

Robust Real Rate Rules

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Abstract: Central banks wish to avoid self-fulfilling fluctuations. This requires “determinacy”. Monetary rules with a unit response to real rates produce determinate inflation under the weakest possible assumptions about the behaviour of households and firms. They are robust to household heterogeneity, hand to mouth consumers, non-rational household/firm expectations, active fiscal policy, missing transversality conditions and to any form of intertemporal link (Euler equation) or nominal-real link (Phillips curve). These rules: allow the implementation of arbitrary inflation dynamics, including optimal policy; are easy to implement in practice, with bonds of any maturity; and can attain high welfare. The performance of these rules suggests a reversed interpretation of the Phillips equation, explaining its poor forecasting performance, and provides insights into monetary transmission—the Fisher equation is key.

Keywords: robust monetary rules, determinacy, Taylor principle, inflation dynamics, monetary transmission mechanism

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Today you start work as president of the Fictian Central Bank (FCB). As FCB president, you have a clear mandate to stabilize inflation, even if that results in unemployment or output losses. How should you act? You have studied New Keynesian macro, so you are inclined to follow some variant of the Taylor rule. You recall the prescription of the Taylor principle: the response of nominal rates to inflation should be greater than one to ensure determinacy and rule out self-fulfilling fluctuations in inflation. But you also remember reading other papers which talked of the Taylor principle being insufficient if there are hand-to-mouth households (Gali, Lopez-Salido & Valles 2004), firm-specific capital (Sveen & Weinke 2005), high government spending (Natvik 2009), or if the inflation target is positive (Ascari & Ropele 2009), particularly in the presence of trend growth and sticky wages (Khan, Phaneuf & Victor 2019). Indeed, you recollect that the Taylor principle inverts if there are sufficiently many hand-to-mouth households (Bilbiie 2008), certain financial frictions (Manea 2019), or non-rational expectations (Branch & McGough 2010; 2018). You also recall that if real government surpluses do not respond to government debt levels, then following the Taylor principle can lead to explosive inflation (Leeper & Leith 2016; Cochrane 2022). Is there a way you could act to ensure determinacy and stable inflation, even if one or more of these circumstances is true? This paper provides a family of “robust real rate rules” that manage to do this. We then reassess classic questions of monetary economics through the lens of these rules.

To illustrate the idea behind these rules, suppose that both nominal and real bonds are traded in an economy. If a unit of the former is purchased at t , it returns the principal plus a nominal yield of i_t in period $t + 1$. If a unit of the latter is purchased at t , it returns the principal plus a nominal yield of $r_t + \pi_{t+1}$ in period $t + 1$, where π_{t+1} is realized inflation between t and $t + 1$. Abstracting for the moment from inflation risk premia, term premia and liquidity premia, arbitrage between these two markets implies that the Fisher equation must hold, i.e.:

$$i_t = r_t + \mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1}, \quad (1)$$

where $\mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1}$ is the full information rational expectation of period $t + 1$'s inflation rate, given period t 's information. Suppose further than the central bank observes both the nominal and real bond markets, and that it can intervene in the former. Then the central bank can choose to set nominal interest rates according to the simple rule:

$$i_t = r_t + \phi \pi_t, \quad (2)$$

where $\phi > 1$. Combining these two equations gives that:

$$\mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1} = \phi \pi_t,$$

which has a unique non-explosive solution of $\pi_t = 0$.² Determinate inflation!

Why is this robust? Firstly, the rule does not require the aggregate Euler equation to hold, even approximately. For the Fisher equation (1) to hold (still ignoring risk/term/liquidity premia for now), there only need to be two deep pocketed, fully informed, rational agents. Arbitrage takes care of the rest. Even full information is not necessary. Since large markets aggregate information (Hellwig 1980; Lou et al. 2019), the Fisher equation can come to hold even when information about future inflation is dispersed amongst market participants.

Given that the rule does not require the aggregate Euler equation to hold, it is automatically robust to heterogeneity, hand-to-mouth agents and non-rational consumer expectations. The only expectations that matter are the expectations of participants in the markets for nominal and real bonds. It is much more reasonable to assume that financial market outcomes lead to rational expectations than to assume rationality of households more generally.

Secondly, the rule does not require the aggregate Phillips equation to hold. The slope of the Phillips curve will have no impact on the dynamics of inflation. If the FCB

² Here we sidestep the issues raised by Cochrane (2011) and follow the standard New Keynesian literature in assuming agents will always select non-explosive paths for inflation. The escape clause rules of Christiano & Takahashi (2018) are one way by which central banks could ensure coordination on the expectations consistent with non-explosive inflation. We discuss this issue in greater detail in TODO.

president is unconcerned with output, they do not need to know if the Phillips curve holds, let alone its slope. Nor does it matter how firms form inflation expectations. Inflation is pinned down by the Fisher and monetary rules, so while non-rational firm expectations could affect output fluctuations, they will not alter the dynamics of inflation.

This may be surprising. How could price setters fail to determine inflation? The short answer is “Walras’s law”. To see how this plays out, suppose that today all firms decide to double their price. Financial market participants still expect zero inflation next period, because that is the only outcome consistent with non-explosive inflation in future. Thus, financial market participants always value nominal bonds the same as real bonds. But the central bank’s monetary rule instructs it to attempt to produce nominal rates which are much higher than real rates, as today’s inflation is high. So, the central bank wants to sell nominal bonds, i.e., to borrow money from financial market participants.

However, no amount of nominal bond selling will induce market participants to lower their valuation of nominal bonds below that of real bonds, though both valuations may fall together (i.e., both nominal and real rates rise). Thus, the central bank will end up reducing the money supply to zero. With households having zero cash, not all final goods will be sold.³ Thus, the final goods market will not clear. To obtain market clearing in final goods, at least some price setters must reduce their price until inflation is zero, so ensuring that the central bank sets nominal rates equal to real rates.

The rest of this paper further examines such “real rate rules”, along with the classic questions of monetary economics they help answer. The next section generalizes the simple rule of equation (2) along various dimensions, including examining rules that respond to other endogenous variables. We also show that the non-linear version of

³ For example, if there are cash goods and credit goods, only credit goods will be sold.

equation (2) is always consistent with zero inflation. Section 1 goes on to show that there are similar rules that determinately implement an arbitrary path for inflation, robustly across models. It concludes with an examination of when, if ever, real rate rules can produce explosive inflation, with particular reference to active fiscal policy and the fiscal theory of the price level. We show that with long maturity debt, a solution with stable inflation and stable real variables always exists, independent of whether fiscal policy is active or passive. Thus, the fiscal theory of the price level fails to determine a unique outcome.

Section 2 discusses how a real rate rule could be implemented in practice. We show that it is easy to adapt real rate rules to work with longer bonds. In the following section, we examine the performance of these rules in a tractable model of the redistribution channel of monetary policy. This serves several purposes. Firstly, it shows robustness to a monetary transmission mechanism that exists even under flexible prices, and which is present in many heterogeneous agent models. Secondly, the model is so simple that it has an exact analytic solution even in the presence of stochastic volatility. We show that time varying risk premia are not a substantial obstacle to the use of these real rate rules. Thirdly, we are able to use this simple analytic framework to reassess the costs of indeterminacy. Unlike in linearized models, indeterminacy leads to increases in the mean of inflation, not just its variance. Finally, this model will lead us towards a general monetary rule for non-linear economies.

Next, Section 4 looks at the welfare costs of various real rate rule specifications in New Keynesian models. Section 5 looks at the data to see how close existing central bank behaviour is to following a rule of our proposed form. Finally, Section 6 looks at the consequences of the zero lower bound for the performance of these rules.

Literature. Rules like equation (2) have appeared in Adão, Correia & Teles (2011), Lubik, Matthes & Mertens (2019) and Holden (2021) amongst other places. However, in the prior literature they have chiefly been introduced for analytic convenience,

rather than as serious proposals. One exception is the work of Cochrane (2017; 2022) who briefly discusses rules of this form within the context of a wider discussion of rules that hold $i_t - r_t$ constant (i.e. rules with $\phi = 0$). Cochrane (2018) further explores rules holding $i_t - r_t$ constant.

The “indexed payment on reserve” rules of Hall & Reis (2016) also rely on observable real rates, but use a different mechanism to achieve determinacy. They propose that the CB issues an asset (“reserves”) with nominal return from \$1 of $$(1 + r_t) \frac{p_{t+1}}{p_t^*}$ or $$(1 + i_t) \frac{p_t}{p_t^*}$. Additionally, in older work, Hetzel (1990) proposes using the spread between nominal and real bonds to guide monetary policy, and Dowd (1994) proposes targeting the price of futures contracts on the price level, which has a similar flavour to our rules, since our rules effectively use expected inflation as the instrument of monetary policy.$

There is also an established literature looking at rules tracking the efficient real interest rate, see e.g. Cúrdia et al. (2015). This is a very different idea.

1 Generalizations and generality

This section establishes the robustness of real rate rules, and considers assorted generalizations. We look at real rate rules 1) in non-linear models, 2) in the presence of monetary policy shocks, 3) in the three equation NK model, 4) with responses to other endogenous variables, 5) with time varying inflation targets, and 6) under active fiscal policy.

1.1 Non-linear models

Our introductory example was in a linearized model. Do real rate rules still work in fully non-linear ones?

Suppose that Ξ_t is the real stochastic discount factor between period t and period $t + 1$, and that I_t is the gross nominal interest rate (so $i_t = \log I_t$) and that R_t is the gross

real interest rate (so $r_t = \log R_t$). Then the pricing equations for nominal and real bonds imply:

$$I_t \mathbb{E}_t \frac{\Xi_{t+1}}{\Pi_{t+1}} = 1, \quad R_t \mathbb{E}_t \Xi_{t+1} = 1.$$

The natural nonlinear version of equation (2) is the following rule:

$$I_t = R_t \Pi \left(\frac{\Pi_t}{\Pi} \right)^\phi.$$

Combining this rule with the bond pricing equations implies that:

$$\mathbb{E}_t \frac{\Xi_{t+1}}{\Pi_{t+1}} = \frac{\mathbb{E}_t \Xi_{t+1}}{\Pi} \left(\frac{\Pi}{\Pi_t} \right)^\phi,$$

so:

$$\mathbb{E}_t \frac{\Xi_{t+1}}{\mathbb{E}_t \Xi_{t+1}} \frac{\Pi}{\Pi_{t+1}} = \left(\frac{\Pi}{\Pi_t} \right)^\phi.$$

It is easy to see that $\Pi_t = \Pi$ is always one solution of this equation, as $\mathbb{E}_t \frac{\Xi_{t+1}}{\mathbb{E}_t \Xi_{t+1}} = 1$. Thus, robust real rate rules are always consistent with stable inflation, even in fully non-linear models. If Ξ_{t+1} is known to be uncorrelated with Π_{t+1} conditional on period t information, then the SDF drops out of this equation, and uniqueness follows from the result established in Appendix A.6. Unfortunately, we cannot prove global uniqueness without specifying a complete model that determines how Ξ_t responds to Π_t . Since the log-linearized model always has a unique solution, it is likely that any multiplicity must be pretty pathological.⁴ Due to the difficulty of working analytically with non-linear models, we switch back to linear ones for the rest of this section. We further examine the impacts of non-linearity in subsequent sections.

⁴ For example, there is multiplicity if it happens that $\Xi_{t+1} = \kappa_t \left(\frac{\Pi}{\Pi_{t+1}} \right)^{\log\left(\frac{\Pi}{\Pi_t}\right) - \frac{1}{2}}$ for some κ_t known at t . An additional solution then has $\log\left(\frac{\Pi}{\Pi_t}\right)$ normally distributed with mean zero and variance ϕ . The author thanks Iván Werning for this counterexample.

1.2 Monetary policy shocks

While the simple rule (2) always produces zero inflation, slight extensions of the rule allow inflation to move. For example, we may add a monetary policy shock, ζ_t to the rule, giving:

$$i_t = r_t + \phi\pi_t + \zeta_t. \quad (3)$$

Monetary policy shocks may perhaps reflect the central bank's limited information. If the central bank does not perfectly observe current inflation, and sets interest rates to $i_t = r_t + \phi\tilde{\pi}_t$, where $\tilde{\pi}_t$ is its signal about inflation, then it will end up setting a slightly different level for nominal rates than that dictated by the rule $i_t = r_t + \phi\pi_t$, effectively generating monetary policy shocks.⁵

The central bank might also deliberately decide to introduce monetary policy shocks correlated with the economy's structural shocks. For example, by lowering $i_t - r_t$ following a positive mark-up or cost-push shock, the central bank can lessen the movement in the output gap.⁶ This has no effect on the determinacy region as structural shocks are exogenous. For now though, we assume that ζ_t is independent of other structural shocks.

From combining (3) with the Fisher equation (1) we have:

$$\mathbb{E}_t\pi_{t+1} = \phi\pi_t + \zeta_t,$$

which (with $\phi > 1$) has the unique solution $\pi_t = -\frac{1}{\phi - \rho_\zeta}\zeta_t$, if ζ_t follows an AR(1) process with persistence ρ_ζ .

A contractionary (positive) monetary policy shock results in a fall in inflation, as expected. If the central bank is more aggressive, so ϕ is larger, then inflation is less volatile. Only monetary policy shocks affect inflation. Of course, if there is a nominal

⁵ Lubik, Matthes & Mertens (2019) look at the determinacy consequences of a central bank that filters inflation signals in order to retrieve the optimal estimate. The determinacy problems they highlight all disappear if the central bank directly responds to its signal.

⁶ Ireland (2007) presents evidence that the US Federal Reserve has reacted to mark-up shocks.

rigidity in the model, such as sticky prices or wages, monetary shocks may have an impact on real variables. But as long as the central bank follows rules like this, these real disruptions have no feedback to inflation. We can understand inflation without worrying about the rest of the economy.

In line with this, an extensive body of empirical evidence finds no role for the Phillips curve in forecasting inflation (see e.g. Atkeson & Ohanian 2001; Ang, Bekaert & Wei 2007; Stock & Watson 2009; Dotsey, Fujita & Stark 2018). In a recent contribution, Dotsey, Fujita & Stark (2018) find that in the post-1984 period, Phillips curve based forecasts perform worse than those of a simple IMA(1,1) model, both unconditionally and conditional on various measures of the state of the economy. This provides strong support for models in which the causation in the Phillips curve runs in only one direction: from inflation to the output gap.⁷

Additionally, Miranda-Agrippino & Ricco (2021) find that a contractionary monetary policy shock causes an immediate fall in the price level, while impacts on unemployment materialise much more slowly. Again, this suggests that causation in the Phillips curve runs from inflation to unemployment, not the other way round.

1.3 Robust real rate rules in the three equation NK world

To understand how our robust rule in equation (3) can explain causation running from inflation to the output gap in the Phillips curve, suppose the rest of the model comprises the Phillips curve:⁸

$$\pi_t = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1} + \kappa x_t + \kappa \omega_t, \quad (4)$$

and the discounted/compounded Euler equation:

⁷ McLeay & Tenreiro (2019) provide an alternative explanation based on the fact that optimal policy prescribes a negative correlation between inflation and output, making difficult empirical identification of the Phillips curve.

⁸ Throughout this paper, we multiply the mark-up shock by κ as the ratio of the response to x_t and the response to ω_t is not a function of either the (Calvo) price adjustment probability or the (Rotemberg) price adjustment cost. See Khan (2005) for derivations.

$$x_t = \delta \mathbb{E}_t x_{t+1} - \varsigma(r_t - n_t), \quad (5)$$

where x_t is the output gap, ω_t is a mark-up/cost-push shock, and n_t is the exogenous natural real rate of interest. This form of discounted/compounded Euler equation appears in Bilbiie (2019) and (under discounting) in McKay, Nakamura & Steinsson (2017). The latter paper shows it provides a good approximation to a heterogeneous agent model with incomplete markets. The standard Euler equation is recovered if $\delta = 1$ and ς is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. This specification also nests the limited asset market participation or “TANK” model of Bilbiie (2008) when $\delta = 1$, but ς is allowed to be negative.

Since $\pi_t = -\frac{1}{\phi - \rho_\zeta} \zeta_t$, and ζ_t is AR(1) with persistence ρ_ζ , the Phillips curve (4) implies that $x_t = -\frac{1}{\kappa} \frac{1 - \beta \rho_\zeta}{\phi - \rho_\zeta} \zeta_t - \omega_t$. The Phillips curve is determining the output gap, given the already determined level of inflation. Does x_t help forecast π_t here? Clearly no. $\mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1} = -\frac{1}{\phi - \rho_\zeta} \mathbb{E}_t \zeta_{t+1} = -\frac{\rho_\zeta}{\phi - \rho_\zeta} \zeta_t = \rho_\zeta \pi_t$. Once you know π_t , you already have all the information you need to form the optimal forecast of π_{t+1} . The correlation in π_t and x_t provides no extra information.⁹

This model also enables us to show the robustness of our rule’s determinacy in practice. Note that with x_t expressed as a linear combination of exogenous variables, there is no need to solve the Euler equation (5) forward, so the degree of discounting (δ) can have no effect on determinacy. Not needing to solve the Euler equation forward also gives robustness to a missing transversality constraint on household assets. For example, if ω_t is independent across time, then the Euler equation implies $r_t = n_t + \frac{1}{\varsigma} \left[\frac{1}{\kappa} \frac{(1 - \beta \rho_\zeta)(1 - \delta \rho_\zeta)}{\phi - \rho_\zeta} \zeta_t + \omega_t \right]$. This contrasts with the results of Bilbiie (2019) who finds that when $\varsigma > 0$ and $\tilde{\beta} \leq 1$, the Taylor principle ($\phi > 1$) is only sufficient for determinacy in the discounting case ($\delta \leq 1$),¹⁰ and with Bilbiie (2008) who finds that when $\delta = 1$ and $\varsigma < 0$, the Taylor principle ($\phi > 1$) is neither necessary nor sufficient

⁹ This result is robust to generalizing to an ARMA(1,1) process for ζ_t . See Appendix A.1.

¹⁰ See equation (40) of Appendix C.1 of Bilbiie (2019).

for determinacy.¹¹ Under our rule (3), the Taylor principle is necessary and sufficient for determinacy whether there is discounting or compounding, and whether ς is positive or negative (given $\phi \geq 0$).¹²

The rule is also robust to the presence of lags in the Euler or Phillips curve. For example, suppose the Phillips curve and Euler equation are instead given by:

$$\begin{aligned}\pi_t &= \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi)\mathbb{E}_t\pi_{t+1} + \tilde{\beta}\varrho_\pi\pi_{t-1} + \kappa x_t + \kappa\omega_t, \\ x_t &= \tilde{\delta}(1 - \varrho_x)\mathbb{E}_tx_{t+1} + \tilde{\delta}\varrho_xx_{t-1} - \varsigma(r_t - n_t),\end{aligned}\tag{6}$$

where $\tilde{\beta}$ and $\tilde{\delta}$ may not have the same structural interpretation as β and δ (depending on the precise micro-foundation). These equations have no impact on the solution for inflation, which remains $\pi_t = -\frac{1}{\phi - \rho_\varsigma}\zeta_t$. Instead, the lag in the Euler equation changes the dynamics of real interest rate, with no impact on inflation or output gaps, while the lag in the Phillips curve affects both output gap and real rate dynamics, with no impact on inflation. For example, if ζ_t 's law of motion is given by $\zeta_t = \rho_\varsigma\zeta_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{\zeta,t}$, where $\mathbb{E}_{t-1}\varepsilon_{\zeta,t} = 0$, then:

$$x_t = \frac{1}{\kappa} \frac{1}{\phi - \rho_\varsigma} \left[\left(\tilde{\beta}\varrho_\pi - \rho_\varsigma(1 - \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi)\rho_\varsigma) \right) \zeta_{t-1} - (1 - \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi)\rho_\varsigma) \varepsilon_{\zeta,t} \right] - \omega_t.$$

As before, the output gap has a closed form solution in terms of the monetary policy and cost push shocks. Despite appearances, inflation is not a true endogenous state, as it must always equal $-\frac{1}{\phi - \rho_\varsigma}\zeta_t$. Monetary policy shocks are still always contractionary, but they only have a short-lived impact on the output gap if ϱ_π is around $\frac{\rho_\varsigma(1 - \beta\rho_\varsigma)}{\beta(1 - \rho_\varsigma^2)}$.

1.4 Responding to other endogenous variables

The original Taylor rule contained a response to output. Even with a unit coefficient on the real interest rate, responding to output will change the determinacy conditions, though it still preserves some robustness. To see this, consider the monetary rule:

¹¹ See Proposition 7 of Appendix B.1 of Bilbiie (2008).

¹² In Appendix A.2 we prove that this is robust to monetary responses to the real rate which are not exactly equal to 1. This is also a corollary of the more general result prove in Appendix A.4.

$$i_t = r_t + \phi_\pi \pi_t + \phi_x x_t + \zeta_t.$$

Assuming the lag-augmented NK Phillips curve (6) continues to hold, this monetary rule is equivalent to the rule:

$$i_t = r_t + \phi_\pi \pi_t + \kappa^{-1} \phi_x [\pi_t - \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi) \mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1} - \tilde{\beta} \varrho_\pi \pi_{t-1}] - \phi_x \omega_t + \zeta_t.$$

(This is produced by using the Phillips curve to substitute out the output gap.)

Combined with the Fisher equation, we have that:

$$\mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1} = \phi_\pi \pi_t + \kappa^{-1} \phi_x [\pi_t - \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi) \mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1} - \tilde{\beta} \varrho_\pi \pi_{t-1}] - \phi_x \omega_t + \zeta_t.$$

This has a determinate solution if the quadratic:

$$[1 + \kappa^{-1} \phi_x \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi)] A^2 - (\phi_\pi + \kappa^{-1} \phi_x) A + \kappa^{-1} \phi_x \tilde{\beta} \varrho_\pi = 0$$

has a unique solution for A inside the unit circle. It is sufficient that the quadratic is positive at $A = -1$ but negative at $A = 1$, which holds if and only if:

$$1 + \kappa^{-1} \phi_x (1 + \tilde{\beta}) + \phi_\pi > 0,$$

$$1 - \kappa^{-1} \phi_x (1 - \tilde{\beta}) - \phi_\pi < 0.$$

So, if $\kappa > 0$, $\phi_x > 0$ and $\tilde{\beta} \in [0,1]$ as expected, then it is sufficient that $\phi_\pi > 1$ as before.¹³ This is still considerable robustness. Providing there is something like a Phillips curve linking inflation and the output gap, the standard $\phi_\pi > 1$ condition will be sufficient for determinacy. This would not hold with a more standard monetary rule without a response to real rates: in that case determinacy depends on $\tilde{\delta}$ and ζ , as shown by the Bilbiie (2008; 2019) results discussed in the last subsection.

Responding to real rates provides additional robustness even with a response to output as it disconnects the Euler equation from the rest of the model. The only remaining role of the Euler equation is to give a path for real rates, given the already determined paths of output and inflation. The Fisher equation, not the Euler equation is central to monetary policy transmission under real rate rules.

¹³ This is stronger than necessary. The second condition states that $\phi_\pi + \kappa^{-1} \phi_x (1 - \tilde{\beta}) > 1$ so a response to the output gap can substitute for a response to inflation. This condition is identical to that for the standard (purely forward looking) three equation NK model with Taylor type rule found in Woodford (2001).

For greater robustness, the central bank can replace the response to the output gap with a response to the cost push shock ω_t . With an appropriate response to ω_t , this is observationally equivalent to responding to the output gap, but ensures determinacy under the standard Taylor principle.

However, it may be hard for the central bank to observe the cost push shock. To get round this, suppose that the central bank knows that a Phillips curve in the form of equation (6) holds. (Our results would generalize to other links between real and nominal variables.) For now, suppose the central bank also knows the coefficients in equation (6). Then the central bank could use a rule of the form:

$$i_t = r_t + \phi_\pi \pi_t + \phi_x [x_t - \kappa^{-1} [\pi_t - \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi) \mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1} - \tilde{\beta} \varrho_\pi \pi_{t-1}]] + \zeta_t.$$

By equation (6), this implies that:

$$i_t = r_t + \phi_\pi \pi_t - \phi_x \omega_t + \zeta_t,$$

as desired. Of course, the central bank is also unlikely to know the exact coefficients in the Phillips curve. However, we show in Appendix A.3 that the central bank may learn these coefficients in real time, without changing the determinacy conditions, at least under reasonable parameter restrictions.¹⁴

If the central bank wishes to respond to other endogenous variables, a similar approach should be possible if they are aware of the broad form of the model's structural equations. However, the central bank may legitimately worry about having fundamental misconceptions about how the economy works. They can be reassured though that the Taylor principle will be enough for determinacy if the response to other endogenous variables is small enough, no matter the form of the model's other equations. We prove this in Appendix A.4. This also implies that a precise unit response to real rates is not needed for determinacy. Real rates are just another

¹⁴ It is sufficient (but not necessary) that $\phi_x \geq 0$, $\phi_\pi \geq 0$, $\kappa \geq 0$, $\tilde{\beta} \in [0,1]$, $\varrho_\pi \in [0,1]$, $\rho_\zeta \in [0,1]$ and $\phi_\pi > \max \left\{ \frac{1}{\tilde{\beta}(1-\varrho_\pi)}, 2(1-\varrho_\pi), \frac{\phi_x(1+\tilde{\beta})}{\kappa} \right\}$.

endogenous variable, so determinacy only requires a response that is sufficiently close to one.

Classic results on determinacy in monetary models can be reinterpreted through this lens. Even if the central bank is not responding to real interest rates, it is still likely to be responding to variables that are highly correlated with them. For example, many models contain an Euler equation of the form:

$$1 = \beta(\exp r_t) \mathbb{E}_t \left(\frac{C_t}{C_{t+1}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\varsigma}},$$

where C_t is real consumption per capita and ς is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Additionally, in many models, in equilibrium, consumption growth roughly follows an ARMA(1,1) process:

$$g_t := \log \left(\frac{C_t}{C_{t-1}} \right) = (1 - \rho_g)g + \rho_g g_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{g,t} + \theta_g \varepsilon_{g,t-1}, \quad \varepsilon_{g,t} \sim N(0, \sigma_g^2).$$

(This is a good approximation to US post-war data.¹⁵) Combining these two equations gives that:

$$r_t = -\log \beta + \frac{1 - \rho_g}{\varsigma} g - \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{\sigma_g}{\varsigma} \right)^2 + \frac{\rho_g}{\varsigma} g_t + \frac{\theta_g}{\varsigma} \varepsilon_{g,t},$$

implying that a (roughly) $\frac{\rho_g}{\varsigma}$ response to consumption growth can substitute for a (roughly) unit response to real rates. Of course, output (growth, level or gap) is in turn highly correlated with consumption growth, so output (growth, level or gap) may also substitute for real rates. For example, in the Smets & Wouters (2007) model of the US economy, the monetary rule is of the form $i_t = \phi_\pi \pi_t + z_t + \zeta_t$, where z_t is a linear combination of other endogenous variables and ζ_t is the monetary shock. At the estimated posterior mode, the correlation between z_t and the real interest rate is 0.63, with both variables having standard deviation of 0.46%. Thus, the Smets & Wouters

¹⁵ Estimating on US data from 1947Q1 to 2021Q4 (BEA series: A794RX) with T-distributed shocks gives $\rho_g = 0.69$, $\theta_g = -0.50$ with p-values both below 10^{-5} . Estimating with Gaussian shocks on less volatile sub-periods gives similar results.

(2007) estimates imply that the Fed is already about two thirds of the way to using a simple robust real rate rule.

1.5 Implementing arbitrary inflation dynamics

Real rate rules can determinately implement any path for inflation, no matter the rest of the model. This implies they can also implement optimal policy, and so attain high welfare. It also implies that any observed inflation and interest rate dynamics are consistent with a real rate rule.

Let π_t^* be an exogenous stochastic process, perhaps a function of the economy's other shocks,¹⁶ and consider the rule:

$$i_t = r_t + \mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1}^* + \phi(\pi_t - \pi_t^*). \quad (7)$$

From the Fisher equation (1), this implies:

$$\mathbb{E}_t(\pi_{t+1} - \pi_{t+1}^*) = \phi(\pi_t - \pi_t^*).$$

Again with $\phi > 1$, there is a unique solution, now with $\pi_t = \pi_t^*$. I.e., at all periods of time, and in all states of the world, realised inflation is equal to π_t^* . Effectively, the central bank is able to choose an arbitrary path for inflation as the unique, determinate equilibrium outcome.

The only constraint is that the targeted path for inflation cannot be a function of endogenous variables. However, this is not much of a limitation, since in stationary equilibrium, endogenous variables must have a representation as a function of the infinite history of the economy's shocks. This means that by choosing π_t^* appropriately, rules in the form of (7) can mimic the outcomes of any other monetary policy regime.¹⁷

¹⁶ Ireland (2007) also allows the central bank's inflation target to respond to other structural shocks.

¹⁷ Other papers have examined the implementation of optimal policy in specific models using instrument rate rules (see e.g. Svensson & Woodford 2003; Dotsey & Hornstein 2006; Evans & Honkapohja 2006; Evans & McGough 2010). However, the various prior proposals do not enable the implementation of a certain inflation path robustly across models.

For example, suppose that the central bank were to set interest rates in a different (though time invariant) way, for example by using another rule, or by adopting optimal policy under either commitment or discretion, given some objective. For simplicity, suppose further that the economy's equilibrium conditions are linear, e.g., because we are working under a first order approximation. Let $(\varepsilon_{1,t}, \dots, \varepsilon_{N,t})_{t \in \mathbb{Z}}$ be the set of structural shocks in the economy,¹⁸ all of which are assumed mean zero and independent both of each other, and over time. Finally, assume that the central bank's behaviour produces stationary inflation, $\tilde{\pi}_t$, with the \sim denoting that this is inflation under the alternative monetary regime. Then, by linearity and stationarity, there must exist a constant $\tilde{\pi}^*$ and coefficients $(\theta_{1,k}, \dots, \theta_{N,k})_{k \in \mathbb{N}}$ such that:

$$\tilde{\pi}_t = \tilde{\pi}^* + \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \sum_{n=1}^N \theta_{n,k} \varepsilon_{n,t-k},$$

with $\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \theta_{n,k}^2 < \infty$ for $n = 1, \dots, N$. So, if the central bank sets:

$$\pi_t^* = \tilde{\pi}^* + \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \sum_{n=1}^N \theta_{n,k} \varepsilon_{n,t-k},$$

(exogenous!) and uses the rule (7), then for all t and in all states of the world, $\pi_t = \pi_t^* = \tilde{\pi}_t$. Moreover, this implies in turn that all the endogenous variables in the two economies must be identical in all periods and in all states of the world.¹⁹

This has two important implications. Firstly, it means that appropriately designed real rate rules can implement (timeless/unconditional/etc.) optimal policy, and thus attain the highest possible level of welfare. Secondly, it means that it is impossible to test empirically if a central bank is using a general real rate rule. Any dynamics of inflation and interest rates are consistent with a real rate rule like (7), for an appropriately chosen π_t^* . Thus, real rate rules are observationally equivalent to any other specification for central bank behaviour. While in the last subsection we found that the

¹⁸ This may include sunspot shocks if they are added following Farmer, Khramov & Nicolò (2015).

¹⁹ Proven in Appendix A.5.

Fed was not exactly using a simple real rate rule, we now see that a slightly more sophisticated real rate rule could fully explain Fed behaviour.

The only slight difficulty with setting π_t^* as a function of structural shocks is that the central bank may struggle to observe these shocks. The central bank can certainly observe linear combinations of structural shocks, via estimating a VAR with sufficiently many lags. For variables that are plausibly contemporaneously exogenous, such as commodity prices for a small(ish) economy, this is already sufficient to recover the corresponding structural shock. To infer other shocks, the central bank needs to know more about the structure of the economy. However, we do not need to assume any more than is standard in rational expectations models. Forming rational expectations requires you to know the structure of the economy; if you know this structure, then you know the mapping from the reduced form shocks estimated by a VAR to the model's structural shocks.²⁰ Additionally, it is common to assume that the central bank responds to an output gap constructed by comparing outcomes to an economy without price rigidity. This already requires the central bank to know the values of all parameters and structural shocks.

1.6 Avoiding over determinacy and explosive inflation

As long as the Fisher equation holds, robust real rate rules can never fail to rule out sunspots. However, in an economy in which the price level is determinate independent of monetary policy, they may produce explosive inflation.²¹ This is true of any monetary rule respecting the Taylor principle, not just the real rate rules we examine

²⁰ This mapping may not be unique valued if there are more shocks than observables. However, since we expect a relatively small number of shocks to explain the bulk of business cycle variance, this is unlikely to be problematic in practice.

²¹ Note: it is certainly not the case though that in any model in which an interest rate peg is determinate, a real rate rule would produce explosive inflation. For example, in the New Keynesian model with a discounted Euler equation, from Subsection 1.1, if $\delta \in \left(-\frac{1+\beta+\kappa\zeta}{1+\beta}, \frac{1-\beta-\kappa\zeta}{1-\beta}\right)$ then an interest rate peg is determinate. We saw that the real rate rule is also determinate (and non-explosive) in this model.

in this paper. Inflation becomes “over determined”, and an explosive solution is all that remains.

For example, suppose that government debt is all one period and nominal, and that real government surpluses are not responsive to government debt levels, meaning fiscal policy is “active”. Then the price level is pinned down by the government debt valuation equation (see e.g. Cochrane (2022)), in line with the fiscal theory of the price level. In particular, to a first order approximation with flexible prices and constant real interest rates:²²

$$\pi_t - \mathbb{E}_{t-1}\pi_t = -\varepsilon_{s,t}, \quad (8)$$

where $\varepsilon_{s,t}$ is an exogenous shock to the present value of real government surpluses, scaled by the value of outstanding real government debt, with $\mathbb{E}_{t-1}\varepsilon_{s,t} = 0$. Suppose in this world that the central bank did follow the basic real rate rule $i_t = r_t + \phi\pi_t + \varepsilon_{\zeta,t}$, where $\mathbb{E}_{t-1}\varepsilon_{\zeta,t} = 0$. Then, from the Fisher equation, $\mathbb{E}_{t-1}\pi_t = \phi\pi_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{\zeta,t-1}$, implying from (8) that:

$$\pi_t = \phi\pi_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{\zeta,t-1} - \varepsilon_{s,t}.$$

With $\phi > 1$, this is an explosive process.

This can also happen in carefully constructed models in which the fiscal theory of the price level does not hold. We give a simple two agent, flexible price, example in Appendix TODO, with no government debt, taxes or spending.

How big a threat is this to the robustness of real rate rules? We need to understand under what conditions following the Taylor principle leads to explosive inflation. Suppose as before then that the central bank follows the simple real rate rule $i_t = r_t + \phi\pi_t + \varepsilon_{\zeta,t}$. We also assume the Fisher equation holds, but we make zero assumptions on the form of the rest of the model. First define the expectational error, $\eta_t := \pi_t - \mathbb{E}_{t-1}\pi_t$. By construction, $\mathbb{E}_{t-1}\eta_t = 0$. In a linearized model, in equilibrium η_t must be a

²² See Cochrane (2022), Subsection 2.5 and following.

linear combination of the model's structural shocks. So, we can always decompose η_t as $\eta_t = \alpha \varepsilon_{\zeta,t} + \nu_t$, where $\mathbb{E}_{t-1} \nu_t \varepsilon_{\zeta,t} = 0$ and $\mathbb{E}_{t-1} \nu_t = 0$. Thus, from the monetary rule:

$$\pi_t - \mathbb{E}_{t-1} \pi_t = \alpha(i_t - r_t - \phi \pi_t) + \nu_t.$$

Combining this with the Fisher equation then implies that:

$$(1 + \alpha \phi) \pi_t - \mathbb{E}_{t-1} \pi_t = \alpha \mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1} + \nu_t.$$

Then from taking expectations conditional on $t - 1$ information we have:

$$\alpha \phi e_{t-1} = \alpha \mathbb{E}_{t-1} e_t,$$

where $e_t := \mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1}$.

There are now two cases. If $\alpha \neq 0$, meaning that monetary policy shocks cause either unexpected inflation or disinflation, then $\phi e_t = \mathbb{E}_t e_{t+1}$. With $\phi > 1$, this has the unique non-explosive solution $e_t = 0$, implying that $\eta_t = \pi_t = \alpha \varepsilon_{\zeta,t} + \nu_t$. This is stable, determinate inflation.

However, if $\alpha = 0$, then:

$$\pi_t = \mathbb{E}_{t-1} \pi_t + \eta_t = i_{t-1} - r_{t-1} + \nu_t = \phi \pi_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{\zeta,t-1} + \nu_t,$$

from (in turn) the definition of η_t , the Fisher equation, the decomposition of η_t and the monetary rule. If $\phi > 1$, this is explosive "over determined" inflation. Note that as in our one period debt, fiscal theory of the price level example, monetary policy shocks do not have any contemporaneous effect on inflation.

This establishes that the only situation in which a real rate rule is inconsistent with stable inflation is if monetary policy shocks have no contemporaneous impact on inflation. This is important for two reasons.

Firstly, it suggests that only in an unlikely, knife edge, case will following the Taylor principle guarantee explosive inflation. A minor change in price/wage stickiness, debt maturity structure, or the introduction of a small cost channel of monetary policy will likely introduce at least some correlation between monetary policy shocks and current inflation, restoring the existence of an equilibrium with stable inflation. Of course, there may also still be other equilibria with explosive inflation, but if we continue to

assume that agents always pick an equilibrium with stable inflation if one exists, then that will be the result.

For example, suppose that the government issues multi-period (geometric coupon) debt, and that both monetary and fiscal policy are active (i.e., real government surpluses do not respond to debt, and the monetary rule satisfies the Taylor principle). Based on results with one period debt, researchers have tended to assume that this “active-active” combination will inevitably produce explosive inflation. This is incorrect. In Appendix C.1 we examine the equilibria of a non-linear model with multi-period debt under flexible prices. We show that under active fiscal policy, there is a valid equilibrium in which real variables and inflation are stable and independent of surpluses, whether or not monetary policy is active. These equilibria feature a growing bubble in the price of government debt which is balanced by declining debt quantities. The initial debt price jumps to ensure the transversality condition is still satisfied, giving a “Fiscal Theory of the Debt Price”. Under passive monetary policy, this implies multiple equilibria, contrary to the usual claim that active fiscal policy ensures unique outcomes (which is again only true with one period debt). In Appendix C.2 we show that these results also hold in a linearised model with sticky prices.

Secondly, our previous result gives central banks a simple test of whether they live in a world in which following the Taylor principle always produces explosive inflation. The central bank can adopt a real rate rule, with ϕ not much larger than 1, and can deliberately introduce small monetary policy shocks. It then just needs to statistically test whether the correlation between its monetary shock and current inflation is zero. With ϕ sufficiently close to 1, the sample size for the test will be large enough to have high power before π_t is excessively high. If the correlation is non-zero, then following the Taylor principle will not produce explosive inflation, and the central bank can then adopt a larger ϕ should it desire. If the correlation is estimated at zero, then the central

bank should adopt $\phi < 1$ as it must be in an economy like that under the fiscal theory of the price level with one period debt. Miranda-Agrippino & Ricco (2021) find unambiguous evidence of a negative contemporaneous impact of US monetary shocks on inflation. Thus, if the Fed is currently using a real rate rule—something we cannot rule out, due to observational equivalence—it can be confident that setting $\phi > 1$ is consistent with stable inflation.

2 Practical implementation of real rate rules

Until recently, central banks concentrated their monetary interventions in overnight debt markets. However, with the rise of quantitative easing, many central banks have been purchasing substantial quantities of longer maturity sovereign debt. There is no reason then that central banks could not conduct open market operations to fix the interest rate on longer maturity bonds. This is convenient as in most countries, inflation protected securities are only issued a few times per year, and at long maturities, e.g., five years. As a result, markets in shorter maturity inflation protected securities may be illiquid or even unavailable, and it can be difficult to reconstruct the short end of the real yield curve. Inflation indexation lags further complicate the use of short maturity inflation protected securities (see e.g. Gürkaynak, Sack & Wright (2010)). For example, 3-month maturity US treasury inflation protected securities (TIPS) have a period t realized yield of $r_{t-1} + \pi_{t-1}$, not $r_{t-1} + \pi_t$ as one would hope, where time is measured in quarters.

In practice, the central bank's trading desk would be tasked with maintaining a particular level of the gap between nominal and real rates according to the market for bonds of a certain maturity. For the rest of this section, we shall assume five-year bonds are used, since five-year TIPS are the shortest maturity issued in the US.

So, let i_t be the nominal yield per-period on a five-year sovereign bond at t , and r_t be the real yield per-period on a five-year inflation protected bond from the same issuer. As ever, t indexes time. The units of time do not need to coincide with the maturity of

the bond. In particular, t may be measured in months, quarters or years, in which case i_t is the nominal yield per-month, per-quarter or per-year, respectively. Let T be the number of periods in five years. For example, T may be 60 if periods are months.

We also allow for the possibility that inflation is not observed contemporaneously. For example, US CPI is observed with a one-month lag. To capture this, while keeping to the convention that $\mathbb{E}_t v_t = v_t$ for all t -dated endogenous variables v_t , we assume that market participants and the central bank use the $t - L$ information set in period t (i.e. they know the values of all $t - L, t - L - 1, \dots$ dated variables), for some $L \geq 0$. Thus, since the central bank does not know π_t at t , we instead assume that they respond to deviations of π_{t-L} from target, rather than π_t .

We allow for a shock in the Fisher equation to capture inflation risk premia, liquidity premia, asymmetric term premia and even further departures from full information rational expectations amongst market participants. Since only $t - L$ dated variables are known in period t , we denote the period t value of this shock by ν_{t-L} . I.e., risk premia (etc.) will be determined L periods in advance, though market participants and the central bank will not act on this, since they use L period old data. Given this, the Fisher equation coming from arbitrage between nominal and real bonds then states that:

$$i_t - r_t = \nu_{t-L} + \mathbb{E}_{t-L} \frac{1}{T} \sum_{k=1}^T \pi_{t+k},$$

where ν_{t-L} is the aforementioned shock to risk premia (etc.). We only require that ν_t is a stationary process.

TODO Allow for indexation lags in TIPS

Slightly generalizing our previous rule (6), we suppose that the central bank intervenes in five-year nominal bond markets to ensure that it is always the case that:

$$i_t - r_t = \bar{\nu}_{t-L} + \mathbb{E}_{t-L} \frac{1}{T} \sum_{k=1}^T \pi_{t+k}^* + \phi(\pi_{t-L} - \pi_{t-L}^*),$$

where $\bar{\nu}_{t-L}$ is the central bank's period t belief about the level of ν_{t-L} .

We have deliberately not added any interest rate smoothing. While such smoothing is often believed to be a relevant feature of real-world central bank behaviour, in our context it adds nothing. Smooth paths for interest rates may be produced from a smooth target path for π_t^* .²³

Also note that while under conventional monetary policy, targeted nominal interest rates are (approximately) constant between monetary policy committee meetings, this may not be the case here. The rule effectively specifies a period t level for $i_t - r_t$, not for i_t . The level of r_t may fluctuate (perhaps in part due to unexpected changes in i_t), so the central bank's trading desk could have to continuously tweak the level of i_t to hold $i_t - r_t$ at its desired level. While this represents a departure from previous operating procedure, there is no reason why holding $i_t - r_t$ approximately constant should be any harder than holding i_t approximately constant. This is thanks to real-time observability of r_t via inflation protected bonds. The central bank could also directly control $i_t - r_t$ by promising to freely exchange \$1 face value of real debt for $$(1 + $i_t - r_t$)$ face value of nominal debt, as suggested by Cochrane (2017; 2018). Alternatively, the central bank could buy or sell a long-short portfolio containing \$1 face value of nominal debt, and $-\$1$ face value of real debt to hold the portfolio's price fixed at $$(i_t - r_t)$.²⁴

Thus, the monetary rule implies that the dynamics of inflation are governed by the single equation:

$$\mathbb{E}_{t-L} \frac{1}{T} \sum_{k=1}^T (\pi_{t+k} - \pi_{t+k}^*) = (\bar{v}_{t-L} - v_{t-L}) + \phi(\pi_{t-L} - \pi_{t-L}^*),$$

i.e.:

$$\mathbb{E}_t \frac{1}{T} \sum_{k=1}^T (\pi_{t+k+L} - \pi_{t+k+L}^*) = (\bar{v}_t - v_t) + \phi(\pi_t - \pi_t^*).$$

²³ In situations in which the dynamics of π_t^* are constrained, then adding smoothing may help match real-world dynamics. In this case, the independence of inflation from the rest of the economy can be preserved if rather than i_{t-1} appearing on the right hand side of the monetary rule, instead there is $i_{t-1} - r_{t-1}$.

²⁴ The author thanks Peter Ireland for this suggestion.

As ever, with $\phi > 1$, there is a unique solution.²⁵ In the special case in which the central bank observes ν_t (i.e. risk premia etc.) so $\nu_t = \bar{\nu}_t$, then $\pi_t = \pi_t^*$, as before. In the general case, as long as $\bar{\nu}_t - \nu_t$ is stationary, the solution takes the form:²⁶

$$\pi_t = \pi_t^* + \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} A_j (\bar{\nu}_{t+j} - \nu_{t+j}),$$

where $A_0 := -\frac{1}{\phi}$, $A_j := 0$ for $j \in \{1, \dots, L\}$, and $A_j := \frac{1}{\phi T} \sum_{k=\max\{0, j-L-T\}}^{j-L-1} A_k$ for all $j > L$, implying $A_{L+1} = -\frac{1}{T\phi^2}$ and $A_j = O\left(\phi^{-\frac{j}{T+L}}\right)$ as $j \rightarrow \infty$.²⁷ Thus, with ϕ large, even if the central bank imperfectly tracks the risk (etc.) premium ν_t , it will still be the case that $\pi_t \approx \pi_t^*$ in all periods. I.e., even in the presence of unobservable risk premia, the central bank can still determinately implement an arbitrary path for inflation. The presence of information lags makes no fundamental difference to this. While information lags may slow down the convergence of A_j to 0 as $j \rightarrow \infty$, increasing the variance of $\pi_t - \pi_t^*$, still for a large enough ϕ , inflation will be very close to its target.

TODO Irregular meetings.

TODO Geometric bonds and perpetuities.

TODO Inflation swaps (more liquid, no deflation protection so simpler pricing)

²⁵ For the intuition, suppose there is no uncertainty, so $\bar{\nu}_t = \nu_t$, and suppose $\pi_0 - \pi_0^* = 1$. Then $\max_{t=1, \dots, T} (\pi_t - \pi_t^*) \geq \phi$. Let t_1^* be the value of t attaining this maximum. Then repeating this process we can find t_2^* such that $\pi_{t_2^*} - \pi_{t_2^*}^* \geq \phi^2$. Continuing, this gives an explosive sub-sequence. We do not have the indeterminacy issues for rules setting long-rates that were noted by McGough, Rudebusch & Williams (2005), due to the presence of the real rate in our rule.

²⁶ Ireland (2015) finds a role for risk premia in explaining US inflation fluctuations, so risk premia appearing in the solution for inflation should not be too surprising.

²⁷ Guess $A_j \propto B^j$. Then (for large j): $B^j = \frac{1}{\phi T} \sum_{k=j-L-T}^{j-L-1} B^k = \frac{1}{\phi T} \frac{B^{j-L-T} - B^{j-L}}{1-B}$, so $\phi T B^{T+L} = \frac{1-B^T}{1-B} \in [1, T]$, implying $0 \leq B \leq \phi^{-\frac{1}{T+L}}$.

3 Real rate rules in a model of the redistribution channel of monetary policy

Sticky prices or wages are not the only channel by which monetary policy may come to have real effects. With households' wealth or debt held in nominal bonds, unexpected inflation leads to redistribution from savers to borrowers, as shown empirically by Doepke & Schneider (2006). The wealth effect will then lead savers to work more and borrowers to work less. If saver households labour supply is more responsive to income than that of borrowers, then total labour supply can increase, producing a positive relationship between output and inflation, even with flexible prices. This is in line with the evidence of Karabarbounis (2016) who finds that older and richer households have higher labour supply elasticities than prime age, moderate wealth ones. This mechanism is at work in many monetary heterogeneous agent models (see e.g. Kaplan, Moll & Violante (2018) and Auclert (2019)), though it may be obscured by sticky prices. In this section we present the simplest possible model of this redistribution channel and use it to further examine the behaviour of real rate rules.

Examining this model is helpful for several reasons. Firstly, it demonstrates that there is nothing about the performance of real rate rules that is specific to variants of the New Keynesian model. With the increased prominence of heterogeneous agent models in the monetary literature, it is particularly important to check robustness to the redistribution channel.

Secondly, our model of the redistribution channel is so simple that it has an exact analytic solution even in the presence of stochastic volatility. So far, we have examined real rate rules either in models in which the linearized Fisher equation ($i_t = r_t + \mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1}$) holds exactly, or in models in which it contains an exogenous risk premium term. However, risk premia are potentially endogenous. As such, they may affect determinacy conditions, or otherwise change the performance of real rate rules. By

including stochastic volatility, our model will generate an endogenous time varying risk premium, allowing us to assess whether real rate rules can retain their good properties in the presence of such endogenous risk premia in the Fisher equation.

Additionally, the model will enable us to reassess the implications of indeterminacy. We show that indeterminacy means not only that inflation will have high variance, but also that its mean will be high.

Finally, the model will also lead us towards a general rule for non-linear models which is likely to deliver high welfare, across all models. We examine this in the final Subsection.

3.1 The model

We now describe the model. The final good is produced under perfect competition using the linear technology $Y_t = Z_t l_t$, where Z_t is an exogenous productivity process, and l_t is aggregate labour supply. Labour is paid a real wage W_t . The final good producer's first order condition implies $W_t = Z_t$.

We define productivity growth $G_t := \frac{Z_t}{Z_{t-1}}$ and assume that G_t evolves according to the law of motion:

$$\gamma_t := \log \left(\frac{G_t}{G} \right) = \rho_\gamma \gamma_{t-1} + (1 - \rho_\gamma) s_{\gamma,t-1} \varepsilon_{\gamma,t}.$$

Here $\varepsilon_{\gamma,t}$ is a shock drawn from a time invariant symmetric distribution with $\mathbb{E} \varepsilon_{\gamma,t} = 0$ and $\sigma_\gamma^2 := \mathbb{E} \varepsilon_{\gamma,t}^2 > 0$. We further assume that for all t , $\varepsilon_{\gamma,t} \in [-1, 1]$. Bounded shocks will help the model's tractability. The distribution of $\varepsilon_{\gamma,t}$ is otherwise unrestricted.

$s_{\gamma,t}$ is an exogenous process determining the volatility of γ_t . We will define the law of motion for $s_{\gamma,t}$ in terms of the cumulant generating function of $\varepsilon_{\gamma,t}$. This is the function $m_\gamma: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow [0, \infty)$ given by:

$$m_\gamma(z) = \log \mathbb{E} \exp(z \varepsilon_{\gamma,t}),$$

for all $z \in \mathbb{R}$. Our assumptions imply that m_γ is convex, that $m_\gamma(-z) = m_\gamma(z)$ for all z , and that $m_\gamma(z) = \frac{1}{2} \sigma_\gamma^2 z^2 + O(z^4)$ as $z \rightarrow 0$. Since $m_\gamma(z)$ is strictly increasing on $[0, \infty)$,

it possesses an inverse $m_\gamma^{-1}: [0, \infty) \rightarrow [0, \infty)$. Using this, we define the following law of motion for volatility $s_{\gamma,t}$:

$$s_{\gamma,t} = \frac{1}{1 - \rho_\gamma} m_\gamma^{-1} \left(\varrho_\gamma m_\gamma \left((1 - \rho_\gamma) s_{\gamma,t-1} \right) + (1 - \varrho_\gamma) m_\gamma \left((1 - \rho_\gamma) \bar{s}_\gamma \right) \eta_{\gamma,t} \right),$$

where the volatility innovation $\eta_{\gamma,t}$ is drawn from another time invariant distribution with $\eta_{\gamma,t} \in [0,1]$ for all t . To see why this process is less weird than it may at first seem, define $v_{\gamma,t} := m_\gamma \left((1 - \rho_\gamma) s_{\gamma,t} \right)$ and $\bar{v}_\gamma := m_\gamma \left((1 - \rho_\gamma) \bar{s}_\gamma \right)$. Then the previous law of motion for $s_{\gamma,t}$ implies that:

$$v_{\gamma,t} = \varrho_\gamma v_{\gamma,t-1} + (1 - \varrho_\gamma) \bar{v}_\gamma \eta_{\gamma,t}.$$

By the previous approximation result for m_γ , $v_{\gamma,t} = \left[\frac{1}{2} (1 - \rho_\gamma)^2 \sigma_\gamma^2 \right] s_{\gamma,t}^2 + O(\bar{s}_\gamma^4)$ and $\bar{v}_\gamma = \left[\frac{1}{2} (1 - \rho_\gamma)^2 \sigma_\gamma^2 \right] \bar{s}_\gamma^2 + O(\bar{s}_\gamma^4)$ as $\bar{s}_\gamma \rightarrow 0$. So, we have that:

$$s_{\gamma,t}^2 = \varrho_\gamma s_{\gamma,t-1}^2 + (1 - \varrho_\gamma) \bar{s}_\gamma^2 \eta_{\gamma,t} + O(\bar{s}_\gamma^4)$$

as $\bar{s}_\gamma \rightarrow 0$. I.e., the squared volatility roughly follows an AR(1) process. Our chosen law of motion for $s_{\gamma,t}$ will permit an exact solution, so we will not use this approximation in the below. Finally note that by construction, $s_{\gamma,t} \leq \bar{s}_\gamma$, so $\gamma_t \in [-\bar{s}_\gamma, \bar{s}_\gamma]$ for all t .

There is a unit mass of households, indexed by i . Households only differ in their discount factor, $\beta_i \in (0,1)$. Each household has a unit mass of members, who may each supply either 0 or 1 units of labour (as in Hansen (1985)). Each working member incurs disutility of $\chi > 0$. The household head determines what proportion of its members work and allocates the same consumption to all household members. As a result, in period t , the head of household i maximizes:

$$\mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \beta_i^k [\log C_{i,t+k} - \chi l_{i,t+k}],$$

where $C_{i,t} \geq 0$ is their real consumption and $l_{i,t} \in [0,1]$ is their labour supply, i.e. the proportion of household members who work. The maximization is subject to the budget constraint:

$$C_{i,t} + A_{i,t} + B_{i,t} = W_t l_{i,t} + A_{i,t-1} R_{t-1} + B_{i,t-1} \frac{I_{t-1}}{\Pi_t},$$

where $A_{i,t}$ is the real quantity of real bonds they purchase in period t , which have real return R_t in period $t + 1$, and $B_{i,t}$ is the real quantity of nominal bonds they purchase in period t , which have real return $\frac{I_t}{\Pi_{t+1}}$ in period $t + 1$. Here, R_t is the gross real interest rate from t to $t + 1$, I_t is the gross nominal interest rate from t to $t + 1$, and Π_t is the gross inflation rate from $t - 1$ to t . As usual, we define $\pi_t := \log \Pi_t$.

Households face both real and nominal borrowing constraints. They cannot borrow at all in real bonds, so $A_{i,t} \geq 0$. This is in line with the rarity of inflation protected debt contracts in reality. With nominal bonds, they face the following debt to income constraint:

$$B_{i,t} \geq -\psi W_t l_{i,t},$$

where $\psi > 0$. The Bank of England imposed a borrowing constraint of this form in 2014.²⁸ Constraints on expected debt payments, i.e., with $(\mathbb{E}_t \frac{I_t}{\Pi_{t+1} G_{t+1}} - 1) B_{i,t}$ on the left hand side, are essentially equivalent to this constraint, as $\mathbb{E}_t \frac{I_t}{\Pi_{t+1} G_{t+1}}$ will not vary in equilibrium. Borrowing constraints of roughly this form are common in the US.

Since Z_t is non-stationary, it is convenient to rewrite the household's problem in terms of detrended variables. We define $c_{i,t} := \frac{C_{i,t}}{Z_t}$, $a_{i,t} := \frac{A_{i,t}}{Z_t}$, $b_{i,t} := \frac{B_{i,t}}{Z_t}$, $w_t := \frac{W_t}{Z_t} = 1$ and $y_t := \frac{Y_t}{Z_t} = l_t$. Then the household's budget constraint may be rewritten as:

$$c_{i,t} + a_{i,t} + b_{i,t} = l_{i,t} + a_{i,t-1} \frac{R_{t-1}}{G_t} + b_{i,t-1} \frac{I_{t-1}}{\Pi_t G_t}.$$

The other constraints are that $l_{i,t} \leq 1$, $a_{i,t} \geq 0$ and $b_{i,t} \geq -\psi l_{i,t}$. Let $\lambda_{i,t}$, $\mu_{i,t}$ and $\nu_{i,t}$, respectively, be the Lagrange multipliers on these last three constraints. Then the household's first order conditions imply:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{1}{c_{i,t}} + \psi \nu_{i,t} &= \chi + \lambda_{i,t}, & 0 &= \min\{\lambda_{i,t}, 1 - l_{i,t}\}, \\ \mu_{i,t} + \beta_i R_t \mathbb{E}_t \frac{1}{G_{t+1} c_{i,t+1}} &= \frac{1}{c_{i,t}}, & \nu_{i,t} + \beta_i I_t \mathbb{E}_t \frac{1}{\Pi_{t+1} G_{t+1} c_{i,t+1}} &= \frac{1}{c_{i,t}}, \\ 0 &= \min\{\mu_{i,t}, a_{i,t}\}, & 0 &= \min\{\nu_{i,t}, b_{i,t} + \psi l_{i,t}\}. \end{aligned}$$

²⁸ <https://www.reuters.com/article/idUKKBN0F10UE20140626>

To keep the model as simple as possible, we suppose there are in fact only two types of households (as in Galí, López-Salido & Vallés (2007) and Bilbiie (2008)). A fraction $1 - \theta$ of households are type “B”, with $\beta_i = \beta_B$. A fraction θ of households are type “S”, with $\beta_i = \beta_S$. We will suppose that $\beta_S > \beta_B$, so S-type households will be savers in equilibrium, while B-type households will be borrowers. In equilibrium, all B-type households will make the same decisions, and so too will all S-type households. Thus, we drop “ i ” subscripts and replace them with “B” or “S” subscripts to represent the decisions of B-type and S-type households respectively. Market clearing then implies that:

$$\begin{aligned} (1 - \theta)c_{B,t} + \theta c_{S,t} &= y_t = l_t = (1 - \theta)l_{B,t} + \theta l_{S,t}, \\ 0 &= (1 - \theta)a_{B,t} + \theta a_{S,t}, \quad 0 = (1 - \theta)b_{B,t} + \theta b_{S,t}. \end{aligned}$$

We look for an equilibrium in which in all periods, B-type households supply as much labour as they can ($l_{B,t} = 1$), have zero real bonds ($a_{B,t} = 0$) and borrow as much as they can in nominal bond markets ($b_{B,t} = -\psi$). If B-type households have zero real bonds, then by market clearing, S-type households must also have zero real bonds ($a_{S,t} = 0$). Similarly, if B-type households have nominal debt, then S-type households must have nominal assets ($b_{S,t} > 0$). In fact, market clearing implies that for all t :

$$b_{S,t} = \psi \frac{1 - \theta}{\theta}.$$

As S-type households are richer than B-type households, they will have a lower incentive to supply labour. We look for an equilibrium in which S-type households are not at the labour supply bound (i.e., $\lambda_{S,t} = 0$ for all t). With B-type households at the labour supply limit, but S-type households below it, monetary expansions will lead S-type households to work more (due to inflation eroding real wealth) but will not change the labour supply of B-type households. The same core mechanism would

work without indivisible labour as long as labour supply becomes sufficiently inelastic at high levels.²⁹ Our chosen preferences give greater tractability.

Substituting our equilibrium restrictions into the market clearing conditions and the household's first order constraints and budget constraint gives that:

$$\begin{aligned} c_{B,t} &= 1 - \psi \left(\frac{I_{t-1}}{\Pi_t G_t} - 1 \right), & c_{S,t} &= \frac{1}{\chi}, \\ l_{S,t} &= \frac{1}{\chi} - \psi \frac{1-\theta}{\theta} \left(\frac{I_{t-1}}{\Pi_t G_t} - 1 \right), \\ y_t = l_t &= (1-\theta) + \theta \frac{1}{\chi} - \psi(1-\theta) \left(\frac{I_{t-1}}{\Pi_t G_t} - 1 \right), \\ \beta_S R_t \mathbb{E}_t \frac{1}{G_{t+1}} &= 1, & \beta_S I_t \mathbb{E}_t \frac{1}{\Pi_{t+1} G_{t+1}} &= 1. \end{aligned} \tag{9}$$

The consumption of B-type households varies negatively with $\frac{I_{t-1}}{\Pi_t G_t}$. When inflation is unexpectedly high, B-type households have less real debt to repay, and so they wish to consume more. To support the higher consumption of B-type households when inflation is high, S-type households work more at these times. The consumption of S-type households is proportional to productivity, Z_t . There is still a non-trivial stochastic discount factor of $\frac{\beta_S}{G_{t+1}}$ as Z_t is stochastic. S-type households are able to insure themselves so well due to their highly elastic labour supply. In richer models, wealthy households are still well insured against inflationary shocks, due to their real asset income dominating that from nominal assets or labour.

Since unexpected inflation leads B-type households to consume more (due to lower real debt) and S-type households to work more (due to lower real wealth), the model produces a Phillips curve type relationship between output and inflation. Substituting the nominal bond first order condition into the output equation (9) gives:

$$y_t = (1-\theta) + \theta \frac{1}{\chi} - \psi(1-\theta) \left(\frac{1}{\beta_S \Pi_t G_t} \left[\mathbb{E}_{t-1} \frac{1}{\Pi_t G_t} \right]^{-1} - 1 \right).$$

So, to a first order approximation:

²⁹ For example, if households have felicity of the form: $\log C_{i,t} + \frac{(1-l_{i,t})^{1-\alpha}}{1-\alpha}$, with $\alpha \in (0,1)$. This is CRRA in leisure. We analyse a special case of these preferences in Appendix TODO.

$$y_t - \mathbb{E}_{t-1}y_t \approx \frac{\psi(1-\theta)}{\beta_S} [\pi_t - \mathbb{E}_{t-1}\pi_t + \gamma_t - \mathbb{E}_{t-1}\gamma_t].$$

This is a New Classical type Phillips curve. Transmission from inflation to the real economy is stronger if θ is small, i.e., if there are many B-type households. This is in line with the evidence of Corsetti, Duarte & Mann (2022).

Even without specifying monetary policy, we may solve for the real interest rate from the Euler equation for real bonds, giving:

$$R_t = \beta_S^{-1} G \exp(\rho_\gamma \gamma_t - v_{\gamma,t}).$$

Real rates positively covary with productivity growth, as when future productivity is expected to be high, S-type households wish to bring forward consumption. Real rates decline when volatility in productivity is high as then S-type households wish to insure themselves against the risk by saving more.

For the model's equilibrium to make sense, we need $l_{S,t} \in [0,1]$, $c_{B,t} \geq 0$ and $\lambda_{B,t} \geq 0$ for all t . $l_{S,t} \in [0,1]$ requires:

$$\frac{\chi\psi(1-\theta)}{\chi\psi(1-\theta) + \theta} \leq \frac{\Pi_t G_t}{I_{t-1}} \leq \frac{\chi\psi(1-\theta)}{\chi\psi(1-\theta) - (\chi-1)\theta}.$$

These two inequalities are sufficient for $c_{B,t} \geq 0$ if $\frac{\theta}{1-\theta} \leq \chi$, and they are sufficient for $\lambda_{B,t} \geq 0$ if $\chi \leq 1 + (1-\theta)\psi$ and β_B is sufficiently small.³⁰ For the inequalities to hold for all t , with probability one, we need $\frac{\Pi_t G_t}{I_{t-1}}$ to be bounded. In the absence of other shocks, it is sufficient that \bar{s}_γ is small enough. In the presence of a monetary policy shock, ζ_t , to be defined, we will also need \bar{s}_ζ to be small enough, where \bar{s}_ζ is the analogous parameter to \bar{s}_γ for the monetary policy shock process.

3.2 Inflation under indeterminacy

Suppose first that the central bank simply pegs the net nominal interest rate at 0, so $I_t = 1$ for all t . For a country experiencing high and unstable inflation, this may seem tempting. Sure, it will produce indeterminacy, and so volatile inflation, but received

³⁰ β_B does not otherwise enter the equilibrium conditions, so we are free to see $\beta_B \approx 0$. We give a rough calibration satisfying these inequalities in Appendix B.

wisdom from linear models is that at least mean inflation will be low. This turns out to be false in non-linear models such as this one.

With $I_t = 1$, Π_t must solve $\beta_S \mathbb{E}_t \frac{1}{\Pi_{t+1} G_{t+1}} = 1$. Due to indeterminacy, this has many solutions. For example, for any $\delta > 0$,³¹ the following is a solution:

$$\Pi_t = \frac{\beta_S}{G} \exp(-\gamma_t + \delta \varepsilon_{\gamma,t} + m_\gamma(\delta)).$$

Thus:

$$\mathbb{E} \pi_t = \mathbb{E} \log \Pi_t = \log \frac{\beta_S}{G} + m_\gamma(\delta).$$

$m_\gamma(\delta)$ is increasing in δ , so mean inflation is also indeterminate, and may be quite high.

3.3 Monetary rules

Now suppose that the central bank uses the non-linear real rate rule:

$$I_t = \Pi R_t \left(\frac{\Pi_t}{\Pi} \right)^\phi \exp(\kappa \gamma_t + \zeta_t + \iota_\gamma v_{\gamma,t} + \iota_\zeta v_{\zeta,t}),$$

with $\phi > 1$. Thus, in equilibrium:

$$I_t = \frac{\Pi G}{\beta_S} \left(\frac{\Pi_t}{\Pi} \right)^\phi \exp((\kappa + \rho_\gamma) \gamma_t + \zeta_t + (\iota_\gamma - 1) v_{\gamma,t} + \iota_\zeta v_{\zeta,t}).$$

As well as the usual response to inflation and monetary policy shock, we are also allowing the central bank to respond directly to the productivity shock, with strength κ . We also allow the central bank to respond directly to the volatilities of productivity, $v_{\gamma,t}$, and of the monetary shock process, $v_{\zeta,t}$, to be defined.

In particular, just as with the γ_t shock, we assume that the monetary shock, ζ_t , evolves according to the law of motion:

$$\zeta_t = \rho_\zeta \zeta_{t-1} + (1 - \rho_\zeta) s_{\zeta,t-1} \varepsilon_{\zeta,t},$$

where $\varepsilon_{\zeta,t}$ is drawn from a time invariant symmetric distribution with $\mathbb{E} \varepsilon_{\zeta,t} = 0$, $\sigma_\zeta^2 := \mathbb{E} \varepsilon_{\zeta,t}^2 > 0$, $\varepsilon_{\zeta,t} \in [-1, 1]$ for all t , and with cumulant generating function:

$$m_\zeta(z) = \log \mathbb{E} \exp(z \varepsilon_{\zeta,t}).$$

³¹ δ cannot be too large as well, else $I_{S,t} \in [0, 1]$ will be violated.

We then define $v_{\zeta,t} := m_{\zeta} \left(\frac{1-\rho_{\zeta}}{\phi-\rho_{\zeta}} s_{\zeta,t} \right)$ and $\bar{v}_{\zeta} = m_{\zeta} \left(\frac{1-\rho_{\zeta}}{\phi-\rho_{\zeta}} \bar{s}_{\zeta} \right)$. The law of motion for the volatility process $s_{\zeta,t} > 0$ is then given in terms of that for $v_{\zeta,t}$:

$$v_{\zeta,t} = \varrho_{\zeta} v_{\zeta,t-1} + (1 - \varrho_{\zeta}) \bar{v}_{\zeta} \eta_{\zeta,t},$$

where the volatility innovation $\eta_{\gamma,t}$ is drawn from another time invariant distribution with $\eta_{\gamma,t} \in [0,1]$ for all t . By construction, $s_{\zeta,t} \leq \bar{s}_{\zeta}$, so $\zeta_t \in [-\bar{s}_{\zeta}, \bar{s}_{\zeta}]$ for all t .

We examine two relevant special cases in which closed form solutions are available. Firstly, suppose that $\kappa = 0$ so the central bank does not respond directly to the productivity shock. Then, from the nominal bond Euler equation ($\beta_S I_t \mathbb{E}_t \frac{1}{\Pi_{t+1} G_{t+1}} = 1$), the model has a solution with:

$$\Pi_t = \Pi(K_{\gamma,0} K_{\zeta})^{-\frac{1}{\phi-1}} \exp \left[-\frac{1}{\phi - \rho_{\zeta}} \zeta_t - \frac{\iota_{\gamma}}{\phi - \varrho_{\gamma}} v_{\gamma,t} - \frac{1 + \iota_{\zeta}}{\phi - \varrho_{\zeta}} v_{\zeta,t} \right],$$

and:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{I_{t-1}}{\Pi_t G_t} = & \frac{1}{\beta_S K_{\gamma,0} K_{\zeta}} \exp \left[-(1 - \rho_{\gamma}) s_{\gamma,t-1} \varepsilon_{\gamma,t} + \frac{1 - \rho_{\zeta}}{\phi - \rho_{\zeta}} s_{\zeta,t-1} \varepsilon_{\zeta,t} - v_{\gamma,t-1} - v_{\zeta,t-1} \right. \\ & \left. + \iota_{\gamma} \frac{1 - \varrho_{\gamma}}{\phi - \varrho_{\gamma}} \bar{v}_{\gamma} \eta_{\gamma,t} + (1 + \iota_{\zeta}) \frac{1 - \varrho_{\zeta}}{\phi - \varrho_{\zeta}} \bar{v}_{\zeta} \eta_{\zeta,t} \right], \end{aligned}$$

where $K_{\gamma,0} := \mathbb{E} \exp \left[\iota_{\gamma} \frac{1 - \varrho_{\gamma}}{\phi - \varrho_{\gamma}} \bar{v}_{\gamma} \eta_{\gamma,t} \right]$ and $K_{\zeta} := \mathbb{E} \exp \left[(1 + \iota_{\zeta}) \frac{1 - \varrho_{\zeta}}{\phi - \varrho_{\zeta}} \bar{v}_{\zeta} \eta_{\zeta,t} \right]$. As usual, positive monetary policy shocks decrease inflation. Additionally, increases in monetary uncertainty will tend to decrease inflation (providing $\iota_{\zeta} > -1$). The nominal stochastic discount factor is increasing in volatility due to Jensen's inequality, so nominal volatility must decrease nominal rates. With I_t increasing in inflation, Π_t must also fall.

Real output, consumption and hours are declining in $\frac{I_{t-1}}{\Pi_t G_t}$, thanks to the model's Phillips curve. Thus, positive productivity shocks increase hours while positive monetary shocks decrease them. Note that hours will inherit some persistence from the persistence of volatility shocks. After an ambiguous initial impact, higher volatility increases output here, as S-type households desire to save pushes down real returns, forcing them to work harder to maintain consumption levels.

We now examine the special case in which $\kappa = \phi - \rho_\gamma$. This means the central bank is raising rates in response to positive productivity shocks. In this case, the model has a solution with:

$$\Pi_t = \Pi(K_{\gamma, \phi - \rho_\gamma} K_\zeta)^{-\frac{1}{\phi-1}} \exp \left[-\gamma_t - \frac{1}{\phi - \rho_\zeta} \zeta_t - \frac{\iota_\gamma - 1}{\phi - \rho_\gamma} v_{\gamma,t} - \frac{1 + \iota_\zeta}{\phi - \rho_\zeta} v_{\zeta,t} \right],$$

and:

$$\frac{I_{t-1}}{\Pi_t G_t} = \frac{1}{\beta_S K_{\gamma, \phi - \rho_\gamma} K_\zeta} \exp \left[\frac{1 - \rho_\zeta}{\phi - \rho_\zeta} s_{\zeta,t-1} \varepsilon_{\zeta,t} - v_{\zeta,t-1} + (\iota_\gamma - 1) \frac{1 - \rho_\gamma}{\phi - \rho_\gamma} \bar{v}_\gamma \eta_{\gamma,t} + (1 + \iota_\zeta) \frac{1 - \rho_\zeta}{\phi - \rho_\zeta} \bar{v}_\zeta \eta_{\zeta,t} \right],$$

where K_ζ is as before, and $K_{\gamma, \phi - \rho_\gamma} := \mathbb{E} \exp \left[(\iota_\gamma - 1) \frac{1 - \rho_\gamma}{\phi - \rho_\gamma} \bar{v}_\gamma \eta_{\gamma,t} \right]$. The crucial difference in this case is that now $\frac{I_{t-1}}{\Pi_t G_t}$ does not respond to productivity shocks, hence neither do hours. By ensuring that inflation is perfectly negatively correlated with productivity growth, the central bank removes productivity risk from the detrended return of nominal bonds.

Going one step further, suppose the central bank has no monetary policy shock (i.e., $\bar{v}_\zeta = 0$) and has a unit response to the volatility in productivity growth (so $\iota_\gamma = 1$). Then the monetary rule may be rewritten more simply as:

$$I_t = R_t [\mathbb{E}_t \Pi_{t+1}^*] \left(\frac{\Pi_t}{\Pi_t^*} \right)^\phi,$$

where $\Pi_t^* = \Pi \frac{G}{G_t}$. This is the non-linear equivalent of the time varying target rule in equation (7), with an inflation target that responds to productivity growth. As in the linear case, the **unique** result is that $\Pi_t = \Pi_t^* = \Pi \frac{G}{G_t}$,³² so $\frac{I_{t-1}}{\Pi_t G_t} = \frac{1}{\beta_S}$. This gives nominal bonds a certain return, relative to trend. As a result, there is no longer any risk in the detrended economy. Hours are constant, and output and consumption are just proportional to productivity. Intuitively, this sounds like a high welfare outcome. We verify this next.

³² This would not automatically hold true for other possible inflation objectives in the non-linear case, whereas it always holds in the linear one. Uniqueness here is a special case of the more general results established in 3.5.

3.4 Welfare

In period 0, a utilitarian policy maker with discount rate β_W would like to maximise:

$$\mathbb{E}_t \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} [(1 - \theta)(\log C_{B,t} - \chi l_{B,t}) + \theta(\log C_{S,t} - \chi l_{S,t})],$$

subject to all of the household's first order conditions. Given these first order conditions, this is equivalent to maximising:

$$\mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \beta_W^k [\log[1 - \psi(X_{t+k} - 1)] + \chi \psi(X_{t+k} - 1)],$$

where $X_t = \frac{I_{t-1}}{\Pi_t G_t}$, subject to the nominal bond Euler equation, $\beta_S \mathbb{E}_t X_{t+1} = 1$. We assume that the policy maker is able to credibly commit to future actions.

Let ξ_t be the Lagrange multiplier on the nominal bond Euler equation, where $\xi_{-1} = 0$ as the policy maker is not constrained by past commitments. Then the policy maker's first order conditions imply:

$$X_t = 1 + \frac{1}{\psi} \left(1 - \frac{1}{\chi + \beta_W^{-1} \beta_S \xi_{t-1}} \right).$$

Note that this implies X_t is actually known in period $t - 1$! Substituting this back into the nominal bond Euler equation gives that for $t > 0$, $X_t = \frac{1}{\beta_S}$, so $\Pi_t = \frac{\beta_S}{G_t} I_{t-1}$. In period 0, $X_0 = 1 + \frac{1}{\psi} \left(1 - \frac{1}{\chi} \right)$, so:

$$\Pi_0 = \frac{I_{-1}}{G_0 \left[1 + \frac{1}{\psi} \left(1 - \frac{1}{\chi} \right) \right]}.$$

This differing behaviour in period 0 comes from the central bank's desire to redistribute between S-type and B-type households. In the special case in which $\psi \frac{1 - \beta_S}{\beta_S} = 1 - \frac{1}{\chi}$, then even in period 0, $\Pi_0 = \frac{\beta_S}{G_0} I_{-1}$.

The planner's solution does not pin down nominal rates, as only real rates matter to households. Optimal policy here could be implemented by the special case we considered in the previous Subsection, using the rule:

$$I_t = R_t [\mathbb{E}_t \Pi_{t+1}^*] \left(\frac{\Pi_t}{\Pi_t^*} \right)^\phi,$$

where $\Pi_t^* = \Pi \frac{G}{G_t}$. This ensures $\Pi_t G_t$ is already known in period $t - 1$, removing any uncertainty about detrended returns.

3.5 Lessons for real rate rules in non-linear models

A priori, it may not have been obvious that real rate rules would continue to perform adequately in a non-linear model with endogenous time varying risk premia. This model has shown that real rate rules maintain their good properties. While time varying risk premia contribute additional volatility to inflation, they do not fundamentally change the nature of the equilibrium.

Optimal policy in this model called for inflation to be negatively correlated with productivity growth. This requires the central bank to raise nominal rates in response to productivity growth. Since real rates contain a positive response to productivity growth, responding to real rates is already a substantial step in the right direction, particularly if productivity growth is very persistent.³³ The downside of responding to real rates was that they respond negatively to productivity volatility, something that must be cancelled out to achieve fully optimal policy. However, the variance in productivity volatility is likely to be small compared to the variance in productivity itself, so a response to real rates is still sensible.

This does not mean that central banks in the real world should respond to productivity growth. In the model, productivity growth enters optimal policy because it is equal to consumption growth of the S-type households. Consumption growth is important as it determines the stochastic discount factor under log utility. That it could be desirable for the central bank to respond to estimates of the stochastic discount factor is a more robust conclusion of this model.

How might this work? Firstly, note that it is possible to estimate the stochastic discount factor (SDF). If Ξ_t is the real SDF between period t and period $t + 1$, then for any asset

³³ This may be easily seen by log-linearizing the model. The log-linearized model: $\pi + r_t + \phi(\pi_t - \pi) + \kappa\gamma_t + \zeta_t + \iota_\gamma v_{\gamma,t} + \iota_\zeta v_{\zeta,t} = i_t = r_t + \mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1}$ has the unique solution $\pi_t = \pi - \frac{\kappa}{\phi - \rho_\gamma} \gamma_t - \frac{1}{\phi - \rho_\zeta} \zeta_t - \frac{\iota_\gamma}{\phi - \rho_\gamma} v_{\gamma,t} - \frac{\iota_\zeta}{\phi - \rho_\zeta} v_{\zeta,t}$. Not responding to real rates is equivalent to setting $\kappa = -\rho_\gamma$ and $\iota_\gamma = 1$, which means inflation is positively correlated with productivity growth, not negatively as desired.

with start of period nominal pay-out (dividend or coupon) stream D_t , then the end of period price of that asset Q_t satisfies:

$$Q_t = \mathbb{E}_t \frac{\Xi_{t+1}}{\Pi_{t+1}} [Q_{t+1} + D_{t+1}].$$

This gives as many moment conditions as there are assets available for trade, with further moment conditions produced by interacting with instruments. This is the basis for a number of approaches to SDF estimation, including that of Pukthuanthong, Roll & Wang (2021). Figure TODO plots a nominal SDF series estimated with a variant of the Pukthuanthong, Roll & Wang (2021) method.³⁴

Armed with an estimator of the real SDF, Ξ_t , the central bank can then use the real rate rule:

$$I_t = R_t [\mathbb{E}_t \Pi_{t+1}^*] \left(\frac{\Pi_t}{\Pi_t^*} \right)^\phi,$$

with:

$$\Pi_t^* = \frac{\Pi}{\Xi} \Xi_t.$$

To see the consequences of such a rule, recall that the definition of a stochastic discount factor implies the following pricing equations for nominal and real bonds:

$$I_t \mathbb{E}_t \frac{\Xi_{t+1}}{\Pi_{t+1}} = 1, \quad R_t \mathbb{E}_t \Xi_{t+1} = 1.$$

Hence, from substituting the definition of Π_t^* into the monetary rule:

$$I_t = \frac{\Pi}{\Xi} R_t [\mathbb{E}_t \Xi_{t+1}] \left(\frac{\Pi_t \Xi}{\Xi_t \Pi} \right)^\phi = \frac{\Pi}{\Xi} \left(\frac{\Pi_t \Xi}{\Xi_t \Pi} \right)^\phi.$$

Thus, from the nominal bond pricing equation:

$$\mathbb{E}_t \frac{\Pi \Xi_{t+1}}{\Xi \Pi_{t+1}} = \left(\frac{\Pi \Xi_t}{\Xi \Pi_t} \right)^\phi,$$

which is of the simple form:

$$\mathbb{E}_t X_{t+1} = X_t^\phi,$$

where $X_t = \frac{\Pi \Xi_t}{\Xi \Pi_t}$. We show in Appendix A.6 that this equation has the unique solution $X_t = 1$, meaning:

³⁴ We describe the data and estimation method in detail in Appendix TODO.

$$\Pi_t = \Pi_t^* = \frac{\Pi}{\Xi} \Xi_t.$$

Consequently, the nominal bond pricing equation implies that $I_t = \frac{\Pi}{\Xi}$.

Nominal rates are constant in equilibrium as the dynamics of inflation ensure that the marginal value of an extra dollar tomorrow (i.e., the nominal SDF) is constant both across states of the world, and across time. This is the maximal amount of nominal insurance that the central bank can provide.

One downside of these SDF-targeting rules is that they imply a high variance of inflation, since SDFs are so volatile. In the presence of price adjustment frictions, this is potentially costly. In these settings, the constant inflation target non-linear real rate rule introduced in Subsection 1.1 may be preferable.

4 Welfare in New Keynesian models

In Section 1, we established that a rule of our form could exactly mimic any other time invariant policy, if responses to structural shocks and their lags are allowed. Thus, rules of our form can mimic unconditionally optimal policy, optimal commitment policy from a timeless perspective, or optimal discretionary policy. Hence, rules of our form can achieve high welfare.

We begin this section by looking at unconditionally optimal time-invariant policy using our rules, in a simple NK model. We then go on to analyse the performance of our rules if further restrictions are placed upon them, such as only permitting the central bank to respond to current or sufficiently recent shocks. We show that optimal policy in estimated models of the US economy comes close to stabilizing inflation, with optimal inflation dynamics describable by an ARMA process with few MA terms.

Any welfare analysis requires us to specify the rest of the model, as welfare is generally a function of output's variability, not just that of inflation. Thus, as a first example suppose that inflation and output are linked by the standard Phillips curve:

$$\pi_t = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1} + \kappa x_t + \kappa \omega_t,$$

where x_t is the output gap, and ω_t is a mark-up shock, which is assumed IID with mean zero. Additionally, suppose that the policy maker wants to minimise the unconditional expectation of a quadratic loss function in inflation and the output gap. I.e., the period t policy maker minimises:

$$(1 - \beta) \mathbb{E} \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \beta^k (\pi_{t+k}^2 + \lambda x_{t+k}^2),$$

for some $\lambda > 0$ and $\beta \in (0,1)$.

We suppose that the policy maker is constrained to choose a time-invariant (i.e., stationary) policy, thus the objective simplifies to:³⁵

$$\mathbb{E}(\pi_t^2 + \lambda x_t^2).$$

As the policy maker only cares about inflation and output gaps, with the former being effectively under their control, and the latter only determined by inflation and mark-up shocks, the optimal policy must have the form:

$$\pi_t = \kappa \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \theta_k \omega_{t-k},$$

for some $\theta_0, \theta_1, \dots$ to be determined. We have already shown that such a policy may be determinately implemented via a rule of the form of (6).

Substituting this policy into the Phillips curve then gives:

$$\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \theta_k \omega_{t-k} = \beta \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \theta_{k+1} \omega_{t-k} + x_t + \omega_t,$$

so:

$$x_t = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\theta_k - \beta \theta_{k+1} - \mathbb{1}[k=0]) \omega_{t-k}.$$

Hence, the policy maker's objective is to choose $\theta_0, \theta_1, \dots$ to minimise:

$$\mathbb{E}(\pi_t^2 + \lambda x_t^2) = \mathbb{E}[\omega_t^2] \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} [\kappa^2 \theta_k^2 + \lambda (\theta_k - \beta \theta_{k+1} - \mathbb{1}[k=0])^2].$$

The first order conditions then give:³⁶

$$\theta_0 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} (\theta_0 - \beta \theta_1 - 1) = 0,$$

³⁵ See e.g. Damjanovic, Damjanovic & Nolan (2008).

³⁶ See Appendix A.7 for the solution of these conditions.

$$\begin{aligned}\theta_1 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}(\theta_1 - \beta\theta_2) - \beta\frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}(\theta_0 - \beta\theta_1 - 1) &= 0, \\ \forall k > 1, \quad \theta_k + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}(\theta_k - \beta\theta_{k+1}) - \beta\frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}(\theta_{k-1} - \beta\theta_k) &= 0.\end{aligned}$$

Unsurprisingly, this agrees with the unconditionally optimal solution given in the prior literature (e.g. Damjanovic, Damjanovic & Nolan (2008)), which satisfies:

$$\pi_t + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa}(x_t - \beta x_{t-1}) = 0,$$

i.e.:

$$\begin{aligned}\kappa \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \theta_k \omega_{t-k} + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa} \left[\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\theta_k - \beta\theta_{k+1} - \mathbb{1}[k=0]) \omega_{t-k} \right. \\ \left. - \beta \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} (\theta_{k-1} - \beta\theta_k - \mathbb{1}[k-1=0]) \omega_{t-k} \right] = 0.\end{aligned}$$

To see the equivalence, note that from matching coefficients, this equation holds if and only if the above first order conditions hold. We will present a convenient representation of the solution to these equations below.

Additionally, note that as $\frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} \rightarrow 0$, $\theta_k \rightarrow 0$ for all $k \in \mathbb{N}$. In other words, if the central bank does not care about the output gap, then they optimally choose to have constant inflation, i.e., to follow the rule from equation (2). The central bank also chooses constant inflation if the Phillips curve is vertical (i.e., $\kappa = \pm\infty$). In this case, neither inflation nor mark-up shocks have any impact on the output gap.

The first order conditions derived above also enable us to easily solve for optimal unconditional policy under limited memory. For example, if the central bank does not “remember” $\omega_{t-1}, \omega_{t-2}, \dots$, so uses a rule that is only a function of ω_t at t , then the optimal θ_0 will satisfy the above first order conditions with $\theta_1 = \theta_2 = \dots = 0$. This means:

$$\theta_0 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}(\theta_0 - 1) = 0,$$

so $\theta_0 = \frac{\lambda}{\lambda + \kappa^2}$. It turns out that this exactly coincides with the solution under discretion.³⁷

³⁷ See Appendix A.8.

If the central bank can “remember” ω_{t-1} , so π_t is an MA(1), then the optimal solution will have:

$$\begin{aligned}\theta_0 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}(\theta_0 - \beta\theta_1 - 1) &= 0, \\ \theta_1 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\theta_1 - \beta\frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}(\theta_0 - \beta\theta_1 - 1) &= 0.\end{aligned}$$

The solution has $\theta_0 \geq 0$ and $\theta_1 \leq 0$. Thus, the shock increases π_t while reducing $\mathbb{E}_t\pi_{t+1}$, thus dampening the required movement in x_t , from the Phillips curve. We will see that this is already enough to come close to the fully optimal policy.

Going one step further, if the central bank can also “remember” π_{t-1} , then they can choose interest rates to ensure π_t follows the ARMA(1,1) process:

$$\pi_t = \rho\pi_{t-1} + \kappa\theta_0\omega_t + \kappa\theta_1\omega_{t-1},$$

for some ρ, θ_0, θ_1 to be determined.³⁸ Since US inflation appears to be well approximated by an ARMA(1,1) (Stock & Watson 2009), this may be a reasonable model of Fed behaviour. This ARMA(1,1) process has the MA(∞) representation:

$$\pi_t = \kappa\theta_0 \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \rho^k \omega_{t-k} + \kappa\theta_1 \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \rho^k \omega_{t-1-k} = \kappa\theta_0\omega_t + \kappa(\rho\theta_0 + \theta_1) \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \rho^{k-1} \omega_{t-k}. \quad (10)$$

Substituting this policy into the Phillips curve gives:

$$\theta_0\omega_t + (\rho\theta_0 + \theta_1) \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \rho^{k-1} \omega_{t-k} = \beta(\rho\theta_0 + \theta_1)\omega_t + \beta(\rho\theta_0 + \theta_1) \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \rho^k \omega_{t-k} + x_t + \omega_t,$$

meaning:

$$x_t = [(1 - \beta\rho)\theta_0 - \beta\theta_1 - 1]\omega_t + (1 - \beta\rho)(\rho\theta_0 + \theta_1) \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \rho^{k-1} \omega_{t-k}.$$

Hence, the policy maker’s objective is to choose ρ, θ_0, θ_1 to minimise:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}(\pi_t^2 + \lambda x_t^2) &= \mathbb{E}[\omega_t^2] \left[\kappa^2\theta_0^2 + \lambda[(1 - \beta\rho)\theta_0 - \beta\theta_1 - 1]^2 \right. \\ &\quad \left. + [\kappa^2(\rho\theta_0 + \theta_1)^2 + \lambda(1 - \beta\rho)^2(\rho\theta_0 + \theta_1)^2] \frac{1}{1 - \rho^2} \right].\end{aligned}$$

³⁸ The targeted inflation can respond to lagged targeted inflation without changing the determinacy properties of realised inflation (always equal to targeted inflation in equilibrium). Targeted inflation cannot respond to other endogenous variables without potentially changing these determinacy properties.

Tedious algebra gives that the first order conditions have solution:³⁹

$$\rho = \frac{\kappa^2 + (1 + \beta^2)\lambda - \sqrt{(\kappa^2 + (1 - \beta)^2\lambda)(\kappa^2 + (1 + \beta)^2\lambda)}}{2\beta\lambda}, \quad \theta_0 = \frac{\rho}{\beta}, \quad \theta_1 = -\rho.$$

As $\lambda \rightarrow 0$, or $\kappa \rightarrow \infty$, $\rho \rightarrow 0$. As $\lambda \rightarrow \infty$, or $\kappa \rightarrow 0$, $\rho \rightarrow \beta$. Since there is no other solution for κ to the equation $\rho = \beta$ than $\kappa = 0$, we must have $\rho \leq \beta$, so $\rho\theta_0 + \theta_1 \leq 0$, meaning that the response of inflation to a positive mark-up shock is again negative after the first period. Since we have one extra degree of freedom, this must attain even higher welfare than the MA(1) solution. In fact, it attains the unconditionally optimal solution. Examination of the unconditionally optimal solution from Appendix A.7 reveals that it has the same form as equation (10), thus by a revealed preference argument, the two solutions must coincide. (For example, the solution for ρ agrees with the geometric decay rate of the MA coefficients at lags beyond the first of the fully optimal solution we found in Appendix A.7.)

Hence, in a world in which the only inefficient shocks are IID cost-push shocks, the central bank can attain the unconditionally optimal welfare by ensuring inflation follows an appropriate ARMA(1,1) process. This process will have an MA coefficient equal to $-\beta \approx -0.99$, and as long as the central bank cares about output stabilisation, it will have a high degree of persistence. This is very close to the IMA(1,1) processes estimated by Dotsey, Fujita & Stark (2018) for the post-1984 period.

³⁹ There is an additional solution to the first order condition with $\rho = \frac{\kappa^2 + (1 + \beta^2)\lambda + \sqrt{(\kappa^2 + (1 - \beta)^2\lambda)(\kappa^2 + (1 + \beta)^2\lambda)}}{2\beta\lambda}$, but this is outside of the unit circle as: $\frac{\kappa^2 + (1 + \beta^2)\lambda + \sqrt{(\kappa^2 + (1 - \beta)^2\lambda)(\kappa^2 + (1 + \beta)^2\lambda)}}{2\beta\lambda} > \frac{\kappa^2 + (1 + \beta^2)\lambda + \sqrt{(\kappa^2 + (1 - \beta)^2\lambda)(\kappa^2 + (1 + \beta)^2\lambda)}}{2\beta\lambda} = \frac{\kappa^2 + (1 + \beta^2)\lambda}{\beta\lambda} > \frac{1 - \beta + \beta^2}{\beta} = \frac{1}{\beta} + \beta - 1 > 1$. However, the given solution is inside the unit circle as $\frac{\kappa^2 + (1 + \beta^2)\lambda - \sqrt{(\kappa^2 + (1 - \beta)^2\lambda)(\kappa^2 + (1 + \beta)^2\lambda)}}{2\beta\lambda} > \frac{\kappa^2 + (1 + \beta^2)\lambda - \sqrt{(\kappa^2 + (1 + \beta)^2\lambda)(\kappa^2 + (1 + \beta)^2\lambda)}}{2\beta\lambda} = -1$, $\frac{\kappa^2 + (1 + \beta^2)\lambda - \sqrt{(\kappa^2 + (1 - \beta)^2\lambda)(\kappa^2 + (1 + \beta)^2\lambda)}}{2\beta\lambda} < \frac{\kappa^2 + (1 + \beta^2)\lambda - \sqrt{(\kappa^2 + (1 - \beta)^2\lambda)(\kappa^2 + (1 - \beta)^2\lambda)}}{2\beta\lambda} = 1$.




Figure 1: Policy frontiers (values attained by varying λ). $\beta = 0.99$, $\kappa = 0.02$.

Purple: Unconditionally optimal policy, equivalent to ARMA(1,1) policy.

Blue (hidden behind purple): Timeless optimal solution.

Red: Policy just responding to current shocks, equivalent to discretion.

Green: Policy that responds to current and once lagged shocks.




Figure 2: Logarithms of ratios of variance under a given policy to variance under unconditionally optimal policy. $\beta = 0.99$, $\kappa = 0.02$.

Blue: Timeless optimal solution.

Red: Policy just responding to current shocks, equivalent to discretion.

Green: Policy that responds to current and once lagged shocks.

To see the welfare attained by the other policies we have discussed, Figure 1 plots the policy frontiers attained by varying λ for each of the policies. In all cases, we follow Eggertsson & Woodford (2003) in setting $\beta = 0.99$ and $\kappa = 0.02$. The figure makes clear that the MA(1) policy (green) is a substantial improvement on the MA(0) (discretionary) policy (red). It also shows just how close Woodford's timeless perspective (1999)⁴⁰ (blue, hidden behind purple) comes to the unconditionally optimal policy. Figure 2 shows how these differences across policies are driven by λ , by plotting the logarithm of the ratio of variance under a given policy to the variance under unconditionally optimal policy. We allow λ to vary from 0.002 (the value obtained by a second order approximation to the consumer's utility with $\kappa = 0.02$, if the elasticity of substitution across goods equals 10) to $\frac{1}{16}$ (corresponding to an equal weight on annual inflation and the output gap). Both the MA(0) and the MA(1) policy generate too much inflation variance and too little variance in output, relative to the unconditionally optimal solution. However, if the central bank can feasibly respond to ω_t and ω_{t-1} they can probably also respond to π_{t-1} , which is enough to deliver the unconditional optimum.

Even in larger models, optimal inflation dynamics appear to be well approximated by an ARMA process with relatively few MA terms. Figure 3 shows the dynamics of observed and optimal inflation in the Justiniano, Primiceri & Tambalotti (2013) model. (This is a medium-scale New Keynesian DSGE model broadly similar to the model of Smets & Wouters (2007).) While actual inflation is highly persistent, with the same shocks hitting the economy, optimal inflation is far less persistent, with the sample autocorrelation essentially insignificant at 95% after four lags.

⁴⁰ See Appendix A.9 for the derivation of this solution.




Figure 3: Behaviour of realised inflation (blue) and optimal inflation (red) in the Justiniano, Primiceri & Tambalotti (2013) model.

Left panel shows the timeseries. Right panel shows their sample autocorrelation.

Note that for any $\rho \in (-1,1)$, the solution for optimal inflation has a multiple shock, ARMA(1, ∞) representation of the form:

$$\pi_t - \pi = \rho(\pi_{t-1} - \pi) + \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \sum_{n=1}^N \theta_{n,k}^{(\rho)} \varepsilon_{n,t-k},$$

where $\varepsilon_{1,t}, \dots, \varepsilon_{N,t}$ are the model's structural shocks. We can approximate this process by truncating the MA terms at some point, e.g. by considering the multiple shock ARMA(1, K) process:

$$\pi_t^{(K)} - \pi = \rho(\pi_{t-1}^{(K)} - \pi) + \sum_{k=0}^K \sum_{n=1}^N \theta_{n,k}^{(\rho)} \varepsilon_{n,t-k}.$$

In Figure 4 we plot the proportion of the variance of optimal inflation that is explained by this truncated process for $K = 0, \dots, 16$, and $\rho \in \{0, 0.61\}$.⁴¹ A multiple shock ARMA(1,1) process already explains over 90% of the variance of optimal inflation, while a multiple shock ARMA(1,2) explains over 95%. Thus, optimal inflation in plausible models can be well approximated by relatively simple inflation dynamics.

⁴¹ $\rho = 0.61$ is the value of ρ that minimises the variance of $\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \sum_{n=1}^N \theta_{n,k}^{(\rho)} \varepsilon_{n,t-k}$. I.e. it is the value of ρ that would be estimated by OLS using an infinite sample of observations from optimal inflation.




Figure 4: Proportion of the variance of optimal inflation in the Justiniano, Primiceri & Tambalotti (2013) model explained by truncating the number of MA lags. Blue: $\rho = 0$. Red: $\rho = 0.61$.

TODO (MORE)

5 Empirical support

In this section we examine whether it is possible that the US Federal Reserve is already using a simple rule of our form. Without the restriction to simple rules, the answer to this would be trivial. Since the rule of equation (6) is compatible with arbitrary inflation dynamics, any observed dynamics can be explained by such a rule.

A natural approach is to take inspiration from the inflation dynamics estimated in reduced form work. Dotsey, Fujita & Stark (2018) find that an IMA(1,1) model for inflation forecasts well, and Stock & Watson (2009) note that this is well approximated by an ARMA(1,1).

TODO write up various empirical tests already performed, or maybe just cut this whole section completely.

6 The zero lower bound

TODO (NOTE: Helps avoid the ZLB, longer rates are less likely to hit zero.)

TODO Rules based on first differences of $i_t - r_t$

TODO Using perpetuities

7 Conclusion

TODO

8 References

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Online Appendix to: “Robust Real Rate Rules”

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19/04/2022

Appendix A Proofs and supplemental results

A.1 Phillips curve based forecasting with ARMA(1,1) policy shocks

As before, we have the monetary rule:

$$i_t = r_t + \phi\pi_t + \zeta_t,$$

which combined with the Fisher equation gives:

$$\mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1} = \phi\pi_t + \zeta_t.$$

Suppose ζ_t follows the ARMA(1,1) process:

$$\zeta_t = \rho_\zeta \zeta_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{\zeta,t} + \theta_\zeta \varepsilon_{\zeta,t-1}, \quad \varepsilon_{\zeta,t} \sim N(0, \sigma_\zeta^2)$$

with $\rho_\zeta, \theta_\zeta \in (-1, 1)$. Then from matching coefficients, with $\phi > 1$ we have the unique solution:

$$\pi_t = -\frac{1}{\phi - \rho_\zeta} \left[\zeta_t + \frac{\theta_\zeta}{\phi} \varepsilon_{\zeta,t} \right].$$

Thus:

$$\pi_t - \rho_\zeta \pi_{t-1} = -\frac{1}{\phi - \rho_\zeta} \left(1 + \frac{\theta_\zeta}{\phi} \right) \left[\varepsilon_{\zeta,t} + \frac{\phi - \rho_\zeta}{\phi + \theta_\zeta} \theta_\zeta \varepsilon_{\zeta,t-1} \right],$$

so π_t also follows an ARMA(1,1) process. Suppose for now that $-\rho_\zeta \leq \theta_\zeta$, which is likely to be satisfied in reality as we expect ρ_ζ to be large and positive, while θ_ζ should be close to zero. (For example, Dotsey, Fujita & Stark (2018) find that an IMA(1,1) model fits inflation well, in which case $-\rho_\zeta = -1 < \theta_\zeta$ as required.) Then $0 < \frac{\phi - \rho_\zeta}{\phi + \theta_\zeta} < 1$, so $\left| \frac{\phi - \rho_\zeta}{\phi + \theta_\zeta} \theta_\zeta \right| < 1$ meaning the process for inflation is invertible. With inflation

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following an invertible linear process, the full-information optimal forecast of π_{t+1} is a linear combination of π_t, π_{t-1}, \dots . In particular, as before x_t is not useful.

In the unlikely case in which $-\rho_\zeta > \theta_\zeta$, or if the forecaster's information set \mathcal{I}_t is smaller than $\{\pi_t, x_t, \pi_{t-1}, x_{t-1}, \dots\}$,⁴³ then x_t may contain some useful information.

Combining the solution for inflation with the Phillips curve:

$$\pi_t = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1} + \kappa x_t + \kappa \omega_t,$$

gives:

$$\begin{aligned} x_t &= -\frac{1}{\kappa} \left[\frac{1 - \beta \rho_\zeta}{\phi - \rho_\zeta} \left(\zeta_t + \frac{\theta_\zeta}{\phi} \varepsilon_{\zeta,t} \right) - \beta \frac{\theta_\zeta}{\phi} \varepsilon_{\zeta,t} \right] - \omega_t \\ &= \frac{1}{\kappa} \left[(1 - \beta \rho_\zeta) \pi_t + \beta \frac{\theta_\zeta}{\phi} \varepsilon_{\zeta,t} \right] - \omega_t. \end{aligned}$$

In this case, it is possible that $\mathbb{E}[\pi_{t+1}|\mathcal{I}_t] \neq \mathbb{E}[\pi_{t+1}|\mathcal{I}_{t-1}, \pi_t]$ as x_t provides an independent signal about $\varepsilon_{\zeta,t}$.

There are two important special cases. If $\omega_t = 0$, and the forecaster knows this, then:

$$\varepsilon_{\zeta,t} = \frac{\phi}{\beta \theta_\zeta} [\kappa x_t - (1 - \beta \rho_\zeta) \pi_t],$$

so:

$$\zeta_t = -\left(\phi - \frac{1}{\beta}\right) \pi_t - \frac{\kappa}{\beta} x_t,$$

which enables the forecaster to form the full-information optimal forecast:

$$\mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1} = -\frac{1}{\phi - \rho_\zeta} (\rho_\zeta \zeta_t + \theta_\zeta \varepsilon_{\zeta,t}) = \frac{1}{\beta} (\pi_t - \kappa x_t).$$

(This formula also follows immediately from the Phillips curve.) Note that the output gap has what Dotsey, Fujita & Stark (2018) call the “wrong” sign, meaning Phillips curve based forecasting regressions may have surprising results. However, in the general case in which ω_t has positive variance, then output's signal about $\varepsilon_{\zeta,t}$ will be polluted by the noise from ω_t , making it much less informative. Indeed, with ϕ large, as we expect, then $\frac{\theta_\zeta}{\phi} \varepsilon_{\zeta,t}$ will have low variance, making it more likely that it is drowned out by the noise from ω_t .

⁴³ We nonetheless assume that π_t and x_t are in \mathcal{I}_t .

The second important special case is when $\varepsilon_{\zeta,t} = 0$, and again the forecaster knows this. In this case, much as in the main text:

$$\mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1} = \rho_\zeta \pi_t - \frac{1}{\phi - \rho_\zeta} \left(1 + \frac{\theta_\zeta}{\phi} \right) \left[\mathbb{E}_t \varepsilon_{\zeta,t+1} + \frac{\phi - \rho_\zeta}{\phi + \theta_\zeta} \theta_\zeta \varepsilon_{\zeta,t} \right] = \rho_\zeta \pi_t,$$

so x_t is unhelpful.

The general case will inherit aspects of these two special cases, as well as the case in which π_t 's stochastic process was invertible. Inflation and its lags will certainly help forecast inflation, but the output gap may also provide a little extra information, possibly with the “wrong” sign.

A.2 Robustness to non-unit responses to real interest rates

Suppose that the central bank is unable to respond with a precise unit coefficient to real interest rates, so instead follows the monetary rule:

$$i_t = (1 + \gamma)r_t + \phi\pi_t + \zeta_t,$$

where $\gamma \in \mathbb{R}$ is some small value giving the departure from unit responses.

For simplicity, suppose the rest of the model takes the same form as in Section 1, with:

$$x_t = \delta \mathbb{E}_t x_{t+1} - \varsigma(r_t - n_t),$$

$$\pi_t = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1} + \kappa x_t + \kappa \omega_t,$$

$$i_t = r_t + \mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1}.$$

We suppose $\phi > 1$, but do not make any assumptions on the signs of $\delta, \beta, \kappa, \varsigma, \gamma$, beyond assuming that $\varsigma \neq 0$ (so monetary policy has some effect on the output gap) and $\kappa \neq 0$ (so monetary policy has some effect on inflation, via the output gap).

Combining the monetary rule with the Fisher equation gives:

$$\mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1} = \gamma r_t + \phi \pi_t + \zeta_t,$$

so:

$$r_t = \frac{1}{\gamma} (\mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1} - \phi \pi_t - \zeta_t),$$

meaning:

$$x_t = \delta \mathbb{E}_t x_{t+1} - \frac{\varsigma}{\gamma} (\mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1} - \phi \pi_t) + \varsigma n_t + \frac{\varsigma}{\gamma} \zeta_t.$$

Then, since:

$$\mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1} = \frac{1}{\beta} \pi_t - \frac{\kappa}{\beta} x_t - \frac{\kappa}{\beta} \omega_t,$$

we have that:

$$\mathbb{E}_t x_{t+1} = \left(\frac{1}{\delta} - \frac{\varsigma \kappa}{\gamma \beta \delta} \right) x_t - \frac{\varsigma}{\delta \gamma} \left(\phi - \frac{1}{\beta} \right) \pi_t - \frac{\varsigma}{\delta \gamma} \left(\gamma n_t + \zeta_t + \frac{\kappa}{\beta} \omega_t \right).$$

Woodford (2003) (Addendum to Chapter 4, Proposition C.1) proves that this model is determinate if and only if both eigenvalues of the matrix:

$$M := \begin{bmatrix} \frac{1}{\delta} - \frac{\varsigma \kappa}{\gamma \beta \delta} & -\frac{\varsigma}{\delta \gamma} \left(\phi - \frac{1}{\beta} \right) \\ -\frac{\kappa}{\beta} & \frac{1}{\beta} \end{bmatrix}$$

are outside of the unit circle, which in turn is proven to hold if and only if EITHER:

Case I: $1 < \det M$, $0 < 1 + \det M - \text{tr } M$, and $0 < 1 + \det M + \text{tr } M$, OR Case II: $0 > 1 + \det M - \text{tr } M$, and $0 > 1 + \det M + \text{tr } M$. Note:

$$\begin{aligned} \det M &= \frac{1}{\beta \delta} - \frac{\varsigma \kappa}{\gamma \beta \delta} \phi, \\ \text{tr } M &= \frac{1}{\delta} - \frac{\varsigma \kappa}{\gamma \beta \delta} + \frac{1}{\beta}. \end{aligned}$$

Thus, Case I requires:

$$\begin{aligned} 1 < \det M &= \frac{1}{\beta \delta} - \frac{\varsigma \kappa}{\gamma \beta \delta} \phi, \\ 0 < 1 + \det M - \text{tr } M &= \frac{(1 - \beta)(1 - \delta)}{\beta \delta} - \frac{\varsigma \kappa}{\gamma \beta \delta} (\phi - 1), \\ \text{and } 0 < 1 + \det M + \text{tr } M &= \frac{(1 + \beta)(1 + \delta)}{\beta \delta} - \frac{\varsigma \kappa}{\gamma \beta \delta} (1 + \phi). \end{aligned}$$

And Case II requires:

$$\begin{aligned} 0 > 1 + \det M - \text{tr } M &= \frac{(1 - \beta)(1 - \delta)}{\beta \delta} - \frac{\varsigma \kappa}{\gamma \beta \delta} (\phi - 1), \\ \text{and } 0 > 1 + \det M + \text{tr } M &= \frac{(1 + \beta)(1 + \delta)}{\beta \delta} - \frac{\varsigma \kappa}{\gamma \beta \delta} (1 + \phi). \end{aligned}$$

To see when these conditions are satisfied, first suppose that $\frac{\varsigma \kappa}{\gamma \beta \delta} < 0$, so $\frac{\varsigma \kappa}{\gamma \beta \delta} = -\frac{|\varsigma \kappa|}{|\gamma| |\beta \delta|}$.

Then if γ is sufficiently small in magnitude, it is immediately clear that all three conditions of Case I are satisfied, since $\phi > 0$, $\phi - 1 > 0$ and $1 + \phi > 0$. In particular, in this case we need:

$$|\gamma| < |\zeta\kappa| \min \left\{ \frac{\frac{\phi}{\max\{0, -(\text{sign}(\beta\delta) - |\beta\delta|)\}}'}{\frac{\phi - 1}{\max\{0, -(\text{sign}(\beta\delta))(1 - \beta)(1 - \delta)\}}'}, \frac{1 + \phi}{\max\{0, -(\text{sign}(\beta\delta))(1 + \beta)(1 + \delta)\}}' \right\}.$$

Alternatively, suppose that $\frac{\zeta\kappa}{\gamma\beta\delta} > 0$, so $\frac{\zeta\kappa}{\gamma\beta\delta} = \frac{|\zeta\kappa|}{|\gamma||\beta\delta|}$. Then, similarly, if γ is sufficiently small in magnitude, both conditions of Case II are satisfied, since $\phi - 1 > 0$ and $1 + \phi > 0$. In particular, in this case we need:

$$|\gamma| < |\zeta\kappa| \min \left\{ \frac{\frac{\phi - 1}{\max\{0, (\text{sign}(\beta\delta))(1 - \beta)(1 - \delta)\}}'}{\frac{1 + \phi}{\max\{0, (\text{sign}(\beta\delta))(1 + \beta)(1 + \delta)\}}'} \right\}.$$

Thus, it is always sufficient for determinacy that:

$$|\gamma| < |\zeta\kappa| \min \left\{ \frac{\frac{\phi}{\max\{0, -(\text{sign}(\beta\delta) - |\beta\delta|)\}}'}{\frac{\frac{\phi - 1}{|(1 - \beta)(1 - \delta)|}}'}, \frac{1 + \phi}{|(1 + \beta)(1 + \delta)|}} \right\}.$$

Since the right-hand side is strictly positive, there is a positive measure of γ for which we have determinacy.

A.3 Real-time learning of Phillips curve coefficients

We start by assuming that the central bank knows the Phillips curve coefficients. A close examination of this case will lead to a natural learning scheme for when the central bank does not know these coefficients.

As in the main text, suppose the central bank is using the rule:

$$i_t = r_t + \phi_\pi \pi_t + \phi_x [x_t - \kappa^{-1} [\pi_t - \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi) \mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1} - \tilde{\beta} \varrho_\pi \pi_{t-1}]] + \zeta_t,$$

and that the model also contains the Phillips curve:

$$\pi_t = \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi) \mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1} + \tilde{\beta} \varrho_\pi \pi_{t-1} + \kappa x_t + \kappa \omega_t,$$

and the Fisher equation:

$$i_t = r_t + \mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1}.$$

We suppose that ζ_t follows the ARMA(1,1) process:

$$\zeta_t = \rho_\zeta \zeta_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{\zeta,t} + \theta_\zeta \varepsilon_{\zeta,t-1}, \quad \varepsilon_{\zeta,t} \sim N(0, \sigma_\zeta^2),$$

with $\rho_\zeta, \theta_\zeta \in (-1, 1)$, and for simplicity, we suppose that $\omega_t = \varepsilon_{\omega,t}$, where $\varepsilon_{\omega,t} \sim N(0, \sigma_\omega^2)$.

From combining all the above equations, we have that if $\phi_\pi > 1$, there is a unique solution with:

$$\pi_t = -\frac{1}{\phi_\pi - \rho_\zeta} \left[\zeta_t + \frac{\theta_\zeta}{\phi_\pi} \varepsilon_{\zeta,t} \right] + \frac{\phi_x}{\phi_\pi} \varepsilon_{\omega,t}.$$

Thus, if we define:

$$\begin{aligned} m_0 &:= \frac{\sigma_\zeta^2}{\kappa(\phi_\pi - \rho_\zeta)} \left[\tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi)(\rho_\zeta + \theta_\zeta) - \left(1 + \frac{\theta_\zeta}{\phi_\pi}\right) \right], \\ m_1 &:= \frac{\sigma_\zeta^2}{\kappa(\phi_\pi - \rho_\zeta)} \left[[\tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi)\rho_\zeta - 1](\rho_\zeta + \theta_\zeta) + \tilde{\beta}\varrho_\pi \left(1 + \frac{\theta_\zeta}{\phi_\pi}\right) \right], \\ m_2 &:= \frac{\sigma_\zeta^2}{\kappa(\phi_\pi - \rho_\zeta)} \left[[\tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi)\rho_\zeta - 1]\rho_\zeta + \tilde{\beta}\varrho_\pi \right](\rho_\zeta + \theta_\zeta), \end{aligned}$$

then by the Phillips curve $m_0 = \mathbb{E}x_t \varepsilon_{\zeta,t}$, $m_1 = \mathbb{E}x_t \varepsilon_{\zeta,t-1}$ and $m_2 = \mathbb{E}x_t \varepsilon_{\zeta,t-2}$. Also note that:

$$\begin{aligned} \kappa &= \frac{\sigma_\zeta^2}{\phi_\pi - \rho_\zeta} \frac{\left(\rho_\zeta + \theta_\zeta - \left(1 + \frac{\theta_\zeta}{\phi_\pi}\right)\rho_\zeta\right)^2}{\rho_\zeta \left(\rho_\zeta + \theta_\zeta - \left(1 + \frac{\theta_\zeta}{\phi_\pi}\right)\rho_\zeta\right) m_0 - \left((\rho_\zeta + \theta_\zeta)m_1 - \left(1 + \frac{\theta_\zeta}{\phi_\pi}\right)m_2\right)}, \\ \tilde{\beta} &= \frac{\left(\rho_\zeta + \theta_\zeta - \left(1 + \frac{\theta_\zeta}{\phi_\pi}\right)\rho_\zeta\right) \left(m_0 - (\rho_\zeta m_1 - m_2)\right) - \frac{\phi_\pi + \theta_\zeta}{(\rho_\zeta + \theta_\zeta)\phi_\pi} \left((\rho_\zeta + \theta_\zeta)m_1 - \left(1 + \frac{\theta_\zeta}{\phi_\pi}\right)m_2\right)}{\rho_\zeta \left(\rho_\zeta + \theta_\zeta - \left(1 + \frac{\theta_\zeta}{\phi_\pi}\right)\rho_\zeta\right) m_0 - \left((\rho_\zeta + \theta_\zeta)m_1 - \left(1 + \frac{\theta_\zeta}{\phi_\pi}\right)m_2\right)}, \\ \varrho_\pi &= -\frac{\left(\rho_\zeta + \theta_\zeta - \left(1 + \frac{\theta_\zeta}{\phi_\pi}\right)\rho_\zeta\right) (\rho_\zeta m_1 - m_2)}{\left(\rho_\zeta + \theta_\zeta - \left(1 + \frac{\theta_\zeta}{\phi_\pi}\right)\rho_\zeta\right) \left(m_0 - (\rho_\zeta m_1 - m_2)\right) - \frac{\phi_\pi + \theta_\zeta}{(\rho_\zeta + \theta_\zeta)\phi_\pi} \left((\rho_\zeta + \theta_\zeta)m_1 - \left(1 + \frac{\theta_\zeta}{\phi_\pi}\right)m_2\right)}. \end{aligned}$$

In other words, once the central bank knows m_0 , m_1 and m_2 they can infer the parameters of the Phillips curve from the known properties of their monetary rule and monetary shock. This is essentially an instrumental variables regression. We are using $\varepsilon_{\zeta,t}$, $\varepsilon_{\zeta,t-1}$ and $\varepsilon_{\zeta,t-2}$ as instruments for $\mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1}$, π_t and π_{t-1} in a regression of the output gap on those variables. This works as long as $\theta_\zeta \neq 0$, else $\mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1}$ and π_t are colinear.

If the central bank does not know the true values of κ , $\tilde{\beta}$ and ϱ_π , we suppose they dynamically update estimates of m_0 , m_1 and m_2 using the following decreasing gain learning rules (for $t > 0$):

$$\begin{aligned} m_{0,t} &= m_{0,t-1} + t^{-1}(x_t \varepsilon_{\zeta,t} - m_{0,t-1}), \\ m_{1,t} &= m_{1,t-1} + t^{-1}(x_t \varepsilon_{\zeta,t-1} - m_{1,t-1}), \\ m_{2,t} &= m_{2,t-1} + t^{-1}(x_t \varepsilon_{\zeta,t-2} - m_{2,t-1}), \end{aligned}$$

where $\iota \in (0,1]$ is a gain parameter. Then they can use the monetary rule:

$$i_t = r_t + \phi_\pi \pi_t + \phi_x [x_t + q_{1,t-1} \mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1} + q_{0,t-1} \pi_t + q_{-1,t-1} \pi_{t-1}] + \zeta_t,$$

where:

$$\begin{aligned} q_{1,t} &:= \frac{\phi_\pi - \rho_\zeta}{\sigma_\zeta^2} \frac{(\rho_\zeta + \theta_\zeta - (1 + \frac{\theta_\zeta}{\phi_\pi}) \rho_\zeta) m_{0,t} - \frac{\phi_\pi + \theta_\zeta}{(\rho_\zeta + \theta_\zeta) \phi_\pi} ((\rho_\zeta + \theta_\zeta) m_{1,t} - (1 + \frac{\theta_\zeta}{\phi_\pi}) m_{2,t})}{(\rho_\zeta + \theta_\zeta - (1 + \frac{\theta_\zeta}{\phi_\pi}) \rho_\zeta)^2}, \\ q_{0,t} &:= -\frac{\phi_\pi - \rho_\zeta}{\sigma_\zeta^2} \frac{\rho_\zeta (\rho_\zeta + \theta_\zeta - (1 + \frac{\theta_\zeta}{\phi_\pi}) \rho_\zeta) m_{0,t} - ((\rho_\zeta + \theta_\zeta) m_{1,t} - (1 + \frac{\theta_\zeta}{\phi_\pi}) m_{2,t})}{(\rho_\zeta + \theta_\zeta - (1 + \frac{\theta_\zeta}{\phi_\pi}) \rho_\zeta)^2}, \\ q_{-1,t} &:= -\frac{\phi_\pi - \rho_\zeta}{\sigma_\zeta^2} \frac{(\rho_\zeta + \theta_\zeta - (1 + \frac{\theta_\zeta}{\phi_\pi}) \rho_\zeta) (\rho_\zeta m_{1,t} - m_{2,t})}{(\rho_\zeta + \theta_\zeta - (1 + \frac{\theta_\zeta}{\phi_\pi}) \rho_\zeta)^2}. \end{aligned}$$

This is reasonable, as if $m_{0,t-1} \approx m_0$, $m_{1,t-1} \approx m_1$ and $m_{2,t-1} \approx m_2$ then $q_{1,t-1} \approx \kappa^{-1} \tilde{\beta} (1 - \varrho_\pi)$, $q_{0,t-1} \approx -\kappa^{-1}$ and $q_{-1,t-1} \approx \kappa^{-1} \tilde{\beta} \varrho_\pi$, so this monetary rule is approximately the same as the full information one previously considered. Using lagged estimates ($q_{1,t-1}$ not $q_{1,t}$ etc.) in the monetary rule reflects central bank information (processing) delays and simplifies the model's solution. It is also a common assumption in the reduced form learning literature (Evans & Honkapohja 2001).

With the new monetary rule, the model is no-longer linear. As a result, the exact solution is analytically intractable. However, we are only really interested in asymptotic dynamics. If $m_{0,t} \rightarrow m_0$, $m_{1,t} \rightarrow m_1$ and $m_{2,t} \rightarrow m_2$ as $t \rightarrow \infty$ then we know the asymptotic solution will be the stable full information one we found previously. We will analyse the system's behaviour with help from the stochastic approximation tools frequently used in the reduced form learning literature (Evans & Honkapohja

2001). These tools only require a zeroth order approximation in t^{-1} to the dynamics of x_t and π_t .⁴⁴ Intuitively, this is because x_t (hence π_t) enters the law of motion for $m_{0,t}$, $m_{1,t}$ and $m_{2,t}$ multiplied by t^{-1} , so a zeroth order approximation to the dynamics of x_t and π_t in t^{-1} delivers a first order approximation to the dynamics of $m_{0,t}$, $m_{1,t}$ and $m_{2,t}$ in t^{-1} .

We conjecture a time-varying coefficients solution with:

$$\pi_t = A_{t-1}\zeta_t + B_{t-1}\varepsilon_{\zeta,t} + C_{t-1}\varepsilon_{\omega,t} + D_{t-1}\pi_{t-1} + O(t^{-1}),$$

where we conjecture $A_t = A_{t-1} + O(t^{-1})$, $B_t = B_{t-1} + O(t^{-1})$, $C_t = C_{t-1} + O(t^{-1})$ and $D_t = D_{t-1} + O(t^{-1})$. Substituting this into the monetary rule, Fisher equation and Phillips curve implies:

$$\begin{aligned} & [1 + \phi_x \kappa^{-1} \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi) - \phi_x q_{1,t-1}] A_t (\rho_\zeta \zeta_t + \theta_\zeta \varepsilon_{\zeta,t}) \\ &= [\phi_\pi + \phi_x \kappa^{-1} + \phi_x q_{0,t-1} - [1 + \phi_x \kappa^{-1} \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi) - \phi_x q_{1,t-1}] D_t] [A_{t-1} \zeta_t \\ &+ B_{t-1} \varepsilon_{\zeta,t} + C_{t-1} \varepsilon_{\omega,t} + D_{t-1} \pi_{t-1}] + \phi_x [q_{-1,t-1} - \kappa^{-1} \tilde{\beta} \varrho_\pi] \pi_{t-1} - \phi_x \varepsilon_{\omega,t} \\ &+ \zeta_t + O(t^{-1}). \end{aligned}$$

Matching terms and using $A_t = A_{t-1} + O(t^{-1})$ and $D_t = D_{t-1} + O(t^{-1})$ then gives that:

$$\begin{aligned} & [1 + \phi_x \kappa^{-1} \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi) - \phi_x q_{1,t}] A_t \rho_\zeta \\ &= [\phi_\pi + \phi_x \kappa^{-1} + \phi_x q_{0,t} - [1 + \phi_x \kappa^{-1} \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi) - \phi_x q_{1,t}] D_t] A_t + 1 \\ &+ O(t^{-1}), \\ & [1 + \phi_x \kappa^{-1} \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi) - \phi_x q_{1,t}] A_t \theta_\zeta \\ &= [\phi_\pi + \phi_x \kappa^{-1} + \phi_x q_{0,t} - [1 + \phi_x \kappa^{-1} \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi) - \phi_x q_{1,t}] D_t] B_t + O(t^{-1}), \\ & 0 = [\phi_\pi + \phi_x \kappa^{-1} + \phi_x q_{0,t} - [1 + \phi_x \kappa^{-1} \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi) - \phi_x q_{1,t-1}] D_t] C_t - \phi_x + O(t^{-1}), \\ & 0 = [\phi_\pi + \phi_x \kappa^{-1} + \phi_x q_{0,t} - [1 + \phi_x \kappa^{-1} \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi) - \phi_x q_{1,t}] D_t] D_t + \phi_x [q_{-1,t} - \kappa^{-1} \tilde{\beta} \varrho_\pi] \\ &+ O(t^{-1}). \end{aligned}$$

⁴⁴ Given certain regularity conditions on the higher order terms. These conditions will be satisfied here, at least providing we restrict $m_{0,t}$, $m_{1,t}$ and $m_{2,t}$ to a small enough open set around m_0 , m_1 and m_2 , using a so called projection facility.

The final equation has two roots, but we know we need to pick the one that gives $D_t \rightarrow 0$ as $\phi_x \rightarrow 0$. Now if $q_{0,t}$ is sufficiently close to q_0 , then $\phi_\pi + \phi_x \kappa^{-1} + \phi_x q_{0,t} > 0$, so:

$$D_t = \frac{(\phi_\pi + \phi_x \kappa^{-1} + \phi_x q_{0,t}) - \sqrt{(\phi_\pi + \phi_x \kappa^{-1} + \phi_x q_{0,t})^2 - 4\phi_x[1 + \phi_x \kappa^{-1} \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi) - \phi_x q_{1,t}][q_{-1,t} - \kappa^{-1} \tilde{\beta} \varrho_\pi]}}{2[1 + \phi_x \kappa^{-1} \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi) - \phi_x q_{1,t}]} + O(t^{-1}),$$

and:

$$\begin{aligned} A_t &= \left[[1 + \phi_x \kappa^{-1} \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi) - \phi_x q_{1,t}](D_t + \rho_\zeta) - (\phi_\pi + \phi_x \kappa^{-1} + \phi_x q_{0,t}) \right]^{-1} + O(t^{-1}), \\ B_t &= \frac{\theta_\zeta [1 + \phi_x \kappa^{-1} \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi) - \phi_x q_{1,t}] A_t}{\phi_\pi + \phi_x \kappa^{-1} + \phi_x q_{0,t} - [1 + \phi_x \kappa^{-1} \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi) - \phi_x q_{1,t}] D_t} + O(t^{-1}), \\ C_t &= \frac{\phi_x}{\phi_\pi + \phi_x \kappa^{-1} + \phi_x q_{0,t} - [1 + \phi_x \kappa^{-1} \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi) - \phi_x q_{1,t}] D_t} + O(t^{-1}). \end{aligned}$$

Since $q_{1,t} = q_{1,t-1} + O(t^{-1})$, $q_{0,t} = q_{0,t-1} + O(t^{-1})$ and $q_{-1,t} = q_{-1,t-1} + O(t^{-1})$, as required we have that $A_t = A_{t-1} + O(t^{-1})$, $B_t = B_{t-1} + O(t^{-1})$, $C_t = C_{t-1} + O(t^{-1})$ and $D_t = D_{t-1} + O(t^{-1})$.

Using this result again, we then have that:

$$\begin{aligned} x_t &= \kappa^{-1} \left[[1 - \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi)(D_{t-1} + \rho_\zeta)] A_{t-1} \zeta_t \right. \\ &\quad + [B_{t-1} - \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi)(A_{t-1} \theta_\zeta + B_{t-1} D_{t-1})] \varepsilon_{\zeta,t} \\ &\quad + [[1 - \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi) D_{t-1}] C_{t-1} - \kappa] \varepsilon_{\omega,t} \\ &\quad \left. + [[1 - \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi) D_{t-1}] D_{t-1} - \tilde{\beta} \varrho_\pi] \pi_{t-1} \right] + O(t^{-1}). \end{aligned}$$

Plugging this into the law of motion for $m_{0,t}$, $m_{1,t}$ and $m_{2,t}$ gives a purely backward looking non-linear system in the endogenous states $m_{0,t}$, $m_{1,t}$, $m_{2,t}$ and π_t . This system is of the correct form to be analysed by the stochastic approximation results given in Evans & Honkapohja (2001).

To apply these results, first suppose that for all t , $m_{0,t} = \hat{m}_0$, $m_{1,t} = \hat{m}_1$ and $m_{2,t} = \hat{m}_2$, for some values \hat{m}_0 , \hat{m}_1 and \hat{m}_2 . Then $q_{1,t} = \hat{q}_1$, $q_{0,t} = \hat{q}_0$ and $q_{-1,t} = \hat{q}_{-1}$ for all t , where:

$$\hat{q}_1 := \frac{\phi_\pi - \rho_\zeta}{\sigma_\zeta^2} \frac{(\rho_\zeta + \theta_\zeta - (1 + \frac{\theta_\zeta}{\phi_\pi}) \rho_\zeta) \hat{m}_0 - \frac{\phi_\pi + \theta_\zeta}{(\rho_\zeta + \theta_\zeta) \phi_\pi} \left((\rho_\zeta + \theta_\zeta) \hat{m}_1 - (1 + \frac{\theta_\zeta}{\phi_\pi}) \hat{m}_2 \right)}{\left(\rho_\zeta + \theta_\zeta - (1 + \frac{\theta_\zeta}{\phi_\pi}) \rho_\zeta \right)^2},$$

$$\hat{q}_0 := -\frac{\phi_\pi - \rho_\zeta}{\sigma_\zeta^2} \frac{\rho_\zeta \left(\rho_\zeta + \theta_\zeta - \left(1 + \frac{\theta_\zeta}{\phi_\pi} \right) \rho_\zeta \right) \hat{m}_0 - \left((\rho_\zeta + \theta_\zeta) \hat{m}_1 - \left(1 + \frac{\theta_\zeta}{\phi_\pi} \right) \hat{m}_2 \right)}{\left(\rho_\zeta + \theta_\zeta - \left(1 + \frac{\theta_\zeta}{\phi_\pi} \right) \rho_\zeta \right)^2},$$

$$\hat{q}_{-1} := -\frac{\phi_\pi - \rho_\zeta}{\sigma_\zeta^2} \frac{\left(\rho_\zeta + \theta_\zeta - \left(1 + \frac{\theta_\zeta}{\phi_\pi} \right) \rho_\zeta \right) (\rho_\zeta \hat{m}_1 - \hat{m}_2)}{\left(\rho_\zeta + \theta_\zeta - \left(1 + \frac{\theta_\zeta}{\phi_\pi} \right) \rho_\zeta \right)^2}.$$

Thus, for all t , $A_t = \hat{A}$, $B_t = \hat{B}$, $C_t = \hat{C}$ and $D_t = \hat{D}$, where:

$$\hat{D} = \frac{(\phi_\pi + \phi_x \kappa^{-1} + \phi_x \hat{q}_0) - \sqrt{(\phi_\pi + \phi_x \kappa^{-1} + \phi_x \hat{q}_0)^2 \dots + 4\phi_x [1 + \phi_x \kappa^{-1} \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi) - \phi_x \hat{q}_1] [\hat{q}_{-1} - \kappa^{-1} \tilde{\beta} \varrho_\pi]}}{2[1 + \phi_x \kappa^{-1} \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi) - \phi_x \hat{q}_1]},$$

and:

$$\hat{A} = \left[[1 + \phi_x \kappa^{-1} \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi) - \phi_x \hat{q}_1] (\hat{D} + \rho_\zeta) - (\phi_\pi + \phi_x \kappa^{-1} + \phi_x \hat{q}_0) \right]^{-1},$$

$$\hat{B} = \frac{\theta_\zeta [1 + \phi_x \kappa^{-1} \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi) - \phi_x \hat{q}_1] \hat{A}}{\phi_\pi + \phi_x \kappa^{-1} + \phi_x \hat{q}_0 - [1 + \phi_x \kappa^{-1} \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi) - \phi_x \hat{q}_1] \hat{D}},$$

$$\hat{C} = \frac{\phi_x}{\phi_\pi + \phi_x \kappa^{-1} + \phi_x \hat{q}_0 - [1 + \phi_x \kappa^{-1} \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi) - \phi_x \hat{q}_1] \hat{D}}.$$

So:

$$\pi_t = \hat{A} \zeta_t + \hat{B} \varepsilon_{\zeta,t} + \hat{C} \varepsilon_{\omega,t} + \hat{D} \pi_{t-1},$$

and:

$$\begin{aligned} x_t &= \kappa^{-1} \left[[1 - \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi)(\hat{D} + \rho_\zeta)] \hat{A} \zeta_t + [\hat{B} - \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi)(\hat{A} \theta_\zeta + \hat{B} \hat{D})] \varepsilon_{\zeta,t} \right. \\ &\quad \left. + [1 - \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi) \hat{D}] \hat{C} - \kappa \right] \varepsilon_{\omega,t} + [1 - \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi) \hat{D}] \hat{D} - \tilde{\beta} \varrho_\pi \pi_{t-1} \\ &= \kappa^{-1} \left[[1 - \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi)(\hat{D} + \rho_\zeta)] \hat{A} [\rho_\zeta [\rho_\zeta \zeta_{t-2} + \varepsilon_{\zeta,t-1} + \theta_\zeta \varepsilon_{\zeta,t-2}] + \varepsilon_{\zeta,t} + \theta_\zeta \varepsilon_{\zeta,t-1}] \right. \\ &\quad + [\hat{B} - \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi)(\hat{A} \theta_\zeta + \hat{B} \hat{D})] \varepsilon_{\zeta,t} + [1 - \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi) \hat{D}] \hat{C} - \kappa \varepsilon_{\omega,t} \\ &\quad + [1 - \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi) \hat{D}] \hat{D} - \tilde{\beta} \varrho_\pi \pi_{t-1} \\ &\quad \left. + \hat{C} \varepsilon_{\omega,t-1} + \hat{D} [\hat{A} \zeta_{t-2} + \hat{B} \varepsilon_{\zeta,t-2} + \hat{C} \varepsilon_{\omega,t-2} + \hat{D} \pi_{t-3}] \right]. \end{aligned}$$

Hence:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E} x_t \varepsilon_{\zeta,t} &= \sigma_\zeta^2 \kappa^{-1} [1 - \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi)(\hat{D} + \rho_\zeta + \theta_\zeta)] \hat{A} + [1 - \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi) \hat{D}] \hat{B}, \\ \mathbb{E} x_t \varepsilon_{\zeta,t-1} &= \sigma_\zeta^2 \kappa^{-1} [1 - \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi)(\hat{D} + \rho_\zeta)] \hat{A} (\rho_\zeta + \theta_\zeta) \\ &\quad + [1 - \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi) \hat{D}] \hat{D} - \tilde{\beta} \varrho_\pi (\hat{A} + \hat{B}), \\ \mathbb{E} x_t \varepsilon_{\zeta,t-2} &= \sigma_\zeta^2 \kappa^{-1} [1 - \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi)(\hat{D} + \rho_\zeta)] \hat{A} \rho_\zeta (\rho_\zeta + \theta_\zeta) \\ &\quad + [1 - \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi) \hat{D}] \hat{D} - \tilde{\beta} \varrho_\pi [\hat{A} (\rho_\zeta + \theta_\zeta) + \hat{D} (\hat{A} + \hat{B})]. \end{aligned}$$

Now denote by \mathcal{J} the map taking the vector:

$$\widehat{m} := \begin{bmatrix} \widehat{m}_0 \\ \widehat{m}_1 \\ \widehat{m}_2 \end{bmatrix}$$

to the vector:

$$\mathcal{J}(\widehat{m}) := \begin{bmatrix} \mathbb{E} x_t \varepsilon_{\zeta, t} \\ \mathbb{E} x_t \varepsilon_{\zeta, t-1} \\ \mathbb{E} x_t \varepsilon_{\zeta, t-2} \end{bmatrix}.$$

Stochastic approximation theory relates the stability of our nonlinear difference equation to the stability of the ODE:

$$\frac{d\widehat{m}(\tau)}{d\tau} = \mathcal{J}(\widehat{m}(\tau)) - \widehat{m}(\tau).$$

The \mathcal{J} map here plays the role usually played by the mapping from the perceived law of motion to the actual law of motion in the reduced form learning literature (Evans & Honkapohja 2001).

We conjecture that:

$$m := \begin{bmatrix} m_0 \\ m_1 \\ m_2 \end{bmatrix}$$

is a locally asymptotically stable point of this ODE. To check this, note that tedious algebra gives that:

$$\left. \frac{\partial \mathcal{J}(\widehat{m})}{\partial \widehat{m}} \right|_{\widehat{m}=m} = \frac{\phi_x}{\kappa \phi_\pi} \begin{bmatrix} 1 & \phi_\pi^{-1} - \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi) & \frac{\phi_\pi^{-1} - \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi)}{\phi_\pi - \rho_\zeta} \\ -\tilde{\beta}\varrho_\pi & 1 - \phi_\pi^{-1}\tilde{\beta}\varrho_\pi & \frac{\phi_\pi[\phi_\pi^{-1} - \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi)] - \phi_\pi^{-1}\tilde{\beta}\varrho_\pi}{\phi_\pi - \rho_\zeta} \\ 0 & -\tilde{\beta}\varrho_\pi & \frac{\phi_\pi[1 - \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi)\rho_\zeta] - \tilde{\beta}\varrho_\pi}{\phi_\pi - \rho_\zeta} \end{bmatrix}.$$

For simplicity, we assume $\phi_x \geq 0$, $\phi_\pi \geq 0$, $\kappa \geq 0$, $\tilde{\beta} \geq 0$, $\varrho_\pi \in [0,1)$, $\rho_\zeta \in [0,1)$ and $\phi_\pi \geq [\tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi)]^{-1}$. Under these assumptions, the off-diagonal elements of this matrix are all non-positive. Other cases may also go through, but for the sake of brevity we concentrate on this most relevant case. Given these assumptions, applying the Gershgorin circle theorem to the columns of this matrix gives the following upper bound on the real part of the eigenvalues of $\left. \frac{\partial \mathcal{J}(\widehat{m})}{\partial \widehat{m}} \right|_{\widehat{m}=m}$:

$$\frac{\phi_x}{\kappa\phi_\pi} \max \left\{ \frac{1 + \tilde{\beta}\varrho_\pi, \phi_\pi^{-1}[\tilde{\beta}(\phi_\pi - \varrho_\pi) + \phi_\pi - 1], (1 - \phi_\pi^{-1})(\phi_\pi - \tilde{\beta}\varrho_\pi) + \tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi)[1 + \phi_\pi(1 - \rho_\zeta)] - \phi_\pi^{-1}}{\phi_\pi - \rho_\zeta} \right\}.$$

The first and second arguments in curly brackets here are both less than $1 + \tilde{\beta}$. Taking the derivative of the third argument in curly brackets with respect to ρ_ζ produces an expression whose sign is not a function of ρ_ζ . Thus, the third argument in curly brackets is maximized at either $\rho_\zeta = 0$ or $\rho_\zeta = 1$. In the former case, the argument is less or equal to $1 + \tilde{\beta}$ providing $\tilde{\beta} \leq 1$. In the latter case, the argument is less or equal to $1 + \tilde{\beta}$ providing that $2(1 - \varrho_\pi) \leq \phi_\pi$. Therefore, if $\phi_x \geq 0$, $\phi_\pi \geq 0$, $\kappa \geq 0$, $\tilde{\beta} \in [0,1]$, $\varrho_\pi \in [0,1)$, $\rho_\zeta \in [0,1)$ and:

$$\phi_\pi > \max \left\{ \frac{1}{\tilde{\beta}(1 - \varrho_\pi)}, 2(1 - \varrho_\pi), \frac{\phi_x(1 + \tilde{\beta})}{\kappa} \right\},$$

then all of the eigenvalues of $\frac{\partial \mathcal{J}(\hat{m})}{\partial \hat{m}} \Big|_{\hat{m}=m}$ are less than one. Consequently, in this case the ODE is locally asymptotically stable, so the stochastic approximation results of Evans & Honkapohja (2001) apply. In particular, if we suppose that \hat{m}_0 , \hat{m}_1 and \hat{m}_2 are constrained to remain within a sufficiently small ball around m_0 , m_1 and m_2 , then the central bank's estimates of the Phillips curve parameters will converge to their true values, and the model's dynamics will converge to the determinate ones under rational expectations.

A.4 Responding to other endogenous variables in a general model

Now, suppose the central bank uses the rule:

$$i_t = r_t + \phi_\pi \pi_t + \iota \phi_z^\top z_t + \phi_\nu^\top \nu_t.$$

Here, z_t is a vector of other endogenous variables, with $z_{t,1} = r_t$, $\iota > 0$ is a scalar governing the strength of response to all of them, and ν_t is an arbitrary exogenous stochastic process (potentially vector valued). As usual, we assume $\phi_\pi > 1$.

Without loss of generality, we suppose that the other endogenous variables satisfy the general linear expectational difference equation:

$$0 = A\mathbb{E}_t z_{t+1} + Bz_t + Cz_{t-1} + d\pi_t + E\nu_t,$$

where the coefficient matrices are such that there is a unique matrix F with eigenvalues in the unit circle such that $F = -(AF + B)^{-1}C$.⁴⁵ This condition on F just states that there is no real indeterminacy in the model. Once inflation is determined, so too is z_t . Having the same shock process entering both the monetary rule and the model's other equations is without loss of generality as it is multiplied by ϕ_v^\top and E respectively.

Now define:

$$G := -A(AF + B)^{-1}.$$

Let L be the lag operator, then note that:

$$(I - GL^{-1})(AF + B)(I - FL) = AL^{-1} + B + CL.$$

Thus, by the model's real determinacy, all of G 's eigenvalues must also be inside the unit circle.

In terms of the lag operator, the model to be solved is then:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}_t(1 - \phi_\pi^{-1}L^{-1})\pi_t &= -\phi_\pi^{-1}\phi_z^\top z_t - \phi_\pi^{-1}\phi_v^\top v_t, \\ \mathbb{E}_t(I - GL^{-1})(AF + B)(I - FL)z_t &= -d\pi_t - Ev_t.\end{aligned}$$

Note for future reference that since ϕ_π^{-1} , G and F all have all their eigenvalues in the unit circle, $(1 - \phi_\pi^{-1}L^{-1})$, $(I - GL^{-1})$ and $(I - FL)$ are all invertible.

We conjecture a series solution of the form:

$$\pi_t = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} l^k \pi_t^{(k)}, \quad z_t = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} l^k z_t^{(k)}.$$

Matching terms gives that $\pi_t^{(0)}$ solves:

$$\mathbb{E}_t(1 - \phi_\pi^{-1}L^{-1})\pi_t^{(0)} = -\phi_\pi^{-1}\phi_v^\top v_t,$$

implying that $\pi_t^{(0)}$ is determinate with:

$$\pi_t^{(0)} = -\mathbb{E}_t(1 - \phi_\pi^{-1}L^{-1})^{-1}\phi_\pi^{-1}\phi_v^\top v_t.$$

Similarly, from matching terms in the law of motion for z_t , we have that:

$$\mathbb{E}_t(I - GL^{-1})(AF + B)(I - FL)z_t^{(0)} = -d\pi_t^{(0)} - Ev_t$$

⁴⁵ The lack of terms in $\mathbb{E}_t\pi_{t+1}$ and π_{t-1} is without loss of generality, as such responses can be included by adding an auxiliary variable $z_{t,j}$ with an equation of the form $z_{t,j} = \pi_t$.

so $z_t^{(0)}$ is also determinate (by our assumption on A , B and C) with:

$$z_t^{(0)} = -(I - FL)^{-1}(AF + B)^{-1}\mathbb{E}_t(I - GL^{-1})^{-1}(d\pi_t^{(0)} - E\nu_t).$$

Note that $\pi_t^{(0)}$ can be treated as exogenous for solving for $z_t^{(0)}$, as the causation only runs one way, from $\pi_t^{(0)}$ to $z_t^{(0)}$.

Now suppose that we have established that $\pi_t^{(k)}$ and $z_t^{(k)}$ are determinate for some $k \in \mathbb{N}$, with a determined solution not a function of higher order terms. (We have already proven the base case of $k = 0$.) We seek to prove that $\pi_t^{(k+1)}$ and $z_t^{(k+1)}$ are also determinate. Matching terms again gives that:

$$\mathbb{E}_t(1 - \phi_\pi^{-1}L^{-1})\pi_t^{(k+1)} = -\phi_\pi^{-1}\phi_z^\top z_t^{(k)},$$

so $\pi_t^{(k+1)}$ is also determinate, with:

$$\pi_t^{(k+1)} = -\mathbb{E}_t(1 - \phi_\pi^{-1}L^{-1})^{-1}\phi_\pi^{-1}\phi_z^\top z_t^{(k)},$$

where we used the inductive hypothesis that $z_t^{(k)}$ is already determined, and so it is effectively exogenous for the purpose of determining $\pi_t^{(k+1)}$. Then from matching terms in the law of motion for z_t :

$$\mathbb{E}_t(I - GL^{-1})(AF + B)(I - FL)z_t^{(k+1)} = -d\pi_t^{(k+1)},$$

so $z_t^{(k+1)}$ is also determinate, with:

$$z_t^{(k+1)} = -(I - FL)^{-1}(AF + B)^{-1}\mathbb{E}_t(I - GL^{-1})^{-1}d\pi_t^{(k+1)},$$

much as before. This completes our proof by induction, establishing that there is a series solution of the given form.

The only remaining thing to check is that the series does indeed converge for sufficiently small ι . This follows immediately from the product structure of the solution above, which means that the variances of $z_t^{(k)}$ and $\pi_t^{(k)}$ must be $O(h^k)$ for some $h \geq 1$. Hence for sufficiently small ι , the model is determinate. I.e., given the Taylor principle is satisfied, a sufficiently small response to other endogenous variables will not break determinacy.

A.5 If inflation is identical, other endogenous variables are identical

Let x_t and \tilde{x}_t be vectors stacking the endogenous variables other than inflation in the economy with our rule and the economy with the alternative rule, respectively. We assume without loss of generality that they are all zero in steady state. By linearity, the equations other than the monetary rule or monetary policy first order condition must have the form:

$$0 = Ax_{t-1} + a\pi_{t-1} + Bx_t + b\pi_t + CEx_{t+1} + cE\pi_{t+1} + \sum_{n=1}^N d_n \varepsilon_{n,t}, \quad (11)$$

in the economy with our rule, and they must have the form:

$$0 = A\tilde{x}_{t-1} + a\tilde{\pi}_{t-1} + B\tilde{x}_t + b\tilde{\pi}_t + C\tilde{E}\tilde{x}_{t+1} + c\tilde{E}\tilde{\pi}_{t+1} + \sum_{n=1}^N d_n \varepsilon_{n,t},$$

in the economy with the alternative rule. (Here, A , B and C are square matrices, while a , b and c are scalars, and d_1, \dots, d_N are vectors.) Since $\pi_t \equiv \tilde{\pi}_t$, $x_t \equiv \tilde{x}_t$ must solve equation (9). It will be the unique solution providing the model has no source of indeterminacy other than perhaps monetary policy. For example, in a three equation NK model, given that $\pi_t \equiv \tilde{\pi}_t$, the Phillips curve implies that the output gap must agree in the two economies, thus the Euler equation then implies that the interest rate must also agree.

A.6 Uniqueness of the solution of a simple non-linear expectational difference equation

Let $\phi > 1$. We seek to prove that the non-linear expectational difference equation:

$$X_t^\phi = E_t X_{t+1},$$

has a unique solution that is:

- a) positive (i.e., $X_t > 0$ for all t),
- b) stationary (so for example $EX_t = EX_s$ for all $t, s \in \mathbb{Z}$),
- c) and has bounded unconditional mean and log mean (i.e., $|EX_t| < \infty$ and $|E \log X_t| < \infty$).

Clearly $X_t = 1$ is one such solution.

Let X_t be a solution to $X_t^\phi = \mathbb{E}_t X_{t+1}$ satisfying (a), (b) and (c) above. Let $x_t := \log X_t$. Then from taking logs, we have:

$$\phi x_t = \log \mathbb{E}_t \exp x_{t+1} \geq \log \exp \mathbb{E}_t x_{t+1} = \mathbb{E}_t x_{t+1},$$

by Jensen's inequality. Therefore, by the law of iterated expectations, for any $k \in \mathbb{N}$:

$$\phi^k x_t \geq \mathbb{E}_t x_{t+k}.$$

As $k \rightarrow \infty$, the left-hand side tends to either plus infinity (if $x_t > 0$), zero (if $x_t = 0$), or minus infinity (if $x_t < 0$). On the other hand, as $k \rightarrow \infty$, the right-hand side tends to $\mathbb{E} x_t > -\infty$. Thus, we must have that $x_t \geq 0$ for all t , else this equation would be violated. Hence, $X_t \geq 1$ for all t .

Now note that by stationarity, the law of iterated expectations and Jensen's inequality:

$$\mathbb{E} X_t = \mathbb{E} X_{t+1} = \mathbb{E} \mathbb{E}_t X_{t+1} = \mathbb{E} X_t^\phi \geq (\mathbb{E} X_t)^\phi,$$

so $1 \geq (\mathbb{E} X_t)^{\phi-1}$, meaning $\mathbb{E} X_t \leq 1$. However, since $X_t \geq 1$ for all t , the only way we can have that $\mathbb{E} X_t \leq 1$ is if in fact $X_t = 1$ for all t .

Therefore, $X_t = 1$ is the unique solution to the original expectational difference equation satisfying (a), (b) and (c) above.

A.7 Solution properties of first welfare example

Recall, that for $k > 1$ the solution must satisfy the recurrence relation:

$$\theta_k + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} (\theta_k - \beta \theta_{k+1}) - \beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} (\theta_{k-1} - \beta \theta_k) = 0.$$

The characteristic equation of this recurrence relationship has roots:

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{\left(1 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} + \beta^2 \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right) \pm \sqrt{\left(1 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} + \beta^2 \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right)^2 - \left(2\beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right)^2}}{2\beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}} \\ &= \frac{\left(1 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} + \beta^2 \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right) \pm \sqrt{\left(1 + (1 + \beta)^2 \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right) \left(1 + (1 - \beta)^2 \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right)}}{2\beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}}. \end{aligned}$$

The positive root satisfies:

$$\begin{aligned}
& \frac{\left(1 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} + \beta^2 \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right) + \sqrt{\left(1 + (1 + \beta)^2 \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right) \left(1 + (1 - \beta)^2 \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right)}}{2\beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}} \\
& > \frac{\left(1 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} + \beta^2 \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right) + \sqrt{\left(1 + (1 - \beta)^2 \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right) \left(1 + (1 - \beta)^2 \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right)}}{2\beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}} \\
& = \frac{1 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} - \beta(1 - \beta) \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}}{\beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}} > \frac{1 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} - (1 - \beta) \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}}{\beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}} = 1 + \frac{1}{\beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}} > 1.
\end{aligned}$$

The negative root satisfies:

$$\begin{aligned}
& \frac{\left(1 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} + \beta^2 \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right) - \sqrt{\left(1 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} + \beta^2 \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right)^2 - \left(2\beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right)^2}}{2\beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}} \\
& > \frac{\left(1 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} + \beta^2 \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right) - \sqrt{\left(1 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} + \beta^2 \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right)^2}}{2\beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}} = 0,
\end{aligned}$$

and:

$$\begin{aligned}
& \frac{\left(1 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} + \beta^2 \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right) - \sqrt{\left(1 + (1 + \beta)^2 \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right) \left(1 + (1 - \beta)^2 \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right)}}{2\beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}} \\
& < \frac{\left(1 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} + \beta^2 \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right) - \sqrt{\left(1 + (1 - \beta)^2 \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right) \left(1 + (1 - \beta)^2 \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right)}}{2\beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}} = 1.
\end{aligned}$$

Hence, the positive root is greater than 1, while the negative root is in (0,1). Thus for $k \geq 1$:

$$\theta_k = \theta_1 \left[\frac{\left(1 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} + \beta^2 \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right) - \sqrt{\left(1 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} + \beta^2 \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right)^2 - \left(2\beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right)^2}}{2\beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}} \right]^{k-1}.$$

Hence, θ_0 , θ_1 and θ_2 are the unique solution of the three linear (in θ_0 , θ_1 and θ_2) equations:

$$\begin{aligned}
& \theta_0 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} (\theta_0 - \beta\theta_1 - 1) = 0, \\
& \theta_1 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} (\theta_1 - \beta\theta_2) - \beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} (\theta_0 - \beta\theta_1 - 1) = 0,
\end{aligned}$$

$$\theta_2 = \theta_1 \left[\frac{\left(1 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} + \beta^2 \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right) - \sqrt{\left(1 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} + \beta^2 \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right)^2 - \left(2\beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right)^2}}{2\beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}} \right].$$

A.8 Solution under discretion of first welfare example

Under discretion, we have the standard first order condition:

$$\pi_t + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa} x_t = 0,$$

i.e.:

$$\kappa \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \theta_k \omega_{t-k} + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa} \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\theta_k - \beta \theta_{k+1} - \mathbb{1}[k=0]) \omega_{t-k} = 0,$$

so:

$$\begin{aligned} \theta_0 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} (\theta_0 - \beta \theta_1 - 1) &= 0, \\ \forall k \geq 1, \quad \theta_k + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} (\theta_k - \beta \theta_{k+1}) &= 0. \end{aligned}$$

The latter recurrence relation has the general solution $\theta_k = \theta_1 \left(\frac{\kappa^2}{\beta \lambda} + \frac{1}{\beta} \right)^{k-1}$, which is explosive as $\beta < 1$. Thus, we must have $\theta_1 = \theta_2 = \dots = 0$. Hence, $\theta_0 = \frac{\lambda}{\lambda + \kappa^2}$.

A.9 Solution under the timeless perspective of first welfare example

The timeless perspective (Woodford 1999) leads to the first order condition:

$$\pi_t + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa} (x_t - x_{t-1}) = 0,$$

i.e.:

$$\begin{aligned} \kappa \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \theta_k \omega_{t-k} + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa} \left[\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\theta_k - \beta \theta_{k+1} - \mathbb{1}[k=0]) \omega_{t-k} \right. \\ \left. - \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} (\theta_{k-1} - \beta \theta_k - \mathbb{1}[k-1=0]) \omega_{t-k} \right] &= 0, \end{aligned}$$

so:

$$\begin{aligned} \theta_0 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} (\theta_0 - \beta \theta_1 - 1) &= 0, \\ \theta_1 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} (\theta_1 - \beta \theta_2) - \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} (\theta_0 - \beta \theta_1 - 1) &= 0, \\ \forall k > 1, \quad \theta_k + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} (\theta_k - \beta \theta_{k+1}) - \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} (\theta_{k-1} - \beta \theta_k) &= 0. \end{aligned}$$

The roots of the characteristic equation corresponding to the latter recurrence relation are:

$$\frac{\left(1 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} + \beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right) \pm \sqrt{\left(1 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} + \beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right)^2 - 4\beta \left(\frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right)^2}}{2\beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}}.$$

The positive root satisfies:

$$\frac{\left(1 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} + \beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right) + \sqrt{\left(1 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} + \beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right)^2 - 4\beta \left(\frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right)^2}}{2\beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}} > \frac{\frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} + \beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}}{2\beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}} = \frac{1 + \beta}{2\beta} > 1.$$

The negative root satisfies:

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{\left(1 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} + \beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right) - \sqrt{\left(1 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} + \beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right)^2 - 4\beta \left(\frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right)^2}}{2\beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}} \\ & > \frac{\left(1 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} + \beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right) - \sqrt{\left(1 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} + \beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right)^2}}{2\beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}} = 0, \end{aligned}$$

and:

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{\left(1 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} + \beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right) - \sqrt{\left(1 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} + \beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right)^2 - 4\beta \left(\frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right)^2}}{2\beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}} \\ & = \frac{\left(1 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} + \beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right) - \sqrt{1 + (1 - \beta)^2 \left(\frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right)^2 + 2(1 + \beta) \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}}}{2\beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}} \\ & < \frac{\left(1 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} + \beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right) - \sqrt{1 + (1 - \beta)^2 \left(\frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right)^2 + 2(1 - \beta) \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}}}{2\beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}} \\ & = \frac{\left(1 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} + \beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right) - \sqrt{\left(1 + (1 - \beta) \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right)^2}}{2\beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}} = \frac{2\beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}}{2\beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}} = 1. \end{aligned}$$

Hence, the positive root is greater than 1, while the negative root is in (0,1). Thus for

$k \geq 1$:

$$\theta_k = \theta_1 \left[\frac{\left(1 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} + \beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right) - \sqrt{\left(1 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} + \beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right)^2 - 4\beta \left(\frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right)^2}}{2\beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}} \right]^{k-1}.$$

Hence, θ_0 , θ_1 and θ_2 are the unique solution of the three linear (in θ_0 , θ_1 and θ_2) equations:

$$\begin{aligned}\theta_0 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}(\theta_0 - \beta\theta_1 - 1) &= 0, \\ \theta_1 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}(\theta_1 - \beta\theta_2) - \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}(\theta_0 - \beta\theta_1 - 1) &= 0, \\ \theta_2 &= \theta_1 \left[\frac{\left(1 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} + \beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right) - \sqrt{\left(1 + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2} + \beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right)^2 - 4\beta \left(\frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}\right)^2}}{2\beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2}} \right].\end{aligned}$$

Appendix B Rough calibration of the redistribution channel model

If B-type households are at the borrowing limits and the labour supply limit, while all constraints are slack for S-type households, then the model's steady state is as follows:

$$c_B = 1 - \psi \frac{1 - \beta_S}{\beta_S},$$

$$l_B = 1,$$

$$b_B = -\psi,$$

$$\lambda_B = \frac{1 + \psi \frac{\beta_S - \beta_B}{\beta_S}}{1 - \psi \frac{1 - \beta_S}{\beta_S}} - \chi,$$

$$\mu_B = \nu_B = \frac{\frac{\beta_S - \beta_B}{\beta_S}}{1 - \psi \frac{1 - \beta_S}{\beta_S}},$$

$$\nu_B = \frac{\frac{\beta_S - \beta_B}{\beta_S}}{1 - \psi \frac{1 - \beta_S}{\beta_S}},$$

$$c_S = \frac{1}{\chi},$$

$$l_S = \frac{1}{\chi} - \psi \frac{1 - \theta}{\theta} \frac{1 - \beta_S}{\beta_S},$$

$$b_S = \psi \frac{1 - \theta}{\theta},$$

$$\lambda_S = \mu_S = \nu_S,$$

$$y = l = (1 - \theta) \left(1 - \psi \frac{1 - \beta_S}{\beta_S} \right) + \theta \frac{1}{\chi},$$

$$R = \frac{G}{\beta_S},$$

$$I = \frac{\Pi G}{\beta_S}.$$

We set ψ and χ so that if $\beta_S = \beta_B$, then $\lambda_B = 0$. This means that if there were no difference in discount factors, the borrowing constraint of type B households would be just slack. This is a broadly reasonable restriction which considerably simplifies the algebra. It implies:

$$\psi \frac{1 - \beta_S}{\beta_S} = 1 - \frac{1}{\chi}.$$

This is also the condition we found in Subsection 3.4 under which the policy maker has no incentive to redistribute between the two groups of agents in the initial period.

In the US, household debt service payments are about 10% of disposable income,⁴⁶ thus we set:

$$\frac{\psi \frac{1 - \beta_S}{\beta_S}}{y} = \frac{1}{10}.$$

This implies:

$$\begin{aligned}\chi &= \frac{11}{10}, \\ y = l = c_B = c_S &= \frac{10}{11}, \\ \lambda_B &= \psi \frac{11}{10} \frac{\beta_S - \beta_B}{\beta_S}, \\ \mu_B = \nu_B &= \frac{11}{10} \frac{\beta_S - \beta_B}{\beta_S}, \\ l_S &= \frac{10}{11} - \frac{1}{11} \frac{1 - \theta}{\theta}.\end{aligned}$$

We set $\theta = \frac{1}{4}$, in line with evidence that only about the top quarter of the US wealth distribution have wealth of at least a third of US mean wealth. (Households between the 50th and 75th percentiles of the wealth distribution have mean wealth of less than a third of the mean wealth of all US households.)⁴⁷ Thus:

⁴⁶ See <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TDSP>.

⁴⁷ Using 2019 data from:

https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/scf/dataviz/scf/table/#series:Net_Worth;demographic:nwcat:population:all;units:mean and:

https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/scf/dataviz/scf/table/#series:Net_Worth;demographic:all;population:all;units:mean.

$$l_S = \frac{7}{11},$$

$$b_S = 3\psi.$$

Finally, we set $\beta_S = \frac{99}{100}$ in line with standard practice for quarterly macro models. This gives that:

$$\psi = 9,$$

so:

$$b_S = 27 = \frac{297}{10}y.$$

29.7 is not too far off the value of the mean wealth of the top quartile of the US wealth distribution divided by US mean household income, which is 25.47.⁴⁸

For completeness, we now verify that the inequalities we imposed in the paper hold in steady state in this calibration. These were:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\chi\psi(1-\theta)}{\chi\psi(1-\theta)+\theta} &\leq \frac{\Pi_t G_t}{I_{t-1}} \leq \frac{\chi\psi(1-\theta)}{\chi\psi(1-\theta)-(\chi-1)\theta}, \\ \frac{\theta}{1-\theta} &\leq \chi, \\ \chi &\leq 1 + (1-\theta)\psi. \end{aligned}$$

At our chosen parameters, these hold in steady state if and only if:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{297}{307} &\leq \frac{99}{100} \leq \frac{297}{296}, \\ \frac{1}{3} &\leq \frac{11}{10}, \\ \frac{11}{10} &\leq \frac{31}{4}. \end{aligned}$$

All of these are clearly true.

⁴⁸ Using 2019 data from:

https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/scf/dataviz/scf/table/#series:Before_Tax_Income;demographic:all:population:all:units:mean

and:

https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/scf/dataviz/scf/table/#series:Net_Worth;demographic:nwcat:population:all:units:mean . 25.47 = (703.59 × 15 + 5710.34 × 10)/25/106.25.

Appendix C Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL) results

C.1 Exact equilibria under active fiscal policy with geometric coupon debt and flexible prices

Suppose the representative household supplies one unit of labour, inelastically. Production is given by:

$$y_t = l_t (= 1).$$

In period 0, the representative household maximises:

$$\mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \log c_t$$

subject to the budget constraint:

$$P_t c_t + A_t + Q_t B_t + P_t \tau_t = P_t y_t + I_{t-1} A_{t-1} + B_{t-1} (1 + \omega Q_t),$$

where c_t is consumption, τ_t are real lump sum taxes, P_t is the price of the final good, A_t is the number of one period nominal bonds purchased by the household at t , which each return I_t in period $t + 1$, Q_t is the price of a long bond and B_t are the number of units of this long bond purchased by the household at t . One unit of the period t long bond bought at t returns \$1 at $t + 1$, along with ω units of the period $t + 1$ bond.

The household first order conditions imply:

$$1 = \beta I_t \mathbb{E}_t \frac{P_t c_t}{P_{t+1} c_{t+1}},$$
$$Q_t = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \frac{P_t c_t}{P_{t+1} c_{t+1}} (1 + \omega Q_{t+1}).$$

The household transversality conditions are that:

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \beta^t \frac{A_t}{P_t c_t} = 0,$$
$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \beta^t \frac{Q_t B_t}{P_t c_t} = 0.$$

The government fixes taxes at a constant positive level:

$$\tau_t = \tau, \quad \tau > 0.$$

The government issues no one period bonds, so:

$$A_t = 0.$$

The central bank pegs nominal interest rates at:

$$I_t = \beta^{-1}.$$

(We will discuss active monetary policy later.)

The final goods market clears, so:

$$y_t = c_t = 1.$$

Thus, from the household budget constraint, we have the following government budget constraint:

$$Q_t B_t + P_t \tau = B_{t-1} (1 + \omega Q_t).$$

We look for an equilibrium in which $P_t = P$ for all $t \geq 0$. However, we do not impose a priori that $P = P_{-1}$.

With $P_t = P$ for $t \geq 0$, the household Euler equations simplify to (respectively):

$$1 = \beta I_t,$$

$$Q_t = \beta \mathbb{E}_t (1 + \omega Q_{t+1}).$$

The former equation is consistent with the CB's peg of $I_t = \beta^{-1}$.

We consider the following solution to the latter equation:

$$Q_t = \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta\omega} + \left(Q_0 - \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta\omega} \right) (\beta\omega)^{-t}.$$

We wish to find Q_0 , which is free to jump. There are three cases to consider:

Case 1: $Q_0 < \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta\omega}$. Then Q_t eventually goes to zero (and then negative), which certainly cannot be consistent with a world in which $I_t > 0$. Thus, this case is ruled out.

Case 2: $Q_0 = \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta\omega}$. Then Q_t is constant, and the government budget constraint becomes:

$$B_t = \beta^{-1} B_{t-1} - \beta^{-1} (1 - \beta\omega) P \tau.$$

Thus:

$$B_t = P \tau \frac{1 - \beta\omega}{1 - \beta} + \left(B_{-1} - P \tau \frac{1 - \beta\omega}{1 - \beta} \right) \beta^{-t-1}$$

So:

$$\begin{aligned}\beta^t \frac{Q_t B_t}{P_t c_t} &= \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta\omega} \frac{1}{P} \left[P\tau \frac{1 - \beta\omega}{1 - \beta} \beta^t + \left(B_{-1} - P\tau \frac{1 - \beta\omega}{1 - \beta} \right) \beta^{-1} \right] \\ &\rightarrow \frac{1}{1 - \beta\omega} \frac{1}{P} \left(B_{-1} - P\tau \frac{1 - \beta\omega}{1 - \beta} \right)\end{aligned}$$

as $t \rightarrow \infty$.

Thus, from the transversality constraint:

$$P = \frac{B_{-1}}{\tau} \frac{1 - \beta}{1 - \beta\omega}.$$

This is the standard FTPL equilibrium. **Equilibrium type 1!**

Case 3: $Q_0 > \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta\omega}$.

Define:

$$\begin{aligned}q_t &:= Q_t (\beta\omega)^t, \\ b_t &:= B_t \omega^{-t}.\end{aligned}$$

Then the government budget constraint states:

$$b_t = \left(1 + \frac{(\beta\omega)^t}{\omega q_t} \right) b_{t-1} - \frac{\beta^t P \tau}{q_t},$$

and the transversality constraint states:

$$\frac{1}{P} \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} q_t b_t = 0.$$

By our solution for q_t , we know that $q_t \rightarrow Q_0 - \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta\omega} > 0$. Thus, the transversality condition requires:

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} b_t = 0.$$

Now define:

$$\hat{b}_t := \frac{b_t}{\prod_{k=0}^t \left(1 + \frac{(\beta\omega)^k}{\omega q_k} \right)},$$

with $\hat{b}_{-1} = b_{-1} = \omega B_{-1}$. The denominator in the definition of \hat{b}_t is greater than 1, so if $b_t \rightarrow 0$ as $t \rightarrow \infty$, then certainly $\hat{b}_t \rightarrow 0$. Likewise, if $\hat{b}_t \rightarrow 0$ as $t \rightarrow \infty$, then also $b_t \rightarrow 0$, since:

$$\begin{aligned}
\prod_{k=0}^{\infty} \left(1 + \frac{(\beta\omega)^k}{\omega q_k} \right) &= \prod_{k=0}^{\infty} \left(1 + \frac{1 - \beta\omega}{\beta\omega + (\omega(1 - \beta\omega)Q_0 - \beta\omega)(\beta\omega)^{-k}} \right) \\
&= \exp \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \log \left(1 + \frac{1 - \beta\omega}{\beta\omega + (\omega(1 - \beta\omega)Q_0 - \beta\omega)(\beta\omega)^{-k}} \right) \\
&\leq \exp \int_{-1}^{\infty} \log \left(1 + \frac{1 - \beta\omega}{\beta\omega + (\omega(1 - \beta\omega)Q_0 - \beta\omega)(\beta\omega)^{-k}} \right) < \infty,
\end{aligned}$$

where the final inequality follows from explicitly calculating the integral (in Maple).

Calculations are available on request.

Now, substituting the definition of \hat{b}_t into the law of motion for b_t gives:

$$\hat{b}_t = \hat{b}_{t-1} - \frac{\beta^t P \tau}{q_t \prod_{k=0}^t \left(1 + \frac{(\beta\omega)^k}{\omega q_k} \right)},$$

so:

$$\begin{aligned}
\hat{b}_t &= \hat{b}_{-1} - P \tau \sum_{j=0}^t \frac{\beta^j}{q_j \prod_{k=0}^j \left(1 + \frac{(\beta\omega)^k}{\omega q_k} \right)} \\
&= \hat{b}_{-1} - P \tau \sum_{j=0}^t \frac{\prod_{k=0}^j \beta \left(1 + \frac{1 - \beta\omega}{\beta\omega + (\omega(1 - \beta\omega)Q_0 - \beta\omega)(\beta\omega)^{-k}} \right)^{-1}}{\beta \left[\frac{\beta}{1 - \beta\omega} (\beta\omega)^j + \left(Q_0 - \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta\omega} \right) \right]}.
\end{aligned}$$

Note that for $k \geq 0$:

$$1 < 1 + \frac{1 - \beta\omega}{\beta\omega + (\omega(1 - \beta\omega)Q_0 - \beta\omega)(\beta\omega)^{-k}} \leq 1 + \frac{1}{\omega Q_0} < \frac{1}{\beta\omega},$$

so:

$$(\beta^2 \omega)^{j+1} < \prod_{k=0}^j \beta \left(1 + \frac{1 - \beta\omega}{\beta\omega + (\omega(1 - \beta\omega)Q_0 - \beta\omega)(\beta\omega)^{-k}} \right)^{-1} < \beta^{j+1}.$$

Thus, since the denominator within the sum is converging to $\beta \left(Q_0 - \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta\omega} \right)$ the sum is finite and has a finite limit as $t \rightarrow \infty$.

Hence, one equilibrium is for $Q_0 > \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta\omega}$ to be arbitrary and for P to be given by:

$$P = \frac{\hat{b}_{-1}}{\tau \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \frac{\prod_{k=0}^j \beta \left(1 + \frac{1 - \beta\omega}{\beta\omega + (\omega(1 - \beta\omega)Q_0 - \beta\omega)(\beta\omega)^{-k}} \right)^{-1}}{\beta \left[\frac{\beta}{1 - \beta\omega} (\beta\omega)^j + \left(Q_0 - \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta\omega} \right) \right]}}.$$

Equilibrium type 2!

Alternatively, suppose P is given. When can we solve the previous equation to find Q_0 ? As $Q_0 \rightarrow \frac{\beta}{1-\beta\omega}$, the right-hand side of the previous equation tends to:

$$\frac{\hat{b}_{-1}}{\tau\omega} \frac{1-\beta}{1-\beta\omega} = \frac{B_{-1}}{\tau} \frac{1-\beta}{1-\beta\omega}.$$

As $Q_0 \rightarrow \infty$, this right-hand side tends to ∞ . Thus, by the intermediate value theorem, for any $P \in \left[\frac{B_{-1}}{\tau} \frac{1-\beta}{1-\beta\omega}, \infty \right]$, there is a Q_0 that satisfies the transversality constraint.

Equilibrium type 3!

Therefore, the FTPL implies a lower bound on the price level, not an upper bound, and so with passive monetary policy, there are multiple equilibria.

Now suppose that monetary policy is active, with:

$$I_t = \beta^{-1} \Pi_t^\phi,$$

with $\phi > 1$ and $\Pi_t := \frac{P_t}{P_{t-1}}$. β^{-1} is the real interest rate in this model, so this is a non-linear real rate rule. Given that $c_t = 1$, the Euler equation for one period bonds implies the nonlinear Fisher equation:

$$1 = \beta I_t \mathbb{E}_t \frac{1}{\Pi_{t+1}},$$

so, for $t \geq 0$:

$$\mathbb{E}_t \frac{1}{\Pi_{t+1}} = \left(\frac{1}{\Pi_t} \right)^\phi.$$

$\Pi_t = 1$ is the unique stationary solution to this equation, by the results of Appendix A.6 (with $X_t := \frac{1}{\Pi_t}$). In this candidate equilibrium, $I_t = \beta^{-1}$, so Π_t and I_t have the same time series as under the passive policy in the special case in which $P = P_{-1}$. Consequently, if $P_{-1} > \frac{B_{-1}}{\tau} \frac{1-\beta}{1-\beta\omega}$ then by the above results, there exists a Q_0 under which all equilibrium conditions and transversality conditions are satisfied. Thus, even with active monetary and active fiscal policy, there is still a stable equilibrium for inflation and real variables.

C.2 Linearised equilibria under active fiscal policy with geometric coupon debt and sticky prices

We just give the linearised equations of the model. These follow equations 5.17 to 5.21 of Cochrane (2022). All shocks (variables of the form $\varepsilon_{\cdot,t}$) are assumed to be mean zero and independent, both across time and across shocks.

Euler:

$$x_t = \mathbb{E}_t x_{t+1} - \sigma r_t.$$

Phillips:

$$\pi_t = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1} + \kappa x_t.$$

Fisher:

$$i_t = r_t + \mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1}.$$

Robust real rate rule:

$$i_t = r_t + \phi \pi_t + \varepsilon_{i,t}.$$

Exogenous real government surplus:

$$s_t = \varepsilon_{s,t}.$$

Debt evolution (v_t is the value of debt to GDP, e_t is the ex-post nominal return on government debt):

$$\rho v_t = v_{t-1} + e_t - \pi_t - s_t.$$

Equal returns:

$$\mathbb{E}_t e_{t+1} = i_t.$$

Bond pricing (ω controls the maturity structure. $\omega = 0$ is one period debt, $\omega = 1$ is a perpetuity):

$$e_t = \omega q_t - q_{t-1}.$$

We assume that $\omega > 0$. Then for any $\phi \neq 0$, the following solves these linear expectational difference equations:

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_t &= -\frac{\varepsilon_{i,t}}{\phi}, & x_t &= -\frac{\varepsilon_{i,t}}{\kappa\phi}, \\ r_t &= \frac{\varepsilon_{i,t}}{\sigma\kappa\phi}, & v_t &= -\frac{\varepsilon_{i,t}}{\sigma\kappa\phi}, \end{aligned}$$

$$e_t = \varepsilon_{s,t} - \left(\frac{\rho}{\sigma\kappa\phi} + \frac{1}{\phi} \right) \varepsilon_{i,t} + \frac{\varepsilon_{i,t-1}}{\sigma\kappa\phi},$$

$$q_t = \frac{1}{\omega} \left[q_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{s,t} - \left(\frac{\rho}{\sigma\kappa\phi} + \frac{1}{\phi} \right) \varepsilon_{i,t} + \frac{\varepsilon_{i,t-1}}{\sigma\kappa\phi} \right].$$

As in the non-linear, flexible price case, the bond price is exploding. However, the real value of government debt remains stationary, which is sufficient for the transversality constraint to be satisfied. Inflation and all real variables are also stationary. Thus, if monetary policy is passive ($\phi \in (0,1)$), then the linearised model has multiple valid equilibria, this one, and the standard “FTPL” one in which q_t is stationary (see Cochrane (2022)). Conversely, if monetary policy is active ($\phi > 1$), then the model possesses a valid equilibrium with stationary inflation and real variables.