

# Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures

CVE	Announced	Affects	Severity	Attack is...	Flaw	Net
Pre-BIP protocol changes	n/a	All Bitcoin clients	Netsplit <sup>[1]</sup>	Implicit <sup>[2]</sup>	Various hardforks and softforks	100%
CVE-2010-5137	2010-07-28	wxBitcoin and bitcoind	DoS <sup>[3]</sup>	Easy	OP_LSHIFT crash	100%
CVE-2010-5141	2010-07-28	wxBitcoin and bitcoind	Theft <sup>[4]</sup>	Easy	OP_RETURN could be used to spend any output.	100%
CVE-2010-5138	2010-07-29	wxBitcoin and bitcoind	DoS <sup>[3]</sup>	Easy	Unlimited SigOp DoS	100%
<b>CVE-2010-5139</b>	2010-08-15	wxBitcoin and bitcoind	Inflation <sup>[5]</sup>	Easy	Combined output overflow	100%
CVE-2010-5140	2010-09-29	wxBitcoin and bitcoind	DoS <sup>[3]</sup>	Easy	Never confirming transactions	100%
CVE-2011-4447	2011-11-11	wxBitcoin and bitcoind	Exposure <sup>[6]</sup>	Hard	Wallet non-encryption	100% ( <a href="http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/CVE-2011-4447.html">http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/CVE-2011-4447.html</a> )
CVE-2012-1909	2012-03-07	Bitcoin protocol and all clients	Netsplit <sup>[1]</sup>	Very hard	Transaction overwriting	100% ( <a href="http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/CVE-2012-1909.html">http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/CVE-2012-1909.html</a> )
CVE-2012-1910	2012-03-17	bitcoind & Bitcoin-Qt for Windows	Unknown <sup>[7]</sup>	Hard	MingW non-multithreading	100% ( <a href="http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/CVE-2012-1910.html">http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/CVE-2012-1910.html</a> )
BIP 0016	2012-04-01	All Bitcoin clients	Fake Conf <sup>[8]</sup>	Miners <sup>[9]</sup>	Softfork: P2SH	100% ( <a href="http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/BIP-0016.html">http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/BIP-0016.html</a> )
CVE-2012-2459	2012-05-14	bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt	Netsplit <sup>[1]</sup>	Easy	Block hash collision (via merkle root)	100% ( <a href="http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/CVE-2">http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/CVE-2</a> )

						012-2459.html)
<b>CVE-2012-3789</b>	2012-06-20	bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt	DoS <sup>[3]</sup>	Easy	(Lack of) orphan txn resource limits	100% ( <a href="http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20123789">http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20123789</a> )
CVE-2012-4682		bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt	DoS <sup>[3]</sup>			100% ( <a href="http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/CVE-2012-4682.html">http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/CVE-2012-4682.html</a> )
<b>CVE-2012-4683</b>	2012-08-23	bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt	DoS <sup>[3]</sup>	Easy	Targeted DoS by CPU exhaustion using alerts	100% ( <a href="http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/CVE-2012-4683.html">http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/CVE-2012-4683.html</a> )
<b>CVE-2012-4684</b>	2012-08-24	bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt	DoS <sup>[3]</sup>	Easy	Network-wide DoS using malleable signatures in alerts	100% ( <a href="http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20124684">http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20124684</a> )
CVE-2013-2272	2013-01-11	bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt	Exposure <sup>[6]</sup>	Easy	Remote discovery of node's wallet addresses	99.99% ( <a href="http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20132272">http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20132272</a> )
CVE-2013-2273	2013-01-30	bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt	Exposure <sup>[6]</sup>	Easy	Predictable change output	99.99% ( <a href="http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20132273">http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20132273</a> )
CVE-2013-2292	2013-01-30	bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt	DoS <sup>[3]</sup>	Hard	A transaction that takes at least 3 minutes to verify	0% ( <a href="http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts">http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts</a> )

						s/security.html?20132292)
<b>CVE-2013-2293</b>	2013-02-14	bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt	DoS <sup>[3]</sup>	Easy	Continuous hard disk seek	99.99% (http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20132293)
CVE-2013-3219	2013-03-11	bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt 0.8.0	Fake Conf <sup>[8]</sup>	Miners <sup>[9]</sup>	Unenforced block protocol rule	100% (http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20133219)
CVE-2013-3220	2013-03-11	bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt	Netsplit <sup>[1]</sup>	Hard	Inconsistent BDB lock limit interactions	99.99% (http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20133220)
BIP 0034	2013-03-25	All Bitcoin clients	Fake Conf <sup>[8]</sup>	Miners <sup>[9]</sup>	Softfork: Height in coinbase	100% (http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/BIP-0034.html)
BIP 0050	2013-05-15	All Bitcoin clients	Netsplit <sup>[1]</sup>	Implicit <sup>[2]</sup>	Hard fork to remove txid limit protocol rule	99.99% (http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?50)
CVE-2013-4627	2013-06-??	bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt	DoS <sup>[3]</sup>	Easy	Memory exhaustion with excess tx message data	99.9% (http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20134627)
CVE-2013-4165	2013-07-20	bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt	Theft <sup>[10]</sup>	Local	Timing leak in RPC authentication	99.9% (http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/

						<a href="https://n/files/charts/security.html?20134165">n/files/charts/security.html?20134165)</a>
CVE-2013-5700	2013-09-04	bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt 0.8.x	DoS <sup>[3]</sup>	Easy	Remote p2p crash via bloom filters	99.9% ( <a href="http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20135700">http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20135700)</a>
CVE-2014-0160	2014-04-07	Anything using OpenSSL for TLS	Unknown <sup>[7]</sup>	Easy	Remote memory leak via payment protocol	Unknown
CVE-2015-3641	2014-07-07	bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt prior to 0.10.2	DoS <sup>[3]</sup>	Easy	(Yet) Unspecified DoS	99.9% ( <a href="http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20135700">http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20135700)</a>
BIP 66	2015-02-13	All Bitcoin clients	Fake Conf <sup>[8]</sup>	Miners <sup>[9]</sup>	Softfork: Strict DER signatures	99% ( <a href="http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?66">http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?66)</a>
BIP 65	2015-11-12	All Bitcoin clients	Fake Conf <sup>[8]</sup>	Miners <sup>[9]</sup>	Softfork: OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY	99% ( <a href="http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?65">http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?65)</a>
BIPs 68, 112 & 113	2016-04-11	All Bitcoin clients	Fake Conf <sup>[8]</sup>	Miners <sup>[9]</sup>	Softforks: Rel locktime, CSV & MTP locktime	99% ( <a href="http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?68">http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?68)</a>
BIPs 141, 143 & 147	2016-10-27	All Bitcoin clients	Fake Conf <sup>[8]</sup>	Miners <sup>[9]</sup>	Softfork: Segwit	99% ( <a href="http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?68">http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?68)</a>

						y.html?141)
CVE-2016-8889	2016-10-27	Bitcoin Knots GUI 0.11.0 - 0.13.0	Exposure	Hard	Debug console history storing sensitive info	100%
CVE-2017-9230	?	Bitcoin	?	?	ASICBoost	0%
BIP 148	2017-03-12	All Bitcoin clients	Fake Conf <sup>[8]</sup>	Miners <sup>[9]</sup>	Softfork: Segwit UASF	?
CVE-2017-12842	2018-06-09				No commitment to block merkle tree depth	
CVE-2016-10724 ( <a href="https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-July/016189.html">https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-July/016189.html</a> )	2018-07-02	bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt prior to 0.13.0	DoS <sup>[3]</sup>	Keyholders <sup>[11]</sup>	Alert memory exhaustion	99% ( <a href="http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?201610724">http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?201610724</a> )
CVE-2016-10725 ( <a href="https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-July/016189.html">https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-July/016189.html</a> )	2018-07-02	bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt prior to 0.13.0	DoS <sup>[3]</sup>	Keyholders <sup>[11]</sup>	Final alert cancellation	99% ( <a href="http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?201610724">http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?201610724</a> )
CVE-2018-17144	2018-09-17	bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt prior to 0.16.3	Inflation <sup>[5]</sup>	Miners <sup>[9]</sup>	Missing check for duplicate inputs	62% ( <a href="http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?201817144">http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?201817144</a> )
CVE-2018-20587 ( <a href="https://medium.com/@lukedashjr/cve-2018-20587-advisory-and-full-disclosure-a3105551e78b">https://medium.com/@lukedashjr/cve-2018-20587-advisory-and-full-disclosure-a3105551e78b</a> )	2019-02-08	Bitcoin Knots prior to 0.17.1, and all current Bitcoin Core releases	Theft <sup>[10]</sup>	Local	No alert for RPC service binding failure	1% ( <a href="http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?201820587">http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?201820587</a> )
CVE-2017-18350	2019-06-22	bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt prior to 0.15.1	Unknown	Varies <sup>[12]</sup>	Buffer overflow from SOCKS proxy	89% ( <a href="http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?201718350">http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?201718350</a> )
CVE-2018-20586	2019-06-22	bitcoind and Bitcoin-	Deception	RPC access	Debug log injection via unauthenticated RPC	50% ( <a href="http://luke.dashjr.org/program">http://luke.dashjr.org/program</a> )

		Qt prior to 0.17.1				s/bitcoin/files/chart/s/security.html?201820586)
CVE-2019-12998 ( <a href="https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2019-September/002174.html">https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2019-September/002174.html</a> )	2019-08-30	c-lightning prior to 0.7.1	Theft	Easy	Missing check of channel funding UTXO	
CVE-2019-12999 ( <a href="https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2019-September/002174.html">https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2019-September/002174.html</a> )	2019-08-30	lnd prior to 0.7	Theft	Easy	Missing check of channel funding UTXO amount	
CVE-2019-13000 ( <a href="https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2019-September/002174.html">https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2019-September/002174.html</a> )	2019-08-30	eclair prior to 0.3	Theft	Easy	Missing check of channel funding UTXO	

1. Attacker can create multiple views of the network, enabling double-spending with over 1 confirmation
2. This is a protocol "hard-fork" that old clients will reject as invalid and must therefore not be used.
3. Attacker can disable some functionality, for example by crashing clients
4. Attacker can take coins outside known network rules
5. Attacker can create coins outside known network rules
6. Attacker can access user data outside known acceptable methods
7. Extent of possible abuse is unknown
8. Attacker can double-spend with 1 confirmation
9. Attacking requires mining block(s)
10. Local attacker could potentially determine the RPC passphrase via a timing sidechannel.
11. Attacking requires signing with the publicly-disclosed alert key
12. Depends on software configuration

## CVE-2010-5137

**Date:** 2010-07-28  
**Summary:** OP\_LSHIFT crash  
**Fix Deployment:** 100%

Affected		Fix
bitcoind wxBitcoin	* - 0.3.4	0.3.5

On July 28 2010, two bugs were discovered and demonstrated on the test network. One caused bitcoin to crash on some machines when processing a transaction containing an OP\_LSHIFT. This was never exploited on the main network, and was fixed by Bitcoin version 0.3.5.

After these bugs were discovered, many currently-unused script words were disabled for safety.

## References

- US-CERT/NIST (<http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2010-5137>)

## CVE-2010-5141

**Date:** 2010-07-28  
**Summary:** ?  
**Fix Deployment:** 100%

Affected		Fix
bitcoind wxBitcoin	* - 0.3.4	0.3.5

On July 28 2010, two bugs were discovered and demonstrated on the test network. One exploited a bug in the transaction handling code and allowed an attacker to spend coins that they did not own. This was never exploited on the main network, and was fixed by Bitcoin version 0.3.5.

After these bugs were discovered, many currently-unused script words were disabled for safety.

## References

- US-CERT/NIST (<http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2010-5141>)

## CVE-2010-5138

**Date:** 2010-07-29  
**Summary:** Unlimited SigOp DoS  
**Fix Deployment:** 100%

Affected		Fix
bitcoind wxBitcoin	* - 0.3.?	0.3.?

On July 29 2010, it was discovered that block 71036 (<http://blockexplorer.com/block/00000000000997f9fd2fe1ee376293ef8c42ad09193a5d2086dddf8e5c426b56>) contained several transactions with a ton of OP\_CHECKSIG commands. There should only ever be one such command. This caused every node to do extra unnecessary work, and it could have been used as a denial-of-service attack. A new version of Bitcoin was quickly released. The new version did not cause a fork on the main network, though it did cause one on the test network (where someone had played around with the attack more).

## References

- US-CERT/NIST (<http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2010-5138>)

## CVE-2010-5139



Main article: *CVE-2010-5139*

**Date:** 2010-08-15

**Summary:** Combined output overflow

**Fix Deployment:** 100%

Affected		Fix
bitcoind wxBitcoin	* - 0.3.10	0.3.11

On August 15 2010, it was discovered (<http://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=822.0>) that block 74638 contained a transaction that created over 184 billion bitcoins for two different addresses. This was possible because the code used for checking transactions before including them in a block didn't account for the case of outputs so large that they overflowed when summed. A new version was published within a few hours of the discovery. The block chain had to be forked. Although many unpatched nodes continued to build on the "bad" block chain, the "good" block chain overtook it at a block height of 74691. The bad transaction no longer exists for people using the longest chain.

The block and transaction:

```
CBlock(hash=0000000000790ab3, ver=1, hashPrevBlock=0000000000606865, hashMerkleRoot=618eba,
nTime=1281891957, nBits=1c00800e, nNonce=28192719, vtx=2)
  CTransaction(hash=012cd8, ver=1, vin.size=1, vout.size=1, nLockTime=0)
    CTxIn(COutPoint(000000, -1), coinbase 040e80001c028f00)
    CTxOut(nValue=50.51000000, scriptPubKey=0x4F4BA55D1580F8C3A8A2C7)
  CTransaction(hash=1d5e51, ver=1, vin.size=1, vout.size=2, nLockTime=0)
    CTxIn(COutPoint(237fe8, 0), scriptSig=0xA87C02384E1F184B79C6AC)
    CTxOut(nValue=92233720368.54275808, scriptPubKey=OP_DUP OP_HASH160 0xB7A7)
    CTxOut(nValue=92233720368.54275808, scriptPubKey=OP_DUP OP_HASH160 0x1512)
  vMerkleTree: 012cd8 1d5e51 618eba

Block hash: 0000000000790ab3f22ec756ad43b6ab569abf0bddeb97c67a6f7b1470a7ec1c
Transaction hash: 1d5e512a9723cbef373b970eb52f1e9598ad67e7408077a82fdac194b65333c9
```

References

- Discovery (<https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=822.0>)
- US-CERT/NIST (<http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2010-5139>)

CVE-2010-5140

**Date:** 2010-09-29

**Summary:** Never confirming transactions

**Fix Deployment:** 100%

Affected		Fix
bitcoind wxBitcoin	* - 0.3.12	0.3.13

Around September 29, 2010, people started reporting (<https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1306.0>) that their sent transactions would not confirm. This happened because people modified Bitcoin to send sub-0.01 transactions without any fees. A 0.01 fee was at that time required by the network for such transactions (essentially prohibiting them), so the transactions remained at 0 confirmations forever. This became a more serious issue because Bitcoin would send transactions using bitcoins gotten from transactions with 0 confirmations, and these resulting transactions would also never confirm. Because Bitcoin tends to prefer sending smaller coins, these invalid transactions quickly multiplied, contaminating the wallets of everyone who received them.

Bitcoin was changed to only select coins with at least 1 confirmation. The remaining sub-0.01 transactions were cleared by generators who modified their version of Bitcoin to not require the micropayment fee. It took a while for everything to get cleared, though, because many of the intermediate transactions had been forgotten by the network by this point and had to be rebroadcast by the original senders.

## References

- Initial reports (<https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1306.0>)
- US-CERT/NIST (<http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2010-5140>)

## CVE-2011-4447

**Date:** 2011-11-11  
**Summary:** Wallet non-encryption  
**Fix Deployment:** 100%

Affected		Fix
bitcoind wxBitcoin	0.4.0 - 0.4.1rc6	0.4.1 0.5.0

## References

- Announcement (<https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=51604.0>)
- Finding (<https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=51474.0>)
- 0.5.0 (<http://bitcoin.org/releases/2011/11/21/v0.5.0.html>)
- US-CERT/NIST (<http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2011-4447>)

## CVE-2012-1909

**Date:** 2012-03-07  
**Summary:** Transaction overwriting  
**Fix Deployment:** 100%

Affected		Fix
Bitcoin protocol	Before March 15th, 2012	BIP 30
Bitcoin-Qt bitcoind	* - 0.4.4rc2 0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.0.4rc2 0.5.1rc1 - 0.5.3rc2 0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0rc2	0.4.4 0.5.0.4 0.5.3 0.6.0rc3
wxBitcoin	ALL	NONE

## References

- Announcement (<https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=67738.0>)
- Fix ([https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/BIP\\_0030](https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/BIP_0030))
- Gentoo bug tracker ([https://bugs.gentoo.org/show\\_bug.cgi?id=407793](https://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=407793))
- US-CERT/NIST (<http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2012-1909>)

# CVE-2012-1910

**Date:** 2012-03-17  
**Summary:** MingW non-multithreading  
**Fix Deployment:** 100%

Affected		Fix
bitcoind for Windows Bitcoin-Qt for Windows	0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.0.4	0.5.0.5
	0.5.1rc1 - 0.5.3.0	0.5.3.1
	0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0rc3	0.5.4
		0.6.0rc4

## References

- Announcement (<https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=69120.0>)
- US-CERT/NIST (<http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2012-1910>)

# BIP-0016

**Date:** 2012-04-01  
**Summary:** Mandatory P2SH protocol update  
**Deployment:** 100%

Affected		Fix
Bitcoin-Qt bitcoind	* - 0.4.4	0.4.5
	0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.0.5	0.5.0.6
	0.5.1rc1 - 0.5.3	0.5.4rc1
	0.6.0rc1	0.6.0rc2
wxBitcoin	ALL	NONE

## References

- BIP 0016

# CVE-2012-2459

**Date:** 2012-05-14  
**Summary:** Block hash collision (via merkle tree)  
**Fix Deployment:** 100%

Affected		Fix
Bitcoin-Qt bitcoind	* - 0.4.6rc1	0.4.6
	0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.5rc1	0.5.5
	0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0.7rc1	0.6.0.7
	0.6.1rc1 - 0.6.1rc1	0.6.1rc2

Block hash collisions can easily be made by duplicating transactions in the merkle tree. Such a collision is invalid, but if recorded (as Bitcoin-Qt and bitcoind prior to 0.6.1 did) would prevent acceptance of the legitimate block with the same hash. This could be used to fork the blockchain, including deep double-spend attacks.

## References

- [Announcement \(https://bitcointalk.org/?topic=81749\)](https://bitcointalk.org/?topic=81749)
- [Gentoo bug tracker \(https://bugs.gentoo.org/show\\_bug.cgi?id=415973\)](https://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=415973)
- [US-CERT/NIST \(http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2012-2459\)](http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2012-2459)
- [Full Disclosure \(https://bitcointalk.org/?topic=102395\)](https://bitcointalk.org/?topic=102395)

# CVE-2012-3789

Main article: *CVE-2012-3789*

**Date:** 2012-06-20  
**Summary:** (Lack of) orphan txn resource limits  
**Fix Deployment:** 100%

	Affected	Fix
Bitcoin-Qt bitcoind	* - 0.4.7rc2	0.4.7rc3
	0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.6rc2	0.5.6rc3
	0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0.8rc2	0.6.0.9rc1
	0.6.1rc1 - 0.6.2.2	0.6.3rc1

## References

- [CVE-2012-3789](#)
- [0.6.3rc1 Announcement \(https://bitcointalk.org/?topic=88734\)](https://bitcointalk.org/?topic=88734)
- [US-CERT/NIST \(http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2012-3789\)](http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2012-3789)

# CVE-2012-4682

**Date:**  
**Summary:**  
**Fix Deployment:** 100%

	Affected	Fix
Bitcoin-Qt bitcoind	* - 0.4.7rc2	0.4.7rc3
	0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.6rc2	0.5.6rc3
	0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0.8rc2	0.6.0.9rc1
	0.6.1rc1 - 0.6.2.2	0.6.3rc1

## References

- [CVE-2012-4682](#)
- [Gentoo bug \(https://bugs.gentoo.org/show\\_bug.cgi?id=435216\)](https://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=435216)

# CVE-2012-4683

Main article: *CVE-2012-4683*

**Date:** 2012-08-23  
**Summary:** Targeted DoS by CPU exhaustion using alerts  
**Fix Deployment:** 100%

Affected		Fix
Bitcoin-Qt bitcoind	* - 0.4.7rc2 0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.6rc2 0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0.8rc2 0.6.1rc1 - 0.6.2.2	0.7.0

References

- CVE-2012-4683
- Announcement (<https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=148038.0>)
- Gentoo bug ([https://bugs.gentoo.org/show\\_bug.cgi?id=435216](https://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=435216))

CVE-2012-4684

Main article: *CVE-2012-4684*

**Date:** 2012-08-24

**Summary:** Network-wide DoS using malleable signatures in alerts

**Fix Deployment:** 100%

Affected		Fix
Bitcoin-Qt bitcoind	* - 0.4.7rc2 0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.6rc2 0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0.8rc2 0.6.1rc1 - 0.6.2.2 - 0.6.3rc1	0.7.0

References

- CVE-2012-4684
- Announcement (<https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=148109.0>)

CVE-2013-2272

**Date:** 2013-01-11

**Summary:** Remote discovery of node's wallet addresses

**Fix Deployment:** 99.99%

Affected		Fix
Bitcoin-Qt bitcoind	* - 0.4.8rc4 0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.7 0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0.10rc4 0.6.1rc1 - 0.6.4rc4 0.7.0rc1 - 0.7.2	0.4.9rc1 0.5.8rc1 0.6.0.11rc1 0.6.5rc1 0.7.3rc1

References

- Announcement (<https://bitcointalk.org/?topic=135856>)
- Gentoo bug ([https://bugs.gentoo.org/show\\_bug.cgi?id=462046](https://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=462046))

CVE-2013-2273

**Date:** 2013-01-30

**Summary:** Predictable change output

Affected		Fix
Bitcoin-Qt bitcoind	* - 0.4.8rc4	0.4.9rc1
	0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.7	0.5.8rc1
	0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0.10rc4	0.6.0.11rc1
	0.6.1rc1 - 0.6.4rc4	0.6.5rc1
	0.7.0rc1 - 0.7.2	0.7.3rc1

## References

- Gentoo bug ([https://bugs.gentoo.org/show\\_bug.cgi?id=462046](https://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=462046))

# CVE-2013-2292

Date: 2013-01-30

Summary: A transaction that takes at least 3 minutes to verify

Fix Deployment: 0%

Affected		Fix
Bitcoin-Qt bitcoind	All versions	No fix yet

## References

- CVE-2013-2292
- Announcement (<https://bitcointalk.org/?topic=140078>)
- Gentoo bug ([https://bugs.gentoo.org/show\\_bug.cgi?id=462046](https://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=462046))

# CVE-2013-2293

*Main article: CVE-2013-2293*

Date: 2013-02-14

Summary: Continuous hard disk seek

Fix Deployment: 99.99%

Affected		Fix
Bitcoin-Qt bitcoind	* - 0.7.3rc1	No fix yet (0.8.0 unaffected)

## References

- CVE-2013-2293
- Announcement (<https://bitcointalk.org/?topic=144122>)
- Gentoo bug ([https://bugs.gentoo.org/show\\_bug.cgi?id=462046](https://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=462046))

# CVE-2013-3219

Date: 2013-03-11

Summary: Unenforced block protocol rule

Fix Deployment: 100%

Affected		Fix
Bitcoin-Qt bitcoind	0.8.0rc1 - 0.8.0	0.8.1

References

- BIP 50

CVE-2013-3220

**Date:** 2013-03-11

**Summary:** Inconsistent BDB lock limit interactions

**Fix Deployment:** 99.99%

Affected		Fix
Bitcoin-Qt bitcoind	* - 0.4.9rc1	0.4.9rc2
	0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.8rc1	0.5.8rc2
	0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.5rc1	0.6.5rc2
	0.7.0rc1 - 0.7.3rc1	0.7.3rc2
wxBitcoin	ALL	NONE

References

- BIP 50

BIP-0034

**Date:** 2013-03-25

**Summary:** Mandatory block protocol update

**Deployment:** 100%

Affected		Fix
Bitcoin-Qt bitcoind	* - 0.4.7	0.4.8rc1
	0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.7	0.5.7rc1
	0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0.9	0.6.0.10rc1
	0.6.1rc1 - 0.6.3	0.6.4rc1
wxBitcoin	ALL	NONE

References

- BIP 0034

BIP-0050

**Date:** 2013-05-15

**Summary:** Hard fork to remove txid limit protocol rule

**Deployment:** 99.99%

Affected		Fix
Bitcoin-Qt bitcoind	* - 0.4.9rc1	0.4.9rc2
	0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.8rc1	0.5.8rc2
	0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.5rc1	0.6.5rc2
	0.7.0rc1 - 0.7.3rc1	0.7.3rc2
wxBitcoin	ALL	NONE

References

- BIP 0050

CVE-2013-4627

**Date:** 2013-06-??

**Summary:** Memory exhaustion with excess tx message data

**Fix Deployment:** 99.9%

Affected		Fix
Bitcoin-Qt bitcoind	* - 0.4.9rc3	0.4.9rc4
	0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.8rc3	0.5.8rc4
	0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.5rc3	0.6.5rc4
	0.7.0rc1 - 0.7.3rc3	0.7.3rc4
	0.8.0rc1 - 0.8.3	0.8.4
wxBitcoin	ALL	NONE

References

CVE-2013-4165

**Date:** 2013-07-20

**Summary:** Timing leak in RPC authentication

**Fix Deployment:** 99.9%

Affected		Fix
Bitcoin-Qt bitcoind	* - 0.4.9rc3	0.4.9rc4
	0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.8rc3	0.5.8rc4
	0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.5rc3	0.6.5rc4
	0.7.0rc1 - 0.7.3rc3	0.7.3rc4
	0.8.0rc1 - 0.8.3	0.8.4rc1
wxBitcoin	ALL	NONE

References

- Bitcoin-Qt 0.8.4 release notes (<https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=287351>)

CVE-2013-5700

**Date:** 2013-09-04

**Summary:** Remote p2p crash via bloom filters

**Fix Deployment:** 99.9%



Affected		Fix
Bitcoin-Qt bitcoind	0.8.0rc1 - 0.8.3	0.8.4rc1

## References

- Bitcoin-Qt 0.8.4 release notes (<https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=287351>)

## CVE-2016-8889

**Date:** 2016-10-27  
**Summary:** Debug console history storing sensitive info  
**Fix Deployment:** 100%

Affected		Fix
Bitcoin Knots GUI	0.11.0 - 0.13.0	0.13.1

## References

- Bitcoin Knots 0.16.1.knots20161027 release notes (<https://github.com/bitcoinknots/bitcoin/blob/v0.13.1.knots20161027/doc/release-notes.md>)
- US-CERT/NIST (<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-8889>)

## CVE-2017-12842

**Date:** 2018-06-09  
**Summary:** No commitment to block merkle tree depth

## References

- Explanation by Sergio Demian Lerner (<https://bitslog.wordpress.com/2018/06/09/leaf-node-weakness-in-bitcoin-merkle-tree-design/>)
- Further elaboration by Suhas Daftuar (<https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2019-February/016697.html>)

## CVE-2017-18350

**Date:** 2019-06-22  
**Summary:** Buffer overflow from SOCKS proxy

Affected		Fix
Bitcoin-Qt bitcoind	0.7.0rc1 - 0.15.0	0.15.1rc1

## References

- Disclosure of details (<https://medium.com/@lukedashjr/cve-2017-18350-disclosure-fe6d695f45d5>)

## CVE-2018-17144

**Date:** 2018-09-17  
**Summary:** Missing check for duplicate inputs  
**Fix Deployment:** 31%

Affected		Fix
Bitcoin-Qt bitcoind	0.14.0rc1 - 0.14.2	0.14.3
	0.15.0rc1 - 0.15.1	0.15.2
	0.16.0rc1 - 0.16.2	0.16.3

## References

- Full disclosure by Bitcoin Core (<https://bitcoincore.org/en/2018/09/20/notice/>)
- Bitcoin Core 0.16.3 release notes (<https://bitcoincore.org/en/2018/09/18/release-0.16.3/>)
- Bitcoin Knots 0.16.3.knots20180918 release notes (<https://github.com/bitcoinknots/bitcoin/blob/v0.16.3.knots20180918/doc/release-notes.md>)
- US-CERT/NIST (<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-17144>)
- Gentoo bug ([https://bugs.gentoo.org/show\\_bug.cgi?id=666669](https://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=666669))

## CVE-2018-20586

**Date:** 2019-06-22  
**Summary:** Debug log injection via unauthenticated RPC

Affected		Fix
Bitcoin-Qt bitcoind	0.12.0rc1 - 0.17.0	0.17.1rc1

## References

- Disclosure of details (<https://medium.com/@lukedashjr/cve-2018-20586-disclosure-ff3e1ab9a21f>)

## Definitions

A critical vulnerability is one that will have disastrous consequences if it is exploited. A serious vulnerability is one that will have serious consequences if it is exploited<sup>[1]</sup>.

## See Also

- Changelog

## References

1. <http://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=88892.0>

### Bitcoin Core documentation

<b>User documentation</b>	Alert system • Bitcoin Core compatible devices • Data directory • Fallback Nodes • How to import private keys in Bitcoin Core 0.7+ • Installing Bitcoin Core • Running Bitcoin • Transaction fees • Vocabulary
<b>Developer documentation</b>	Accounts explained • API calls list • API reference (JSON-RPC) • Block chain download • Dump format • getblocktemplate • List of address prefixes • Protocol

**History &  
theory**

documentation • Script • Technical background of version 1 Bitcoin addresses • Testnet • Transaction Malleability • Wallet import format  
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures • DOS/STONED incident • Economic majority • Full node • Original Bitcoin client • Value overflow incident

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title=Common\_Vulnerabilities\_and\_Exposures&oldid=67027"

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