



Zero-Knowledge Proofs in the Wild

Anna Kaplan

29/10/19 @ ZKProof community event



ZKPs

Signatures

Encryption



Signatures

Encryption

ZKPs

The background of the slide is a photograph of a garden. In the upper left, there are green, leafy plants. In the center, a red watering can is partially visible, and a black hose with a silver nozzle lies on the dark brown soil. To the right, a large, bright yellow leaf is prominent. The overall scene is slightly out of focus, with the text overlaid in white.

Industry


Practitioner

**Protocols using
ZKPs**


**Protocols using
Signatures**

**Protocols using
Encryption**

Privacy Pass



Audit Logs on Blockchain



Universally Composable and Privacy-Preserving




Privacy Pass

**Work by Alex Davidson, Ian Goldberg, Nick Sullivan, George
Tankersley, and Filippo Valsorda, 2018**

<https://privacypass.github.io/>


What was the problem?

- Developed by  **CLOUDFLARE**[®]
- Cloudflare needs to prevent malicious attacks, e.g. comment spam or SQL attacks, from the web
- Cloudflare does this through **IP reputation** assessment
- How to know that's a “good” IP address? I have a great solution for you!

Select all images with a

bus

Click verify once there are none left.



VERIFY

Screenshot by
me, 29.10.2019




Why can't I read that?
Am I a robot?

Failing a CAPTCHA three times because I
couldn't tell what is and isn't a street sign




**MRW I ENTER THE CORRECT CAPTCHA
FOR THE THIRD TIME AND IT STILL SAYS I'M WRONG**



MAKE REACTION GIFS AT MEMECENTER.COM

What was the problem?

- Developed by  **CLOUDFLARE**
- Cloudflare needs to prevent malicious attacks, e.g. comment spam or SQL attacks, from the web
- Cloudflare does this through **IP reputation** assessment
- Those who are privacy conscious are mostly affected by CAPTCHAs!
- When you solve the CAPTCHA, you get a 🍪 - but when you don't want to be followed around you solve endless CAPTCHAs.



Idea: “Modernized Ecash” with no cash involved

- Idea based on **Ecash (Chaum 1983)**:

- You take a token, blind it, get a blind signature
- Issuance and Redemption are unlinkable



- After Real World Crypto 2016: How to apply the idea of **blinded signatures to not always having to solve CAPTCHAs?**
 - Filippo Valsorda and George Tankersley came up with first specification for a blinded token to be issued when a CAPTCHA is solved, and can be redeemed later
 - Take a token, blind it, send it to Cloudflare with CAPTCHA solution, get a blind signature in response, which you can later redeem
 - These are unlinkable for Cloudflare

Idea: “Modernized Ecash” with no cash involved

Token →
blind it



Blind Token

Blind Signature

Make digital
signature

Mint private
key 🔑



Issuance

Validate



Token, Signature

Mint public
key



Redemption

Cryptography toolbox

- Problem: Ecash was based on RSA. 1980s cryptography is slow!
- At PETS 2016, Davidson, Tankersley, and Valsorda asked for help and Dan Boneh mentioned EC-OPRFs.
- OPRF: Oblivious Pseudo-Random Function
- **Batched Elliptic Curve VOPRF with redemption** (Tankersley)
 - Multiple simultaneous OPRFs based on Elliptic Curve multiplication
 - VRF-like public verification
 - Batched validation for more efficiency
- **VOPRFs**  **Ecash**: Ecash is publicly verifiable  VOPRFs only verifiable in the redemption phase by the issuer

Where do ZKPs come into play?

- EC-VOPRFs use a **Discrete Log Equivalence Proof**
 - Short ZKP that two pairs of points have the same Discrete Log, denounced **DLEQ(P:R == Q:S)**.

Idea: “Modernized Ecash” with no cash involved

Token →
blind it



Blind Token, solved CAPTCHA

Blind Signature

Make digital
signature

Mint private
key



Issuance

Validate

Token, Signature

Mint public
key




Redemption




How does it work?

From Sullivan, 2nd ZKProof Workshop, 2019



Issuance



Redemption

Current state and other ideas to think about

- Privacy Pass exists as an extension and Firefox or Chrome
- **Problems:**
 - Double-spending
 - Solution could be time sharding
- **Other ideas to use this idea:**
 - Anonymous session resumption for TLS
 - Anonymous referral code mechanism (e.g. discount codes) - used in Brave browser for ads
 - Single bit ZKP (e.g. Am I over 18?)




Privacy Pass - another take!

<https://privatestorage.io/>

What happened?

- Least Authority and Private Internet Access announce PrivateStorage (privacy focused VPN provider)
- PrivacyStorage is private, secure and end-to-end encrypted cloud storage solution, based on Least Authority's Tahoe-LAFS
- For a more robust access control method and controlling reasons, traditional accounting or subscription systems did not suit the desired privacy property
- Private Storage therefore implements **Zero Knowledge Access Passes (ZKAPs)** as a variation of Privacy Pass



ZKAPs -> PrivateStorage

In order to better address the access-control issue in our development of the PrivateStorage service, we are implementing **Zero Knowledge Access Passes (ZKAPs)**. For ZKAPs, we have designed a variation of Privacy Pass, a zero knowledge cryptographic protocol, to facilitate access-control to our Tahoe-LAFS storage servers. For our PrivateStorage implementation, we are using the Privacy Pass zero-knowledge proofs—along with proof-of-payment, instead of proof-of-humanness—as with the original implementation. By integrating blinded tokens with the existing sharding and lease system in Tahoe-LAFS, we have created a Zero Knowledge Access Pass (ZKAP) to require a proof of payment for the storage servers to allow ciphertext shards to be stored.

<https://leastauthority.com/blog/the-path-from-s4-to-privatestorage/>



Auditing technology

Joint worked with Jan Camenisch, Manu Drijvers, and Maria Dubovitskaya





User i



User j



User i



User j

data details

data identifier

KAPLAN
0419


01.04. 52€ from André
 02.04. -59€ to Lea
 ...

Time	User 1	User 2	User 3
2/17/2019 13:06:11	<div>data identifier</div> <div>data</div> <div>record session identifier</div>
...

How to construct such a protocol in best practice?

**Modular cryptographic design,
e.g. Universal Composability framework**

Universal Composability (Canetti 2001)



Proving a protocol secure means both worlds should be indistinguishable

Let π and F be ppt protocols. We say that π *UC-realizes* F if for any ppt adversary A there exists a ppt adversary S s.t. for any ppt environment E we have:

$$\text{EXEC}_{F,S,E} \approx \text{EXEC}_{\pi,A,E}$$

Security guarantees for our system



Transaction
privacy



Transaction
authentication



Transaction
timestamping



Transaction
uniqueness



Record integrity




Auditor
authorization




Auditing
correctness


Security definition (1/2)



Security definition (2/2)



Protocol for Audit Logs on Blockchain



Implementing



- As a feature for Identity Mixer in Hyperledger Fabric on ClientSDK in Java with the use of Apache Milagro Crypto Library (AMCL)
- Instantiating NIZKs: Schnorr's protocol with Fiat-Shamir heuristic on elliptic curve BN256 (Schnorr '91, Fiat and Shamir '86, Barreto and Naehrig '05)

for AMCL: <https://github.com/miracl/amcl>

**Test on 2 core Intel machine with i5-7200U
2.5GHz CPU and 8GB RAM**

time in milliseconds

Full Identity mixer benchmark test on signing and auditing

229.6

Identity mixer benchmark test on signing

35.5

Identity mixer benchmark test on auditing

10.4



**And other wild
creatures do exist!**

Goldwasser and Park, 2018

Public Accountability vs. Secret Laws: Can They Coexist?

A Cryptographic Proposal

Shafi Goldwasser
MIT and Weizmann

Sunoo Park
MIT

FRAGMENT

"Our Laws are not generally known; they are kept secret by the small group of nobles who rule us. We are convinced that these ancient laws are scrupulously administered; nevertheless it is an extremely painful thing to be ruled by laws that one does not know."

—Franz Kafka, Parables and Paradoxes.

Since 9/11, journalists, scholars and activists have pointed out that *secret laws* — a body of law whose details and sometime mere existence is classified as top secret — were on the rise in all three branches of the US government due to growing national security concerns. Amid heated current debates on governmental wishes for exceptional access to *encrypted* digital data, one of the key questions is: which mechanisms can be put in place to ensure that government agencies follow agreed-upon rules in a manner which does not compromise national security objectives? This promises

an eventual solution, it seems clear that a key factor in any solution will be the ability to trust government agencies to be *transparent* about their practices to the maximum extent consistent with their ability to enforce laws and maintain security. Secondly, and relatedly, it is important that forms of encryption that ensure that government agencies can be held accountable to the law for their requests to access plaintext information, provide the guarantee that abuse of power can be prevented in *principle*.

These basic, natural requirements are further complicated by increasing governance (or lack thereof) of intelligence agencies' *secret laws*: that is, where *even the details of law* are kept *top secret information*.² The very concept of *secret* is at odds against the principles of accountability and transparency. The abundant use of secret law can render entirely meaningless to the public a lawfully behaving government that only abuses power. Indeed, recent heated disc

Metrics with ZKPs: Prio

Prio

Private, Robust, and Scalable Computation of Aggregate Statistics

Background

Prio is a privacy-preserving system for the collection of aggregate statistics. Each Prio client holds a private data value (e.g., its current location), and a small set of servers compute statistical functions over the values of all clients (e.g., the most popular location). As long as at least one server is honest, the Prio servers learn nearly nothing about the clients' private data, except what they can infer from the aggregate statistics that the system computes.

To protect functionality in the face of faulty or malicious clients, Prio uses *secret-shared non-interactive proofs* (SNIPs), a new cryptographic technique that yields a hundred-fold performance improvement over conventional zero-knowledge approaches. Prio extends classic private aggregation techniques to enable the collection of a large class of useful statistics. For example, Prio can perform a least-squares regression on high-dimensional client-provided data without ever seeing the data in the clear.

Prio provides a number of desirable properties:

► Privacy

As long as at least one of the Prio servers is honest, the system leaks nearly nothing (in a precise sense) about the clients' private data.

Zcash, Mumblewimble, ...



References

- David Chaum: Blind Signatures for Untraceable Payments, 1983 (https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-1-4757-0602-4_18)
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- Talk by Nick Sullivan at 2nd ZKProof Workshop in Berkeley (<https://crypto.dance/projects/7128053>)
- Privacy Pass: <https://privacypass.github.io/>
- Ran Canetti: Universally Composable Security: A New Paradigm for Cryptographic Protocols, 2001 (<https://eprint.iacr.org/2000/067>)
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- Shafi Goldwasser and Sunoo Park: Public Accountability vs. Secret Laws: Can They Coexist?, 2018 (<https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/664.pdf>)
- Prio: <https://crypto.stanford.edu/prio/>
- Mumblewimble: <https://github.com/mumblewimble/>
- Zcash: <https://zcash.readthedocs.io/en/latest/>, <https://electriccoin.co/>, <https://www.zfnd.org/>
- All photos are stock photos and free to use.



Thank you!

Anna Kaplan

 anna.kaplan@tum.de

 @kaplannie

Backup

Ecash (Chaum 1983)

k



$kr^e \bmod N$

$(k^d)^r \bmod N$

d



$(kr^e)^d \bmod N$

Issuance



Token, Signature



Validate



Redemption



User i



User j







data identifier

KAPLAN
0419

data details

01.04. 52€ from André
02.04. -59€ to Lea
...

 Time	 User 1	 User 2	 User 3
2/17/2019 13:06:11	<div>data identifier</div> <div>data</div> <div>record session identifier</div>
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