us first truths? How can it give us premises (which by their very nature must be true or false) from which to infer other truths? Either knowledge by acquaintance does not involve the application of concepts and cannot therefore give premises for inference, or it does involve the application of concepts and cannot be distinguished from knowledge by description. There are no facts that are independent of conceptual frameworks, some philosophers argue. The world is not divided into things, their properties and relations. Indeed the only distinctions that exist are distinctions that we make out of the world with our concepts and categories. Referring to a fact is just another way of talking about a proposition's being true. To say that the world contains the fact, grass being green, is just another way of saying that it is true that grass is green. Only a structured reality could make propositions true and only acquaintance with such structure would be a plausible candidate for the source of foundational knowledge. Many contemporary philosophers argue that the very nature of justification precludes the possibility of having justification for believing empirical propositions that eliminates the possibility of error.

Check Your Progress I

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1) What is the significance of the relation between sense and reference, according to Frege?

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2) Do you agree with Russell's distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description?

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4.4 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN

Life and Works

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) played a significant role in the development of various contemporary philosophical traditions like Analytic Philosophy, Logical Positivism, and Ordinary Language Philosophy. He continues to influence the Hermeneutic and Postmodern trends in philosophy today. His works are immensely challenging, and he raises fundamental questions about the nature of philosophy and philosophizing.

The *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus* was the only book published during his lifetime. Throughout his life Wittgenstein wrote down his thoughts in notebooks, returning to the same topics repeatedly for conceptual clarity. He was never

fully content with any of the arrangements of the remarks and thoughts in his notebooks and left to his literary editors to publish from his manuscripts. The *Notebooks* are preliminary versions of ideas which was later crystallised in the *Tractatus*. *Philosophical Remarks* contains his thoughts in 1930 and *Philosophical Grammar* is a collection of his remarks from 1932-34. The *Blue and Brown Books* were prepared so as to help his students in 1932 and 1933. From 1936 onwards he worked on various versions of what we now know as the *Philosophical Investigations* (1953), which he hoped would provide a definitive presentation of his thought. *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* (1956) contain ideas he worked on from 1937 to 1944. From 1944 onwards he worked mainly on philosophical psychology: *Zettel*, *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology* I and II and *Last Writings on Philosophical Psychology* I and II are from these years. From 1950 to 1951 we also have *On Certainty* and *Remarks on Colour*. Another source for his views is records of his conversations and lectures taken by friends and pupils.

The Early Wittgenstein

Coming out of the *Notebooks*, written in 1914-16, and showing Schopenhauerian and other cultural influences, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* is a continuation of and reaction to Frege and Russell's conceptions of logic and language. *Tractatus* consists of a series of short, numbered statements and its structure purports to show its internal essence. It is constructed around seven basic propositions, numbered by the natural numbers 1-7, with the rest of the text numbered by decimal figures as numbers of separate propositions indicating the logical importance of the propositions. Wittgenstein was setting the limits of thought and language, in this work. The book can be summed up, in his words: 'What can be said at all can be said clearly; and whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent' (*T* Preface).

Picture Theory of Meaning

The *Tractatus* addresses the problems of philosophy dealing with the relation between the world, thought and language, and presents a logical solution. The world, thought, and proposition share the same logical form and hence the world is represented by thought, which is expressed in proposition. The world consists of facts and not of things (*T* 1.1). Facts are existent states of affairs (*T* 2), which are combinations of objects. Objects have various properties and combine with one another according to their internal properties. The states of affairs are complex by nature which can be analysed into constituent simple objects. The totality of the actual and possible states of affairs makes up the whole of reality and the world is totality of the actual states of affairs.

In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein presents a picture theory of thought and language. Pictures are models of reality (*T* 2.12) and are made up of elements that represent objects, and the combination of objects in the picture represents the combination of objects in the state of affairs. The logical structure of the picture, whether in thought or in language, is isomorphic with the logical structure of the state of affairs which it pictures. The possibility of this structure being shared by the picture (the thought, the proposition) and the state of affairs is the pictorial form. The function of language is to represent states of affairs in the world. 'A proposition is a picture of reality. A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it' (*T* 4.01). The logical relationships among the elements of a

proposition represent the logical relationships among the objects in the world. A proposition has a sense if it describes a possible state of affairs; otherwise, it is meaningless. Thus, the only meaningful language is the fact-stating language of the natural sciences. 'The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science' (*T* 4.11). Logic is based on the idea that every proposition is either true or false. This bi-polarity of propositions enables the composition of more complex propositions from atomic ones by using truth-functional operators (*T* 5). Wittgenstein supplies, in the *Tractatus*, the first presentation of Frege's logic in the form of what has become known as 'truth-tables'. This provides the means to analyze all propositions into their atomic parts. He also provides the general form of a proposition (*T* 6), showing that any proposition is the result of successive applications of logical operations to elementary propositions.

Wittgenstein's Silence

Wittgenstein's views on values are radically different from that of logical atomism and logical positivism. According to the *Tractatus*, there are only propositions of science within the boundary of meaningful language. For the positivists there is nothing to be silent about. Wittgenstein, however, believed that 'There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical' (*T* 6.522). The propositions of the *Tractatus* themselves are also to be included in the class of the inexpressible, as they are not propositions of science.

Ethical and spiritual values also are in the realm of the mystical. Wittgenstein says we will not find values among the facts of the world, for everything is what it is (*T* 6.41). Therefore, the sense of the world, what constitutes its value, must lie outside the world. It cannot be one more fact among the scientifically observable facts in the world. Consequently he held that 'ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental' (*T* 6.421). '*How* things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is higher. God does not reveal himself *in* the world' (*T* 6.432). Wittgenstein closes his discussion of the mystical and ends the *Tractatus* with his final, oracular statement: 'What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence' (*T* 7). The *Tractatus*, on this reading, is part of the ineffable, and should be recognized as such.

The Later Wittgenstein: *Philosophical Investigations*

The complex edifice of the *Tractatus* is built on the assumption that the task of logical analysis was to discover the elementary propositions, whose form was not yet known. What is 'hidden' in our ordinary language could be 'completely clarified' by a final 'analysis' into 'a single completely resolved form of every expression', which would bring to the goal of 'complete exactness'. Wittgenstein recognizes this as an illusion in the *Investigations*. Rejecting this dogmatism, he moves from the realm of logic to that of ordinary language as the centre of philosophical investigations; from an emphasis on definition and analysis to 'family resemblance' and 'language-games'; and from systematic philosophical writing to a collection of interrelated remarks. With the rejection of the assumption that all representations must share a common logical form, the conception of the unsayable disappeared; what remains are language-games of conversation and collaboration in the stream of life. 'What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use' (*PI* 116). The picture theory of meaning is replaced by a tool-use model of language.

The *Investigations* begins with a quote from Augustine's *Confessions* which gives 'a particular picture of the essence of human language,' based on the idea that 'individual words in language name objects,' and that 'sentences are combinations of such names' (*PI* 1). This picture of language is at the base of the mainstream philosophy, including the *Tractatus* and Wittgenstein in *PI* replaces this name-reference picture with a tool-use model: 'the meaning of a word is its use in the language' (*PI* 43). We learn the meaning of words by learning how to use them, just as we learn to play chess, not by associating the pieces with objects, but by learning how they can be moved.

A sign becomes a meaningful word not because it is associated with a reference, but because it has a function in the stream of life. One can elucidate the meaning of a word by describing how it is used in a variety of situations, showing the similarities and differences of the uses. Wittgenstein compares words to tools, each having distinctive functions: 'The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects' (*PI* 11). For example, 'pain' and 'pen' are both nouns and 'to speak' and 'to think' are both verbs; the difference between these words, however, are revealed by looking at their various uses as a hammer is distinguished by a chisel by the way it is used. One and the same word can have different meanings: To know the height of Mount Everest is different from knowing how a mango tastes. The former, but not the latter, can be expressed in a proposition (*PI* 78). This is simply because the word 'to know' functions in different ways. The meaning of a word is not fixed forever; there are variety of uses and similarities and differences in the meaning. Wittgenstein explains this dimension of language with the analogies of family resemblance and language-games.

Language-games

In order to address the variety of language uses, and their being 'part of an activity', Wittgenstein introduces an investigational tool, 'language-game'. Wittgenstein's choice of 'game' is based on the over-all analogy between language and game. As he was watching a game, he thought that in language we are using words in a variety of ways. Similar to the diversity of games, our multiple ways of language use do not conform to a single model. In contrast to the one-dimensional picture theory of name-object of the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein gives a list of language uses such as giving orders, and obeying them; describing the appearance of an object; speculating about an event; making a joke; translating from one language into another; asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying (*PI* 23). Just as we cannot give a definition of 'game', we cannot find 'what is common to all these activities and what makes them into language or parts of language' (*PI* 65).

A second reason why Wittgenstein compares the use of language to games is to emphasize that language use is an activity: "… the term 'language-game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life"(*PI* 23). Words and deeds are interwoven in the stream of life: 'the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, [is] the language-game' (*PI* 7). The problem with the name-object theory of language is not only that there are other uses of language besides referring to objects, but also that the act of referring to objects plays no role unless it is an activity within the context of a particular language-game (*PI* 49).

Wittgenstein used the notion of language-games also to illustrate that we run into philosophical confusions when we do not pay attention to the fact that the function of words vary from one language-game to another. The logical positivists treated scientific discourse as the only meaningful discourse and judged all other ways of speaking (aesthetic, religious and ethical discourses) to be meaningless. According to Wittgenstein, language-uses (like basketball and football) must be judged on their own terms, by their own standards. Not paying attention to the differences in the governing rules in different language-games is the cause of many traditional philosophical problems. Wittgenstein thinks the proper role of the philosopher is not to propose new theories but to remove 'misunderstandings concerning the use of words, caused, among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of language' (*PI* 90).

Rule-following

The analogy of language-game also points to the fact that both language and games are rule-governed activities. Like games, language has constitutive rules; they determine what is normative in a language/game. A rule is not an abstract entity, transcending all of its particular applications; knowing the rule is not grasping that abstract entity and thereby knowing how to use it. His investigations free one from the bewitchment of Platonic, Augustinian and Cartesian picture of language use. He wants to show that we need not posit any sort of external or internal authority beyond the actual applications of the rule. Wittgenstein's formulation of the problem was wrongly interpreted as a sceptical problem concerning meaning, understanding and using of a language.

According to Wittgenstein, ''Obeying a rule' is a practice' (*PI* 202) and involves objectivity, regularity and normativity. First of all, rule-following is something that an agent actually does, not merely something that seems so to the agent. It is only in the actual use of a rule, that is, in the actual practice, a rule is revealed, understood and followed. Secondly, rule-following is a repeatable procedure. It is repeatable over time and across persons. It can be taught and learned. Thirdly, there is normativity; i.e., regularity is subject to standards of correctness. The distinction between is and ought is kept; there is a correct way of following a rule. Rule-following actions are not just regularities of behaviour but regularities that have normative force, ways one ought to act. 'Following a rule is analogous to obeying an order. We are trained to do so; we react to an order in a particular way' (*PI* 206). As a practice there is no gap between a rule and an action following a rule; they are distinct but inseparable.

Private Language

The rule-following remarks are followed by the so called "the private-language argument", one of the most discussed among the Wittgensteinian themes. A private-language is something in which 'individual words … are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations' (*PI* 243). Wittgenstein has shown that if sensations are metaphysically (only I can have it) and epistemologically (only I know it) private, one cannot have a language about sensations. A language in principle unintelligible to anyone but its user would necessarily be unintelligible to the user also, because no meanings could be established objectively and normatively for its signs. The proposed language is not a useful language; for words can only be correctly or incorrectly applied if there are objective criteria for using them correctly. Rules of grammar determine whether a particular language use is correct or not. Private linguist

cannot build up grammar for a private language. The signs in language can only function when there is a possibility of judging the correctness of their use, 'so the use of [a] word stands in need of a justification which everybody understands' (*PI* 261). Even apparently the most self-guaranteeing of all sensations, pain, derives its identity from a practice of expression, reaction and use of language. Agreement in human behaviour is fundamental to language use. The common behaviour of human beings and the very general facts of nature make particular concepts and customs, including those about sensations, possible and useful. Like any practice, language use must have objective and normative standards.

Family Resemblance

To illustrate the relationship of language-games to one another, Wittgenstein uses the concept of 'family resemblances' (*PI* 67). The members of a family share many similar features, such as eye colour, temperament, hair, facial structure, and build. However, there will be no one particular feature that they all share in common. With this analogy, Wittgenstein is attacking the theory of essentialism, which is the Platonic thesis that for things to be classed together they must share some essence. According to Wittgenstein our modes of discourse are examples of language, and the fact that they belong to the same category does not imply there is a single essence they all possess. Instead, the different language-games 'are related to one another in many different ways' (*PI* 65). Instead of general explanations, and definitions based on sufficient and necessary conditions, there are 'family resemblances' among the various uses of a word and language games. The meaning of a word is not located in the logical form which is common to all uses of that word, but in the 'complicated network of similarities, overlapping and criss-crossing' (*PI* 66). 'The strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres' (*PI* 67). The mistake of the *Tractatus* was to impose on language the standards of 'the crystalline purity of logic' as though human language were some sort of calculus (*PI* 107). Family resemblance, thus, serves to exhibit the variety as well as vagueness that characterize different uses of the same concept. It is neither Platonic Idea nor the logical form of the *Tractatus* that govern the various uses of words; they are interwoven in the form/stream of life.

Form/Stream of Life

According to the *Tractatus* language is an autonomous, abstract system of symbols in which the role of the human subject is insignificant. In striking contrast, for later Wittgenstein, language is something living and growing. Language use is an activity that takes place within the stream of life. The notion of 'form/web/stream of life' captures this insight: 'To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life' (*PI* 19). Our ways of speaking are not bound by logically necessary structure but are intimately tied into the common human practices, the hurly-burly of our everyday actual life. He is emphatic: 'Only in the stream of life words have meaning'.

Philosophers often held that a philosophical justification had to be given for every belief we have. This is, however, a hopeless and useless task. There is simply a point where justifications come to an end: 'If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what 1 do."' (*PI* 217) 'What has to be accepted, the given is—so one could say—forms of life.' (*PI* p. 226). There can be no justification

for our most basic concepts and ways of viewing the world because 'what people accept as a justification—is shewn by how they think and live' (*PI* 325). Forms of life can be understood as changing and contingent, dependent on culture, context, history, etc. It is also the form of life, "the common behaviour of mankind" which is "the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language" (PI 206), giving a shape and continuity to the stream of life.

Check Your Progress II

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1) Critically evaluate: 'What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence'

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2) Critically evaluate *Tractatus*' view of philosophy and the correct method in philosophy, in the light of *Philosophical Investigations*.

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4.5   LET US SUM UP

The linguistic turn in twentieth century philosophy makes philosophy predominantly analysis and description of language. Language is not only a medium of philosophizing but the primary subject matter of philosophical investigations. Despite their differences in style and content, Frege, Russell and early Wittgenstein share the goals of (1) repudiating traditional metaphysics, (2) reducing language to a series of elementary propositions that would represent facts, and (3) developing a theory of language that would establish the boundaries of meaning. The later Wittgenstein links language and philosophy with activity and firmly places philosophizing in the stream of life. His analogies of language games, family resemblance and form/stream of life has shown new ways of doing philosophical therapy and the remarks on rule-following and private language have initiated philosophical discussions and debates in many branches of philosophy.

4.6   KEY WORDS

Linguistic Turn, Analytic Philosophy, Sense and Reference, Knowledge by Aquaintance and Knowledge by Description, Picture Theory of Meaning, Language-games, Family Resemblance, Rule-following, Private Language and Form of Life.

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