# QSynth - A Program Synthesis approach for Binary Code Deobfuscation

**Binary Analysis Workshop - NDSS** 

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### Talk Outline

#### Context:

- Need to address highly obfuscated binaries
- Few approaches address data obfuscation

**Goal:** deobfuscating expression (obfuscated with data transformations)

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### Takeway

We provide a **synthesis approach**addressing various obfuscations
and that **supersede** the state-of-the-art in both **speed** and **accuracy** 

### Q٥

### Table of Contents

#### Background

Software obfuscation

Deobfuscation techniques

#### Our Synthesis Approach

Goal & Contributions
Approach steps

### **Experimental Benchmarks**

Experimental Setup

Benchmarks

#### Conclusion




### Obfuscation types

### Control-Flow Obfuscation

Hiding the **logic** and algorithm of the program

Virtualization, Opaque predicates, CFG-flattening, Split, Merge, Packing, Implicit Flow, MBA, Loop-Unrolling...



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#### **Data-Flow Obfuscation**

Hiding data, constants, strings, APIs, keys etc.

Data encoding, MBA, Arithmetic Encoding, Whitebox, Array Split, Fold and Merge, Variable Splitting...

$$a+b \qquad \Longrightarrow \qquad \frac{(((((((a \land \neg b)+b) << 1) \land \neg ((a \lor b)-(a \land b))) << 1) - ((((a \land \neg b)+b) << 1) \oplus ((a \lor b) - (a \land b)))))}{(a \lor b) - (a \land b))))}$$

### Obfuscation types

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#### Example

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**Problem:** Reverting an obfuscating transformation is hard.

### Deobfuscation

Let's focus on two deobfuscation techniques:


Dynamic Symbolic Execution

Program Synthesis

### Symbolic Execution

#### Definition


Mean of executing a program using **symbolic values** (logical symbols) rather than real values (bitvectors) in order to obtain an **in-out relationship of a path** 



### Symbolic Execution

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Mean of executing a program using **symbolic values** (logical symbols) rather than real values (bitvectors) in order to obtain an **in-out relationship of a path** 



### Dynamic Symbolic Execution (a.k.a. concolic)

- ▶ Properties: work on dynamic paths and use runtime values
- Advantages: path sure to be feasible and thwart various obfuscations

⇒ In this context used to extract symbolic expressions (e.g. b)

```
1  if (a > 0) {
2     b += (a | -1) - 1;
3     b -= ((~ a) & -1);
4  } else {
5     b += (a | -3) + 1;
6  }
7  b -= 1 + ((b * (b + 1)) % 2);
```

#### Symbolic State

 $\Rightarrow$  In this context used to extract symbolic expressions (e.g. b)

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 $\overline{\phi_b} = b$ 

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#### Symbolic State

$$\phi_b = b$$

$$\phi_b = b + (\alpha | -1) - 1$$

⇒ In this context used to extract symbolic expressions (e.g. b)

```
1 if (a > 0){
2     b += (a | -1) - 1;
3     b -= ((-a) & -1);
4 } else {
5     b += (a | -3) + 1;
6 }
7    b -= 1 + ((b * (b + 1)) % 2);
```

#### Symbolic State

$$\phi_b = b$$
 $\phi_b = b + (a \mid -1) - 1$ 
 $\phi_b = b + (a \mid -1) - 1 - ((\sim a)$ 
 $\& -1)$ 

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#### Symbolic State

$$\phi_b = b$$

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$$\phi_b = b + (a \mid -1) - 1 - ((\sim a))$$

$$\& -1)$$

$$\phi_b = b + (a \mid -1) - 1 - ((\sim a))$$

$$\& -1) - 1 + (((b + (a \mid -1)) - 1 - ((\sim a))) \times (b + ...)$$

#### **Question:** How to simplify the $\phi_b$ expression?

(Knowing that the quality of the result depends on the syntactic complexity of the obfuscated expression)

#### Definition

Program synthesis consists in automatically deriving a program from:

- a high-level specification (typically its I/O behaviour)
- additional constraints:
  - Compilation: a faster program
  - Deobfuscation: a smaller or more readable program

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### Example



Input

Output

Obfuscated Program

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Obfuscated Program

Input	Output
1, 2	3

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-	-

Obfuscated Program

Input	Output
1, 2	3
2, 2	4

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*

Obfuscated Program

Input	Output
1, 2	3
2, 2	4
2,3	5

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	Input	Output		
	1, 2	3	_	a. 1 h
	2, 2	4	$\Rightarrow$	a+b
Obfuscated Program	2, 3	5		

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### Example

7	

Obfuscated Program

In	put	Output
1	1, 2	3
2	2, 2	4
2	2, 3	5

$$\Rightarrow$$

$$a + b$$

#### **Problem**

Synthesizing programs (expressions) with complex behaviors is hard.

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### Key Intuition

### **Symbolic Execution**

- + Capture full semantic
- Influenced by syntactic complexity




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### **Program Synthesis**

- Only influenced by semantic complexity
- Black-box ⇒ big search space




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**Idea**: Using symbolic execution to reduce the synthesis search space

### Contributions

A synthesis approach using an


Offline Enumerative Search

based on pre-computed lookup tables


combined with an Abstract Syntax Tree simplification algorithm

which **outperform** similar approach of the state-of-the-art (e.g. Syntia)

### **QSynth:** Overview



### QSynth: Overview



### **Execution Tracing**

#### Dynamic Binary Instrumentation

Using **QBDI**: QuarkslaB Dynamic binary Instrumentation (similar to Pin, DynamoRIO)

- multi-architecture & platform
- no (direct) thread support

#### **Qtracer** (a abditool like Pin ''pintools'')

- gather instruction executed with their concrete state (registers and memory)
- Data are consolidated in database (SQLite, PostgresSQL etc.)

#### Original


```
mov qword [0x000232c0], 8
mov r13, rax
test rax, rax
je 0x42a7
xor r8d, r8d
xor edx, edx
xor esi, esi
```

## Instrumentation


```
mov qword [0x000232c0], 8
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
### **QSynth:** Overview




### **QSynth:** Overview



⇒ Triton allows computing any **symbolic expression** along the trace by backtracking on data dependencies




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


⇒ Triton allows computing any **symbolic expression** along the trace by backtracking on data dependencies

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6  b -= 1;
```




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
$$\varphi \triangleq (b + (a - 1)) - 1$$

 $O_{\epsilon}$  the associated I/O oracle can be evaluated on different inputs

# **QSynth:** Overview



# **QSynth: Overview**



# Synthesis Primitive

#### Definition

We call Synthesis Primitive any program SP taking as input parameters a **black-box oracle**  $O_{\varphi}$  and a **set of input parameters to the oracle** I, and returning, in case of success, a program p, such that for any  $i \in I$  then  $p(i) = O_{\varphi}(i)$ .

$$\mathcal{SP}(O_{\varphi}, I) \Rightarrow p \mid \forall i \in I, p(i) \equiv O_{\varphi}(i)$$
  
 $\mathcal{SP}(O_{\varphi}, I) \Rightarrow \emptyset$ 

Generate a set of programs based on a given **grammar**: (operators & variables)

$$a + b$$
,  $a - b$ ,  $a + a$ ,  $b + b$ ,  $a + a - b$ , ...

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and with a set of inputs: (pseudo-random)

vector 
$$I = \{(1, 1), (1, 0), (2, 1)\}$$

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-	
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Outputs	р
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### Generate a set of programs based on a

given grammar: (operators & variables)

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#### Bad 🖓

- Expressions derived grows exponentially (but can still easily achieve 10 nodes AST expressions)
- ▶ This primitive is **unsound** (it is only sound wrt. I)

2, 1, 0	U , D
0, 1, 1	a – b
2, 2, 4	a + a

# Generate a set of programs based on a given **grammar**: (operators & variables)

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#### Bad 🖓


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
#### Good 🖒

Generated **only once** and usable on different obfuscations and **across programs** 

# **QSynth:** Overview




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


$$\varphi \triangleq (((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \land A) - (((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \lor A)$$




$$I = \{(1,1), (1,0), (2,1)\}$$

$$\varphi \triangleq (((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \land A) - (((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \lor A)$$



$$\begin{split} I &= \{ (1,1), (1,0), (2,1) \} \\ O_{\varphi} \text{outputs} &= \{3,0,1\} \\ \mathcal{SP} [\text{outputs}] : \text{not found} \end{split}$$

$$\varphi \triangleq (((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \land A) - (((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \lor A)$$




$$I = \{(1,1), (1,0), (2,1)\}$$

$$O_{\varphi} \text{outputs} = \{3,1,3\}$$

$$\mathcal{SP}[\text{outputs}]: \text{not found}$$

# AST simplification - Example

$$\varphi \triangleq (((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \land A) - (((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \lor A)$$



$$I = \{(1,1), (1,0), (2,1)\}$$


$$O_{\varphi} \text{outputs} = \{0,1,2\}$$

$$\mathcal{SP}[\text{outputs}]: \text{not found}$$

20 / 26

# AST simplification - Example

$$\varphi \triangleq (((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \land A) - (((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \lor A)$$




$$I = \{(1,1), (1,0), (2,1)\}$$
  
 $O_{\omega}$  outputs =  $\{2,1,3\}$ 

 $\mathcal{SP}[\mathsf{outputs}]$ : found  $\Rightarrow A + B$ 



$$\varphi \triangleq (((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \land A) - (((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \lor A)$$





$$I = \{(1,1), (1,0), (2,1)\}$$


$$O_{\varphi}$$
outputs =  $\{2, 1, 3\}$ 


$$SP$$
[outputs]: found  $\Rightarrow A + B$ 

# **Q**b

### AST simplification - Example

$$\varphi \triangleq (((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \land A) - (((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \lor A)$$





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
 $O_{\varphi}$ outputs =  $\{2, 1, 3\}$ 


 $\mathcal{SP}[\mathsf{outputs}]$ : found  $\Rightarrow A + B$ 

# **Q**b

### AST simplification - Example

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
$$I = \{(1,1), (1,0), (2,1)\}$$

 $O_{\omega}$  outputs =  $\{2, 1, 3\}$ 

 $SP[outputs]: found \Rightarrow A + B$ 

# **Q**b

$$\varphi \triangleq (((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \land A) - (((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \lor A)$$






$$I = \{(1,1), (1,0), (2,1)\}$$

$$O_{\omega}$$
 outputs =  $\{2, 1, 3\}$ 


$$SP[outputs]: found \Rightarrow A + B$$



$$\varphi \triangleq (((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \land A) - (((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \lor A)$$







$$I = \{(1,1), (1,0), (2,1)\}$$

 $O_{\omega}$  outputs =  $\{0, 1, 3\}$ 


 $\mathcal{SP}[\mathsf{outputs}]$ : found  $\Rightarrow V1 \oplus A$ 



$$\varphi \triangleq (((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \land A) - (((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \lor A)$$










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










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








$$\varphi \triangleq (((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \land A) - (((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \lor A)$$





#### Result

#### Obfuscated:

$$(((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \land A) - (((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \lor A)$$

$$\bigcup$$

#### **Deobfuscated:**

$$(A + B) \oplus A$$

### Table of Contents

#### Background

Software obfuscation
Deobfuscation techniques

#### Our Synthesis Approach

Goal & Contributions
Approach steps

# Experimental Benchmarks Experimental Setup Benchmarks

Conclusion

### Dataset

- ⇒ Datasets are built with Tigress 2.2 and the EncodeArithmetic (EA), EncodeData (ED) and Virtualization (VR).
- ⇒ In each dataset: 500 obfuscated functions (except 239 for EA-ED)

### **Dataset**

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	Mean size φ (in node)					
	Original Obfuscate					
#1: Syntia †	3.97	203.19				
#2: EA	13.5	131.56				
#3: VR-EA	13.5	443.64				
#4: EA-ED	13.5	9223.46				

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# lookup table (SP): 3,358,709 expressions (14 sets of 3 vars & 5 operators each) input vector size I (for SP): 15

# Syntia benchmark

### **Simplification**

	Mean expr. size			Simplification			Mean scale factor		
	Orig	Obf <sub>B</sub>	Synt	Ø	Partial	Full	Obf <sub>S</sub> /Orig	Synt/Orig	
Syntia	/	/	/	52	0	448	/	/	
QSynth	3.97	203.19	3.71	0	500	500	x35.03	x0.94	

Orig, Obf<sub>S</sub>, Obf<sub>B</sub>, Synt are rsp. original, obfuscated (source, binary level) and synthesized exprs

## Syntia benchmark

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#### **Accuracy & Speed**

	Semantic		Tim	ne	
		Sym.Ex	Synthesis	Total	per fun.
Syntia	/	/	/	34 min	4.08s
QSynth	500	1m20s	15s	1m35s	0.19s

### Tigress benchmark

#### **Simplification**

	Mean expr. size			Simplification			Mean Scale factor		
	Orig	Obf <sub>B</sub>	Synt	Ø	Partial	Full	Obf <sub>S</sub> /Orig	Synt/Orig	
Dataset 2	iset 2   13.5   245.81   21.92	245.81	0	500	354	x18.34	x1.64		
EA	13.5	240.01	21.92	"	500	(70.80%)	X10.34	X1.04	
Dataset 3	13.5	443.64	25.42	0	500	375		x1.90	
VR-EA	13.5	443.04	25.42	"	500	(75.00%)	-	X1.90	
Dataset 4	13.5	9223.46	3812.84	5	234	133	x405.25	x234.44	
EA-ED	13.5	7223.40	3012.04	3	234	(55.65%)	x400.20	A234.44	

Orig, Obf<sub>S</sub>, Obf<sub>B</sub>, Synt are respectively original, obfuscated (source, binary level) and synthesized expressions

## Tigress benchmark

### **Simplification**

	Mean expr. size			Simplification			Mean Scale factor			
	Orig	Obf <sub>B</sub>	Synt	Ø	Partial	Full	Obf <sub>S</sub> /Orig	Synt/Orig		
Dataset 2	13.5	245.81	0.45.03	21.92	0	500	0 500 3	354	x18.34	x1.64
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 $Orig, Obf_S, Obf_B, Synt \ are \ respectively \ original, \ obfuscated \ (source, \ binary \ level) \ and \ synthesized \ expressions$ 

### **Accuracy & Speed**

	Semantic	Time			
		Sym.Ex	Synthesis	Total	per fun.
Dataset 2	OK: 413	1m7s	1m42s	2m49s	0.34s
EA	KO: 4				
Dataset 3	OK: 401	17m10s	2m46s	19m56s	2.39s
VR-EA	KO: 43				
Dataset 4		13m18s	2h7m	2h21m	35.47s
EA-ED	_	10111108	211/111	2112 1111	33.478

### Challenge

 $\Rightarrow$  Deobfuscating some data-flow based  $\ensuremath{\textit{(composite)}}$  obfuscations

#### Challenge

⇒ Deobfuscating some data-flow based (composite) obfuscations

#### **Results**

 $\Rightarrow$  A scalable synthesis algorithm improving the state-of-the-art in both **speed** and **accuracy** 

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#### Limitation:

- synthesizing expressions using constants
- addressing encoded-data (which scale)

#### Challenge

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#### **Results**

⇒ A scalable synthesis algorithm improving the state-of-the-art in both speed and accuracy

#### Limitation:

- synthesizing expressions using constants
- addressing encoded-data (which scale)

#### Future work:

- experimenting other synthesis primitives & simplification strategies (D&C...)
- combining with other approach (not necessarily synthesis-based)
- testing against other obfuscators



### References



Susmit Jha, Sumit Gulwani, Sanjit A Seshia, and Ashish Tiwari.

Oracle-guided component-based program synthesis.

Proceedings of the 32nd ACM/IEEE International Conference on Software Engineering-Volume 1, pages 215-224. ACM, 2010.

Synthesis time: 31 seconds in average

Fabrizio Biondi, Sébastien Josse, Axel Legay, and Thomas Sirvent. Effectiveness of synthesis in concolic deobfuscation.

Computers & Security, 70:500-515, 2017.

Synthesis time: 96 bits in 20 seconds ca.



Tim Blazytko, Moritz Contag, Cornelius Aschermann, and Thorsten Holz. Syntia: Synthesizing the semantics of obfuscated code.

26th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 17), pages 643-659, 2017.


Synthesis time: 4 seconds in average



# Presetting pre-computed synthesis lookup tables

Goal: Finding the smallest discriminative input vector size

How: Checking equivalence by SMT with synthesized expr. (on EA)




x axis: input vector size, y axis: Function number



# Presetting pre-computed synthesis lookup tables

Goal: Finding the smallest discriminative input vector size


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
We chose 15 as a good trade-of between semantic accuracy and evaluation speed.



## Synthesis time distribution (on EA)



## Synthesis simplification (on EA)



Functions (ordered by obfuscated node size)