# Introduction to Cryptography

2. Block ciphers

Manuel – Summer 2019

Block ciphers

A *block cipher* is composed of two functions, inverse of each other:

$$E : \{0,1\}^n \times \{0,1\}^k \to \{0,1\}^n \qquad D : \{0,1\}^n \times \{0,1\}^k \to \{0,1\}^n$$
$$(P,K) \mapsto C \qquad\qquad\qquad (C,K) \mapsto P$$

where n and k are the sizes of a block and the key, respectively.

Block ciphers

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$$(P, K) \mapsto C \qquad\qquad\qquad (C, K) \mapsto P$$

where n and k are the sizes of a block and the key, respectively.

Goal: given a key K, design an invertible function E whose output cannot be distinguished from a random permutation over $\{0,1\}^n$.

m_1 m_2 m_3

E_k E_k E_k

c_1 c_2 c_3

Basic principle:

- Split the plaintext in blocks of size n

- Encrypt each block with a function E and a key K

- Electronic Code Block (ECB) mode

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E_k E_k E_k

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
- Electronic Code Block (ECB) mode

Limitation: what if a block is repeated several times over the message?

Basic principle:

- Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
- Most commonly used mode
- Uses an Initialization Vector
- Can it be parallelized?

Basic principle:

- CTR stands for counter

- The counter acts like an IV

- The E_K function randomizes the counter

- Can be run in parallel

What is randomness?


```
int getRandomNumber()
{
    return 4;  // chosen by fair dice roll.
               // guaranteed to be random.
}
```

Definition (Kolmogorov randomness)

Let x be a string.

- We say that x is *random* if and only if it is not shorter than any program that can produce it in any language.

- The *entropy* of x is the minimum number of bits necessary to describe x.

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Remark.
A random string of length k cannot be compressed in any way, therefore it has entropy k

Example.
3434 3434 3434 3434 3434 3434 3434 3434
ed71 b38f 4316 6907 a8ea 75d3 c141 735f

Generating true randomness is not simple:

- Toss a coin

- Measure physical phenomena that are expected to be random

- In case of a lack of entropy the output is blocked

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- Toss a coin

- Measure physical phenomena that are expected to be random

- In case of a lack of entropy the output is blocked

Example.
The thermal noise from a semiconductor resistor
A nuclear decay radiation source measured by a Geiger counter

Random function from the C standard:

```
1  /*  Linear congruential generator */
2  static unsigned long next = 1;
3
4  /* RAND_MAX assumed to be 32767 */
5  int rand(void) {
6    next = next * 1103515245 + 12345;
7    return((unsigned)(next/65536) % 32768);
8  }
9
10 void srand(unsigned int seed) {
11   next = seed;
12 }
```

A secure method from Blum, Blum and Shub:

1. Generate two large primes p and q, both being 3 mod 4

2. Set $n = pq$

3. Choose a random integer x coprime to n

4. Define

$$\begin{cases} x_0 & \equiv \ x^2 \bmod n \\ x_{i+1} & \equiv \ x_i^2 \bmod n \end{cases}$$

5. At each iteration select the least significant bit of x_i

Why is BBS secure?

Can bits generated using BBS be predicted?

Problem (Quadratic Residuosity (QR))

Let $n = pq$ be the product of two primes. Given an integer y, is it a square mod n, i.e. is there an x such that $x^2 \equiv y \bmod n$?

This loose formulation will be refined in the next chapter (3.32).

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This loose formulation will be refined in the next chapter (3.32).

Strategy:

- Prove that the QR problem is hard

- If this is hard the previous bit cannot be predicted

- A sequence a pseudo-random bits generated by BBS cannot be compressed

In order to prove that the QR problem is hard we first recall and prove few results from number theory. The goal is to prove that solving the QR problem is as hard as factoring. That is, knowing how to solve one implies knowing how to solve the other one.

Theorem (Fermat's little theorem)

Let $p \in \mathbb{N}$ and $a \in \mathbb{Z}$. If p is prime and $p \nmid a$, then

$$a^{p-1} \equiv 1 \bmod p.$$

More generally, for any $p \in \mathbb{N}$ and $a \in \mathbb{Z}$,

$$a^p \equiv a \bmod p.$$

Lemma

If $p \equiv 3 \bmod 4$ is prime, then the equation $x^2 \equiv -1 \bmod p$ has no solution.

Proof.
Suppose such an x exists. Then raising it to the power of $(p-1)/2$ and applying Fermat's little theorem (2.13) yields

$$\left(x^2\right)^{\frac{p-1}{2}} \equiv x^{p-1} \equiv 1 \bmod p.$$

On the other hand $p \equiv 3 \bmod 4$, implies $(p-1)/2$ odd and

$$(-1)^{\frac{p-1}{2}} \equiv -1 \bmod p. \notzero$$

□

Proposition

Let $p \equiv 3 \bmod 4$ be a prime, y be an integer and $x \equiv y^{\frac{p+1}{4}} \bmod p$.

- If y has a square root mod p, then its square roots are $\pm x \bmod p$

- If y has no square root mod p, then the square roots of $-y$ are $\pm x \bmod p$

Proof.
The case $y \equiv 0 \bmod p$ being trivial, we assume $y \not\equiv 0 \bmod p$.
Applying Fermat's little theorem (2.13) we get

$$x^4 \equiv y^{p+1} \equiv y^2 y^{p-1} \equiv y^2 \bmod p. \tag{2.1}$$

Proof (continued).

Since p is prime all the non zero elements have a multiplicative inverse (prop. 1.33). Therefore rewriting eq. (2.1) into

$$(x^2 - y)(x^2 + y) \equiv 0 \bmod p,$$

implies $x^2 \equiv \pm y \bmod p$. Hence at least one of y and $-y$ is a square mod p.

Suppose that both y and $-y$ are square mod p, i.e. there exist a and b such that $y \equiv a^2 \bmod p$ and $-y \equiv b^2 \bmod p$.

Then $\left(b^{-1}a\right)^2 \equiv -1 \bmod p$, that is -1 is a square mod p, contradicting lem. 2.14$_{\not\;}$.

Hence exactly one of y and $-y$ has square roots $\pm x \bmod p$.

$\square$

Keeping in mind the initial goal of studying the BBS generator where the squares are computed mod $n = pq$, with both p and q congruent to 3 modulo 4, we recall the following result.

Theorem (Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT))

Let $m_1, \ldots, m_k \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{0\}$ be pairwise relatively prime and $a_1, \ldots, a_k \in \mathbb{Z}$. Then the system of congruences

$$\begin{cases} x & \equiv & a_1 \bmod m_1, \\ x & \equiv & a_2 \bmod m_2, \\ & \vdots & \\ x & \equiv & a_n \bmod m_k. \end{cases}$$

has a unique solution modulo $m = m_1 m_2 \ldots m_k$.

Square roots for a composite modulus

Example.
Find x such that $x^2 \equiv 71 \bmod 77$.

As $77 = 7 \times 11$, the congruency can be rewritten

$$\begin{cases} x^2 \equiv 71 \equiv 1 \bmod 7 \\ x^2 \equiv 71 \equiv 5 \bmod 11. \end{cases}$$

As both 7 and 11 and 3 mod 4, from prop. 2.15 we derive

$$\begin{cases} x \equiv \pm 1 \bmod 7 \\ x \equiv \pm 4 \bmod 11. \end{cases}$$

Finally, by applying the CRT (2.17) the four solutions can be recombined modulo 77 such as to get

$$x \equiv \pm 15, \ \pm 29 \bmod 77.$$

From square roots to factors

In the previous example we used the factorisation of n in order to calculate the square root of x modulo n. We now show that if we know the square root then we can factorize n.

Proposition

Let n be a product of two unknown primes p and q, both being 3 mod 4. Let $x \equiv \pm a,\ \pm b \bmod n$ be the four solutions to $x^2 \equiv y \bmod n$. Then $\gcd(a - b, n)$ is a non-trivial factor of n.

Proof.
From the construction of a and b, we know that $a \equiv b \bmod p$ and $a \equiv -b \bmod q$ (or the other way around). Therefore $p | (a - b)$ while $q \nmid (a - b)$, which means that $\gcd(a - b, n) = p$. $\qquad\square$

Remarks on the BBS generator

We showed that:

- Solving the factorization problem allows to solve the QR problem

- Solving the QR problem gives the factorization of the modulus

The previous reasoning is:

- Not a formal security reduction

- Enough to "informally" consider BBS as a secure pseudo-random number generator

A few informal definitions:

- A *random oracle* is a "black box" that returns a truly uniform random output on an input. Submitting the same input more than once leads to the same output.

- A *pseudorandom function* is a function that emulates a random oracle

- A pseudorandom function that cannot be distinguished from a random permutation is called *pseudo random permutation*

- A *blockcipher* is a pseudorandom permutation

- A *one way function* is a function easy to evaluate but hard to invert

Basic Feistel network

We want to build a random bijection over $2n$ bits

- Size of a block: $2n$ bits

- Split the block into two blocks of n bits each

- $F : \{0,1\}^n \times \{0,1\}^k \to \{0,1\}^n$

We define the function

$$\Psi_F : \{0,1\}^{2n} \longrightarrow \{0,1\}^{2n}$$
$$[L, R] \longmapsto [R, L \oplus F(R, K)]$$

Proposition

For any function F, Ψ_F is a bijection and $\Psi_F^{-1} = \sigma \circ \Psi_F \circ \sigma$, with
$$\sigma : \{0,1\}^{2n} \longrightarrow \{0,1\}^{2n}$$
$$[L, R] \longmapsto [R, L]$$

Proof.
By definition of Ψ_F, $\Psi_F([L_0, R_0]) = [R_0, L_0 \oplus F(R_0, K)] = [L_1, R_1]$.
Equivalently,
$$\begin{cases} R_0 &=& L_1 \\ L_0 &=& R_1 \oplus F(L_1, K). \end{cases}$$

Moreover
$$\begin{aligned}
\sigma \circ \Psi_F \circ \sigma([L_1, R_1]) &= \sigma \circ \Psi_F \circ \sigma([R_0, L_0 \oplus F(R_0, K)]) \\
&= \sigma\left(\Psi_F([L_0 \oplus F(R_0, K), R_0])\right) \\
&= \sigma\left(R_0, L_0 \oplus F(R_0, K) \oplus F(R_0, K)\right) \\
&= [L_0, R_0].
\end{aligned}$$
$\square$

Setting up two black boxes, a random oracle and a Feistel network, the goal for an attacher is to distinguish them.

Setting up two black boxes, a random oracle and a Feistel network, the goal for an attacher is to distinguish them.

Number of messages necessary to reach the goal:

| Rounds	KPA	CPA	CPCA
1	1	1	1
2	$\mathcal{O}\left(\sqrt{2^n}\right)$	2	2
3	$\mathcal{O}\left(\sqrt{2^n}\right)$	$\mathcal{O}\left(\sqrt{2^n}\right)$	3
4	$\mathcal{O}\left(2^n\right)$	$\mathcal{O}\left(\sqrt{2^n}\right)$	$\mathcal{O}\left(\sqrt{2^n}\right)$

Two rounds – CPA

Attack strategy:

- For simplicity we denote $F(X, K)$ by $F_k(X)$ and $\Psi_{F_{k_2}} \circ \Psi_{F_{K_1}}$ by $\Psi^2_{F_{K_1}, F_{K_2}}$

- $\Psi^2_{F_{K_1}, F_{K_2}}\left([L_0, R_0]\right) = [L_2, R_2]$ with $L_2 = L_0 \oplus F_{K_1}(R_0)$ and $R_2 = R_0 \oplus F_{K_2}(L_2)$

- The inverse of $\Psi^2_{F_{K_1}, F_{K_2}}$ is

$$\Psi^{-2}_{F_{K_1}, F_{K_2}} = \Psi^{-1}_{F_{K_1}} \circ \Psi^{-1}_{F_{K_2}}$$
$$= \sigma \circ \Psi_{F_{K_1}} \circ \sigma \circ \sigma \circ \Psi_{F_{K_2}} \circ \sigma$$
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- $\Psi^2_{F_{K_1}, F_{K_2}}([L_0, R_0]) = [L_2, R_2]$ with $L_2 = L_0 \oplus F_{K_1}(R_0)$ and $R_2 = R_0 \oplus F_{K_2}(L_2)$

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$$= \sigma \circ \Psi^2_{F_{K_2}, F_{K_1}} \circ \sigma$$

What if we use $m_1 = [m_{1_L}, m_{1_R}]$ and $m_2 = [m_{2_L}, m_{2_R}]$ such that

$$\begin{cases} m_{1_L} \neq m_{2_L} \\ m_{1_R} = m_{2_R} \end{cases}$$

Basic KPA strategy:

1. Find a collision over the m_{i_R}, $1 \leq i \leq 2^n$

2. If a collision is found for m_j and m_l check if

$$m_{j_{L_2}} \oplus m_{l_{L_2}} = m_{j_{L_0}} \oplus m_{l_{L_0}}$$

Basic KPA strategy:

1. Find a collision over the m_{i_R}, $1 \leq i \leq 2^n$

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$$m_{j_{L_2}} \oplus m_{l_{L_2}} = m_{j_{L_0}} \oplus m_{l_{L_0}}$$

By the birthday paradox (slide 4.11):

- Number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs needed: $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{2^n})$

- No better than $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{2^n})$:
  - Collision on $m_{i_{L_2}} = m_{i_{L_0}} \oplus F_{K_1}(m_{i_{R_0}})$ for two messages
  - The variables $m_{i_{L_2}}$, $m_{i_{L_0}}$, and $m_{i_{R_0}}$ are fixed
  - It only depends on F_{K_1}, which can take 2^n different values
  - From l messages $\frac{l(l-1)}{2}$ pairs can be constructed
  - Probability of collision: $\approx \frac{l(l-1)}{2 \cdot 2^n}$

Attack strategy:

- $\Psi^3_{F_{k_1}, F_{k_2}, F_{k_3}}([L_0, R_0]) = [L_3, R_3]$ with

$$\begin{cases} L_3 = R_0 \oplus F_{K_2}(L_2) \\ R_3 = L_2 \oplus F_{K_3}(L_3) \end{cases}$$

and $L_2 = L_0 \oplus F_{K_1}(R_0)$

- Notice for a pair of messages (m_a, m_b)

$$m_{a_{R_0}} = m_{b_{R_0}} \Leftrightarrow m_{a_{L_2}} \oplus m_{b_{L_2}} = m_{a_{L_0}} \oplus m_{b_{L_0}}$$

$$m_{a_{L_2}} = m_{b_{L_2}} \Leftrightarrow m_{a_{L_3}} \oplus m_{b_{L_3}} = m_{a_{R_0}} \oplus m_{b_{R_0}} \quad (2.2)$$

$$m_{a_{L_3}} = m_{b_{L_3}} \Leftrightarrow m_{a_{R_3}} \oplus m_{b_{R_3}} = m_{a_{L_2}} \oplus m_{b_{L_2}}$$

Attack strategy:

- Choose two plaintexts m_1 and m_2 such that $m_{2_{R_0}} = m_{1_{R_0}}$

- Choose a ciphertext c_3 such that $m_{3_{L_3}} = m_{2_{L_3}}$

- From the third equation of (2.2)

  $$m_{3_{R_3}} \oplus m_{2_{R_3}} = m_{3_{L_2}} \oplus m_{2_{L_2}}$$

- Using the first equation of (2.2) enforce $m_{3_{L_2}}$ to be $m_{1_{L_2}}$

  $$m_{3_{R_3}} = m_{2_{R_3}} \oplus m_{1_{L_0}} \oplus m_{2_{L_0}}$$

- How to conclude?

Data Encryption Standard (DES):

- 1974: IBM uses Feistel networks to create LUCIFER

- 1975: LUCIFER is sent to NSA for review and modifications

- 1977: renamed DES and becomes the official encryption standard

- 2002: DES is not secure anymore and is replaced by AES

Advanced Encryption Standard

Advanced Encryption Standard (AES):

- 1997: call for candidates to replace DES
- Requirements:
  - Possible key sizes: 128, 192 and 256 bits
  - Input block size: 128 bits
  - Work on various hardware (e.g. 8-bit processors)
  - Speed
- Five finalists: MARS, RC6, Rijndael, Serpent, and Twofish
- 2001: Rijndael is chosen to become AES

AES – General description

Brief outline of AES:

- 10 rounds for a 128-bit key (12 and 14 for 192 and 256-bit)

- A round is formed of layers

  - *SubBytes*: substitution operation

  - *ShiftRows*: linear mixing step on the rows

  - *MixColumns*: linear mixing on the columns

  - *AddRoundKey*: apply a round key derived from the main key

AES – Encryption

Plaintext

AddRoundKey

SubBytes

ShiftRows

MixColumns

AddRoundKey

Rounds 1 to 9

SubBytes

ShiftRows

AddRoundKey

Round 10

Ciphertext

AES setup:

- The 128 bits are grouped into 16 bytes

- Each byte is composed of 8 bits:

$$a_{0,0}, a_{1,0}, a_{2,0}, a_{3,0}, a_{1,1}, \cdots, a_{3,3}$$

- Bits are arranged in a 4×4 matrix:

$$\begin{bmatrix} a_{0,0} & a_{0,1} & a_{0,2} & a_{0,3} \\ a_{1,0} & a_{1,1} & a_{1,2} & a_{1,3} \\ a_{2,0} & a_{2,1} & a_{2,2} & a_{2,3} \\ a_{3,0} & a_{3,1} & a_{3,2} & a_{3,3} \end{bmatrix}$$

Invertible elements

So far we worked with the set $S = \{0, \cdots, n-1\}$ using modular congruences (def. 1.19). In the proof of prop. 2.15 we noted that when n is prime all the non-zero elements of S are invertible.

Example.

(i) The set $S = \{0, \cdots, 4\}$ has five elements, and since five is prime all the non-zero elements are invertible. Indeed,

$$1 \cdot 1 \equiv 1 \bmod 5, \ 2 \cdot 3 = 6 \equiv 1 \bmod 5, \text{ and } 4^2 = 16 \equiv 1 \bmod 5.$$

(ii) The set $S = \{0, \cdots, 5\}$ has six elements, and as six is not prime some non-zero elements are not invertible. In fact since

$$2 \cdot 3 = 6 \equiv 0 \bmod 6,$$

we conclude that 2 and 3 are not invertible mod 6.

Loosely speaking a set where the addition and multiplication operations are defined and such that every non-zero element is invertible for the multiplication is called a *field*.

When a field has a finite number of elements it is called *finite field*. For each prime p and positive integer n there exists a finite field with p^n elements, often denoted $GF(p^n)$ or $\mathbb{F}_{p^n}$ (GF standing for Galois Field).
Remark.
The set $S = \{0, \cdots, 8\}$ has $9 = 3^2$ elements and is not a field since 3 is not invertible. Therefore the question remaining to answer is "how to construct a finite field with nine elements", or more generally with p^n elements.

Polynomials over finite fields

Similarly to how polynomials are defined over common fields such as the real numbers, they can also be defined over finite fields. The main difference relies on their coefficients which take their values in the base field.

In a field, a polynomial which cannot be written as the product of two polynomials of lower degree is said to be *irreducible*.

Example.

ⅰ In $\mathbb{F}_2[X]$, $X^2 + 3X + 1$ and $X^2 + X + 1$ are equal.

ⅱ In $\mathbb{F}_5[X]$, $X^3 + X + 3 = (X + 4)(X^2 + X + 2)$ is not irreducible.

ⅲ In $\mathbb{F}_{17}[X]$, $X^3 + X + 3$ is irreducible.

Theorem

Let $P(X)$ be an irreducible polynomial of degree n in $\mathbb{F}_p[X]$, and F be the set of all the polynomials of degree less than n. Then F is a finite field with p^n elements.

Proof.

Assuming addition and multiplication are properly defined we need to prove that F has p^n elements and that all but 0 are invertible.

It is simple to see that F has p^n elements since each of the n monomials (from degree 0 to $n-1$) can take p different values (from 0 to $p-1$).

Non-prime fields

Proof (continued).

Let $A(X)$, $B(X)$ and $C(X)$ be three distinct non-zero polynomials such that

$$A(X)B(X) \equiv A(X)C(X) \bmod P(X).$$

This implies $A(X)\left(B(X) - C(X)\right) \equiv 0 \bmod P(X)$, which is not possible since $P(X)$ is irreducible.

Hence multiplying a polynomial $A(X)$ by all the non-zero elements of F results in covering all the non-zero polynomials of F, meaning that there is a polynomial $B(X)$ such that

$$A(X)B(X) \equiv 1 \bmod P(X).$$

□

In Rijndael $\mathbb{F}_{2^8}$ is used:

- $P(X) = X^8 + X^4 + X^3 + X + 1$ is the irreducible over $\mathbb{F}_2[X]$
- Each element of $\mathbb{F}_{2^8}$ is a polynomial of the form

$$a_7X^7 + a_6X^6 + a_5X^5 + a_4X^4 + a_3X^3 + a_2X^2 + a_1X + a_0$$

- The polynomial is described as a byte $a_7a_6a_5a_4a_3a_2a_1a_0$
- The sum of two polynomials is the XOR of their bit representation

Finite fields in the AES

In Rijndael $\mathbb{F}_{2^8}$ is used:

- $P(X) = X^8 + X^4 + X^3 + X + 1$ is the irreducible over $\mathbb{F}_2[X]$
- Each element of $\mathbb{F}_{2^8}$ is a polynomial of the form

$$a_7 X^7 + a_6 X^6 + a_5 X^5 + a_4 X^4 + a_3 X^3 + a_2 X^2 + a_1 X + a_0$$

- The polynomial is described as a byte $a_7 a_6 a_5 a_4 a_3 a_2 a_1 a_0$
- The sum of two polynomials is the XOR of their bit representation
- Multiplying a polynomial $Q(X)$ by X:
    1. Shift left the byte representation of $Q(X)$ and append a 0
    2. If the first bit is 0 stop and otherwise XOR with $P(X)$
- Multiplying $Q(X)$ by $R(X)$:
    1. Split $R(X)$ into the monomials $M_i(X)$, $i \leq \deg R(X)$
    2. For $M_i(X)$ applying the multiplication by X $\deg M_i(X)$ times
    3. Add all the results using XOR

Example.

Let $Q(X) = X^7 + X^4 + X + 1$ and $R(X) = X^2 + 1$. Determine the product $Q(X)R(X)$ in $\mathbb{F}_{2^8}[X]$.

1. Regular strategy: multiply and reduce mod $P(X)$

- $Q(X)R(X) = X^9 + X^7 + X^6 + X^4 + X^3 + X^2 + X + 1$

- Since $P(X) = 0$, $X^9 = X^5 + X^4 + X^2 + X$ and

$$Q(X)R(X) \equiv X^7 + X^6 + X^5 + X^3 + 1 \bmod P(X)$$

2. Represent polynomials as bytes and apply XOR operations:

Write $Q(X) = 10010011$ and decompose $R(X)$ as $X \cdot X + 1$

- $Q(X) \cdot X = 100100110 \oplus 100011011 = 000111101$

- $(Q(X) \cdot X) \cdot X = 001111010$

- $(Q(X) \cdot X) \cdot X + Q(X) = 01111010 \oplus 10010011 = 11101001$

- $Q(X)R(X) \equiv X^7 + X^6 + X^5 + X^3 + 1 \bmod P(X)$

For each byte in the matrix:

- Split it into two 4-bit numbers a and b
- Find byte c in the S-Box table at row a and column b
- Replace the original byte by c

S-Box

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
0	99	124	119	123	242	107	111	197	48	1	103	43	254	215	171	118
1	202	130	201	125	250	89	71	240	173	212	162	175	156	164	114	192
2	183	253	147	38	54	63	247	204	52	165	229	241	113	216	49	21
3	4	199	35	195	24	150	5	154	7	18	128	226	235	39	178	117
4	9	131	44	26	27	110	90	160	82	59	214	179	41	227	47	132
5	83	209	0	237	32	252	177	91	106	203	190	57	74	76	88	207
6	208	239	170	251	67	77	51	133	69	249	2	127	80	60	159	168
7	81	163	64	143	146	157	56	245	188	182	218	33	16	255	243	210
8	205	12	19	236	95	151	68	23	196	167	126	61	100	93	25	115
9	96	129	79	220	34	42	144	136	70	238	184	20	222	94	11	219
10	224	50	58	10	73	6	36	92	194	211	172	98	145	149	228	121
11	231	200	55	109	141	213	78	169	108	86	244	234	101	122	174	8
12	186	120	37	46	28	166	180	198	232	221	116	31	75	189	139	138
13	112	62	181	102	72	3	246	14	97	53	87	185	134	193	29	158
14	225	248	152	17	105	217	142	148	155	30	135	233	206	85	40	223
15	140	161	137	13	191	230	66	104	65	153	45	15	176	84	187	22

Generating the S-Box

Simple construction:

- For a in $\mathbb{F}_{2^8}^*$ compute its inverse $b = a^{-1}$ or set $b = 0$ if $a = 0$

- Represent b as a column vector $B = (b_0, \cdots, b_7)$

- Compute

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} b_0 \\ b_1 \\ b_2 \\ b_3 \\ b_4 \\ b_5 \\ b_6 \\ b_7 \end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} c_0 \\ c_1 \\ c_2 \\ c_3 \\ c_4 \\ c_5 \\ c_6 \\ c_7 \end{pmatrix}$$

- The entry located at row $(a_7 \cdots a_4)_2$ and column $(a_3 \cdots a_0)_2$ of the S-Box is $(c_7 \cdots c_0)_2$

Example.
Find the S-Box entry corresponding to the byte 11001011?

Example.

Find the S-Box entry corresponding to the byte 11001011?

The byte 11001011 stands for $a(X) = X^7 + X^6 + X^3 + X + 1$, and we observe that

$$a(X) \cdot X^2 = X^9 + X^8 + X^5 + X^3 + X^2$$
$$\equiv X^8 + X^4 + X^3 + X \bmod P(X)$$
$$\equiv 1 \bmod P(X).$$

Therefore we calculate

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix},$$

and finally conclude that the entry at row 12 and column 11 is 31.

The ShiftRows layer

Cyclically shift to the left row i by offset i, $0 \leq i \leq 3$

The MixColumns layer

Left multiply the output of ShiftRows by the matrix

$$C(X) = \begin{pmatrix} 00000010 & 00000011 & 00000001 & 00000001 \\ 00000001 & 00000010 & 00000011 & 00000001 \\ 00000001 & 00000001 & 00000010 & 00000011 \\ 00000011 & 00000001 & 00000001 & 00000010 \end{pmatrix}$$

The AddRoundKey layer

Combine each byte from the MixColumns output with a byte from the round key

The original 128 bits key is arranged into a 4×4 matrix $K(X)$

Label the first four columns $K(0), \cdots, K(3)$ and add forty more:

- $K(i) = K(i-4) \oplus K(i-1)$, for $i \not\equiv 0 \bmod 4$
- $K(i) = K(i-4) \oplus T(K(i-1))$, for $i \equiv 0 \bmod 4$

Generating a round key

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The transformation $T(K(i-1))$ is defined over the column i:

- Compute $r(i) = 00000010^{\frac{i-4}{4}}$
- Cyclically top shift the elements of the column by 1
- Apply the SubBytes layer (2.42) to each byte of the column and get the column vector (a, b, c, d)
- Finally return the column vector

$$T(K(i-1)) = (a \oplus r(i), b, c, d)$$

Generating a round key

The original 128 bits key is arranged into a 4×4 matrix $K(X)$

Label the first four columns $K(0), \cdots, K(3)$ and add forty more:

- $K(i) = K(i-4) \oplus K(i-1)$, for $i \not\equiv 0 \bmod 4$
- $K(i) = K(i-4) \oplus T(K(i-1))$, for $i \equiv 0 \bmod 4$

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- Finally return the column vector

$$T(K(i-1)) = (a \oplus r(i), b, c, d)$$

The i-th round key is given by the columns $K(4i), \cdots, K(4i+3)$

Example.
$K(i)$ being simple to generate for $i \not\equiv 0 \bmod 4$, we focus on the case $i \equiv 0 \bmod 4$. For instance if $i = 40$ and $K(39)$ is the column vector $(10001100, 00001100, 11000110, 11110011)$, then

- Cyclical top shit: $(00001100, 11000110, 11110011, 10001100)$

- SubBytes transformation:

$$00001100 \quad \rightarrow \quad 11111110, \quad 11000110 \quad \rightarrow \quad 10110100$$
$$11110011 \quad \rightarrow \quad 00001101, \quad 10001100 \quad \rightarrow \quad 01100100$$

- $r(40) = X^9 \equiv X^5 + X^4 + X^2 + X \bmod P(X) = 00110110$

- Get the final column vector $T(K(39))$

$$T(K(39)) = (11111110 \oplus 00110110, 10110100, 00001101, 01100100)$$
$$= (11001000, 10110100, 00001101, 01100100)$$

- Finally define $K(40)$ as $K(36) \oplus T(K(39))$

The decryption process is simple:

- Perform all the operations in reverse order

- Replace the SubBytes, ShitRows and MixColumns operations by their inverse

Remark.
It is possible to construct an inverse cipher performing decryption by applying a sequence of inverse operations in the same order as it is done for encryption

Key points

- What does it mean to be random?

- Recall Fermat's little theorem

- Recall the CRT

- How is a Feistel network organised?

- Describe AES

Thank you!

2.4 `https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/56/Tux.jpg`

2.4 `https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f0/Tux_ecb.jpg`

2.4 `https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a0/Tux_secure.jpg`

2.7 `https://www.xkcd.com/221/`