

# Building a Canarytoken to Monitor Windows Process Execution



## Who Are We?

We are [the budding] Thinkst Labs:

Research, learning, and teaching  
ThinkstScapes ([thinkst.com/ts](http://thinkst.com/ts))  
Both in CO, enjoying its outdoors



**Casey**



**Jacob**

# Topics

Canarytokens History / background

Research Approach

Command Execution Alert

Idea to delivery

# Canarytokens Background

# Canarytokens History / Background

- Free / Open Source


- Simple Objects

- Create alert on access

- DNS / HTTP primitives

- Surprisingly Effective

<https://canarytokens.org/generate>



# Canarytoken Example

 CANARY  
TOKENS

What is this and why should I care?

[Documentation](#)

Select your token

-  Web bug / URL token  
Alert when a URL is visited
-  DNS token  
Alert when a hostname is requested
-  AWS keys  
Alert when AWS key is used
-  Sensitive command token  
Alert when a suspicious Windows command is run
-  Microsoft Word document  
Get alerted when a document is opened in Microsoft Word
-  Microsoft Excel document  
Get alerted when a document is opened in Microsoft Excel
-  Kubeconfig token  
Alert when a Kubeconfig is used

Brought to you by [Thinkst Canary](#)

Know. When it matters.

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## Canarytoken triggered

### ALERT

A DNS Canarytoken has been triggered by the Source IP 192.168.32.1. Please note that the source IP refers to a DNS server, rather than the host that triggered the token.

#### Basic Details:

Channel	DNS
Time	2023-01-04 16:48:32 (UTC)
Canarytoken	pvd6nto02timeqnrg312345
Token Reminder	nltest.exe example for Cactus Con (This token was created to monitor the execution of: nltest.exe)
Token Type	cmd
Source IP	192.168.32.1
Sensitive Command Information	User casey executed "nltest.exe" on the host

#### Canarytoken Management Details:

Manage this Canarytoken [here](#)

More info on this token [here](#)

# Attackers Use It / You Are Alerted

**Canarytokens**  
No tokens created. [Why should I?](#)

Create a new token

Select token type

- Web Bug**  
URL that alerts when hit.
- DNS**  
DNS hostname that alerts when queried.
- AWS API Key**  
Amazon Web Services API key that alerts when used. 
- MS Word Document**  
Microsoft Word document that alerts when opened.
- MS Word Macro Document**  
Microsoft Word document that alerts when macro run.

**AWS API Key Canarytoken Triggered**

Time Since Incident  
**4 minutes ago**

Timestamp  
**Sep 11, 02:11:44 PM GMT+2**

Flock  
**Default Flock**

Source IP  
**102.65.5.98**

Token  
**AWS API Key**

Token Memo  
**AWS API keys on Jim's Laptop**

Date: Fri Sep 11 2020 14:11:44 GMT+0200 (South Africa Standard Time)  
Headers:  
Connection: close  
Accept-Encoding: identity  
User-Agent: aws-cli/1.11.121 Python/2.7.16 Darwin/19.6.0 botocore/1.5.84  
Geo IP Details:  
city: Cape Town  
host\_domain:  
is\_v4\_mapped: false  
country: South Africa


[Mark as seen](#)

# Research Approach

# Research Insights - Fragility of Early Ideas

Early ideas:

- DOSKeys
- Event 4688
- Scheduled Task
- WMI
- nslookup



## Idea Generation / Collaboration


Thinkst is a remote-first company, always working

Slack WhiteBoards / App

Asynchronous

Ok to fail

# Command Execution Alert




# What do we want to build?

Could we build a SIMPLE token for teams, that will alert on execution of rare commands?

# DFIR Report

18:57 UTC Discovery - IcedID Discovery Commands



# Reading DFIR Ransomware Reports

- It is clear there are common exe's attackers run
- “nltest /trusted\_domains”
- Who [legitimately] runs this???
- **Could we build a SIMPLE token for teams, that will alert on execution?**

Multiple commands responsible for enumerating Active Directory groups, domain joined computers, and domain trusts, were executed via Cobalt Strike on the beachhead.

```
whoami /groups  
net group /domain  
net group "domain computers" /domain  
net group /domain "Domain controllers"  
net group "domain admins" /domain  
nltest /trusted_domains
```

The threat actor was observed querying a non-existent group Domain controller, followed by a command correcting the mistake that queried the group Domain controllers .

```
net group /domain "Domain controller"  
net group /domain "Domain controllers"
```

In nearly every report on ransomware we see sequences of commands.

Many of them rarely or never used by ordinary people day to day...

But HOW would we create a simple alert?

## — Trial and Error - Prototypes

Let's start experimenting, what command is best?

What is the most simple way to install?



# Idea to Delivery

## Requirements

### Easy To Deploy

This doesn't replace complex EDR and SIEM alert behavioral detection.

### Low False Positive Rate

Some commands are more rare and make better alerting.

# First Attempts In Learning - FAIL

## doskey alias?

# doskey

Article • 03/03/2021 • 8 minutes to read • 8 contributors

 Feedback

Calls Doskey.exe, which recalls previously entered command-line commands, edits command lines, and creates macros.

# Specifically Macros/Alias

## DOSKey examples ^


Some common examples to help you be slightly more productive are as follows:

Alias	What It Does
<code>doskey d=dir \$*</code>	Lists a directory
<code>doskey n=notepad \$*</code>	Opens a file with Notepad (for example, n text.txt)
<code>doskey ..=cd ..\..</code>	Changes to the parent directory

<https://4sysops.com/archives/using-doskey-aliases/>

<https://devblogs.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20071121-00/?p=24433>

```
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.e: + v  
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.25267.1000]  
(c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.  
  
C:\Users\casey>doskey schtasks=C:^\\windows^\\system32^\\schtasks.exe $* ^&^& notepad.exe 2^>nul 1^>nul  
  
C:\Users\casey>schtasks  
  
Folder: \  
TaskName          Next Run Time      Status  
=====          ======      =====  
INFO: There are no scheduled tasks presently available at your access level.  
  
Folder: \Microsoft  
TaskName          Next Run Time      Status  
=====          ======      =====  
INFO: There are no scheduled tasks presently available at your access level.  
  
Folder: \Microsoft\OneCore  
TaskName          Next Run Time      Status
```



This is CLOSE to what we want  
Run Scheduled Task and...  
notepad in the background

# Why it fails

Not all shells persist or use the doskey, so RDP or remote execution, won't use the doskey alias...

It fails because its not global on the host and risky to rely on.




## Event 4688 - Scheduled Task

You can attach a task to an event.

Attempt to monitor Windows Event Logs and alert.

<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/wincat/trigger-a-powershell-script-from-a-windows-event>



## Why this fails

Not simple

Too Noisy, its per EVENT, then you have to filter by exe

Too Many moving parts



When you get stuck perhaps ask?

What would a developer do?

What would an attacker do?

◦ Hmmm...



# Image File Execution Options

A screenshot of a blog homepage titled "ODDVAR MOE'S BLOG". The title is in large white capital letters at the top left. Below it is a subtitle "Notes from My adventures with Windows security" in a smaller white font. The background of the header features a dark, slightly blurred image of a person's hands working on a keyboard. The main content area has a dark grey background with white text. At the top of this area, there are three small images: a portrait of a man on the left, a triangle icon with three circles in the middle, and a portrait of a man on the right. To the right of these images, the word "Microsoft" is written in white. Below this header, the main article title is displayed in large white capital letters: "PERSISTENCE USING GLOBALFLAGS IN IMAGE FILE EXECUTION OPTIONS – HIDDEN FROM AUTORUNS.EXE".

**ODDVAR MOE'S BLOG**

Notes from My adventures with Windows security

Domene

Microsoft

PERSISTENCE USING GLOBALFLAGS IN  
IMAGE FILE EXECUTION OPTIONS –  
HIDDEN FROM AUTORUNS.EXE

<https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persistence-using-globalflags-in-image-file-execution-options-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/>

# So it sat for a while... Then “This WORKS!”



**casey** 11:25 AM

This TOTALLY works

Here is the write up original blog about it.

11:26 <https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persistence-using-globalflags-in-image-file-execution-options-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/>



**Oddvar Moe's Blog** | Oddvar Moe [MVP]

Persistence using GlobalFlags in Image File Execution Options – Hidden from Autoruns.exe



TL;DR

- Found a technique to execute any binary file after another application is closed without being detected by Autoruns.exe.
- Requires administrator rights and does not belong in userland.
- Can also be executed from alternate data streams
- Plant file on disk and run these commands to create persistence that triggers everytime someone closes notepad.exe:

[Show more](#)

# Monitoring Silent Process Exit

## Monitor Process

You can specify a monitor process by entering a process name, along with command line parameters, in the **Monitor Process** text box. You can use the following variables in your command line.

Variable	Meaning
%e	ID of the exiting process. This is the monitored process that exited silently.
%i	ID of the initiating process. In the case of self termination, this is the same as the exiting process. In the case of cross-process termination, this is the ID of the process that caused the termination.
%t	ID of the initiating thread. This is the thread that caused the termination.
%c	The status code passed to <code>ExitThread</code> or <code>TerminateThread</code> .

For example, the following value for **Monitor Process** specifies that on silent exit, WinDbg is launched and attached to the exiting process.

<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/registry-entries-for-silent-process-exit>

# Run a command, Run another Command In the Background!

Examples:

nltest.exe => nslookup.exe <canarytoken>

nltest.exe =>

powershell.exe -command Resolve-DNSName <canarytoken>

## Why is this not working?

%computername%.%username%.hjgwzjkvh8ak8x168675.canarytokens.com

"This works, **but I don't see the leading parameters** in the alert, just noting???" Why?

# Oh Wait? nslookup Won't work 😢

nltest.exe => nslookup.exe <canarytoken>

Why does this fail?

%c - Status Code

**collision**

%computername

## Monitor Process

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%t	ID of the initiating thread. This is the thread that caused the termination.
%c	The status code passed to <code>ExitThread</code> or <code>TerminateThread</code> .

## Encoding over DNS with PowerShell

We want to collect some artifacts in the alert

Username

Computername

# DNS Encoding

## Encoding additional information in your token

Your DNS token can carry a small amount of additional custom data when it's triggered. This can be used for adding incident-specific data to your alert with custom DNS based tokens. Use the following encoding rules to place generic data into your DNS token:

- Base32 encode your data, and remove any padding '=' characters
- Insert periods (.) after every 63-bytes
- Append the magic string '.G'+<2-random-digits>+'. (e.g. '.G12.' or '.G83.')
- Append your DNS token This creates a new hostname of the form:

```
<base32-string>.<base32-string>.G<2-random-digits>.<dns-token>
```

Bear in mind the total length of the hostname still cannot exceed 253-bytes, so the amount of raw bytes that can be encoded is ~125.

## Remove Spaces and Non-Unicode

A process run as LOCAL SERVICE. Or any other username.

Needs to be condensed/stripped of spaces

So we can use it in a DNS name.

localservice

## Operational Caveats / Impact

Not a replacement for EDR or SIEM

Alerting on cmd / PowerShell cause infinite loops

Some Anti-Malware/Endpoint Protection will detect/alert on token installation / reg setup.

- **Some realities we had deal with**

DNS Duplicate Lookup Suppression / You just won't believe it  
AV / EDR Alerts - It looks bad, so be sure you know that  
Commands aren't are rare as you might think/suspect.

# What may be exposed?

- Username

- Hostname

- Executable



These may appear in public databases, and DNS  
Keep that in mind.

## Research is Done

Research (what don't we know) and the engineering that depends on it.

Once we had the single exec we were "done" with research, then it was engineering/finesse to get it over the line



Final Product!

# The Sensitive Command Token

## Choose A Command To Monitor

Candidates are:  
Low frequency/rare  
Short lived (run then exit)

BAD  
cmd, powershell, outlook

BETTER  
nltest, systeminfo, whoami

## Create Token

Canarytokens.org  
Sensitive Command  
Input Email, Note and Process  
To monitor.

## Import Registry

Requires Administrator  
reg import canary.reg

Can be deployed to multiple  
machines

Works even if file is not present.



What is this and why should I care?

[Documentation](#)

Sensitive command token

-  Web bug / URL token  
Alert when a URL is visited
-  DNS token  
Alert when a hostname is requested
-  AWS keys  
Alert when AWS key is used
-  Sensitive command token  
Alert when a suspicious Windows command is run
-  Microsoft Word document  
Get alerted when a document is opened in Microsoft Word
-  Microsoft Excel document  
Get alerted when a document is opened in Microsoft Excel
-  Kubeconfig token  
Alert when a Kubeconfig is used

Brought to you by [Thinkst Canary](#), our insanely easy-to-use honeypot solution that deploys in just 3 minutes. **Know. When it matters.**

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What is this and why should I care?

[Documentation](#)

Sensitive command token ▾

alert@example.com

Create Token to monitor for nlttest.exe at branch offices.  
This should be a rare command

nlttest.exe

Create my Canarytoken



## Your sensitive process execution token is active!

[Download your MS registry file](#)

Once installed (with admin permissions) you'll get an alert whenever someone (or someone's code) runs your sensitive process. It will automatically provide the command used, computer the command ran on, and the user invoking the command.

Ideas for use:

- Ideal candidates are executables often used by attackers but seldom used by regular users (e.g., whoami.exe, net.exe, wmic.exe, etc.).
- You can use this for attacker tools that are not present on your system (e.g., mimikatz.exe), and if they are ever downloaded and run you'll get an alert!
- Use a network management tool to deploy across your organization.

# Canarytokens delivers a .reg

```
Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00
; Sensitive command token generated by Thinkst Canary
; Run with admin privs on Windows machine as: reg import FILENAME

; command that will be watched for
[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File
Execution Options\nltest.exe]
"GlobalFlag"=dword:00000200

; magic unique canarytoken that will be fired when this command is executed
[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SilentProcessExit
\nltest.exe]
"ReportingMode"=dword:00000001
"MonitorProcess"="cmd.exe /c start /min powershell.exe -windowstyle hidden -command
\"$($u=$(\\"$env:username\\\") -replace('[^\\x00-\\x7f]|\\s', '')[0..63] -join '');
$c=$(\\\"$env:computername\\\") -replace('[^\\x00-\\x7f]|\\s', '');Resolve-
DnsName -Name \\\"$c.UN.$u.CMD.pvd6nto02timeqnpgsql8675309.canarytokens.com\\\")\\\""
```

We will break this down shortly

# Enable silent process exit monitoring

Article • 12/14/2021 • 2 minutes to read • 1 contributor

 Feedback

The **Enable silent process exit monitoring** flag enables silent exit monitoring for a process.

Hexadecimal value	0x200
Symbolic Name	FLG_MONITOR_SILENT_PROCESS_EXIT
Destination	Image file registry entry

# Reporting Mode

The **Reporting Mode** setting is available as an application setting, but not as a global setting. You can use the following check boxes to set the reporting mode.

**Launch monitor process** **Enable dump collection** **Enable notification** The **ReportingMode** registry entry is a bitwise OR of the following flags.

Flag	Value	Meaning
LAUNCH_MONITORPROCESS	0x1	When silent exit is detected, the monitor process (specified in the <b>Monitor Process</b> box) is launched.
LOCAL_DUMP	0x2	When silent exit is detected, a dump file is created for the monitored process. In the case of cross-process termination, a dump file is also created for the process that caused the termination.
NOTIFICATION	0x4	When silent exit is detected, a pop-up notification is displayed.

# Monitor Process

You can specify a monitor process by entering a process name, along with command line parameters, in the **Monitor Process** text box. You can use the following variables in your command line.

Variable	Meaning
%e	ID of the exiting process. This is the monitored process that exited silently.
%i	ID of the initiating process. In the case of self termination, this is the same as the exiting process. In the case of cross-process termination, this is the ID of the process that caused the termination.
%t	ID of the initiating thread. This is the thread that caused the termination.
%c	The status code passed to <b>ExitThread</b> or <b>TerminateThread</b> .

Using a debug / attacker persistence technique.

We can easily use this to silently alert us upon execution of a specified exe.

## Break it down

cmd.exe start /min powershell.exe /hidden

Start a Hidden PS Window

Some redundancy here, we do not want popup to show

Powershell.exe constructs a DNS Name Lookup

Remove non supported chars

DNS only supports ascii.

# End Goal - DNS Alert, user/computer name

```
1 cmd.exe /c start /min powershell.exe -windowstyle hidden -command
2 $(($u=$("u$env:username\" -replace('[^\x00-\x7f]|\s', '')))[0..63] -join '';
3 $c=$(("c$env:computername\" -replace('[^\x00-\x7f]|\s', ''));
4 Resolve-DnsName -Name "\"$c.UN.$u.CMD.pvd6nto02timeqnrp8675309.canarytokens.com\""
5
6
```

```
PS C:\Users\casey> $u = $env:USERNAME
PS C:\Users\casey> $c = $env:COMPUTERNAME
PS C:\Users\casey> Write-host -ForegroundColor Green "$c.UN.$u.CMD.pvd6nto02timeqnrp8675309.canarytokens.com"
CASEYBCD8.UN.casey.CMD.pvd6nto02timeqnrp8675309.canarytokens.com
PS C:\Users\casey>
```

```
PS C:\Users\casey\Desktop> reg import .\canarytoken.reg  
The operation completed successfully.  
PS C:\Users\casey\Desktop> |
```

```
PS C:\Users\casey\Desktop> nltest.exe /?  
Usage: nltest [/OPTIONS]  
  
/SERVER:<ServerName> - Specify <ServerName>  
  
/QUERY - Query <ServerName> netlogon service  
/REPL - Force partial sync on <ServerName> BDC  
/SYNC - Force full sync on <ServerName> BDC  
/PDC_REPL - Force UAS change message from <ServerName> PDC  
  
/SC_QUERY:<DomainName> - Query secure channel for <Domain> on <ServerName>  
/SC_RESET:<DomainName>[\<DcName>] - Reset secure channel for <Domain> on <ServerName> to <DcName>  
/SC_VERIFY:<DomainName> - Verify secure channel for <Domain> on <ServerName>  
/SC_CHANGE_PWD:<DomainName> - Change a secure channel password for <Domain> on <ServerName>  
/DCLIST:<DomainName> - Get list of DC's for <DomainName>  
/DCNAME:<DomainName> - Get the PDC name for <DomainName>  
/DSGETDC:<DomainName> - Call DsGetDcName /PDC /DS /DSP /GC /KDC  
    /TIMESERV /GTIMESERV /WS /NETBIOS /DNS /IP /FORCE /WRITABLE /AVOIDSELF /LDAPONLY /BACKG /DS_6 /DS_8 /DS_9 /DS_10  
    /KEYLIST /TRY_NEXT_CLOSEST_SITE /SITE:<SiteName> /ACCOUNT:<AccountName> /RET_DNS /RET_NETBIOS  
/DNSGETDC:<DomainName> - Call DsGetDcOpen/Next/Close /PDC /GC  
    /KDC /WRITABLE /LDAPONLY /FORCE /SITESPEC  
/DSGETFTI:<DomainName> - Call DsGetForestTrustInformation  
    /UPDATE_TDO
```

Run nltest & alert us behind the scene, quick and easy :)

CASEYBCD8.UN.casey.CMD.pvd6nto02timeqnrp8675309.canarytokens.com

# Canarytoken triggered

## ALERT

A DNS Canarytoken has been triggered by the Source IP 192.168.16.1. Please note that the source IP refers to a DNS server, rather than the host that triggered the token.

### Basic Details:

<b>Channel</b>	DNS
<b>Time</b>	2022-12-30 16:37:53 (UTC)
<b>Canarytoken</b>	0mpmy260rq80silluue12345
<b>Token Reminder</b>	Create Token to monitor for nltest.exe at branch offices. This should be a rare command (This token was created to monitor the execution of: nltest.exe)
<b>Token Type</b>	cmd
<b>Source IP</b>	192.168.16.1
<b>Sensitive Command Information</b>	User casey executed "nltest.exe" on the host caseyce69

### Canarytoken Management Details:

**Date:** 2023 Jan 04 16:50:10.019649 (UTC) **IP:** 192.168.32.1 **Channel:** DNS



Known Exit Node	False
-----------------	-------

### Basic Info

Memo	nltest.exe example for Cactus Con
------	-----------------------------------

(This token was created to monitor the execution of: nltest.exe)

User executing command	casey
------------------------	-------


Computer executing command	caseybcd8
----------------------------	-----------

# Verify - Windows 4688 Events

Event 4688, Microsoft Windows security auditing.

General Details

<b>Creator Subject:</b>	
Security ID:	CASEYBCD8\casey
Account Name:	casey
Account Domain:	CASEYBCD8
Logon ID:	0x37105
<b>Target Subject:</b>	
Security ID:	NULL SID
Account Name:	-
Account Domain:	-
Logon ID:	0x0
<b>Process Information:</b>	
New Process ID:	0xaa4
New Process Name:	C:\Windows\System32\nltest.exe
Token Elevation Type:	TokenElevationTypeFull (2)
Mandatory Label:	Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level
Creator Process ID:	0x1e74
Creator Process Name:	C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
Process Command Line:	



# Verify Application Log Event 3000

Event Properties - Event 3000, Process Exit Monitor

X

General Details

The process 'C:\Windows\System32\net.exe' exited with exit code 0. The creation time for the exiting process was 0x01d921e4194136f5.

Log Name: Application  
Source: Process Exit Monitor  
Event ID: 3000  
Level: Information  
User: CASEYBCD8\casey  
OpCode: Info  
More Information: [Event Log Online Help](#)

Logged: 1/6/2023 8:32:34 AM  
Task Category: None  
Keywords:  
Computer: CASEYBCD8

Up  
Down

# Windows Error Reporting (WER)

This token is dependent on WER being enabled.  
Confirm status

## WindowsErrorReporting

<a href="#">Disable-WindowsErrorReporting</a>	Disables Windows Error Reporting.
<a href="#">Enable-WindowsErrorReporting</a>	Enables Windows Error Reporting.
<a href="#">Get-WindowsErrorReporting</a>	Retrieves the Windows Error Reporting status.

# Requirements

- Administrator to install

- Any user can run the command.

- You can reuse the .reg file on multiple machines.

- Any execution of the command creates an alert and sends username / hostname over DNS.

## Use Cases - Candidate EXE's

Short run commands

Rare

Binary doesn't need to be present.

- Watch for psexec.exe or example if your organization never uses it.
- System you cannot install software on, but **can** change a registry key. 3rd Party systems.

## Use Cases - meta

- Same reg file will work across entire organization (DNS will provide computer and user info)
  - Push out to org for simple visibility into e.g., mimikatz.exe invocation
- Lightweight/built-in option for legacy/non-standard systems that don't run baseline EDR, etc.

## ▪ Enhancements

# Filter Decisions - whoami.exe /all

# Live Demo!



# Closing Thoughts

- We can repurpose a malware/offensive technique to create a simple way for teams to get an alert when a executable fires.

One registry key , deployed to all machines, capture user and computer dynamically at run time.

Give it a test? Give us feedback?



Thanks to the Thinkst Team! ❤️ 🤝

We landed this as a team

Idea to Prototype, to Production, to Support






# Closing Thoughts and Resources

<https://blog.thinkst.com/2022/09/sensitive-command-token-so-much-offense.html>

<https://canarytokens.org>

<https://thinkst.com/>

Books we love on  
Research & Engineering



# Check it out, try it!

<https://canarytokens.org/generate>

The screenshot shows the 'Select your token' dropdown menu from the Canary Tokens website. The menu includes:

- Web bug / URL token (Alert when a URL is visited)
- DNS token (Alert when a hostname is requested)
- AWS keys (Alert when AWS key is used)
- Sensitive command token (Alert when a suspicious Windows command is run)
- Microsoft Word document (Get alerted when a document is opened in Microsoft Word)
- Microsoft Excel document (Get alerted when a document is opened in Microsoft Excel)

Below the menu, a green banner states: "Did you know some of the best security teams in the world run Thinkst Canary?" with a "Find out why" button.