

Semantic security

Adversary
 \mathcal{A}

$b' \in \{0,1\}$

$m_0, m_1 \in \mathcal{M}, |m_0| = |m_1|$

$c = \text{Enc}(k, m_b)$

$b \in \{0,1\}$

Challenger
 $k \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n)$

$\pi = (\text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ is **semantically secure** if $\forall \mathcal{A}$ PPT, $\exists \varepsilon(n)$ negligible such that

$$\Pr[\text{Priv}^{\text{eav}}_{\mathcal{A}, \pi}(n) = 1] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon(n) \quad \text{Priv}^{\text{eav}}_{\mathcal{A}, \pi}(n) = 1 \text{ if } b' = b \text{ and } 0 \text{ otherwise}$$

CPA-security (Chosen-Plaintext Attack)

Semantic security + Adversary
 \mathcal{A}

m'

$c' = \text{Enc}(k, m')$

Encryption Oracle
 $k \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n)$

$\pi = (\text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ is **CPA-secure** if $\forall \mathcal{A}$ PPT, $\exists \varepsilon(n)$ negligible such that

$$\Pr[\text{Priv}^{\text{cpa}}_{\mathcal{A}, \pi}(n) = 1] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon(n) \quad \text{Priv}^{\text{cpa}}_{\mathcal{A}, \pi}(n) = 1 \text{ if } b' = b \text{ and } 0 \text{ otherwise}$$

CCA-security (Chosen-Ciphertext Attack)

CPA-security + Adversary
 \mathcal{A}

$c' \neq c$

$m' = \text{Dec}(k, c')$

Decryption Oracle
 $k \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n)$

$\pi = (\text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ is **CCA-secure** if $\forall \mathcal{A}$ PPT, $\exists \varepsilon(n)$ negligible such that

$$\Pr[\text{Priv}^{\text{cca}}_{\mathcal{A}, \pi}(n) = 1] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon(n) \quad \text{Priv}^{\text{cca}}_{\mathcal{A}, \pi}(n) = 1 \text{ if } b' = b \text{ and } 0 \text{ otherwise}$$

Π semantic secure at multiple interceptions $\Rightarrow \Pi$ non-deterministic ; Π CCA-secure $\Rightarrow \Pi$ non-malleable



increased capabilities

+ multiple
interceptions /
integrations

+ adaptive
adversary

Stronger security