



Soutenance finale

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Dataset Presentation

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EDA

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01

Dataset Presentation


Chosen dataset






Hardware In The Loop

Physical and network data from a Water Distribution Testbed, simulating water flow with real and virtual components to analyze effects of cyber and physical attacks in a 2-hour period.

Timeline of attacks




Timeline of attacks (2)



Physical sensors behavior

Scatter chart of each sensor type



02


EDA

Exploratory Data Analysis




Labels - Binary class



Density Plot of Network Dataset Labels




Density Plot of Physical Dataset Labels



Labels - Multi-class




Quick rewind to our timeline




Network features

Density Plot of Network Dataset Numerical Features




Network features (2)


Bar Plot of Network Dataset Categorical Features



Network features (3)



Physical Features (2)



03

Analysis - Network

Methods and processes



Process

- Focus on multi-class classification
- Use a StandardScaler
- Separate analysis:
 - Using full contextual information
 - Without contextual information
- Use the following metrics:
 - Accuracy
 - Recall
 - F1
 - MCC
 - Balanced accuracy
- Plot and analyse feature importance
- Same for network and physical datasets

Non-supervised Algorithms

Isolation Forest

- Without a fixed contamination rate:
 - **12505** outliers detected (5%)
 - **7695** are real anomalies
 - **61.5%** of precision
- Contamination rate at 27.5%:
 - 66k anomalies to find
 - **37940** real anomalies detected
 - **57.7%** of precision


Local Outlier Factor

- Too slow for any production use
- Contamination rate at 27.5%:
 - **30919** outliers detected (12%)
 - Only **3599** are real anomalies

Deep Learning


Neural network

- Tried multiple architectures
- Final one has:
 - 3 hidden layers (1024, 256, 64)




LSTM

- Similar results to the neural network




Classifiers - Decision Tree

With contextual information




No contextual information





Classifiers - Random Forest

With contextual information



No contextual information





04

Analysis - Physical

Methods and processes

Non-supervised Algorithms

Isolation Forest

- Without a fixed contamination rate:
 - **6177** outliers detected
 - **1180** are real anomalies
 - **19%** of precision
- Contamination rate at 16%:
 - 66k anomalies to find
 - **37940** real anomalies detected
 - **57.7%** of precision


Local Outlier Factor

- Too slow for any production use
- **71** outliers detected (12%)
- Only **24** are real anomalies

Deep Learning


Neural network

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
LSTM

- Similar results to the neural network




Classifiers - Decision Tree

With contextual information




No contextual information and with balanced classes




Classifiers - Random Forest

With contextual information and balanced classes



Classifiers - XGBoost

With contextual information and balanced classes



05

Demo

Key results & adversarial attack

06

Conclusion

Recap of results and takeaways

Conclusion



XGBoost is the best

92.3% accuracy on the network test set



Security breach

The network models would still let attacks go through if used in production, so they need to be used carefully



Adversarial Attack

We showed how easy it can be to change the data (and not the model !) and drastically confuse a model => security breach