

# Evidence Brief: Cross-Domain Intersections Affecting the Russia–Ukraine War

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## Bottom Line

Open-source evidence shows multiple cross-domain intersections that can unintentionally advantage Russia while Ukraine and partners pursue defense and humanitarian aims. These include (1) continued European purchases of Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG), (2) sanction-evasion networks spanning third countries, and (3) corporate/financial structures with Russian links operating in or around Ukraine that Ukrainian authorities are actively dismantling. This brief does not find credible evidence of a Ukrainian state-level policy to collaborate with Russia, but it does document vulnerabilities, infiltration attempts, and residual economic flows that warrant immediate mitigation.

### 1) Energy Domain – EU Purchases of Russian Gas/LNG

- EU imports of Russian gas fell sharply since 2021, yet Russian LNG cargoes to the EU reached record levels in 2024 and remained significant in 2025 discussions. This creates ongoing revenue streams for Russia even as EU aid flows to Ukraine continue. Policy momentum now targets a full phase-out by 2027–2028.

Key datapoints (sources in chat message):

– Bruegel: Russian gas down to ~54 bcm in 2024 (~18% of EU gas imports). – FT/Ember and others: record EU Russian LNG in 2024; ~+18–19% year-on-year in some analyses. – European Commission/Parliament: proposed regulation to end Russian gas imports by end-2027; debate on 2026 acceleration.

### 2) Finance/Corporate – Cyprus/Ukraine-linked structures (example)

- Ukraine sanctioned a Cyprus-based gambling empire allegedly linked to Russian owners behind the online casino Pin-Up, citing flows and ownership changes that obscured beneficiaries. Authorities reported millions in royalty payments from a Ukrainian entity to a Cyprus company during wartime; the owners deny Kremlin ties. This illustrates the risk of cross-border vehicles moving funds in ways that may indirectly benefit Russia.

### 3) Influence & Info Ops – Kremlin proxy networks in Europe

- The Pravfond leak (50,000 internal emails) described an official Russian foundation financing legal aid and influence activities across Europe, with EU sanctions in place since 2023. This demonstrates a metadomain intersection of lawfare, media, financing and covert influence.

### 4) Infiltration & Corruption – Ukrainian counter-intel actions

- Ukraine's SBU and anti-corruption bodies have recently arrested suspected spies and dismantled defence-procurement graft schemes (including drone contracts). This evidences active countermeasures against infiltration and corruption rather than collaboration.

## What This Does Not Show

- No credible open-source proof of systemic Ukrainian–Russian state collaboration.
- Instead, evidence points to: (a) residual EU energy purchases from Russia; (b) third-country sanction-evasion networks; (c) specific corporate cases investigated by Ukraine; and (d) ongoing Russian influence/infiltration attempts.

### Immediate Mitigations (Actionable)

1) Energy: Fast-track legal ban on Russian LNG/pipeline purchases; enforce origin traceability and spot-market prohibitions; mandate public monthly disclosure by buyers. 2) Finance: Expand beneficial ownership audits of Cyprus/UAE/Türkiye-linked vehicles touching Ukraine; require escrow for royalty/brand/franchise payments. 3) Influence: Resource EU/NATO hybrid-threat centers to track Pravfond-style funding; require FARA-style transparency for foreign-funded legal/media ops. 4) Ukraine Oversight: Shield anti-corruption bodies' independence; use open dashboards for defence procurement; condition some aid on verified anti-graft milestones. 5) Verification: Publish a public 'no-strike/no-fund' ledger tying banks, buyers, and logistics to compliance.

### Notes

This brief summarizes and interprets open-source reporting and official data. The chat response accompanying this PDF includes direct links and citations for verification.