THE EXPORT BOOM AND THE BACKLASH

Reactions to Positive Economic Change in First World War America

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Abstract

Extensive scholarship links negative economic change to support for far-right movements. Yet the success of those movements is not confined to periods of negative economic change. This article studies the political effects of the positive shock to manufacturing in the US caused by export demand during the First World War. Counties exposed to the boom experienced increases in population, manufacturing output, and wages. They also had more branches of the Ku Klux Klan and other far-right groups, experienced riots in the Red Summer of 1919, reduced the political power of immigrants, and increased law enforcement and incarceration. The export boom, by inducing in-migration, increased the immigrant and nonwhite shares of the population. The lack of negative economic effects on natives suggests that prejudice against out groups, and not economic competition, accounts for the reaction. The path from globalization to illiberal backlash runs through globalization's winners as well as its losers.

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1 INTRODUCTION

There is extensive evidence linking economic harm to support for far-right and anti-globalization movements. Scholars link the negative effects of China's integration into the global economy on local labor markets in other countries to political polarization (Autor et al., 2020), support for populist parties (Colantone and Stanig, 2018*b*; Dippel et al., 2022; Milner, 2021), and opposition to globalization (Colantone and Stanig, 2018*a*). Research on this reaction at the individual level highlights a shift towards authoritarian values (Ballard-Rosa et al., 2021; Ballard-Rosa, Jensen and Scheve, 2022). Other research finds similar responses to analogous negative economic shocks. Anelli, Colantone and Stanig (2021) argue automation increases support for populist parties; Baccini and Weymouth (2021) and Broz, Frieden and Weymouth (2021) link manufacturing decline in the US to support for the populist right, especially by white voters who experience a decline in group status. Yet more scholarship links economic harm from government austerity policies to a set of reactions ranging from Brexit (Fetzer, 2019) to the rise of the Nazis (Galofré-Vilà et al., 2021).

This research suggests that governments that want to realize the economic benefits of globalization and technological change without the costs of backlash must implement policies that shield voters from negative economic changes. This scholarship thus links to Ruggie (1982)'s idea that the post-Second World War liberal international order was politically feasible because of the extensive welfare state. Indeed, there is evidence that trade adjustment assistance in the US mitigates the political backlash from trade shocks (Margalit, 2011; Kim and Pelc, 2021; Ritchie and You, 2021).

Yet outbursts of populism and far-right activity are not confined to periods or regions of economic decline. In the period abutting the First World War, the United States experienced both unprecedented prosperity and a reactionary backlash. The First World War generated an enormous export boom, especially in the manufacturing sector (Figure 1, left panel). While the export boom was short-lived, manufacturing output remained persistently above pre-war

levels (Figure 1, right panel). Hourly wages in manufacturing increased by 90% between 1914 and 1918, and by 135% between 1914 and 1924 (Rees, 1960, 3). The economic boom improved living standards: in part thanks to easy access to credit, consumer goods like the new automobile were "affordable for all but the poorest of the nation's households" (Gordon, 2017*b*, 165). Amidst this prosperity, the Ku Klux Klan re-emerged as a mass membership organization. The second Klan, founded in 1915, claimed four to six million members by the mid-1920s (Gordon, 2017*a*). It was active outside the South, and sought to rally white, Protestant, "100 percent Americans" against Black, Jewish, and Catholic Americans. In its anti-Communism, racism, lower-middle class support base, penchant for uniformed parades and contempt for democratic norms, the Klan had much in common with the European Fascist movements of the same era (MacLean, 1994). It was not the only manifestation of a nativist backlash. In 1919, there were anti-Black riots in major cities, including New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia, and numerous incidents of violence against immigrants (see Higham 1974, 223–227). The 1921 Emergency Quota Act and 1924 Immigration Act brought America's age of mass migration to an end. There was enormous popular demand for racist ideas, as seen by the commercial success of eugenicist tracts, like Madison Grant's *The Passing of the Great Race* (Higham, 1974).



Figure 1: Wartime surge in US exports, data from Carter et al. (2006)

That the First World War export boom was followed by the rise of the KKK and a nativist

backlash does not in itself show that the one caused the other. This article argues, however, that the export boom and the backlash were connected. Positive economic change—provided it is not distributed uniformly across space—creates incentives for internal migration. A positive shock to demand for goods produced in one region also increases labor demand and wages in that region, which attracts migrants from other regions. In-migration increases the diversity of the regions experiencing the boom, in part because if the initial population distribution is affected by sorting then those moving in will be different from those already there, in part because immigrants tend to have higher rates of internal migration and so tend to be more responsive in their location decisions to local economic changes (Cadena and Kovak, 2016). The existing inhabitants of affected regions then might react against or try to deter the in-migrants.

This article studies the effects of the First World War export boom on politics and economics in the US at the county level. The main independent variable is a shift-share measure of exposure to the export boom. The empirical strategy compares the changes in a set of outcome variables in counties with a mix of industries more exposed to the boom—like metals and preserved food for which there was a spike in wartime export demand—against the changes in counties that were less exposed to the boom. This strategy estimates the causal effect of the export boom under standard difference-in-differences assumptions: counties more exposed to the boom would have trended in the same direction as less-exposed counties in the absence of the boom. I relax these assumptions by controlling for pre-shock employment in agriculture and the sum of non-agricultural exporting industry shares, and so only require that counties with similar levels of industrialization but differing exposure to the boom followed parallel trends. I also directly check for differential pre-trends by estimating event-study specifications.

I follow each step of the path linking the boom to the anti-immigrant backlash. I first examine the export boom's effects on economic and social variables. The boom was associated with a sharp increase in manufacturing output and wages. Counties exposed to the boom

experienced an increase in population. While the populations of all groups, including white natives, increased, the share of immigrants and Black Americans increased disproportionately. All these effects persisted through to 1930, consistent with a theoretical model in which the temporary shock, due to sunk capital investments or agglomeration economies, permanently changed the spatial distribution of economic activity.

The export boom affected the presence of far-right groups, political violence, the structure of city government, and the types of public goods provided. Counties more exposed to the export boom had more branches of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s and 1930s, and were more likely to have a station of the American Protective League, a wartime vigilante group. While there is no pre-shock variation in the presence of these groups, I confirm that the shock was orthogonal to a range of measures of pre-shock far-right activity. Exposure to the boom was associated with an increase in the number of incidents of political violence, an effect driven by riots in the summer of 1919. In more exposed counties, more cities adopted the City Manager form of government, which was designed in part to reduce the political power of immigrant machines. Counties more exposed to the shock reduced the relative employment of teachers, increased relative employment in law enforcement, and increased incarceration. This finding parallels Derenoncourt (2022)'s study of the second Great Migration, which finds that areas which experienced larger inflows of Black migrants in the 1940–1970 period reduced education provision and increased punitive policing. More broadly, this study links scholarship on trade and economic change as determinants of policy with the large political economy literature on diversity and public goods provision (see for instance Alesina and La Ferrara 2005).

I find evidence that these outbursts of nativism were a non-economic reaction to contact with out-groups. I examine this proposition in three ways. First, I show that the link between boom and backlash was stronger in counties which, due to pre-shock attributes, were more susceptible to in-migration by immigrants and Southern Blacks in response to economic change. This evidence suggests that the in-migration of out-groups, and not simply population change, accounts for the backlash. Second, I show that the export boom decreased

the occupational segregation of immigrants and nonwhite residents. Even while natives may have tried to avoid the new in-migrants—I do find that the export boom increased residential segregation—the labor market pushed them together. Third, I show that the link between boom and backlash was stronger in counties that experienced higher casualty rates in the First World War. Ferrara and Fishback (2020) show that First World War casualties increased anti-immigrant discrimination at the local level. An account in which internal migration imposed economic costs on natives would not predict a stronger reaction to in-migration in places where nationalist sentiment was heightened; one in which cultural hostility to out-groups accounts for the reaction would make that prediction.

This article's main contribution is in identifying a new link between exposure to trade and an illiberal backlash. A voluminous literature documents that the negative effects of trade on import-competing sectors increase support for populist and anti-globalization movements. That literature implicitly assumes that the path from global economic integration to backlash runs solely through the negative effects of trade. This article's finding of an anti-immigrant and racist backlash in response to changes in the global economy, in places that gained from those changes, is evidence of another path. Policies that attempt to cushion the political effects of trade—and social scientific analysis of when international openness is politically sustainable—must consider the areas that gain as well as those that lose. This article bolsters Goodman and Pepinsky (2021)'s argument that the post-Second World War liberal international order was made possible in part by restrictive immigration policies. Openness can itself drive opposition to immigration, and curtailing immigration shuts off one channel connecting trade to populism.

In finding that trade induces domestic migration, which in turn affects domestic politics, this article connects a growing literature on international trade to international political economy. A number of studies find that trade liberalization shifts population and economic activity towards locations with better opportunities to export (Hanson, 1998; Fajgelbaum and Redding, 2014; Fan, 2019). Others examine how import competition affects migration

away from import-competing areas (Greenland, Lopresti and McHenry, 2019). While these ideas and results are well-established in international economics, their influence on political economy has been limited. This study documents that an important way in which trade affects domestic politics is by changing the spatial distribution of economic activity.

The most closely related article is Helms (2022), which examines how the 2005 Multi-Fiber Agreement induced internal migration in India, which in turn led to rioting and support for Sons of the Soil politicians. This article differs in showing that, because immigrants have higher rates of internal migration than natives, existing migrant-native cleavages are not necessary for positive economic change to spur nativist backlash. Furthermore, it demonstrates that this phenomenon is not unique to developing economies where a lack of transportation infrastructure motivates migration and so should apply to a broader range of contexts. It also illustrates the mechanism linking in-migration and nativist reaction. This article uses detailed economic data to rule out primarily economic explanations and support a taste-based explanation.

While this article examines the particular case of the First World War export boom, the theoretical mechanism linking boom and backlash rests on a set of well-established results from a range of fields in political science and economics. In addition to the studies linking trade shocks to migration listed above, there is a wealth of scholarship in labor economics on the greater propensity of immigrants to migrate internally (Borjas, 2001; Cadena and Kovak, 2016), especially to locations with higher nominal wages (Monras and Albert, 2022). Much scholarship in political science and political economy links immigrant inflows to an anti-immigrant backlash (Hopkins, 2010; Hangartner et al., 2019; Tabellini, 2020), and increased diversity to reductions in public goods provision (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Algan, Hémet and Laitin, 2016). Much survey research finds that natives prefer immigrants with ties of residence and cultural affinity to the nation (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015; Margalit and Solodoch, 2021). Given that the propensity of immigrants to migrate internally at higher rates is linked to their having fewer place-specific ties, positive economic change should

cause precisely those types of immigrants disliked by natives to move to growing locations. It is likely that the insights from this case apply more broadly to incidents of rapid and unevenly-distributed economic growth.

2 DATA

I assemble a county-level dataset on economic and political variables, which I standardize following Hornbeck (2010) to 1910 county boundaries. The main independent variable is the change in exports per worker to the UK, Germany and France, between 1910 and 1916, which I calculate using microdata from the 1910 census (Ruggles et al., 2021), and product-level trade data from the 1910 and 1916 editions of *Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States*. Following Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013), I compute the change in exports per worker in county i as

$$\Delta \text{EPW}_i = \sum_j \frac{\Delta X_j}{L_j} \frac{L_{ij}}{L_i}$$

where ΔX_j is the change in exports in industry j between 1910 and 1916, L_j is total employment in the US in industry j in 1910, and L_{ij}/L_i is the share of employment in county i in industry j.[1] I focus on exports to the UK, France, and Germany as these countries were major US trading parters—accounting for 50% of US exports in 1910—and were directly affected by the war. US exports to the UK and France spiked, but exports to Germany collapsed due to the British wartime blockade of Germany (Figure A-1). I include exports to Germany to address the concern that the growth in exports to the UK and France may simply reflect a reallocation of exports that would have gone to Germany. I focus on the difference through to 1916 as this precedes the US entry into the war in 1917, and so makes it more plausible that my results are driven by an increase in overseas demand, not domestic industrial policy. To aid interpretation, I subtract the mean ΔEPW and divide by the standard deviation, so all regression coefficients should be interpreted as the effect of a

[1] Kovak (2013) shows that in a specific-factors model of regional economies, the effect of a change in world prices on regional labor demand and wages takes a shift-share form.

standard deviation increase.

I study the effect of the export boom on population change and economic outcomes. As measures of local changes in population composition I use the county-level changes in log population, the log share of immigrants in the population, the log share of immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe in the population, and the log share of nonwhite residents in the population, between 1910 and 1920 and between 1910 and 1930.[2] I calculate these variables using data from the Census of Population (Manson et al., 2020). I study the positive economic effects of the boom using the change in the log value of manufactured products and the log average manufacturing wage using data from the Census of Manufacturing. As the Census Bureau did not publish county-level totals for these variables in 1910, I study the change relative to 1900. One might observe an increase in average manufacturing wages due to the boom, but negative effects on residents' labor market outcomes, if wages in non-manufacturing sectors declined, or if all the increase in wages went to in-migrants. I use linked census microdata from the 1910 and 1920 censuses (Abramitzky, Boustan and Rashid, 2020) to examine changes in labor market outcomes for native-born adult white men resident in affected counties in 1910. The census did not ask respondents about their incomes, but it did record detailed information about occupations. Economic historians have used average 1950 incomes by occupation to measure social mobility (Abramitzky, Boustan and Eriksson, 2014). I examine the effects of the boom on the individual-level change in log imputed 1950 income, as well as on the change in an individual's percentile rank within his county of residence, whether he participated in the labor force, and whether he owned his dwelling. I also use the linked census data to examine whether the export boom prompted the out-migration of existing residents, by checking the fraction of the linked sample in each county who were resident in a different state or county in the 1920 census.

I use data on two far-right movements. The primary measure is the log (one plus) number of chapters of the second Ku Klux Klan. The emergence of the Klan is interesting both in its

[2]For variables of the form $\ln\left(\frac{x}{y}\right)$ where x can take zero values, I calculate $\ln\left(\frac{1+x}{y}\right)$.

own right—it was the largest and most prominent far-right group in US history—and as a credible revealed-preference measure of anti-immigrant and anti-Black attitudes. I use data collected from internal Klan newspapers by Kneebone and Torres (2015). As an additional measure of far-right activism, I use the presence of duty stations of the American Protective League, a wartime vigilante group opposed to German immigrants and leftists. Data on members, including the locations of their duty stations, has been digitized by Ancestry.[3] I geocode the duty station locations and assign them to 1890 counties.

I also gather data on a variety of pre-shock measures of far-right and anti-immigrant activity. Historians emphasize patterns of continuity between the 1920s Klan and earlier nativist and anti-Catholic organizations, namely the Know Nothing party of the 1850s and the American Protective Association of the 1890s (see for instance Gordon 2017*a*). I use data on the county level share of the vote won by the Know Nothings in the 1854 and 1856 Congressional and 1856 Presidential elections (Clubb, Flanigan and Zingale, 1987). To measure the presence of the American Protective Association, I digitize information on the locations of newspapers aligned with the organization, members of congress on its Roll of Honor in 1892 and state-level membership from Kinzer (1964).

I study how the boom affected political violence using data collected by Turchin (2012). Turchin collects information on riots, rampages, and lynchings from existing sources and historical newspapers. I geocode this data for the period 1890–1940, and compute the number of incidents by county and year. Because violent incidents are relatively rare, for the most part I focus on the change in the log number of incidents between the period 1890–1914 and 1915–1940.

I examine the effects of the boom on the structure of city governance and the types of public goods provided. From 1909 onwards, cities in the US moved to replace elected mayors with professional city managers. These changes promised more efficient administration, and a reduction in the political power of immigrants, by curtailing machine politics (Gordon,

[3] `https://www.ancestrylibrary.com/search/collections/60422/`

1968). I gather data on the number and population of city manager cities in each county from the *Tenth Yearbook of the City Manager's Association* (1924). I also use census microdata to measure a change in the types of public goods provided, from education to policing and incarceration. I measure the log share of the population employed as teachers, and in law enforcement, and the log share of the population incarcerated.

3 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY

I examine the effects of the export boom on economic, social, and political change. My baseline empirical specification is

$$\Delta Y_{is} = \beta \Delta \text{EPW}_{is} + \mathbf{X}_{is}\gamma + \delta_s + \varepsilon_{is}$$

where ΔY_{is} is the change in outcome variable Y in county i in state s before and after the export boom, $\mathbf{X}_{is}$ is a vector of controls, and δ_s is a state fixed effect. Differencing the dependent and independent variables accounts for time-invariant county-level confounders, and fixed effects and controls allow for differential trends by states and pre-existing variables. I estimate this equation by weighted least squares, weighted by the number of workers used to construct the industry shares.[4] I cluster standard errors at the state level to account for possible spatial autocorrelation.[5]

This specification captures the causal effect of the export boom on the outcome variable given standard difference-in-differences assumptions. One must believe that counties with greater employment in more affected industries would have, in the absence of the shock, followed the same trend as counties with less employment in those industries. The magnitude

[4] I include workers in non-traded industries in these weights: the correlation between these weights and 1910 population is 0.998.

[5] Adão, Kolesár and Morales (2019) argue that conventional standard errors in shift-share designs like this one fail to account for correlation in the error structure between locations with a similar mix of industries. In Table A-3, I re-estimate the results for population, immigration, KKK formation, City Manager adoption, and violence using the standard errors proposed by Adão, Kolesár and Morales (2019), and find that doing so gives smaller standard errors than clustering at the state level.

and sharp timing of the shock makes it unlikely that developments within the US account for the boom—one would need to believe that American industries that produced products useful for war happened to experience a productivity boom that perfectly coincided with war in Europe. However, it is possible that more-exposed counties were simply different from less-exposed counties.[6]

I address this concern in two ways. First, in the main specification I control for the sum of exporting non-agricultural industry shares, and the share in agricultural employment. These controls ensure that my models compare counties with a similar level of industrialization, but a different mix of exporting industries. Second, I directly test for pre-trends and long-run effects by estimating the following event-study specification:

$$Y_{ist} = \alpha_{is} + \beta_t \Delta \text{EPW}_{is} \mathbf{1}\{t \neq 1910\} + \mathbf{X}_{is}\gamma_t + \delta_{st} + \varepsilon_{ist}$$

This specification regresses the outcome in levels on the 1910–1916 change in exports interacted with year fixed effects, with county and state-by-year fixed effects and 1910 controls interacted with the year fixed effects. I set 1910, the last census year before the export boom, as the base year, and so estimates of β_t give the effect of the export boom on the outcome variable relative to 1910.

For the KKK and APL variables, there is no pre-shock variation, as the groups in question did not exist before the shock. One can think of a regression of the post-shock level of the outcome variable on the change in exports per worker as being equivalent to a differenced specification. However, there is no pre-shock variation to account for pre-existing heterogeneity, and so causal identification is more plausible in this case given a selection-on-observables assumption. The main concern is that places more exposed to the export boom had greater latent far-right sentiment, which was only observed when the various far-right groups emerged post-shock. I address this concern by showing that, conditional on controls, the incidence

[6]In Figure A-3 I show that the point estimates for the main results are stable when controlling for the share of employment in each industry in 1910, suggesting that no one industry accounts for my results.

of the export boom was orthogonal to a range of measures of pre-First World War far-right activity.

4 RESULTS

4.1 *Effects on Economic Activity*

The export boom increased population, wages, and manufacturing output in affected counties. It also disproportionately increased the population of out-groups—immigrants and Black Americans—in those counties. Table 1 shows the effects of the export boom on population and economic activity. Results from panel 1 model (1) suggest that a standard deviation increase in the shock was associated with a 4 percent increase in population in 1920. Models (2) and (3) suggest that the shock had a larger effect on manufacturing wages, and a smaller, but still positive, effect on wages. Models (4) and (6) show that in counties affected by the shock, the immigrant and non-white population increased faster than the population as a whole. Model (5) shows that the population of immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe—who were considered to be more culturally distant than immigrants from Protestant Northern European countries—experienced a larger increase than other immigrant groups. The second panel shows the difference through to 1930. That the coefficients across specifications are comparable to and in all but one case larger than those through to 1920 is notable given that the export boom was temporary (Figure 1). This set of results is suggestive of path dependence. The shock may have influenced the longer-run distribution of economic activity through sunk investments, or through agglomeration effects, which provided a rationale for people and firms to locate in places which gained population due to the boom after the boom subsided (Bleakley and Lin, 2012), or by facilitating the development of migrant networks which reduced the cost of subsequent in-migration. These results are also evidence against the idea that the boom was followed by a bust that may itself have prompted a political reaction. Counties more exposed to the boom experienced a relative increase in wages even through to 1930.

	pop	Mf output	Mf wages	% immigrant	% E&S Europe	% nonwhite
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel 1: Difference to 1920						
ΔEPW	0.042***	0.088**	0.029***	0.015***	0.042***	0.088***
	(0.013)	(0.039)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.015)	(0.026)
DV mean	0.077	1.372	1.013	-0.288	0.09	-0.103
R^2	0.276	0.225	0.417	0.204	0.099	0.206
N	2948	2711	2711	2948	2948	2948
Panel 2: Difference to 1930						
ΔEPW	0.070***	0.116***	0.024***	0.027***	0.064***	0.125***
	(0.020)	(0.043)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.038)
DV mean	0.151	1.368	1.037	-0.697	-0.085	0.2
R^2	0.362	0.236	0.232	0.366	0.133	0.309
N	2948	2458	2458	2948	2948	2948

This table shows the results of regressions of changes in population, manufacturing, and diversity on the export shock, using county-level data. The key independent variable is ΔEPW, the change in exports between 1910 and 1916. In model (1) the dependent variable is the change in log population, in (2) the change in log manufacturing output, in (3) the change in log manufacturing wages, in (4) the change in the log foreign-born share of the population, in (5) the change in the log Eastern- and Southern-European immigrant share of the population, and in (6) the change in the log nonwhite share of the population. The top panel shows differences to 1920, the bottom, differences to 1930. For models (1), (4), (5), and (6), the base year is 1910, for models (2) and (3) the base year is 1900. All models include state fixed effects, and controls for the sum of employment in non-agricultural exporting industries and in agriculture, and are weighted by the number of workers used to calculate the change in exports per worker. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. For full model output see Tables F-1 and F-2. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table 1: Effects of the export boom on population, manufacturing, and diversity

Figures 2, 3, and 4 show event-study specifications for the effect of the export boom on the dependent variable reported in Table 1. For the most part, there is little evidence that more exposed counties were trending in different directions prior to the shock. Differential trends were small in relation to the effect of the export boom, suggesting that bias from violations of the parallel trends assumption is small in relation to the estimated magnitudes. There is some evidence of a differential pre-trend in manufacturing output in Figure 3, but controlling for 1900 log output interacted with year fixed effects (shown in blue) results in coefficients for 1880 and 1890 that are close to zero, and a much larger estimate for the effect through to 1920, suggesting that the base specification reported in Table 1 gives, if anything, a conservative estimate. There is some evidence of more affected counties following a differential trend in wages, but more affected counties seem to have experienced declines in wages prior to the shock, and so the estimate in Table 1 likely understates the positive effect of the boom on wages.[7]



Figure 2: Event study effect on log population and % nonwhite
Regression results in Table G-1

I find no evidence that the boom harmed the economic status of pre-existing residents of affected counties. Table A-5 reports the results of regressions of individual-level changes in

[7]Table A-4 confirms that the effect of the boom on manufacturing output is larger when controlling for 1900 log manufacturing, and that the effect of the boom on wages is comparable in magnitude and statistically significant when controlling for the change in log wages between 1890 and 1900, and when controlling for 1900 log wages.



Figure 3: Event study effect on log manufacturing output and log average wages
Regression results in Table G-2



Figure 4: Event study effect on immigration
Regression results in Table G-1

occupational status, within-county status percentile, homeownership, labor force participation, and interstate and intercounty migration over the 1910–1920 period, on the county-level export boom, for native-born adult white men. These variables do not capture changes in wages, but one would expect negative economic shocks that shift workers into lower-status jobs or out of the labor force entirely, or that force workers to sell their homes, would translate into negative changes in these variables. There is no evidence of such an effect. Indeed, residents of affected counties were slightly more likely to become home-owners between 1910 and 1920. There is also evidence that residents of affected counties were less likely to migrate to a different county, suggesting that the economic boom gave residents greater reason to

stay.

4.2 *Backlash*

The boom was associated with greater adherence to far-right groups, the adoption of City Managers, and political violence. Table 2 shows the results of regressions of the log number of KKK branches, the presence of the APL, City Manager adoption, and changes in the rate of political violence. I find that a standard deviation increase in the export boom is associated with around a 10 percent increase in the number of KKK branches and a 3 percentage point increase in the probability of the county having an APL duty station. Model (3) examines the effect of the export boom on the change in the log number of City Manager cities between 1914 and 1920.[8] A standard deviation increase in exposure to the boom is associated with around a 4 percent increase in the number of City Manager cities. This result is consistent with a theory in which natives, in response to immigrant inflows, adopted the City Manager system which would limit the power of immigrant political machines. Model (4) shows that a standard deviation increase in exposure to the boom was associated with around an 8 percent increase in the number of incidents of political violence.[9] Figure 5 examines the effect at the county-year level in an event study. While incidents of political violence are infrequent events and so these yearly estimates are imprecise, it is clear that the effect in Table 2 is due to the uptick in violence in 1919. This result is important given that 1919 was at the height of the export boom, and was a year marked by a wave of anti-Black violence in American cities.[10]

[8]Table A-8 presents results from alternative specifications examining the effects of the export boom on city manager adoption.

[9]Additional models reported in Table A-9 show that the boom had a marginally larger effect on the number of riots and on the total number of fatalities across incidents, and that the boom did increase the number of incidents of racial or ethnic violence. Note also that the effects of the boom on log KKK chapters and incidents of violence—variables that might increase mechanically with population—are larger than the effect on population estimated in Table 1. These estimates, and those in Table A-19, which adjust linearly for the increase in population, and find similar results to Table 2, suggest that the results in Table 2 are not due to the mechanical effects of population increase.

[10]Table A-10 reports the results of regressions in the change in the Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote relative to 1908 on the export boom. I do not find evidence of a consistent effect on voting, though this result is consistent with the boom leading to an anti-immigrant and anti-Black backlash. It is theoretically ambiguous which party would benefit from nativist sentiment: while the Republicans were more anti-Catholic, the Democrats were more anti-Black, and the KKK was active in both parties. I do

	KKK	APL	CM cities	violence
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ΔEPW	0.099**	0.030**	0.048***	0.077***
	(0.048)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.025)
ln pop 1910	x	x		
DV mean	0.344	0.2	0.042	0.002
R^2	0.716	0.448	0.275	0.246
N	2948	2948	2949	2949

This table shows the results of county-level regressions of nativism on the incidence of the export boom. In model (1), the dependent variable is the log number of Ku Klux Klan chapters in the county in the 1920s and 1930s, in (2) it is a binary indicator for the presence of the American Protective League, in the county, in (3) it is the change in the log number of City Manager cities between 1914 and 1920, in (4), the difference in the log number of incidents of political violence between 1915–1940 and 1890–1914. Models are weighted by the number of workers used to calculate exposure to the export boom. All models control for the share of employment in non-agricultural exporting sectors and agriculture, (1) and (2) also control for log population in 1910. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. For full model output see Table F-3. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table 2: Effects of the export boom on nativism

To interpret the cross-sectional estimates of KKK and APL presence in Table 2 as causal, one would need to believe that—conditional on controls for population, exporting industry and agricultural shares, and state fixed effects—the export boom was uncorrelated with unobservable factors associated with far-right activism. This assumption, while strong, is more plausible given the results in Figure 6, which shows standardized coefficients from regressions of various measures of pre-shock nativism on the export boom, controlling for the share in agriculture, the sum of non-agricultural exporting shares, log population in 1910, and state fixed effects. There is little evidence that the export boom was correlated with support for the Know-nothing Party in the 1850s, or with the presence of the American Protective Association, an anti-Catholic and anti-immigrant group in the 1890s. One would expect latent anti-immigrant and racist sentiment among natives to affect whether immigrants and Black Americans resided in a given location. I estimate a precise null relationship between

find that the export boom increased support for the Republicans in 1924. In that year there was a fight at the Democratic convention between the pro- and anti-Klan factions of the party, which culminated in the Democratic candidate denouncing the Klan, and the Klan supporting the Republicans (Chalmers, 1965).



Figure 5: Event study effect on incidents of political violence, using data from Turchin (2012)
Regression results in Table G-6

the export boom and the log share of immigrants and nonwhite residents in 1910. Across these models, the only effect comparable in magnitude to that for KKK formation is for the presence of APA-affiliated newspapers in the 1890s. Table A-6 shows the effect of the boom on KKK and APL formation is robust to controlling for this variable.

4.3 *Public Goods*

Counties more exposed to the boom shifted public goods provision away from education and towards policing and incarceration. In Table 3, the dependent variables are the change in the log share of teachers in the population, 1910–1920 and 1910–1930, the change in the log share of the population employed in law enforcement, 1910–1920 and 1910–1930, and the change in the log share of the population incarcerated 1900–1920 and 1900–1930, all calculated using census microdata. A standard deviation increase in exports per workers is associated with a roughly 2% decrease in the share of teachers, a 5% increase in the share employed in law enforcement, and around a 20% increase in the share incarcerated through to 1920. These results are robust to controlling for trends related to the level of the outcome variable in 1910, for which the parallel trends assumption is more plausibly satisfied. There is some evidence



Figure 6: The export boom was orthogonal to pre-First World War nativism
Unstandardized regression results in Table A-7

that these effects persisted into the 1930s, although the estimates are generally smaller and less precise. Additionally, for the log share of teachers and log share in law enforcement I am able to check for pretrends using data from 1900–1910 (the 1910 census microdata does not contain information on incarceration), and find little evidence of differential pre-trends in Figure 7.



Figure 7: Event study effect on education and law enforcement provision
Regression results in Table G-3

	% teachers		% law enforcement		% incarcerated	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel 1: Difference to 1920						
ΔEPW	-0.015^{***}	-0.028^{***}	0.032^{***}	0.059^{***}	0.210^{**}	0.232^{**}
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.088)	(0.098)
ln % teachers 1910		x				
ln % law enforcement 1910				x		
ln % incarcerated 1900						x
DV mean	0.189	0.189	-0.003	-0.003	-0.238	-0.238
R^2	0.206	0.328	0.083	0.317	0.200	0.472
N	2949	2949	2949	2949	2858	2858
Panel 2: Difference to 1930						
ΔEPW	0.001	-0.018^{**}	-0.000	0.034^{**}	0.194^{*}	0.216^{***}
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.114)	(0.075)
DV mean	0.398	0.398	0.501	0.501	0.381	0.381
R^2	0.380	0.624	0.279	0.552	0.145	0.382
N	2949	2949	2949	2949	2858	2858

This table shows the results of regressions of the change in the log share of population employed as teachers, in law enforcement, and incarcerated on the export shock, using county-level data. The key independent variable is ΔEPW, the change in exports between 1910 and 1916. All dependent variables are in log differences, in panel 1 models (1)–(4), the dependent variable is the difference between 1910 and 1920, in (5) and (6), between 1900 and 1920. In panel 2, the dependent variables are changes between 1910 or 1900 and 1930. All models include state fixed effects and controls for the sum of employment in non-agricultural exporting industries and in agriculture, and are weighted by the number of workers used to calculate the change in exports per worker. Model (2) controls for the log share of teachers in the population in 1910, (4) controls for log share of law enforcement workers in 1910, and (6) controls for the log share incarcerated in 1900. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. For full model output see Tables F-4 and F-5. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table 3: Effects of the export boom on education, law enforcement, and incarceration

5 MECHANISMS

The results presented thus far suggest that the export boom had positive local economic effects, but changed the composition of the population of affected areas, increasing the population as a whole and the share of out-groups in the population. In areas affected by the export boom, residents were more likely to join hate groups, participate in political violence, support changes in government to limit the power of immigrants, and shift public spending towards more punitive public goods. This section presents evidence to bolster the interpretation that the backlash was driven by the in-migration of out-groups, that the boom increased interaction between natives and out-groups in the labor market, and that the reaction to the increased presence of these groups was due to noneconomic factors.

5.1 *Out Groups*

If the backlash was a reaction against out-groups in particular, and not just a product of economic change and population growth, one would expect a stronger backlash in counties in which the export boom also had a stronger effect on the presence of out-groups. I examine this phenomenon using data on immigrant and Black migration networks in 1900. The first panel of Table 4 shows the results of regressions subset according to whether the share of immigrants in a county in 1900 was above or below the state's median. One would expect that counties with more immigrants in 1900 had the kinds of amenities that disproportionately attracted immigrants, and that pre-existing immigrant networks would have influenced the locational choices of subsequent migrants. I find that the effect of the export boom on the log share of immigrants is driven by counties with larger initial immigrant populations, and that its effects on measures of backlash were stronger in those counties. The second panel reports regressions subset by the share of each county's Black population in 1900 born in the South, for Northern counties. While the internal migration of immigrants in this period followed historical patterns, the First World War coincided with—and influenced—the mass

migration of African Americans from the agricultural South to Northern cities. Economic history scholarship on the Great Migration finds that pre-existing migrant networks influenced migration choices (Boustan, 2010). I find that in counties in which the Black population had more connections with the South, the Black population increased more in response to the export boom. As in the first panel, I find that the effect of the boom on the backlash was generally stronger in that subset of counties that experienced greater in-migration.

The idea that the backlash was a taste-based reaction to the presence of out-groups is consistent with the fact that the boom increased the share of culturally marginal immigrant groups more than others, and with the kind of anti-immigrant rhetoric espoused by groups like the KKK. Hiram Evans, head of the Klan during the 1920s, complained that "the Nordic American today is a stranger in large parts of the land his fathers gave him" (Evans, 1926, 39). Part of the reaction was due to people alienated by the increased presence of immigrants.

I use data on residential segregation to bolster the interpretation that distaste for out-groups, especially for immigrants, accounts for the backlash. Logan and Parman (2017*a*,*b*) develop a measure of Black segregation based on the propensity of Black residents to live next door to natives, using the order in which households are enumerated on census returns. Eriksson and Ward (2019) compile an analogous measure of immigrant segregation. An increase in out-group segregation in response to an increase in the number of out-group members would be consistent with natives disliking interacting with out groups, moving out of the areas in which those groups settled, and perhaps supporting policies to restrict them to certain neighborhoods. Figure 8 shows a clear effect of the export boom on immigrant segregation, and evidence of Black segregation increasing over time in these counties as well.[11]

5.2 *Labor Market Contact*

The export boom increased contact between natives and out-group members in the labor market. I use census microdata to compute the occupational isolation—a normalized measure

[11] I present regression results in Table A-11

	% out group		KKK chapters		CM cities		violence	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel 1: Subset by 1900 share of immigrants								
ΔEPW	−0.002	0.015***	0.043	0.106**	−0.011	0.057***	−0.027**	0.087***
	(0.011)	(0.004)	(0.027)	(0.053)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.029)
1900 % immigrant	1H	2H	1H	2H	1H	2H	1H	2H
ln pop 1910			x	x				
DV mean	-0.292	-0.283	0.266	0.423	0.035	0.048	0.002	0.001
R^2	0.259	0.256	0.620	0.730	0.452	0.308	0.087	0.327
N	1486	1460	1486	1460	1486	1461	1486	1461
Panel 2: Subset by 1900 Black share Southern-born								
ΔEPW	0.032	0.090***	0.004	0.137**	0.020*	0.057***	0.032*	0.086**
	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.063)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.042)
1900 Black % Southern	1H	2H	1H	2H	1H	2H	1H	2H
ln pop 1910			x	x				
DV mean	-0.167	-0.045	0.324	0.492	0.039	0.061	0.001	-0.021
R^2	0.127	0.376	0.517	0.753	0.126	0.433	0.245	0.450
N	710	687	710	687	710	687	710	687

This table shows the results of regressions of the nativist backlash on the export boom, subset by factors that affected the responsiveness of the immigrant and Black population to economic change. Even-numbered models in the top panel are subset to counties with shares of immigrants in 1900 above the state median. In the bottom panel even-numbered models are subset to counties in which the share of the Black population in 1900 born in the South was above the state median. The bottom panel is also subset to counties outside the South. The dependent variable in models (1) and (2) is the change in the log immigrant percentage between 1910 and 1920 in the top panel, and the change in the log nonwhite percentage in the bottom panel. The dependent variable in (3) and (4) is the log number of KKK chapters, in (5) and (6) the change in the log number of City Manager cities, in (7) and (8) the change in the log number of incidents of political violence. All models include state fixed effects, and controls for the sum of employment in non-agricultural exporting industries and in agriculture. (3) and (4) also control for 1910 log population. Models are weighted by the number of workers used to calculate exposure to the export boom. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. For full model output see Tables F-6 and F-7. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table 4: Effects of the export boom on nativism, subset by immigrant and Black migration networks



Figure 8: Event study effect on residential segregation
Regression results in Table G-3

of the probability of a given member of a group encountering other members of that group in the same occupation—of immigrant and Black residents of each county in each census. Figure 9 shows that the export boom was associated with a decrease in occupational segregation for both immigrants and Black Americans.[12] This result is of interest given that the export boom increased residential segregation. While natives may have preferred to avoid out-group members, they were put into contact with them in the labor market. This result makes a taste-based explanation for the backlash more plausible, as natives may have been more likely to be spurred to action by the growing presence of out-groups if they actually came into contact with them. Indeed, in Table A-14, I find that the backlash was stronger in counties with lower initial rates of occupational segregation, suggesting that labor market contact was important. I also find some evidence in Table A-15 that the export boom increased the rate of immigrant and nonwhite managers in the population, though at around the same rate as it increased the share of both groups in the population as a whole. The export boom thus may have put native residents in the position of being employed or managed by out-group members, which may have threatened their sense of status. This result fits with the KKK's complaints that "the control of much of our industry and commerce [was] taken over by strangers" (Evans, 1926, 39). It also supports interpretations of the anti-globalization backlash

[12]I report regression results in Table A-13

that emphasize status concerns over direct economic losses (Mutz, 2018; Gidron and Hall, 2017).



Figure 9: Event study effect on immigrant and nonwhite occupational segregation
Regression results in Table G-3

5.3 *The Effects of Wartime Mobilization*

The backlash was stronger in places which experienced more casualties in the First World War, reinforcing the interpretation that it was a reaction to increased diversity. The Klan's leaders themselves argued that the First World War provided the impetus for the group's formation. Evans (1926, 39–40) claimed that "The war revealed that millions whom we had allowed to share our heritage and prosperity ... had other loyalties." Ferrara and Fishback (2020) find that the First World War casualty rate was positively associated with wartime anti-German sentiment. If a behavioral dislike of immigrants, coupled with immigrant in-migration, accounts for the backlash, one would expect to see a stronger effect of the boom on the backlash in areas where nationalist and anti-immigrant sentiment was already inflamed. In contrast, if the backlash was purely due to economic factors, such as labor-market competition, one would not expect casualties to moderate the effect of the boom. Table 5 shows the results of regressions of KKK formation, City Manager adoption, and political violence, on the export boom, subset according to whether the county had above- or below-median casualties as a share of the 1910 population, using data from Ferrara and Fishback (2020). The export

	KKK chapters		CM cities		violence	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ΔEPW	0.033	0.071**	0.007	0.059***	0.028	0.085**
	(0.022)	(0.031)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.034)
Casualties / pop	1H	2H	1H	2H	1H	2H
ln pop 1910	x	x				
DV mean	0.299	0.405	0.03	0.055	-0.008	0.012
R^2	0.600	0.778	0.291	0.320	0.140	0.350
N	1434	1434	1434	1434	1434	1434

This table shows the results of regressions of the nativist backlash on the export boom, subset according to the rate of First World War casualties. The dependent variable in models (1) and (2) is log number of KKK chapters, in (3) and (4) it is the change in the log number of City Manager cities between 1914 and 1920, and in (5) and (6) it is the difference in the log number of incidents of political violence between 1890–1914 and 1915–1940. Odd-numbered models are subset to counties with below-median ratios of First World War casualties to 1910 population, even-numbered models are subset to counties with above-median casualty rates. All models include state fixed effects, and controls for the sum of employment in non-agricultural exporting industries and in agriculture. Models (1) and (2) also control for 1910 log population. Models are weighted by the number of workers used to calculate exposure to the export boom. Robust standard errors in parentheses. For full model output see Table F-8. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table 5: Effects of the export boom on nativism, subset by First World War casualties

boom had a stronger effect on the backlash in counties with higher casualty rates.[13]

5.4 *Alternative Explanations*

It is unlikely that labor market or electoral competition account for the link between the export boom and the backlash. Given the evidence that the export boom increased manufacturing wages, and had no negative effects on the economic status of pre-existing residents, one cannot support an explanation in which workers reacted to economic harm by punishing immigrants. Nor is it likely that the boom increased the marginal benefit in the labor market of deterring migrants. The persistent effects of the boom reported in Table 1 are suggestive of agglomeration economies, which would imply that in-migration could have in itself increased

[13]It is plausible that the export boom affected First World War enlistments and casualties, either through increasing the share of young men in the population, or by increasing nationalist sentiment. Table A-12 examines this question. While I do find evidence that enlistment relative to 1910 population was positively correlated with the export boom, this effect seems to be simply due to the population increase created by the boom: it disappears when scaling by interpolated 1917 population. I do not find evidence that casualty rates were higher in areas more affected by the boom.

natives' wages by raising productivity and thus labor demand. The effects of the boom on wages were if anything more positive in locations with stronger immigrant and Southern Black migration networks (Table A-16), which provides more evidence against a labor market competition explanation.[14] If in-migration decreased native wages at the margin, one would expect migrant networks to cause the shock to have a less positive effect on wages.[15]

I do not find evidence that political competition between immigrants and natives explains the emergence of far-right groups. Dancygier (2010) argues that conflict between natives and immigrants occurs when immigrants have access to political power and so are able to control scarce government-allocated resources. Table A-17 shows the effects of the boom on KKK formation and City Manager adoption, subset by states with low and high residency requirements to voting. I construct an index of residency requirements using the total months one had to be resident in the country, state, county and district to vote in each state in 1914, using information compiled by Keyssar (2000). Biavaschi and Facchini (2020) use a similar index for 1896 as a measure of immigrant access to the franchise. If immigrant political power motivated the backlash, one would expect to see a backlash in places with low restrictions on immigrants voting. I find however that the effect of the boom on KKK formation was stronger in states with larger barriers to immigrants voting. This result is itself consistent with a taste-based explanation for the backlash, in that one would expect states with more xenophobic residents to have stricter restrictions in place prior to the boom, and that residents of those states would have been more likely to respond to immigration by joining hate groups. Political competition does not explain the far-right backlash in part because natives were able to make changes to restrict the political power of immigrants. I find that the effect of the boom on city manager adoption—which limited the power of immigrant political machines—was confined to states with low immigrant voting restrictions.

[14] A vast literature in labor economics finds mixed effects of immigration on the wages of native workers Card (2009)

[15] I also do not find evidence that counties affected by the shock experienced greater labor unrest as measured by Industrial Workers of the World Strikes, in Table A-18.

6 CONCLUSION

This paper examines the effects of the First World War export boom on political and economic outcomes in the US. Areas specializing in industries useful for the war effort—especially metals and meat-packing—benefitted materially from an economic boom that raised industrial output, wages, and population. The increase in population was accompanied by an increase in diversity: Black Americans, and immigrants, especially from Southern and Eastern Europe, migrated disproportionately to the growing counties. The natives reacted against diversity by joining nativist groups, rioting, voting to curtail the political power of immigrants, and shifting public goods provision towards policing and incarceration.

These results suggest that economic change does not only lead to populist, xenophobic, and illiberal politics through its effects on those harmed by the change. While an extensive literature documents the effects of negative economic change—due to trade, automation, or government policy—on politics, few scholars have studied the effects of positive change. Yet the mechanism linking the First World War export boom and the backlash should apply to other cases. There is extensive evidence that trade prompts internal migration (Fajgelbaum and Redding, 2014), that immigrants migrate more than natives (Cadena and Kovak, 2016), and that natives react against in-migration (Hopkins, 2010). Indeed, there are other cases of positive economic change being accompanied by political reaction. For instance, the California Gold Rush of the 1850s was accompanied by a movement against Chinese immigration (Kanazawa, 2005). The UK's post-Second World War prosperity was accompanied by riots against Caribbean immigrants and politicians prophesying that immigration would lead to rivers "foaming with much blood."

When should we expect positive economic change to foment a nativist backlash? A few features of the case suggest an explanation. The export boom was large enough to cause substantial population movements and changes in the local composition of affected areas, and the nativist backlash was stronger in areas which experienced more culturally distant—Black

and immigrant—migrants. These factors suggest that the magnitude of economic change and the level of diversity in the country as a whole are important preconditions for such an effect. Furthermore, while the effects of the boom on population and economic activity lasted at least until 1930, the nativist reaction was comparatively short-lived. The export boom primarily affected violence in 1919, and the KKK as an organization declined rapidly from its peak in the mid-1920s (Gordon, 2017*a*). This temporal disconnect suggests that intergroup contact and assimilation may have gradually eroded nativist hostility (Mousa, 2020; Choi, Poertner and Sambanis, 2019). The rapidity of the change in out-group populations, relative to these slower processes of acculturation may explain why the boom precipitated a backlash. It also suggests that existing scholarship on reactions to negative economic change should be understood in part as capturing an effect related to social dislocation, that is also present in cases of rapid positive economic change. A broader set of cases are needed to fully test these hypotheses. This study provides a first step.

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Table A-1: Summary statistics

Variable	N	Mean	SD	q5	q95
ΔEPW	2,949	0.00	1.00	-0.54	1.97
% in agriculture 1910	2,949	0.56	0.23	0.12	0.87
% in non-agricultural exporting industries 1910	2,949	0.12	0.12	0.01	0.38
ln pop 1910	2,948	9.75	0.98	8.14	11.26
Δln pop 1910–1920	2,948	0.08	0.23	-0.16	0.46
Δln pop 1910–1930	2,948	0.15	0.38	-0.25	0.81
ln Mf output 1900	2,816	13.11	1.90	10.03	16.43
Δln Mf output 1900–1920	2,711	1.37	1.14	-0.42	3.26
Δln Mf output 1900–1930	2,458	1.37	1.26	-0.65	3.51
ln Mf average wages 1900	2,816	5.82	0.36	5.13	6.34
Δln Mf wages 1900–1920	2,711	1.01	0.30	0.57	1.53
Δln Mf wages 1900–1930	2,458	1.04	0.27	0.59	1.46
ln % immigrant 1910	2,948	-3.61	2.00	-7.31	-1.18
Δln % immigrant 1910–1920	2,948	-0.29	0.61	-1.07	0.49
Δln % immigrant 1910–1930	2,948	-0.70	0.75	-2.02	0.29
ln % Eastern and Southern European 1910	2,948	-6.38	2.07	-9.51	-2.85
Δln % Eastern and Southern European 1910–1920	2,948	0.09	0.94	-1.47	1.70
Δln % Eastern and Southern European 1910–1930	2,948	-0.08	0.94	-1.59	1.55
ln % nonwhite 1910	2,948	-3.82	2.38	-7.85	-0.48
Δln % nonwhite 1910–1920	2,948	-0.10	0.70	-1.16	0.99
Δln % nonwhite 1910–1930	2,948	0.20	1.15	-1.17	2.68
ln KKK chapters	2,949	0.34	0.52	0.00	1.39
APL present	2,949	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00
ln CM cities 1914	2,949	0.01	0.08	0.00	0.00
Δln CM cities 1914–1920	2,949	0.04	0.17	0.00	0.69
ln incidents of political violence 1890–1914	2,949	0.06	0.22	0.00	0.69
Δln political violence, 1915–1940 relative to 1890–1914	2,949	0.00	0.28	-0.69	0.69
ln % teachers 1910	2,949	-5.08	0.43	-5.83	-4.44
Δln % teachers 1910–1920	2,949	0.19	0.31	-0.20	0.67
Δln % teachers 1910–1930	2,949	0.40	0.31	-0.02	0.94
ln % law enforcement 1910	2,949	-7.75	0.68	-8.81	-6.57
Δln % law enforcement 1910–1920	2,949	0.00	0.54	-0.86	0.88
Δln % law enforcement 1910–1930	2,949	0.50	0.59	-0.37	1.52
ln % incarcerated 1900	2,858	-8.98	1.48	-10.59	-6.10
Δln % incarcerated 1900–1920	2,858	-0.24	1.65	-3.30	2.93
Δln % incarcerated 1900–1930	2,858	0.38	1.99	-2.85	3.84

Table A-2: Rotemberg weights for 20 most important industries

Industry code	Industry	Rotemberg Weight	ΔEPW	Employment 1910
336	Primary metal industries	0.260	271	685,257
346	Fabricated metal products	0.252	807	303,083
406	Meat products	0.199	962	90,212
376	Motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment	0.083	341	149,403
476	Petroleum and coal products	0.054	761	50,278
417	Confectionery and related products	0.031	2,095	27,659
387	Photographic equipment and supplies	0.028	1,949	3,534
469	Misc chemicals and allied products	0.026	475	101,879
358	Misc machinery	0.023	124	377,781
478	Rubber products	0.021	251	55,274
377	Aircraft and parts	0.007	28,518	223
306	Logging	0.005	-28	166,373
408	Canning and preserving fruits, vegetables, and seafoods	0.004	454	24,699
386	Professional equipment	0.004	284	11,435
407	Dairy products	0.003	455	32,145
379	Railroad and misc transportation equipment	0.003	32	187,897
489	Leather products, except footwear	0.002	424	29,051
409	Grain-mill products	0.002	305	55,706
468	Paints, varnishes, and related products	0.002	241	10,640
316	Glass and glass products	0.001	38	90,129



Figure A-1: US exports to the UK, Germany and France, data from Fouquin and Hugot (2016)

	pop	% immigrant	KKK chapters	CM cities	violence
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ΔEPW	0.042***	0.015***	0.099***	0.048***	0.077***
	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.019)
1910 ln pop			x		
DV mean	0.077	-0.288	0.344	0.042	0.002
R^2	0.276	0.204	0.716	0.275	0.246
N	2948	2948	2948	2949	2949

This table shows the results of regressions of the 1910–1920 change in log population, change in log % immigrant, log number of KKK chapters, change in log number of city manager cities, and change in log number of incidents of political violence, on the export boom, using standard errors robust to errors correlated across industry shares as recommended by Adão, Kolesár and Morales (2019). All models include state fixed effects, and controls for the sum of employment in non-agricultural exporting industries and in agriculture. Model (3) also controls for 1910 log population. Models are weighted by the number of workers used to calculate exports per worker. AKM standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table A-3: Effects of the export boom on population, share of immigrants, KKK formation, City Manager adoption, and violence, with AKM standard errors



Figure A-2: Geographical distribution of the export boom



Figure A-3: Effects controlling for individual industry shares

Notes: Each point is the coefficient from a different regression of the outcome variable on ΔEPW, controlling for the sum of non-agricultural industry shares, the share in agriculture, the share employed in the industry in question, and state fixed effects. The regressions of log klaverns also control for log 1910 population. The thick lines show 90% confidence intervals, the thin lines 95% confidence intervals, calculated using standard errors clustered at the state level.

	Mf output				Mf wages			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
ΔEPW	0.180***	0.215***	0.098**	0.123***	0.033***	0.030***	0.026***	0.021***
	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Period	1900–1920	1900–1930	1900–1920	1900–1930	1900–1920	1900–1930	1900–1920	1900–1930
ln Mf output 1900	x	x						
Δ ln Mf output 1890–1900			x	x				
ln Mf wages 1900					x	x		
Δ ln Mf wages 1890–1900							x	x
DV mean	1.372	1.368	1.312	1.292	1.013	1.037	1.008	1.03
R^2	0.335	0.341	0.218	0.230	0.592	0.485	0.458	0.294
N	2711	2458	2504	2301	2711	2458	2504	2301

This table shows the results of county-level regressions of changes in manufacturing on the incidence of the export boom. In models (1) and (3), the dependent variable is the change in the log value of manufacturing products between 1900 and 1920, in (2) and (4) the change in the log value of manufacturing products between 1900 and 1930. In models (5) and (7), the dependent variable is the change in log average wages in manufacturing between 1900 and 1920, and in models (6) and (8), the dependent variable is the change in log average wages in manufacturing between 1900 and 1930. All models include state fixed effects and controls for the sum of shares of non-agriculture exporting industries and the share in agriculture. Models (1) and (2) also control for 1900 log manufacturing output, models (3) and (4) control for the change in log manufacturing output between 1890 and 1900, (5) and (6) control for log manufacturing wages in 1900, and (7) and (8) control for the change in log manufacturing wages between 1890 and 1900. Models are weighted by the number of workers used to calculate exposure to the export boom. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. For full model output see Table F-9. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table A-4: Robustness for effects on economic variables

	ln occscore	county rank	homeowner	LFP	change state	change county
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ΔEPW	−0.000	0.000	0.004*	−0.000	−0.002	−0.013**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.005)
Individuals	4725804	4725804	5603670	5881381	5884323	5884323
DV mean	0.119	0.01	-0.037	0.005	0.24	0.482
R^2	0.815	0.401	0.592	0.202	0.700	0.557
N	2949	2949	2949	2949	2949	2949

This table shows the results of regressions of individual-level changes in economic status and activity on the export shock, using linked census microdata on native-born white adult men, from the 1910 and 1920 censuses. The key independent variable is ΔEPW, the change in exports at the county level between 1910 and 1916. The dependent variable in models (1) is the change in the individual's log occupational score, which assigns workers the average 1950 income for their occupation, between 1910 and 1920. In (2) it is the change in that individual's within-county occscore percentile, in (3), the change in whether the individual owned his home, in (4) the change in whether he participated in the labor force, in (5) whether he moved to a different state, and in (6) whether he moved to a different county. Data is aggregated to the county level, but regressions are weighted by the number of individuals used to calculate the dependent variable. All models include state fixed effects, and controls for the sum of employment in non-agricultural exporting industries and in agriculture. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. For full model output see Table F-10. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table A-5: Effects of the export boom on native-born white adult men, using linked 1910–1920 census microdata



Figure A-4: Individual effects of the export boom on occupational status and home ownership, subset by 1910 occupational status

Regression results in Table G-5

	KKK chapters			APL present		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ΔEPW	0.150***	0.099**	0.079**	0.047***	0.030**	0.030*
	(0.027)	(0.048)	(0.033)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.016)
ln pop 1910		x	x		x	x
ln APA newspapers 1890s			x			x
DV mean	0.344	0.344	0.344	0.2	0.2	0.2
R^2	0.637	0.716	0.738	0.419	0.448	0.448
N	2949	2948	2948	2949	2948	2948

This table shows the results of cross-sectional county-level regressions of post-WWI right-wing extremism on the incidence of the export boom. In (1)–(3), the dependent variable is the log number of Ku Klux Klan chapters in the county in the 1920s and 1930s, in (4)–(6), it is a binary measure of whether the American Protective League was active. Models are weighted by the number of workers used to calculate exposure to the export boom. All models include state fixed effects and controls for the share of employment in non-agricultural exporting sectors and agriculture, (2), (3), (5), and (6) control for log 1910 population, (3) and (6) also control for the log number of newspapers aligned with the American Protective Association in the 1890s. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. For full model output see Table F-11. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table A-6: Effects of the export boom on nativist groups



Figure A-5: Event study effects on immigrant and nonwhite managers
Regression results in Table G-4

	% Know-nothing		% Fillmore	APA papers	APA members	APA MC	% nonwhite	% immigrant
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
ΔEPW	−0.461	−0.031	0.009	0.040	0.026	−0.001	0.041	−0.018
	(0.316)	(0.063)	(0.010)	(0.029)	(0.064)	(0.001)	(0.068)	(0.029)
Period	1854	1856	1856	1890s	1897	1892	1910	1910
DV mean	22.108	0.613	0.033	0.019	-3.874	0.016	-3.819	-3.606
R^2	0.867	0.260	0.568	0.648	0.197	0.272	0.701	0.879
N	1895	1936	1965	2948	2947	2815	2948	2948

This table shows the results of cross-sectional county-level regressions of pre-WWI right-wing extremism on the incidence of the export boom. In model (1) the dependent variable is vote share for the Know-Nothing party in the 1854 congressional election, in (2) Know-Nothing vote share in the 1856 congressional election, in (3) vote share for Fillmore, the Know-Nothing Presidential candidate in 1856, in (4) the log number of newspapers aligned with the American Protective Association in the 1890s, in (5) the state-level log of membership per capita in the American Protective Association in 1897, in (6) an indicator for whether the county's Member of Congress was on the American Protective Association's "Roll of Honor" in the 1892 Congress, in (7) the log non-white share of the population in 1910, in (8) the log immigrant share of the population in 1910. All models except (5), for which the dependent variable is measured at the state level, include state fixed effects. All models control for the sum of non-agricultural exporting industry shares in 1910, the share in agriculture in 1910, and 1910 log population. Models are weighted by the number of workers used to calculate exposure to the export boom. Model 6 is estimated at the county-by-Congressional district level, when a county falls into more than one district, the observation is weighted by number of workers multiplied by the share of the county in that district. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. For full model output see Table F-12. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table A-7: Null effects of the export boom on earlier far-right activism

	CM cities			CM city pop		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ΔEPW	0.048***	0.041***	0.041***	0.368***	0.374***	0.373***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.125)	(0.118)	(0.118)
ln pop 1910		x	x		x	x
ln % urban 1910			x			x
ln % immigrant 1910			x			x
DV mean	0.042	0.042	0.042	0.496	0.496	0.496
R^2	0.275	0.295	0.295	0.191	0.191	0.194
N	2949	2948	2948	2949	2948	2948

This table shows the results of cross-sectional county-level regressions of City Manager adoption on the incidence of the export boom. In models (1)–(3), the dependent variable is the change in the log number of City Manager cities between 1914 and 1920, in (4)–(6) it is the change in the log population of City Manager cities between 1914 and 1920. Models are weighted by the number of workers used to calculate exposure to the export boom. All models control for the share of employment in non-agricultural exporting sectors and agriculture. (2), (3), (5), and (6) also control for 1910 log population, (3) and (6) control for the 1910 log share of residents in urban area and log share of immigrants. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. For full model output see Table F-13. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table A-8: Effects of the export boom on City Manager adoption

	Incidents	Riots	Racial	Deaths
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ΔEPW	0.077***	0.087***	0.046***	0.098*
	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.017)	(0.052)
DV mean	0.002	-0.004	0.005	-0.006
R^2	0.246	0.302	0.275	0.138
N	2949	2949	2949	2949

This table shows the results of county-level regressions of the change in incidents of political violence on the export boom, using data from Turchin (2012). In model (1), the dependent variable is the difference between the log number of violent incidents 1890–1914, and the log number of violent incidents 1915–1940. In (2), it is the difference in the log number of incidents coded as riots, in (3) the difference in the log number of incidents coded as having a racial or ethnic dimension, in (4), it is the difference in the log number of fatalities between all incidents 1890–1914 and 1915–1940. Models are weighted by the number of workers used to calculate exposure to the export boom. All models include state fixed effects and control for the share of employment in non-agricultural exporting sectors and agriculture. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. For full model output see Table F-14. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table A-9: Effects of the export boom on political violence

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ΔEPW	0.283	−0.244	−0.980**	0.249	−0.174
	(0.340)	(0.257)	(0.441)	(0.628)	(0.681)
Period	1908–1916	1908–1920	1908–1924	1908–1928	1908–1932
DV mean	7.716	-6.563	-5.5	-7.985	15.317
R^2	0.507	0.532	0.714	0.467	0.415
N	2788	2788	2789	2788	2790

This table shows the results of regressions of the change in the share of the two-party presidential vote won by the Democratic candidate relative to 1908, on the export boom. The dependent variable in model (1) is the change in Democratic voteshare between 1908 and 1916, in (2) the change between 1908 and 1920, in (3) the change between 1908 and 1924, in (4) the change between 1908 and 1928, and in (5) the change between 1908 and 1932. All models include state fixed effects, and controls for the sum of employment in non-agricultural exporting industries and in agriculture, models are weighted by the number of workers used to calculate exposure to the export boom. Robust standard errors in parentheses. For full model output see Table F-15. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table A-10: Effects of the export boom on voting in presidential elections

	Immigrant		Black	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ΔEPW	0.009***	0.009***	0.010	0.032***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Period	1910–1920	1910–1930	1910–1920	1910–1930
DV mean	-0.004	-0.032	-0.053	-0.013
R^2	0.141	0.165	0.158	0.276
N	2752	2719	2245	2197

This table shows the results of regressions of county-level residential segregation on the export shock. The dependent variable in model (1) is the change in average immigrant segregation between 1910 and 1920, using data from Eriksson and Ward (2019). In model (2) the dependent variable is the change in immigrant segregation between 1910 and 1930. In (3), it is the change in Black segregation between 1910 and 1920 using data from Logan and Parman (2017*b*), in (4), the change between 1910 and 1930. All models include state fixed effects, controls for the sum of employment in non-agricultural exporting industries and in agriculture, and are weighted by the number of workers used to calculate the change in exports per worker. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. For full model output see Table F-16. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table A-11: Effects of the export boom on immigrant and Black residential segregation

	Enlistment rate				Casualty rate			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
ΔEPW	0.048**	0.035	0.015	0.004	0.097	0.131	0.058	0.106
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.082)	(0.093)	(0.104)	(0.126)
Denominator	1910 pop	1910 pop	1917 pop	1917 pop	1910 pop	1910 pop	Enlist-ments	Enlist-ments
ln pop 1910		x		x		x		x
DV mean	-3.599	-3.599	-3.659	-3.659	-7.194	-7.194	-3.588	-3.588
R^2	0.263	0.295	0.203	0.234	0.165	0.212	0.276	0.361
N	2913	2913	2913	2913	2868	2868	2841	2841

This table shows the results of regressions of First World War enlistment and casualty rates, using data from Ferrara and Fishback (2020), on the export boom. The dependent variable in models (1) and (2) is the log number of soldiers enlisted over 1910 population, in (3) and (4) it is the log number of enlistments over 1917 population, calculated by linearly interpolating 1910 and 1920 population. In (5) and (6) the dependent variable is the log number of deaths over 1910 population, in (7) and (8) it is the log number of deaths over the log number of enlistments. All models include state fixed effects, and controls for the sum of employment in non-agricultural exporting industries and in agriculture. Even-numbered models also control for 1910 log population. Models are weighted by the number of workers used to calculate exposure to the export boom. Robust standard errors in parentheses. For full model output see Table F-17. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table A-12: Effects of the export boom on First World War enlistment and casualties

	Immigrant		Nonwhite	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ΔEPW	−0.110***	−0.156***	−0.192***	−0.196***
	(0.030)	(0.042)	(0.038)	(0.041)
Period	1910–1920	1910–1930	1910–1920	1910–1930
DV mean	0.09	0.332	0.169	0.256
R^2	0.099	0.187	0.251	0.344
N	2904	2899	2703	2681

This table shows the results of regressions of county-level occupational segregation on the export shock. The dependent variable in model (1) is the change in immigrant occupational isolation between 1910 and 1920, in (2) the change between 1910 and 1930, in (3) the change in nonwhite occupational isolation between 1910 and 1920, in (4) the change between 1910 and 1930. All models include state fixed effects, controls for the sum of employment in non-agricultural exporting industries and in agriculture, and are weighted by the number of workers used to calculate the change in exports per worker. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. For full model output see Table F-18. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table A-13: Effects of the export boom on immigrant and nonwhite occupational segregation

	KKK chapters		CM cities		violence	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel 1: Subset by immigrant occupational segregation						
ΔEPW	0.104**	0.024	0.049***	0.005	0.073***	−0.043**
	(0.048)	(0.035)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.027)	(0.020)
Immigrant occupational isolation	1H	2H	1H	2H	1H	2H
ln pop 1910	x	x				
DV mean	0.452	0.242	0.059	0.024	-0.008	0.011
R^2	0.698	0.287	0.289	0.073	0.358	0.053
N	1462	1461	1462	1462	1462	1462
Panel 2: Subset by nonwhite occupational segregation						
ΔEPW	0.106**	0.035	0.054***	−0.003	0.070**	0.014
	(0.052)	(0.036)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.029)	(0.010)
Nonwhite occupational isolation	1H	2H	1H	2H	1H	2H
ln pop 1910	x	x				
DV mean	0.469	0.247	0.052	0.033	0.016	-0.012
R^2	0.745	0.313	0.355	0.140	0.320	0.073
N	1401	1400	1401	1401	1401	1401

This table shows the results of regressions of nativism on the export shock, subset by levels of occupational segregation in 1910. The dependent variable in models (1) and (2) is the log number of KKK chapters, in (3) and (4) the change in the log number of City Manager cities between 1914 and 1930, and in (5) and (6) the change in the log number of incidents of political violence. Odd-numbered models are subset to counties with below-median occupational segregation, even-numbered models to those with above-median occupational segregation. In the top panel this is defined as the occupational isolation of immigrants, in the bottom panel, the occupational isolation of nonwhite residents. All models include state fixed effects, controls for the sum of employment in non-agricultural exporting industries and in agriculture, and are weighted by the number of workers used to calculate the change in exports per worker. Models (1) and (2) also control for log 1910 population. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. For full model output see Tables F-19 and F-20. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table A-14: Effects of the export boom on nativism, subset by occupational segregation

	Immigrant		Nonwhite	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ΔEPW	0.019*	0.022**	0.053*	0.054
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.031)	(0.034)
Period	1910–1920	1910–1930	1910–1920	1910–1930
DV mean	-0.085	-0.17	-0.104	-0.076
R^2	0.130	0.223	0.079	0.137
N	2949	2949	2949	2949

This table shows the results of regressions of the county-level log share of immigrant and nonwhite managers on the export shock. The dependent variable in model (1) is the change in log immigrant managers over population between 1910 and 1920, in (2) the change between 1910 and 1930, in (3) the change in log nonwhite managers over population between 1910 and 1920, in (4) the change between 1910 and 1930. All models include state fixed effects, controls for the sum of employment in non-agricultural exporting industries and in agriculture, and are weighted by the number of workers used to calculate the change in exports per worker. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. For full model output see Table F-21. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table A-15: Effects of the export boom on immigrant and nonwhite managers

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ΔEPW	0.010	0.032***	0.010	0.035***
	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)
1900 % immigrant	1H	2H		
1900 Black % southern			1H	2H
DV mean	1.04	0.986	0.915	0.9
R^2	0.439	0.441	0.180	0.333
N	1364	1347	689	669

This table shows the results of regressions of the change in log manufacturing wages between 1910 and 1920 on the export boom. Model (1) is subset to counties with shares of immigrants in 1900 below the state median, (2) to counties above the state median, (3) to Northern counties in which the share of the Black population in 1900 born in the South was below the state median, (4) to counties above the state median. All models include state fixed effects, and controls for the sum of employment in non-agricultural exporting industries and in agriculture. Models are weighted by the number of workers used to calculate exposure to the export boom. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. For full model output see table F-22. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table A-16: Effects of the export boom on manufacturing wages, subset by immigrant and Black migration networks

	KKK chapters		CM cities	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ΔEPW	0.041*	0.131***	0.050**	0.023
	(0.021)	(0.041)	(0.020)	(0.014)
Voting restrictions	1H	2H	1H	2H
1910 ln pop	x	x		
DV mean	0.33	0.355	0.047	0.037
R^2	0.849	0.560	0.343	0.096
N	1303	1644	1303	1645

This table shows the results of regressions of KKK chapters and city manager adoption on the export boom, subset by state residency requirements to vote. The dependent variable in models (1) and (2) is the log 1 + number of KKK chapters. The dependent variable in models (3) and (4) is the change in the log number of City Manager cities between 1914 and 1920. Models (1) and (3) are subset to states with below-median restrictions on voting, using data on the number of months one had to be resident in the country, state, county, and sub-county units to vote from Keyssar (2000). Models (2) and (4) are subset to states with above-median restrictions on migrants voting. All models include state fixed effects, and controls for the sum of employment in non-agricultural exporting industries and in agriculture. Models (1) and (2) also control for 1910 log population. Robust standard errors in parentheses. For full model output see Table F-23. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table A-17: Effects of the export boom on KKK formation and City Manager adoption, subset by migrant voting restrictions

	Δ strikes		strikes 1919	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ΔEPW	−0.038	−0.026	0.002	−0.005
	(0.048)	(0.055)	(0.006)	(0.006)
ln pop 1910		x		x
DV mean	-0.009	-0.009	0.002	0.002
R^2	0.201	0.213	0.366	0.439
N	2949	2948	2949	2948

This table shows the results of regressions of Industrial Workers of the World strike activity, on the export boom. The dependent variable in models (1) and (2) is the difference in the log number of strikes between 1915–1920 and 1905–1914, in (3) and (4) it is the log number of strikes in 1919. All models include state fixed effects, and controls for the sum of employment in non-agricultural exporting industries and in agriculture. Even-numbered models also control for 1910 log population. Models are weighted by the number of workers used to calculate exposure to the export boom. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. For full model output see Table F-24. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table A-18: Null effects of the export boom on IWW strikes

	KKK	APL	CM cities	violence
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ΔEPW	0.078**	0.030**	0.035***	0.063***
	(0.035)	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.021)
ln pop 1910	x	x		
DV mean	0.305	0.2	0.018	-0.024
R^2	0.705	0.448	0.223	0.227
N	2948	2948	2948	2948

This table shows the results of the controlled direct effects of nativism on the export boom, adjusting for the increase in population between 1910 and 1920. All models include state fixed effects, and controls for the sum of employment in non-agricultural exporting industries and in agriculture. Models (1) and (2) also control for 1910 log population. Models are weighted by the number of workers used to calculate exposure to the export boom. Standard errors calculated by fractional weighted bootstrap clustered by state in parentheses. Full model output in Table F-25. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table A-19: Controlled direct effects of the export boom on nativism, adjusting for population growth

	pop	Mf output	Mf wages	% immigrant	% E&S Europe	% nonwhite
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ΔEPW	0.042***	0.088**	0.029***	0.015***	0.042***	0.088***
	(0.013)	(0.039)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.015)	(0.026)
% exporting 1910	0.010	0.238	0.262***	−0.242**	−0.531**	−0.177
	(0.092)	(0.466)	(0.087)	(0.102)	(0.234)	(0.169)
% agricultural 1910	−0.134*	−0.388	0.267***	−0.083	−0.037	−0.239
	(0.073)	(0.347)	(0.053)	(0.088)	(0.142)	(0.190)
DV mean	0.077	1.372	1.013	-0.288	0.09	-0.103
R^2	0.276	0.225	0.417	0.204	0.099	0.206
N	2948	2711	2711	2948	2948	2948

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table F-1: Full model output for Table 1, top panel

A tables with full regression output

	pop	Mf output	Mf wages	% immigrant	% E&S Europe	% nonwhite
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ΔEPW	0.070***	0.116***	0.024***	0.027***	0.064***	0.125***
	(0.020)	(0.043)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.038)
% exporting 1910	−0.273*	−0.210	0.013	−0.523***	−1.042***	−0.527
	(0.154)	(0.508)	(0.099)	(0.127)	(0.286)	(0.323)
% agricultural 1910	−0.463***	−0.685*	0.027	−0.057	0.317**	−0.418
	(0.120)	(0.378)	(0.063)	(0.125)	(0.130)	(0.339)
DV mean	0.151	1.368	1.037	-0.697	-0.085	0.2
R^2	0.362	0.236	0.232	0.366	0.133	0.309
N	2948	2458	2458	2948	2948	2948

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table F-2: Full model output for Table 1, bottom panel

	KKK	APL	CM cities	violence
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ΔEPW	0.099**	0.030**	0.048***	0.077***
	(0.048)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.025)
% exporting 1910	−0.380	−0.785***	−0.332***	−0.697
	(0.314)	(0.141)	(0.120)	(0.453)
% agricultural 1910	−0.604	−0.732***	−0.167	−0.081
	(0.369)	(0.099)	(0.106)	(0.326)
ln pop 1910	0.335**	0.109***		
	(0.141)	(0.029)		
DV mean	0.344	0.2	0.042	0.002
R^2	0.716	0.448	0.275	0.246
N	2948	2948	2949	2949

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table F-3: Full model output for Table 2

	% teachers		% law enforcement		% incarcerated	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ΔEPW	-0.015^{***}	-0.028^{***}	0.032^{***}	0.059^{***}	0.210^{**}	0.232^{**}
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.088)	(0.098)
% exporting 1910	0.492^{***}	0.273^{***}	0.016	-1.011^{***}	2.280^{*}	-0.867
	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.096)	(0.119)	(1.290)	(1.242)
% agricultural 1910	0.215^{***}	0.156^{**}	0.139	-1.453^{***}	3.390^{***}	-0.175
	(0.044)	(0.059)	(0.104)	(0.111)	(0.824)	(0.616)
ln % teachers 1910		-0.352^{***}				
		(0.042)				
ln % law enforcement 1910				-0.492^{***}		
				(0.043)		
ln % incarcerated 1900						-0.736^{***}
						(0.056)
DV mean	0.189	0.189	-0.003	-0.003	-0.238	-0.238
R^2	0.206	0.328	0.083	0.317	0.200	0.472
N	2949	2949	2949	2949	2858	2858

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table F-4: Full model output for Table 3, top panel

	% teachers		% law enforcement		% incarcerated	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ΔEPW	0.001	−0.018**	−0.000	0.034**	0.194*	0.216***
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.114)	(0.075)
% exporting 1910	0.753***	0.428***	0.185	−1.093***	−1.024	−4.160**
	(0.088)	(0.081)	(0.128)	(0.131)	(1.455)	(1.584)
% agricultural 1910	0.367***	0.279***	0.792***	−1.188***	1.485*	−2.067**
	(0.058)	(0.080)	(0.137)	(0.127)	(0.779)	(0.832)
ln % teachers 1910		−0.519***				
		(0.040)				
ln % law enforcement 1910				−0.612***		
				(0.048)		
ln % incarcerated 1900						−0.734***
						(0.042)
DV mean	0.398	0.398	0.501	0.501	0.381	0.381
R^2	0.380	0.624	0.279	0.552	0.145	0.382
N	2949	2949	2949	2949	2858	2858

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table F-5: Full model output for Table 3, bottom panel

	% out group		KKK chapters		CM cities		violence	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
ΔEPW	−0.002	0.015***	0.043	0.106**	−0.011	0.057***	−0.027**	0.087***
	(0.011)	(0.004)	(0.027)	(0.053)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.029)
% exporting 1910	−0.281	−0.267**	−0.356	−0.489	−0.681**	−0.292**	0.117	−1.232**
	(0.366)	(0.113)	(0.268)	(0.436)	(0.338)	(0.124)	(0.193)	(0.571)
% agricultural 1910	−0.185	−0.113	−0.630***	−0.604	−0.634**	−0.080	−0.065	−0.179
	(0.414)	(0.079)	(0.207)	(0.516)	(0.295)	(0.135)	(0.149)	(0.378)
ln pop 1910	0.023	0.007	0.437***	0.323*				
	(0.055)	(0.007)	(0.104)	(0.166)				
1900 % immigrant	1H	2H	1H	2H	1H	2H	1H	2H
DV mean	-0.292	-0.283	0.266	0.423	0.035	0.048	0.002	0.001
R^2	0.259	0.256	0.620	0.730	0.452	0.308	0.087	0.327
N	1486	1460	1486	1460	1486	1461	1486	1461

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table F-6: Full model output for Table 4, top panel

	% out group		KKK chapters		CM cities		violence	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
ΔEPW	0.032	0.090***	0.004	0.137**	0.020*	0.057***	0.032*	0.086**
	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.063)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.042)
% exporting 1910	0.183	0.074	−0.516	−0.646	0.148	−0.574***	−0.674*	−1.697***
	(0.228)	(0.186)	(0.391)	(0.716)	(0.106)	(0.206)	(0.363)	(0.560)
% agricultural 1910	−0.060	0.136	−0.497*	−0.551	0.156	−0.404	−0.613	−0.922
	(0.314)	(0.261)	(0.270)	(0.983)	(0.105)	(0.270)	(0.398)	(0.566)
ln pop 1910	0.040	0.106***	0.373***	0.333				
	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.057)	(0.212)				
1900 Black % Southern	1H	2H	1H	2H	1H	2H	1H	2H
DV mean	-0.167	-0.045	0.324	0.492	0.039	0.061	0.001	-0.021
R^2	0.127	0.376	0.517	0.753	0.126	0.433	0.245	0.450
N	710	687	710	687	710	687	710	687

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table F-7: Full model output for Table 4, bottom panel

	KKK chapters		CM cities		violence	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ΔEPW	0.033	0.071**	0.007	0.059***	0.028	0.085**
	(0.022)	(0.031)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.034)
% exporting 1910	−0.618**	−0.299	−0.338**	−0.351**	0.308	−1.166*
	(0.303)	(0.479)	(0.164)	(0.137)	(0.312)	(0.598)
% agricultural 1910	−1.032***	−0.243	−0.224**	−0.134	0.262	−0.268
	(0.128)	(0.495)	(0.093)	(0.133)	(0.213)	(0.463)
ln pop 1910	0.220***	0.434***				
	(0.055)	(0.124)				
Casualties / pop	1H	2H	1H	2H	1H	2H
DV mean	0.299	0.405	0.03	0.055	-0.008	0.012
R^2	0.600	0.778	0.291	0.320	0.140	0.350
N	1434	1434	1434	1434	1434	1434

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table F-8: Full model output for Table 5

	Mf output				Mf wages			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
ΔEPW	0.180***	0.215***	0.098**	0.123***	0.033***	0.030***	0.026***	0.021***
	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)
% exporting 1910	−1.046*	−1.538***	0.382	−0.103	0.014	−0.260***	0.331***	0.090
	(0.560)	(0.557)	(0.439)	(0.500)	(0.069)	(0.073)	(0.092)	(0.105)
% agricultural 1910	−2.663***	−3.128***	−0.208	−0.577	−0.149**	−0.411***	0.381***	0.152**
	(0.450)	(0.501)	(0.323)	(0.361)	(0.065)	(0.054)	(0.050)	(0.058)
ln Mf output 1900	−0.276***	−0.305***						
	(0.034)	(0.039)						
Δ ln Mf output 1890–1900			−0.085	−0.091				
			(0.052)	(0.057)				
ln Mf wages 1900					−0.670***	−0.712***		
					(0.066)	(0.058)		
Δ ln Mf wages 1890–1900							−0.193***	−0.233***
							(0.022)	(0.026)
Period	1900–1920	1900–1930	1900–1920	1900–1930	1900–1920	1900–1930	1900–1920	1900–1930
DV mean	1.372	1.368	1.312	1.292	1.013	1.037	1.008	1.03
R^2	0.335	0.341	0.218	0.230	0.592	0.485	0.458	0.294
N	2711	2458	2504	2301	2711	2458	2504	2301

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table F-9: Full model output for Table A-4

	ln occscore	county rank	homeowner	LFP	change state	change county
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ΔEPW	−0.000	0.000	0.004*	−0.000	−0.002	−0.013**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.005)
% exporting 1910	0.032***	−0.040***	−0.113**	−0.024*	−0.055**	0.057
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.045)	(0.013)	(0.024)	(0.065)
% agricultural 1910	0.260***	−0.052***	−0.216***	−0.037***	−0.141***	−0.003
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.026)	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.054)
Individuals	4725804	4725804	5603670	5881381	5884323	5884323
DV mean	0.119	0.01	-0.037	0.005	0.24	0.482
R^2	0.815	0.401	0.592	0.202	0.700	0.557
N	2949	2949	2949	2949	2949	2949

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table F-10: Full model output for Table A-5

	KKK chapters			APL present		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ΔEPW	0.150***	0.099**	0.079**	0.047***	0.030**	0.030*
	(0.027)	(0.048)	(0.033)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.016)
% exporting 1910	−1.655***	−0.380	0.056	−1.200***	−0.785***	−0.787***
	(0.415)	(0.314)	(0.454)	(0.139)	(0.141)	(0.169)
% agricultural 1910	−2.270***	−0.604	−0.502	−1.274***	−0.732***	−0.732***
	(0.398)	(0.369)	(0.342)	(0.104)	(0.099)	(0.106)
ln pop 1910		0.335**	0.234*		0.109***	0.109***
		(0.141)	(0.118)		(0.029)	(0.019)
ln APA newspapers 1890s			0.488***			−0.002
			(0.181)			(0.062)
DV mean	0.344	0.344	0.344	0.2	0.2	0.2
R^2	0.637	0.716	0.738	0.419	0.448	0.448
N	2949	2948	2948	2949	2948	2948

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table F-11: Full model output for Table A-6

	% Know-nothing		% Fillmore	APA papers	APA members	APA MC	% nonwhite	% immigrant
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
ΔEPW	−0.461	−0.031	0.009	0.040	0.026	−0.001	0.041	−0.018
	(0.316)	(0.063)	(0.010)	(0.029)	(0.064)	(0.001)	(0.068)	(0.029)
% exporting 1910	−4.392	−0.409	0.282	−0.891*	−2.072**	−0.035*	−1.857*	0.494
	(8.218)	(1.310)	(0.306)	(0.476)	(0.882)	(0.020)	(1.080)	(0.442)
% agricultural 1910	1.161	0.575	0.260	−0.210	−3.270***	−0.027*	−1.472**	−3.054***
	(6.701)	(0.364)	(0.258)	(0.200)	(0.910)	(0.014)	(0.614)	(0.407)
ln pop 1910	1.009	0.230*	0.029	0.207***	−0.249***	−0.006*	0.216***	0.055
	(0.782)	(0.133)	(0.031)	(0.075)	(0.090)	(0.003)	(0.075)	(0.039)
Intercept					0.507			
					(1.454)			
Period	1854	1856	1856	1890s	1897	1892	1910	1910
DV mean	22.108	0.613	0.033	0.019	-3.874	0.016	-3.819	-3.606
R^2	0.867	0.260	0.568	0.648	0.197	0.272	0.701	0.879
N	1895	1936	1965	2948	2947	2815	2948	2948

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table F-12: Full model output for Table A-7

	CM cities			CM city pop		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ΔEPW	0.048***	0.041***	0.041***	0.368***	0.374***	0.373***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.125)	(0.118)	(0.118)
% exporting 1910	−0.332***	−0.148	−0.136	−2.660**	−2.810***	−2.499**
	(0.120)	(0.090)	(0.086)	(1.048)	(0.965)	(0.973)
% agricultural 1910	−0.167	0.073	0.112	−1.197*	−1.393	−0.534
	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.084)	(0.713)	(0.969)	(0.832)
ln pop 1910		0.048	0.049		−0.039	−0.032
		(0.036)	(0.036)		(0.191)	(0.185)
ln % urban 1910			0.003			0.069***
			(0.003)			(0.021)
ln % immigrant 1910			0.002			0.005
			(0.012)			(0.128)
DV mean	0.042	0.042	0.042	0.496	0.496	0.496
R^2	0.275	0.295	0.295	0.191	0.191	0.194
N	2949	2948	2948	2949	2948	2948

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table F-13: Full model output for Table A-8

	Incidents	Riots	Racial	Deaths
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ΔEPW	0.077***	0.087***	0.046***	0.098*
	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.017)	(0.052)
% exporting 1910	−0.697	−0.717	−0.562	−0.102
	(0.453)	(0.470)	(0.511)	(0.528)
% agricultural 1910	−0.081	−0.037	−0.213	0.060
	(0.326)	(0.349)	(0.350)	(0.449)
DV mean	0.002	-0.004	0.005	-0.006
R^2	0.246	0.302	0.275	0.138
N	2949	2949	2949	2949

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table F-14: Full model output for Table A-9

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ΔEPW	0.283	−0.244	−0.980**	0.249	−0.174
	(0.340)	(0.257)	(0.441)	(0.628)	(0.681)
% exporting 1910	3.236	8.368*	1.438	7.248	5.630
	(2.812)	(4.345)	(4.266)	(7.141)	(6.740)
% agricultural 1910	−1.362	3.048	6.513	−2.100	−0.973
	(2.250)	(2.749)	(4.093)	(8.836)	(7.782)
Period	1908–1916	1908–1920	1908–1924	1908–1928	1908–1932
DV mean	7.716	-6.563	-5.5	-7.985	15.317
R^2	0.507	0.532	0.714	0.467	0.415
N	2788	2788	2789	2788	2790

***$p < 0.01$; **$p < 0.05$; *$p < 0.1$

Table F-15: Full model output for Table A-10

	Immigrant		Black	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ΔEPW	0.009***	0.009***	0.010	0.032***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.011)	(0.010)
% exporting 1910	0.017	−0.150**	−0.236**	−0.338***
	(0.025)	(0.062)	(0.110)	(0.083)
% agricultural 1910	0.023	0.017	−0.169*	−0.307***
	(0.017)	(0.030)	(0.088)	(0.083)
Period	1910–1920	1910–1930	1910–1920	1910–1930
DV mean	-0.004	-0.032	-0.053	-0.013
R^2	0.141	0.165	0.158	0.276
N	2752	2719	2245	2197

***$p < 0.01$; **$p < 0.05$; *$p < 0.1$

Table F-16: Full model output for Table A-11

	Enlistment rate				Casualty rate			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
ΔEPW	0.048**	0.035	0.015	0.004	0.097	0.131	0.058	0.106
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.082)	(0.093)	(0.104)	(0.126)
% exporting 1910	−0.146	0.176	−0.130	0.149	0.300	−0.557	0.713	−0.564
	(0.236)	(0.156)	(0.243)	(0.169)	(0.818)	(0.424)	(1.040)	(0.393)
% agricultural 1910	−0.463*	−0.057	−0.325	0.025	0.523	−0.603**	0.999	−0.612
	(0.235)	(0.111)	(0.230)	(0.128)	(0.733)	(0.268)	(1.105)	(0.430)
ln pop 1910		0.082*		0.071		−0.226		−0.326
		(0.044)		(0.046)		(0.158)		(0.256)
Denominator	1910 pop	1910 pop	1917 pop	1917 pop	1910 pop	1910 pop	Enlist-ments	Enlist-ments
DV mean	-3.599	-3.599	-3.659	-3.659	-7.194	-7.194	-3.588	-3.588
R^2	0.263	0.295	0.203	0.234	0.165	0.212	0.276	0.361
N	2913	2913	2913	2913	2868	2868	2841	2841

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table F-17: Full model output for Table A-12

	Immigrant		Nonwhite	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ΔEPW	−0.110***	−0.156***	−0.192***	−0.196***
	(0.030)	(0.042)	(0.038)	(0.041)
% exporting 1910	−0.013	0.760**	−0.189	−0.046
	(0.300)	(0.342)	(0.311)	(0.280)
% agricultural 1910	−0.081	0.448*	0.255	0.854***
	(0.244)	(0.256)	(0.247)	(0.219)
Period	1910–1920	1910–1930	1910–1920	1910–1930
DV mean	0.09	0.332	0.169	0.256
R^2	0.099	0.187	0.251	0.344
N	2904	2899	2703	2681

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table F-18: Full model output for Table A-13.

	KKK chapters		CM cities		violence	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ΔEPW	0.104**	0.024	0.049***	0.005	0.073***	−0.043**
	(0.048)	(0.035)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.027)	(0.020)
% exporting 1910	−0.348	−0.457	−0.411***	−0.113	−0.978**	0.701
	(0.445)	(0.320)	(0.136)	(0.132)	(0.481)	(0.471)
% agricultural 1910	−0.279	−0.950***	−0.226	−0.185**	−0.409	0.246
	(0.613)	(0.160)	(0.156)	(0.084)	(0.411)	(0.250)
ln pop 1910	0.363**	0.238***				
	(0.175)	(0.031)				
Immigrant occupational isolation	1H	2H	1H	2H	1H	2H
DV mean	0.452	0.242	0.059	0.024	-0.008	0.011
R^2	0.698	0.287	0.289	0.073	0.358	0.053
N	1462	1461	1462	1462	1462	1462

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table F-19: Full model output for Table A-14, top panel

	KKK chapters		CM cities		violence	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ΔEPW	0.106**	0.035	0.054***	−0.003	0.070**	0.014
	(0.052)	(0.036)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.029)	(0.010)
% exporting 1910	−0.600	−0.275	−0.315**	−0.372**	−0.969*	−0.013
	(0.466)	(0.353)	(0.142)	(0.166)	(0.566)	(0.194)
% agricultural 1910	−0.859*	−0.557***	−0.123	−0.269***	−0.003	0.075
	(0.442)	(0.200)	(0.096)	(0.092)	(0.357)	(0.054)
ln pop 1910	0.289*	0.248***				
	(0.162)	(0.034)				
Immigrant occupational isolation	1H	2H	1H	2H	1H	2H
DV mean	0.469	0.247	0.052	0.033	0.016	-0.012
R^2	0.745	0.313	0.355	0.140	0.320	0.073
N	1401	1400	1401	1401	1401	1401

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table F-20: Full model output for Table A-14, bottom panel

	Immigrant		Nonwhite	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ΔEPW	0.019*	0.022**	0.053*	0.054
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.031)	(0.034)
% exporting 1910	0.152	0.204	−0.363	−0.476
	(0.097)	(0.133)	(0.389)	(0.414)
% agricultural 1910	0.128	0.276***	−0.065	−0.221
	(0.088)	(0.084)	(0.174)	(0.341)
Period	1910–1920	1910–1930	1910–1920	1910–1930
DV mean	-0.085	-0.17	-0.104	-0.076
R^2	0.130	0.223	0.079	0.137
N	2949	2949	2949	2949

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table F-21: Full model output for Table A-15

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ΔEPW	0.010	0.032***	0.010	0.035***
	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)
% exporting 1910	0.369***	0.202**	0.001	0.127
	(0.096)	(0.092)	(0.131)	(0.111)
% agricultural 1910	0.095	0.224***	0.062	0.172***
	(0.077)	(0.053)	(0.084)	(0.056)
1900 % immigrant	1H	2H		
1900 Black % southern			1H	2H
DV mean	1.04	0.986	0.915	0.9
R^2	0.439	0.441	0.180	0.333
N	1364	1347	689	669

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table F-22: Full model output for Table A-16

	KKK chapters		CM cities	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ΔEPW	0.041*	0.131***	0.050**	0.023
	(0.021)	(0.041)	(0.020)	(0.014)
% exporting 1910	0.107	−0.579	−0.595**	−0.124
	(0.313)	(0.428)	(0.251)	(0.197)
% agricultural 1910	0.673**	−1.216***	−0.427**	−0.040
	(0.300)	(0.187)	(0.205)	(0.063)
ln pop 1910	0.638***	0.068		
	(0.048)	(0.048)		
Voting restrictions	1H	2H	1H	2H
DV mean	0.33	0.355	0.047	0.037
R^2	0.849	0.560	0.343	0.096
N	1303	1644	1303	1645

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table F-23: Full model output for Table A-17

	Δ strikes		strikes 1919	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ΔEPW	−0.038	−0.026	0.002	−0.005
	(0.048)	(0.055)	(0.006)	(0.006)
% exporting 1910	−0.398	−0.693	0.065	0.256*
	(0.527)	(0.495)	(0.164)	(0.140)
% agricultural 1910	−0.115	−0.501*	−0.079	0.170*
	(0.374)	(0.279)	(0.105)	(0.091)
ln pop 1910		−0.078		0.050
		(0.088)		(0.034)
ln pop 1910		x		x
DV mean	-0.009	-0.009	0.002	0.002
R^2	0.201	0.213	0.366	0.439
N	2949	2948	2949	2948

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table F-24: Full model output for Table A-18

	KKK	APL	CM cities	violence
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ΔEPW	0.078**	0.030**	0.035***	0.063***
	(0.035)	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.021)
% exporting 1910	−0.404	−0.786***	−0.335***	−0.700
	(0.281)	(0.142)	(0.116)	(0.431)
% agricultural 1910	−0.561*	−0.732***	−0.126	−0.036
	(0.317)	(0.100)	(0.098)	(0.297)
ln pop 1910	0.330***	0.109***		
	(0.117)	(0.027)		
DV mean	0.305	0.2	0.018	-0.024
R^2	0.705	0.448	0.223	0.227
N	2948	2948	2948	2948

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table F-25: Full model output for Table A-19

	pop	% nonwhite	% immigrant	% E&S Europe
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ΔEPW $\cdot\{t = 1890\}$	-0.009	-0.041^{**}	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.029)
ΔEPW $\cdot\{t = 1900\}$	-0.006	-0.016	-0.000	-0.029
	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.029)
ΔEPW $\cdot\{t = 1920\}$	0.042^{***}	0.088^{***}	0.015^{***}	0.042^{***}
	(0.013)	(0.026)	(0.006)	(0.015)
ΔEPW $\cdot\{t = 1930\}$	0.070^{***}	0.125^{***}	0.027^{***}	0.064^{***}
	(0.020)	(0.038)	(0.010)	(0.016)
DV mean	9.656	-3.738	-3.777	-6.67
R^2	0.981	0.961	0.982	0.950
N	14659	14659	14659	14659

This table shows the regression coefficients from Figures 2 and 4. In model (1) the dependent variable is log population, in (2) the log nonwhite share of the population, in (3) the log foreign-born share of the population and in (4) the log share of the population born in Southern and Eastern Europe. All models control for the sum of non-agricultural exporting shares and the share in agriculture in 1910 interacted with year indicators. For computational reasons models are estimated using the Fixest estimation routine which does not produce estimates for control coefficients. All models include county and state-by-year fixed effects, and are weighted by the of workers used to calculate exposure to the export boom. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table G-1: Event-study effects of the export boom on population and diversity

B regression output for figures

	Mf output		Mf wages
	(1)	(2)	(3)
ΔEPW $\cdot\{t = 1880\}$	-0.046	-0.018	0.019^{**}
	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.007)
ΔEPW $\cdot\{t = 1890\}$	-0.055^{***}	-0.036^{*}	0.015^{**}
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.006)
ΔEPW $\cdot\{t = 1920\}$	0.092^{**}	0.183^{***}	0.028^{***}
	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.008)
ΔEPW $\cdot\{t = 1930\}$	0.115^{***}	0.216^{***}	0.025^{***}
	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.008)
1900 ln mf output		x	
DV mean	13.382	13.414	6.136
R^2	0.968	0.970	0.951
N	13261	13103	13245

This table shows the regression coefficients from Figure 3. In models (1) and (2) the dependent variable is log manufacturing output, in (3) log average manufacturing wages. All models control for the sum of non-agricultural exporting shares and the share in agriculture in 1910 interacted with year indicators. For computational reasons models are estimated using the Fixest estimation routine which does not produce estimates for control coefficients. Model (2) also controls for 1900 log manufacturing output interacted with year indicators. All models include county and state-by-year fixed effects, and are weighted by the of workers used to calculate exposure to the export boom. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table G-2: Event-study effects of the export boom on manufacturing

	teachers	policing	residential segregation		occupational segregation	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ΔEPW $\cdot\{t = 1900\}$	0.013	0.011	-0.000	0.002	-0.007	-0.007
	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.029)	(0.029)
ΔEPW $\cdot\{t = 1920\}$	-0.028^{***}	0.059^{***}	0.009^{***}	0.011	-0.109^{***}	-0.109^{***}
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.002)	(0.011)	(0.030)	(0.030)
ΔEPW $\cdot\{t = 1930\}$	-0.018^{**}	0.034^{**}	0.009^{***}	0.032^{***}	-0.156^{***}	-0.156^{***}
	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.002)	(0.010)	(0.042)	(0.042)
1910 ln teachers	x					
1910 ln policing		x				
Segregated group			Immigrant	Black	Immigrant	Nonwhite
DV mean	-4.724	-7.634	0.096	0.326	-7.4	-7.4
R^2	0.928	0.930	0.859	0.878	0.981	0.981
N	11705	11705	11119	9576	11581	11581

This table shows the regression coefficients from Figures 7, 8, and 9. In model (1) the dependent variable is the log share of teachers in the population, in (2) the log share employed in law enforcement, in (3) the Eriksson-Ward average immigrant residential segregation, in (4) Logan and Parman's measure of Black residential segregation, in (5) the log of immigrant occupational isolation and in (6) the log of nonwhite occupational isolation. All models control for the sum of non-agricultural exporting shares and the share in agriculture in 1910 interacted with year indicators. For computational reasons models are estimated using the Fixest estimation routine which does not produce estimates for control coefficients. Model (1) also controls for the 1910 log share of teachers interacted with year indicators, (2) controls for the 1910 log share employed in law enforcement. All models include county and state-by-year fixed effects, and are weighted by the of workers used to calculate exposure to the export boom. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table G-3: Event-study effects of the export boom on public goods and segregation

	immigrant	nonwhite
	(1)	(2)
ΔEPW $\cdot\{t = 1900\}$	-0.014	-0.001
	(0.011)	(0.022)
ΔEPW $\cdot\{t = 1920\}$	0.019^{*}	0.053^{*}
	(0.010)	(0.031)
ΔEPW $\cdot\{t = 1930\}$	0.022^{**}	0.054
	(0.010)	(0.034)
DV mean	-6.514	-8.24
R^2	0.971	0.915
N	11705	11705

This table shows the regression coefficients from Figure A-5. In model (1) the dependent variable is the log share of immigrants in managerial jobs relative to the population, in (2) the log share of nonwhite residents in managerial jobs relative to the population. All models control for the sum of non-agricultural exporting shares and the share in agriculture in 1910 interacted with year indicators. For computational reasons models are estimated using the Fixest estimation routine which does not produce estimates for control coefficients. All models include county and state-by-year fixed effects, and are weighted by the of workers used to calculate exposure to the export boom. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table G-4: Event-study effects of the export boom on immigrant and nonwhite managers

	immigrant	nonwhite
	(1)	(2)
ΔEPW · 1910 occscore Q1	0.001	0.007**
	(0.001)	(0.003)
ΔEPW · 1910 occscore Q2	0.005**	0.006**
	(0.002)	(0.002)
ΔEPW · 1910 occscore Q3	0.004***	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.003)
ΔEPW · 1910 occscore Q4	0.001	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.002)
ΔEPW · 1910 occscore Q5	0.004***	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.002)
DV mean	0.01	-0.004
R^2	0.966	0.544
N	14637	14632

This table shows the regression coefficients from Figure A-4. In model (1) the dependent variable is the individual's change in log occupational score between 1910 and 1920, in (2) the change in homeownership between 1910 and 1920. Models are restricted to native-born white adult men, aggregated to the 1910 occscore quintile-by-county level, and weighted by the number of individuals in each cell. The independent variables are the change in exports per worker interacted with the individual's quintile of the occscore distribution in 1910. All models include state-by-quintile fixed effects and control for the share in exporting industries and the share in agriculture interacted with quintile indicators. Due to the large number of controls, for computational reasons the models are estimated using the Fixest routine that does not return estimates of control coefficients. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table G-5: Effects of the export boom on residents' economic outcomes by 1910 occupational status

Table G-6: Event-study effects of the export boom on political violence

Variable	Coef.	S.E.	Variable	Coef.	S.E.
$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1890\}$	0	(0.001)	$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1916\}$	0.019	(0.014)
$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1891\}$	0.003	(0.004)	$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1917\}$	−0.022	(0.016)
$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1892\}$	0.013	(0.01)	$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1918\}$	−0.007	(0.006)
$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1893\}$	0.001	(0.001)	$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1919\}$	0.06***	(0.02)
$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1894\}$	0.012	(0.009)	$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1920\}$	0.01	(0.013)
$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1895\}$	−0.003	(0.002)	$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1921\}$	0	(0.001)
$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1896\}$	0	(0.001)	$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1922\}$	0.013	(0.009)
$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1897\}$	−0.002	(0.001)	$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1923\}$	0.015	(0.012)
$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1898\}$	−0.003	(0.002)	$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1924\}$	0.002*	(0.001)
$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1899\}$	−0.006	(0.005)	$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1925\}$	0.011	(0.01)
$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1900\}$	−0.014	(0.012)	$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1926\}$	−0.001	(0.001)
$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1901\}$	−0.018	(0.017)	$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1927\}$	−0.019	(0.016)
$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1902\}$	−0.018	(0.016)	$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1928\}$	0.013	(0.01)
$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1903\}$	0.014	(0.011)	$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1929\}$	−0.018	(0.016)
$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1904\}$	0	(0.001)	$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1930\}$	0	(0.001)
$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1905\}$	0.006	(0.006)	$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1931\}$	0.006	(0.006)
$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1906\}$	−0.014	(0.016)	$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1932\}$	0.012	(0.01)
$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1907\}$	−0.028	(0.026)	$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1933\}$	0	(0)
$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1908\}$	−0.001	(0.002)	$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1934\}$	0.01	(0.01)
$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1909\}$	0.016	(0.01)	$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1935\}$	−0.018	(0.016)
$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1910\}$	−0.008	(0.018)	$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1936\}$	0	(0)
$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1911\}$	0.008	(0.008)	$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1937\}$	0.015	(0.009)
$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1912\}$	−0.005	(0.005)	$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1938\}$	0	(0.001)
$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1913\}$	−0.002	(0.017)	$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1939\}$	−0.018	(0.016)
$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1915\}$	0.002	(0.003)	$\Delta\text{EPW} \cdot \{t = 1940\}$	0	(0)

This table shows regression coefficients from Figure 5. The dependent variable is the log number of violent incidents in that year. The model includes county and state-by-year fixed effects, and controls for the sum of exporting industry shares in 1910 and the share in agriculture in 1910 interacted with year indicators. For computational reasons the model is estimated using the Fixest estimation routine which does not produce estimates for control coefficients. $R^2 = 0.41$, $N = 150,399$. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$