


How Did Things Go Right?

RYAN KITCHENS
NETFLIX

| LEARNING MORE FROM INCIDENTS





SRE WORLD


**SLOs
& SLIs**




**Error
Budgets**



**War
Rooms**




**Incident
Reviews**




Failure is so important



@this_hits_home



**Failure is so
important
that it's
no longer
interesting.**




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


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
Failure is the normal state.



**Failure is so
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Failure is the normal state.

We're pretty good
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


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
**Failure is so
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Recovery > prevention.

**The most important
thing we can learn
is how to build the
capacity to encounter
failure successfully.**



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Recovery > prevention.

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
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
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


Recovery > prevention.

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Success isn't the absence of failure.

There is no panacea



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


Recovery > prevention.

Availability is made up
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Success isn't the absence of failure.

There is no panacea
(except for expertise).





@this_hits_home

There is no root cause.



@this_hits_home

**There is no
root cause.**



@this_hits_home

There is no
groot cause.



@this_hits_home

There is no
root cause.



@this_hits_home

~~There is no~~
A PERFECT STORM
~~root cause.~~



@this_hits_home

~~There is no~~
A PERFECT STORM
~~root cause.~~

| EACH NECESSARY,
BUT ONLY JOINTLY SUFFICIENT



 @this_hits_home

**There is no
A PERFECT STORM
root cause.**

multiple contributing factors.

| EACH NECESSARY,
BUT ONLY JOINTLY SUFFICIENT



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SREcon19 Americas Themes

Comprehension

Understandability

Predictability

| NONE OF THESE ARE ENTIRELY POSSIBLE



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SREcon19 Americas Themes

Comprehension

Incidents cannot be fully comprehended.

They are fraught with uncertainty.

Remediation items will contribute to further incidents.

Understandability

Predictability

| NONE OF THESE ARE ENTIRELY POSSIBLE



@this_hits_home

SREcon19 Americas Themes

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Managing the small stuff does not prevent big incidents.

Incidents are not made up of causes. We do not find them; we construct them.

Predictability

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SREcon19 Americas Themes

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Understandability

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Incidents are not made up of causes. We do not find them; we construct them.

Predictability

Learning from the last incident will not allow you to predict the next one.

Complex systems are not deterministic.

Their state cannot be precisely or repeatedly foretold.

NONE OF THESE ARE ENTIRELY POSSIBLE



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Aaron P Blohowiak

@aaronblohowiak

Following



Why do we expect every engineer and operator to be Laplace's Demon?

8:30 AM - 11 Oct 2018



@this_hits_home

TO LEARN MORE FROM INCIDENTS

Ask more ‘how’ than ‘why’



@this_hits_home

5 Whys is a competitive disadvantage.



@this_hits_home

5 Whys is a competitive disadvantage.



There is no root cause.



@this_hits_home


5 Whys is a competitive disadvantage.



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**Make sure
that things
go right**

**Rather than
preventing them
from going wrong**




SAME PROCESS,
DIFFERENT OUTCOMES

 @this_hits_home

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


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


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


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DIFFERENT OUTCOMES

 @this_hits_home

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Normal Work



Workarounds

Non-Compliance

SUCCESS

FAILURE

| SAME PROCESS,
DIFFERENT OUTCOMES

 @this_hits_home

Make sure
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Normal Work



Workarounds

FAILURE

SUCCESS

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DIFFERENT OUTCOMES

@this_hits_home

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Normal Work



Workarounds

Non-Compliance

SUCCESS

FAILURE



| SAME PROCESS,
DIFFERENT OUTCOMES

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Constraining

'PERFORMANCE VARIABILITY'

in order to remove failures will also remove

SUCCESSFUL EVERYDAY WORK!



@this_hits_home



Kitchens

@this_hits_home



what if the real success was the incidents we
made along the way

9:22 PM - 12 Jan 2019





Kitchens


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


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
9:22 PM - 12 Jan 2019







Traditional investigation uses a small portion of the total experience.




@this_hits_home

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Planned Outcomes

What about the 99.999% of the time in which **things go right?**




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
Planned Outcomes


What about the 99.999% of the time in which **things go right?**












**Availability
is perceived.**

Success is often **invisible**



Success is often **invisible**



@this_hits_home

HOW DO WE

SUCCESS AND FAILURE
IS NOT REALLY A DUALITY




@this_hits_home

HOW DO WE

Keep normal work normal

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@this_hits_home

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
Keep normal work normal

AND

KEEP

INCIDENTS
WEIRD?

SUCCESS AND FAILURE
IS NOT REALLY A DUALITY



@this_hits_home

Signups Impact Triggered By Website Going Cattywampus

DETAILS

Type	Incident
Regions	Global
Severity	Major
Signup Impact?	Yes
Notifications	Yes
Source of Detection	Paging Alert

ACTIVITY

Status	STABLE
Assignee	Ryan Kitchens
Watchers	0

DATES

Created	03/25/2019 1:45 PM
Updated	03/25/2019 1:50 PM
Incident Start	03/25/2019 1:40 PM
Incident Detected	03/25/2019 1:41 PM
Stabilization Time	03/25/2019 1:48 PM

DESCRIPTION

We were paged for an abnormal RPS trend which kicked off the investigation. Signup flows were depressed in conjunction with a spike in traffic to the website that sent Node.js into a ‘death spiral’.

During this time, customers would have been experiencing errors when attempting to load the site.

We are still looking into the nature of the requests to surface any patterns that may be helpful.

DO YOUR INCIDENTS GET FILED
OR DO THEY GET READ?



@this_hits_home

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Contributors & Enablers

Mitigators

Risks

Difficulties in Handling

Follow-up Items

Artifacts

Timeline


References

Open Questions

CONTRIBUTORS & ENABLERS
MITIGATORS
RISKS
DIFFICULTIES IN HANDLING
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
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
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OPEN QUESTIONS



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Contributors & Enablers

Mitigators

Risks

Division of labor across teams.

Usage of deprecated property UI over the recommended one.

No type safety or constraints were in place for the property.

The team had confusion about how to revert the property.

Property parser is overly optimistic of intended context.

Clearing massive amounts of individual rules is not trivial.

Afterwards, we still observed short-circuiting on redemption.

No feedback to users on effects of removing rules en masse.

SR rule to handle broken headers.

Only regions in peak traffic window observed the issue.

Website clusters auto-scaled as expected to meet demand.

An old ASG was able to be repurposed into additional capacity.

Rate limiting was observed via recently created dashboards.

New ASG was deployed which patched a bug in the validation.

All relevant teams were alerted to the issue in under one minute.

An engineer discovered the property change by searching events.

Contributors & Enablers

An unstaged, global property change was performed.

Large volume of redemptions during the holiday window.

Invalid rules added to redemption workflows.

Removal of rules contributed to an increase of traffic.

Validate commands started failing in mid-tier APIs.

ID validation was not working as expected.

Recent move to new instance types had unexpected perf.



@this_hits_home

Use of deprecated UI over the recommended one.

No type safety or property constraints.

Risks

Division of labor across teams.

The team had confusion about how to revert.

Property parser is overly optimistic of intended context.

Clearing massive amounts of individual rules is not easy.

Short-circuiting for redemption persisted long after.

No system feedback to users during mass rule removal.

Proxy rules added to handle broken headers.

Only peak traffic regions observed the issue.

Clusters eventually auto-scaled to meet demand.

Old ASG was repurposed into additional capacity.

New ASG deployed to patch a bug in validation.

Rate-limiting observed via recently saved dashboard.

All relevant teams were alerted under 1min to the issue.

A person discovered the change by searching events.

Mitigators

An unstaged, global property changed was performed.

Large volume of redemptions during holiday window.

Invalid rules added to redemption workflows.

Removal of rules contributed to an increase of traffic.

Validate cmd started failing in mid-tier APIs.

Contributors & Enablers

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Unexpected perf from upgrade to new instance types.



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Contributors & Enablers

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
Open Questions

CONTRIBUTORS & ENABLERS


MITIGATORS

RISKS

DIFFICULTIES IN HANDLING



Contributors & Enablers
Mitigators
Risks
Difficulties in Handling
Follow-up Items
Artifacts ‘Islands of Knowledge’
Timeline
References
Open Questions




Contributors & Enablers
Mitigators “I didn’t know
Risks it worked like that.”
Difficulties in Handling
Follow-up Items
Artifacts ‘Islands of Knowledge’
Timeline
References
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- Contributors & Enablers
- Mitigators “I didn’t know it worked like that.”
- Risks
- Difficulties in Handling
- Follow-up Items
- Artifacts ‘Islands of Knowledge’
- Timeline
- References “We didn’t make any changes...
did we?”
- Open Questions



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Artifacts

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MITIGATORS

RISKS

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
ARTIFACTS

FOLLOW-UP ITEMS

REFERENCE

TIMELINE

OPEN QUESTIONS




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Contributors Mitigators Risks Difficulties Follow-up Artifacts Timeline References Open Questions

Maps, Context, and Tribal Knowledge:

On the Structure and Use of Post-Incident Analysis Artifacts in Software Development and Operations

J. Paul Reed | LUND UNIVERSITY



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Mitigation

Risk

Difficulties

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
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16:40	CS contacts about <u>SomeProblem</u> begin.
18:44	First call about the issue is escalated
18:54	confirms there is an increase in CS call volume for the issue.
19:01	team tries to reproduce the problem and determines the problem might involve ...
19:04	<u>Engineer1</u> from Team escalates the issue
19:11	<u>Engineer1</u> creates TICKET-XXX ...
19:28	asks if SomeService is involved in the issue. <u>Engineer1</u> suggests paging <u>ServiceTeam</u> instead.
19:33	<u>Engineer2</u> from ServiceTeam responds.
19:35	Working theory at this point is that ...



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13:06:44 13:15:00 13:30:00 13:45:00 14:00:00 14:15:00 14:30:00




- Critical relayed observation
- Stated hypothesis

Trade-offs Under Pressure: HEURISTICS AND OBSERVATIONS OF TEAMS RESOLVING INTERNET SERVICE OUTAGES

-John Allspaw

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what's going on
WHEN IT SEEMS LIKE
NOTHING
is happening?

KEEP CALM NOTHING IS HAPPENING |



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HOW HARD ARE
people working
JUST TO KEEP THE SYSTEM
HEALTHY?



HOW HARD ARE
people working
JUST TO KEEP THE SYSTEM
HEALTHY?

How do you
THINK ABOUT
feeding this
backUP THE CHAIN?




HOW HARD ARE
people working
JUST TO KEEP THE SYSTEM
HEALTHY?

How do you
THINK ABOUT
feeding this
backUP THE CHAIN?

Or do you NOT
BECAUSE EVERYTHING
looks good?





THE HARDEST PROBLEM IN TECH

YOU HAVE to talk TO PEOPLE!

THERE IS NO GETTING AROUND THIS |



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
Interviews

GETTING FROM
‘why did things go wrong?’
TO ‘how did things go right?’

EVERY EXPERIENCE
IS VALID & ESSENTIAL



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MIND IF I TAKE NOTES?

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Kitchens

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if you say 'root cause' you are a cop

9:53 AM - 5 Mar 2019



UP FOR A QUICK CHAT?

NETFLIX

MAKING
A
MURDERER

Learning TEAMS

HOW DO TEAMS ADAPT SUCCESSFULLY? |



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ASK
BETTER
QUESTIONS



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Interviews

elicit descriptions
to construct **how we got here.**

try to convey **what the world
looked like** from their
perspective.



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How we respond is important.

BEST PRACTICES
ARE NOT REAL PRACTICES

“WE MUST...

Be more careful.

Avoid making
mistakes.

Have more discipline.

Show more
thoughtfulness.”



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How we respond is important.

BEST PRACTICES
ARE NOT REAL PRACTICES

“WE MUST...

~~Be more careful.~~

Avoid ~~making~~
~~mistakes.~~

~~Have more discipline.~~

Show ~~more~~
~~thoughtfulness.”~~



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How we respond is important.

BEST PRACTICES
ARE NOT REAL PRACTICES



‘incidents’ are
SURPRISES



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FUNDAMENTAL
INCIDENTS ARE OFTEN
SURPRISING EVENTS

Takeaways

Recovery > Prevention.

There is no root cause.

Stop reporting on the nines.

Learn how things go right.

Thank you



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<http://continuous.wtf>

