


Tutorial: Attacks on Zero-Knowledge Proof Systems

ZKProof5 | November 16, 2022 | Tel Aviv, Israel

Presented by: Anna Kaplan




Outline

Example 1: Un-Trusted Setup

Example 2: Documentation Gone Wrong

Example 3: Primitive Primitives

Other Examples & What's Next?





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Example 1: Un-Trusted Setup

∃ zk-SNARKs that need a trusted setup

Preaching to the choir!

Trusted setup: In a setup phase for the zk-SNARK, a common reference string and a simulation trapdoor are generated. The simulation trapdoor is also called toxic waste.

Either:

Perform a MPC or

use a zero-knowledge proof system which doesn't need a trusted setup!

Don't use a system which needs a trusted setup without one!



Explorer: https://www.ace.co.il/4419897 (Only 279 NIS!)

Silly analogy



Learnings

DOS & DON'TS

- Perform a trusted setup when needed
- dunderstand the boundaries and mathematical models of the trusted setup situation you use
- Review your implementation for a trusted setup
- **Lesson** Lesson Lesson
- PDo not not document it



0.02

Example 2: Documentation Gone Wrong

Document what your statement in a mathematical way!

For zk-SNARKs, we say: "zk-SNARKs are succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge, where the knowledge-proof attests to the correctness of a statement."

But what is a **statement**?



My zk-SNARK implementation proves that I have knowledge over inputs x, y, and b such that if b is TRUE, then I can output the sum of x and y, and if b is FALSE, then I can output the multiplication of x and y.





{An example statement}

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{An example statement}

```
function EXAMPLE-STATEMENT-V0(x, y, b) z \leftarrow 0 if b = 1 then z \leftarrow x + y else z \leftarrow x \cdot y end if \text{return } z end function
```



My zk-SNARK implementation proves that I have knowledge over inputs x, y, and b such that if b is TRUE, then I can output the sum of x and y, and if b is FALSE, then I can output the multiplication of x and y.

{An example statement}

```
1 fn example_statement(x: F, y: F, b: F) -> F
2 { let mut z: F = 0;
3    if b == 1 {
4         z = add(x,y);
5    }
6    else {
7         z = mul(x,y);
8    }
9    return z;
10 }
```



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```
\begin{array}{c} \textbf{function} \; \text{EXAMPLE-STATEMENT-VO}(\mathbf{x},\,\mathbf{y},\,\mathbf{b}) \\ z \leftarrow 0 \\ \textbf{if} \; b = 1 \; \textbf{then} \\ z \leftarrow x + y \\ \textbf{else} \\ z \leftarrow x \cdot y \\ \textbf{end} \; \textbf{if} \\ \text{return} \; z \\ \textbf{end} \; \textbf{function} \end{array}
```

```
1 fn example_statement(x: F, y: F, b: bool) -> F
2 {    let mut z: F = 0;
3     if b {
4         z = add(x,y);
5     }
6     else {
7         z = mul(x,y);
8     }
9     return z;
10 }
```



```
function EXAMPLE-STATEMENT-V0(x, y, b) z \leftarrow 0 if b = 1 then z \leftarrow x + y else z \leftarrow x \cdot y end if return z end function
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Reminder 1:


An arithmetic circuit consists of addition and multiplication gates over a finite field F.

Reminder 2:

If/Else can be represented, for b a Boolean:




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


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




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Reminder 3:

For a Boolean b, this holds: (1-b) * b = 0






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Reminder 3:

For a Boolean b, this holds: (1-b) * b = 0





My zk-SNARK implementation proves that I have knowledge over input a x, y, and b such that if b is TRUE anen I can output the sum of x and y, and if b is FALSE, then I can calculate multiplication of x and y. $z \leftarrow 0$ if b = 1 then $z \leftarrow x + y$ else $z \leftarrow x \cdot y$ end if return zend function

No types specified!

Constants & field not specified!

Why are we doing this?!




Learnings

DOS & DON'TS

- Cite and explain your references
- Include a high-level explanation of your system
- Explain your notation
- de Use graphics where you can
- Include technical concerns you had and their resolution
- Include an information flow
- Include descriptions and justification of used parameters
- herform or reference an analysis of the system (e.g. a security proof) with mentioning modelling choices for the performed analysis
- P Only document the updates especially if you don't adhere to the original notation
- P Only provide parameters in the specification without a justification, discussion or comment



Learnings, from yesterday





 $| \circ O3 |$

Example 3: Primitive Primitives

Zero-knowledge proof systems use intrinsic cryptographic primitives most of the time!

When I say cryptographic primitive, what comes to your mind?



Zero-knowledge proof systems use intrinsic cryptographic primitives most of the time!

When I say cryptographic primitive, what comes to your mind?

E.g.: Elliptic curves, hash functions, encryption schemes, signature schemes, ...



Challenge: Choosing an elliptic curve

BLS6-6

BN254

BLS12-381

Challenge: Choosing a hash function

MiMC

Poseidon Blake2

SHA256



Learnings

DOS & DON'TS

- Know your use case and its boundaries
- Compare primitives to each other
- Engage in research regarding the primitives you're using
- Keep up to date with the research community
- delta Understand the boundaries and mathematical models of the used primitives
- Pon't tweak cryptographic primitives



° 04 What's Next?

What's next?

Other attacks on zero-knowledge proof systems:

- Forging proofs by leaked keys
- Malleability of zero-knowledge proof systems
- Replay attacks
- etc.

Have you seen any other attacks in the wild?



What's Next?


Other attacks on zero-knowledge proof systems:

- Forging proofs by leaked keys
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- etc.

Have you seen any other attacks in the wild?

Join our effort to collect these and sum up development strategies at Least Authority!






Anna Kaplan

anna@leastauthority.com @kaplannie

Thanks for coming and keep in touch!

@leastauthority





LEASTAUTHORITY.COM

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Backup Slides

```
statement CONDITIONAL_OP {F:F_p} {
   fn main(x : F, y : F, b : BOOL) -> F {
     let z : F
     z <== if b then {
      ADD(x,y)
   } else {
      MUL(x,y)
   } ;
   return z ;
}</pre>
```

Make sure to make b a BOOLEAN!



```
statement CONDITIONAL_OP {F:F_p} {
  fn main(x : F, y : F, b : BOOL) \rightarrow F {
    let z : F
    z \le if b then {
      ADD(x,y)
                                               Tip:
    } else {
                                               If/Else can be represented, for b a
      MUL(x, y)
                                               Boolean:
    return z ;
                                                   outcome = b * if-true-value +
                                                                  (1-b) * else-value
                    But also:
                    For a Boolean b, this holds:
                          (1-b) * b = 0
```