Introduction to Smart Contract Exploitation

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Download the virtual machine.
The login/password are grehack/grehack.
To deploy the exercises, run:
 /home/grehack/Desktop/start_exercises.sh

You can re-start the exercises by running again the script.

Alternatively, follow the <u>installation instructions</u> for a local installation.

Need help? Slack: https://empireslacking.herokuapp.com/ #ethereum

Prerequisites

Ganache

Ganache allows to prototype and to test smart contracts on a local blockchain. The local blockchain validates instantaneously the transactions, and allow to have pre-mined ethers.

The Ganache GUI lets you see the transactions and the blocked mined.

Geth

Geth is an ethereum client.

With geth, you can:

- Mine,
- Transfer funds
- Create a contract
- Sends transactions

Solc

Solc is the Solidity compiler.

Exercise 1: Robbing the Bank

In this exercise we will see how to interact and exploit the following contract:

```
contract Bank {
   mapping (address => uint) tokens;
   // Return the balance of the user
  function getBalance(address user) view public returns(uint) {
       return tokens[user];
   }
   // Buy tokens
  function buy() payable public{
       tokens[msg.sender] += msg.value;
   }
   // Exchange the token for ether
   function withdraw() public{
      // Retrieve the user balance
      uint balance = tokens[msg.sender];
      // Send the balance to 0
      tokens[msg.sender] = 0;
      // Send the ether equivalent of the balance
      msg.sender.transfer(balance);
   }
   // Send tokens to another user
  function transfer(address to, uint amount) public{
       tokens[to] += amount;
      tokens[msg.sender] -= amount;
   }
}
```

Figure1: Bank.sol

The contract allows anyone to buy its tokens.

It contains four functions:

- getBalance: returns the tokens balance of the user
- buy: buy tokens with ether
- withdraw: convert back the tokens to ether
- transfer: transfer the tokens to another user

Interacting with the contract

Our goal will be to buy 1000 tokens by calling the function buy with 1000 wei (1 wei is 1e-18 ether).

The first thing to do is to attach geth to the local blockchain:

\$ geth attach <u>http://127.0.0.1:7545</u>

This opens a terminal to interact with the blockchain.

The contract is deployed at the address 0x38B30b220F0277a179958401CFD638708AA321f2.

You can see the contract creation at the transaction 0x8ad9c9eb0c30d54f9e69d8b6fd564eef597f0a103360926733a54609cd623efb on ganache:




Figure 2: Ganache GUI

To interact with the contract in geth, you need to export the contract ABI using solc:

```
$ solc bank.sol--abi
    [{"constant":false,"inputs":[],"name":"withdraw","outputs":[],"payable"
:false,"stateMutability":"nonpayable","type":"function"},{"constant":false,"i
nputs":[],"name":"buy","outputs":[],"payable":true,"stateMutability":"payable
","type":"function"},{"constant":false,"inputs":[{"name":"to","type":"address
"},{"name":"amount","type":"uint256"}],"name":"transfer","outputs":[],"payable
e":false,"stateMutability":"nonpayable","type":"function"},{"constant":true,"
inputs":[{"name":"user","type":"address"}],"name":"getBalance","outputs":[{"name":"","type":"uint256"}],"payable":false,"stateMutability":"view","type":"function"}]
```

Then in the geth terminal, you can associate the abi to the address of the contract:

Now, you can call the functions of the contract by executing a transaction through MyBankInstance.

To send a transaction calling buy with 1 ether:

```
> MyBankInstance.buy({from: eth.accounts[0], value:web3.toWei(1,
'ether')})
```

"0x53663a568f65ef3f84ad6b66e260f3f8255188a54d565ad33a86f44b09b15c1b"

- The value returned is the hash of the transaction.
- In {} you can specify the transaction parameters (from specify the sender, value the ether sent)
- eth.accounts is the list of local accounts
- web3.toWei converts ether to wei (1 wei = 1e-18 ether)

You can inspect the transaction using its hash:

```
>eth.getTransactionReceipt('0x53663a568f65ef3f84ad6b66e260f3f8255188a54 d565ad33a86f44b09b15c1b')
```

Or using the ganache GUI.

Some functions do not change the state of the blockchain, and can be executed locally. These functions are marked with one of these attributes:

- constant
- pure
- view

For example, getBalance can be called without executing a transaction. To do so, do not specify the transaction parameters ({from: ..}) when you call the function:

```
> MyBankInstance.getBalance(eth.accounts[0])
1000
```

As you see, you now possess 1000 tokens of your contract!

Exploiting the Vulnerability

Another user already bought 90 ether worth of token (see transaction: 0xdd7de39d9e1ab9f098ecaa48e7599f5b4b5fe29ae068cfcdf99b0e457150d6bf)

It is possible to steal the ether?

Let us look more closely at the transfer function:

```
function transfer(address to, uint amount) public{
   tokens[to] += amount;
   tokens[msg.sender] -= amount;
}
```

Figure 3: Buggy transfer function

There is no check to ensure that the sender has enough tokens! If someone sends more tokens than he has, an underflow will occur at:

```
tokens[msg.sender] -= amount;
```

Leading the user to have a large number of tokens!

Once we have an arbitrary amount of tokens, we can withdraw the entire ether balance of the bank by calling withdraw.

To summarize to exploit the vulnerability, you need to:

- 1. Call transfer with a large number to trigger the underflow
- 2. Set your token balance to the bank ether balance. You can send tokens to arbitrary addresses to reduce your balance.
- 3. Call withdraw

1 and 2 can be done in one action if you determine the underflow result.

The exact ether balance of the bank is returned by:

> eth.getBalance(MyBankInstance.address)

Exploit the contract and steal the ether.

Web3 tips

- You can store the return of a call to a variable:
 - var my_balance = eth.getBalance(MyBankInstance.address)
- Due to the internal representation for <u>large number</u> in web 3, do not use direct arithmetic operations, but use the BigNumber operators:
 - var_a.plus(var_b) instead of a + b
 - var_a.sub(var_b) instead of a b

Exercise 2: Stealing the Ownership

The following contract is deployed at address 0x06aC60dd55774579608fF22740b72042C165526b. 90 ethers are inside the contract, can you steal them?

```
contract IamTheOwner{
   address owner;

   // Constructor
   // In Solidity a constructor can only be called
   // One time.
   // To be a constructor, a function needs to have
```

```
// the same name as the contract, or
// to be declared with the constructor keyword
function IAmTheOwner() public{
    owner = msg.sender;
}

// Empty function to deposit ether
function deposit() payable public{}

// Withdraw the account balance
function withdraw() public {
    // It can only be called by the owner
    require(msg.sender == owner);
    owner.transfer(address(this).balance);
}
```

Figure 4: <u>lamTheOwner.sol</u>

Hint

Do not read the following if you don't want help

A constructor is a specific function in Solidity that is only callable when the contract is deployed. To be the constructor a function must:

- Have the *exact* same name as the name
- Use the constructor keyword

The constructor keyword was recently added to Solidity, as several contracts were hacked because a function was supposed to be the constructor, but was incorrectly named, due to typo or change in the contract name.

Exercise 3: Guessing the Number

The following contract is deployed at 0x397B55bB094da054E85AEa66835355D2AcA14645:

```
contract Bet {
```

```
address owner = msg.sender;
uint random_number = 0x0;

function setRandomNumber(uint n) payable public{
    require(msg.sender == owner);
    random_number = n;
}

function guessNumber(uint guess) public {
    if(random_number == guess){
        owner = msg.sender;
        msg.sender.transfer(address(this).balance);
    }
}
```

Figure 5: <u>Bet.sol</u>

Can you guess the current number currently stored in random_number?

Hint

Do not read the following if you don't want help

On ethereum, all transactions are public. As a result, you are able to track what transactions were done to this contract. In particular, there were two transactions:

- 0xdb64c6aa544f1ab48e6aa96f26e2c2d8d9cf4f953893f79f9c1b605c4136a526
- 0x554d16b90e66a5c7661c2df054df44ab9fb8bb573aef2291cbc0c1c04612a638

A transaction has a data field:

- The first four bytes are the function id, which is equal to the keccak hash of the function signature. In our example:
 - Oxd6bfea28: setRandomNumber(uint256)
 - 0xb438d018: guessNumber(uint256)
- The remaining bytes are the parameters

As a result, you can follow the transactions and discover what was the last number set through setRandomNumber.

Exercise 4: Exploiting a Reentrancy

The following contract is deployed at 0x72f4572204D8E5cE165968b1B49AE360a0A50dD3:

```
contract Reentrancy {
   mapping (address => uint) userBalance;

function getBalance(address u) view public returns(uint){
    return userBalance[u];
}

function addToBalance() payable public{
   userBalance[msg.sender] += msg.value;
}

function withdrawBalance() public {
   if( ! (msg.sender.call.value(userBalance[msg.sender])() ) ){
      revert();
   }
   userBalance[msg.sender] = 0;
}
```

Figure 6: Reentrancy.sol

2 ethers were deposed, could you steal them?

Hint

Do not read the following if you don't want help

A reentrancy vulnerability is a specific vulnerability that abuses the ethereum design.

A contract can send a transaction to another contract or a wallet.

If the destination is a contract, it's so-called fallback function will be executed (if present). The fallback function of a contract has the signature:

```
function () { ...}
```

A malicious fallback function can be able to execute a function of the original contract (and thus re-enter to the contract). On our example, it creates the following attack vector:

- The malicious contract call the withdrawBalance function
- The execution of withdrawBalance leads to execute the fallback function of the malicious contract
- The fallback function calls a second times withdrawBalance
- As a result, the malicious contract can withdraw two times its original balance

We will use the following skeleton of malicious contract:

```
// ABI of the target
contract Reentrancy {
  function addToBalance() payable public;
  function withdrawBalance() public;
}
contract ReentrancyExploit {
 bool attack_is_on=false; // set to true when the attack is on
 Reentrancy vulnerable contract;
  address owner;
 constructor() public{
     owner = msg.sender;
  }
 // Depose some ether to the target
 // And save the target address
 function deposit(Reentrancy _vulnerable_contract) public payable{
      vulnerable_contract = _vulnerable_contract;
     vulnerable_contract.addToBalance.value(msg.value)();
  }
```

```
// This function will launch the attack
 function launch_attack() public{
     // You must set attack_is_on to true
     // and call the withdrawBalance function of the target
 }
 // fallback function
 // This is the function executed when a transaction is sent to
 // the contract
 function () public payable{
     // You must check that the attack is ongoing
     // If it is, re-call the withdrawBalance of the target
     // and set attack_is_on to false to prevent an infinite loop
 }
 // Withdraw the money
 // This function will be call after the attack, to get the money
 function get_money() public{
     owner.transfer(addressthis).balance);
  }
}
```

Figure 7: ReentrancyExploit.sol

You will need to update:

- The launch_attack function
- The fallback function

Once you have updated the contract, you can deploy it, using truffle: \$ truffle migrate -f 3

The address of the contract will be display:

ReentrancyExploit: 0x..

Update ReentrancyExploit.sol and use it to exploit Reentrancy.sol.