Quant. Comp. HW - 2

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1 Simon's Problem

- (a) There are 128 possible outputs
- (b) See attached source code:

67866407927622586744034130520498283665

- (c) I reported an average of 152 trials
- (d) For the first query there are $(1/2)*2^n = 2^{n-1}$ possible outputs, since only half will dot with a to zero. All of these except zero will be LI, so there are $2^{n-1}-1$ valid strings, making the probability on the first try $(2^{n-1}-1)/2^{n-1}$ and so the number of queries is $2^{n-1}/(2^{n-1}-1)$. For the next string, the only LD vectors are 0 and the previous one, so the expected number of queries for the second string is $2^{n-1}/(2^{n-1}-2)$. So, at each stage, the number of valid strings is $2^{n-1}-(numPrevStrings+1)$, so for the last string it should be $2^{n-1}/(2^{n-1}-2^{n-2})=2^{n-1}/2^{n-2}=2$

2 Modular Exponentiation

Here was my python code:

def successive_squaring(base, exponent, modulus):
 e = 1
 vals = {}

```
while e <= exponent:
                   sq = str(pow(base, e, modulus))
                  vals[e] = sq
                  print base , "^" , e, " " , sq
                 e *= 2
         ex = exponent
         keys = sorted(vals)
         print keys
         i = len(keys)-1
         total = 1
         while ex > 1:
                  k = keys[i]
                  i -= 1
                  if ex - k < 0:
                           continue
                  else:
                            total = (total*int(vals[k])) % modulus
                            ex -= k
          print total
successive_squaring(1234, 1234*1234, int(math.pow(10,10)))
And the output was:
                          3102217216.0
```

3 RSA Misuse

I first tried to solve this as strictly a math problem, but had little success, in large part because I thought that the gcd(e1, e2) was somehow irrelevant to the problem. However, I noticed that normally the exponents are the same value when performing RSA, so I scoured google to see if there was some well known attack where you have a common modulus with different attacks. Turns out that it is fairly well documented, and Simmons wrote a paper on it a while back.

The basic idea is: Since

$$qcd(e_1, e_2) = 1$$

, then

$$\exists u, v \ s.t. \ e_1 * u + e_2 * v = 1$$

To solve for u and v, I used the extended Euclidean algorithm. I then raise each side to u and v

$$c1^{u} = (M^{e1})^{u} mod \ n$$

$$c2^{v} = (M^{e2})^{v} mod \ n$$

$$c1^{u} * c2^{v} = (M^{e1})^{u} * (M^{e2})^{v} mod \ n = M^{e1*u + e2*v} mod \ n = M mod \ n$$

Because my modular exponentiation code can't handle negatives, note that $c2^{-v^{-1}} \mod n = c2^{n+v} \mod n$ Using my attached code, I computed

 $3212790810508942120998734201487211474076472537783700137\\22534356594819460385825586617211817817458902529441531$

4 Prime factorization

Problem: Consider n=121932632103337941464563328643500519

(a) How many bits is n?

print len(str(121932632103337941464563328643500519))

Output:

36

(b) Find if n is prime with program that runs in less than one second.

```
def miller_rabin_pass(a, s, d, n):
    a_to_power = pow(a, d, n)
    if a_to_power == 1:
        return True
    for i in xrange(s-1):
        if a_to_power == n - 1:
        return True
```

```
a_to_power = (a_to_power * a_to_power) % n
        return a_to_power == n - 1
def miller_rabin(n):
        #compute s and d
         d = n - 1
         s = 0
        while d \% 2 == 0:
                   d >>= 1
                   s += 1
         #Run several miller_rabin passes
         for repeat in xrange(20):
                    a = randint(2, n-1)
                    if not miller_rabin_pass(a, s, d, n):
                              return False
         return True
print miller_rabin(n)
                              False
   (c) Simple trial divisions only need to try up to sqrtn in the worst case.
So
   (d)
   (e) See attached code
             123456789987654353
                                   987654321123456823
```