

Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) Communication Implementation

Gunnar Fandrich

Group: Autogators

Electrical and Computer Engineering

University of Florida

Gainesville, Florida

gunnarfandrich@ufl.edu

Mark Lai

Group: Autogators

Electrical and Computer Engineering

University of Florida

Gainesville, Florida

marklai@ufl.edu

Rafael Hernandez-Lopez

Group: Autogators

Electrical and Computer Engineering

University of Florida

Gainesville, Florida

rhernandezlopez1@ufl.edu

Rohan Malik

Group: Autogators

Electrical and Computer Engineering

University of Florida

Gainesville, Florida

rmalik@ufl.edu

Abstract—Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) allows communication between vehicles, promoting driver awareness and potentially reducing the number of collisions. Existing V2V implementations (cellular vehicle-to-everything, C-V2X) rely on cloud data, whereas the implementation shown in this paper does true V2V between vehicles. A mockup utilizing two ESP32 with a time-of-flight (ToF) sensor and accelerometer communicate using UDP to deliver a proof-of-concept for V2V that can be used as a base for V2V.

Index Terms—V2V, vehicles, driver, awareness, C, ESP32, UDP

I. INTRODUCTION

As society moves towards utilizing more autonomous driving systems, vehicles can act as a network to promote efficient and safe driving. This network is referred to as vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V). Automotive vehicles should communicate with each other through V2V to increase driver awareness and reduce the number of collisions.

The current state of V2V is nonexistent. The closest thing on the market to V2V is the 2023 Safety Cloud for Chrysler Vehicles, which is implemented through a cellular network to create C-V2X (cellular vehicle-to-everything) [?]. While this is fairly close to V2V, passing through a cloud does not exhibit true V2V. Ideally the cars would communicate directly to each other, which is what is covered by the implementation discussed in this paper. Additionally, Stellantis announced vehicle-to-grid (V2G) testing in 2019 [?].

In 1999, the FCC designated a 75 MHz spectrum in the 5.9 GHz band for dedicated short-range communications (DSRC) [?]. Unfortunately, this band was reallocated in 2020 for unlicensed WiFi [?] use due to the failure of automobile makers to release V2X production cars. Due to the removal of this band, we chose UDP over WiFi as an acceptable simplified protocol for V2V. Ideally, UDP would be replaced with another

protocol built on top of UDP, or similar protocol, specifically for V2V and operate on an FCC-designated band for V2V.

V2V will be illustrated using an ESP32 paired with time-of-flight (ToF) sensor and accelerometer. Each ESP32 represents a simplified car, and communicate with each other using UDP. UDP was chosen as the protocol to allow ad hoc car networks to be formed as well as allow dropped packets once a car leaves the network.

II. V2V IMPLEMENTATION

This section covers our V2V implementation, the features and the mockup.

A. Features

B. Hardware Mockup

III. RESULTS

a) *LTH Mand*: After low-temperature hydrogenation [1], the resist layer will be etched and expose the SiARC underneath. This results in the stack from Fig. 1. TODO: Explain what we use this for.

b) *RIE Mand*: Reactive ion etching (RIE) [2] is used to cut the SiARC layer, exposing the ODL underneath.

IV. SECURITY

Our implementation of V2V has room to improve. A V2V implementation usable on the market would address a few security concerns.

A. Packet Security

As our UDP packets are being broadcasted to everyone in the nearby vicinity, an attacker only needs to be located near the network to be considered a “car”. This means that anyone could send fake messages or tamper with existing packets. This leaves room for improvement in terms of admitting “cars” on




Fig. 1. The silicon stack after LTH Mand.

the network, and properly identifying nodes on the network as “car”, “adversary”, or “miscellaneous” nodes.

Attackers on the network could potentially leverage this limitation to inhibit the flow of traffic by broadcasting that there is some blockade ahead (ToF sensor data shows car ahead, accelerometer data shows there is no/little movement). Attackers could also target individual vehicles with a similar idea. They could send false packets to make the victim vehicle think it has to brake suddenly, potentially crashing with vehicles behind them or causing them to brake too fast. If the victim is carrying a heavy load, such as a large trailer, braking too fast can compromise the stability of their vehicle and potentially swerve out of control or unlatch their trailer.

B. Network Security

A member of the ad hoc network may be either calibrated to send too many packets or is an attacker. In a case where the packet traffic is too heavy, a denial of service attack (DoS) may occur. This should be addressed as well before V2V is accepted by car manufacturers.

As the network is completely open to new “cars”, attackers may be able to probe the network for more vulnerabilities than those discussed. For example, perhaps some UDP misconfig-

uration could be leveraged to forward UDP packet contents to a CAN bus, or similar idea.

V. CONCLUSION

Lots of things happen in the 14 nm process flow.

REFERENCES

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