Cryptography Fundamentals for Developers and Security Professionals

Introduction

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




Target

Snapchat

NSA






History of Cryptography

- Three greatest advances
- Today's methods
- Exciting future

The Weakest Link





The Cornet Project

Recordings of Shortwave Numbers Stations

Shortwaveology.net

One-Time Pad

MAMPE BVQDI JQORJ WRELZ

12 0 12 15 4 1 21 16 3 8 9 16 14 17 9 22 17 4 11 25


DELIV ERYAT NINET HIRTY

3 4 11 8 21 4 17 24 0 19 13 4 19 7 8 7 8 17 19 24

PEXXZ FMODBWYBVC DZVEX

15 4 23 23 25 5 12 14 3 1 22 24 1 21 2 3 25 21 4 23

Addition Modulo 26



Possible Keys

CGPJ QYXT

2 6 15 9 16 24 23 19

ASDF JKLP

0 18 3 5 9 10 11 15

RCDV DYUP

17 2 3 21 3 24 20 15

COME HOME

2 14 12 4 7 14 12 4

LEMO NADE


11 4 12 14 13 0 3 4

Pseudo Random Numbers

$$(Ax_0 + B) \mod 2^{64} = x_1$$

3,227,678,411,623,578,827	9	J
3,385,237,196 ,860,930,252	16	Q
1,905,768,108 ,648,866,984	10	K
250,722,988 ,989,761,836	22	W
739,326,635 ,180,224,684	21	V
2,072,715,979 ,080,927,912	9	J
4,241,563,340 ,079,199,532	14	0
206,026,408 ,329,146,540	16	Q

Entropy




Claude E. Shannon

A Mathematical Theory of Communication 1948

Information theory

Bit



One-Time Pad

MAMPE BVQDI JQORJ				MAMPE BVQDI			JQORJ WRELZ
12 0 12 15 4 1 21 16 3 8 9 16 14 17 9	22 17 4 11 25 12 0 12 15 4	1 21 16 3 8 9 16 14 17 9	22 17 4 11 25	12 0 12 15 4 1 21 16 3 8	9 16 14 17 9 22 17 4 11	25 12 0 12 15 4 1 21 16 3 8	9 16 14 17 9 22 17 4 11 25
DELIV ERYAT NINET		ERYAT NINET		DELIV ERYAT			NINET HIRTY
3 4 11 8 21 4 17 24 0 19 13 4 19 7 8	7 8 17 19 24 3 4 11 8 21	4 17 24 0 19 13 4 19 7 8	7 8 17 19 24	3 4 11 6 21 4 17 24 0 19	13 4 19 7 8 7 8 17 19	24 3 4 11 8 21 4 17 24 0 19	13 4 19 7 8 7 8 17 19 24
PEXXZ FMODBWYBVC		FMODBWYBVC		PEXXZ FMODB			3 WYBVC DZVEX
15 4 25 25 25 5 12 14 3 1 22 24 1 21 2		5 12 14 3 1 22 24 1 21 2		MAMPE BVODI			JOORJ WRELZ
MAMPE BVQDI JQORJ		BVQDI JQORJ		12 0 12 15 4 1 21 16 3 8			9 16 14 17 9 22 17 4 11 25
DELIV ERYAT NINET	HIRTY DELLY	FRYAT NINFT	HIDTY	DELIV ERYAT	NINET HIRT	DELLY ERVAT	NINET HIRTY
3 4 11 8 21 4 17 24 0 19 13 4 19 7 8		4 17 24 0 19 13 4 19 7 8		3 4 11 8 21 4 17 24 0 19			13 4 19 7 8 7 8 17 19 24
PEXXZ FMODBWYBVC	DZVEX PEXXZ	FMODB WYBVC	DZVEX	PEXXZ FMODB	WYBVC DZVE	X PEXXZ FMODE	WYBVC DZVEX
15 4 23 23 25 5 12 14 3 1 22 24 1 21 2		5 12 14 3 1 22 24 1 21 2		15 4 23 23 25 5 12 14 3 1	22 24 1 21 2 3 25 21 4	23 15 4 25 23 25 5 12 14 3 1	22 24 1 21 2 3 25 21 4 23
MAMPE BVQDI JQORJ	WRELZ MAMPE	BVQDI JQORJ	WRELZ	MAMPE BVQDI	JQORJ WREL	Z MAMPE BVQDI	JQORJ WRELZ
12 0 12 15 4 1 21 16 3 8 9 16 14 17 9	22 17 4 11 25 12 0 12 15 4	1 21 16 3 8 9 16 14 17 9	22 17 4 11 25	12 0 12 15 4 1 21 16 3 8	9 16 14 17 9 22 17 4 11	25 12 0 12 15 4 1 21 16 3 8	9 16 14 17 9 22 17 4 11 25
DELIV ERYAT NINET	HIRTY DELIV	ERYAT NINET	HIRTY	DELIV ERYAT			NINET HIRTY
3 4 11 8 21 4 17 24 8 19 13 4 19 7 8	7 8 17 19 24 3 4 11 8 21	4 17 24 0 19 13 4 19 7 8	7 8 17 19 24	3 4 11 8 21 4 17 24 0 19	13 4 19 7 8 7 8 17 19	24 3 4 11 8 21 4 17 24 0 19	13 4 19 7 8 7 8 17 19 24
PEXXZ FMODBWYBVC		FMODBWYBVC		PEXXZ FMODB			WYBVC DZVEX
15 4 25 25 25 5 12 14 5 1 22 24 1 21 2		5 12 14 3 1 22 24 1 21 2		15 4 23 23 25 5 12 14 3 1			22 24 1 21 2 3 25 21 4 23
MAMPE BVQDI JQORJ		BVQDI JQORJ		MAMPE BVQDI			JQORJ WRELZ
DELIV ERYAT NINET		ERYAT NINET		DELIV ERYAT			NINET HIRTY
PEXXZ FMODBWYBVC		FMODB WYBVC		PEXXZ FMODE	WYRYC DZVE	V DEVV7 EMODE	SWYBVC DZVEX
25 4 23 23 25 5 12 14 3 1 22 24 1 21 2		5 12 14 3 1 22 24 1 21 2		15 4 23 23 25 5 12 14 3 1			22 24 1 21 2 3 25 21 4 23
MAMPE BVODI JOORJ	WRELZ MAMPE	BVODI JOORI	WRFI 7	MAMPE BVQDI	JQORJ WREL	Z MAMPE BVQDI	JQORJ WRELZ
12 0 12 15 4 1 21 16 3 8 9 16 14 17 9		1 21 16 3 8 9 16 14 17 9		12 0 12 15 4 1 21 16 3 8	9 16 14 17 9 22 17 4 11	25 12 0 12 15 4 1 21 16 3 8	9 16 14 17 9 22 17 4 11 25

One-Time Pad

$$\log_2(26) = 4.7$$

(that is, $2^{4.7} = 26$)

$$1,000 \times 4.7 = 4,700$$

Pseudo-Random Pad

64 bits
$$\longrightarrow$$
 x_0 \longrightarrow x_1 \longrightarrow x_2 \longrightarrow x_3 \longrightarrow x_4 \longrightarrow x_{995} \longrightarrow x_{996} \longrightarrow x_{997} \longrightarrow x_{998} \longrightarrow x_{999}

64 bits (at most)

One-Time Pad

- Truly random
- Used only once
- Maximum entropy


- Mistakes are common
- Hard to use
- Compromised




The Enigma Machine




Advancing Rotors



Plug Board




Plug Board




= 100,391,791,500

Plug Board



= 150,738,274,937,250

Decryption



Rotor Pattern

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F

S D O V I L A H N R M Z C W P U G B K Q F T E Y J X

S D O V I L A H N R M Z C W P U G B K Q F T E Y J X

S D O V I L A H N R M Z C W P U G B K Q F T E Y J X

Entropy

of a 26-letter sequence

One-Time Pad: $4.7 \times 26 = 122.2$

Enigma Rotor: 4.7

Entropy

of one output letter

Without Reflector: $log_2(26) = 4.7$

With Reflector: $log_2(25) = 4.6$

Rotor Combinations

Single Stepping: $26 \times 26 \times 26 = 17,576$

Double Stepping: $26 \times 25 \times 26 = 16,900$

Procedure Mistakes

- Same initial rotor settings for a day
- No repeated initial rotor settings in a month
- Encrypt key twice in a message
- Send same message encrypted differently

Biggest Mistake


- Daily plug board configurations
- $\log_2(150,738,274,937,250) = 47.1 \text{ bits!}$

HEIN	1!							GEH	IEIM	1!			1				家		NOVI	EMBEI	R 193
ag	Wa	lzenl	age	Rings	te	llung	1		5	tec	ker	ver	bir	ndur	iger	1	1	к	enng	ruppe	en
30	IV	V	III	26	26	14		BP	cs	DI	EJ	FU	GQ	KV	LR	NW	ОТ	CHN	YCF	JYU	NMR
29	III	II	V	15	06	14	11	BW	DX	EP	FT	НО	IS	KL	MU	RY	VZ	IRS	KIH	HUG	WUT
28	II	III	I	11	21	07	11	BE	DZ	FU	GP	HL	IQ	JN	KV	OX	SW	ZXR	NOT	UKN	KLC
27	IV	V	I	1 17	03	08	1	AH	CP	DG	ER	JQ	KY	LX	MN	ОТ	VZ	BMQ	XXZ	CRN	RXB
26	I	III	· V	01	05	05	1	AW	CQ	EM	FZ	IN	JT	LX	os	PV	RY	AAK	HAN	ZUH	RBJ
25	II	III	IV	1 06	09	03	1	AH	BS	EL	FY	GT	JZ	KW	MO	NV	QU	KVI	UVJ	RDT	OEM
24	III	I	V	15	09	07	1	AT	BD	CU	EP	FY	GK	HI	JN	MR	QV	AZV	XZM	IKP	IWZ
.23	IV	I	V	09	03	16	1	AN	BR	CS	DP	GT	IY	JZ	ко	QU	VW	DDM	EUF	LYR	AYZ
22	III	IV	II	1 17	25	16	1	AV	BI	CQ	DG	EL	HP	JO	KZ	NX	SU	TTD	KDO	BWL	XGV
21	III	IV	V	1 17	16	19	11	BN	CQ	EM	FZ	GT	HI	OR	PW	SV	UY	CHL	COU	LAI	ZIV
20	III	V	I	1 16	10	04	1	AO	BI	CN	DV	GQ	HP	JX	KR	LU	MS	URX	EBK	MHI	TDK
19	I	V	III	1 12	23.	21	1	АТ	CM	DG	EX	FL	JN	KV	PU	QR	YZ	NFQ	PGD	SYS	PZV
18	II	III	I	08	01	04	1	AT	ВЈ	CV	DQ	ΕÝ	FR	GN	KS	ox	UW .	RZA	VJC	JAQ	CLW
17	I	III	V	04	24	10	17	AM	BW	EV	FJ	GQ	IK	LU.	NX	OR	PZ	LDT	MQE	EWQ	EJX
16	I	II	IV	1 18	05	03	1	AQ	BV	DP	EO	FK	IZ	LM	NR	SU	WY	YBS	XCZ	XOR	WWG
15	II	IV	TII	1 19	24	25	1	CX	DE	FG	HQ	IR	JU	KY	MP	NO	VZ	LTM	LXE	LOW	LEX
14	III	V	I	17	14	25	1	AJ	BS	CH	DM	ER	FP	GU	IW	NX	QT	RSV	TIY	MRZ	XCS
13	II	I	III	1 14	22	12	1	AT	CG	DU	HQ	IO	JK	LS	NZ	RW	VY	KCG	AJR	MWK	AGL
12	II	IV	III	1 21	07	02	1	AC	BN	DF	GQ	нТ	IM	JY	OW	RX	VZ	SWL	DMY	EFQ	RXO
11	II	IV	V	23	02	26	1	AD	CK	EI	FN	HQ	JT	LX	PY	RV	WZ	RWY	IDB	QLJ	ULM
10	II	I	IV	04	02	16	-		BZ					LN				A CONTRACTOR	SEP	10000	
09	II	V	IV	02	01	02	1	AO	CR	DF	EV	GZ	HP	IS	LN	MX	QU	- ICP	PGW	VKP	NAR
08	II	I	III	10	11	11	1	AG	ВЭ	CZ	DL	ET	FK	IS	NR	ox	WY	OII	PIG	DSR	FIC
07	IV	II .	III	- 11	23	08	1	AT	BE	CM	DQ	FP	GK	HI	LW	OY	SX	WFZ	EIZ	LSC	UAB
06	V	I	IV	1 18	09	04	1	AF	BI	CW	EV	GX	HS	NU	OZ	QT	RY	GXX	WHO	SOG	WQI
05	II	I	IV	1 16	04	06	1	BE	CO	DF	GM	HY	JQ	KZ	NX	RV	SU	YCI	HQL	FAP	LUX
04	II	III	I	1 11	12	09	1	AJ	BI	CN	DO	EG	HT	KQ	UV	WX	YZ	OGF	PFQ	KFD	YNY
03	V	II	III	1 25	21	17	T	AB	CW	EH	FX	IO	JR	LP	MS	NT	QU	VIJ	JFR	DIF	PZA
02	III	IV	II	1 19	02	26	1	AP	CY	DX	EH	FW	GN	JZ	LU	RT	SV	DYP	GJX	ZIO	LLD
01	V	IV	I	13	19	17	17	AU	BZ	CV	EF	GK	HW	IX	JS	LR	NQ	FUO	CJK	PIU	CAY

More Frequent Configurations

- Fewer intercepts
 - Harder to crack
- More time per message
 - One day: military advantage
 - One week: history lesson
- Protect the most significant improvement

Diffie-Hellman



Whitfield Diffie




Martin Hellman




Ralph Merkle

Shared Secret
Untrusted Channel


Modulo Addition and Subtraction




Modulo Multiplication



Modulo Multiplication



Secret Communications



Algebra Refresher


$$ab = ba$$

$$(g^a)^b = g^{ab}$$


$$g^{ab} = g^{ba}$$
$$(g^a)^b = (g^b)^a$$

$$(g^{a}_{mod n})^{b}_{mod n} = (g^{b}_{mod n})^{a}_{mod n}$$

Exponentiation in a Modulus




Exponentiation in a Modulus



0 1 2 ... n-3 n-2 n-1

Exponentiation in a Modulus

$$g^{n-1} \mod n = 1$$



0 1 2

. . .

n-3 n-2 n-1


Fermat's Little Theorem

 $g^{n-1} \mod n = 1$

if n is prime and g is not a multiple of n



Premature Cycles



Large Primes

2048 bits

616 digits



46 digits

10,000,000,...,000,000

Man in the Middle



Asymetric Cryptography





Rest of the Course

- Modern cryptographic methods
- Mathematics
- Flaws
- Mistakes

Conclusion

- Entropy
- One-time pad
- Patterns can be exploited
- Weakest link: human operator