

# THOMAS NEUBER

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## EDUCATION AND AFFILIATIONS

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**Ph.D. candidate in economics** *October 2014 – present*

Bonn Graduate School of Economics and Institute for Applied Microeconomics, University of Bonn, Germany. Advisors: Thomas Dohmen (primary), Armin Falk, and Felipe Valencia Caicedo.

**Research assistant** *June 2017 – present*

briq – Institute on Behavior & Inequality, Bonn, Germany

**Research fellow** *January 2018 – present*

Collaborative Research Center (CRC) TR 224

**Student in the *Young ECONtribute Program*** *April 2020 – present*

ECONtribute: Markets & Public Policy (cluster in the German Excellence Strategy)

**Master in economics (M.Sc.)** *October 2014 – September 2018*

University of Bonn, Germany

**Bachelor in economics (B.Sc.)** *April 2011 – August 2014*

University of Munich (LMU), Germany

**Abroad semester** *September 2013 – March 2014*

University of Washington, Seattle, WA

## REFERENCES

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### Thomas Dohmen

*Professor at the University of Bonn*  
Institute for Applied Microeconomics  
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### Armin Falk

*Professor at the University of Bonn*  
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### Felipe Valencia Caicedo

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## RESEARCH

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### Diffusion of Being Pivotal and Immoral Outcomes

(with Armin Falk and Nora Szech)

*Review of Economic Studies, Volume 87, Issue 5, October 2020, Pages 2205–2229*

We study how the diffusion of being pivotal affects immoral outcomes. In our main experiment, subjects decide about agreeing to kill mice and receiving money versus objecting to the killing and foregoing the monetary amount. In a baseline condition, subjects decide individually about the life of one mouse. In the main treatment, subjects are organized into groups of eight and decide simultaneously. Eight mice are killed if at least one subject opts for killing. The fraction of

subjects agreeing to kill is significantly higher in the main condition compared with the baseline condition. In a second experiment, we run the same baseline and main conditions but use a charity context and additionally study sequential decision-making. We replicate our finding from the mouse paradigm. We further show that the observed effects increase with experience, i.e., when we repeat the experiment for a second time. For both experiments, we elicit beliefs about being pivotal, which we validate in a treatment with non-involved observers. We show that beliefs are a main driver of our results.

### **Motivated by Others' Preferences? An Experiment on Imperfect Empathy**

(with Jana Hofmeier)

*CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper No. 096*

People care about others. But how do they assess the utility of others when making other-regarding decisions? Do they apply their own preferences or do they adopt the preferences of the other person? We study this question in a laboratory experiment where subjects in the role of senders can pay money to avoid harm arising to receivers. In a first step, we elicit all subjects' willingness to pay (WTP) for not having to eat food items containing dried insects. We then show senders the WTPs of receivers and repeat the elicitation procedure, but now with receivers having to eat the food items and senders stating their WTPs to spare the receivers from having to eat them. We find that not only receivers' preferences matter for decisions but also senders' own preferences, a phenomenon for which we use the term imperfect empathy. In motivating prosocial transfers, senders' and receivers' WTPs act as complements by reinforcing each other. Conversely, pairs of sender and receiver who are dissimilar generate lower transfers than others. Since transfers usually benefit receivers more than they cost senders, we also find that dissimilarity within pairs reduces welfare. Our results complement the extensive literature on prosocial preferences, which so far abstracts from heterogeneous valuations. The implications might be far-reaching. For example, systematic differences in consumption preferences between net payers and recipients could undermine public support for public welfare systems.

### **Egocentric Norm Adoption**

*Job market paper*

Social norms pervade human behavior, but the importance of any norm is usually open to interpretation. This paper provides experimental evidence showing that people perceive the relevance of norms egocentrically: they believe in norms that are good for them in the sense that they would personally profit from these norms if everybody adhered to them. Many previous experiments have studied conflicting norms and have shown that people favor principles that allow them to be selfish. This paper also presents a (virtual) laboratory experiment in which subjects face conflicting norms. However, they decide over others instead of themselves, while their own payoffs depend on further participants' choices in the same decision contexts. Despite the absence of any personal motives, subjects deciding over others rely more intensively on normative principles that align with their own interests. Afterward, we ask subjects to predict the decisions of others, who might have different interests. Beliefs display the same kind of bias as found for decisions, pointing towards an unconscious mechanism. Survey answers provide further support for the importance of egocentrism: subjects who report pronounced perspective-taking are less biased.

### **Limited Self-knowledge and Survey Response Behavior**

(with Armin Falk and Philipp Strack)

*Working paper*

We study response behavior in surveys and show how the explanatory power of self-reports can be improved. First, we develop a choice model of survey response behavior under the assumption that the respondent has imperfect self-knowledge about her individual characteristics. In panel data, the model predicts that the variance in responses for different characteristics increases in self-knowledge and that the variance for a given characteristic over time is non-monotonous in

self-knowledge. Importantly, the ratio of these variances identifies an individual's level of self-knowledge, i.e., the latter can be inferred from observed response patterns. Second, we develop a consistent and unbiased estimator for self-knowledge based on the model. Third, we run an experiment to test the model's main predictions in a context where the researcher knows the true underlying characteristics. The data confirm the model's predictions as well as the estimator's validity. Finally, we turn to a large panel data set, estimate individual levels of self-knowledge, and show that accounting for differences in self-knowledge significantly increases the explanatory power of estimates. Using a median split in self-knowledge and regressing risky behaviors on self-reported risk attitudes, we find that the  $R^2$  can be multiple times larger for above- than below-median subjects. Similarly, gender gaps in risk attitudes are considerably larger when restricting samples to subjects with high self-knowledge. These examples illustrate how using the estimator may improve inference from survey data.

## **State Institutions and the Evolution of Patience**

(with Thomas Dohmen)

*Working in progress*

The degree to which people behave patiently is a crucial determinant of various economic outcomes at both the individual and the aggregate level. This paper contributes to our understanding of this important economic concept by studying the persistent effect that statehood during the last two millennia has had on patience around the globe. We show that state history and individuals' levels of patient behavior exhibit a humped shaped relationship, consistent with recent findings for the association between historical statehood and economic development. The relationship is robust to various controls, including contemporary institutions and even economic development. We then turn towards identifying the geographically portable component of the effect by comparing migrants from different origins that now reside in the same country. We find a pronounced negative effect of home countries' state history on patient behavior, which is significant and robust to controls. It is shown that our results are consistent with a model where state history has a persistently positive effect on patient behavior through the emergence of patience-promoting norms, which are substitutes for intrinsic patience but not portable. The overall effect of state history on present-day patient behavior masks partial crowding-out of intrinsic patience.

## **PRESENTATIONS AND SUMMER SCHOOLS**

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|---|-----------------------|
| <b>Annual Congress of the <i>Verein für Socialpolitik</i></b>                             | <i>September 2020</i> |
| Presented project: "Limited Self-knowledge and Survey Response Behavior"                  |                       |
| <b>Annual Congress of the European Economic Association</b>                               | <i>August 2020</i>    |
| Presented project: "Limited Self-knowledge and Survey Response Behavior"                  |                       |
| <b>Early-Career Behavioral Economics Conference</b>                                       | <i>July 2020</i>      |
| Presented project: "Motivated by Others' Preferences? An Experiment on Imperfect Empathy" |                       |
| <b>Annual Congress of the <i>Verein für Socialpolitik</i></b>                             | <i>September 2019</i> |
| Presented project: "Motivated by Others' Preferences? An Experiment on Imperfect Empathy" |                       |
| <b>Annual Congress of the European Economic Association</b>                               | <i>August 2019</i>    |
| Presented project: "Motivated by Others' Preferences? An Experiment on Imperfect Empathy" |                       |
| <b>Conference of the Society for Economic Measurement</b>                                 | <i>August 2019</i>    |
| Presented project: "Limited Self-knowledge and Survey Response Behavior"                  |                       |
| <b>Spring School in Behavioral Economics</b>  | <i>March 2018</i>     |
| San Diego, CA   |                       |
| <b>The Choice Lab PhD Workshop in Behavioral and Experimental Econ.</b>                   | <i>August 2017</i>    |
| Presented project: "State Institutions and the Evolution of Patience"                     |                       |

## GRANTS AND HONORS

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**Research grant by the CRC TR 224** *March 2020*  
Funding of €4.000 for the project “Egocentric Norm Adoption” (within Project A01)

**Research grant by the CRC TR 224** *May 2018*  
Funding of €4.000 for the project “Motivated by Others’ Preferences? An Experiment on Imperfect Empathy” (within Project A01)

**Doctoral scholarship** *October 2014 – September 2018*  
Bonn Graduate School of Economics

**Munich Honors Program in Economics** *April 2012 – August 2014*  
University of Munich

**PROSA<sup>LMU</sup> scholarship** *September 2013 – March 2014*  
German Academic Exchange Service and University of Munich

## TEACHING EXPERIENCE

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**Seminar on scientific work methods (undergraduate)** *Winter term 2019/20*  
Department of Economics, University of Bonn

**Seminar on scientific work methods (undergraduate)** *Summer term 2019*  
Department of Economics, University of Bonn

**Tutor for statistics (undergraduate)** *Winter term 2016/17*  
Department of Economics, University of Bonn

**Tutor for macroeconomics (undergraduate)** *Summer term 2012*  
Department of Economics, University of Munich

## OTHER

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<b>Computer skills</b>	L <sup>A</sup> T <sub>E</sub> X, Mathematica, Python, R, Stata
<b>Languages</b>	German (native), English (fluent)