



CERTIK

# Six Network

## Definix Core Contracts

### Security Assessment

March 29th, 2021

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# Overview

## Project Summary

|                     |  |
|---------------------|--|
| <b>Project Name</b> | Six Network - Definix Core Contracts                                   |
| <b>Description</b>  | The core DEX contracts of the Definix implementation based on Uniswap. |
| <b>Platform</b>     | Ethereum; Solidity, Yul  |
| <b>Codebase</b>     | <a href="#">GitHub Repository</a>                                      |
| <b>Commits</b>      | 1. <a href="#">fbcee365914d1eeea933a058ba2f82d3fb3160e6</a>            |

## Audit Summary

|                            |                                     |
|----------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| <b>Delivery Date</b>       | March 29th, 2021                    |
| <b>Method of Audit</b>     | Static Analysis, Manual Review      |
| <b>Consultants Engaged</b> | 1                                   |
| <b>Timeline</b>            | March 26th, 2021 - March 29th, 2021 |

## Vulnerability Summary

|                              |   |
|------------------------------|---|
| <b>Total Issues</b>          | 1 |
| ● <b>Total Critical</b>      | 0 |
| ● <b>Total Major</b>         | 0 |
| ● <b>Total Medium</b>        | 1 |
| ● <b>Total Minor</b>         | 0 |
| ● <b>Total Informational</b> | 0 |



# Executive Summary

We were tasked with auditing the Definix DEX implementation that is based on PancakeSwap which in turn is based on Uniswap.

There were no changes introduced to the Definix codebase from the PancakeSwap implementation, however, we should note that the PancakeSwap implementation deviates from the Uniswap implementation in that it imposes a 0.2% fee on trades instead of a 0.3% fee and continues to split that fee in a final resulting 0.05% fee towards the fee address of the protocol.

A single finding was identified that is a well known issue with regards to the usage of a domain separator that we advise the Definix team to fix to ensure no issues may arise in a consequent fork of the chain the project deploys to.




## Files In Scope

| ID  | Contract            | Location   |
|-----|---------------------|--|
| DER | DefinixERC20.sol    | <a href="#">contracts/DefinixERC20.sol</a>               |
| DFY | DefinixFactory.sol  | <a href="#">contracts/DefinixFactory.sol</a>             |
| DPR | DefinixPair.sol     | <a href="#">contracts/DefinixPair.sol</a>                |
| IDC | IDefinixCallee.sol  | <a href="#">contracts/interfaces/IDefinixCallee.sol</a>  |
| IDE | IDefinixERC20.sol   | <a href="#">contracts/interfaces/IDefinixERC20.sol</a>   |
| IDF | IDefinixFactory.sol | <a href="#">contracts/interfaces/IDefinixFactory.sol</a> |
| IDP | IDefinixPair.sol    | <a href="#">contracts/interfaces/IDefinixPair.sol</a>    |
| IER | IERC20.sol          | <a href="#">contracts/interfaces/IERC20.sol</a>          |
| MAT | Math.sol            | <a href="#">contracts/libraries/Math.sol</a>             |
| SMH | SafeMath.sol        | <a href="#">contracts/libraries/SafeMath.sol</a>         |
| UQ2 | UQ112x112.sol       | <a href="#">contracts/libraries/UQ112x112.sol</a>        |



# File Dependency Graph





# Manual Review Findings

| ID            | Title                     | Type          | Severity | Resolved |
|---------------|---------------------------|---------------|----------|----------|
| <u>DER-01</u> | Cross-Chain Replay Attack | Logical Issue | ● Medium | 🕒        |



## DER-01: Cross-Chain Replay Attack

| Type          | Severity | Location  |
|---------------|----------|---|
| Logical Issue | ● Medium | <u><a href="#">DefinixERC20.sol L29-L37</a></u> |

### Description:

The `DOMAIN_SEPARATOR` used by the contract is only computed once during its `constructor` whereby the current `chainid` is evaluated once.

### Recommendation:

We advise it to be re-computed each time on the `permit` function instead as calculating the separator once causes cross-chain replay attacks to be possible whereby the chain the contract is deployed in forks, contains a different `chainid` but due to the separator being assigned once utilizes the main chain's `chainid` thus enabling a single permit to be used on both chains.

### Alleviation:

The Six Network team has stated that their contracts are already live and as such, it is not possible to remediate this particular exhibit. The security vulnerability that arises from this exhibit would only manifest if the Binance chain the contracts are deployed in forks and produces a satellite chain on which the signatures could be replayed.



# Appendix

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## Finding Categories

### Logical Issue

Logical Issue findings are exhibits that detail a fault in the logic of the linked code, such as an incorrect notion on how `block.timestamp` works.