

Hack.lu

Mobile application testing

Web Application hack techniques



OWASP Mobile Top 10 Risks

M1 – Weak Server Side Controls

M2 – Insecure Data Storage

M3 - Insufficient Transport Layer Protection

M4 - Unintended Data Leakage

M5 - Poor Authorization and Authentication

M6 - Broken Cryptography


M7 - Client Side Injection

M8 - Security Decisions Via Untrusted Inputs

M9 - Improper Session Handling

M10 - Lack of Binary Protections

OWASP assessment model



M1 – Weak server side controls, risk

- In order for this vulnerability to be exploited, the organization must expose a web service or API call that is consumed by the mobile app. The exposed service or API call is implemented using insecure coding techniques that produce an OWASP Top Ten vulnerability within the server.
- Through the mobile interface, an adversary is able to feed malicious inputs or unexpected sequences of events to the vulnerable endpoint. Hence, the adversary realizes the original OWASP Top Ten vulnerability on the server.

M1 – prevention

- Secure coding and configuration practices must be used on server-side of the mobile application. For specific vulnerability information, refer to the OWASP Web Top Ten or Cloud Top Ten projects

M2 – Insecure data storage, risk

- Insecure data storage vulnerabilities occur when development teams assume that users or malware will not have access to a mobile device's filesystem and subsequent sensitive information in data-stores on the device
 - (Jailbreak/rooting!)
- Filesystems are easily accessible. Organizations should expect a malicious user or malware to inspect sensitive data stores. Rooting or jailbreaking a mobile device circumvents any encryption protections. When data is not protected properly, specialized tools are all that is needed to view application data.

M2 – prevention

- The cardinal rule of mobile apps is to not store data unless absolutely necessary
- You also have to consider the implications of losing mobile users' data to a silent jailbreak or root exploit
- The lesson here is to know what data is being stored and protect it appropriately

M3 – Insufficient Transport protection, risk

- Mobile applications frequently do not protect network traffic. They may use SSL/TLS during authentication but not elsewhere. This inconsistency leads to the risk of exposing data and session IDs to interception.
- The use of transport security does not mean the app has implemented it correctly
- To detect basic flaws, observe the phone's network traffic. More subtle flaws require inspecting the design of the application and the applications configuration.

M3 – prevention

- Assume that the network layer is not secure and is susceptible to eavesdropping
- Apply SSL/TLS to transport channels that the mobile app will use to transmit sensitive information, session tokens, or other sensitive data to a backend API or web service
- Account for outside entities like third-party analytics companies, social networks, etc. by using their SSL versions when an application runs a routine via the browser/webkit. Avoid mixed SSL sessions as they may expose the user's session ID.
- Use strong, industry standard cipher suites with appropriate key lengths
- Use certificates signed by a trusted CA provider

M3 – prevention 2

- Never allow self-signed certificates, and consider certificate pinning for security conscious applications
- Always require SSL chain verification
- Only establish a secure connection after verifying the identity of the endpoint server using trusted certificates in the key chain
- Alert users through the UI if the mobile app detects an invalid certificate.
- Do not send sensitive data over alternate channels (e.g, SMS, MMS, or notifications)
- If possible, apply a separate layer of encryption to any sensitive data before it is given to the SSL channel. In the event that future vulnerabilities are discovered in the SSL implementation, the encrypted data will provide a secondary defense against confidentiality violation.

M4 – Unintended data leakage, risk

- Unintended data leakage occurs when a developer inadvertently places sensitive information or data in a location on the mobile device that is easily accessible by other apps on the device
- First, a developer's code processes sensitive information supplied by the user or the backend. During that processing, a side-effect (that is unknown to the developer) results in that information being placed into an insecure location on the mobile device that other apps on the device may have open access to.
- Typically, these side-effects originate from the underlying mobile device's operating system (OS)

M4 – prevention

- It is important to threat model your OS, platforms, and frameworks, to see how they handle the following types of features:
 - URL Caching (Both request and response)
 - Keyboard Press Caching
 - Copy/Paste buffer Caching
 - Application backgrounding
 - Logging
 - HTML5 data storage
 - Browser cookie objects
 - Analytics data sent to 3rd parties

M5 – Poor authentication authorization, risk

- Poor or missing authentication schemes allow an adversary to anonymously execute functionality within the mobile app or backend server used by the mobile app
- Weaker authentication for mobile apps is fairly prevalent due to a mobile device's input form factor. The form factor highly encourages short passwords that are often purely based on 4-digit PINs.
- To test for poor authorization schemes, testers can perform binary attacks against the mobile app and try to execute privileged functionality that should only be executable with a user of higher privilege while the mobile app is in 'offline' mode

M5 – prevention

- Developers should assume all client-side authorization and authentication controls can be bypassed by malicious users. Authorization and authentication controls must be re-enforced on the server-side whenever possible.
- Due to offline usage requirements, mobile apps may be required to perform local authentication or authorization checks within the mobile app's code. If this is the case, developers should instrument local integrity checks within their code to detect any unauthorized code changes. See M10 for more information about detecting and reacting to binary attacks

M6 – Broken cryptography, risk

- In order to exploit this weakness, an adversary must successfully return encrypted code or sensitive data to its original unencrypted form due to weak encryption algorithms or flaws within the encryption process

M6 – prevention

- Use reliable libraries
- Skilled programmers
- Proper key management (Keychain on iOS, Keystore on Android)

M7 – Client side injection, risk

- Client-side injection results in the execution of malicious code on the mobile device via the mobile app
- Typically, this malicious code is provided in the form of data that the threat agent inputs to the mobile app through a number of different means
- The data is malformed and is processed (like all other data) by the underlying frameworks supporting the mobile app as executable code
- The code is malicious in nature and executed by the app

M7 – prevention

- In general, protecting your application from client side injection requires looking at all the areas your application can receive data from and applying some sort of input validation
- In certain cases this is simple but for others it is more complex

M8 – Security decisions via insecure data, risk

- Developers generally use hidden fields and values or any hidden functionality to distinguish higher level users from lower level users. An attacker can intercept the calls (IPC or web service calls) and temper with such sensitive parameters. Weak implementation of such functionalities leads to improper behavior of an app and even granting higher level permissions to an attacker. This can easily be exploited through hooking functionality.

M8 – prevention

- Scrutinize input
- Validate before use
- Only accept if it is completely screened
- Screen ALL input
- Use secure development techniques

M9 – Improper session handling, risk

- In order to facilitate a stateful transaction between a user and a mobile app's backend servers, mobile apps use session tokens to maintain state over stateless protocols like HTTP or SOAP. To maintain state, the mobile app must use a cookie, and add this cookie to all future service transactions between the mobile app and the server.
- Improper session handling occurs when the session token is unintentionally shared with the adversary during a subsequent transaction between the mobile app and the backend servers

M9 – prevention

- To handle sessions properly, ensure that mobile app code creates, maintains, and destroys session tokens properly over the life-cycle of a user's mobile app session

M10 – Lack of binary protections, risk

- A lack of binary protections within a mobile app exposes the application and its owner to a large variety of technical and business risks if the underlying application is insecure or exposes sensitive intellectual property. A lack of binary protections results in a mobile app that can be analyzed, reverse-engineered, and modified by an adversary in rapid fashion.

M10 – prevention

- First, the application must follow secure coding techniques for the following security components within the mobile app:
 - Jailbreak Detection Controls
 - Checksum Controls
 - Certificate Pinning Controls
 - Debugger Detection Controls

M10 – prevention 2

- Next, the app must adequately mitigate two different technical risks that the above controls are exposed to:
 - The organization building the app must adequately prevent an adversary from analyzing and reverse engineering the app using static or dynamic analysis techniques
 - The mobile app must be able to detect at runtime that code has been added or changed from what it knows about its integrity at compile time. The app must be able to react appropriately at runtime to a code integrity violation

2016

- M1 Improper Platform usage:
 - Not using platform provided security features (not using Android permissions, iOS Touch ID and keychain etc)
 - Not following coding guidelines etc

2016

- M2 Improper data storage:
 - Combination of M2 and M4 from previous top 10

2016

- M3 Insecure communications:
 - Not using SSL/TLS or not properly using SSL/TLS (or no encryption at all!)

2016

- M4 Insecure authentication:
 - Failing to properly identify the user (relying on lock screen of device?)
 - Weak session management (reusing sessions)
 - Failing to maintain identity of user
 - Insecure storage of long term cookies on device

2016

- M5 Insufficient cryptography:
 - Failing to properly use cryptography for local storage
 - Inventing your own cryptography
 - Poor protection of keys

2016

- M6 Insecure authorization:
 - Authorization done on client side
 - Not linking logon identity to data access
 - Enrollment weaknesses

2016

- M7 Client code quality:
 - ‘Old’ M8
 - Poor checks on user inputs
 - Insecure programming techniques

2016

- M8 Code tampering:
 - Unable to detect code manipulation on device
 - Lack of runtime protections

2016

- M9 Reverse engineering:
 - Storing sensitive information in application (without proper protection)

2016

- M10 Extraneous functionality:
 - Backdoors
 - Debugging code in production

Android application testing




ANDROID

Android application testing

- If you want to do it yourself:
 - Android SDK: <http://developer.android.com/sdk/index.html#download>
 - APKTool: <https://code.google.com/p/android-apktool/downloads/list>
 - JD-GUI: <http://jd.benow.ca/>
 - Dex2Jar: <https://code.google.com/p/dex2jar/downloads/list>
 - Burp Proxy: <http://portswigger.net/burp/download.html>
 - Andriller: <http://android.saz.lt/cgi-bin/download.py>
 - Python 3.0: <http://python.org/download/releases/3.0/>
 - AFLLogical: <https://github.com/viaforensics/android-forensics>
 - SQLite Browser: <http://sourceforge.net/projects/sqlitebrowser/>
 - Drozer: <https://www.mwrinfosecurity.com/products/drozer/community-edition/>
 - Lobotomy: <https://github.com/LifeForm-Labs/lobotomy>

Android application testing



Android application testing

- But first....
- Prepare your device:
 - Enable USB debugging
 - Unlock bootloader
 - Root it



Android application testing

- Rooting your device means installing linux software that grants normal users root privileges
 - Allows you to bypass security
 - Is different for each device
 - May break your device and will void your warranty!




Android application testing

- ADB (Android Debugging Bridge) is one of the first tools to use
- Is part of the platformtools part of the SDK

```
$ adb devices
List of devices attached
emulator-5554    device
```

- If you connect with ADB for the first time, you need to accept the certificate of the computer on the device

Android application testing



Android application testing

Android boot process:

- The boot process is essential in securing Android.
- If you can intervene you can inject and manipulate the Android Platform.
- (*This is actually necessary when rooting an Android device*).
- For Nexus 7 (2012): <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/how-root-nexus-7-2012-wi-fi-nexus-10-stock-android-5-0-lollipop-via-cf-auto-root-1474771>

Android application testing


Android boot process:

1. BIOS starts the device (hardware).
2. The BIOS loads the kernel.
3. The kernel creates the first process:
 - Init
 - Mount directories, reads init.rc and other startup files
4. init will start other processes (adbd, vold etc.)
 - In /system there is a build.prop file that also contains additional startup and device information

Android application testing

- Android boot process
 - Once all system processes are started, init will startup Zygote
 - Zygote is responsible for creating Dalvik Virtual machines and loading libraries etc.
 - Applications are spawned from Zygote

Android application testing



Android application testing


- To create your testing environment (examples on Kali):
 - Install the android-sdk (make sure to use the proper java version!):
 - apt-get install openjdk-7-jdk
 - apt-get install android-sdk
- If you're on a 64 bit machine (older kali):
 - apt-get install lib32ncurses5 lib32stdc++6

Android application testing

- Use android manager to install platform-tools and the SDK at least
- On Kali this is all installed in /usr/share/android-sdk
- Important subdirectories: tools and platform-tools
- Add them to your PATH so you can find all the commands
- Don't forget to select the proper java if you have more installed:
 - root@kali:~# update-java-alternatives -l
 - java-1.6.0-openjdk-amd64 1061 /usr/lib/jvm/java-1.6.0-openjdk-amd64
 - java-1.7.0-openjdk-amd64 1051 /usr/lib/jvm/java-1.7.0-openjdk-amd64


Android application testing

- You can also install Android emulators and virtual devices.
- In my experience this does not provide:
 - a reliable test environment
 - better to buy a Nexus phone and use that as a testbed.




Android application testing

- adb really is your friend....




Android application testing

- adb push and pull allow you to put and get files
- adb install allows you to install apk (package) files
- adb backup allows you to make backups
- Etc.



Android application testing



The screenshot shows a terminal window titled "1. bash" displaying the documentation for various `adb` commands. The text is as follows:


```
device commands:
adb push [-p] <local> <remote>
    - copy file/dir to device
    ('-p' to display the transfer progress)
adb pull [-p] [-a] <remote> [<local>]
    - copy file/dir from device
    ('-p' to display the transfer progress)
    ('-a' means copy timestamp and mode)
adb sync [<directory> ]
    - copy host->device only if changed
    (-l means list but don't copy)
adb shell <command>
    - run remote shell interactively
adb shell <command>
    - run remote shell command
adb emu <command>
    - run emulator console command
adb logcat [<filter-spec> ] - View device log
adb forward --list - list all forward socket connections.
    the format is a list of lines with the following format:
        <serial> " " <local> " " <remote> "\n"
adb forward <local> <remote> - forward socket connections
    forward specs are one of:
        tcp:<port>
        localabstract:<unix domain socket name>
        localreserved:<unix domain socket name>
        localfilesystem:<unix domain socket name>
        dev:<character device name>
        jdwp:<process pid> (remote only)
adb forward --no-rebind <local> <remote>
    - same as 'adb forward <local> <remote>' but fails
    if <local> is already forwarded
adb forward --remove <local> - remove a specific forward socket connection
adb forward --remove-all - remove all forward socket connections
adb reverse --list - list all reverse socket connections from device
adb reverse <remote> <local> - reverse socket connections
    reverse specs are one of:
        tcp:<port>
        localabstract:<unix domain socket name>
        localreserved:<unix domain socket name>
        localfilesystem:<unix domain socket name>
adb reverse --norebind <remote> <local>
    - same as 'adb reverse <remote> <local>' but fails
    if <remote> is already reversed.
adb reverse --remove <remote>
    - remove a specific reversed socket connection
adb reverse --remove-all - remove all reversed socket connections from device
adb jdwp - list PIDs of processes hosting a JDWP transport
adb install [-lrtsdg] <file>
    - push this package file to the device and install it
    (-l: forward lock application)
```

Android application testing

- adb shell command allows you to access the device and browse around

```
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
u0_a44 3874 130 1308028 60676 ffffffff 00000000 S com.google.android.apps.docs.editor.s
des
u0_a70 3958 130 1392940 94000 ffffffff 00000000 S com.google.android.gm
u0_a32 4059 130 1292000 43140 ffffffff 00000000 S com.google.android.calendar
u0_a2 4085 130 1199008 29140 ffffffff 00000000 S com.android.providers.calendar
root 4331 2 0 0 ffffffff 00000000 S kworker/0:0
u0_a39 4332 130 1198876 25648 ffffffff 00000000 S com.google.android.deskclock
root 4670 2 0 0 ffffffff 00000000 S kworker/u:0
root 4680 2 0 0 ffffffff 00000000 S kworker/u:3
root 4681 2 0 0 ffffffff 00000000 S kworker/u:4
u0_a91 4693 130 1262780 50308 ffffffff 00000000 S com.safetyculture.iauditor
root 4713 2 0 0 ffffffff 00000000 S kworker/u:5
u0_a22 4808 130 1219204 37380 ffffffff 00000000 S com.android.systemui:screenshot
root 4838 2 0 0 ffffffff 00000000 S kworker/u:6
root 5000 2 0 0 ffffffff 00000000 S kworker/u:2
system 5005 130 1196424 26912 ffffffff 00000000 S android:ui
u0_a40 5024 130 1217592 44036 ffffffff 00000000 S com.android.documentsui
u0_a6 5043 130 1196428 25476 ffffffff 00000000 S com.android.externalstorage
root 5286 2 0 0 ffffffff 00000000 S flush-0:20
shell 5406 133 1116 528 c0076820 40412b80 S /system/bin/sh
root 5412 2 0 0 ffffffff 00000000 S migration/1
root 5413 2 0 0 ffffffff 00000000 S kworker/1:0
root 5414 2 0 0 ffffffff 00000000 S ksoftirqd/1
root 5415 2 0 0 ffffffff 00000000 S watchdog/1
root 5416 2 0 0 ffffffff 00000000 S migration/2
root 5417 2 0 0 ffffffff 00000000 S kworker/2:0
root 5418 2 0 0 ffffffff 00000000 S ksoftirqd/2
root 5419 2 0 0 ffffffff 00000000 S watchdog/2
root 5420 2 0 0 ffffffff 00000000 S migration/3
root 5421 2 0 0 ffffffff 00000000 S kworker/3:0
root 5422 2 0 0 ffffffff 00000000 S ksoftirqd/3
root 5423 2 0 0 ffffffff 00000000 S watchdog/3
root 5424 2 0 0 ffffffff 00000000 S kworker/1:1
root 5425 2 0 0 ffffffff 00000000 S kworker/3:1
shell 5426 5406 2424 716 00000000 403a03c0 R ps
root 5427 2 0 0 ffffffff 00000000 S kworker/2:1
shell@grouper:/ $ █
```

Android application testing



```
root@kali: ~
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
init
init.environ.rc
init.grouper.rc
init.grouper.usb.rc
init.rc
init.trace.rc
init.usb.rc
init.zygote32.rc
mnt
proc
property_contexts
root
sbin
sdcard
seapp_contexts
selinux_version
sepolicy
service_contexts
storage
sys
system
ueventd.grouper.rc
ueventd.rc
vendor
shell@grouper:/ $ ls
```


Android application testing

- Once USB debugging is activated, and the phone is rooted, interesting things may happen...
- Passwords and gestures are stored in /data/system

```
usagestats  
users  
shell@grouper:/data/system $ ls -l password.key  
-rw----- system system 72 2015-05-09 19:41 password.key  
shell@grouper:/data/system $
```

Android application testing

- List installed packages: adb shell pm list packages



```
root@kali: ~
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) context=u:r:init:s0
root@grouper:/ # ^D
shell@grouper:/ $ ^D
root@kali:~# adb shell pm list packages
package:com.google.android.youtube
package:com.android.providers.telephony
package:com.google.android.gallery3d
package:com.google.android.googlequicksearchbox
package:com.android.providers.calendar
package:com.android.providers.media
package:com.google.android.apps.docs.editors.docs
package:com.google.android.onetimeinitializer
package:com.android.wallpapercropper
package:com.android.launcher
package:com.android.documentsui
package:com.android.externalstorage
package:com.google.android.apps.enterprise.dmagent
package:com.android.htmlviewer
package:com.android.mms.service
```

Android application testing

- Look at the logfiles
 - adb logcat -d -f /mnt/sdcard/logcats.log

```
shell@grouper:/ $ ^D
root@kali:~# adb logcat -d -f /mnt/sdcard/logcats.log
root@kali:~# adb shell
shell@grouper:/ $ cd /mnt/sdcard
shell@grouper:/mnt/sdcard $ ls -l
drwxrwx--- root      sdcard_r   2015-05-09 17:21 Alarms
drwxrwx--x root      sdcard_r   2015-06-13 17:16 Android
drwxrwx--- root      sdcard_r   2015-05-09 19:18 DCIM
drwxrwx--- root      sdcard_r   2015-06-13 16:26 Download
drwxrwx--- root      sdcard_r   2015-05-10 17:23 MifareClassicTool
drwxrwx--- root      sdcard_r   2015-05-09 17:21 Movies
drwxrwx--- root      sdcard_r   2015-05-09 17:21 Music
drwxrwx--- root      sdcard_r   2015-05-09 19:06 Notifications
drwxrwx--- root      sdcard_r   2015-05-09 19:14 Pictures
drwxrwx--- root      sdcard_r   2015-05-09 17:21 Podcasts
drwxrwx--- root      sdcard_r   2015-05-09 17:21 Ringtones
-rw-rw---- root      sdcard_r   487863 2015-06-13 18:14 logcats.log
shell@grouper:/mnt/sdcard $
```

Android application testing

- Modifying the app to be able to test it, but you run into some obstacles:
 - Runtime signature verification
 - Runtime rooting detection
 - Runtime debuggable detection
 - Certificate pinning

Android application testing

- To intercept HTTP(S) traffic, use burpsuite, similar to iOS...
- However...
 - On Android it is not as easy to set a system wide proxy, better use the transparent proxy, Access Point and redirection technique.

Android application testing

- Another great tool you need is apktool
 - This tool is used to manage Android install packages (apk files)
 - Current version on Kali is 1.5.2-kali or 2.0.0
 - New 2.0 version is available at <https://ibotpeaches.github.io/Apktool/>.
 - This version also support Android 5 (lollipop) and higher

Android application testing

```
root@kali:~# cp Downloads/apktool_2.0.0.jar apktool2.jar
root@kali:~# java -jar apktool2.jar
Apktool v2.0.0 - a tool for reengineering Android apk files
with smali v2.0.5 and baksmali v2.0.5
Copyright 2014 Ryszard Wiśniewski <brut.alll@gmail.com>
Updated by Connor Tumbleson <connor.tumbleson@gmail.com>

usage: apktool
  -advance,--advanced  prints advance information.
  -version,--version   prints the version then exits
usage: apktool if|install-framework [options] <framework.apk>
  -p,--frame-path <dir>  Stores framework files into <dir>.
  -t,--tag <tag>        Tag frameworks using <tag>.
usage: apktool d[ecode] [options] <file_apk>
  -f,--force            Force delete destination directory.
  -o,--output <dir>     The name of folder that gets written. Default is apk.out
  -p,--frame-path <dir>  Uses framework files located in <dir>.
  -r,--no-res           Do not decode resources.
  -s,--no-src           Do not decode sources.
  -t,--frame-tag <tag>  Uses framework files tagged by <tag>.
usage: apktool b[uild] [options] <app_path>
  -f,--force-all        Skip changes detection and build all files.
  -o,--output <dir>      The name of apk that gets written. Default is dist/name.apk
  -p,--frame-path <dir>  Uses framework files located in <dir>.

For additional info, see: http://ibotpeaches.github.io/Apktool/
For smali/baksmali info, see: http://code.google.com/p/smali/
root@kali:~#
```

Android application testing

- Handles apk files, unzips them and converts dex files to smali

```
root@kali:~/Desktop/Android# java -jar apktool2.jar d hacmeandroid_v1.0.apk
I: Using Apktool 2.0.0 on hacmeandroid_v1.0.apk
I: Loading resource table...
I: Decoding AndroidManifest.xml with resources...
I: Loading resource table from file: /root/apktool/framework/1.apk
I: Regular manifest package...
I: Decoding file-resources...
I: Decoding values */* XMLs...
I: Baksmaling classes.dex...
I: Copying assets and libs...
I: Copying unknown files...
I: Copying original files...
```

Android application testing

- Expanded directory looks like this

```
root@kali:~/Desktop/Android# mv hacmeandroid_saved hacmeandroid
root@kali:~/Desktop/Android# cd hacmeandroid_v1.0
root@kali:~/Desktop/Android/hacmeandroid_v1.0# ls -l
total 20
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1365 Jun 13 18:29 AndroidManifest.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 268 Jun 13 18:29 apktool.yml
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Jun 13 18:29 original
drwxr-xr-x 6 root root 4096 Jun 13 18:29 res
root@kali:~/Desktop/Android/hacmeandroid_v1.0# █
```

Android application testing

- AndroidManifest.xml

```
drwxr-xr-x 6 root root 4096 Jun 13 18:29 res
root@kali:~/Desktop/Android/hacmeandroid_v1.0# cat AndroidManifest.xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="no"?>
<manifest xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android" package="com.and">
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.INTERNET"/>
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.SEND_SMS"/>
    <application android:icon="@drawable/icon" android:label="@string/app_name">
        <activity android:label="@string/app_name" android:name=".MainActivity">
            <intent-filter>
                <action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN"/>
                <category android:name="android.intent.category.LAUNCHER"/>
            </intent-filter>
        </activity>
        <activity android:label="Funds Transfer" android:name=".FundsTransferActivity"/>
        <activity android:label="Transaction History" android:name=".TransactionHistoryactivity"
        "/>
        <activity android:label="Profile update" android:name=".profileupdateactivity"/>
        <activity android:label="Account Summary" android:name=".accountsummaryactivity"/>
        <activity android:label="login screen1" android:name=".loginactivity"/>
        <activity android:label="Remember me" android:name=".loginactivity2"/>
        <activity android:label="Home" android:name=".homeActivity"/>
        <activity android:label="Proxy Setting" android:name=".Proxysetting"/>
    </application>
</manifest>
root@kali:~/Desktop/Android/hacmeandroid_v1.0#
```

Android application testing

- Smali files

```
root@kali: ~/Desktop/Android/hacmeandroid_v1.0/smali/com
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 2081 Jun 13 18:29 AccountSummaryResponse.smali
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 869 Jun 13 18:29 FundsTransferResponse.smali
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1919 Jun 13 18:29 Loginresponse.smali
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 3013 Jun 13 18:29 Profileupdate1Response.smali
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 869 Jun 13 18:29 ProfileupdateResponse.smali
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1731 Jun 13 18:29 TransactionHistoryResponse.smali
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 2496 Jun 13 18:29 TransactionModified.smali

./and/service:
total 60
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 5636 Jun 13 18:29 AccountSummaryService.smali
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 6663 Jun 13 18:29 FundsTransferService.smali
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 12530 Jun 13 18:29 Loginservice.smali
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 5808 Jun 13 18:29 Profileupdate1service.smali
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 8508 Jun 13 18:29 Profileupdateservice.smali
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 6369 Jun 13 18:29 TransactionHistoryService.smali

./and/util:
total 36
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 19616 Jun 13 18:29 Base64Coder.smali
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 3005 Jun 13 18:29 FileUtil.smali
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 6837 Jun 13 18:29 GetResponseBody.smali
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 2338 Jun 13 18:29 Globals.smali

./ssl:
total 4
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Jun 13 18:29 bypass


./ssl/bypass:           "the quieter you become, the more you are able to hear"
total 24
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 2901 Jun 13 18:29 BypassedHttpClient.smali
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 8058 Jun 13 18:29 EasySSLSocketFactory.smali
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 4270 Jun 13 18:29 EasyX509TrustManager.smali
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 3700 Jun 13 18:29 MyHttpClient.smali
root@kali:~/Desktop/Android/hacmeandroid_v1.0/smali/com#
```

Android application testing

- Smali files can easily be changes, recompiled and repackaged using apktool
 - This creates a new .apk (modified) and this can be installed and used
- 32 bit vs 64 bit problems will be encountered in your Java environment!!

Android application testing


- Application signing
 - Any application developer can create his or her own (self-signed) certificate to sign a package file.
 - Keep this certificate as you need the same certificate for all your applications.



```
Arthurs-MacBook-Pro-2:Android theart42$ jarsigner -keystore signer.keystore -keypass 11banaan -storepass 11banaan Android_Phone_App.apk hacktest
Arthurs-MacBook-Pro-2:Android theart42$
```


Android application testing

- You can create keystores with different programs (e.g. Portecle)



Android application testing

- You can create keystores with different programs



Android application testing

- Application signing
 - If you want to check the certificate of an installed apk:

```
$ unzip testing.apk  
$ cd META-INF  
$ openssl pkcs7 -in CERT.RSA -print_certs -inform DER -out out.cer  
$ cat out.cer
```

Android application testing

```
.method public constructor <init>()V
    .locals 1

    invoke-direct {p0}, Landroid/app/Activity;-><init>()V

    const/4 v0, 0x1

    iput-boolean v0, p0, Lsrc/com/rbl/controller/SplashActivity;->j:Z

    const-string v0, "SHA-512"

    iput-object v0, p0, Lsrc/com/rbl/controller/SplashActivity;->s:Ljava/lang/String;

    sget-object v0, Lcominfosys/core/a;->p:Ljava/lang/String;

    iput-object v0, p0, Lsrc/com/rbl/controller/SplashActivity;->h:Ljava/lang/String;

    const-string v0, "5b424061393532376332387f2decaf80ec8dab5e1bbf50ded7fe1060ba280e0511c825c77df7448a0e1d0ce853738fa187d22b37f482b9db8206646ef79e863225c101fa
1314a236d361aa"

    iput-object v0, p0, Lsrc/com/rbl/controller/SplashActivity;->t:Ljava/lang/String;

    return-void
.end method
```

Android application testing

```
invoke-virtual {v0, v1, v2}, Landroid/content/pm/PackageManager;->getPackageInfo(Ljava/lang/String;I)Landroid/content/pm/PackageInfo;
move-result-object v0

iget-object v0, v0, Landroid/content/pm/PackageInfo;->signatures:[Landroid/content/pm/Signature;
array-length v1, v0

if-eqz v1, :cond_1

const/4 v1, 0x0

aget-object v0, v0, v1

const-string v1, "SHA-512"

invoke-static {v1}, Ljava/security/MessageDigest;->getInstance(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/security/MessageDigest;
move-result-object v1

invoke-virtual {v0}, Landroid/content/pm/Signature;->toByteArray()[B
move-result-object v0

invoke-virtual {v1, v0}, Ljava/security/MessageDigest;->update([B)V
invoke-virtual {v1}, Ljava/security/MessageDigest;->digest()[B
move-result-object v0

const/4 v1, 0x0

invoke-static {v0, v1}, Landroid/util/Base64;->encodeToString([BI)Ljava/lang/String;
move-result-object v0

iget-object v1, p0, Lsrc/com/rbl/controller/SplashActivity;->t:Ljava/lang/String;
invoke-static {v0, v1}, Lsrc/com/rbl/controller/SplashActivity;->c(Ljava/lang/String;Ljava/lang/String;)Z
move-result v0

# if-nez v0, :cond_1
```

Android application testing

- Detection of debug flag

```
.method public a(Ljava/lang/String;Ljava/util/List;)Ljava/util/List;
.locals 11

    igure-object v0, p0, Lsrc/com/rbl/uicontroller/ek;->a:Ljava/lang/String;
    const-string v1, "here0"
    invoke-static {v0, v1}, Landroid/util/Log;->d(Ljava/lang/String;Ljava/lang/String;)I
    igure-object v0, p0, Lsrc/com/rbl/uicontroller/ek;->a:Ljava/lang/String;
    invoke-static {v0, p1}, Landroid/util/Log;->d(Ljava/lang/String;Ljava/lang/String;)I
    sget-object v0, Lcom/infosys/core/a;->ch:Landroid/app/Activity;
    invoke-virtual {v0}, Landroid/app/Activity;->getApplicationInfo()Landroid/content/pm/ApplicationInfo;
    move-result-object v0

    igure v0, v0, Landroid/content/pm/ApplicationInfo;->flags:I
    and-int/lit8 v0, v0, 0x2
#
#      if-eqz v0, :cond_0
#      goto :cond_0
```


Android application testing

- Another option is dex2jar and jd-gui to decompile to Java code

```
root@kali:~/Desktop/Android# dex2jar classes.dex
this cmd is deprecated, use the d2j-dex2jar if possible
dex2jar version: translator-0.0.9.15
dex2jar classes.dex -> classes_dex2jar.jar
Done.
root@kali:~/Desktop/Android# ls -l
total 36156
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 6344307 Jun 13 18:24 apktool2.jar
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 62492 Mar 29 2012 classes.dex
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 68085 Jun 13 19:00 classes_dex2jar.jar
drwxr-xr-x 6 root root 4096 Jun 13 18:51 hacmeandroid_v1.0
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 255117 Jun 13 18:50 hacmeandroid_v1.0.apk
drwxr-xr-x 6 root root 4096 Apr 5 2012 HacmeBank - Android v1.0
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 30271149 Jun 13 18:27 hacmebank_android.zip
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Jun 13 18:41 save
root@kali:~/Desktop/Android#
```


Android application testing

- JADX is an integrated tool environment



Android application testing

- Or ByteCodeViewer



Android application testing

- Runtime rooting detection
 - This almost exclusively is done by looking for the su binary in a number of places on the device
 - Look for the string "su" to see where the existence of this file is checked
 - Sometimes the developer checks for other files as well
 - You have to disable all of these checks, may take a while

Android application testing

- Once the code has been decompiled, look in the AndroidManifest.xml file for content providers. They will share application data!
- grep -R 'content://' AndroidManifest.xml.
- Each content provider is a potential dataleak point.
- adb shell content query --uri <url> will provide information on content.

Android application testing

```
$ grep -R "content://" .  
./NotePad$Media.smali:    const-string v0, "content://com.threebanana.notes.provider.NotePad/media"  
./NotePad$Media.smali:    const-string v0, "content://com.threebanana.notes.provider.NotePad/media_api_id"  
./NotePad$Media.smali:    const-string v0, "content://com.threebanana.notes.provider.NotePad/media_silent_delete"  
./NotePad$Media.smali:    const-string v0, "content://com.threebanana.notes.provider.NotePad/parent_note_of_media"  
./NotePad$Media.smali:    const-string v0, "content://com.threebanana.notes.provider.NotePad/media_with_owner"  
./NotePad$Media.smali:    const-string v0, "content://com.threebanana.notes.provider.NotePad/images_for_note"  
./NotePad$MediaNotes.smali:    const-string v0, "content://com.threebanana.notes.provider.NotePad/media_notes"  
./NotePad$Notes.smali:    const-string v0, "content://com.threebanana.notes.provider.NotePad/topnotes"  
./NotePad$Notes.smali:    const-string v0, "content://com.threebanana.notes.provider.NotePad/notes"  
./NotePad$Notes.smali:    const-string v0, "content://com.threebanana.notes.provider.NotePad/notes_show_deleted"  
./NotePad$Notes.smali:    const-string v0, "content://com.threebanana.notes.provider.NotePad/notes_silent"  
./NotePad$Notes.smali:    const-string v0, "content://com.threebanana.notes.provider.NotePad/notes_silent_delete"  
./NotePad$Notes.smali:    const-string v0, "content://com.threebanana.notes.provider.NotePad/notes_nodeid"  
./NotePad$Notes.smali:    const-string v0, "content://com.threebanana.notes.provider.NotePad/notes_nodeid_silent"  
./NotePad$Notes.smali:    const-string v0, "content://com.threebanana.notes.provider.NotePad/notes_nodeid_silent_delete"  
./NotePad$Notes.smali:    const-string v0, "content://com.threebanana.notes.provider.NotePad/notes_with_images"  
./NotePad$Notes.smali:    const-string v0, "content://com.threebanana.notes.provider.NotePad/add_media_for_note"  
./NotePad$Notes.smali:    const-string v0, "content://com.threebanana.notes.provider.NotePad/add_media_for_note_silent"  
./NotePad.smali:.field public static final SCHEME:Ljava/lang/String; = "content://"  
./NotePad.smali:    const-string v0, "content://com.threebanana.notes.provider.NotePad/wipe"  
./NotePadPending$Notes.smali:    const-string v0, "content://com.threebanana.notes.provider.NotePadPending/notes"  
./NotePadPending$Notes.smali:    const-string v0, "content://com.threebanana.notes.provider.NotePadPending/notes_nodeid"  
./NotePadPending$Notes.smali:    const-string v0, "content://com.threebanana.notes.provider.NotePadPending/notes_nodeid_parent"
```




Android application testing

- We can do this manually, or use Drozer:
 - <https://www.mwrinfosecurity.com/products/drozer/>
 - <https://github.com/mwrlabs/drozer>
- Drozer is a client server product that automates a lot of the testing.
- Uses an agent on the mobile device:
 - adb install agent.apk

Android application testing

- Use adb to forward port 31415:
 - adb forward tcp:31415 tcp:31415
- Start application/agent on device
- Start drozer on system:
 - drozer console connect



Android application testing

- Find content URI's

```
dz> run app.provider.finduri com.threebanana.notes
Scanning com.threebanana.notes...
content://com.threebanana.notes.provider.NotePad/notes
content://com.threebanana.notes.provider.NotePadPending/notes/
content://com.threebanana.notes.provider.NotePad/media
content://com.threebanana.notes.provider.NotePad/topnotes/
content://com.threebanana.notes.provider.NotePad/media_with_owner/
content://com.threebanana.notes.provider.NotePad/add_media_for_note
content://com.threebanana.notes.provider.NotePad/notes_show_deleted
content://com.threebanana.notes.provider.NotePad/notes_with_images/
```

Android application testing

- Query content URI's

```
dz> run app.provider.query content://com.threebanana.notes.provider.NotePad/notes --vertical
      reminder 0
      hashcodes
child_count 0
      altitude 0
      sharekey 0
source_url null
      nodeid -1
timestamp 1386319989407
      _id 1
      created 1386319989407
longitude 0
parent_nodeid -1
api_pending_op 1
      parent_id -1
accuracy_altitude 0
publicURL
      text This is a secret note
```

Android application testing

- Other application issues:
 - Insecure file storage (wrong permissions)
 - File inclusion attacks
 - Client side injection attacks
- See OWASP top 10 mobile security


Android application testing

- Traffic interception
 - Passive, using tcpdump-arm
 - http://omappedia.org/wiki/USB_Sniffing_with_tcpdump

Android application testing

- Traffic interception
 - Active, using a malicious AP, Linux interception etc...
 - Intercepting HTTPS traffic requires installation of proxy CA.
 - adb push portswiggerca.crt /mnt/sdcard/portswiggerca.crt.
 - On device go to Settings -> Personal -> Security and install certificate from sdcard.

Android application testing



Android application testing

- Alternative ways to install certificates:
 - Pull the cacerts.bks file from /system/etc/security
 - Add certificate (using Bouncy Castle for instance)
 - Remount /system partition read/write
 - Restore cacerts.bks file

Android application testing

- What about certificate pinning on Android?
 - The most common way involves a number of steps:
 - Read the server certificate from a file
 - Store it in a keystore object in your app
 - Initialize a TrustManager with this keystore
 - With this TrustManager you create an SSLContext and SSLSocketFactory
 - Use this SSLSocketFactory to make the connection to your server
 - The TrustManager verifies the server certificate against the keystore

Android application testing

```
InputStream in = resources.openRawResource(certificateRawResource);

keyStore = KeyStore.getInstance("BKS");
keyStore.load(resourceStream, password);
```

Android application testing

```
HttpParams httpParams = new BasicHttpParams();

SchemeRegistry schemeRegistry = new SchemeRegistry();
schemeRegistry.register(new Scheme("https", new SSLSocketFactory(keyStore), 443));

ThreadSafeClientConnManager clientMan = new ThreadSafeClientConnManager(httpParams, schemeRegistry);

httpClient = new DefaultHttpClient(clientMan, httpParams);
```


Android application testing

- How to bypass?
 - Sometimes the code itself verifies the certificates, this check can be disabled in the smali file(s)
 - Often you need to replace the proper BKS keystore with one that contains your man-in-the-middle certificate
 - Challenge is to find the password for opening/modifying the keystore
 - Sometimes this password is stored in plain text in the code (DUMB!)
 - More often this password is encrypted/obfuscated
 - Use the Java Debugger to obtain the password

Android application testing

- To get the password
 - Look through the code to find the initialization of the KeyStore object
 - Look for the KeyStore.load method and determine the parameters
 - This indicates which parameter contains the password
 - Make a note of the module, method and the parameter for later

Android application testing



The screenshot shows a terminal window titled "1. vim" displaying Java bytecode. The code is written in a pseudo-assembly language where each line represents an instruction. The instructions include moves between registers (v0, v1), jumps (goto_1, goto_2), object creation (new-instance), field reads (iget-object), static method invocations (invoke-static), direct method invocations (invoke-direct), virtual method invocations (invoke-virtual), try blocks (try_start, try_end, catch), and finally blocks (catchall). The code is annotated with comments explaining the purpose of each section, such as creating a String object, decoding Base64, loading a KeyStore, and closing an InputStream.

```
move-result-object v0
move-object v1, v0
:goto_1
:try_start_2
new-instance v0, Ljava/lang/String;
iget-object v3, p0, Lcom/infosys/c/a;->p:Ljava/lang/String;
const/4 v4, 0x0
invoke-static {v3, v4}, Landroid/util/Base64;->decode(Ljava/lang/String;I)[B
move-result-object v3
invoke-direct {v0, v3}, Ljava/lang/String;-><init>([B)V
iget-object v3, p0, Lcom/infosys/c/a;->i:Ljava/security/KeyStore;
invoke-virtual {v0}, Ljava/lang/String;->toCharArray()[C
move-result-object v0
invoke-virtual {v3, v1, v0}, Ljava/security/KeyStore;->load(Ljava/io/InputStream;[C)V
:try_end_2
.catch Ljava/security/NoSuchAlgorithmException; {:try_start_2 .. :try_end_2} :catch_3
.catch Ljava/security/cert/CertificateException; {:try_start_2 .. :try_end_2} :catch_4
.catch Ljava/io/IOException; {:try_start_2 .. :try_end_2} :catch_5
.catchall {:try_start_2 .. :try_end_2} :catchall_0


:goto_2
:try_start_3
invoke-virtual {v1}, Ljava/io/InputStream;->close()V
:try_end_3
.catch Ljava/io/IOException; {:try_start_3 .. :try_end_3} :catch_7

/KeyStore
```

Android application testing

- To get the password
 - Modify the AndroidManifest.XML file to enable debugging
 - Rebuild the APK, sign and install
 - Run the application
 - Use adb jdwp to find the portnumber where the app is listening for JDB
 - Forward this port: adb forward tcp:8000 tcp:<jdwp port>
 - JDB –attach localhost:8000
 - Set a breakpoint on the method in the module
 - Once it breaks, print the contents of the variable

Android application testing



The screenshot shows a terminal window titled "1. jdb" displaying the Java debugger (jdb) command help and a session transcript.

Commands:

- lock <expr> -- print lock info for an object
- threadlocks [thread id] -- print lock info for a thread
- pop -- pop the stack through and including the current frame
- reenter -- same as pop, but current frame is reentered
- redefine <class id> <class file name> -- redefine the code for a class
- disablegc <expr> -- prevent garbage collection of an object
- enablegc <expr> -- permit garbage collection of an object
- !! -- repeat last command
- <n> <command> -- repeat command n times
- # <command> -- discard (no-op)
- help (or ?) -- list commands
- version -- print version information
- exit (or quit) -- exit debugger

Types:

- <class id>: a full class name with package qualifiers
- <class pattern>: a class name with a leading or trailing wildcard ("*")
- <thread id>: thread number as reported in the 'threads' command
- <expr>: a Java(TM) Programming Language expression.

Most common syntax is supported.

Startup commands:

Startup commands can be placed in either "jdb.ini" or ".jdbrc" in user.home or user.dir

Session Transcript:

```
> locals
No default thread specified: use the "thread" command first.
> stop in com.infosys.c.a.e
Invalid method specification: ae
Usage: stop at <class>:<line_number> or
      stop in <class>.<method_name>[(argument_type,...)]
> stop in com.infosys.c.a.e
Set breakpoint com.infosys.c.a.e
>
Breakpoint hit: "thread=Thread-4640", com.infosys.c.a.e(), line=-1 bci=0

Thread-4640[1] print p
p = "ZXZmbWlxMDI2YW5k"
Thread-4640[1]
```


iOS application testing



iOS application testing

- Background information
- iOS has its roots in OS X, based on the Darwin OS, sources are available!
- Apps are written in Objective-C or Swift
- Xcode is the development environment, runs on OS X and provides a simulator
- <http://damnvulnerableiosapp.com/> Damn Vulnerable iOS application

iOS application testing



iOS application testing

- Objective-C is object oriented environment
- Applications are built on a collection of objects
- Objects exchange messages (as their way of method calling)
- Libraries are often called frameworks

iOS application testing

- As objects exchange messages, all objects are active once an application has started
- If you can send a message to an object, you can bypass the regular flow


```
@implementation Classname
@synthesize blorg; // generates set/get methods
@synthesize gurgle;

Instance *myInstance = [[Instance alloc] init];

[myInstance setGurgle:@"foo"]; // infix notation
myInstance.gurgle = @"foo"; // dot notation
```

iOS application testing


- First security control is the secure boot
- Each step ensures that the proper software is running:



iOS application testing

- Once system is running, application sandbox (seatbelt) takes over
- Entitlements control access to user information and system-wide resources
- All apps run under 1 user: mobile
- Apps are digitally signed by Apple, an Enterprise or Developer certificate
- Signature is checked before starting an application

iOS application testing




iOS application testing

- Device has full disk encryption (FDE) by default, protects against hardware attacks and allows for quick erase
- Each file is encrypted with its own key, to implement access control
- Data and apps are not protected against:
 - Jailbreaking
 - Backup attacks
 - Software vulnerabilities

iOS application testing

- Each app has a unique UUID and is stored in:
 - /var/mobile/Containers/Bundle (code)
 - /var/mobile/Containers/Data (data)
- Distributed as a (signed) .ipa file (ZIP file)
- Native apps are stored in /Applications
- On older (< 9) iOS:
 - /private/var/mobile/Library/Caches/com.apple.mobile.installation.plist contains list of all installed applications

iOS application testing




A screenshot of a terminal window titled "1. ssh". The window shows a file listing from a root shell on a device named "hakPhone4s". The command run is "ls -l". The output shows the directory structure of the WhatsApp application bundle. The "WhatsApp.app" directory is listed with permissions "drwxr-xr-x" and size "73304". Other files listed include "iTunesArtwork" and "iTunesMetadata.plist". The terminal window has a standard OS X look with red, yellow, and green close buttons at the top left.

```
hakPhone4s:/var/mobile/Containers/Bundle/Application/8DCE4685-78CB-46C5-B7FB-A1CF568272E7 root# ls -l
total 520
drwxr-xr-x 86 mobile mobile 73304 Jan 17 10:59 WhatsApp.app/
-rw-r--r--  1 mobile mobile 527593 Jan 17 11:00 iTunesArtwork
-rw-r--r--  1 mobile mobile   2549 Jan 17 11:00 iTunesMetadata.plist
hakPhone4s:/var/mobile/Containers/Bundle/Application/8DCE4685-78CB-46C5-B7FB-A1CF568272E7 root#
```

iOS application testing

```
1. ssh
drwxr-xr-x 2 mobile mobile    170 Jan 17 10:59 WAStorageWarningViewController~iphone.nib/
drwxr-xr-x 4 mobile mobile    170 Jan 17 10:59 WAVerificationCloudReminder.storyboardc/
drwxr-xr-x 2 mobile mobile    136 Jan 17 10:59 WAVideoPreviewViewController.nib/
drwxr-xr-x 2 mobile mobile    136 Jan 17 10:59 WAVoiceCallViewController.nib/
drwxr-xr-x 2 mobile mobile    136 Jan 17 10:59 WAWallpaperPickerController.nib/
-rw-r--r-- 1 mobile mobile   3936 Dec 30 22:13 WAWebClientSessionTableViewCell.nib
drwxr-xr-x 2 mobile mobile    136 Jan 17 10:59 WAWebLinkTableViewCell.nib/
-rw-r--r-- 1 mobile mobile   2089 Dec 30 22:13 WS-12.png
-rw-r--r-- 1 mobile mobile   2725 Dec 30 22:13 WS-16.png
-rw-r--r-- 1 mobile mobile   3267 Dec 30 22:13 WS-24.png
-rw-r--r-- 1 mobile mobile   5209 Dec 30 22:13 WS-32.png
drwxr-xr-x 2 mobile mobile   1394 Jan 17 10:59 Wallpaper/
-rwrxr-xr-x 1 mobile mobile 19735504 Jan  5 23:46 WhatsApp*
drwxr-xr-x 2 mobile mobile    986 Jan 17 10:59 WhatsAppChat.momd/
-rw-r--r-- 1 mobile mobile   931 Dec 30 22:13 WhitePixel.png
-rw-r--r-- 1 mobile mobile   2527 Dec 30 22:13 XE-12.png
-rw-r--r-- 1 mobile mobile   3291 Dec 30 22:13 XE-16.png
-rw-r--r-- 1 mobile mobile   4050 Dec 30 22:13 XE-24.png
-rw-r--r-- 1 mobile mobile   5906 Dec 30 22:13 XE-32.png
-rw-r--r-- 1 mobile mobile  374585 Dec 30 22:13 Xylophone.caf
-rw-r--r-- 1 mobile mobile   2032 Dec 30 22:13 YE-12.png
-rw-r--r-- 1 mobile mobile   2699 Dec 30 22:13 YE-16.png
-rw-r--r-- 1 mobile mobile   3184 Dec 30 22:13 YE-24.png
-rw-r--r-- 1 mobile mobile   4670 Dec 30 22:13 YE-32.png
-rw-r--r-- 1 mobile mobile   2319 Dec 30 22:13 ZA-12.png
-rw-r--r-- 1 mobile mobile   3211 Dec 30 22:13 ZA-16.png
-rw-r--r-- 1 mobile mobile   3893 Dec 30 22:13 ZA-24.png
-rw-r--r-- 1 mobile mobile   6272 Dec 30 22:13 ZA-32.png
-rw-r--r-- 1 mobile mobile   1778 Dec 30 22:13 ZM-12.png
-rw-r--r-- 1 mobile mobile   2260 Dec 30 22:13 ZM-16.png
-rw-r--r-- 1 mobile mobile   2664 Dec 30 22:13 ZM-24.png
-rw-r--r-- 1 mobile mobile   4338 Dec 30 22:13 ZM-32.png
```


iOS application testing



A screenshot of a macOS terminal window titled "1. ssh". The window shows the command "ls -l" being run in the directory "/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/123C39CA-369B-4D39-890E-3AA6FA32879A". The output of the command is:

```
hakPhone4s:/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/123C39CA-369B-4D39-890E-3AA6FA32879A root# ls -l
total 0
drwxr-xr-x 2 mobile mobile 136 Feb 21 15:11 Documents/
drwxr-xr-x 6 mobile mobile 204 Jun 15 2015 Library/
drwxr-xr-x 2 mobile mobile 102 Jan 17 11:00 StoreKit/
drwxr-xr-x 2 mobile mobile 68 Feb 21 15:11 tmp/
hakPhone4s:/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/123C39CA-369B-4D39-890E-3AA6FA32879A root#
```


iOS application testing



A terminal window titled "1. ssh" showing the file structure of an iOS application's container. The directory path is /var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/123C39CA-369B-4D39-890E-3AA6FA32879A. The command ls -l is used to list files in the Documents, Library, and Preferences folders.


```
drwxr-xr-x 2 mobile mobile 68 Feb 21 15:11 tmp/
hakPhone4s:/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/123C39CA-369B-4D39-890E-3AA6FA32879A root# ls -l Documents/
total 8
-rw-r--r-- 1 mobile mobile 533 Jun 15 2015 StatusMessages.plist
-rw-r--r-- 1 mobile mobile 182 Feb 21 15:11 SyncHistory.plist
hakPhone4s:/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/123C39CA-369B-4D39-890E-3AA6FA32879A root# ls -l Library/
total 0
drwxr-xr-x 6 mobile mobile 204 Jun 15 2015 Caches/
drwxr-xr-x 2 mobile mobile 102 Jun 15 2015 FieldStats/
drwxr-xr-x 2 mobile mobile 408 Feb 21 15:11 Logs/
drwxr-xr-x 2 mobile mobile 102 Feb 21 15:11 Preferences/
hakPhone4s:/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/123C39CA-369B-4D39-890E-3AA6FA32879A root# ls -l Library/Preferences
total 4
-rw----- 1 mobile mobile 165 Feb 21 15:11 net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.plist
hakPhone4s:/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/123C39CA-369B-4D39-890E-3AA6FA32879A root#
```

iOS application testing



iOS application testing

- To be able to REALLY test an app, you need a Jailbroken device
- Jailbreaking allows you to:
 - Run any app;
 - Install your own tools;
 - Alternative app stores;
 - Unsigned binaries;
 - Disable sandbox;
 - SSH access to device.
- Jailbreaks become increasingly rare



General	
Videos	0
Photos	11
Applications	4
Capacity	12,7 GB
Available	10,9 GB
Version	8.1.2 (12B440)
Carrier	vf nl 18.0
Model	MD239DN/A
Serial Number	DNXH5BW5DTD2

iOS application testing


- After jailbreak, install Cydia app store:
 - Repositories with additional tools
 - Packaged as .deb files (Linux)
 - Install APT packages
 - Install OpenSSH



iOS application testing

- Jailbreak security issues:
 - Default password for root and mobile user is alpine.
 - Change this after jailbreaking and installing OpenSSH!!

iOS application testing





The terminal window has three colored window control buttons (red, yellow, green) at the top left. The title bar in the center says "2. ssh". The main pane shows the following text:

```
arthurs-macbook-pro-2:~ theart42$ ssh root@192.168.247.149
root@192.168.247.149's password:
hakPhone4s:~ root# ls
Library Media
hakPhone4s:~ root# ls /
Applications Library User boot dev lib ppuntether sbin usr
Developer System bin cores etc mnt private tmp var
hakPhone4s:~ root#
```



iOS application testing

- Cydia repositories



iOS application testing

- Packages



iOS application testing

- Packages install most useful tools in one go:

```
iPhone:~ root# apt-get install adv-cmds com.sull.clutchpatched  
curl cycript odcctools developer-cmds dpkg  
com.ericasadun.utilities file file-cmds findutils gawk git grep  
inetutils com.autopear.installipa ldid less lsdf mobilesubstrate  
com.saurik.substrate.safemode mobileterminal-applesdk nano netcat  
network-cmds python sed shell-cmds sqlite3 syslogd system-cmds  
tcpdump top uikittools unrar unzip vim wget whois zip
```

iOS application testing

- In Xcode you can:
 - Disable code signing.
 - Build an application.
 - Make a distribution file (.ipa).
 - Copy the package to the device (scp).
 - Deploy using IPA Installer Console or use iPhone configuration utility.

iOS black box testing

- Traffic analysis:
 - Install tcpdump on device and ‘sniff’ traffic
 - `tcpdump -i en0 -n -vv -s 0 -U not port 22`

iOS black box testing

```
2. ssh
length 313) 17.178.101.14.993 > 192.168.247.149.49676: P, cksum 0x8c15 (correct),
5432:5693(261) ack 1129 win 147 <nop,nop,timestamp 755527826 268421108>
13:44:18.224593 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 11767, offset 0, flags [DF], proto TCP (6),
length 52) 192.168.247.149.49677 > 17.178.101.14.993: ., cksum 0xcc7d (correct), 2
04:204(0) ack 2881 win 8100 <nop,nop,timestamp 268421403 755283736>
13:44:18.224599 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 58544, offset 0, flags [DF], proto TCP (6),
length 52) 192.168.247.149.49677 > 17.178.101.14.993: ., cksum 0xc8a1 (correct), 2
04:204(0) ack 3935 win 8034 <nop,nop,timestamp 268421403 755283736>
13:44:18.224605 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 15486, offset 0, flags [DF], proto TCP (6),
length 52) 192.168.247.149.49676 > 17.178.101.14.993: ., cksum 0x402b (correct), 1
129:1129(0) ack 5693 win 8175 <nop,nop,timestamp 268421403 755527826>
13:44:18.231958 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 48031, offset 0, flags [DF], proto TCP (6),
length 319) 192.168.247.149.49677 > 17.178.101.14.993: P, cksum 0x6b56 (correct),
204:471(267) ack 3935 win 8192 <nop,nop,timestamp 268421410 755283736>
13:44:18.237144 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 18355, offset 0, flags [DF], proto TCP (6),
length 174) 192.168.247.149.49676 > 17.178.101.14.993: P, cksum 0x2f76 (correct),
1129:1251(122) ack 5693 win 8192 <nop,nop,timestamp 268421415 755527826>
^C
534 packets captured
817 packets received by filter
5 packets dropped by kernel
hakPhone4s:~ root#
```

iOS black box testing





- Or:
 - Build an Access Point with Kali or Pineapple
 - Analyse traffic with Wireshark or tcpdump
 - Don't forget to disable firewall on your access point
 - And enable ip_forwarding
- Much more powerful and more tools at your disposal (especially if you are using Kali)
- Use a wifi dongle that has monitoring capabilities!

iOS black box testing

- Use proxy software on Kali to intercept Web traffic
 - Burpsuite
 - ZAP
- Set proxy in wifi profile on device,
- or use iPhone Configuration Utility,
- or use transparent redirection on Kali

iOS black box testing




iOS black box testing

- Install the burpsuite CA:
 - Send .crt file as mail attachment and install
 - Use the iPhone Configuration Utility
- Settings -> General -> Profiles



iOS black box testing



SUBJECT NAME	
Country	PortSwigger
State/Province	PortSwigger
Locality	PortSwigger
Organization	PortSwigger
Organizational Unit	PortSwigger CA
Common Name	PortSwigger CA
ISSUER NAME	
Country	PortSwigger

iOS black box testing

- If an application does not honor the HTTP proxy settings, what can you do?
 - Intercept DNS traffic and return the IP address of your test machine as the target IP. Don't forget to forward the traffic to the actual destination
 - Perform transparent redirection on your Linux machine using iptables.
- In both cases, your proxy must support invisible/transparent proxying

iOS black box testing

- An example:

```
iptables -t nat -F PREROUTING
iptables -t nat -F POSTROUTING
iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -i eth2 -s 172.16.42.0/24 -d 1.2.3.4 -p tcp --dport 443 -j DNAT --to
172.16.42.42:443
iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o eth0 -d 1.2.3.4 -j SNAT --to 172.16.98.222
iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -s 172.16.42.0/24 -d 0.0.0.0/0 -j MASQUERADE
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward
```

iOS black box testing

- For other traffic (non-HTTP) you can use Mallory as a generic proxy or write your own scripts.... Both are complicated.
- Use iptables for redirection.
- Luckily most (> 90%) of client / server traffic is web based:
 - Screen scraping
 - Web services

iOS black box testing

- What about certificate pinning?
 - Hack the application (replace certificate files with your own).
 - Use ios-ssl-killswitch or trustme.
- They overrule or patch the SSL framework to always accept Certificate.
- If done properly, pinning is hard to bypass (actual verifications in application code).

iOS black box testing

- In client/server communication, check for:
 - Proper certificate handling (does the app accept self-signed certificates)
 - Is sensitive information cached somewhere?
 - Where are the (persistent) cookies?
 - Any Javascript in use?
 - XML injection
 - Be careful with Unique Device ID
(can be spoofed)



iOS black box testing

- In client / server communication, to protect your customers, check for:
 - Access to address book, photos
 - Geolocation
 - Access to phone etc...

iOS black box testing

- Local data storage:
 - User preferences
 - Media files
 - Attachments
 - Config settings

iOS black box testing

- Local data stored in:
 - plain files
 - .plist files
 - SQLite database
- You can often find credentials, urls, password, tokens, cookies etc.

iOS black box testing

- You can use the SSH access to browse the file system
- Or use iExplorer to browse device
- Don't forget that these files are stored in your backup as well, so force encrypted backups
- Use the data protection classes to properly protect data on the device

```
[ [NSFileManager defaultManager] createFileAtPath:[self filePath]
    contents:[@"file content" dataUsingEncoding:NSUTF8StringEncoding]
    attributes:[NSDictionary dictionaryWithObject:NSUTFFileProtectionComplete
forKey:NSUTFFileProtectionKey] ];
```

iOS black box testing

Backups

The screenshot shows the 'Backups' settings screen. It has two main sections: 'Automatically Back Up' and 'Manually Back Up and Res'. Under 'Automatically Back Up', there are two options: 'iCloud' (unchecked) and 'This computer' (checked). Below 'This computer', there is a checked checkbox for 'Encrypt local backup'. At the bottom of this section is a 'Change Password...' button. To the right, under 'Manually Back Up and Res', there is a 'Back Up Now' button and a 'Latest Backup:' label showing the date and time.

Automatically Back Up

iCloud
Back up the most important data on your iPad to iCloud.

This computer
A full backup of your iPad will be stored on this computer.

Encrypt local backup
This will allow account passwords, Health, and HomeKit data to be backed up.

Change Password...

Manually Back Up and Res


Manually back up your iPad. Your backup stored on this computer.

Back Up Now

Latest Backup:
27/03/16 18:11 to this computer

iOS black box testing

- You can use filemon.iOS to monitor file access in realtime



```
2. ssh
-rw-r--r-- 1 root wheel 13044 Jun 13 14:22 filemon.iOS
hakPhone4s:~ root# file filemon.iOS
-sh: file: command not found
hakPhone4s:~ root# chmod u+x filemon.iOS
hakPhone4s:~ root# ./filemon.iOS
GOT PID: 588 and rc: 0 - aggregated
aggregated (PID:588) Stat changed /private/var/mobile/Library/BatteryLife/Archives
/powerlog_2016-01-03_1ADC9A50.PLSQL-wal
DEV: 1,3 INODE: 223792 MODE: 81a4 UID: 501 GID: 501 Arg64: 371310237659


GOT PID: 588 and rc: 0 - aggregated
aggregated (PID:588) Stat changed /private/var/mobile/Library/BatteryLife/Archives
/powerlog_2016-01-03_1ADC9A50.PLSQL
DEV: 1,3 INODE: 223790 MODE: 81a4 UID: 501 GID: 501 Arg64: 371321634184

GOT PID: 588 and rc: 0 - aggregated
aggregated (PID:588) Stat changed /private/var/mobile/Library/BatteryLife/Archives
/powerlog_2016-01-03_1ADC9A50.PLSQL-wal
DEV: 1,3 INODE: 223792 MODE: 81a4 UID: 501 GID: 501 Arg64: 371326405798

GOT PID: 588 and rc: 0 - aggregated
aggregated (PID:588) Stat changed /private/var/mobile/Library/BatteryLife/Archives
```

iOS black box testing


- Use plutil to examine the encoded plist files



```
SystemConfiguration
com.apple.captive.plist
com.apple.networkextension.cache.plist
com.apple.networkextension.necp.plist
com.apple.networkextension.plist
com.apple.security.cloudkeychainproxy3.keysToRegister.plist
hakPhone4s:/Library/Preferences root# more com.apple.captive.plist
-sh: more: command not found
hakPhone4s:/Library/Preferences root# cat com.apple.captive.plist
bplist00@WISPrAccounts
hakPhone4s:/Library/Preferences root#
hakPhone4s:/Library/Preferences root#
hakPhone4s:/Library/Preferences root# plutil -convert xml1 com.apple.captive.plist
Converted 1 files to XML format
hakPhone4s:/Library/Preferences root# ls -l
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 2 root wheel 340 Jun 13 13:53 SystemConfiguration
-rw-r--r-- 1 root wheel 223 Jun 13 14:29 com.apple.captive.plist
-rw-r--r-- 1 root wheel 649 Apr 28 21:24 com.apple.networkextension.cache.plist
-rw-r--r-- 1 root wheel 63 Jun 13 13:53 com.apple.networkextension.necp.plist
-rw-r--r-- 1 root wheel 8784 Jun 13 13:53 com.apple.networkextension.plist
-rw-r--r-- 1 root wheel 922 Jun 13 13:36 com.apple.security.cloudkeychainproxy3.ke
ysToRegister.plist
hakPhone4s:/Library/Preferences root# cat com.apple.captive.plist
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/Pro
pertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
    <key>WISPrAccounts</key>
    <dict/>
</dict>
</plist>
hakPhone4s:/Library/Preferences root#
```

iOS black box testing

- SQLite databases
- Use the sqlite3 command to read data



The screenshot shows a Mac OS X terminal window titled "2. ssh". The window has three colored window control buttons (red, yellow, green) at the top left. The title bar also displays the system status (CPU load, date, battery level, etc.). The terminal itself is black with white text. It shows the following session:

```
hakPhone4s:/private/var/mobile/Library/SMS root# sqlite3 sms.db
SQLite version 3.7.13
Enter ".help" for instructions
sqlite> 
```

iOS black box testing

- Read SMS messages

```
sqlite> select * from message;
1|76694598-F845-523B-E758-D5643FD039D9|Uw tegoed voor deze periode is bijgeschreven
. Uw internetbundel is weer aangevuld.|0||1||1
                                         streamtyped@@@NSMutableAttributed
String|1010|SMS|e:|2BABFF44-9950-4348-A3FA-4D7773C6A3C8|0|449052586|449065311|0|1|1
1010|0|0|0|0|1|1|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|1|1|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0
2|6382363B-EB34-4A00-A085-B4AC1114AC89|1|0|1|2|1||1|1|0|1|iMessage|p:+31637422847|667CC0
B3-D401-4C99-80C1-3AC6AA0F6738|0|449064641|0|0|1|1|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|1|1
10|0|0|0|0|1|3||0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0
3|874E9F55-9540-4A9D-9ADC-3248CE154027|Testje|0||3||1
                                         streamtyped@@@NSMutableAttributed
ributedString|1010|iMessage|p:+31637422847|667CC0B3-D401-4C99-80C1-3AC6AA0F6738|0|14
49064576|449065312|0|1|1|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|1|1|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|1|0|0|0|0|0
0
4|98F6AA3C-DBC7-F62B-4C2A-9E42BF3B32C8|Your allocated phone no. is 310820152. Thank
you for joingin the REDteam BTS. Call the Yatebts IVR at(32843)|0||4||1|
                                         streamtyped
@@@NSMutableAttributedString|1010|SMS|e:|2BABFF44-9950-4348-A3FA-4D7773C6A3C8|0
|449141542|449141545|0|1|1|0|0|0|0|0|0|1|0|0|1|1|0|0|0|0|0|1|1|0|0|0|0|1|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0
0|0|0
```

iOS black box testing

- Keychain
 - Securely stores password, certificates, keys
 - Is encrypted with device and keybag specific keys
 - iOS has a single keychain (is a sqlite database) that stores all items for all applications
 - Application only has access to its own keys
 - /private/var/Keychains/keychain-2.db
 - Uses dataprotection classes as well (interesting: ThisDeviceOnly)

iOS black box testing

```
hakPhone4s:/private/var/Keychains root# ls -l
total 1328
-rw----- 1 _securityd wheel 16384 Apr 10 10:54 TrustStore.sqlite3
-rw----- 1 _securityd wheel      47 Jan  1 1970 accountStatus.plist
-rw----- 1 _securityd wheel      0 Feb  1 12:20 caissuercache.sqlite3
-rw----- 1 _securityd wheel     512 Jan  1 1970 caissuercache.sqlite3-journal
-rw----- 1 _securityd wheel 315392 Jun 13 13:41 keychain-2.db
-rw----- 1 _securityd wheel 32768 Jun 13 14:04 keychain-2.db-shm
-rw----- 1 _securityd wheel 416152 Jun 13 13:51 keychain-2.db-wal
-r----- 1 root      wheel 141368 Jun 13 13:51 keychain-ota-backup.plist
-rw----- 1 _securityd wheel 45056 Jun 13 13:19 ocspcache.sqlite3
-rw----- 1 _securityd wheel 32768 Jun 13 14:07 ocspcache.sqlite3-shm
-rw----- 1 _securityd wheel 346112 Jun 13 13:53 ocspcache.sqlite3-wal
hakPhone4s:/private/var/Keychains root# █
```

iOS black box testing

Keychain table	Description
genp	Generic passwords – kSecClassGenericPassword
inet	Internet passwords – kSecClassInternetPassword
cert and keys	Certificates, keys and digital identity (cert+key) items – kSecClassCertificates and kSecClassIdentity

iOS black box testing

- Keychain

```
↳ Generic Password
↳ -----
↳ Service: CommCenter
↳ Account: SIM_PIN
↳ Entitlement Group: apple
↳ Label: (null)
↳ Generic Field: <38393331 30373131 31323030 38323031 353232>
↳ Keychain Data: 0123
```

iOS black box testing

- Log files
 - /var/log directory

```
total 0
drwxr-xr-x 3 root wheel 102 Feb  1 12:26 CoreCapture
drwxr-xr-x 2 root wheel 102 Mar  7 10:02 apt
drwxr-xr-x 2 root wheel  68 Feb  1 12:09 asl
drwx----- 2 root wheel 102 Feb  1 12:41 com.apple.revisiond
drwxr-xr-x 2 root wheel  68 Feb  1 12:09 com.apple.xpc.launchd
drwxr-xr-x 2 root wheel  68 Feb  1 12:09 ppp
drwxr-xr-x 2 root wheel  68 Feb  1 12:09 sa
hakPhone4s:~ root#
```

iOS black box testing

- Log files
 - May contain interesting system information

iOS black box testing

- Cache
 - Snapshots are taken in the Cache directory of the Application root
 - Can contain sensitive information from screenshot
 - Keyboard cache in /var/mobile/Library/Keyboard/dynamic-text.dat

iOS black box testing

```
2. ssh
hakPhone4s:/var/mobile/Library/Keyboard root# ls -l
total 4
drwxr-xr-x 3 mobile mobile 102 Feb  8 2014 CoreDataUbiquitySupport
-rw----- 1 mobile wheel  175 Apr 12 11:00 dynamic-text.dat
drwxr-xr-x 2 mobile mobile 238 Jun 13 14:31 en-dynamic.lm
hakPhone4s:/var/mobile/Library/Keyboard root# hexdump -c dynamic-text.dat
00000000 D y n a m i c D i c t i o n a r y
00000010 y - 5 \0 \0 \0 \0 \0 \0 \0 \0 \0 \0 \0 \0 \0 \0 \0 \0 \0 020
00000020 001 \0 a c c e s s \0 001 \0 c o m \0 003
00000030 \0 g m a i l \0 005 \0 h a c k t e s
00000040 t \0 002 \0 H a c k t e s t \0 002 \0 i
00000050 c l o u d \0 001 \0 i P h o n e \0 001
00000060 \0 i s \0 002 \0 m o b i l e h a c k
00000070 d e m o \0 001 \0 N \0 001 \0 S c r e e
00000080 n s h o t s \0 001 \0 t b v \0 001 \0 t
00000090 h e \0 001 \0 v \0 002 \0 w o w b a g g
000000a0 e r t h e g r e a t \0 001 \0 Z \0
000000af

hakPhone4s:/var/mobile/Library/Keyboard root#
```

iOS black box testing

- Applications are encrypted using FairPlay DRM
- To be able to test an application, you need to decrypt it
- Check with the otool

```
Tests-iPhone:/var/mobile/Applications/84593008-5B13-4CFC-BCEB-727DDC29DD50/Twitter.app root# otool -l Twitter
    cmd LC_ENCRYPTION_INFO
    cmdsize 20
cryptoff 8192
cryptsize 5476352
cryptid 1
```

Encrypted

iOS black box testing

- Use Clutchpatched or dumpdecrypted for decryption

```
DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES=dumpdecrypted.dylib /var/mobile/Applications/xxxxxxxx-xxxx-  
xxxx-xxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxx/Scan.app/Scan
```

iOS black box testing

- Runtime manipulation


- Cycript

```
cy# function printMethods(className) {
cy>   var count = new new_Type("I");
cy>   var methods = class_copyMethodList(objc_getClass(className), count);
cy>   var methodsArray = [];
cy>   for(var i = 0; i < *count; i++) {
cy>     var method = methods[i];
cy>     methodsArray.push({selector:method_getName(method), implementation:method_getImplementation(method)});
cy>   }
cy>   free(methods);
cy>   free(count);
cy>   return methodsArray;
cy> }
cy#
```

iOS black box testing

- Cycrypt
 - Combination of Interactive Objective-C interpreter and Javascript
 - App runtime behaviour can be manipulated
 - Can connect to an active process
 - Gives access to all classes and variables of an app
 - Used for runtime analysis to:
 - Bypass security locks
 - Access sensitive information in memory
 - Bypass authentication
 - Access restrictive parts of the application

iOS black box testing




iOS black box testing

- To be able to determine the object structure of the app you can dump it with class-dump or class-dump-z

iOS black box testing

- class-dump-z



The screenshot shows a terminal window titled "2. ssh" displaying the output of the class-dump-z command. The output is a dump of Objective-C class definitions, including the `in_addr` and `sockaddr_in` structures, the `NSObject` protocol, and the `UIApplicationDelegate` protocol. The code includes various methods such as `-zone`, `-retainCount`, `-autorelease`, `-release`, `-retain`, `-respondsToSelector:`, `-conformsToProtocol:`, `-isMemberOfClass:`, `-isKindOfClass:`, `-isProxy`, `-performSelector:`, `-self`, `-class`, and `-isEqual:`. The code ends with an `@end` directive and a note about the file size: `--More--(byte 1809)`.

```
typedef struct in_addr {
    unsigned _field1;
} in_addr;


typedef struct sockaddr_in {
    unsigned char _field1;
    unsigned char _field2;
    unsigned short _field3;
    in_addr _field4;
    BOOL _field5[8];
} sockaddr_in;

@protocol NSObject
@optional
@property(nonatomic, copy) NSString* debugDescription;
@required
@property(nonatomic, copy) NSString* description;
@property(nonatomic, assign) Class superclass;
@property(nonatomic, assign) unsigned hash;
-(NSZone*)zone;
-(unsigned)retainCount;
-(id)autorelease;
-(oneway void)release;
-(id)retain;
-(BOOL)respondsToSelector:(SEL)selector;
-(BOOL)conformsToProtocol:(id)protocol;
-(BOOL)isMemberOfClass:(Class)aClass;
-(BOOL)isKindOfClass:(Class)aClass;
-(BOOL)isProxy;
-(id)performSelector:(SEL)selector withObject:(id)object withObject:(id)object3;
-(id)performSelector:(SEL)selector withObject:(id)object;
-(id)performSelector:(SEL)selector;
-(id)self;
-(Class)class;
-(BOOL)isEqual:(id)equal;
@end

@protocol UIApplicationDelegate <NSObject>
@optional
@property(nonatomic, nonatomic) UIWindow* window;
-(void)application:(id)application didUpdateUserActivity:(id)activity;
--More--(byte 1809)
```

iOS black box testing

- class-dump



The screenshot shows a terminal window titled "2. ssh" displaying the output of the class-dump command. The output is a C-style code dump of various Objective-C structures and unions, including CGPoint, CGRect, CGSize, NSRange, NSZone, SCNetworkReachability, SecKey, headerStruct, in_addr, and sockaddr_in. The code is generated by class-dump 3.1.2, which is Copyright (C) 1997-1998, 2000-2001, 2004-2007 by Steve Nygard.

```
/*
 * Generated by class-dump 3.1.2.
 *
 * class-dump is Copyright (C) 1997-1998, 2000-2001, 2004-2007 by Steve Nygard.
 */

struct CGPoint {
    float x;
    float y;
};

struct CGRect {
    struct CGPoint origin;
    struct CGSize size;
};

struct CGSize {
    float width;
    float height;
};

struct _NSRange {
    unsigned int _field1;
    unsigned int _field2;
};

struct _NSZone;

struct __SCNetworkReachability;

struct __SecKey;

struct headerStruct {
    int _field1;
    char _field2;
};

struct in_addr {
    unsigned int _field1;
};

struct sockaddr_in {
    --More--(byte 577)
```

Challenges?

- No jailbreak available
- Extensive rooting detections
- Runtime detection by applications

Solution?

Frida

<http://www.frida.re/>

```
Quick-start Instructions

~ $ sudo pip install frida
~ $ frida-trace -i "recv*" Twitter
recvfrom: Auto-generated handler: .../recvfrom.js
Started tracing 21 functions.
1442 ms    recvfrom()
# Live-edit recvfrom.js and watch the magic!
5374 ms    recvfrom(socket=67, buffer=0x252a618,
length=65536, flags=0, address=0xb0420bd8,
address_len=16)
```

Frida

Provides a runtime environment that allows you to hook functions in an application and manipulate the flow, read data etc.

Frida

WORKSHOP!!!