

#### Summary

Audit Report prepared by Solidified for Wyvern Exchange covering the Wyvern Protocol Audit Specification contracts.

### **Process and Delivery**

Per client's request, one Solidified expert performed an unbiased and isolated audit of the below contracts. The final results are presented here.

#### **Audited Files**

The following files were covered during the audit:

- ProxyRegistry.sol
- AuthenticatedProxy.sol
- WyvernProxyRegistry.sol
- WyvernExchange.sol
- Exchange.sol
- Exchange-core
- SaleKindInterface.sol
- TokenRecipient.sol
- ReentrancyGuarded.sol
- ArrayUtils.sol

#### Notes:

The audited versions are the ones present in the commit 060314a275c9821e77c784763b9423fc38acecaa

#### Intended Behavior

The purpose of these contracts is to facilitate exchange of non fungible assets in the ethereum blockchain



#### Issues Found

## 1. Low level calls might succeed if contract is non-existent

If an order target is a contract that has self destruct mechanism, a malicious party can kill the target right before the atomic match and still get the transaction funds. This happens because low level calls return true for non-existent contracts.

This issue has a limited surface attack, but it's present in the report to raise awareness of such scenario.

### 2. Give preference for 'bytes32' over 'string'

For constant values smaller than 32 bytes, give preference for a bytes32 type, since they are much cheaper than string types, which are dynamically sized.

## 3. Remove empty constructor

WyvernProxyRegistry.sol - lines 22-28

```
/**
  * @dev Create a WyvernProxyRegistry instance
  */
function WyvernProxyRegistry ()
    public
{
}
```

Since there's no code execution, there's no need for a constructor function.



# 4. Consider implementing versioning mechanism in the Exchange

Since there might be more than one deployed exchange at a time, it might be useful to implement a versioning mechanism in the WyvernExchange contract itself. That way users(and even the dapp frontend) can be sure of which version they are interacting with.

## 5. Consider using uint256 types

Although uint and uint256 are equivalent, it's a best practice to use the more explicit version.

## 6. Newer compiler version available

Changing the solidity version pragma to the latest version (`^0.4.20`) as of this writing, to enforce the use of an up-to-date compiler, is recommended.

List of known compiler bugs and their severity can be found here: <a href="https://etherscan.io/solcbuginfo">https://etherscan.io/solcbuginfo</a>

### **Closing Summary**

No critical or major issues were found, but it's advised to consider implementing a few of the suggestions present in this report.

#### **Disclaimer**



Solidified audit is not a security warranty, investment advice, or an endorsement of the Wyvern Exchange. This audit does not provide a security or correctness guarantee of the audited smart contracts. Securing smart contracts is a multistep process, therefore running a bug bounty program as a complement to this audit is strongly recommended.

The individual audit reports are anonymized and combined during a debrief process, in order to provide an unbiased delivery and protect the auditors of Solidified platform from legal and financial liability.

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