

# ASFEE 2024 Grenoble

*Scientific Program*

## Thursday, June 27th

### Plenary session 1 – Cristina Bicchieri | 9.05 - 10.20

Spontaneous inferences: variability and asymmetry in social inferences from norm information: *Amphithéâtre*

### Parallel sessions 1 – in memory of Gary Charness | 11 - 12.30

Cooperation 1: 204 | Games 1: 208 | Gender: 209 | Preference elicitation: 211

### Invited sessions: 13.45 - 14.45

LLMs in Social and Behavioral Research: *Amphithéâtre* | Replicability, Robustness and Generalizability: *UXLab*

### Parallel Sessions 2 | 14.45 - 16.15

Beliefs: 204 | Individual Decision Making 1: 208 | Inequality: 209 | RCT 1: 211

### Parallel Sessions 3 | 16.45 - 18.15

Cooperation 2: 204 | Pro-environmental Behavior: 208 | RCT 2: 209 | Social choice: 211

## Friday, June 28th

### Plenary session 2 – Guillaume Fréchette | 9 - 10.15

TBA: *Amphithéâtre*

### Parallel Sessions 4 | 10.45 - 12.15

AI & algorithms: 204 | Coordination & Network: 208 | Metacognition: 209 | Workplace behavior: 211

### Poster Session | 13.15 - 13.45

All posters: *First floor*

### Parallel Sessions 5 | 13.45 - 15

Games 2: 204 | Honesty & Dishonesty: 208 | Individual Decision Making 2: 209 | Social behavior and trust: 211

### Parallel Sessions 6 | 15.30 - 16.30

Markets: 204 | Methods & tools: 208 | Prosocial behavior: 209

## Special events

### Invited sessions | Thursday, 13.45 - 14.45

#### LLMs in Social and Behavioral Research | Amphithéâtre

- **Benjamin Manning** (MIT): *Automated Social Science: Language Models as Scientist and Subject*
- **Lucia Passaro** (University of Pisa) *Large Language Models: An Overview*
- **Max R. P. Grossmann** (University of Cologne) *Integrating Machine Behavior into Human Subject Experiments*

#### Replicability, Robustness and Generalizability | UXLab

- **Martin Buchner**: *Settling Settler Mortality: An Expert Survey on the Replication Debate between Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Albouy (2012)*
- **Balazs Aczel**: *Exploring Analytical Variability in the Social Sciences*
- **Felix Holzmeister**: *Heterogeneity in effect size estimates: Empirical evidence and practical implications*

### Poster Session Video Appetizer

Thursday, 10.20 - 10.30 | *Amphithéâtre*

### Poster Session

Friday, 13.14 - 13.45 | *First Floor*

### Assemblée Générale ASFEE (in French, for members)

Thursday, 18.15 - 18.45 | *Amphithéâtre*

## Overview of Sessions (click for details)

### Parallel Sessions 1 – in memory of Gary Charness | Thursday, 11 - 12.30

- Cooperation 1 (Room 204)
- Games 1 (Room 208)
- Gender (Room 209)
- Preference elicitation (Room 211)

### Parallel Sessions 2 | Thursday, 14.45 - 16.15

- Beliefs (Room 204)
- Individual Decision Making 1 (Room 208)
- Inequality (Room 209)
- RCT 1 (Room 211)

### Parallel Sessions 3 | Thursday, 16.45 - 18.15

- Cooperation 2 (Room 204)
- Pro-environmental Behavior (Room 208)
- RCT 2 (Room 209)
- Social choice (Room 211)

### Parallel Sessions 4 | Friday, 10.45 - 12.15

- AI & algorithms (Room 204)
- Coordination & Network (Room 208)
- Metacognition (Room 209)
- Workplace behavior (Room 211)

### Parallel Sessions 5 | Friday, 13.45 - 15

- Games 2 (Room 204)
- Honesty & Dishonesty (Room 208)
- Individual Decision Making 2 (Room 209)
- Social behavior and trust (Room 211)

### Parallel Sessions 6 | Friday, 15.30 - 16.30

- Markets (Room 204)
- Methods & tools (Room 208)
- Prosocial behavior (Room 209)

### Poster Session

- Poster Session (First Floor)

## Invited Sessions

### Invited session - LLMs in Social and Behavioral Research

**Max GROSSMANN (University of Cologne):** Integrating Machine Behavior into Human Subject Experiments.

**Benjamin MANNING (MIT):** Automated Social Science: Language Models as Scientist and Subjects.

**Lucia PASSARO (University of Pisa):** Large Language Models: An Overview.

### Invited session - Replicability, Robustness and Generalizability

**Martin BUCHNER (University of Duisburg-Essen):** Settling Settler Mortality: An Expert Survey on the Replication Debate between Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Albouy (2012).

**Balazs ACZEL (Eotvos Lorand University Budapest):** Exploring Analytical Variability in the Social Sciences.

**Felix HOLZMEISTER (University of Innsbruck):** Heterogeneity in effect size estimates: Empirical evidence and practical implications.

## Poster session

**Huen Tat AU YEUNG (Stockholm University) :** Information acquisition with correlation neglect

**Clémentine BOULEAU (Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne):** Does Manipulating Confidence Affect the Gender Gap in Willingness to Lead?

**Elodie CORVAISIER (GATE/CNRS/Université Lyon 2):** Impact of forced displacement on detrimental gender-based norms in the Sahel region of Africa

**Damiano PAOLI (Alma Mater Studiorum - University of Bologna):** Trust the AI Process: Do Humans Accept AI's Distributive Choices

**Michèle KAESER (University of Bern Institute for Organization and HR):** Supervisors' reactions to employees' penalty contracts

**Sacha KRAMER (Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1):** Exploring Changes in Farmers' Economic Behaviors during Epizootics: An Experimental Study

**Luisa LORE (University of Innsbruck):** Consumer (mis)perception of and beliefs updating on second-hand clothing

**Andrea MARIETTA LEINA (University of East Anglia):** Cooperation and inequalities: an experimental approach

**Kaloyana NANEVA (UniCA-Laboratoire GREDEG):** From Experiments to Experiences: The Influence of Virtual Reality on Probability Judgements

**Marie-Sophie ROUL (LEDa):** Determinants and mechanisms of trust towards environmental allegations : experimental evidence from a “green trust” game

**Alessandro SALIS (University of Sassari):** Narratives, Self-Control and Prosocial Behavior

**Matylda TROCINSKA (LMU Munich):** “Unpacking the ethics of leadership: Does power shape (im)moral preferences?”

**Xin ZHANG (University of Bologna):** Break the Norm: The effect of Opinion Leaders and Homophily

## Parallel Sessions 1 – in Memory of Gary Charness

### Cooperation 1 (Room 204)

**Maria GARCIA VALINAS (University of Oviedo):** Norm-nudges and heterogeneous preferences in public goods games.

**Pierce GATELY (University of Nottingham):** Rule Following and Cooperation.

**Moritz JANAS (NYU Abu Dhabi):** Eliciting thresholds for interdependent behavior.

**Rémi SUCHON (Anthropo-lab Lille):** Growing cooperation.

**Marie Claire VILLEVAL (CNRS):** Selective Information Sharing and Group Delusion.

### Games 1 (Room 208)

**Giuseppe ATTANASI (Sapienza University Rome):** A belief-dependent analysis of equality of opportunities in the dictator game.

**Nahed EDDAI (IESEG School of Management):** Strategic ambiguity and learning.

**Enrico LONGO (University of Hamburg):** Grassroots and Seed Money in a Multiple Public Goods setting.

**Rostislav STANEK (Masaryk University):** Strategic uncertainty attitudes in games.

**Claire RIMBAUD (Université Paris-Dauphine):** Beliefs and Ingroup Favoritism with Children.

### Gender (Room 209)

**Noémi BERLIN (CNRS):** Why do women choose different medical specialities? The role of competitiveness and taste for specialty amenities.

**Siri ISAKSSON (NHH Norwegian School of Economics):** Will Artificial Intelligence get in the way of achieving gender equality?.

**Zahra MURAD (University of Portsmouth):** Can co-leadership break the glass ceiling?.

**Nina RAPOPORT (Paris School of Economics):** Gender differences in willingness to lead: The role of confidence.

**Angela SUTAN (Burgundy School of Business):** It's better when I see you: using AR visualizations to avoid stereotypes about board members' selection.

### Preference elicitation (Room 211)

**Antonio FILIPPIN (University of Milan):** The Goods, the Bads, and the Well-Behaved.

**Ivan MITROUCHEV (IESEG School of Management):** Uncovering rationality.

**Antoine NEBOUT (INRAE):** A convenient truth: between-subject random incentives and preferences towards risk and time.

**Thibault RICHARD (IESEG School of Management):** Survey and experimental measures of uncertainty preferences.

**Fabrice LE LEC (University of Lille):** Subjective probability transformations as the effect of a non-linear treatment of stochastic reference point.

## Parallel Sessions 2

### Beliefs (Room 204)

**Irene Maria BUSO (University of Bologna):** Uncertainty and Fake News: An Experimental Study on the Strategic Use of Fake News in Belief Formation.

**Thomas DE HAAN (University of Bergen):** Longevity Beliefs Elicitation: Full Distributions and Visual Support.

**Pedro GONZALEZ FERNANDEZ (Maastricht University):** Belief Bias Identification.

**Levent GUMUS (Ghent University):** Beliefs in Reciprocity, Confidence, and Trust.

**Fidel PETROS (WZB Berlin & Berlin School of Economics):** Concerns about rising prices may raise prices.

### Individual Decision Making 1 (Room 208)

**Nicola CAMPIGOTTO (University of Trento):** Mental Accounting, Information Avoidance and Voluntary Carbon Offsets.

**Antoine MALEZIEUX (Burgundy School of Business):** More taxes, more money? 35 years of Laffer Curve experiments.

**Simon MATHEX (CEE-M Montpellier):** Dissecting the rebound effect: causes, quantification, and mitigation interventions through a survey experiment on residential heating.

**Juliane WIESE (University of Warwick):** Unveiling the Effects of Hidden Luck and Merits on Redistribution.

**Agnès FESTRE (Université Côte d Azur):** Social Capital: Experimental validation of survey measures.

### Inequality (Room 209)

**Assia ABDELFAHATTAH (GAEL Grenoble):** Individual and social acceptability of tax systems in unequal societies.

**Ankush ASRI (Radboud University):** Affirmative action: Within-group inequality in competitive environments.

**Roberto BRUNETTI (GATE):** Beliefs in Merit, Trickle-Down Economics, and Preferences for Redistribution: An Experiment with the Top and Bottom 20%.

**Claire MOLLIER (Université Paris Nanterre):** Perceptions of inequality: When the grass is less green on the other side.

**Valentine SCHMITZ GELDHOF (Université Catholique de Lille):** The effect of aggregate income dynamics on redistribution preferences: an experimental study.

### RCT 1 (Room 211)

**Gwen-Jiro CLOCHARD (Osaka University):** A large-scale field experiment to disentangle sources of statistical discrimination in a social setting.

**Enrique FATAS (Universidad Europea):** The Invisible and Widespread Discrimination of Migrants A Field Experiment in a Large Commercial Bank in Peru.

**Paul M. GORNY (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology):** The Gender of Opportunity: How Gendered Job Titles Affect Job Seeker Attraction.

**Matthieu POURIEUX (Université de Rennes):** Ranking effects in recipe choices : a randomized controlled trial in a food app.

**Brice CORGNET (EMLyon):** Navigating Autonomy: The Impact of Scheduling Flexibility and Choices on Vulnerable Workers.

## Parallel Sessions 3

### Cooperation 2 (Room 204)

**Julian BENDA (University of Innsbruck):** Reducing strategic uncertainty increases group protection in collective risk social dilemmas.

**David MASCLET (CREM Rennes):** Disentangling the Effects of Global and Local Heterogeneity on Cooperation in Multi-Level Public Goods: Experimental Evidence.

**Simon VARAINE (CEE-M Montpellier):** Are people conditionally parochial? Eliciting cooperative strategies in intergroup conflict.

**Huan XIE (Concordia University):** Favor Exchange: An Experiment.

**Dimitri DUBOIS (CNRS - University of Montpellier):** Managing Mobile Common Pool Resources: An Experimental Investigation of Spatial Externalities and Collective Action.

### Pro-environmental Behavior (Room 208)

**Abdelkarim AZAMI IDRISSE (BETA - Lorraine):** Does lobbying impact firms environmental efforts?.

**Philippine DE LATTRE (GAEL Grenoble):** Impact of environmental labelling for different substitution levels and food categories: experimental evidence.

**Andrea ESSL (Universität Bern):** The Tree Task: An incentivized, one-shot decision task to measure pro-environmental behavior.

**Valeria FANGHELLA (Grenoble Ecole de Management):** (Failing to) Mitigate motivated reasoning about wind energy: an experimental survey from France.

**Alice SOLDA (Ghent University):** Playing Dumb to Look Green.

### RCT 2 (Room 209)

**Ankush ASRI (Radboud University):** Unlocking young women's minds? The impact of a low-cost career guidance program.

**Beatrice BRAUT (University of Genoa):** The effects of reminders on engagement and walking: Evidence from a large scale experiment.

**Amalia DI GIROLAMO (University of Birmingham):** Talent is Everywhere, Opportunity is Not: Online Role Model Mentoring and Students' Aspirations.

**Irene MUSSIO (Leeds University Business School):** Clear Waters, Bright Futures: How Low-Cost Information Interventions Can Increase Health Preventive Behaviors.

**Ismaël RAFAI (Université Côte d Azur):** Hiding Preventive Messages within a Smartphone Game: Proof of concept and Field Experiment.

### Social choice (Room 211)

**Marco STIMOLO (University of Siena):** Effects of Income Mobility and Redistribution on Trust: Experimental Evidence.

**Maria-José MONTOYA VILLALOBOS (IESEG School of Management):** Correcting negative externalities: an experiment on the acceptability of taxes and regulatory standards.

**Georg SATOR (University of Nottingham):** Social influence on moral judgements.

**Lily SAVEY (Paris School of Economics):** Misinformation favouring extreme candidates: An experimental assessment of individual-level and aggregate effects.

**Benjamin OUVARD (GAEL Grenoble):** Harnessing social information to improve public support for Pigouvian taxes.

## Parallel Sessions 4

### AI & algorithms (Room 204)

**Marie-Pierre DARGNIES (Université Paris Dauphine):** Behavioral measures improve AI hiring: A field experiment.

**Damien MAYAUX (Paris School of Economics):** Regulating Visual Marketing Cues from the Lab.

**Marco PERSICHINA (University of Rome 2):** Congestion management and navigation systems: a lab experiment on individual choices vs delegation.

**Ismaël RAFAI (Université Côte d Azur):** Measuring AI-Large Language Model's economic preferences.

**Vincent TEIXEIRA (Université de Lorraine):** Algorithm Control and Responsibility : Shifting Blame to the User ?.

### Coordination & Network (Room 208)

**Margherita COMOLA (Université Paris-Saclay):** Competing for Influence: An Experiment on Multi-Agent Network Targeting.

**Yang LIRONG (Nanyang Technological University):** Action Revisions in Conflicting-Interests Coordination Games.

**Arno RIEDL (Maastricht University):** Coordination and Network Proximity: Experimental Evidence from Real-Existing Networks.

**Jeffrey ZEIDEL (New York University Abu Dhabi):** A Signaling Game Played By Teams: Theory and Experiment.

**Stephan SEMIRAT (GAEL Grenoble):** Meaning to coordinate: an experiment.

### Metacognition (Room 209)

**Quentin CAVALAN (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne):** Meta-metacognition and information search in the context of career choices.

**Charlotte CORDES (LMU Munich):** Motivated procrastination.

**Karl HAUSER (GAEL Grenoble):** Nutri-Score: lackluster Nudge or powerful Boost? Exploring the two sides of behavioral economics on the case of a food choice targeting behavioral policy-tool.

**Matteo SCACCHI (University of Insubria):** Choosing to be nudged: the effect of beliefs on social norm avoidance. An Experiment on charitable giving.

**Nicolas JACQUEMET (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne):** How large is “large enough”? Large(. . .)-scale experimental evidence on the stability of confidence measures.

### Workplace behavior (Room 211)

**Magdalena KOTEK (LISER Luxembourg):** Team Diversity in Dual Identity Formation: Empowering Cooperation and Tackling Discrimination and Counterproductive Work Behaviour.

**Emilien PROST (ESSCA Lyon):** Having Experience in the Trenches.

**Olivier SAVRIMOUTOO (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne):** The Cognitive Processes Behind Hiring Discrimination: An Experimental Investigation.

**Ludovica SPINOLA (Milano-Bicocca University):** Spillover effects of cooperative behaviour when switching tasks: the role of gender.

**Milos FISAR (Masaryk University):** Procrastination vs. Performance over Continuous Time: The Role of Breaks and Internet Browsing Temptations on Productivity.



## Parallel Sessions 5

### Games 2 (Room 204)

**Gabriel BAYLE (CEE-M Montpellier):** Efficiency of the Minimum Approval Mechanism with heterogeneous players.

**Evan FRIEDMAN (Paris School of Economics):** Quantal Response Equilibrium with a Continuum of Types: Characterization and Nonparametric Identification.

**Enya TURRINI (Royal Holloway University of London):** Information-signaling in pre-trial bargaining: An experiment.

**Tim CASON (Purdue University):** Communication, Guilt, and Agency Risk with Payoff Externalities.

### Honesty & Dishonesty (Room 208)

**Beatrice BOULU-RESHEF (Université d'Orléans):** Truthful reputation? Theory and Experiments in the Context of Investment Behavior.

**Fabio GALEOTTI (CNRS):** Non-verifiable dishonesty: Confessions as a detection and deterrence mechanism.

**Chloe TERGIMAN (Smeal College of Business):** Why do oaths work? Image concerns and credibility in promise-keeping.

**Sarah ZACCAGNI (Aarhus University):** For God, Family, and Country: The Impact of Moral Reminders on Dishonesty.

### Individual Decision Making 2 (Room 209)

**Noémie BOBIN (Université de Montpellier):** Overconfidence, Gender, and the Dynamics of Competitiveness in a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment.

**Mehdi LOUAFI (Université d'Orléans):** Do Concerns for Risks of Personal Data Leaks Impact Decision-Making in Finance?.

**Anne-Gaëlle MALTESE (University of Strasbourg):** Does Creativity Thrive on Plot Twists? Exploring the effect of surprise on team creativity.

**Michela CHESSA (Université Côte d'Azur):** How people learn complexity? An experiment on the Dirty Face problem.

### Social behavior and trust (Room 211)

**Adam ZYLBERSZTEJN (Université Lyon 2):** Anonymity, nonverbal communication and prosociality in digitized interactions: An experiment on charitable giving.

**Moti MICHAELI (University of Haifa):** Are Anti-Vaxxers Anti-Social? How convictions shape prosocial behavior and vaccination decisions.

**Sara GIL GALLÉN (Université de Strasbourg):** Equality of opportunity in a probabilistic dictator game: An artefactual field experiment.

**Eli SPIEGELMAN (Burgundy School of Business):** The evolution of conventions: strategies or preferences?.

## Parallel Sessions 6

### Markets (Room 204)

**Ben GRODECK (University of Exeter):** No Intention to Profit, No Repugnance? Experimental Evidence For Outcome-Based Repugnance.

**Alexandros KARAKOSTAS (ESSCA Lyon):** Virtue Signaling in Credence Goods Markets.

**Yujiang SUN (CEE-M Montpellier):** Giving under background risk: An experimental study.

### Methods & tools (Room 208)

**Max GROSSMANN (University of Cologne):** uproot: An Experimental Framework with a Focus on Performance, Flexibility, and Ease of Use.

**Andrea GUIDO (Burgundy School of Business):** On the external validity of experimental measures of reciprocity.

**Matteo M. MARINI (Masaryk University):** Meta-analyses in Economic Psychology: A sustainable approach to cross-cultural differences.

### Prosocial behavior (Room 209)

**Thibaut ARPINON (Georg-August-Universität Göttingen):** Impact of Animal Welfare Education on Perceived Life Worthiness and Policy Support.

**Romain ESPINOSA (CNRS):** Impact of NGOs' Undercover Videos on Citizens' Emotions and Pro-Social Behaviors.

**Andrea MARTINANGELI (Burgundy School of Business):** Externalities and the erosion of trust.

# Book of abstracts

## Cooperation 1

Day: Thu, June 27th | Time: 11 - 12.30 | Room: 204

### Presentations:

#### 1. Maria GARCIA VALINAS (University of Oviedo)

**Title:** Norm-nudges and heterogeneous preferences in public goods games

**Abstract:** Norm-nudges provide individuals with information about other individuals, such as their behaviors or beliefs. It has been shown in the literature that individuals react to these norm-nudges, but their effect is not always in the expected direction (Bicchieri and Dimant, 2022). We study, on the one hand, the channel of influence of these norm-nudges through the type of beliefs that are modified (normative or descriptive beliefs) and, on the other hand, the impact of the typology of preferences of the individuals in the group. We ran a lab experiment with 597 persons at the Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory from University Grenoble Alpes. Participants played a three-person linear public goods game. Each participant had to decide her unconditional and conditional contributions to the public good following the procedure of Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001). They also responded to questions eliciting their first- and second-order normative beliefs and descriptive beliefs (Bicchieri and Xiao, 2009). Four between-subjects treatments were conducted, each with phases that are within-subjects. The treatments differ in the information provided to participants from phase 2 onwards. Phase 1 is identical in all treatments with the measure of the participants' unconditional and conditional contributions, their first- and second-order normative beliefs and descriptive beliefs. Based on the participant's unconditional contributions in this Phase 1, she is classified as a conditional cooperator in the definition of Thöni and Volk (2018) or a low contributor otherwise. Phase 2 is the same as Phase 1, except that participants received some additional information in the interest treatments. The information given in Phase 2 is repeated in Phase 3. In phase 3, the type, conditional cooperator or low contributor, of the two other group members of the participant is displayed. We use the strategy method so that each participant makes decisions with the two other group members who are conditional contributors, with the two other group members who are low contributors, or with one of the two other group members who is conditional cooperator and the other who is low contributor. Information given to the participants from Phase 2 to 4 is specific to the treatment. The information relates to the components of the social norm as defined in d'Adda et al. (2020). The social norm consists in private values about the socially acceptable behavior, expectations regarding other participants' considerations of the socially acceptable behavior and expectations regarding other participants' behavior. We test three types of information corresponding to each component of the social norm. In treatment Optimal Nudge (OPT), participants receive the following information in all phases after Phase 1: "Contributing 20 to the project is good for the group", that announces the social optimum to the participants. In treatment Descriptive Nudge (DES), the participant receives in Phase 2 information about the average unconditional contributions in Phase 1 in the session. In Phase 3, the average contribution that is announced is calculated by the type of the participants with whom she is matched. In treatment Normative Nudge (NOR), the participant receives in Phase 2 information about the average second-order normative beliefs given by the participants in Phase 1 in the session. In Phase 3, the average second-order normative beliefs that is announced is calculated by the type of the participants with whom she is matched. We conduct a fourth treatment that is the Control with no information that is communicated in the different phases. First results show that unconditional contributions to the public good are positively correlated with the participant's first-order normative beliefs and descriptive beliefs in all phases and treatments (the effect of second-order normative beliefs is not significant). By contrast, we observe not significant effect of the composition of the group: being matched with two participants who are classified as conditional cooperators does not increase contributions to the public good. Treatment effects show that the nudge informing participants about the optimal contribution to the public good leads to higher contributions than in the other treatments. References Bicchieri, C. and Dimant, E. (2022), "Nudging with care: the risks and benefits of social information," *Public Choice*, 191(3), 443-464 Bicchieri, C. and Xiao, E. (2009), "Do the right thing: but only if others do so", *Journal of Behavioural Decision Making*, 22(2), 191-208. D'Adda, G., Dufwenberg, M., Passarelli, F. and Tabellini, G. (2020), Social norms with private values: Theory and experiments, *Games and Economic Behavior*, 124, 288-304. Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S. and Fehr, E. (2001), "Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment", *Economics Letters*, 71( 3), 397-404. Thöni, C. and Volk, S.: 2018. "Conditional cooperation: Review and refinement", *Economic Letters*, 171, 37-40.

#### 2. Pierce GATELY (University of Nottingham)

**Title:** Rule Following and Cooperation

**Abstract:** Rule following is fundamental to social order and often a practical form of human cooperation, as evidenced by recent global events in which governments sought to enshrine cooperation by issuing rules (e.g., mask mandates during COVID-19). Both rule following and cooperation have in common that they are individually costly but collectively beneficial in many interesting situations. Implementing rules can be a relatively costless way to induce cooperation by appealing to notions of social or moral norms. Here, across two studies (preregistered at AEA RCT Registry: AEARCTR-0009755) we investigate how rule following and voluntary cooperation are connected, in particular if there is a non-enforced rule demanding cooperation. Baum et al. (2004) classify rules as directive statements designed to guide behaviour with respect to different choice alternatives and assert that rules are a means through which one promotes behaviours which benefit the collective in favour of behaviour that generates short term benefits. Accepting this definition and purpose of rules, the link between rules and cooperation is evident. Rules are an essential component to establishing cooperation on a large scale through their ability to direct and govern behaviour. Rules constitute the grammar of society by prescribing socially appropriate behaviour in particular contexts. Across two studies we investigate how cooperation in a social dilemma situation is linked to people's propensity to follow costly rules. We examine whether the purpose of a rule and the social consequences of rule violations impact the rate of rule following, combining two experimentally validated paradigms: (i) Public Goods Game(s) (PGG); and (ii) Rule Following Task(s) (Kimbrough and Vostroknutov, 2016, 2018; Gaechter et al., 2022). Rule following is governed by both personal and social motives. In this experiment we examine both motives side-by-side with participants either faced with a rule that has a social purpose (i.e., the

provision of a public good) or a rule that has no purpose (i.e., standard Rule-Following Tasks (RFT)). Combining features from these two settings allows us to examine the impact of social consequences and a stated purpose on rule following behaviour and the impact of a rule on cooperative behaviour. Study 1 ( $N = 524$ ) consists of five treatments which examine how rule following behaviour and cooperation in a public good setting are related and documents differences in behaviour. We examine the impact of a rule on cooperative behaviour, and differences in rule following behaviour across three classifications of rules: (i) pointless rule; (ii) pointful rule; and (iii) pointful rule with stated purpose. In Study 1 we find that introducing a rule into PGG frameworks increases the rate of cooperation, and adding a social consequence and stated purpose to the rule increases rule following and shifts expectations of other behaviour upwards. In line with previous findings, we observe costly rule following with an average rule following rate of 69.2% (median rule following rate = 80%) in the presence of a pointless rule which is personally costly. We document the fact that rules have an all-or-nothing effect whereby the majority of people either completely comply with or violate the rule. In our two Baseline treatments in Study 1 we observe a striking difference in behaviour in Baseline RFT and Baseline PGG. We adapt the bucket RFT (Kimbrough and Vostroknutov, 2018) and in our paradigm placing 5 tokens in the blue bucket represents complete rule following in treatments with a rule and contributing ones' total endowment to the public good in PGG treatments. We find that the presence of a pointless rule simultaneously increases the proportion of participants placing all 5 tokens in the blue bucket and the proportion of participants placing 0 tokens in the blue bucket (i.e., free riding in the PGG case and rule violation in RFT case). In Study 2 ( $N = 2,880$ ), we analyse underlying mechanisms (differences in social expectations and conditional preferences) to explain the differences in behaviour observed in Study 1, using the same tasks participants in Study 1 completed. That is, in Study 2 we analyse differences in social expectations and conditional preferences for three classifications of rules: (i) pointless rule; (ii) pointful rule; and (iii) pointful rule with stated purpose. In Study 2 we investigate how the social consequences of a rule alter conditional preferences (both normative and empirical) for rule following and social expectations of others rule following behaviour. We apply the 'ABC' (Gaechter et al., 2017) approach to examine whether both normative and empirical attitudes and beliefs are predictive of participants rule following and cooperative behaviour. Data collection for Study 2 is ongoing. References: W. M. Baum, P. J. Richerson, C. M. Efferson, and B. M. Paciotti. Cultural evolution in laboratory microsocieties including traditions of rule giving and rule following. *Evolution and Human Behavior*, 25(5):305–326, 2004. S. Gaechter, F. Koelle, and S. Quercia. Reciprocity and the tragedies of maintaining and providing the commons. *Nature human behaviour*, 1(9):650–656, 2017. S. Gaechter, L. Molleman, and D. Nosenzo. Why people follow rules. Working Paper, 2022. E. O. Kimbrough and A. Vostroknutov. Norms make preferences social. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 14(3):608–638, 2016. E. O. Kimbrough and A. Vostroknutov. A portable method of eliciting respect for social norms. *Economics Letters*, 168:147–150, 2018.

### 3. Moritz JANAS (NYU Abu Dhabi)

**Title:** Eliciting thresholds for interdependent behavior

**Abstract:** Threshold models have a long tradition in studying collective action and norm change. An individual's threshold is the smallest share of society members who must exhibit a behavior such that the individual chooses to do the same. We present a theoretical framework for how perceived benefits from change, conformity preferences, and expected social sanctions determine individual thresholds. We test the hypotheses empirically via an incentive-compatible method for eliciting thresholds, applying it to the context of affirmative action in a large, diverse (stratified by race) sample of the US population. The results demonstrate how race/ethnicity/gender, conformity, reference groups, and social pressure determine threshold distributions. The model allows us to study societal equilibria. We find that social multipliers are large; that is, modest differences in perceived benefits of affirmative action lead to substantially different equilibrium behavior across social groups. We also find significant heterogeneity in the potential for social tipping points, i.e., how ripe-for-change societies are. Counterfactual analyses suggest policy interventions for promoting behavioral change.

### 4. Rémi SUCHON (Anthropo-lab Lille)

**Title:** Growing cooperation

**Abstract:** Cooperation is one of the most important determinants of the success of human groups. However, groups do not always succeed in developing norms of cooperation, especially with anonymous interactions. For instance, cooperation is seldom observed in indefinitely repeated prisoners dilemma experiments with stranger matching. This is the case even when the time horizon, the size of the community and the payoff from cooperation make cooperation theoretically sustainable. In this paper, we test whether initiating small groups that gradually expand foster cooperation in an indefinitely repeated stranger-matching prisoner dilemma game. Starting small is a common and intuitive way to build large groups. It may provide suitable conditions to develop virtuous norms of cooperation. However, whether such a mechanism is effective has not been tested in a clean lab experiment. Our experiment comprises 3 parts. In each part, participants play an indefinitely repeated prisoners dilemma. In the baseline, matching groups start out large, with 8 members. The matching groups remain fixed for the 3 parts of the experiment, and participants interact with strangers for the length of the experiment within their marching group of 8. In the treatment, groups start out small and then grow larger: In the first part, participants are matched in pairs and play the indefinitely repeated prisoners dilemma in partners' matching. In the second part, each pair is merged with another randomly selected pair, and participants play the indefinitely repeated prisoners dilemma in stranger matching within the resulting group of 4. In the last part, each group of 4 is merged with another randomly selected group of 4, and participants play the indefinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma in stranger matching within the resulting group of 8. We find that cooperation is significantly higher in the treatment. We also find that, in the treatment, cooperation decreases as the size of the community increases. This is mostly due to a substantial decrease in cooperation between the first and the second part, i.e. when matching switches from partner to stranger. Turning to our main hypothesis, we find that cooperation in the third part of the experiment is significantly higher in the treatment, where growth was experienced, than in the baseline. This suggests that letting groups grow from small to big provides suitable conditions to develop a norm of cooperation.

### 5. Marie Claire VILLEVAL (CNRS)

**Title:** Selective Information Sharing and Group Delusion

**Abstract:** Although in many situations groups make better decisions than individuals, groups also often make mistakes. We investigate experimentally one possible source of sub-optimal decision-making by groups: the selective and asymmetric sharing of ego-relevant information among team members. We show that good news about one's performance is shared more often with team members than bad news. The biased information sharing within teams, together with selection neglect by the receivers,

induces higher team confidence compared to an unbiased exchange of performance feedback. As a result, weak teams end up making worse investment decisions in a bet whose success depends on the team's ability. The endogenous social exchange of ego-relevant information may thus lead to detrimental group delusion, and we find this effect to be comparable across smaller and larger groups.

## Games 1

**Day:** Thu, June 27th | **Time:** 11 - 12.30 | **Room:** 208

### Presentations:

1. **Giuseppe ATTANASI** (Sapienza University Rome)

**Title:** A belief-dependent analysis of equality of opportunities in the dictator game

**Abstract:** Thanks to a simultaneous “reciprocal dictator game” with paired individuals who play between themselves and at the same time the dual role of dictators and recipients, we investigate whether distributional preferences or belief-dependent preferences have a better predictive power. We compare the theoretical predictions of two models of social preferences that can explain behavior in this gift-exchange context: distributional preferences in the form of opportunity-based kindness à la Saito (AER, 2013), and belief-dependent preferences in the form of intention-based kindness à la Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (GEB, 2004). By disentangling experimentally the features that lead from the standard dictator game to our reciprocal dictator game (equality of endowments, equality of opportunities, and beliefs on the other's actions), we test the consistency of the predictions of the two models under each treatment manipulation. Overall, our results support the view that other-regarding behavior in gift-exchange settings is mainly driven by players' beliefs on the other's kindness rather than by equality of opportunities of being kind to the other.

2. **Nahed EDDAI** (IESEG School of Management)

**Title:** Strategic ambiguity and learning

**Abstract:** Many strategic and non-strategic choices are made under ambiguity (Knight, 1921; Ellsberg, 1961), where decision-makers lack information about the probabilities of the realization of the relevant outcomes. Ellsberg's seminal contribution and theoretical advances that follow in the field of behavioral decision analysis lead to a plethora of experimental papers on individual decision-making under ambiguity. There has also been a significant growth in research on the role of ambiguity in strategic interactions, especially during the last decade (Di Mauro and Castro, 2011; Eichberger and Kelsey, 2011; Ivanov, 2011; Kelsey and Le Roux, 2013; Chark and Chew, 2015; Kelsey and Le Roux, 2015; Kelsey and Le Roux, 2018; Dominiak and Duersch, 2019; Li, Turmunkh and Wakker, 2019; Calford, 2020; Li, Turmunkh and Wakker, 2020; Aoyagi, Masuda and Nishimura, 2021; Eddai, 2022). Although these studies provide many insights about the nature of strategic interactions in the face of ambiguity, important gaps in the literature on preferences and behavior under strategic ambiguity remain. One of the important open questions concerns the impact of learning under ambiguity in repeated strategic interactions. Indeed, most everyday decision situations under ambiguity, whether in individual or social context, do not fit the typical assumption according to which agents are totally ignorant of the probabilities but they often have opportunities for learning from previous experience. Learning under individual decision-making under ambiguity has been investigated by several studies (Baillon et al., 2017; Aydogan, 2021; Abdellaoui et al., 2023). However, to our best knowledge, the impact of learning under ambiguity in strategic interactions has still not been investigated experimentally. The main objective of this paper is to address this shortcoming in the literature. In particular, we investigate the effect of learning on ambiguity attitudes in the context of a repeated minimum-effort Coordination game. We first present an economic model of learning under strategic ambiguity that predicts a decrease of ambiguity perception over time. We then present experimental evidence to test the predictions of our model. We consider a repeated coordination game where players have incentives to coordinate their efforts and each player's payoff will depend on the effort undertaken by the other players. We measure ambiguity attitudes in a repeated coordination game following Baillon et al. (2018, ECMA). Our analysis shows how learning can impact ambiguity attitudes, while controlling for measurements of other economic preferences.

3. **Enrico LONGO** (University of Hamburg)

**Title:** Grassroots and Seed Money in a Multiple Public Goods setting

**Abstract:** Experiments with multiple threshold public goods provide insight into how groups overcome coordination issues to collectively select and fund one option from a set of alternatives. When heterogeneity in preferences and endowment is introduced, Corazzini et al. (2022) show that groups tend to focus on and successfully fund the option that is preferred by the wealthiest group member, demonstrating a wealthy-interest policy bias even in the absence of corruption, politics, and information asymmetries. At the same time, groups converge to divide costs in highly progressive ways, with differences in voluntary contributions mostly offsetting differences in endowments or benefits received. In this paper, we consider a misalignment in the preferences over the public goods to be funded between a majority of poor subjects and a minority of rich subjects and we investigate how funding, selection, and success of public goods are impacted when i) rich and poor subjects make their contribution choices sequentially (either the rich subject or the three poor subjects contribute first), and ii) one alternative public good emerges as salient for the poor (or not). Our evidence confirms that the alternative preferred by the wealthy represents a viable coordination device for the group in all treatments with no salience. Contributing to the public good preferred by the wealthy is beneficial for all group members and reduces within-group inequality. In the absence of a salient option for the poor and with the rich subject moving first, both coordination and profits increase. Introducing a salient option per se increases the coordination on the public good preferred by the poor, but does not reduce inequality. Interestingly, when a salient option is combined with the poor subjects moving first, both coordination and profits increase and inequality is also reduced.

4. **Rostislav STANEK** (Masaryk University)

**Title:** Strategic uncertainty attitudes in games

**Abstract:** Strategic uncertainty is the uncertainty that players face with respect to the purposeful behavior of other players in

an interactive decision situation. Strategic uncertainty is fundamental to many economic problems such as coordination failures, investment decisions or teamwork. The literature measures strategic uncertainty by varying the source of uncertainty. The procedure is based on elicitation of certainty equivalents for games where the uncertainty comes from the purposeful decision of the other player and lotteries with exogenously given probabilities (Heinemann 2009) or unknown probabilities (Bruttel et al. 2023). Such comparison involves not only uncertainty generated by human purposeful action but also human interaction as such. There is ample evidence that people treat acts by humans differently compared to acts caused by nature (Bohnet et al. 2008, Li et al. 2020). The question arises whether strategic uncertainty attitudes are driven by ambiguity aversion generated by unknown counterpart's behavior or by the mere interaction with of human counterpart. Moreover, strategic uncertainty should not be reduced to the source of uncertainty. There are human interactions where players can be quite certain about the counterpart's strategy, while other interactions incur high strategic uncertainty. This paper develops a method how to manipulate strategic uncertainty in human strategic interactions while keeping the equilibrium beliefs and strategies constant. We conduct an experiment that measures strategic uncertainty, and we identify strategic uncertainty aversion in human interactions. Similarly, to our paper Szkup & Trevino (2020) manipulate uncertainty regarding counterpart's action by changing the payoff structure of a strategic game with incomplete information. They use 2x2 coordination game in which players obtain imprecise but correlated private signals about the payoff in coordination equilibrium. The precision of the signal determines the equilibrium expectations that the other player chooses a particular action. The player is considered to face high strategic uncertainty if both actions of the other player are equally likely. In contrast to their approach, our manipulation does not change the equilibrium strategies or probabilities assigned to the particular action of the other player. Instead of expected probabilities, our experiment manipulates expected volatility of probabilities - an ambiguity measurement suggested by Izthakian (2020) We use a 2x2 strategic game with imperfect information as a setup for our experiment. In this game, players choose between two actions A and B. If a player chooses action A, he incurs some costs that are drawn from a uniform distribution. Depending on the level of the costs, players can have dominant strategy A, B or their strategies can be strategic complements (substitutes). The players do not know counterpart's costs which leads to unique cut-off equilibrium strategies. We exploit the fact that the same equilibrium belief and strategies can be generated by a mixture of dominant A and dominant B types on one hand or by a mixture of dominant and coordination types on the other hand. While the behavior of dominant types is less uncertain, the existence of coordination leads to higher volatility of beliefs. We elicit not only participants' actions, but we also ask them to choose the game with different levels of strategic uncertainty and different equilibrium payoffs in a sequence of binary choices. The choices revealed preference for games with lower levels of strategic uncertainty.

5. **Claire RIMBAUD** (Université Paris-Dauphine)

**Title:** Beliefs and Ingroup Favoritism with Children

**Abstract:** We investigate whether ingroup favoritism can be driven by guilt-aversion (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007). Indeed, if the decision-maker believes that ingroups expect more pro-sociality from him than outgroups, then (s)he will favor ingroups to fulfill their expectations (not necessarily because (s)he prefers them or believes it will lead to further benefit for him/her). Guilt-aversion should be linked to the development of understanding of second-order beliefs and of social perspective-taking. Hence, it seems relevant to study its role on ingroup favoritism among primary-school children. To test this hypothesis, we measure—not only donation behaviors—but also beliefs and theory-of-mind skills. We observe ingroup favoritism in donations for about half of children. Favoritism is partially explained by guilt-averse preferences: on the one hand, favoring an ingroup who knows the dictator's team (hence, expects a generous donation) is more frequent than favoring an ingroup who does not know the dictator's team (hence, expects a medium donation). On the other hand, we do not observe that children's donations are influenced by outgroups' knowledge of the dictator's team. Moreover, donations and second-order beliefs are correlated among older children. Finally, theory-of-mind skills (as measured by our tasks) do not seem to explain whether children consider the recipients' knowledge in their donations.

## Gender

**Day:** Thu, June 27th | **Time:** 11 - 12.30 | **Room:** 209

### Presentations:

1. **Noémi BERLIN** (CNRS)

**Title:** Why do women choose different medical specialties? The role of competitiveness and taste for specialty amenities

**Abstract:** Empirical evidence shows that men and women make different educational choices and hold different types of occupations. In this paper, we study the case of medical studies in France: a very competitive field in which there are today more women than men and where high gender imbalances in terms of medical specialty choices are observed. We investigate the determinants of the gender gap of specialty choices that takes place at the end of the 6th year of medical studies after taking a national exam that rank the students allowing them to sequentially choose a specialty from the available residency positions. We confirm that women perform less and thus have a more constrained specialty choice set than men. Competitiveness largely explains this gender gap in performance. We also show that even when facing the same choice set, women choose different specialties than men and that is mainly because women have different taste in specialties amenities, whereas behavioral variables only play a minor role in this decision.

2. **Siri ISAKSSON** (NHH Norwegian School of Economics)

**Title:** Will Artificial Intelligence get in the way of achieving gender equality?

**Abstract:** The promise of generative AI to increase human productivity relies on developing skills to become proficient at it. There is reason to suspect that women and men use AI tools differently, which could result in productivity and payoff gaps in a labor market increasingly demanding knowledge in AI. Thus, it is important to understand if there are gender differences in AI-usage among current students. We conduct a survey at the Norwegian School of Economics collecting use and attitudes

towards ChatGPT, a measure of AI proficiency, and responses to policies allowing or forbidding ChatGPT use. Three key findings emerge: first, female students report a significantly lower use of ChatGPT compared to their male counterparts. Second, male students are more skilled at writing successful prompts, even after accounting for higher ChatGPT usage. Third, imposing university bans on ChatGPT use widens the gender gap in intended use substantially. We provide insights into potential factors influencing the AI adoption gender gap and highlight the role of appropriate encouragement and policies in allowing female students to benefit from AI usage, thereby mitigating potential impacts on later labor market outcomes.

3. **Zahra MURAD** (University of Portsmouth)

**Title:** Can co-leadership break the glass ceiling?

**Abstract:** This study examines the impact of co-leadership as an institutional solution to enhance gender diversity in top leadership roles. We propose that responsibility aversion may contribute to the gender gap in leadership positions and explore how co-leadership affects women’s willingness to take on such roles. Our findings across three studies (N=2000) suggest that women are less inclined to be solo decision-makers but are more willing to engage in leadership when responsibilities are co-shared. In solo leadership setups, women experience heightened levels of responsibility, anxiety, blame, and guilt, which are significantly mitigated in co-leadership contexts. These results offer valuable insights for organizational decision-makers aiming to increase representative diversity in leadership, suggesting that co-leadership could be an effective strategy for achieving this goal.

4. **Nina RAPOPORT** (Paris School of Economics)

**Title:** Gender differences in willingness to lead: The role of confidence

**Abstract:** This experimental paper studies the link between gender differences in confidence and willingness to become the leader of a group in two different leadership environments. In the first environment (“influence”), the leader’s payoff depends on their ability to persuade group members to make the correct decision, and in the second, on their ability to make the correct decision on behalf of group members after receiving their input (“responsibility”). Before indicating their willingness to become leader, participants undergo an individual first stage in which they gain experience (but not feedback) in the same type of decisions. This allows us to measure individual ability and beliefs on performance in the task. While the gender gap in willingness to lead is larger in the “responsibility” condition, confidence seems to play a larger role in driving leadership aspirations in the “influence” condition.

5. **Angela SUTAN** (Burgundy School of Business)

**Title:** It’s better when I see you: using AR visualizations to avoid stereotypes about board members’ selection

**Abstract:** Traditionally, boards have a shareholders-oriented mission: The main responsibility of directors is to discipline and monitor managers (Huse, 2007). However, board roles, board members’ backgrounds, and characteristics beyond the traditional monitoring and control role have lately received more attention (Van Ees et al., 2009; Ruigrok et al., 2007). There is, for instance, a crucial role of board members in providing resources to the firm, strategic advice, knowledge, innovation, and networking for the company (Hillman et al., 2000; Andres et al., 2012; Huse, 2007; Pfeffer, 1972; Mizruchi, 1996; Burt, 1992). Therefore, the issue of the criteria used to select board members became especially prominent as many countries introduced new legislations, quotas, and recommendations focusing on the notion of board diversity, mainly regarding gender and age (European Commission, 2011). One can categorize board diversity into directly observable (e.g., gender, age, nationality) and less visible aspects (e.g., educational, previous work experience, competencies) (Kang et al., 2007; Mahadeao et al., 2012; Galia & Zenou, 2012). The most visible illustration of diversity pressure on board members’ selection criteria is gender diversity. Quotas and current practices are common knowledge; they function as focal points. However, as Fiske et al. (2002) pointed out, such focal points can be bi-dimensional and activate opposite stereotypes about gender diversity. As noted by Nekhili & Gatfaoui (2013), the use of diversity criteria, in particular gender diversity, in the selection of board members faces several obstacles: The glass ceiling (Terjesen, 2009) prevents the selection of females into boards; board roles are different for males and females (Bilimoria & Piderit, 1994; Kesner, 1988; Peterson & Philpot, 2007); the board selection process often leads to the formation of a “club of overconfident males” or an “old boy’s network” (Burke, 1997). Gender diversity quotas are expected to allow for the entrance of fundamentally different people into boards with significantly different characteristics than the incumbent board members (Rosenblum & Roithmayr, 2015). However, data show that there is very little difference in the profiles of females and males recruited into boards; their dominant characteristics, e.g., education and experience, are the same; the effects of such gender diversity on the performance of organizations are highly controversial (Simpson et al., 2010). As Doldor et al. (2012) pointed out, the board appointment process was often criticized for its subjective and exclusionary nature and its likelihood to generate obstacles to diversity. These criticisms include unclear selection criteria and unconscious bias in the selection process, excessive importance of social capital and personal reputations, or selection practices emphasizing fit with existing (typically male-dominated) board cultures rather than actual skills. Our research contributes to investigating this board appointment process by exploring the biases on the selection of board members generated/reduced by i) the common knowledge of diversity, ii) the group decision-making, iii) the ability of a board to visualize (with AR/VR) the consequences of decisions if the board needs to manage a public good, a company or a standard asset. We hypothesize that, by properly making decisions salient through AR visualizations (avatars), we can create effective tools and reduce the influence of gender stereotypes and redesign competitive workplaces such that they align with heterogeneous preferences to reach gender equality. We expect that AR will i) augment the self and embeds it in the perceived outcomes, rather than leaving users as external observers of a simulation; ii) reduce the cognitive load of participants by superposing credence (what I am told and I need to believe) and experience (what I test and experience) attributes of the body and environment. Our work relates to a recent stream of research called “situated visualization” (Willett et al., 2017), where data is visualized close to the physical spaces, objects, or people to which the data refers, often using augmented reality technology. We construct our mechanism by considering the findings of Epley & Dunning (2000) and addressing the criticisms of the Krupka & Weber (2013) method: Individuals are better at predicting other individuals’ preferences than theirs. However, they do not naturally form expectations about average behavior when not prompted to do so (in the absence of incentives). As Erkut et al. (2014) pointed out, participants are incentivized to reveal what they perceive to be the collectively shared judgment of the appropriateness of the actions they evaluate, not their own personal judgment. We conducted several experiments in which participants are board makers, not board takers, as in choice experiments. Participants first compose an avatar for themselves and an ID card based on standard measures, including overconfidence, that they choose to display or not. After, they perform a board composition task in which they will have to select members for the board, one by one, following popular criteria, in a virtualized environment with avatars. Participants see the evolution of their board in real time and, most importantly, the

consequences of implemented preferences on the management of an asset, a public good, or a company. We run lab and field experiments with “real” board members. The criteria used are gender and age (Kang et al., 2007; Mahadeao et al., 2012), educational background and nationality (Nekhili & Gatfaoui, 2013; Ruigrok et al., 2007; Mahadeao et al., 2012), the role of a director’s previous experience (Terjesen et al., 2009; Ben Amar et al., 2013), and the ID card with personal characteristics. Size and aspect were malleable. See Figure 3. A new member (small/tall avatar). Superposed visualizations. Selected members.

## Preference elicitation

**Day:** Thu, June 27th | **Time:** 11 - 12.30 | **Room:** 211

### Presentations:

1. **Antonio FILIPPIN** (University of Milan)

**Title:** The Goods, the Bads, and the Well-Behaved

**Abstract:** Our life very often involves unpleasant activities. Moreover, the same bundles can often be represented as containing goods or bads by changing the reference point. Economic research focuses almost exclusively on “goods”, with the justification that the toolbox is the same. From an empirical perspective, this is contentious and there are reasons to suspect that representing bundles as containing bads rather than goods may make a difference for decision-makers. Borrowing from Prospect Theory, we hypothesize that the diminishing sensitivity in the loss domain will make subjects averse to diversification when choosing between “bads.” Indeed, Filippin and Mantovani (2022) find aversion to diversification in a survey where subjects are asked to choose between fatalities and jobs lost. In this paper we test whether the “goods” vs. “bads” framing results in a flip in the curvature of the indifference curves. Preliminary evidence from a pilot experiment confirms that the choice among the very same fundamentals induces convex indifference curves (preference for diversification) in the “goods” domain, and concave indifference curves (aversion to the diversification) in the “bads” domain

2. **Ivan MITROUCHEV** (IESEG School of Management)

**Title:** Uncovering rationality

**Abstract:** Standard economic theory often assumes that rational individuals make decisions that maximize their utility, which is a component of welfare. However, recent discussions in behavioural welfare economics and decision theory have raised serious concerns regarding rationality as a reliable indicator of welfare. We propose an experiment where we explore in depth the relationship between rationality and welfare. We test the normative appeal of some axioms of rational choice, propose a novel approach to understand people’s choice revision in the risk, time and social domains, and study the relationship between, on the one hand, people’s degree of rationality, and on the other hand, their opinions on decision making quality and level of subjective well-being.

3. **Antoine NEBOUT** (INRAE)

**Title:** A convenient truth: between-subject random incentives and preferences towards risk and time

**Abstract:** The random incentive system (RIS) is the gold standard real-incentive mechanism in economic experiments: one of the choices made by each subject is played for real. In a variation of this mechanism, called hybrid RIS, each subject has a selection probability 00, but no effect is captured regarding the magnitude of the non-zero selection probability. These results point to a “convenient truth”: experimentalists can use hybrid RIS to reduce experimental costs or consider larger choice outcomes, without distorting observed preferences.

4. **Thibault RICHARD** (IESEG School of Management)

**Title:** Survey and experimental measures of uncertainty preferences

**Abstract:** Given their significance in the economic literature, uncertainty preferences have been increasingly incorporated into large-scale surveys representative of the general population. In this context, the assessment of these individual preferences typically relies on the use of qualitative measures (e.g., Likert scales). However, the extent to which such measures align with experimental measures, remains unclear. This is particularly true regarding preferences under ambiguity (i.e., preferences under uncertainty when the probabilities of an event are not objectively defined). To address this gap, we conduct an experiment measuring ambiguity attitudes using both Ellsberg urns and natural events, and examine their correlation with a series of qualitative or introspective questions. Through this project, our aim is to design a concise module specifically tailored to elucidate ambiguity preferences.

5. **Fabrice LE LEC** (University of Lille)

**Title:** Subjective probability transformations as the effect of a non-linear treatment of stochastic reference point

**Abstract:** Koszegi and Rabin’s (2007) model has become the workhorse model for endogenous reference-dependent preferences. However, in its present form, it cannot explain some important stylized facts observed in the experimental/empirical literature; in particular, it cannot account for the fact that individuals seem to be overly sensitive to the changes from impossible to possible (possibility effect) or to the changes from possible to certain (certainty effect), and the risk attitudes that go along (risk-seeking behaviour for low probabilities of large gains and risk-aversion for low probabilities in the domain of losses). These phenomena are usually accounted for through the probability transformation function, in rank-dependent expected utility or likewise in cumulative prospect theory. In order to extend KR model in these directions, we propose here to relax the simplifying assumption made by Koszegi and Rabin that the stochastic reference point corresponds exactly to the lottery under consideration. This assumption implies that the weights given to each possible outcome, used as reference points, correspond exactly to their probabilities. The underlying idea is that the additional sensations of gains and losses of facing one specific consequence should be more intense if the individual had a high probability of obtaining the other outcomes. In this paper, we generalize KR’s model to the case where stochastic reference point can be subject to some form of probability transformation. In particular, we assume that the subjective stochastic reference point is a pessimistic transformation of the lottery under consideration. Under



this assumption, we show that reference-dependent preferences can be represented by a rank-dependent utility function with inverted-S shape probability transformation, allowing the model to explain the previously mentioned stylized facts. The reasoning is carried on using the equivalence presented by Masatlioglu and Raymond (2016) between reference dependent preferences and rank-dependent expected utility, a result we extend to less stringent constraints and assumptions on parameters and functional forms. We show in particular how these results extend to pessimistic reference point. In addition, we expose how this extended model provides a flexible and frugal framework to account for decisions under risk usually assumed to stem from a direct distortion of probabilities. Two theoretical results can be highlighted: first, for two-branch lotteries, the extended KR model and rank-dependent expected utility (or cumulative prospect theory in the gains) cannot be distinguished; second, for lotteries with more branches, it can be shown that there always exists a difference between both models. In other words, for two-branch lotteries, this extended KR model is equivalent to a RDU one and is able to account all behaviors that RDU/CPT can explain, but this equivalence breaks down for more complicated lotteries. This last point provide room to test empirically the performance of both the usual CPT/RDU models and the extended KR. In order to do so, we run a series of structural estimations with past experimental data that used lotteries of more than 3 branches (e.g., Hey and Orme, 1995). Preliminary results indicate the extended KR model performs at least as well as RDU/CPT. Several implications and open questions are discussed, among which preferences in the loss domain, the possibility to set up specific experimental choices that distinguish clearly between both types of models, and the possibility to have the status quo as part of the endogenous reference point.

## Beliefs

**Day:** Thu, June 27th | **Time:** 14.45 - 16.15 | **Room:** 204

### Presentations:

1. **Irene Maria BUSO** (University of Bologna)

**Title:** Uncertainty and Fake News: An Experimental Study on the Strategic Use of Fake News in Belief Formation

**Abstract:** The present experimental analysis aims to shed light on the relationship between the formation of motivated beliefs and “fake” news. Previous experimental evidence has suggested that uncertainty on the consequences of a choice on the welfare of other individuals (e.g., Dana et al., 2007; Exley, 2016; Garcia et al., 2020) or on the environment (e.g., Momsen and Ohndorf, 2022) as well as uncertainty on the prevalent social norm (e.g., Bicchieri et al., 2023) creates a moral wiggle room that is exploited to undertake selfish behaviours, and belief manipulation has been identified as a source of self-serving behaviour (e.g., Bicchieri et al., 2023; Hasley and Weber, 2010). Our experiment belongs to this strand of literature as it aims to test if a fake news on the consequences of a choice on the welfare of another individual influences the formation of the belief on the consequences and the choice to take toward a selfish option rather than toward a prosocial one; also, not only we test if fake news induce a biased beliefs, but also if distortion occurs particularly when the fake news is aligned to the self-interested choice, i.e., if fake news are used to form exclusively or mainly motivated beliefs. We build on the experimental setting of Exley (2016) Garcia et al. (2020) to detect the strategic use of uncertainty to take more selfish choices: 4 scenarios are implemented through the use of multiple choice lists where subjects choose between a safe option and a risk option, and these 4 scenarios differ in whether the beneficiary of the safe option and of the risky option is the same subject who is choosing or another recipient, i.e. another individual in the experiment or a charity. We add to this setting a signal on the payoff, positive or null, that the lottery would determine. This signal could be more or less informative: similarly to Poinas et al. (2012), subjects receive a true but imperfect signal on the urn composition and the informativeness of the signal is exogenously manipulated. Subjects are told that one of two urns is randomly selected (i.e., each has a probability of 0.5) for each price list and determine the result of the lotteries in that price list. The WHITE URN is composed by 1000 white balls, the BLACK URN is composed by 999 white balls and 1 black ball. The lotteries in a price list pay the positive outcome if the WHITE URN is associated to that price list. The computer inspects the urn checking the color of  $n$  balls with replacement and give a signal on the presence of the black ball. Depending on  $n$ , the signal on the information on the absence of the black ball is more or less informative. Preliminary results from pilot sessions show that self-serving behaviour is present and it is increased by the weakly informative signal.

2. **Thomas DE HAAN** (University of Bergen)

**Title:** Longevity Beliefs Elicitation: Full Distributions and Visual Support

**Abstract:** We investigate subjective longevity beliefs in a large sample of the Swiss adult population, using the Click- and- Drag interface, a tool to empower subjects to intuitively submit full belief distributions. We collect data on longevity beliefs on archetypes, on a series of different health scenarios, and for themselves. We implement both a CDF elicitation task – in line with most of the literature – and a PDF version for the same task. Our results show that participants estimates elicited with a PDF interface were more accurate than those using the CDF interface. We show additionally that providing participants with a visual support in the form of an average longevity distribution, substantially helps to improve accuracy and debias estimates. Moreover providing visual aid right away clearly outperformed helping after a first unguided estimation. Our findings show the promise of eliciting full distributions, reveal a surprising outperforming of the PDF over the CDF visualisation, and show that providing visual guidance is a powerful tool for improving longevity predictions.

3. **Pedro GONZALEZ FERNANDEZ** (Maastricht University)

**Title:** Belief Bias Identification

**Abstract:** This paper proposes a unified theoretical model to identify and test multiple probabilistic updating biases within a single framework. The model achieves separate identification by focusing on the updating of belief distributions, rather than classic point-belief measurements. Testing the model in a laboratory experiment reveals significant heterogeneity at the individual level: All tested biases are present, and each participant exhibits at least one identifiable bias. Notably, motivated-belief biases (optimism and pessimism) and sequence-related biases (gambler’s fallacy and hot hand fallacy) are identified as key drivers of biased inference. Moreover, at the population level, base rate neglect emerges as a persistent influence. This study contributes to

the belief-updating literature by providing a methodological toolkit for researchers examining links between different conflicting biases, or exploring connections between updating biases and other behavioural phenomena.

4. **Levent GUMUS** (Ghent University)

**Title:** Beliefs in Reciprocity, Confidence, and Trust

**Abstract:** Probabilistic beliefs are key drivers of economic behaviour, yet incentive-compatible and easy-to-understand measures of beliefs have proved elusive. We develop a novel method that allows us to econometrically recover probabilistic beliefs from simple binary choices between bets on different events. The method is incentive-compatible under all major models of decision-making, and easy to understand for subjects. We test the method by eliciting beliefs about the reciprocation of trust. The mean belief we elicit predicts trust, and performs slightly better than commonly used qualitative and quantitative survey questions. Further adding confidence in beliefs describing the belief distribution improves the performance of our measure dramatically. This shows the promise of the method for applied work.

5. **Fidel PETROS** (WZB Berlin & Berlin School of Economics)

**Title:** Concerns about rising prices may raise prices

**Abstract:** We use a laboratory experiment to investigate whether statements from a governmental institution expressing concerns about price increases can trigger such increases by facilitating tacit collusion. Such statements on market conduct are disclosed after an exogenous and unexpected upward cost shock. The two potential channels affecting tacit collusion work through (i) the reduction of strategic uncertainty and (ii) an inducement of correlated beliefs. We find that issued statements of concern become a self-fulfilling prophecy triggering price increases and that the reduction in strategic uncertainty drives this adverse effect. Our results suggest that institutions should refrain from publishing such statements of concern.

## Individual Decision Making 1

**Day:** Thu, June 27th | **Time:** 14.45 - 16.15 | **Room:** 208

### Presentations:

1. **Nicola CAMPIGOTTO** (University of Trento)

**Title:** Mental Accounting, Information Avoidance and Voluntary Carbon Offsets

**Abstract:** Voluntary carbon offsets allow individuals to mitigate the impact of their emissions by funding environmental and energy projects. Despite the growth of this market, the behavioral drivers of offsetting decisions remain largely unexplored. This paper discusses the results of two incentivized online experiments examining two of these drivers, namely mental accounting (the cognitive bookkeeping process by which individuals evaluate gains and losses) and information avoidance (the tendency to avoid or delay information acquisition). The results suggest that: (i) monetary transactions associated with activities that are clearly perceived as carbon-intensive result in higher contributions to an offset programme, consistent with mental accounting predictions; (ii) individuals with a low pro-environmental orientation are more likely to avoid information about their emissions, thus contributing less; (iii) on average, the choice to actively avoid (seek) information reduces (increases) contributions relative to situations in which information is unavailable (compulsively provided).

2. **Antoine MALEZIEUX** (Burgundy School of Business)

**Title:** More taxes, more money? 35 years of Laffer Curve experiments

**Abstract:** According to economist Arthur Laffer, an optimal tax rate exists that maximizes revenue collection, known as the “Laffer curve”. This concept influenced fiscal doctrine and the idea of supply-side economics, suggesting that a tax cut could increase tax revenue when the government operates on the right side of the curve. However, at the microeconomic level, the theory remains ambiguous: higher taxes may incentivize people to work more by reducing available income (income effect), but they may also provide an incentive to work less as the opportunity cost of leisure decreases (substitution effect). Many people intuitively believe that as taxes increase, individuals’ motivation to work decreases. Macroeconomic research has explored this relationship but has generated conflicting conclusions. Experimental research has also examined the influence of income tax on effort, with seminal work by Swenson (1988) and subsequent studies, such as e.g., Kessler and Norton (2016), Djanali and Sheehan-Connor (2012), and Fochmann et al. (2013) reporting opposing effects, both negative and positive. In typical Laffer curve experiments in experimental economics, participants are assigned to different treatments that represent varying tax rates (high, low, medium). In these experiments, participants are given a real effort task and are paid based on their performance. They are also informed of the corresponding tax rate on their earnings, for example, 75%, 50%, or 25%. The goal of these experiments is to observe how variations in the exerted effort across these treatments impact the overall tax revenue, thereby shedding light on the effects of increase in tax rates. However, there are important problems with those small-scale experiments (such as statistical power, generalizability of the findings or selective reporting) and this is where conducting a meta-analysis becomes crucial. In this study, I aim to provide a definitive answer to the research question: what is the impact of rising taxes on labor supply in laboratory experiments? I have identified 31 independent studies implementing Laffer curve experiments, and currently, I have data from 20 papers, with four promised datasets, four lost datasets, and three datasets awaiting responses from the authors. My analysis will consider policy variables, individual variables, and experimental variables. Policy variables include the level of tax rates, their proportional or progressive nature, and whether they are redistributed. Individual variables encompass participants’ gender, age, and individual productivity. Experimental variables involve treatments being between or within participants, the exogenous imposition or endogenous choice of tax rates, and more. This study aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the impact of taxes on effort provision in the lab, establish standards for future Laffer curve experiments, and identify interesting avenues for future research.

3. **Simon MATHEX** (CEE-M Montpellier)

**Title:** Dissecting the rebound effect: causes, quantification, and mitigation interventions through a survey experiment on residential heating

**Abstract:** It is now well established that energy efficiency improvements of a technology generate less energy savings than expected due to the rebound effect. The main explication is by becoming more efficient, the technology become also less expensive and incites people to use it more (price effect). By choosing a technology more efficient and ecological, people can be also feel less guilty and use it more frequently (moral licensing effect). In a survey experiment of 3756 subjects, we quantify the magnitude of the rebound in residential heating and distinguishing the part due to the price effect to the part due to the moral licensing effect. We also test two policy interventions to mitigate the magnitude of the rebound effect: a nudge based on a social norm and a boost based on increased knowledge of people. Our findings show an average rebound effect of 26% due to the price effect, which is increased by 1.5% due to the moral licensing effect, despite the difference between the two is not statistically significant. The fact that the choice of the greener technology is endogenous rather than exogenous seems to counteract the moral licensing effect by generating a consistency effect that reduces the rebound effect by 1.8%. Boost also reduces the magnitude of the rebound effect by 1.7%. We don't find a significant effect for the nudge. Finally, we discuss the inclusion of the moral licensing effect in the rebound effect literature and related methodological issues.

4. **Juliane WIESE** (University of Warwick)

**Title:** Unveiling the Effects of Hidden Luck and Merits on Redistribution

**Abstract:** We investigate whether unveiling a non-winner's behind-the-veil performance in a winner-takes-all game affects the winner's redistributive behavior. In a unique game setting where luck plays an important part in the selection process and winners can contribute very little and still win, we find strong evidence of justified deservingness among winners. The more winners contribute relative to the non-winners in the production phase, the less they redistribute to the non-winners. However, in treatments where we unveil information about the non-winners' performance, we find that the non-winners' performance, even when it is meaningless in the production phase, significantly increased the winners' redistribution.

5. **Agnès FESTRE** (Université Côte d Azur)

**Title:** Social Capital: Experimental validation of survey measures

**Abstract:** The social fabric, generally recognised as essential for economic and social transactions, is often referred to as Social Capital (SC). In this paper, we explore to what extent inexpensive attitudinal survey data can be a substitute for more expensive experimental data as a metric of SC, using a cross-country design. We use data from two standard subject pools (located in Spain and France) and a mixed approach in the sense of presenting validated attitudinal survey questions from the SC section of the latest wave of World Values Survey (WVS) to our participants, in addition to games for eliciting SC through actions and beliefs. Our data can be compared to publicly available WVS data at the relevant regional level as well as the national level. The main takeaway from our study is that SC measured by survey items is predominantly higher in Spain than in France but not consistently so across items and spatial resolution (general vs groups, national vs regional and local), whereas SC measured by choices and beliefs in incentivised games is predominantly higher in France. This may confirm that there is reason for scepticism concerning the general validity of survey measures in the context of social capital. Keywords: social capital; cross-cultural; lab experiments JEL Classification: Q12; C22; D81

## Inequality

**Day:** Thu, June 27th | **Time:** 14.45 - 16.15 | **Room:** 209

### Presentations:

1. **Assia ABDELFAHATTAH** (GAEL Grenoble)

**Title:** Individual and social acceptability of tax systems in unequal societies

**Abstract:** Inequalities are persistent and global but vary across countries (Piketty et al., 2021). They reinforce economic and societal problems, while individuals show preferences that are against inequality. Taxation serves as a means to mitigate inequalities through the redistribution of public transfers and the funding of public goods. Nevertheless, tax systems must be accepted by individuals to achieve tax compliance and avoid potential fraudulent behavior, thus guaranteeing efficiency. Tax systems vary based on the magnitude of taxation as well as whether they are flat, i.e. a uniform deduction, or progressive, i.e. a deduction depending on the income level of taxpayers. Do these features of taxation systems influence individual and collective acceptability of the system? Does the acceptability vary depending on the initial inequalities of the society? To answer these questions, we run an incentivized online experiment using the Prolific platform. In total, 720 participants from France, United Kingdom and United States of America, will participate in four between-subject treatments. In each treatment, we present scenarios with a specific composition of inequalities in the society (slightly, medium and highly unequal) and participants declare whether they consider taxation systems, i.e. flat or progressive, with different levels of taxation as (very) socially undesirable or (very) socially desirable. We use the experimental design of Krupka and Weber (2013), and give financial retributions if the participant answers the most given answer to the question among a group of about 30 participants. We therefore elicit the perception of the social norm in terms of taxation system and level of taxation depending on inequalities in the society. In one treatment, all participants of the group are from the same country, i.e. France, UK or USA, while in another treatment, the group consists in an equal proportion of participants from each country. The comparison between these two treatments will determine whether the perception of the social norm depends on their experience in terms of tax payments in the country where they live. In each treatment, participants also play a dictator game and an ultimatum game with the strategy method where they have to choose a specific taxation system that will be applied to the participants of their group and determine their payment. They give answers for different distributions of endowments (slightly, medium and highly unequal). In one treatment, answers to these games are given before answers regarding the perception of the social norm while in another they are given afterwards. The comparison will give insights regarding the impact of considering first individual or collective preferences on such preferences. The introduction of a tax system, flat or progressive, rather than another is fueling the debate in public opinion about what is a fair tax system. The study by Barr and Miller (2020) suggests that acceptability of inequality depends on the inequality of the society but they provide no insight regarding preferences towards taxation systems in the presence of inequality. Our study

aims to fill this gap providing results on the individual and collective preferences for taxation systems depending on the level of inequality.

2. **Ankush ASRI** (Radboud University)

**Title:** Affirmative action: Within-group inequality in competitive environments

**Abstract:** Inequality in wealth, income, and opportunities based on natural identities, especially caste and gender, is widespread. One policy tool to “level the playing field” is Affirmative Action (AA) policies. Previous research has shown that AA policies effectively increase beneficiaries’ willingness to compete. However, most studies focus on resource heterogeneity between groups, even though significant differences exist within groups. That is, a “creamy layer” exists, a term coined by sociologists to refer to society’s wealthy, non-upper caste members. This study investigates the effect of the group- and income-based AA policies on willingness to compete, fairness perceptions about the AA policies, and intergroup relations with both within- and between-group inequality. In line with previous literature, the willingness to compete in a Tullock contest increases for beneficiaries and does not decrease for non-beneficiaries with within-group homogeneity; however, within-group heterogeneity discourages non-beneficiaries. Regarding fairness, we find that participants find GB-AA the least fair, especially with heterogeneity, even though everyone chooses the institution according to their benefit as a social planner. We further find that the rich, creamy layer among the beneficiaries of affirmative action is hated the most when points are deducted from them, especially when they win the contest.

3. **Roberto BRUNETTI** (GATE)

**Title:** Beliefs in Merit, Trickle-Down Economics, and Preferences for Redistribution: An Experiment with the Top and Bottom 20%

**Abstract:** We conduct an online survey-experiment in the US to study how competing narratives on individual merit and trickle-down economics influence preferences for redistribution. Participants from the top and bottom quintiles of the income distribution (spectators) decide how much money to redistribute between two people (stakeholders). The first stakeholder, Person 1, is a rich entrepreneur in real life and is assigned \$50 for a task he/she has performed. The second stakeholder, Person 2, is poor, does not perform any task and is assigned \$

4. Before choosing how much to redistribute from Person 1 to Person 2, spectators read their real-life characteristics. First, their level of effort (high/low) expressed in hours worked per day. Second, Person 1’s source of ownership of the firm by describing him/her as either having founded the firm or having inherited it. Third, to test the trickle-down hypothesis, in three different treatments we manipulate, i) the amount of money donated to charity (high/low) by Person 1 (Philanthropic channel), ii) the number of employees (high/low) working in Person 1’s firm (Employment channel), and (iii) the number of patents (high/low) obtained by Person 1’s firm (Innovation channel). Stakeholders’ characteristics are combined randomly for a total of 16 conjoint tables administered in a within-subject design. We find that the effort of the low-income stakeholder has the greatest impact on spectators’ redistributive choices. The effort of the high-income stakeholder impacts negatively the redistributive choices, but to a lesser degree than the effort of the low-income stakeholder. We find that the trickle-down works only when it is framed in terms of donation to charity and it impacts only the redistributive choice of low-income spectators. Finally, we find some evidence also for the trickle-down framed in terms of innovation for rich women and poor techno-optimists.

4. **Claire MOLLIER** (Université Paris Nanterre)

**Title:** Perceptions of inequality: When the grass is less green on the other side

**Abstract:** This study explores how individuals perceive and respond to social inequalities based on intergroup comparisons. Specifically, we examine whether individuals tend to minimize the inequalities they experience when they observe more pronounced disparities in another group. To investigate this, a laboratory experiment is conducted where participants receive different allocations within their group and different types of information regarding the other group: no information, the wealthiest’s allocation, the poorest’s allocation, the level of inequality between the two players, and the actions taken to reduce (or not) inequalities within the group. By analyzing participants’ responses and behaviors to this information, I seek to better understand the mechanisms of perception and reaction to social inequalities, as well as their potential impact on attitudes and behaviors towards equity and social justice.

5. **Valentine SCHMITZ GELDHOF** (Université Catholique de Lille)

**Title:** The effect of aggregate income dynamics on redistribution preferences: an experimental study

**Abstract:** Redistribution is an essential and effective tool for policymakers to reduce inequality and limit social unrest. The implementation of redistribution policies depends critically on popular support, and citizens’ preferences. This paper aims to assess how redistributive choices are impacted by the dynamics of the aggregate level of income, i.e. the economic trends (growth, degrowth, stability). The relationship between redistributive preferences and inequality has been extensively studied. The economic literature emphasizes the importance of individual perceptions, whether of inequality (Gimpelson & Treisman, 2018), of social mobility prospects (Alesina, Stantcheva, & Teso, 2018), or of their social position (Cruces, Perez-Truglia, & Tetaz, 2013; Hvidberg, Kreiner, & Stantcheva, 2023). But other factors, such as views of fairness (e.g. belief in meritocracy) and views of the government (i.e. distrust in its ability to address the issue), are crucial. These beliefs interact with perceptions and contribute to shape people’s support for redistribution (for a review, see Stantcheva, 2021). Some studies have looked at the impact of macroeconomic context on redistributive preferences, but little is known about how economic recession affects people’s support for redistribution. In such situations, the tensions between individual enrichment and redistribution are intensified compared to growth situations, where both reducing inequalities and pursuing individual enrichment are feasible at the same time. A previous study emphasizes how the trade-off between one’s own and others’ income depends on how actual income diverges from expectations-based reference points: receiving a lower income than expected tends to encourage selfish behaviour (Benistant

& Suchon, 2021). Transposed to our context of economic degrowth, support for redistribution might be hampered. Yet this is uncertain, as this effect could be counterbalanced by an increased solidarity resulting from participants' feeling of sharing a "common fate" (Zhang, 2019). In order to identify the causal effect of the dynamics of aggregate income, we run an experiment, which allows us to evacuate many dimensions of preferences over redistribution. For instance, we are able to generate aggregate income variations while keeping the initial level of inequality constant. In addition, it ensures that assignment of participants to a treatment group is purely random, and not based on other personal characteristics that could be potential confounding factors. Participants are first grouped into pairs and received unequal initial incomes in the first step, based on their performance at a previous real-effort task: the rich participant receives 75% of the aggregate income while the poor one only receives 25%. In the second step, an additional aggregate income is offered to be shared. Depending on the treatment conditions, the size of this additional aggregate income is larger (growth treatments), smaller (degrowth treatments) or equal (stable treatment) than the initial one. Redistributive choices are then elicited for two situations: one would, if paid-out, impact their own pair (involved choice), while the other one would impact another randomly chosen pair (neutral choice). Comparing distributions in the second step between treatment conditions allows us to identify the causal effect of income dynamics on redistributive preferences. Moreover, comparing neutral choices and involved choices enables us to assess how the self-serving bias varies with aggregate income dynamics. We recruited 458 participants for this experiment. Our results show that the income dynamics impacts poor participants' redistributive choices, but not rich participants'. Indeed, poor participants transfer a larger share when the aggregate income is increasing. Thus, growth dynamics increases tolerance to inequality among the poor only. Another finding is that the self-serving bias is similar in all treatment conditions, i.e. moral hypocrisy is not affected by the dynamics of aggregate income.

## RCT 1

**Day:** Thu, June 27th | **Time:** 14.45 - 16.15 | **Room:** 211

### Presentations:

1. **Gwen-Jiro CLOCHARD** (Osaka University)

**Title:** A large-scale field experiment to disentangle sources of statistical discrimination in a social setting

**Abstract:** Whether differential treatment is due to statistical or taste-based discrimination is a long-standing debate in the discrimination literature. In this paper, we argue that previous research has not fully disentangled the complexity around statistical discrimination. We propose a distinction between two types of statistical discrimination: individual, i.e., whether the individual is productive or not, and collective, i.e., whether the individual would fit well into the team. We analyze the influence of these two types on individual behavior by conducting a large-scale correspondence study in a social setting where the distinction between individual and collective statistical discrimination is particularly relevant. We contact amateur football clubs in 15 Latin American countries and ask them to participate in a practice session as either a local or an immigrant newcomer. We estimate discrimination by comparing the positive response rate for fictitious applicants with and without an immigrant background, including countries in the Americas, Europe, and Asia. Results from a first experiment in Argentina show signs of both types of statistical discrimination at play. A second study, extending the analysis by using about 15,000 applications that vary in origin and characteristics of the applicants tests for solutions to clearly identify the mechanisms.

2. **Enrique FATAS** (Universidad Europea)

**Title:** The Invisible and Widespread Discrimination of Migrants A Field Experiment in a Large Commercial Bank in Peru

**Abstract:** We study discrimination towards Venezuelan migrants in a large commercial bank in Peru. Bank executives (including branch and risk managers) participate in a comprehensive survey experiment, including vignettes and sociodemographic and professional information about executives. Participants are randomly assigned to one condition in each vignette experiment, so we can establish causal relations between the nationality (Peruvian or Venezuelan) and gender (men or women) of clients described in the vignettes and the quality of the service provided. Our results strongly suggest that executives are blind to the discrimination of migrants in Peru, outside their offices. However, the discrimination of migrants in substantial, as the likelihood of accessing basic financial services (opening a bank account, getting a loan application approved) is significantly lower for Venezuelan than for Peruvian clients. Discrimination is largely preference-based and based in a profound mistrust in migrants. Executives see Venezuelan and Peruvian clients as equally skilled and literate financially and equally prone to relevant behavioral drivers (risk tolerance, present bias). We document the existence of intersectional discrimination, as Venezuelan women have a probability of getting a loan approved that is half the probability Peruvian women have (and sixty percent the probability of a male Venezuelan applying to the same loan). Exposure to migrants in their daily professional lives has very limited positive effects. We develop an Intersectional Discrimination Dual Index (IDDI), measuring supply and demand intersectional discrimination drivers, and document how the experiment triggered a large positive change in the bank's policies.

3. **Paul M. GORNY** (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology)

**Title:** The Gender of Opportunity: How Gendered Job Titles Affect Job Seeker Attraction

**Abstract:** We study the effects of gender-fair framing of job titles in online job ads in a randomized controlled trial in cooperation with a large online job platform in Germany. We investigate how the usage of a gender-fair job title affects the overall number of applications, the number of applications by females, and the share of female applicants. The goals of our study are (i) to investigate whether the number of female applications can be increased by deviating from the "generic masculine" which is typically used in German, (ii) to study whether any changes in overall applicant numbers are due to a specific gender of the applicants, and (iii) investigate whether and how these effects differ across job categories. We focus on three broad job categories: IT & Development, Business & Management, and Marketing & Sales, which differ in the share of employed females. Our study encompasses two treatments per each of the three categories: In the baseline, the job titles in the ads used the generic masculine. In the gender-fair treatment, the jobs were advertised using a gender-fair job title. Overall, the treatment

manipulation did not affect the average number of applications or the number of female applicants. We observe a significant and positive treatment effect in Business & Management. The number of applications was higher, and job ads with gender-fair titles were clicked more often than those in the baseline. While there was no treatment effect for IT & Development in general, we find a positive impact of gender-fair job titles if the IT job was advertised by a non-IT company. We discuss potential mechanisms for our results.

#### 4. **Matthieu POURIEUX** (Université de Rennes)

**Title:** Ranking effects in recipe choices : a randomized controlled trial in a food app

**Abstract:** Food consumption has two main impacts: (1) on the human health through nutrition, and (2) on the whole environment through the life cycle of products. From a policy perspective, favoring the consumption of healthy and environmental-friendly products is both a major public health issue and one important lever to address climate change. However, consumers only have limited information per se about the true qualities of a given food product, which may hamper their ability to decide on what they can safely eat or stop eating. A primary way of informing consumers about their food purchases is the use of labels, and especially 5-colors labels (from A to E) whose effectiveness has been scientifically documented. In Europe, and particularly in France, the NutriScore has been adopted as the main tool to inform consumers about the nutritional quality of products or meals. As for the environmental impact of goods, the Ecoscore is emerging as a potentially effective candidate. There exists a large literature on the impact of nutritional labels, and in particular the NutriScore, on consumers' food quality intake as well as a growing literature focusing on the effects of environmental labelling (such as the EcoScore). However, studying the combination of both types of labels is relatively new. At the same time, that labels may enable to achieve the reduction in consumption of both unhealthy and environmentally-damaging products is debatable. Moreover, product information is only one dimension of the food decision, which is also heavily dependent on the broad choice architecture, and particularly on the way products are presented to consumers. In physical food purchases (online shop, supermarket, recipe book, etc.), products are organized by categories, price families, or other rankings that are decided by sellers. In web or mobile apps, which are increasingly used in daily food decisions, products are often ranked by popularity or by grades provided by past customers (e.g: restaurants). Selective ranking of products, which is a type of "nudge", has indeed been documented as a powerful lever for behavioral change. If it was possible to rank the products, meals or recipes by their NutriScore or their EcoScore (from A to E, from green to red), what would be the impact on the nutritional and environmental quality of food choices ? To answer this question, we build a pre-registered field experiment based on naturally-occurring food decisions using a mobile phone application which offers users the possibility to search for recipes that fit their needs and habits. We partner with the private firm that owns the application to exogenously manipulate the ranking of proposed recipes given users' inputs. Specifically, we follow all users of the food application who are (uniform-)randomly assigned to one of three groups. One group serves as control and is not assigned to a treatment: the ranking of recipes in the application's search engine still relies on recipes' grades (the baseline setup in the application). The two remaining groups are assigned to a treatment that modifies the ranking of recipes: it is based on the underlying value of either the NutriScore or the EcoScore. All rankings appear in descending order: the recipe with the highest grade/value of NutriScore/value of EcoScore is always ranked first. Before the intervention phase where the treatments are implemented, all three groups are observed in the no-modification environment (observational phase). This setting will allow us to rely on a difference-in-difference strategy to assess the ceteris paribus effect of ranking recipes based on either the NutriScore or the EcoScore on both the nutritional and environmental quality of selected recipes. Both phases last for a month: the observational phase started on 01/01/2024 and the intervention phase began on 01/02/2024. During the whole process the experimenters did not have access to the data nor to the application: it is only after all the data is collected and preliminary data curation is achieved that our private partner will give us access to the data (with an agreement to supply the raw materials at the end of March 2024).

#### 5. **Brice CORGNET** (EMLyon)

**Title:** Navigating Autonomy: The Impact of Scheduling Flexibility and Choices on Vulnerable Workers

**Abstract:** The workplace has recently undergone significant transformations characterized by an unprecedented level of scheduling autonomy. In a natural field experiment involving 998 gig workers, we show that scheduling autonomy, which requires effective planning, exclusively benefits workers with high self-control. Workers with limited self-control earn less when presented with scheduling choices, as they tend to commit to excessively rigid schedules. These vulnerable workers, characterized by low income and health status, are the most adversely affected by scheduling autonomy. For instance, workers in the lowest income quartile earn \$2.15 less per hour when given scheduling options than when given a fixed schedule. We conclude that flexibility does not benefit all workers and that excessive autonomy, especially among vulnerable populations with limited cognitive resources, can be detrimental.

## Cooperation 2

**Day:** Thu, June 27th | **Time:** 16.45 - 18.15 | **Room:** 204

### Presentations:

#### 1. **Julian BENDA** (University of Innsbruck)

**Title:** Reducing strategic uncertainty increases group protection in collective risk social dilemmas

**Abstract:** The climate crisis and the ecological emergency, with their associated losses in ecosystems, biodiversity and wildlife habitats, entail significant pressure on sustained human and planetary well-being. These are examples of so-called large scale collective action problems. While individual measures (e.g., private adaptation, which we refer to in the following as "individual solutions") exist to privately protect against adverse effects of these phenomena, such as the increasing occurrence of natural disasters, collective efforts such as mitigation and collective adaptation constitute public goods that generate higher aggregate well-being (referred to herein as "collective solutions"). Previous experimental literature has addressed this issue through modelling collective risk social dilemmas. While one branch of the literature focuses on understanding the role of inequality

and uncertainty about damages on collective investments for avoiding losses, mainly motivated by climate change negotiations, experimental evidence in Gross & De Dreu (2019, SciAdv) and Gross & Böhm (2020, PNAS) suggests that when groups face a common threat, individuals resort to private protection over the collective avoidance of the threat, if given the opportunity. We show in our paper that a large proportion of this overwhelming self-reliance can be attributed to strategic uncertainty about others' behavior. So far, the literature on collective risk social dilemmas has considered that all agents can contribute to their solution to some extent. This abstracts from the fact that the benefits of collective measures against losses can extend beyond those providing them and bearing their cost (Tompkins & Eakin, 2012, GlobEnvironChange). Indeed, there may exist subgroups of the population who, due to geographical or institutional reasons for example, cannot take action to protect themselves or others from the collective risk. In a novel experimental design, we expand the collective risk social dilemma by building on Blanco et al. (2018, JEEM) to incorporate a subgroup ("beneficiaries") who are affected by the collective risk but do not have the capacity to protect against it. A second subgroup ("providers") can invest into a collective solution (protecting all group members from the deterministic loss of their resources through a threshold public good) or a less efficient but safe individual solution (protecting only themselves), as introduced in Gross & Dreu (2019). Field examples with beneficiaries in collective risk social dilemmas include, for example, the management of vegetation complexity on coffee plantations, where potentially lower yields and enhancement costs to individual providers are offset by collective benefits due to increased soil stability and an enhanced wildlife habitat (Philpott et al., 2008, ConservBiol); or the participation of French rural landholders in Flood Prevention Action Plans, by which flooding risk is voluntarily increased on their properties to reduce vulnerability to flooding in densely populated, urban areas downstream (Erdlenbruch et al., 2009, JEnvManag). While beneficiaries may not be able to implement these collective measures directly, institutional arrangements exist that allow them to make voluntary monetary transfers to incentivize and financially compensate providers to provide the collective solution to the shared problem. In a pre-registered laboratory experiment ([https://aspredicted.org/SXY\\_YVF](https://aspredicted.org/SXY_YVF)) with 400 participants (sample size determined through a power analysis), we consider a repeated decision-environment with four treatment conditions, systematically varying strategic uncertainty: i) a baseline scenario with passive beneficiaries, ii) proportional arrangements where beneficiaries can transfer resources to compensate providers for collective solution efforts, thereby changing the Nash Equilibrium from welfare-inefficient to socially efficient, iii) pledges allowing for non-binding commitments among both subgroups, and iv) reducing the problem to a single provider and single beneficiary, thereby eliminating within-subgroup strategic uncertainty. We hypothesize that all treatments with transfers will increase the likelihood of avoiding collective damages compared to the baseline scenario, with the single provider-beneficiary treatment resulting in the highest efficiency to avoid collective damages. Our results are based on multilevel regressions for difference-in-differences estimates (accounting for pre-treatment group-specific variation). We find that all three treatments with transfers significantly improve the proportion of collective solutions with respect to the baseline scenario, with more protected beneficiaries and less resources lost. Further, removing strategic uncertainty by reducing group size to a single provider and beneficiary entails a higher likelihood of avoiding collective damages than a group of providers and passive beneficiaries, even in the absence of resource transfers. Most importantly, our findings suggest that compared to the setting with passive beneficiaries, institutions involving proportional transfers to the group of public good providers can increase the avoidance of collective damages to the same extent as removing strategic uncertainty with a single public good provider and a single beneficiary. In conclusion, our results indicate that strategic uncertainty about others' behavior plays an important role in hindering the emergence of cooperative solutions in collective risk social dilemmas, as opposed to individualism or selfishness. In fact, in our experiment individuals are willing to forgo a share of their payoff to provide the collective solution when within-subgroup strategic uncertainty is absent. Institutions such as the proportional distribution of transfers may help achieve similar levels of efficiency in contexts where eliminating strategic uncertainty is not possible.

## 2. David MASCLÉ (CREM Rennes)

**Title:** Disentangling the Effects of Global and Local Heterogeneity on Cooperation in Multi-Level Public Goods: Experimental Evidence

**Abstract:** Using an artefactual field experiment in a bilingual Swiss state, this paper investigates how heterogeneity influences cooperation in a multiple-level public good game composed of a global good and two local goods. In contrast to studies that use the minimal group paradigm to enforce identity (Tajfel et al. 1971), group membership is based on language by using two native groups, German and French speakers, as our subject pool. We find that heterogeneity has a negative effect on contributions, which is mainly driven by a decrease of contributions to local public goods while contributions to the global good are not affected. The lower contributions to the local goods in the heterogeneous treatments are due to lower contributions by majority members while the minority members contribute similar amounts to the reference group or even more. Finally, we observe that the impact of heterogeneity on contributions is magnified for individuals who are members of a linguistic minority in their real life.

## 3. Simon VARAINE (CEE-M Montpellier)

**Title:** Are people conditionally parochial? Eliciting cooperative strategies in intergroup conflict

**Abstract:** Previous research shows that most people condition their cooperation on the cooperative behavior of others in their group. In many contexts, however, ingroup cooperation is embedded in intergroup conflict. In this case, do people condition cooperation on the behavior of ingroup and/or outgroup members? The present study proposes a variant of the strategy method similar to Fischbacher et al. (2001, Econ. Lett.) to elicit individual cooperative strategies in intergroup conflict situations. In an intergroup prisoner dilemma (IPD), participants decide on their contribution depending on the average contribution of i) other ingroup members and ii) outgroup members. This allows us to distinguish between nonfighters, unconditional fighters, and ingroup and/or outgroup conditional fighters. In a within-subjects design, we compare the distribution of these profiles to a conflict-free setting (standard PD). The experimental protocol of the present study is currently under evaluation by an ethics committee. Pre-registration and data collection are scheduled for the end of April.

## 4. Huan XIE (Concordia University)

**Title:** Favor Exchange: An Experiment

**Abstract:** We conduct an experiment on a two-player infinitely repeated favor exchange game under incomplete information. In the stage game, each player has to decide whether to provide a favor to the other player. A favor generates a fixed benefit for the recipient and a cost for the provider, which can be either low or high. We study the situation where this cost is private information and it is efficient to provide a favor only when the cost is low. We focus on Stationary Strongly Symmetric (SSS) strategies, which prescribe players to play the same strategy after any history, and a class of Markov strategies, defined as

Bounded Favors Bank (BFB) strategies, where the state variable is the net number of favors received by a player. Within this class, we consider strategies that involve either a reward (BFB<sub>r</sub>) or a punishment (BFB<sub>p</sub>) for doing/receiving favors. We find that overall subjects in the experiment are able to exchange favors to a relatively large extent. The results from strategy estimation and strategy-fitting procedures suggest that subjects' behavior can be largely explained by BFB strategies and SSS strategies. BFB<sub>r</sub> are more prevalent than BFB<sub>p</sub>, suggesting that rewarding subjects for making favors is a better way to sustain the exchange of favors. Among SSS strategies, never doing a favor is the most prevalent, but doing a favor when it is efficient is also very popular even though it is not an equilibrium strategy.

5. **Dimitri DUBOIS** (CNRS - University of Montpellier)

**Title:** Managing Mobile Common Pool Resources: An Experimental Investigation of Spatial Externalities and Collective Action

**Abstract:** This research endeavors to unravel the complexities surrounding the management of mobile common pool resources (MCPRs), focusing on the pivotal role of spatial externalities. The study is premised on an experimental design that simulates the dynamic and mobile nature of common-pool resources (CPRs) across multiple patches, thus introducing a spatial dimension to the classic CPR dilemma. Through a series of laboratory experiments conducted at the Laboratory for Experimental Economics of Montpellier (LEEM), we dissect the impact of different management structures and the magnitude of spatial externalities on resource harvesting decisions. Our experimental framework comprises a sequence of games, control tasks, and questionnaires designed to elicit participants' harvesting behaviors, cognitive abilities, cooperation levels, and social preferences. The MCPR game, forming the core of our experiment, challenges participants to manage resources across two patches under varying conditions of spatial externality and player distribution. This setup allows us to observe the interplay between individual and collective decision-making in the context of resource mobility and externalities. Two distinct treatments are investigated: a two-player-two-patch (2n2p) scenario and a three-player-two-patch (3n2p) scenario, each designed to elucidate the effects of player number and distribution on resource management efficiency. Our hypotheses explore the anticipated divergence in resource management strategies under different configurations, highlighting the potential inefficiencies introduced by increased player numbers and heightened spatial externalities. To date, we have successfully gathered data from a total of 63 groups under the two-player-two-patch (2n2p) treatment. In contrast, for the three-player-two-patch (3n2p) treatment, we have collected data from 42 groups. Efforts are underway to complete the data collection for the remaining 20 groups in the 3n2p treatment. We anticipate finalizing this phase by the end of March or by the first week of April at the latest. Preliminary analysis is geared towards understanding the behavioral dynamics underpinning resource extraction decisions, employing both parametric and non-parametric tests to scrutinize the deviations from efficient equilibrium paths. This analysis is complemented by an exploration of social preferences and their implications on cooperative behavior within the MCPR context. Keywords: Mobile Common Pool Resources, Spatial Externalities, Experimental Economics, Resource Management, Collective Action

## Pro-environmental Behavior

**Day:** Thu, June 27th | **Time:** 16.45 - 18.15 | **Room:** 208

### Presentations:

1. **Abdelkarim AZAMI IDRISSE** (BETA - Université de Lorraine)

**Title:** Does lobbying impact firms environmental efforts?

**Abstract:** The influence of political lobbying is considered to be a powerful mean of influencing the decisions made by policy makers. Thus, firms may invest more in lobbying to prevent either the enactment or the enforcement of environmental policies, resulting in a reduction in their environmental expenditures. In this paper, we experimentally investigate how lobbying affects firms' environmental efforts. The experiment consists of a one-shot game played by an active subject, plus a passive subject which is the environmental organization World Wildlife Fund (WWF). Each active subject assumes the role of a company whose activity may cause environmental damage that reduces the WWF's fund. In the baseline, subjects decide on the amount of money to invest in environmental prevention in order to reduce the probability of the damage occurring. First, while we are interested in the firms' trade-off between environmental prevention and lobbying expenditures, we run two treatments in which subjects can invest in lobbying to reduce the probability of being held responsible if the damage occurs. Second, since we aim to identify the channel of lobbying in which firms prefer to invest, we distinguish between ex-ante lobbying (second treatment), in which firms lobby before they know whether the damage has occurred or not, and ex-post lobbying (third treatment), in which firms lobby after the damage has occurred. The results show that subjects generally invest more in preventing environmental damage than in lobbying. More specifically, subjects invest more in prevention when they do not have the opportunity to lobby or when they can invest in ex-post lobbying. However, we find that subjects tend to invest more in lobbying ex-ante than in lobbying ex-post.

2. **Philippine DE LATTRE** (GAEL Grenoble)

**Title:** Impact of environmental labelling for different substitution levels and food categories: experimental evidence

**Abstract:** An incentivised laboratory framed field experiment with 519 subjects examined the impact of four environmental labelling formats on purchases within 12 sets of products. The formats tested are (i) the 8 color classes, (ii) the score, (ii) the score and the color classes combined, and (iv) the personalized. Using difference-in-difference, we estimate the between-labelling variability of within-subject changes in the purchases' Environmental Footprint score, whose calculation is based on Life Cycle Analysis and European Commission recommendations. All labelling improve the environmental impact of purchases. However, the personalized does not significantly improve them for sets focusing on close substitutions and on protein sources.

3. **Andrea ESSL** (Universität Bern)

**Title:** The Tree Task: An incentivized, one-shot decision task to measure pro-environmental behavior



**Abstract:** To help mitigate climate change and its associated costs, behavioral economists need to better understand the determinants of pro-environmental behavior. How can this behavior be measured in the lab or online? This study presents the Tree Task, an incentivized, one-shot task used to measure pro-environmental behavior in the form of tree planting. In the Tree Task, individuals face a trade-off between individual immediate financial rewards and long-term environmental gains. In particular, participants have to decide between spending money to plant trees or keeping the money for themselves. We find that participants' decisions depend on the costs and environmental impact of a tree. As expected, higher costs lead to fewer planted trees, whereas higher carbon dioxide offsets foster tree planting. The number of trees planted correlates with established self-reports assessing environmental attitudes and intentions, belief in climate change, and values in line with pro-environmental behavior. The Tree Task extends the set of validated tasks measuring incentivized pro-environmental behavior in the lab as a short, vivid, and easy-to-explain task.

4. **Valeria FANGHELLA** (Grenoble Ecole de Management)

**Title:** (Failing to) Mitigate motivated reasoning about wind energy: an experimental survey from France

**Abstract:** We study the prevalence of motivated reasoning about onshore wind energy and strategies to mitigate it, drawing on survey design techniques used in the literature. We conduct an incentivized online survey (pre-registered) with a representative sample of the French population (N=2550). All respondents assess the veracity of 10 factual statements about onshore wind and a neutral question. The control group answered as in traditional opinion surveys while in the other conditions we vary the incentive to answer truthfully: (i) reward for each correct answer (with two levels, high 0.30€ and low 0.10€); (ii) cheap talk, informing about the existence of motivated responding; (iii) consequentiality, indicating that survey results would be shared with stakeholders of the energy transition. Reward and cheap talk allows us to identify the existence of motivated reasoning regarding onshore wind energy and whether these incentives can mitigate it. If there were no motivated reasoning, respondents would provide truthful answers already in the control group. By contrast, we expect consequentiality to increase motivated responding, as it may encourage strategic behavior. On average, our results show that neither rewards nor cheap talk increase the share of correct answers about wind energy compared to the control group. However, for reward, we see a significant increase in the share of correct answers for sentences that highlight positive aspects of wind (mainly among respondents against wind energy), while a significant reduction in the share of correct answers for sentences that highlight negative aspects of wind (mainly among respondents in favor of wind energy) compared to the control group. Hence, all respondents answer more favorably to wind energy when exposed to financial incentives. We will test whether this result is caused by an experimenter demand effect (study planned for April). This has important implications for survey design as financial incentives are widely recognized as a means to encourage truthful responses. Next, as hypothesized, we observe a reduction in the share of correct answers about wind energy in the consequentiality compared to the control group. Finally, none of the treatment has an effect on the neutral question, confirming our hypothesis that incentives for truthful responses are relevant only when the topic triggers motivated reasoning.

5. **Alice SOLDA** (Ghent University)

**Title:** Playing Dumb to Look Green

**Abstract:** This paper investigates whether individuals use information complexity as an excuse to remain ignorant so as to behave more selfishly. We study this question in a context where individuals face a trade-off between their monetary payoff and their pro-environmental preferences. We propose that individuals use information complexity as an excuse to make self-serving mistakes, which allow them to behave more selfishly without compromising their pro-environmental image. To test this idea, we conducted an online experiment in which we varied (i) the complexity of the information regarding the environmental impact of a donation and (ii) whether there is a trade-off between participants' selfish motives and pro-environmental preferences. In line with our hypothesis, we found that participants make more mistakes when information is complex, but even more so when there is a trade-off between their monetary payoff and their pro-environmental preferences. Our findings suggest that pro-environmental individuals do 'play dumb' when doing so gives them an excuse to behave more selfishly without compromising their image.

## RCT 2

**Day:** Thu, June 27th | **Time:** 16.45 - 18.15 | **Room:** 209

### Presentations:

1. **Ankush ASRI** (Radboud University)

**Title:** Unlocking young women's minds? The impact of a low-cost career guidance program

**Abstract:** Young people lacking job-qualifying skill formation are likely to face precarious labor market conditions in the future. This might be particularly the case for youth from disadvantaged backgrounds and for young women facing rigid gender norms putting them at risk of not entering the labor force. Career guidance prior to major career choices has the potential to alleviate these risks. We examine whether and how a low-cost 10-hour long career guidance program implemented during school hours can facilitate career choices as well as labor market entry in the future. Our results from a school-level clustered randomized controlled trial with more than 5000 primarily female students in the final grade of 45 secondary schools in urban India show that the program significantly increases the share of students pursuing further skill formation and encourages students to consider their interests as the most important criterion for the selection of their career path.

2. **Beatrice BRAUT** (University of Genoa)

**Title:** The effects of reminders on engagement and walking: Evidence from a large scale experiment

**Abstract:** Step-tracking apps aim at promoting a healthier lifestyle, but users' lack of compliance is an issue. In this study, we implement a large RCT to examine the effectiveness of different framing and duration of text message reminders on engagement with the app and walking habits. We conduct a 7-weeks experiment with 20,187 users of the app WeWard in France. We send three types of messages, each of them leveraging a different behavioral feature, compared to a generic reminder, and we vary the duration of the intervention from 1 to 3 weeks. We document that the message providing information about peers' performance increases app utilization. However, no type of message is able to affect the number of steps tracked by the app.

3. **Amalia DI GIROLAMO** (University of Birmingham)  
**Title:** Talent is Everywhere, Opportunity is Not: Online Role Model Mentoring and Students' Aspirations  
**Abstract:** This study explores whether it is possible to affect children's aspirations and ambitions through a classroom-based intervention. We design and implement ORME, an Online Role-model Mentoring program, which consists of exposing children to online meetings with a group of role models. We evaluate ORME with a Randomized Controlled Trial targeting 7th-grade students (12-13 years old) in Campania, an Italian region historically plagued by stagnating economic conditions, the presence of organized crime, and a generalized lack of trust in institutions. One year after the intervention, children exposed to ORME are 8.3 and 9.6 percentage points more likely to enroll in academic and top-tier tracks, respectively. The potential mechanism of this effect is through an increase in aspirations, self-efficacy, and self-reported effort
4. **Irene MUSSIO** (Leeds University Business School)  
**Title:** Clear Waters, Bright Futures: How Low-Cost Information Interventions Can Increase Health Preventive Behaviors  
**Abstract:** Contaminated drinking water poses a significant, long-term health challenge in developing countries. With the aim of shedding light on the most effective presentation of this information in awareness campaigns, we run a cluster-randomized control trial involving 1,388 households in Punjab, Pakistan that provides information about fecal matter presence in drinking water. We find that information on water quality matters when aiming to change behaviors and lowering health risks of water-borne diseases. A few months after the intervention, 40% of the households provided with water quality test results and 48% of the households provided with the test results and information on water purification measures actually implement water purification measures. This study is evidence of the efficacy of low-cost information-based interventions, offering valuable insights for health policy in resource-constrained settings.
5. **Ismaël RAFAI** (Université Côte d Azur)  
**Title:** Hiding Preventive Messages within a Smartphone Game: Proof of concept and Field Experiment  
**Abstract:** Extended Abstract Motivations. Unhealthy and risky behaviors are a major public policy concern. Traditional preventive campaigns aiming to reduce those behaviors are sometime ineffective, due to reluctance toward preventive messages. In this project, we aimed to introduce a new type of policy intervention, inspired by product placement and nudge theory, which consists in hiding prevention within an entertaining smartphone game. In contrast with serious games, where the players are aware of being exposed to prevention, our approach is innovative in the sense that the players are exposed to the prevention without noticing it, therefore reducing reluctance to the intervention. Moreover, by measuring (subjective and objective) effectiveness and acceptability of such intervention, our research aspires to bridge the gap between policy goals and public reception, offering insights that can inform more effective strategies for promoting healthier behaviors, paving the way for new types of policy. Methods. We developed a smartphone game called "La disparition de Léo", where the player incarnates a hacker who infiltrates the phone of Leo – a disappeared PhD student – to help his friends finding him. The player access Leo's phone content, including Discussions, Photos, Notes, as well as an Instagram-like social network. The player can freely explore this content, to solve riddles (e.g. finding passwords, etc.). Solving riddles give access to more content that helps the player finding the truth about Leo's disappearance. Aside the game, an administration platform was developed, which allows experimenters to modify Leo's phone content and do versioning. We used this framework in the context of alcohol consumption. We create two versions of the game: a "Nudge" version, where preventive messages were hidden in some discussions and a "Placebo" version, where those preventive messages were replaced by casual discussions not referring alcohol (e.g. one of Leo's friends has an accident, attributed to alcohol consumption in the Nudge, and to bad weather in the Placebo). After measuring in December 2023 the participants' intertemporal risk preferences, we randomly assigned them to the Nudge or the Placebo version and ask them remotely to play the game by their own. After playing the game, participants were convoked to a new experimental session, where we collected their attitudes toward alcohol consumption. We then revealed them the preventive purpose of the game and ask them to evaluate the acceptability and the perceived efficiency of the preventive messages. Results. Data analysis is in progress.

## Social choice

**Day:** Thu, June 27th | **Time:** 16.45 - 18.15 | **Room:** 211

### Presentations:

1. **Marco STIMOLO** (University of Siena)  
**Title:** Effects of Income Mobility and Redistribution on Trust: Experimental Evidence  
**Abstract:** In societies with stagnant inequality, individuals perceive they are not being given a fair chance to improve their economic situation, negatively affecting their trust in political and economic institutions, as well as corroding interpersonal trust and individuals' ability to cooperate. In this research proposal, we designed an incentivized experiment to verify the effects of two distinct inequality-reducing mechanisms— income mobility and redistribution—in fostering pro-social behavior. In this planned experiment, we expect to confirm that a reduction of inequality can foster pro-social behavior, unveiling several additional layers of complexity in the dynamics of trust and trustworthiness, pointing to the non-equivalence of income-mobility vs. redistributive instruments, and the greater effectiveness of the latter
2. **Maria-José MONTTOYA VILLALOBOS** (IESEG School of Management)  
**Title:** Correcting negative externalities: an experiment on the acceptability of taxes and regulatory standards  
**Abstract:** This paper investigates the acceptability of public policies seeking to mitigate negative externalities through a majority vote. We use an unframed laboratory experiment where participants face a negative externalities game, and we introduce public policies through taxation policies and bans with available alternatives. The participants are asked to vote for or against the policy implementation before and after experiencing the game and a policy trial. We explore the influences of policy trial experiences, cultural worldviews, and the support of bans and taxes on policy decisions. The results indicate that support

for regulatory standards is higher than for taxes. We also find that experience from a policy trial affects the acceptability of regulatory standards exclusively. Moreover, the study demonstrates that hierarchical cultural worldviews decrease support only for taxation policies.

3. **Georg SATOR** (University of Nottingham)

**Title:** Social influence on moral judgements

**Abstract:** Using the tools of experimental economics we document that the presence of other people and other people's moral opinions has large and significant effects on peoples' moral judgements. Examining underlying mechanisms reveals two distinct channels: First, providing information about the choices of others directly shifts participants' intrinsic preferences. Second, participants who are exposed to social reward and punishment mechanisms strategically distort publicly visible moral judgements to make them even more conform with majority views.

4. **Lily SAVEY** (Paris School of Economics)

**Title:** Misinformation favouring extreme candidates: An experimental assessment of individual-level and aggregate effects

**Abstract:** A lot has been made recently about extreme parties or candidates trying to improve their electoral chances. In some instances, extremists might benefit from spreading misinformation about their centrist credentials. In this article, we test the effect of such misinformation on individual voting behaviour in laboratory elections. Do individuals increase voting for extreme candidates? As a result, do extreme candidates win elections more often? Does misinformation make individuals vote less strategically? Is the election outcome less efficient? To answer such questions, we propose an experiment in which individuals vote to elect one of five candidates. Misinformation is implemented as a treatment that motivates voters to believe that the extreme candidate is more central than she actually is. Based on a simple model of strategic behaviour, we theoretically predict that having treated voters believe the misinformation increases the electoral chances of the extreme candidate at the expense of the closest moderate candidate. We expect this effect to be driven by extremist voters, whose propensity to behave strategically should be impaired by their distorted perception of the electoral setting.

5. **Benjamin OUVARD** (GAEL Grenoble)

**Title:** Harnessing social information to improve public support for Pigouvian taxes

**Abstract:** Pigouvian taxes are often unpopular among the general public. This study aims to test the effectiveness of providing social information as a means of improving support for such taxes. Using a laboratory experiment with a market game with externalities, we provide subjects with information about other participants' beliefs regarding the "right thing to do" (voting, or not, for tax implementation). To gain insight into the mechanisms by which social information impacts subjects' beliefs, we also elicit personal, normative, and positive beliefs. Our findings indicate that social information does influence subjects' beliefs, although support for Pigouvian taxes is only weakly influenced. We also show that subjects who experience the tax are more likely to support it, and the tax is shown to effectively reduce externalities in the game.

## AI & algorithms

**Day:** Fri, June 28th | **Time:** 10.45 - 12.15 | **Room:** 204

### Presentations:

1. **Marie-Pierre DARGNIES** (Université Paris Dauphine)

**Title:** Behavioral measures improve AI hiring: A field experiment

**Abstract:** The adoption of Artificial Intelligence (AI) for hiring practices is often impeded by a scarcity of comprehensive employee data. Our study hypothesizes that the inclusion of behavioral measures can enhance the predictive accuracy of AI in hiring. We study this hypothesis in the context of microfinance credit officers. Overall, our findings suggest that survey-based behavioral measures markedly improve the predictions. We train a random-forest algorithm to predict productivity within sample. We then validate its robustness against the selected training sample and potential strategic responses by applicants by running two out-of-sample tests: one forecasting the future performance of novice employees and another within a field experiment on hiring. Both tests corroborate the effectiveness of incorporating behavioral data in refining the hiring process. At the same time, our field experiment comparing workers hired by the algorithm with those hired by human managers did not reveal significant differences in treatment effects.

2. **Damien MAYAUX** (Paris School of Economics)

**Title:** Regulating Visual Marketing Cues from the Lab

**Abstract:** Webpages are full of marketing cues, these salient visual elements that steer consumers toward specific choices. The literature has written extensively about the algorithms that determine which choices are promoted, but little about the cues themselves. In this paper, I show that one can regulate what cues look like to improve consumer welfare based on a simple lab experiment, without prior knowledge about the algorithm or consumer preferences. The reason is that some cues are intrinsically safer than others: they are not blindly followed, hence help when attributed to the preferred choices but do not harm otherwise. In a lab experiment, I compare consumer performance in a choice task, varying the cue and the algorithm. I find that brown circles are safer than green circles and explain this using a model of rational attention. I also illustrate how the choice of a cue shapes supply-side incentives regarding the algorithm. Finally, I discuss how to use this approach in practice to regulate online choice environments.

3. **Marco PERSICHINA** (University of Rome 2)

**Title:** Congestion management and navigation systems: a lab experiment on individual choices vs delegation

**Abstract:** this paper contributes to the literature by providing new behavioral insight to improve policy measures that promote the adoption of autonomous systems of collective navigators as promising instruments for reducing urban traffic congestion and

the related level of emissions, fostering the ecological transition by larger adoption among consumers of sustainable modes and choices of transportation. We contribute by the implementation of a laboratory experiment in which we adopt an original variant of the threshold public good game, designed to analyse the presence of externalities both in terms of congestion and CO2 emissions and to evaluate the behavioral response of individuals in front to the possibility to be driven toward the optimal social welfare in presence of heterogeneous mobility costs. To the best of our knowledge, our design represents a novelty in the threshold public good game literature. Additionally, the discussion of the results of the experiment can provide interesting insights both for transportation policies and environmental ones.

#### 4. **Ismaël RAFAI** (Université Côte d Azur)

**Title:** Measuring AI-Large Language Model’s economic preferences

**Abstract:** Extended Abstract Artificial Intelligence (AI) is now capable of making autonomous decisions and replacing humans in many cognitive works, including e.g. medicine, finance, commerce, or academic. Therefore, economists should not consider AI only as a technological breakdown increasing productivity, but also as genuine economic agents making decisions. This consideration is particularly relevant given the recent raise of AI large language models (AI-LLM hereafter), such as OpenAI’s ChatGPT. Indeed, thanks to their impressive ability in processing and generating text that mimic human’s reasoning, the number of tasks and decisions delegated to AI-LLM is exploding. Because the “intelligence” of AI-LLM emerged from complex algorithms trained on a vast amount of data, the most effective way to understand and predict AI-LLM “decision” making is not necessarily to open the “algorithm blackbox”. Instead, similar paradigms employed to study human cognition and decision making could be considered, by confronting AI to controlled environment, and observe and analyze their decisions, to identify some emerging recurrent behavioral patterns. In this line, a new research field consists in conducting experiments to study AI-LLM decision making. Researchers in this field have conducted experiments to elicit certain cognitive biases that AI-LLM may exhibit (Chen and al. 2023; Talboy and al. 2023). While many studies investigate whether AI-LLM responses are more intuitive or reflexive (Kahneman’s System 1 and 2), to the best of our knowledge, the literature reports no proper confrontation of AI-LLM with standard economic preferences elicitation methods. We aim to fill this gap, by measuring AI-LLM preferences toward risk, time and others to answer the following questions. (1) Can we (and how to) adapt economic preference elicitation methods to elicit ChatGPT preferences? (2) (In which context), may ChatGPT reveal coherent and stable economic preferences? (3) How the elicited preferences respond to different framing of the preferences elicitation tasks? To answer those questions, we will adapt experimental procedures for commonly used preference to administer them to ChatGPT-4. Risk preferences will be elicited by adapting Gneezy and Potters’s Investment Game (1997) and the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (Crosetto and Filippin, 2013). Time preferences will be elicited using adaptation of the Convex Time Budget (Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012). Finally, social preferences will be investigated by adapting Dictator Game (Forsythe and al., 1994) and the Social Value Orientation (Murphy et al., 2011). Furthermore, the sensitivity of ChatGPT-4’s economic preferences to framing will be assessed by testing variations in task formulations. References [1] Andreoni, J., & Sprenger, C. (2012). “Estimating time preferences from convex budgets”. *American Economic Review*, 102(7), 3333-3356 [2] Chen, Y., Andiappan, M., Jenkin, T., & Ovchinnikov, A. (2023). “A Manager and an AI Walk into a Bar: Does ChatGPT Make Biased Decisions Like We Do?”. Working Paper. Available at SSRN 4380365 [3] Crosetto, P., & Filippin, A. (2013). “The ‘bomb’ risk elicitation task”. *Journal of risk and uncertainty*, 47, 31-65. [4] Forsythe, R., Horowitz, J. L., Savin, N. E., & Sefton, M. (1994). “Fairness in simple bargaining experiments”. *Games and Economic behavior*, 6(3), 347-369. [5] Gneezy, U., & Potters, J. (1997). “An experiment on risk taking and evaluation periods”. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 112(2), 631-645. [6] Murphy, R. O., Ackermann, K. A., & Handgraaf, M. J. J. (2011). “Measuring Social Value Orientation”. *Judgment and Decision Making*, 6(8), 771-78

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#### 5. **Vincent TEIXEIRA** (Université de Lorraine)

**Title:** Algorithm Control and Responsibility : Shifting Blame to the User ?

**Abstract:** We conducted a laboratory experiment in which participants could either choose between an equal and an unequal allocation. Or they could delegate the choice to an algorithm controlled by another participant. This participant has either high control over the algorithm (the algorithm follows the participant’s decision perfectly) or low control (the algorithm sometimes follows the participant’s decision). Our results suggest that a high level of control by the participants over the algorithm implies that participants bear full responsibility in the event of an unequal decision. A low level of control by the participants over the algorithm implies that the participants are perceived as 56.17% less responsible than participants who have a high level of control over the algorithm. The delegator is perceived as 56.52% more responsible than the delegator who delegates to an algorithm that is fully controlled. Finally, we demonstrate that participants with low control over the algorithm are more likely to choose an unequal allocation when they can hide themselves behind the algorithm. These results imply that companies might prioritize an algorithm’s profitability over ethical considerations, effectively shifting the burden of responsibility to the user.

## Coordination & Network

**Day:** Fri, June 28th | **Time:** 10.45 - 12.15 | **Room:** 208

## Presentations:

### 1. Margherita COMOLA (Université Paris-Saclay)

**Title:** Competing for Influence: An Experiment on Multi-Agent Network Targeting

**Abstract:** We design a laboratory experiment on strategic targeting, where two players with opposite opinions compete for influence by choosing a target node to spread information over a given network. We investigate whether players are able to identify the best-response strategy which depends on their relative influence, and which behavioral motives drive their targeting choices. Results show that players tend to target nodes that are central in the network and nodes that are not targeted by their rival. While nodes' initial opinion has no impact on best reply, our subjects display a strong affinity bias (i.e. tendency to target nodes with initial opinions similar to theirs) and a moderate opposition bias (i.e. aversion to target nodes with different initial opinions).

### 2. Yang LIRONG (Nanyang Technological University)

**Title:** Action Revisions in Conflicting-Interests Coordination Games

**Abstract:** We design an experiment to study the implications of allowing players to revise their actions in conflicting interest coordination games. Players receive opportunities to revise actions that arrive randomly; final payoffs are determined by the actions prepared at the last revision opportunity. We consider one Battle-of-the-Sexes game and three versions of inequality games. Our three treatments vary the relative frequency of players' expected opportunities to revise actions, leading to different predictions regarding equilibrium selection with action revision. Coordination rates in these revision games are significantly higher than under the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. Confirming theoretical predictions, we find that the player's preferred action profile with fewer expected revision opportunities is more likely to be implemented. However, we also observe that, apart from the relative frequency of revision opportunities, the payoff specification is an important predictor of equilibrium selection.

### 3. Arno RIEDL (Maastricht University)

**Title:** Coordination and Network Proximity: Experimental Evidence from Real-Existing Networks

**Abstract:** Societies' ability to coordinate behavior is of crucial importance, as a lack of coordination can lead to large individual and social costs. Importantly, coordination does not take place in a social vacuum and efficient coordination might crucially depend on the social connections among the relevant agents. An important and understudied way in which social networks can influence coordination is through altruism or trust generated by network-based proximity – i.e., how close two individuals are in a network. To investigate this mechanism, we combine data from an incentivized coordination task with data on real-existing friendship networks of 22 villages in Uganda. For the coordination task, we use a two-player minimum-effort game (MEG). In this game, two individuals choose simultaneously and independently how much effort to invest in a joint project, with the lowest chosen effort determining both players' payoffs. We introduce treatment variations along two dimensions to analyze the influence of network proximity. First, we match participants subsequently in different pairs, varying the disclosure of the participants' identities across the pairs. Either no player knows the other's identity (anonymous pairs – AN), or both players are informed about each other's identity (fully disclosed pairs – FD). Second, we vary the effort costs between subjects. Half of them are randomly assigned to a high effort cost (HEC) treatment, while the other half face low effort costs (LEC). Our main prediction is that higher proximity in village social networks increases effort, and that this effect is stronger in the HEC condition. We develop our hypothesis utilizing existing experimental studies. In laboratory experiments of the MEG with anonymous pairs, it has been shown that higher effort costs lead to lower effort. We expect that higher effort costs increase the scope for an effect of network proximity on effort. Furthermore, combining the insight that altruism and trust increase the ability to coordinate on a Pareto superior equilibrium in the MEG, and evidence on how altruism and trust are positively influenced by closeness, maximum network flow, and network triads, we develop specific hypotheses for each of these three measures of network proximity. Our results show that in the high cost condition, having common friends has a positive influence on effort among pairs with a direct tie, but not among pairs without a direct tie. Similarly, having a direct tie has a positive influence on effort among pairs with common friends, but not among pairs without common friends. These results support the importance of network triads through which network proximity influences coordination. We do not find support for alternative measures of network proximity that involve a different combination of direct and common friends. We make the following contributions to this literature. First, to study the influence of network-based proximity, we make use of real social networks. The existing literature typically uses lab experiments where social connections are artificially imposed on anonymous participants. Our use of real social networks can help address some of the questions raised about internal and external validity when social connections are imposed and made evident in the lab. Our results indicate that even without making networks salient, behavior is influenced by social proximity. Second, most of the existing literature assumes that social connections influence who is able to coordinate with whom, and/or who receives information about others' behavior. Our study of the role of network proximity sheds light on a new way in which networks can influence coordination. In addition, we provide a systematic comparison of three measures of network proximity. Third, we use a dyadic approach, and apply it across multiple pairs. While this diverges from the standard approach where one and the same behavior is exhibited towards all partners, it has the advantage that it is less restrictive in the sense that it allows partner-specific behavior.

### 4. Jeffrey ZEIDEL (New York University Abu Dhabi)

**Title:** A Signaling Game Played By Teams: Theory and Experiment

**Abstract:** Sender-receiver signaling games are played by teams in the laboratory. We implement three team and choice rule treatments: Individual decision making, majority rule voting with 5 team members, and unanimity rule voting with a default action, also with 5 team members. We find teams that use majority rule voting are more rational than individual decision makers, in the sense that they better respond to their opponents' actual behavior. Team members under unanimity rule vote strategically to cancel out the bias for the default action, with significant heterogeneity between sender and receiver teams. We estimate a single parameter team equilibrium model, and show that this model can help explain the observed relationships of behavior to game payoffs and choice rules.

### 5. Stephan SEMIRAT (GAEL Grenoble)

**Title:** Meaning to coordinate: an experiment

**Abstract:** In a sender-receiver cheap talk game, where a sender, privately informed about a type, sends a message to a receiver,

who then chooses an action, there is no concern for a meaning of the messages. Messages are used as a coordination device to pair the sender's types and the receiver's actions, and identical pairings are obtained by swapping all the messages. Thus the theory is agnostic about the language use. However, anecdotal evidences and some experiments (e.g. Blume, 2022) suggest that messages might have an extraneous meaning (i.e. refer to something beyond their *meaning in use*), which might influence the outcomes. The questions we ask are: (i) whether there is more than a 'meaning in use' in the messages that are sent in a sender-receiver game, and (ii) whether this possible extraneous meaning is related to the strategic aspects of the game. The current study aims to shed experimental light on these questions. We conducted a lab experiment to test in a sender-receiver game whether the messages that are used by the players are indicative or imperative. We consider that a message is indicative if its use can be unequivocally associated with a sender's type, whereas a message is imperative if its use can be unequivocally associated with a receiver's action. Although theory cannot discriminate message use with regard to these aspects (because in equilibrium, a sender's type is unequivocally associated with a receiver's action), we define an experimental protocol that allows us to make the distinction, without necessarily imposing it. We organized and conducted four treatments in a between-subjects design. On the one hand, we test whether messages with no a priori meaning allow players to coordinate. We compare two treatments in order to determine whether one meaning emerges rather than another, and according to the degree of players' conflict as to which action to associate with which type. On the other hand, we test whether one meaning or the other, i.e. indicative or imperative, lasts more over time when some conflict between the players is introduced. To that end, we compare two other treatments, in which each meaning is first induced for the players, in order to test, in a second step, whether one meaning is more resistant than the other to the introduction of the conflict. The experiment was carried out in February 2024 at the Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory from University Grenoble Alpes with 386 participants. The data collected are currently being analyzed. First results show that on average players manage to coordinate on a specific meaning of messages with average gains (0.72) that are strictly higher than expected gains in case of a pooling (babbling) strategy (0.5). The gains are not different between the sender and receiver roles.

## Metacognition

**Day:** Fri, June 28th | **Time:** 10.45 - 12.15 | **Room:** 209

### Presentations:

1. **Quentin CAVALAN** (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)

**Title:** Meta-metacognition and information search in the context of career choices

**Abstract:** In various critical scenarios, individuals must assess their strengths and weaknesses to make well-informed decisions. Whether starting a new business venture or embarking on a career change, being aware of one's abilities is of utmost importance. While individuals' metacognition often provides them with reliable self-evaluations, it can fail at times. Recent studies have shed light on individuals' capacity to recognize such metacognitive failures, an ability termed meta-metacognition. This paper presents the first experimental examination of the significance of meta-metacognition in economic decision-making by investigating its impact on individuals' demand for feedback about their own ability, in situations where self-knowledge is crucial. To explore this issue, we adopt a modified version of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)'s experimental paradigm, where individuals have to decide which payment scheme will compensate their work. Within this setup, we introduce the opportunity for participants to buy feedback regarding their own ability. We report two seemingly contradictory findings. Surprisingly, when individuals distrust their metacognition, they still tend to rely on it. Concurrently, we observe an increase in their demand for feedback, which seems to compensate for their poor metacognition.

2. **Charlotte CORDES** (LMU Munich)

**Title:** Motivated procrastination

**Abstract:** Procrastination is often attributed to time-inconsistent preferences but may also arise when individuals derive anticipatory utility from holding optimistic beliefs about their future effort costs. This study provides a rigorous empirical test for this notion of 'motivated procrastination'. In a longitudinal experiment over four weeks, individuals must complete a cumbersome task of unknown length. We find that exogenous variation in scope for motivated reasoning results in optimistic beliefs among workers, which causally increase the deferral of work to the future. The roots for biased beliefs stem from motivated memory, such that procrastination may persist even if uncertainty is eventually resolved.

3. **Karl HAUSER** (GAEL Grenoble)

**Title:** Nutri-Score: lackluster Nudge or powerful Boost? Exploring the two sides of behavioral economics on the case of a food choice targeting behavioral policy-tool

**Abstract:** The Nutri-Score is a European policy-tool that aims to improve the nutritional quality of purchase decisions in supermarkets, without restricting the set of available options or changing the economic incentives of the consumer – in short: it is a behavioral policy-tool. Yet, uncertainty remains on what type of behavioral policy-tool the Nutri-Score actually is and what impact this might have on its still debated behavior inflection capability. Considering the Nudge and Boost literature, we propose a framework for Behavioral Economics, in which the Choice Architect can either cater to behavioral biases (Nudge) or try to eradicate them (Boost). In this framework, Nudges and Boosts are the two sides of the Behavioral Economics coin. We test this framework in an economic laboratory experiment, with three treatments: the Nutri-Score, a Nutri-Score-based Nudge and a Nutri-Score based Boost. 574 French consumers were monetarily incentivized to be either motivated to choose healthy food or to be indifferent toward the nutritional quality of their choice. The experiment yields evidence for the relevance of the framework, as it predicts that Nudges have a reversible impact on behavior, while Boosts have a non-reversible impact on behavior. Results also show, that the Nutri-Score acts as a lackluster Nudge for indifferent consumers and as a powerful Boost for motivated consumers. Thus, we conclude that the Nutri-Score is in fact more Boost than Nudge and that its weaker performance in field experiments can be explained by a target mismatch: the Nutri-Score is intended for consumers who are

struggling to choose healthier products but it is primarily used by consumers who are already intrinsically health aware. This insight opens avenues for the improvement of this European, behavioral policy-tool.

4. **Matteo SCACCHI** (University of Insubria)

**Title:** Choosing to be nudged: the effect of beliefs on social norm avoidance. An Experiment on charitable giving

**Abstract:** Social norms have been effectively utilized to nudge people towards donations, but would subjects, when given a choice, seek out or avoid being nudged? Through a lab experiment, this paper investigates individuals' preferences to know or avoid descriptive norms in the context of charitable giving. Participants are presented with a donation opportunity and exposed to one of six treatments in which we manipulate two factors: a nudge that highlighted the social norm of giving (that could be absent, forced, or optional), and an elicitation of beliefs about the norm (present or absent). Our experimental design allows us to examine how individuals with different beliefs about social norms are more or less likely to seek out or avoid the norm and how they respond to nudges designed to encourage donations. In fact, outside of controlled experimental settings, descriptive norms are not imposed upon individuals, making information-seeking preferences and information avoidance crucial factors in shaping philanthropic decisions and designing effective interventions. Our findings have important implications for policymakers and organizations pursuing to promote pro-social behavior and contribute to the understanding of the mechanisms through which descriptive norms affect donation behavior. These results suggest that social norm nudges significantly boost charitable donations. However, when individuals are offered the choice, they typically opt out of being nudged, leading to a decrease in overall donation rates.

5. **Nicolas JACQUEMET** (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)

**Title:** How large is "large enough"? Large( . . . )-scale experimental evidence on the stability of confidence measures

**Abstract:** The notion of confidence, the metacognitive processes that constantly evaluates if our own actions, answers, or statements are correct, is the focus of a wide range of literature in behavioral sciences. The typical design relies on multiple trials of a given task and measures confidence from the average performance observed over all trials. These measures are then used to document both the relationship between confidence and important dimensions of human behavior at the individual level, and the distribution of heterogeneity in confidence at the inter-individual level. A key requirement of both kinds of empirical questions is to rely on measures of confidence that are stable enough at both the inter- and the intra-individual level. This paper provides an empirical investigation of this assumption based on the large-scale evidence available in the Confidence database. We rely on resampling exercises to study the stability of confidence as a function of the total number of trials. We also relate these measures of (within and between individual) stability to the design characteristics that vary across the studies available. Our main conclusions are twofold. First, both the level of confidence at the individual level and the comparisons across individuals become remarkably stable after 50 trials. Second, staircase designs do not seem to help in reducing the number of trials required to reach within-individual stability, nor hurt between-individual stability.

## Workplace behavior

**Day:** Fri, June 28th | **Time:** 10.45 - 12.15 | **Room:** 211

### Presentations:

1. **Magdalena KOTEK** (LISER Luxembourg)

**Title:** Team Diversity in Dual Identity Formation: Empowering Cooperation and Tackling Discrimination and Counterproductive Work Behaviour

**Abstract:** Note: This project constitutes the first chapter of my PhD Thesis. I had the opportunity to present my experimental design at last year's ASFEE conference and was rewarded with the ASFEE Poster Prize! We finalise data collection by April and I am very eager to present our findings at the conference. Diversity research has cumulated numerous insights on the paradoxical nature of heterogeneous workforces (Bassett-Jones, 2005). This research established that its adverse, social and economic implications, such as discrimination (Tajfel & Turner, 2001) and unethical behaviour (i.e., Counterproductive Work Behaviour, CWB; Spector et al., 2006) can be mitigated through a shared feeling of cohesion (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000; Charness et al., 2014; Kim & Choi, 2021; Liu et al., 2020). Scholarship proposes Dual Identity (DI), a framework that simultaneously acknowledges and promotes concrete subgroup- as well as abstract superordinate group membership, as the key to facilitating social change (Banfield & Dovidio, 2013; Prash et al., 2022). Supposedly, only the co-existence of multiple identities allows reaping the benefits of employees' heterogeneous, individual sub-identities while impeding adverse effects through a shared superordinate identity (Gaertner et al., 1996). Doing so, DI can activate a group identity, inducing prosocial concerns and cooperative behaviour toward peers (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000; Charness et al., 2014) that can subsequently curb discrimination and CWB in teams (Corgnet et al., 2020). Yet, albeit offering plentiful benefits – entailing increased awareness of bias (Prash et al., 2022), willingness to engage with out-group members and social change motivation (Glasford & Dovidio, 2011) – the formation of a DI can also trigger resistance due to identity threat (Martiny et al., 2017) or internal psychological conflict (Kende et al., 2021). The current project thus investigates team diversity as a boundary condition of the successful implementation of a DI that fosters cooperation while hampering discrimination and CWB. Drawing on the Identity Complexity Framework (Roccas & Brewer, 2002) and Group Preferences for Intergroup Relations (Dovidio et al., 2009), we propose that the cross-cutting of identities in diverse teams increases contact with outgroup members (Callens et al., 2015; Dovidio et al., 2017; Gaertner et al., 1996), proliferates identity complexity and thereby minimises cohesion of individual subgroups (Hopkins, 2011). Hence, we hypothesise that (H1) Team Diversity has a positive impact on DI formation and that (H2-H4) DI's positive effect on cooperation and negative effects on discrimination and CWB will be fortified with increasing team diversity. Doing so, we are conducting an online experiment with 120 university students, which was preregistered on aspredicted.org. In the first stage of the experiment, we induce students' social identity by means of their study program membership. We divide them into teams of four members with

different levels of diversity, based on study program membership (i.e., high: 1A vs 1B vs 1C vs 1D; low: 2A vs 2B) and conduct a baseline measure of cooperation, discrimination and CWB. Specifically, we are employing a series of one-shot experimental games: a Public Goods Game (PGG; Charness et al., 2014), a ‘taking’ Dictator Game (DG) (Cox, 2007) and a classical, ‘giving’ DG (Dato & Nieken, 2014). In the second stage, we additionally induce a team identity by making students collective university membership salient, using an adjusted version of the newly developed Cultural Communities Memory Game (Prasch et al., 2022). The teams are reshuffled to imperfect strangers, while retaining the team composition, and the experimental games repeated. The dependent variables of interest are conceptualised as changes between the first and second stages: in contribution to the PGG (i.e., cooperation), variation in amounts given in the DG (i.e., discrimination) and total amount taken in the DG (i.e., CWB). Additionally, we capture unethical behaviour as total occurrences of less than five tokens given and more than five tokens taken in the respective DG. The efficacy of the DI formation is assessed using an implicit group-identification question (Madera et al., 2012) and Likert-scale items indicating the strength of identification with the study program and university (Johnson et al., 2012). The final stage of the experiment is a survey capturing socio-demographic characteristics, personality, and social appropriateness of discrimination. We randomise the pay out of participants’ earnings between the two rounds. The contributions of this study are manifold, as we are investigating DI outside its typical context of migration and are looking beyond minimal group effects (Riener & Wiederhold, 2016). Acknowledging the criticism on passive induction of identities, we are applying active methods that are claimed to enhance the mental accessibility of the categories (Hornsey, 2008; Prasch et al., 2022). In addition to the specific boundary conditions of DI formation, we are also investigating behavioural consequences thereof and providing insights on team diversity to inform managerial implications.

## 2. **Emilien PROST** (ESSCA Lyon)

**Title:** Having Experience in the Trenches

**Abstract:** The project aims to find empirical evidence to prove that managers will adjust the remuneration of their employees based on their prior experience with the tasks assigned to them. We study their tendencies to propose a higher wage for tasks perceived as difficult and a lower wage for those considered easy. Conversely, we investigate how managers who do not have direct experience with the tasks performed by their employees, are more likely to suggest a more equitable distribution of income between their employees and themselves. To capture this concept, we implement the same two-stage game in two experiments, each comprising two treatments. In the first stage, the participant designated as the employer and the participant designated as the employee perform separate tasks. Subsequently, in stage 2, the employer receives the outcome of the employees’ work and must decide the size of the bonus as compensation for his or her effort. In the initial treatment, the participant designated as the employer completes a reading comprehension task, while the participant designated as the employee undertakes a different task: a calculation task. In the second treatment, both the employer and the employee engage in a calculation task. To measure the impact of the belief into the difficulty of the task on the employer’s behavior, we conduct this game and these treatments in two separate experiments, varying the difficulty of the calculation task.

## 3. **Olivier SAVRIMOUTOO** (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)

**Title:** The Cognitive Processes Behind Hiring Discrimination: An Experimental Investigation

**Abstract:** While the role of statistical discrimination in the unequal treatment suffered by populations who are victims of discrimination is now well known, recent work shows that its consequences are multiplied by the distortion of information processing that this statistical discrimination implies. The experiment by Esponda et al. (2023) thus shows that stereotypes distort not only the average estimates of the characteristics of groups, but also the inferences made from new information about individuals. This phenomenon, termed Representative Signal Distortion (RSD), leads to a biased interpretation of new information about individuals due to the stereotypes that apply to their group, and is thus likely to call into question the capacity of information on candidates to counteract the effects of existing statistical discrimination. To examine this hypothesis, the project utilises a laboratory experiment wherein participants act either as candidates or as recruiters. The study manipulates the level of education and group affiliation of candidates across two dimensions: Educated versus uneducated, with educated candidates possessing a higher qualification rate than their uneducated counterparts; Blue group versus orange group, with the blue group comprising a higher proportion of qualified candidates. Participants acting as recruiters anonymously encounter candidates one by one, receiving information regarding each candidate’s educational level and group affiliation. Following this initial acquaintance phase with the candidate’s profile, the recruiter enters a decision-making phase, during which a visual signal indicating the candidate’s actual qualification status is displayed. Only candidates within the upper half of the performance distribution are deemed qualified, inherently resulting in an over-representation of candidates from the blue group. This protocol facilitates the measurement of how a candidate’s profile influences decision-making, and a joint analysis of decisions and reaction times enables the estimation of underlying cognitive parameters that produce these decisions. To generate heterogeneity between educated and uneducated candidates, their performance is calculated as follows: the performance of educated candidates is based on 16 learned questions and 4 unlearned questions, while that of uneducated candidates is based on 4 learned questions and 16 unlearned questions. These differing calculation methods lead to an over-representation of educated candidates among those qualified. The Orange and Blue groups are then formed by assigning candidates such that the Blue (Orange) group consists of 70% (30%) educated candidates and 30% (70%) uneducated candidates. After this classification, candidates are sorted according to their relative position to median performance. Participants scoring at or above the median are classified as qualified, and those scoring below the median are classified as unqualified. In the employer experiment, a distinct sample of participants act as employers tasked with hiring only qualified candidates and rejecting unqualified ones. Employers meet each candidate and make a binary decision to ‘hire or reject’ for each. Besides group affiliation and education level, recruiters receive a noisy signal about the candidate’s qualification level (manifested as a visual perception task). Experimental treatments vary both the order in which employers receive information about the candidates and the incentive system applied to their recruitment decisions: Baseline: The base condition presents the group, followed by education, and finally the visual signal; Education First: An identical protocol to the baseline condition, with information on education presented before group affiliation; Subsidy Orange: A hiring subsidy is offered for the group with a lower rate of educated candidates (orange group); Subsidy Blue: A subsidy for hiring candidates from the Blue group (advantaged regarding education) induces employers to prefer this group. We replicate the patterns from Esponda et al. (2023) showing higher rates of hiring from the Blue group and lower rates of hiring from the Orange group, compared to the respective true qualification rates of candidates. Preliminary results obtained from fitting a psychometric function in the form of a logistic regression to the data indicates a preference for candidates from the Blue group, even after controlling for candidates’ true educational level and qualification status and for employers’ prior beliefs



about the proportions of qualified candidates in each combination of group affiliation and education level. Employers' seem to require a smaller proportion of evidence to be consistent with their judgment to hire candidates from the Blue group. Further analyses planned over the period of April - May 2024 will perform parameter estimation and model comparisons across a range of Drift Diffusion Models, with the aim of comparing how the bias (starting point) and drift rate (rate of evidence accumulation) are influenced by the core factors of our experimental design, namely candidate group and education. The modelling of those parameters will also address the effects of our subsidies and of the order of presentation of the candidates' profile on employers' information processing to arrive at their decisions.

4. **Ludovica SPINOLA** (Milano-Bicocca University)

**Title:** Spillover effects of cooperative behaviour when switching tasks: the role of gender

**Abstract:** A worker within a firm, or a researcher within the academia, is required to both cooperate with colleagues in team-projects and to compete with them for career progressions. Hence, within workplaces, individuals need to adapt when switching between tasks characterized by different levels of competitiveness and cooperativeness. In this paper, we experimentally investigate possible spillover effects on males' and females' cooperation measured by indefinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemmas, distinguished by two different levels of the competitiveness-cooperativeness index (CCI, Demuynck et al., 2022). Additionally, as the importance placed on competitiveness might differently impacts males' and females' attitudes towards the task, in our Decomposition treatment we separately present its zero-sum component and its common interest component. While our results support the efficacy of the CCI in measuring the competitiveness and cooperativeness of the Prisoner's Dilemma, the impact of the choice architecture intervention is different for whether the Prisoner's Dilemma is highly competitive (CCIHHigh) or highly cooperative (CCILow). Our Decomposition treatment enhances cooperation in highly competitive setting (CCIHHigh), whereas no such effect is observed in highly cooperative context (CCILow). In addressing our main research question, we find that females are more likely than males to spill over their cooperative behaviour when switching from a low competitive environment to a high competitive one.

5. **Milos FISAR** (Masaryk University)

**Title:** Procrastination vs. Performance over Continuous Time: The Role of Breaks and Internet Browsing Temptations on Productivity

**Abstract:** In an era where digital distractions are inescapable, understanding the nuanced impact of internet browsing on workplace productivity is crucial. The study investigates the complex interplay between breaks, online browsing temptations, and productivity through a laboratory experiment. We dissect productivity into three key components: (i) the decrement in performance over time due to boredom or fatigue, (ii) the refreshing effect of breaks on participant energy, and (iii) the impact of the lure of internet browsing. We employ a matrix counting real-effort task to measure participants' engagement in the face of internet distractions. Our hypothesis posits that while breaks and internet browsing temptations might enhance productivity in the latter stages of the task, they could detrimentally affect performance in the initial phases. As of the submission deadline to ASFEE, the data collection is ongoing. We anticipate that a complete draft of the paper will be available by early May.

## Games 2

**Day:** Fri, June 28th | **Time:** 13.45 - 15 | **Room:** 204

### Presentations:

1. **Gabriel BAYLE** (CEE-M Montpellier)

**Title:** Efficiency of the Minimum Approval Mechanism with heterogeneous players

**Abstract:** The Minimal Approval Mechanism (MAM) was introduced by Masuda et al. (2014) as a mechanism aimed at mitigating free riding in the social dilemma context of a public good game. The MAM is a two-stage mechanism which theoretically achieves the socially optimum level of public good provision, according to various equilibrium concepts (e.g., BEWDS, level-k, or minimax regret). We study the robustness of this mechanism to the introduction of endowment heterogeneity. We explore, theoretically and experimentally, how endowment inequalities affect the effectiveness of the MAM at improving the level of provision. We find that the mechanism is still Pareto-improving under endowment heterogeneity, but that its efficiency diminishes as inequality is increased. Our experimental findings indicate a significant weakening of the mechanism under endowment inequalities, surpassing our theoretical predictions. A close examination of individual behaviors reveals a significant drop in contributions compared to the uniform case, prompted by even minor inequalities. Intriguingly, our findings challenge conventional assumptions by showing that inequality aversion does not drive contributions in a public good game with endowment disparities. We explore the impact of beliefs about the contributions of advantaged player and guilt aversion as potential motivations.

2. **Evan FRIEDMAN** (Paris School of Economics)

**Title:** Quantal Response Equilibrium with a Continuum of Types: Characterization and Nonparametric Identification

**Abstract:** Quantal response equilibrium (QRE), a statistical generalization of Nash equilibrium, is a standard benchmark in the analysis of experimental data. Despite its influence, nonparametric characterizations and tests of QRE are unavailable beyond the case of finite games. We address this gap by completely characterizing the set of QRE in a class of binary-action games with a continuum of types. Our characterization provides sharp predictions in settings such as global games, volunteer's dilemma, and the compromise game. Further, we leverage our results to develop nonparametric tests of QRE. As an empirical application, we revisit the experimental data from Carrillo and Palfrey (2009) on the compromise game.

3. **Enya TURRINI** (Royal Holloway University of London)

**Title:** Information-signaling in pre-trial bargaining: An experiment

**Abstract:** Most legal disputes end with a settlement, but not all of them. The cases where settlement fails impose substan(al

costs on the judicial system. An important reason for settlement failures is asymmetric information: when one party has private information, the uninformed party may be forced to go to trial. The importance of informational gaps notwithstanding, scarce experimental literature has investigated pre-trial bargaining under asymmetric information. Moreover, to the extent informational gaps inhibit settlements, one would expect informed parties to transmit information indirectly, e.g., by taking commitments to signal their strength. While theoretical literature supports this argument, parties do not seem to engage in such information-conveying strategies. We explore these issues by using an experiment where we ask participants to play the role of a recipient or a proposer in a setup that mimics a legal dispute. We add to this basic setup the option of information signaling, in the form of a commitment to pay an additional amount at trial conditional on losing. We hypothesize that settlement proposals that are coupled with a self-penalty signal would be accepted more often; and that proposers would be inclined to commit to signal their merits (anticipating a higher rate of acceptance).

#### 4. **Tim CASON** (Purdue University)

**Title:** Communication, Guilt, and Agency Risk with Payoff Externalities

**Abstract:** Communication is effective in enhancing cooperation in strategic settings. In this paper, we present a scenario in which actions of principals and agents not only affect payoffs for the pair within the specific agency relationship, but also impact the earnings and outcomes of an external principal-agent pair. Maximum social efficiency is achieved only if all principals and agents choose to cooperate. These settings where agency risk and outcome externalities coexist are pervasive, extending to various levels, including group dynamics, industry collaborations, national initiatives, and international endeavors aimed at addressing pressing global challenges such as climate change. We investigate how different types of communication between principals and agents affect cooperation and efficiency in this environment. Communication is hypothesized to impact beliefs, which in turn affects the psychological costs (e.g., guilt and lying aversion) that principals and agents feel when choosing their actions. A baseline treatment allows no communication opportunities. Two communication treatments introduce (a) a single, private message from the agent to the principal in each pair; and (b) preliminary free-form chat between both agents and principals whose payoffs are affected by actions, in addition to the single, private message in (a). Participants provide complete and incentivized first- and second-order beliefs. The opportunity for free-form communication in the group significantly increases cooperative choices of both principals and agents. Allowing agents to send a single private message has only an asymmetric effect. These messages increase cooperative choices by principals but not agents. Beliefs are consistent with the behavior observed, with beliefs that others will cooperate higher in the treatment with free-form communication. Similarly, we also observe the asymmetric influence of the single private message on first and second order beliefs of the principals and agents. Beliefs impact cooperative choices in a manner consistent with simple guilt aversion. These findings provide evidence of a beliefs channel through which communication affects behavior.

## Honesty & Dishonesty

**Day:** Fri, June 28th | **Time:** 13.45 - 15 | **Room:** 208

### Presentations:

#### 1. **Beatrice BOULU-RESHEF** (Université d'Orléans)

**Title:** Truthful reputation? Theory and Experiments in the Context of Investment Behavior

**Abstract:** This paper studies the impact of a reputation system which combines information related to truth-telling and information related to economic performance on firms' and investors' behavior in an investment game. Such a reputation system allows to link the two important aspects of reputation - honesty and performance - which have been so far studied separately. We analyze firms' and investors' strategies using a cheap talk framework and use laboratory experiments to test the predictions of the model. Both in the theory and in the experiments, we observe that via this reputation mechanism, firms' truthful behavior can be induced, especially for bad-type firms and environments in which success-rate is low. Second, the reputation system helps investors distinguish between good and bad investment firms via the reputation score which explains the investors' investment difference between good-type and bad-type firms. The higher the reputation score, the higher the propensity of investors to invest. Third, we find that different types of investment firms treat reputation differently: good-type firms' announcements are positively impacted by their probability of success and by their reputation score while bad-type firms' announcements are only related to the probability of success. Thus, although bad-type firms do not seem to care about reputation, the fact that only good firms treat reputation as an asset is enough to allow investors to distinguish good-firms from bad-firms. Our findings help inform questions related to the design of reputation systems.

#### 2. **Fabio GALEOTTI** (CNRS)

**Title:** Non-verifiable dishonesty: Confessions as a detection and deterrence mechanism

**Abstract:** In this paper we study confessions as a detection and deterrence mechanism of unethical behavior. In the majority of real-life situations across contexts, such as insurance and tax fraud, the manipulation of financial statements, or student cheating, it is impossible to detect and punish unethical behavior unless it is confessed voluntarily. In a theoretical model and large-scale experiment with 1202 subjects, we derive and test the impact of a confession possibility, together with varying the size of a fine, on detecting unethical behavior. In addition, we analyze whether the anticipation of a confession possibility, anticipating monetary and image costs of a confession, can serve as a deterrence mechanism of unethical behavior. Our results show that a confession possibility is a successful tool to detect unethical behavior across all conditions and over time, and in particular when the fine is low, but that it does not deter unethical behavior in our setting. We also find that confessions are not driven by altruistic motives, supporting the view that the internal mechanism underlying the confession decision is based on a trade-off including monetary and image costs. In addition, we find a negligible fraction of false confessions, supporting the use of confessions as a detection mechanism.

#### 3. **Chloe TERGIMAN** (Smeal College of Business)

**Title:** Why do oaths work? Image concerns and credibility in promise-keeping

**Abstract:** In a laboratory experiment we investigate the channels through which honesty oaths affect behavior and credibility. We manipulate the common knowledge of the oath and investigate three non-pecuniary costs associated with oath-breaking. Our results highlight the importance of image costs related to self-image, and image costs stemming from how players perceive each other while suggesting a lesser role for image costs linked to diffuse observation. Despite the significant impact of oaths on oath-takers, we find that the mere knowledge that an oath has been signed is neither sufficient nor necessary to generate trust in the oath-taker: instead, individuals rely on their experience.

4. **Sarah ZACCAGNI** (Aarhus University)

**Title:** For God, Family, and Country: The Impact of Moral Reminders on Dishonesty

**Abstract:** Despite the strong moral value tied to religious teachings, we lack substantial evidence on how reminders from religious authorities influence behavior compared to those from secular authorities. In our experiment, we test the effect of reminders from different authorities on dishonesty among young students in Tanzania, a country with high levels of religiosity and corruption. The results show that reminders from secular authorities (family and state) effectively reduce dishonesty, whereas the impact of generic and religious reminders is weak and statistically insignificant. Our findings align with a theoretical model where reminders lower dishonesty by heightening attention and agents experience context-specific disutility from dishonesty.

## Individual Decision Making 2

**Day:** Fri, June 28th | **Time:** 13.45 - 15 | **Room:** 209

### Presentations:

1. **Noémie BOBIN** (Université de Montpellier)

**Title:** Overconfidence, Gender, and the Dynamics of Competitiveness in a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment

**Abstract:** We investigate the relationship between overconfidence and competitiveness, addressing two pivotal research inquiries. First, we explore the prevalence and patterns of overconfidence and underconfidence in their three forms, overprecision/underprecision, overestimation/underestimation and overplacement/underplacement (e.g. Moore and Schatz, 2017), exhibited by subjects in a competitive framework. Our main hypothesis examines how the three forms of overconfidence correlate with the individuals' willingness to enter competition in our task. Additionally, our research extends to examining how overconfidence manifests differently across genders. Particularly noteworthy is the study by Niederle and Vesterlund (2017), which associates the gender gap in competitiveness with variations in overplacement. We also collected the subjects' stated competitive practices and feelings of evolving into competitive surroundings to identify how their personal development shapes their overconfidence and willingness to compete. Second, we aim to elucidate the variations in individuals' willingness to engage in competitive activities, particularly when the number of opponents within each group varies. Our study intends to manipulate N, forming groups of 4, 8, 16 or 32, in a between-subject design, to ascertain whether the decision to enter competition is contingent, at least in part, on the number of opponents. This notion draws inspiration from the work of Garcia and Tor (2009), introducing the "N-effect". The "N-effect" posits that as the number of contestants (denoted as N) increases, the probability of participants choosing to enter in competition diminishes. This behavioral inclination may stem from the dynamics of social comparison (Festinger, 1964), where individuals, cognizant of competing against a multitude rather than a handful of contestants, become increasingly wary of others' perceptions and evaluations. In this study, we leveraged "Fête de la Science" (FS)—a prominent public event dedicated to the popularization of Science in France—as a platform for gathering data. We adapted the Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) experimental design for the specific context of the FS as a 10-minutes experiment with questionnaires and incentivized effort tasks to pasture competitiveness and confidence biases. Passersby were only informed that they can participate in an experiment for scientific purposes and earn money according to their decisions. We collected 447 observations in October 2023. Our preliminary analyses confirm that individuals that currently practice competitive activities, or have practiced it the longest, choose the tournament more frequently. We also find a significant gender gap in competitiveness as well as a stronger overplacement bias for men. We will extend our analysis to the other concepts and the interactions between overconfidence, competitiveness and the "N-effect".

2. **Mehdi LOUAFI** (Université d Orléans)

**Title:** Do Concerns for Risks of Personal Data Leaks Impact Decision-Making in Finance?

**Abstract:** Based on an experiment with participants from the general population, we examine the determinants of individuals' investment decisions in the presence of potential personal data leaks. We find that participants when presented with scenarios explicitly acknowledging the probability distribution and content of personal data leaks, tend to prioritize financial performance over the safeguarding of their personal data. However, we show that individuals adjust their preferences in favor of privacy when confronted with high risks of data leaks or low financial returns. Additionally, we observe that the magnitude of data leaks in previous rounds, as measured by the number of participants affected, decreases the likelihood of investing in options carrying privacy risks. While past exposures to data leaks at the aggregate level influence decision-making, individual experiences of data leaks in previous rounds do not significantly impact subsequent investment decisions. These findings contribute to our understanding of how individuals navigate complex trade-offs associated with privacy, shedding light on decision-making within the context of data security concerns and financial decisions.

3. **Anne-Gaëlle MALTESE** (University of Strasbourg)

**Title:** Does Creativity Thrive on Plot Twists? Exploring the effect of surprise on team creativity

**Abstract:** Most individuals prefer control and predictability rather than the unknown. Unfortunately, "much surprise is inevitable because it is part of the natural order of things and cannot be avoided, eliminated, or controlled" (McDaniel et al., 2003). In addition, humans' thoughts and perceptions are shaped by their own beliefs and expectations. Consequently, individuals might perceive a discrepancy between their expectations and any event that may occur. This leads to surprise and the need for an individual or a group to evaluate the event and adapt its own schemas to this new situation. Before going into the details of our model and protocol, let's focus on the very definition of surprise and its close link with creativity. Based on the

extensive literature on surprise, we can define surprise as sudden and resulting from a change in expectations and beliefs that have both physiological and cognitive features and implications. In the context of our work, we are, more specifically, focusing on the link between surprise and the collective creative process. In fact, among possible unexpected events are the ones related to creative activities. As it has been defined in the literature, creativity is a social endeavor (Amabile, 2016), and collective creativity is the product of interactions between individuals (Csikszentmihalyi et al., 1996). Even though a single individual may carry out an activity or task, this does not mean that we should overlook the considerable number of activities and tasks that are carried out collectively on a day-to-day basis. This obviously applies in different contexts, including within organizations. Again, a common link emerges between surprise and creativity. On the one side, surprise is a central element in the life of any organization, as organizations must adapt to a constantly evolving environment in order to survive. On the other side, creativity is crucial for innovations and organizations. Thus, when tackling a creative task, teams must consider potential changes as the task progresses because those changes bring out challenges regarding responsiveness, reframing, and adaptability. In other words, the phenomenon of surprise accentuates the need for resilience because of the discomfort and urgency that unexpected events can create. To study surprise, we need first to understand the phenomenon itself. In fact, “before the event there are expectations. After the event there may be surprise” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982), and surprise is a response to violating constituted expectations or beliefs (Grace and Maher, 2015). Consequently, the definition of surprise relies more precisely on the concept of unexpectedness (Macedo et al., 2009; Reizenzein et al., 2019), inducing that individuals might perceive a discrepancy between their expectations and any unexpected event that may occur. This simultaneously leads to a feeling of surprise and a disruption of their cognitive process. Thus, one needs to evaluate the event and adapt its own schemas to this new situation. Based on the previous mechanisms, the current cognitive model of surprise (Reizenzein, 2019) lacks a collective perspective on how groups would lead this process. The first aim of our work is to contribute conceptually to this model, as surprise might occur in a team context where responsiveness, reframing, and adaptability are both individual and collective. This is all the more important if we acknowledge that a collective phenomenon cannot be expressed by simply aggregating individual phenomena. The very existence of a group induces the emergence of more complex dynamics intrinsically linked to the very existence of this group, i.e. the emergence of social processes through the interactions of the involved agents. However, we also contribute empirically by testing hypotheses on core elements of our collective model: the discrepancy of surprise perceptions, the emerging collective processes, and the influence of group composition. To do so, we elaborated the following experimental protocol. This protocol is a collective experiment (with face-to-face interactions) involving 122 teams (366 subjects) working on two specific tasks. First, the “schema-setting” task aims to create relevant schemata for subjects where surprise will never occur. During this task, teams must think about a new idea or project to improve their daily life at the university. Then, the “surprise task” differs according to the level of surprise. For baseline teams, no surprise will occur. For treatment 1, some hints have been given in the instructions to induce a possible change in the instructions (surprise is low). For treatment 2, no hint has been given in the instructions (surprise is high). The final task is the following: “Imagine and describe the dwellings of a city in the future, built underwater” (the change in treatments 1 and 2 is the “built underwater” addition to the instructions halfway through the task). This experiment is completed with various questionnaires. The data obtained during this experimental protocol can be divided into two parts: information related to the subjects and the conduct of the experiment (socio-demographic, personality traits, group work, surprise, pre-existing relationships) and data on creative performance. The elaborated ideas were presented to evaluators to assess their originality and feasibility for each task. Our strategy to analyze those data is to pursue an econometric analysis of teams’ creative performance, both in terms of feasibility and originality. From the experimental protocol described in the previous section, we aim to observe the effect of surprise on teams’ creative performance. The literature on surprise and collective creative performance is scarce, and we are, to the best of our knowledge, the first paper to adapt the evolutionary cognitive model of surprise to collective processes and the first paper to test it experimentally. As the results of this study are currently being analyzed, we expect to share them rapidly in upcoming updates.

#### 4. Michela CHESSA (Université Côte d Azur)

**Title:** How people learn complexity? An experiment on the Dirty Face problem

**Abstract:** This paper aims to investigate the Aha! moment insight (hereafter referred to as “Aha insight”). The Aha insight is characterized by a sudden comprehension that can lead to a new interpretation of a situation and point to the solution to a problem. Typically, this insight is associated with a strong positive emotional affect state. The discovery process implied by the Aha insight does not occur at the culmination of mental effort but rather as a flash of understanding after a period of rest or distraction. We investigate the Aha insight through an experimental investigation of a well-known iterative reasoning game known as the Dirty Face problem. The Dirty Face problem, formally described by Littlewood (1986), is a prominent example of induction puzzles in mathematics, dating back as early as 1961 (Gardner, 1961). Since the early 2000s, the Dirty Face problem has been utilized in economic experiments. Weber (2001) and Bayer and Chan (2007) reconfigured the problem settings to require only finite levels of rationality to reach the desired equilibrium outcome. This allowed them to investigate whether real individuals’ behavior aligns with theoretical predictions, particularly regarding the number of iterations required to solve the problem. Notably, the Dirty Face problem is intriguing for testing purposes because, unlike competitive guessing games such as the beauty-contest game, players cannot gain an advantage by being only marginally more rational than others; comprehension can only occur when all players are fully rational. More recently, Bayer and Renou (2024) addressed this externality issue by implementing a design that enables the comparison of interactions with humans and interactions with machines. As the machines are fully rational, the game is then implemented as a task for a single decision maker. We implement a design similar to that of Bayer and Renou (2024), where a single decision maker interacts with four fully rational machines. However, unlike their setup, the puzzle is not played only once; each decision maker plays the puzzle 60 consecutive times. The focus of our paper is to investigate the learning process and capture the Aha insight when the flash of understanding occurs. Additionally, we test for different orderings of complexity levels, where complexity is defined as the number of iterations necessary to solve the puzzle. In one treatment, the level of complexity is uniformly distributed between 1 and 5. In a second treatment, complexity regularly increases over time. We combine a traditional experimental investigation with two physiological measures—face reading of emotions and heart rate—to capture the Aha insight. Our research questions aim to investigate (1) how people learn under different orderings of complexity levels in the game and (2) how the distribution of puzzle complexity influences the occurrence and strength of the Aha insight. References Bayer, R.-C. and M. Chan (2007). The Dirty Faces Game Revisited. School of Economics Working Papers 2007-01, University of Adelaide, School of Economics. Bayer, R.-C. and L. Renou (2024). Interacting with man or machine: When do humans reason better? Forthcoming in *Management Science*. Gardner, M. (1961). The Second

## Social behavior and trust

Day: Fri, June 28th | Time: 13.45 - 15 | Room: 211

### Presentations:

1. **Adam ZYLBERSZTEJN** (Université Lyon 2)

**Title:** Anonymity, nonverbal communication and prosociality in digitized interactions: An experiment on charitable giving

**Abstract:** We empirically examine the value of modern digital communication tools for inducing prosocial behavior. In our online experiment ( $N = 594$ ), charity members transmit a standardized message to potential donors through alternative digital communication channels varying the amount of nonverbal content (written message in the baseline TEXT condition vs. voice recording in AUDIO vs. video-recorded discourse in VIDEO). We find partial support for the initial conjecture that individuals are more cooperative towards strangers the less anonymous the latter become to the former. Compared to the baseline TEXT condition, our AUDIO treatment induces a nearly 40% increase in the average donation. However, the transmission of nonverbal cues may backfire: the effect observed in the richest VIDEO condition has only half the magnitude of the one in AUDIO. We attribute this phenomenon to the "avoiding the ask" behavior previously documented in the charity giving literature. We also rule out the possibility that these treatment effects stem from perceptual mechanisms by which these changes in prosociality are driven by the differences in the perception of charity members in the stimuli, suggesting that the treatment effects capture the intrinsic value of reducing anonymity for promoting prosociality in the digital world.

2. **Moti MICHAELI** (University of Haifa)

**Title:** Are Anti-Vaxxers Anti-Social? How convictions shape prosocial behavior and vaccination decisions

**Abstract:** Remaining not vaccinated against Covid-19 by the end of the pandemic is a clear indication of having strong convictions. Such willingness to bear consequences to follow what one believes to be the right course of action is an important and understudied characteristic that is potentially responsible for a wide range of human behaviors, ranging from political activism through adopting unpopular habits to volunteering to help others. In a series of incentivized tasks performed by a large representative sample of the Israeli adult population ( $n=1,562$ ), we document a negative correlation between vaccination against Covid-19 and the tendency to act pro-socially. This result seems to counter the intuition according to which vaccinating during the pandemic goes hand in hand with being pro-social. We explain this puzzling finding using the notion of convictions: The pro-social behavior of non-vaxxers reflects their willingness to bear the costs of what they perceive as the correct course of action, a willingness that tends to surpass the average level found in the general population. This rationale further implies that those with the weakest convictions are likely to vaccinate only partially and show the lowest levels of pro-sociality. Drawing on this line of reasoning we develop a formal model that is able to explain this empirically-found pattern of pro-sociality as a function of the number of vaccination-doses taken, a pattern that we dub as a 'truncated U-shape'. The model also provides an insight into the marked differences in pro-social behavior patterns between participants who reported vaccinating due to pressure and those who did not.

3. **Sara GIL GALLEN** (Université de Strasbourg)

**Title:** Equality of opportunity in a probabilistic dictator game: An artefactual field experiment

**Abstract:** Saito (2013) proposed a theoretical model showing that it is not only equality of outcomes that plays an essential role in subjects' preferences for equity, but also equality of opportunity. The present study aimed at measuring subjects' sensitivity to equality of opportunity in a probabilistic dictator game, depending on whether they or a partner owned a randomly assigned indivisible good. The research implemented a between-subject artefactual field experiment at a folk music festival in southern Italy. The results showed that dictators were more selfish in the appropriation than the donation treatment, as they selected higher probabilities of appropriating the indivisible good than retaining it when it was in their property. This suggests that envy may have a stronger effect than guilt. Hence, it provides novel empirical insights into the role of equality of opportunity in social preferences.

4. **Eli SPIEGELMAN** (Burgundy School of Business)

**Title:** The evolution of conventions: strategies or preferences?

**Abstract:** Evolutionary systems are defined by two characteristics: a "mutation" mechanism generating diversity and a "selection" mechanism rewarding success. In social evolutionary systems, mutation is trivially identified with individual experimentation or mistakes. Selection, however, is less clear, and the focus of this paper. Specifically, we test the predictions of "direct evolutionary mechanisms" in which relatively successful strategies outcompete the less successful, with "indirect evolutionary mechanisms" in which the locus of selection is a utility function. We do this with a 60-period, stranger matching Trust Game, with two unusual features. First, in every period, participants face three simultaneous games against different opponents. Second, consistent with the literature in the evolution of cooperation, Trustors have a probability of observing Trustee behavior before choosing, which transforms each game into an anti-coordination game. Under direct evolution, Trustee behavior should depend only on the mixed-strategy equilibrium of the game, while indirect evolution additionally imposes consistency requirements across the games in any period. This difference has empirical implications at the individual and aggregate levels, and our data favor the hypotheses drawn from indirect models. Our results speak to the nature of social rationality. Participants in our experiment do not adopt payoff-maximizing strategies, but rather "conventions" in the sense of "rules of appropriate behavior" that they apply across the three games. However, the conventions that emerge do respond to incentives in ways largely predictable by the average payoff they earn.

## Markets

**Day:** Fri, June 28th | **Time:** 15.30 - 16.30 | **Room:** 204

### Presentations:

1. **Ben GRODECK** (University of Exeter)

**Title:** No Intention to Profit, No Repugnance? Experimental Evidence For Outcome-Based Repugnance

**Abstract:** We study whether and why people feel repugnance towards harmless transactions that profit off others' misfortune, without causing the misfortune itself. Examples of such transactions include second-hand markets for life insurance and prediction markets for disasters. Repugnance in these contexts can be a constraint on market efficiency. In a series of online experiments (N>2000) that vary in the moral intensity of misfortune—from monetary losses in a game to deaths from road accidents—we find robust evidence of repugnance, measured using costly third-party punishment towards the party profiting from others' bad luck. Intentions to profit from others' misfortune play a limited role in punishment decisions. Repugnance is observed even when profits are associated with good outcomes. Overall, people dislike profit-making when it is attached to others' (mis)fortune, suggesting repugnance is mainly outcome-based.

2. **Alexandros KARAKOSTAS** (ESSCA Lyon)

**Title:** Virtue Signaling in Credence Goods Markets

**Abstract:** Many economic transactions are plagued by asymmetric information and misaligned incentives between two contracting parties. This is particularly true in markets for credence goods, where the buyer is often unable to assess the suitability of a purchased good or service and must rely on an impression regarding the prosocial attitudes of the seller. As sellers who exhibit other-regarding preferences will act in ways that better serve the buyers' interests, the latter will often look for cues or signals that would allow them to distinguish between other-regarding and self-interested sellers. At the same time, if sellers are aware that signals of norm compliant behavior are used by buyers as a means of selecting their interaction partners, they will attempt to signal that they care for more than their own self-interest. This generates a virtue signaling environment. We study theoretically how sellers' past actions in a donation task may act as signals of their moral character in credence goods markets. We derive conditions under which such signals are used by sellers and perceived as credible by buyers, linking signaling behavior to market prices and to market participants' beliefs and levels of risk aversion. The model's predictions are tested in a laboratory experiment.

3. **Yujiang SUN** (CEE-M Montpellier)

**Title:** Giving under background risk: An experimental study

**Abstract:** Distributional decision-making often confronts exogenous uncertainty, causing disruptions in terms of ex post equity. Our understanding of the potential impact of such uncertainty on the ex ante giving behaviors remains rather limited. Recent studies have explored this question in the context of background risk. However, the inconsistent findings from these studies leave the impact of background risk on prosocial behavior an open question in the field. In this study, we employ a modified dictator game in a lab experiment to investigate giving behavior under exposure to background risk. A key novelty is the inclusion of a common exposure treatment, simulating a scenario where everyone is equally exposed to background risk. Our results reveal that exposure to background risk does not significantly affect the mean donation in the dictator game. However, it does result in a more centralized distribution of donations around the mean. Specifically, when either one player is exclusively exposed, we observe a significant increase in the likelihood of allocating around one-quarter of the pie to the recipient, akin to a risk-free environment. As a result, people are more likely to give “little” (Engel, 2011) prior to a resolution of background risk. We posit an intuition that individuals tend to simplify their decision-making process in environments characterized by increasing complexity resulting from exposure to background risk. This intuition aligns with recent findings suggesting that people avoid applying rules (conceptualized as certain strategies and preferences) with the increasing computational complexity (Oprea, 2020). Although a similar increase in allocating one-quarter of the pie is not significant in the common exposure treatment, this could be explained by individuals perceiving uncertainties borne on both ends as canceling each other out in the first place, also reflecting an application of simplifying the decision-making process. This tendency to simplify the decision-making process under complexity due to background risk may also explain the lack of correlation between risk preference and giving behavior in our regression analysis. Additionally, we find a significant correlation between giving behavior and one's subjective perception of closeness with their counterparts. Interestingly, when recipients are exclusively exposed, dictators perceive less closeness, while recipients exhibit an elevated perception.

## Methods & tools

**Day:** Fri, June 28th | **Time:** 15.30 - 16.30 | **Room:** 208

### Presentations:

1. **Max GROSSMANN** (University of Cologne)

**Title:** uproot: An Experimental Framework with a Focus on Performance, Flexibility, and Ease of Use

**Abstract:** Existing popular software frameworks for conducting behavioral experiments—both online and in the lab—suffer from limitations including architectural inflexibility and limited feature sets that restrict their utility. They are closed source or do not encourage outside contributions. To overcome these restrictions, we introduce “uproot”: a scalable, fully parallelizable, open-source framework for developing and conducting behavioral experiments. uproot revolutionizes data storage with an append-only log, ensuring data persistence and allowing the use of arbitrary data types. uproot provides many additional important features for modern experiments. For example, Likert scales are provided out of the box, file uploads are possible, and error messages

can be customized easily. With capabilities such as page repetition, random page orderings, indefinitely repeated sets of pages, management of individual subjects, dynamically sized sessions, and convenient APIs, uproot overcomes many of the limitations of existing frameworks. Our framework is suited for both small-scale and large-scale studies, including surveys and experiments in which participants interact with each other. Finally, we encourage community-driven development.

2. **Andrea GUIDO** (Burgundy School of Business)

**Title:** On the external validity of experimental measures of reciprocity

**Abstract:** In this paper, we shed light on the external validity of experimental measures of reciprocity via an online study conducted in partnership with a financial institution in Nigeria. We explore whether measure of reciprocity, both incentivized and non-incentivized, can predict non-laboratory economic decisions such as loan repayment. We collected a sample of over 300 individuals for which we dispose of both financial records and behavior in the online experiment. Our findings suggest that the incentivized measure of reciprocity positively correlate with the timeliness of loan repayment. However, we do not find any significant correlation between incentivized measures of reciprocity and the probability of late repayment. Moreover, non-incentivized measures of reciprocity are not predictive of repayment behavior.

3. **Matteo M. MARINI** (Masaryk University)

**Title:** Meta-analyses in Economic Psychology: A sustainable approach to cross-cultural differences

**Abstract:** This manuscript is a methodological work on the state of research using meta-analytic procedures in Economic Psychology, with a focus on the investigation of cross-cultural differences. We review published meta-analyses and introduce a new classification thereof by data source, describing how the different categories relate to the study of cross-cultural differences. We also discuss related opportunities and challenges, proposing a sustainable methodological approach that is then implemented in three case studies where we re-analyze data from published meta-analyses. In doing so, the relevance of culture as a determinant is explored by relating country-level cultural indicators to experimental measures of risk aversion, tax compliance, and prosocial behavior, respectively. It turns out that, after we control for country-level cultural heterogeneity and economic development, country-level individualism predicts these economic outcomes. We discuss possible interpretations of our findings.

## Prosocial behavior

**Day:** Fri, June 28th | **Time:** 15.30 - 16.30 | **Room:** 209

### Presentations:

1. **Thibaut ARPINON** (Georg-August-Universität Göttingen)

**Title:** Impact of Animal Welfare Education on Perceived Life Worthiness and Policy Support

**Abstract:** We study the impact of educating lay people on animal welfare on their perception of animal farming conditions and their support for policy intervention. To this end, we use a pre-registered online experiment (UK representative sample) where some participants are randomly exposed to a short training on animal welfare derived from the well-known Five Domain framework. Next, participants evaluate the lifeworthiness of farmed chickens under different rearing scenarios, alongside an incentivized petition-giving game. Our design controls for potential experimenter demand effects and self-selection. We aim to offer insights into the impact of structured and informed animal welfare interventions. The data collection is set to occur in April 2024.

2. **Romain ESPINOSA** (CNRS)

**Title:** Impact of NGOs' Undercover Videos on Citizens' Emotions and Pro-Social Behaviors

**Abstract:** Undercover videos have become a popular tool among NGOs to influence public opinion and generate engagement for the NGO's cause. These videos are seen as a powerful and cost-effective way of bringing about social change, as they provide first-hand evidence and generate a strong emotional response among those who see them. In this paper, we empirically assess the impact of undercover videos on support for the cause. We in addition analyze whether the increased engagement among viewers is driven by the negative emotional reactions produced by the video. To do so, we design an online experiment that enables us to estimate both the total and emotion-mediated treatment effects on engagement by randomly exposing participants to an undercover video (of animal abuse) and randomly introducing a cooling-off period. We collected about 3,300 observations. We find that the video successfully increases actions in favor of animals (i.e., donations to NGOs and petitions), but we fail to prove that this effect is due to the presence of primary emotions induced by the video. Last, we investigate whether activists correctly anticipate their undercover videos' (emotional) impact via a prediction study involving activists.

3. **Andrea MARTINANGELI** (Burgundy School of Business)

**Title:** Externalities and the erosion of trust

**Abstract:** We present a theory linking political and social trust to explain trust erosion in modern societies. Individuals disagree on the seriousness of an externality problem, which leads to diverging policy opinions on how to solve it. This heterogeneity has two important effects on trust. First, disappointment with the policy rule enacted by the government breeds institutional distrust. Individuals that are more worried blame the government because the rule is too lenient. The less worried blame it even more because it is too intrusive. Second, as the rule also shapes individuals' notion of civic behavior, it drives a wedge between what an individual expects from others and their actual behavior. This fuels social distrust. The more individuals are worried, the more they distrust others that are not complying with the rules. Our experimental survey conducted in four European countries shows how these trust dynamics came to the surface during the Covid-19 pandemic. Once led to think intensely about the virus, lower institutional trust was reported predominantly by respondents that were less worried about the virus, whereas social trust declined (more) for worried individuals. We lastly find that support for the welfare state erodes alongside sliding trust levels.

## Poster session

**Day:** Fri, June 28th | **Time:** 13.15 - 13.45 | **Room:** First floor

### Presentations:

1. **Huen Tat AU YEUNG** (Stockholm University)  
**Title:** Information acquisition with correlation neglect  
**Abstract:** In this paper, I argue that non-Bayesian belief formation would lead to a distortion in the information gathered in the first place. Therefore, considering both belief formation and information acquisition simultaneously is crucial. Focusing on correlation neglect, I show how belief bias enters information acquisition decisions and potentially amplifies the bias. After introducing uncertainty in the data generating process (DGP), i.e. the level of correlation in this case, the implication would be different if the underlying mechanism is different. With a proposed experiment, it is possible to document the additional bias, uncover the underlying mechanism, and design information policies to reduce the bias driven by the difference in information consumption.
2. **Clémentine BOULEAU** (Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne)  
**Title:** Does Manipulating Confidence Affect the Gender Gap in Willingness to Lead?  
**Abstract:** Gender disparities in leadership roles have long been a focal point of research, particularly due to their implications for the gender wage gap. While existing literature has extensively explored biases and discrimination in leader selection processes, a growing body of research highlights the role of gender differences in willingness to lead (WTL) in perpetuating the leadership gap. Notably, disparities in confidence levels have been proposed as a potential contributor to these differences, with women often exhibiting lower levels of confidence compared to men (Coffman, 2014; Adamecz-Völgyi and Shure, 2022). However, empirical evidence on the role of confidence in explaining gender disparities in leadership aspirations remains limited. To address this gap, the present study seeks to identify the causal relationship between gender differences in confidence and the gender gap in willingness to lead (WTL) by experimentally manipulating confidence levels within a controlled laboratory environment.
3. **Elodie CORVAISIER** (GATE/CNRS/Université Lyon 2)  
**Title:** Impact of forced displacement on detrimental gender-based norms in the Sahel region of Africa  
**Abstract:** The project aims to understand how forced displacement impacts the perceptions of detrimental gender social norms of adolescents and their parents. We focus on examining the perceptions of two prevalent practices in the Sahel region of Africa: child-early forced marriage (CEFM) and female genital mutilation (FGM). The United Nations considers FGM and CEFM as violations of human rights for girls and women. Given that FGM is often practiced as a pre-marital rite of passage, girls who undergo it are more likely to be married at an early age. CEFM impedes girls' education, increases early pregnancy and the risk of maternal mortality, obstetric complications, gender-based violence, and HIV/AIDS, and robs them of their agency to make decisions about their lives. These harmful practices, still common in the Sahel, raise serious concerns regarding health, social justice, and respect for individual autonomy. The methodology employs incentivized behavioral economics games with 500 adolescents and their parents in both peaceful and attacked areas of Burkina Faso. These areas are currently facing a significant surge in forced displacement due to terrorist attacks. We aim to measure social norms through three types of expectations and assess the impact of disseminating social information on various local norms.
4. **Damiano PAOLI** (Alma Mater Studiorum - University of Bologna)  
**Title:** Trust the AI Process: Do Humans Accept AI's Distributive Choices  
**Abstract:** As Artificial Intelligence (AI) becomes more integrated into our everyday lives and we increasingly rely on it by delegating tasks of various complexity, it is relevant to examine how people react to AI's autonomous decision-making. This study investigates human perception of unsupervised decisions made by AI that generate real consequences for someone else. I employ a large-scale online experiment involving three participant roles: taskers completing tasks (real effort or charitable donations), spectators awarding bonus rewards to taskers, and supervisors reviewing spectator decisions. The intervention involves human and AI spectators, who must decide how to split an additional reward between two taskers, after observing their performance. Then, human supervisors will have to decide if and to what extent to modify the division proposed by human or AI spectators, without observing the taskers' performance. With this experimental design, I aim to test two hypotheses: (i) whether humans exhibit differential acceptance of ethical-based decisions made by AI compared to humans; and (ii) whether the perceived trustworthiness of AI for economically relevant judgments varies based on the task type (computational vs. moral).
5. **Michèle KAESER** (University of Bern Institute for Organization and HR)  
**Title:** Supervisors' reactions to employees' penalty contracts  
**Abstract:** This study aims to investigate the impact of bonus and penalty contracts on supervisors' reactions in the context of subjective performance evaluations. In practice, most firms use subjective performance evaluations of employees (Prendergast and Topel, 1993; Prendergast, 1999). One reason is that important parts of employee performance are often not directly measurable; that is, for most employees it is impossible to assess their contribution to firm value objectively (Bol, 2008). However, previous research conducted in the field (Bol, 2011; Breuer et al., 2013) and in the lab (Berger et al., 2013) consistently showed a leniency bias in which supervisors assign higher ratings to employees than warranted by their performance. Simultaneously, literature indicates that framing incentive contracts as penalties rather than bonuses is an effective and allegedly costless way to motivate employees to exert more effort. Whereas a bonus is paid after the employee has met a specified performance target, a penalty contract rewards the employee up front, and the employee has to repay the variable component if the specified performance target is not met. If the two contract types are designed such that they are payoff-equivalent, prospect theory predicts that, due to loss aversion, employees work harder to avoid paying the penalty than to gain the bonus. In line with this prediction, experiments (e.g., Essl et al., 2023; de Quidt, 2018; Levitt et al., 2013) have repeatedly shown that penalty contracts induce more or at least the same effort as bonus contracts. However, penalty contracts are rarely observed in practice. Thus, researchers have examined potential adverse effects of these contracts outside the realm of effort provision. For example, there is evidence that people perceive penalty contracts as unfair or controlling (e.g., Luft, 1994; Hannan et al., 2005; Christ et al., 2012), cheat more to avoid



a penalty than to receive a bonus (Grolleau et al., 2016; Schindler and Pfattheicher, 2017), or feel more stressed and choke under time-dependent penalty contracts (Essl and Jaussi, 2017). Yet, the literature has thus far ignored the role of the supervisor. This study aims to bridge these two clearly related but previously unconnected literature strands. Therefore, the proposed research project opens a new research stream by bringing together the two formerly disconnected strands of literature on contract framing and subjective performance appraisals. We hypothesize that supervisors are even more lenient when employees work under a penalty contract compared to a bonus contract. Reasons may be that supervisors empathize with their employees, are afraid of adverse reactions by their employees, do not want to harm their own self-image or are loss averse to others' payoffs. To test our hypothesis, we conduct a lab experiment applying a principal-agent setting. Participants in the role of agents (=employees) perform a real effort task, while those in the role of principals (=supervisors) benefit from the agents' work and assess their performance. We combine a between- and a within-subjects design. Participants are randomly assigned either a bonus or penalty contract (between-subject design). The incentives are financially equivalent in all treatments. The only distinction between the treatments lies in how they are framed (receiving a low (high) payment in the beginning and a potential bonus (penalty) later). Supervisors' assessment of employees' performance determines whether the employees receive a bonus or – in the penalty treatment – must pay back a penalty. Participants then undergo two treatments in a within-subjects design: one where the employees have the option to reward or punish the supervisors as a reaction to their subjective performance evaluation and another where this option is absent. In addition, we collect data on loss aversion for own and other peoples' payments, altruistic behavior, self-image concerns, empathy, personality traits, and demographics.

6. **Sacha KRAMER** (Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1)

**Title:** Exploring Changes in Farmers' Economic Behaviors during Epizootics: An Experimental Study

**Abstract:** This research is aiming to investigate the economic behaviors of livestock farmers during health crises, particularly focusing on epizootics (i.e. animal epidemics). Motivated by the increasing interest in multidisciplinary studies merging economics and epidemiology (epi-eco), our study contributes to this field by conducting a financial double auction market (DA) experiment. The experiment simulates the dynamics of a contagious risk representing the spread of a disease among livestock traded by farmers. Our design consists of two parts of ten periods each, with the first part without any disease and the second part introducing a contagious disease risk associated with asset ownership. During each period, participants can engage in buying and selling livestock, which yield random dividends at the end of the period for their owners. The introduction of a contagious risk in the second part decreases the average dividends for infected livestock, who also possess a probability of infecting other animals within the participant portfolio. Through this investigation, we aim to explore participants decision-making strategies in response to the risk of disease transmission. We analyze variations in prices and trading volumes following the introduction of the disease, highlighting the intricate relationship between economic interests and the potential spread of disease among assets. Our goal is to provide valuable insights into the intersection of economics and epidemiology and also gather data for epidemiological models and policymakers. Additionally, we seek to understand how infectious diseases emerging in markets alter farmers' behaviors and impact the market, thereby enhancing our understanding of the economic implications of epizootics.

7. **Luisa LORE** (University of Innsbruck)

**Title:** Consumer (mis)perception of and beliefs updating on second-hand clothing

**Abstract:** Creating a sustainable production system for goods and services is one of the main economic-environmental challenges of the present day. A promising system to address this challenge is the "circular economy". More specifically, circular economy leverages three core practices: reducing waste generation through the purchase of durable, repairable, or refillable products; engaging in the repair and reuse of products, thus extending their lifespan; recycling waste, thereby diverting it from landfills and allowing for the recovering of valuable materials. Much weight is placed by policymakers on fostering these three circular economy practices among consumers, especially repair and reuse. The EU produces 12.6 million tonnes of textile waste annually, with clothing and footwear contributing 5.2 million tonnes, equivalent to 12 kg of waste per person annually. The EU Commission considers repair and reuse a priority step (after waste prevention) in the order of preference for managing and disposing of waste according to the hierarchy established in the Waste Framework Directive. Nonetheless, engagement in repair and reuse seems to remain quite low. Unfortunately, only 22% of post-consumer textile waste is collected separately for recycling or reuse, while the rest is often burned or deposited in landfills. In 2020, in France, 29% (15.1m people) of shoppers bought and 36% (18.7m people) sold second-hand clothes. We want to conduct a research project on consumers' attitudes towards second-hand goods, specifically related to image concerns in the clothing industry. Our study involves a series of survey experiments on the French general population. We aim to understand people's perception of second-hand clothing, their image concerns and belief updates on a voucher choice between two vouchers from the same online store, one for conventional e-commerce and the other for second-hand e-commerce. Our first survey experiment aims to investigate if there is a negative perception of buyers of second-hand clothes. Participants are shown 16 photos of clothes and are asked to answer four questions for each photo using a 5-point Likert scale. The questions relate to the wealth, style, and political orientation of the person wearing the outfit in the photo, and their willingness to pay for the outfit in the photo. We also asked them about incentivized second-order beliefs about all four. The photos' characteristics are as follows: 1/2 are worn by a male model, and 1/2 are worn by a female model. Three photos are taken per clothes, keeping the background and pose constant for a given model. The clothes characteristics are 1/2 first-hand and 1/2 second-hand, and no brand is visible. We implement two between-subject treatment variations: Blind (control) and Second-hand. In the Blind condition, subjects are shown eight photos without any information, while in the Second-hand condition, they are shown the same eight photos, but on those with second-hand clothing, there is a "Second-Hand" label. We want to investigate whether there is a systematic difference between the evaluation of Second-Hand outfits between the Blind treatment and the Second-Hand treatment. In our second survey experiment, we aim to investigate if we can improve people's negative perception of second-hand clothes by presenting them with others' unbiased opinions, namely the answers from the Blind treatment. We are going to ask subjects to choose between two types of vouchers in a multiple price list setting: one voucher for first-hand clothes from popular e-commerce, and another one for second-hand clothes from the same e-commerce. We are going to implement three treatment conditions: No Info (control), Unbiased Info, Biased and Unbiased Info. In the No Info condition, subjects will choose the voucher with no additional information. In the Unbiased Info condition, subjects will receive information about the first-order belief of the subjects in study one in the control before choosing a voucher. In the Unbiased and Biased Info, subjects will receive information about the first-order belief of the subjects in study one in both the control and the treatment before choosing a voucher.

8. **Andrea MARIETTA LEINA** (University of East Anglia)  
**Title:** Cooperation and inequalities: an experimental approach  
**Abstract:** Are individuals willing to cooperate to increase their collective welfare despite existing inequalities? We intend to analyse this question within an innovative experimental framework, departing from existing literature in two significant ways. Firstly, in our experiment, players engage in a production phase where they determine their earnings through a game played in pairs, diverging from the central use of public good games in previous studies (Cappelen et al., 2010; Gächter et al., 2017). Secondly, unlike previous studies that imposed an exogenous alternation of production and distribution phases, in our setting, players have a choice: either to continue the game to increase their earnings or to opt for the distribution phase. The game advances to another production round only if both players in a pair choose to cooperate; otherwise, they transition to the distribution phase. In this new setting, we plan to implement two treatments to explore the impact of high and low levels of inequality on these dynamics. We hypothesise that this approach will reveal nuanced insights into the relationship between cooperation and inequalities that previous research may have overlooked.
9. **Kaloyana NANEVA** (UniCA-Laboratoire GREDEG)  
**Title:** From Experiments to Experiences: The Influence of Virtual Reality on Probability Judgements  
**Abstract:** This project is devoted to the exploration of Virtual Reality (VR) technologies as an innovative method for testing individuals' economic behavior allowing the replication of real-world situations within a controlled environment. Our main objective is to understand potential deviations in the choices decision agents make when experiencing a VR simulation, compared to empirical findings within conventional laboratory conditions. In particular, we focus on the empirically grounded phenomenon of probability weighting in choice under risk, represented by an inverse S-shape function [5] describing the tendency of overweighting small probabilities and underweighting moderate and high probabilities. We analyze potential variations of the probability weighting function between two treatments, one with the use of VR technologies, and another one involving abstract monetary gambles. We will investigate the theoretical framework of Rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU) [3] by implementing the trade-off method developed by Wakker and Deneffe (1996) [6] and a parameter-free elicitation of the probability weighting function. [1], [2] The selected experimental framework will imply a VR simulation of climate change irregularities and their effects in the context of agricultural decision-making between varieties of crops. [4] Climate-resilient crops allow producers to adapt to weather conditions such as increased drought and heatwaves. Our study will therefore provide evidence for understanding if their rates of adoption increase when experimental subjects experience a VR-induced extreme environmental event compared to when subjects perform a standard framed but non-immersive choice task. Keywords: Virtual Reality, Context dependence, Rank-dependent expected utility, Probability weighting, Trade-off method, Agricultural decision-making. References : [1] Abdellaoui, M. (2000). Parameter-free elicitation of utility and probability weighting functions. *Management Science*, 46(11), 1497–1512. [2] Bleichrodt, H., & Pinto, J. L. (2000). A parameter-free elicitation of the probability weighting function in medical decision analysis. *Management Science*, 46(11), 1485–1496. [3] Quiggin, J. (1982). A theory of anticipated utility. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 3(4), 323–343. [4] Schrieks, Teun, et al. (2024). Drought risk attitudes in pastoral and agro-pastoral communities in Kenya. *Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics*, 108, 102143. [5] Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty. *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, 5, 297–323. [6] Wakker, P., & Deneffe, D. (1996). Eliciting von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities when probabilities are distorted or unknown. *Management Science*, 42(8), 1131–1150.
10. **Marie-Sophie ROUL** (LEDa)  
**Title:** Determinants and mechanisms of trust towards environmental allegations : experimental evidence from a “green trust” game  
**Abstract:** Consumers' demand in pro-environmental goods has been growing with recent environmental concerns. Consequently, firms have increased their amount of environmental communications and eco-labelling schemes, many of them corresponding to “greenwashing” practices, only designed to capture demand without significantly improving the environmental impact of the firms' activities. The information asymmetry thus created could bring consumers to avoid so-called “green” products, by fear of greenwashing. This paper researches whether “green (mis)trust” mechanisms allow for efficient detection of greenwashing, or whether they prevent sustainable consumption. We propose a novel “green trust game”, in which a trustor delegates their resources to an environmental investor. We hypothesise that green trust mechanisms differ from interpersonal trust mechanisms (such as beliefs of trustworthiness, uncertainty and betrayal aversions), and isolate green trust. We also test the impact of providing imperfect information to the trustor, by manipulating the trustee's possibility to communicate with the trustor through cheap talk and imperfect certification mechanisms. Finally, we test the impact of feedback on the choices of a sample of trustees on the trustors' behaviours.
11. **Alessandro SALIS** (University of Sassari)  
**Title:** Narratives, Self-Control and Prosocial Behavior  
**Abstract:** The aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between narratives and prosocial behavior in a strategic context where social and self-image, as well as self-control, play a crucial role. We introduce a self-control conflict for individuals by utilizing a Common Resource Pool, in which individuals can utilize a specific number of resources from a fixed common pool in a simultaneous game. Our paper wants to contribute to the previous literature in two ways: first, we study how narratives affect prosocial behavior in a strategic context. Second, we investigate the relation between prosocial narratives and self-control. Benabou et al. (2020) indeed argue that self and social image concerns help to counteract self-control problems that creates undesirable impulse to behave immorally; we test if people with prosocial preferences but with a low level of self-control are indeed less prosocial. We expect to find a positive relation between cooperative behaviors and high level of self-control; at the same time, individuals with low level of self-control should act less prosocial. What narratives should do is to reinforce one's beliefs and influence more individuals with low level of self-control.
12. **Matylda TROCINSKA** (LMU Munich)  
**Title:** “Unpacking the ethics of leadership: Does power shape (im)moral preferences?”  
**Abstract:** In my project, I aim to establish a causal relationship between power and (im)moral choices (in particular dishonesty) across different decision environments. In recent years in Germany, we have witnessed prominent scandals involving leaders abusing power, such as the Wirecard and Volkswagen Diesel Scandals. Such instances were documented among leading

politicians (Celse and Chang, 2021), managers (Haeghele, 2021), government officials (Hanna and Wang, 2017), and in academia (Acemoglu et al., 2022). Psychology literature provides suggestive evidence on higher degree of power leading to more immorality (Lammers, 2010). However, it is unclear to what extent power abuse reflects decision-makers' moral preferences or whether power indeed shapes decision-makers' morality. The main goal of this project is to resolve this issue and provide clear evidence on the causal effects of power and organizational structures on moral preferences. I study this mechanism in two experiments using student and the general working population. The former one assigns subjects to an experience of High or Low Power in a laboratory. That variation corresponds to having decision rights over many vs. few others. Importantly, I seek to differentiate between being powerful and being in an environment that may (in itself) be prone to immoral actions. This will allow me to separately study the effects of holding power and being responsible vs. holding power in situations in which power offers an opportunity to act immorally. To achieve these goals, this study builds on experimental corruption games that analyze the behavior of participants in leading roles who have the power to determine the payoffs of several agents (see, e.g., Abbink et al., 2002). In these paradigms, an evaluator allocates a monetary prize to competitors and may act (or not act) upon bribes. A main feature for our purposes is that these settings allow us to expose participants to situations in which they may hold allocation rights over many (or few) others, in environments that do (or do not) allow for immoral acts (bribes) before decisions are taken. Hence, we can exogenously assign participants to situations in which power (in the form of allocation rights over others' payoffs) is either naturally construed as responsibility or comes with the opportunity to freely act upon bribes in immoral ways. Following the corruption game, I elicit participants' dishonesty level. I measure dishonesty using a mind game in which participants first will be shown a coin on their screen and are asked to 'pick' heads or tails (in their minds). Then, they flip the (virtual) coin and report whether the outcome coincided with the side they picked beforehand. This procedure will be repeated 10 times (i.e., ten 'picks' and ten coin tosses). The hypothesis is that higher degree of power translates into more dishonesty. I aim to disentangle the channels of the effect by asking subjects about the prescriptive and descriptive norms. The results of my project can be of crucial importance for organizations and their design of hierarchical structures and distribution of power inside them.

13. **Xin ZHANG** (University of Bologna)

**Title:** Break the Norm: The effect of Opinion Leaders and Homophily

**Abstract:** Social norm evolution is essential to the development of society but can be blocked by norm entrenchment. Opinion leaders, distinguished by their increased media coverage and superior information access, possess the capacity to catalyze norm-breaking through endorsement; however, their actions are contingent upon individual motives. This study explores the influence of opinion leaders, specifically examining how those informed by general social preferences regarding a given norm contribute to steering society toward the socially optimal path—or not—across various circumstances. We adapted the theoretical model based on Gallice and Grillo (2020) and designed a laboratory experiment, to provide valuable feedback to refine existing theoretical frameworks.