

حملات در لایه دوم عبارتند از:

MAC Attacks / CAM Overflow

Catalyst switches use hash to place MAC in CAM table. 63 bits of source (MAC, VLAN, misc) creates a 17-bit hash value. If the value is the same there are 8 columns to place CAM entries, if all 8 are filled the packet is flooded. Dsniff (macof) can generate 480,000 MAC entries on a switch per minute $8000/s \times 60$.

Assuming a perfect hash function, the CAM table will total out at 128,000 ($16,000 \times 8$) 131,052 to be exact. Since hash isn't perfect it actually takes 70 seconds to fill the CAM table. Once table is full, traffic without a CAM entry floods on the VLAN, but NOT existing traffic with an existing CAM entry.

1	A	B	C						
2	D	E	F	G					
3	H								
.	I								
.	J	K							
16,000	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T

Flooded!


VLAN Hopping Attacks

Dynamic Trunk Protocol (DTP):

Automates ISL/802.1Q trunk


configuration - Operates between switches - Does not operate on routers

A station can spoof as a switch with ISL or 802.1Q signaling (DTP signaling is usually required as well)
The station is then member of all VLANs
Requires a trunking favorable setting on the port



Double Encapsulated 802.1q VLAN Hopping Attack

Send double encapsulated 802.1Q frames
Switch performs only one level of decapsulation
Unidirectional traffic only
Works even if trunk ports are set to off




GARP Attacks

An ARP request message should be placed in a frame and broadcast to all computers on the network.
Each computer receives the request and examines the IP address. The computer mentioned in the request sends a response; all other computers process and discard the request without sending a response

Gratuitous ARP is used by hosts to “announce” their IP address to the local network and avoid duplicate IP addresses on the network; routers and other network hardware may use cache information gained from gratuitous ARPs. Gratuitous ARP is a broadcast packet (like an ARP request). ARP has no security or ownership of IP or MAC addresses.

- What if we did the following?



***Host W** broadcasts I'm 1.2.3.1 with MAC 12:34:56:78:9A:BC

*(Wait 5 seconds)

***Host W** broadcasts I'm 1.2.3.1 with MAC 12:34:56:78:9A:BC

*When host Y requests the MAC of 1.2.3.1 the real router will reply and communications will work until host W sends a gratuitous ARP again

*Even a static ARP entry for 1.2.3.1 on Y will get overwritten by the Gratuitous ARP on some OSs

More on Arpspoof


- All traffic now flows through machine running dsniff in a half-duplex manner
Not quite a sniffer but fairly close
- Port security doesn't help
- Static ARP doesn't help
- Note that attack could be generated in the

opposite direction by spoofing the destination host when the router sends its ARP request

Spanning Tree Attacks

Spanning Tree

- Purpose: To maintain loop-free topologies in a redundant Layer 2 infrastructure
- Provides path recovery services



Send BPDU (Bridge protocol data unit) messages from attacker to force spanning tree recalculations

Impact likely to be DoS

- Send BPDU messages to become root bridge

The hacker then sees frames he shouldn't

MITM, DoS, etc. all possible

Any attack is very sensitive to the original topology, trunking, PVST, etc.

Requires attacker to be dual homed to two different switches

