

The positioning of a specific armed non-state actor along the two dimensions might vary considerably across space and time. For example, certain cartels in Mexico might have a higher capacity and willingness to bend the rules of the game and project control into their areas of influence than others. Therefore, it should be noted that this theoretical approach is action-based and tied to a spatio-temporal unit, as opposed to specific actor identities. It is the nature of the predominant security challenge that a government faces in a specific spatio-temporal unit, rather than the identity of the violent non-state actor, that is thought to influence its welfare spending. Suppose for example, that rebel group  $g$  has some territorial control at time  $t$  in the subnational area  $i_1$ , but not in area  $i_2$ . Therefore, I expect to see group  $g$  conducting guerrilla-style attacks in area  $i_1$  and terrorist-style attacks in area  $i_2$ , both at time  $t$ . Consequently, in the next period  $t + 1$ , we should see higher levels of subnational welfare spending in area  $i_1$  than in area  $i_2$ , even though the governments of both areas face the same opponent  $g$ .