

# **The Real Effects of Debt Relief: Evidence from Independent School Districts in Texas<sup>\*</sup>**

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U.S. school districts face pressing needs for facility improvements, yet limited debt capacity hampers their ability to raise sufficient capital for these projects. I study how debt assistance affects educational outcomes through increased capital investment in debt-strapped districts. Using a novel quasi-natural experiment, I find that debt support increases capital spending by 22%, leading to substantial long-term improvements in educational outcomes, including higher test scores and graduation rates. The findings suggest that state intervention in debt capacity can produce long-run positive effects by revitalizing previously forgone high-impact projects.

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Deteriorating school facility conditions in the U.S. pose a major threat to the quality of public education. Poor infrastructure creates unsafe learning environments and limits students' access to technology essential for digital-age learning. In 2012, the total deferred maintenance reached \$200 billion ([Alexander and Lewis \(2014\)](#)), which has nearly tripled over the last decade ([Filardo \(2021\)](#)). School districts frequently issue debt for large-scale improvements, which accounts for around 80% of capital investment funding.<sup>1</sup> Since they repay these debts primarily through ad valorem taxes, often subject to state-mandated caps, districts have varying debt capacities to raise funds for facility improvements. Disparities in access to physical capital can significantly impact human capital development during the K-12 years, the most crucial period for human capital formation, further widening the education gap and income inequality (e.g. [Card et al. \(2022\)](#), [Chetty et al. \(2014\)](#), [Huggett et al. \(2011\)](#)).

This paper investigates whether increased capital spending on school facilities can improve educational outcomes, using a quasi-natural experiment in which a state government subsidizes school district debt payments. I find that debt-strapped school districts substantially increase capital spending shortly after receiving subsidies. I then document that state-sponsored investment translates into significant improvements in educational outcomes in the long run, such as higher test scores and completion rates. The coefficient estimates imply that the effect sizes in academic performance are comparable to those observed in the class size reduction experiment in Tennessee (e.g. [Chetty et al. \(2011\)](#)). The findings provide evidence that state-led debt assistance enables debt-laden school districts to initiate value-adding projects, leading to an improved quality of public education.

I exploit a novel quasi-natural experiment in which state intervention lowered the local share of debt servicing costs in Texas in 1998 by subsidizing a portion of debt payments for school districts. Over 57% of independent school districts in Texas received these subsidies during the first biennium, with total state contributions reaching approximately \$84 billion

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<sup>1</sup>State and federal funding contribute to the remaining 20% of total capital outlays ([Filardo \(2016\)](#) and [Filardo \(2021\)](#)).

by 2022. The design of the allocation formula incentivizes debt-laden districts to apply and grants them a greater state contribution even after controlling for taxable property wealth. Heterogeneous responses to the debt assistance programs, driven by school districts' pre-policy debt burdens, generate plausibly exogenous variation in capital expenditures. This measure strongly predicts the extent of capital investment in post-policy periods and ensures that other confounding factors, such as local economic growth, demographic shifts, and concurrent policy changes, do not drive the results.

Using this shock, I find that districts with high pre-existing debt burdens significantly increase their capital spending following the debt assistance program. These highly leveraged districts allocate roughly \$570 more per student to capital projects, or 22% more cumulatively over three years, than their less-indebted counterparts. Over 85% of this additional spending is directed toward major construction or renovation projects. This translates to an extra \$2.3 million in capital expenditures for an average-sized district, covering roughly 70% of the funding required to bring school buildings up to good condition.<sup>2</sup> These results suggest that debt assistance programs enable heavily indebted districts to finance large-scale infrastructure improvements by reducing debt servicing costs.

The state-sponsored capital investment funds impactful infrastructure projects. Academic achievement, measured by standardized 8th-grade reading and math scores, improves by 0.06 and 0.12 standard deviations, respectively, approximately five years after an increase of \$1,000 per pupil in capital spending. The magnitude of the effect in this study is large compared to existing studies that rely on close bond elections for identification. In this paper, the marginal capital projects create greater impacts because state intervention allows debt-laden districts to start projects with significant potential for educational improvements that were previously neglected. These findings highlight the positive and long-lasting benefits of unlocking the potential of value-adding projects enabled by debt

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<sup>2</sup>In 2013, the estimated average cost for necessary repairs, renovations, and modernizations to achieve good building condition was \$4.5 million among survey respondents [Alexander and Lewis \(2014\)](#), equivalent to approximately \$3.3 million in 2000 after adjusting for inflation.

assistance.

Similarly, incremental capital outlays lead to long-term positive outcomes beyond standardized test scores. The effects on high school completion, college entrance exam participation, college enrollment, attendance, and dropout rates are generally positive. The estimates suggest that a \$1,000 increase in capital spending per pupil results in an average improvement of 1.4 percentage points in graduation rates after five years. The same increase corresponds to a 0.12 percentage point rise in attendance rates in the long run, representing 15% of a standard deviation. Additionally, each \$1,000 per pupil invested in capital expenditures is associated with a 1.1 percentage point increase in college entrance exam participation, a 0.7 percentage point increase in college enrollment, and a 0.02 percentage point reduction in dropout rates, though these last estimates are statistically insignificant. Overall, these findings corroborate that infrastructure improvement projects, particularly through alleviating debt burdens, provide substantial benefits across multiple student outcomes.

The results show that improvements in instructional facilities, rather than increases in current expenditures or enhancements in teacher quality, drive long-term educational gains. Muted short-term responses across various measures suggest that students fully benefit from enhanced facilities only after the projects are completed. Additional analyses of teacher quality indicators further support the capital spending channel as the primary mechanism. Specifically, the percentage of teachers with master's or doctorate degrees and turnover rates remain unchanged around the policy implementation between high- and low-leverage groups, while the average years of total and within-district experience actually decline after 1998 for debt-strapped districts. Furthermore, per-pupil operational spending over three years declines by \$400, or 1.9%, with only 58% of this reduction attributed to cuts in instructional spending.

To ensure the internal validity of the results, I take several steps to address any remaining endogeneity concerns. First, I control for any time-invariant district characteristics

along unobservable dimensions by including school district fixed effects. Next, I rerun the empirical tests excluding a subset of school districts significantly affected by concurrent events around the debt assistance programs, such as the fracking booms that boosted the local tax base. Additionally, I examine the relationship between various measures of local economic growth and school district indebtedness during the pre-policy period to verify that differential trends in local economic conditions do not bias the results. I further confirm the robustness of the findings by including interaction terms between 1990 Census variables and linear trends. The main findings hold up across a battery of robustness tests, suggesting that the results are not driven by potential confounding factors.

Overall, this paper causally identifies the positive and sizable effects of capital investment on education quality. By exploiting a novel quasi-natural experiment, this study isolates the effects of capital spending on infrastructure projects that were previously infeasible for heavily indebted districts. Given the hazardous infrastructure conditions many students currently face, the findings underscore the critical role of debt support in safeguarding student well-being.

## 1. Related Literature

This paper adds to several strands of the literature. First, a growing body of research in finance examines the real effects of financing constraints on local and state governments. [Adelino et al. \(2017\)](#) show that increases in credit supply due to the credit rating recalibration positively affect government expenditures and private-sector employment. Exploiting the small issuer cutoff, [Dagostino \(2018\)](#) finds that an exogenous increase in the cutoff leads to increases in issuance volume, employment, and wages at the county level. [Agrawal and Kim \(2022\)](#) indicate that the cross-sectional variation in water quality stems from the deterioration in bond credit rating following the demise of monoline insurers. [Posenau \(2022\)](#) examines the bond covenant and finds that the violation of covenants induces utility districts to charge higher prices and lower water system expenses. [Yi \(2021\)](#) uses a change

in the banking regulation to document that issuers significantly reduce issuance amount when the demand from banks declines.

I contribute to this literature by utilizing a unique dataset within the context of school districts to examine the real effects of reducing debt financing costs on measurable outcomes. School districts mainly serve the purpose of delivering quality public education to students, with standardized outcomes such as test scores and graduation rates. Together with the granularity of school district data, this setting captures how alleviating debt burdens can benefit students through increased capital investment, thereby shedding light on the impacts of financial flexibility on public goods provision.

This paper also relates to literature that investigates the marginal effect of additional capital spending on the quality of education. Several studies examine the relationship between capital spending and student outcomes through close bond elections.<sup>3</sup> [Cellini et al. \(2010\)](#) is the first paper that exploits close school bond elections to identify the causal impact of capital spending. They find that school districts that pass the bond measures exhibit improvements in test scores and growth in housing prices in the long run. Other researchers utilize a similar setting, but their results are mixed. [Martorell et al. \(2016\)](#) use the same TEA data to show modest facility improvement after the school district passes bond elections. However, they do not find any significant effect on test scores. [Baron \(2022\)](#) shows similar results using close bond elections in Wisconsin that capital spending does not affect test scores, dropout rates, and college enrollment rates. On the other hand, some papers provide evidence in support of the positive effects of capital spending. [Rauscher \(2020\)](#) focus on California school districts and show that the effect mainly comes from low-socioeconomic-status (SES) students, suggesting heterogeneous effects depending on district characteristics. In a similar vein, [Biasi et al. \(2023\)](#) document that the benefits of additional capital expenditures can differ across the type of spending. Major instructional facilities renovation and construction lead to an increase in test scores, whereas spending

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<sup>3</sup>Papers that do not rely on the discontinuity in bond elections include, for example, [Conlin and Thompson \(2017\)](#), [Goncalves \(2015\)](#), [Lafortune and Schönholzer \(2022\)](#), and [Neilson and Zimmerman \(2014\)](#).

on non-instructional facilities such as football stadiums does not.

This paper provides a complementary view to analyze the efficiency of capital spending by focusing on debt-constrained school districts. The debt assistance programs provide greater debt support to school districts with overwhelming outstanding debt burdens, which often cannot even resort to bond elections. By focusing on debt subsidy, this paper highlights the relevant margin, where marginal spending can be allocated to high-impact projects that were previously infeasible without federal or state support.

## 2. Institutional Details

### 2.1. Financing Capital Investment

In 2020, U.S. public school districts spent over \$870 billion to provide an adequate level of public education to students. More than 10% of the total expenditure was spent on capital outlays. Capital spending is a crucial part of school district expenditures as it is typically used to construct new facilities, renovate existing buildings, and/or purchase educational equipment such as school buses. Given the scale of the infrastructure projects, a combination of local taxes or state support allocated to facilities maintenance each year is insufficient to cover the associated costs.<sup>4</sup> As a result, school districts almost always rely on debt financing.

The most common type of municipal bonds issued by school districts is called general obligation (GO) bonds.<sup>5</sup> GO bonds are backed by the taxing power of the issuer. School

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<sup>4</sup>Plant maintenance and operation spending explains around 9% of current spending among independent school districts in Texas. However, it cannot be used to, for example, build another campus for the following reasons. The usage of maintenance expenditures is limited to daily maintenance and operation of facilities, which often excludes major improvements. Even if those funds can be spent at the district's own discretion, it would require absurdly high property tax rates to raise enough capital funding. In addition, some districts may find maintenance expenditures insufficient for the regular upkeep of existing buildings if most of their buildings are severely outdated.

<sup>5</sup>Some school districts issue other types such as revenue bonds. Local governments issue revenue bonds to finance a specific project. They pay debt service on the bonds using the cash flows generated from the project. However, school districts rarely use revenue bonds as most of instructional facilities do not generate revenues.

districts often pledge ad valorem taxes, or property taxes, to repay bondholders. In addition to the exemption from federal income tax, this feature allows school districts to borrow at relatively low interest rates compared to other types of financing. Hence, school districts typically use GO bonds and increase property tax rates to cover the debt service payments.

However, some school districts remain underfunded without federal or state intervention since they differ vastly in their ability to raise property tax rates for many reasons.<sup>6</sup> For example, the issuance of GO bonds requires the issuer to receive voter approval. School districts with tax-sensitive voters may not be able to increase property tax rates if they cannot pass bond measures. Furthermore, high property taxes can lead to an increase in net out-migration which can erode the tax base ([Tiebout \(1956\)](#)). State governments often impose debt restrictions on school districts as well to maintain the financial health of local governments.

## **2.2. State Debt Assistance Programs in Texas**

Until the 1990s, Texas school districts already under a large debt burden found it challenging to raise additional debt from local sources in the absence of state or federal support for capital spending. Such concerns directed attention toward the equalization of facilities funding, which led the state of Texas to pass the Instructional Facilities Assistance (IFA) program in 1998.<sup>7</sup>

The IFA was the first state-level intervention in Texas to provide continuing support to school districts. By sharing the debt service of the newly issued bonds throughout their life, the state intended to boost capital investment by school districts. The program provides a guaranteed yield of \$35 per average daily attendance (ADA) for each penny of Interest and

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<sup>6</sup>States and federal government pay less than a quarter of the capital outlay and debt service, and 11 states do not provide any funding to school districts.

<sup>7</sup>Edgewood Independent School District and other school districts filed a series of school finance lawsuits since 1984, now known as the *Edgewood* cases. The Texas Supreme Court sided with the plaintiff, finding that the prevailing school finance system in Texas unconstitutional. Policymakers responded to the decision by revising the state funding formula and redistributing the excess revenues from wealthy districts to property-poor districts. However, the state's attempt at school finance equalization was limited to the current spending which covers all expenditures to run day-to-day school operations.

Sinking (I&S) tax effort.<sup>8</sup> For example, the state would support 60% of annual debt service for qualifying bonds if an independent school district has \$140,000 of taxable wealth per ADA.<sup>9</sup> Figure A3 presents the potential IFA assistance as a function of local taxable value per pupil.<sup>10</sup>

The IFA significantly lowered the local share of the debt burden. Around 30% of school districts received the funding during the first 4 rounds. They were able to borrow approximately \$5.6 billion with state support, only paying 42% of debt service for the qualifying bonds on average. A total of \$620 million was appropriated to help school districts pay for the first annual debt service on eligible debts across 11 funding rounds. The state continues to provide debt subsidies for the approved bonds, although no funding has been allocated to the IFA since 2017.

To be eligible for IFA assistance, the district has to meet several requirements. First, districts must apply for the funding as the IFA assistance is not automatically granted. The state funding was secured for the life of the eligible debt, so districts do not have to reapply for the funding in the following years. Also, the usage of bond proceeds is strictly limited to the instructional facilities. Next, districts must have sufficient authorized issuance amounts from the previous bond elections.

While the IFA made substantial progress toward capital spending equalization, there were some limitations. The funding rounds were competitive as the funding fell short of the growing demand for modernizing school facilities. The state prioritized low-property wealth districts when the total amount of assistance requested exceeded the available funding at each round. In addition, the state only supported the newly issued debt. Bonds

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<sup>8</sup>Texas school districts charge two types of property tax rates. The school district uses I&S taxes to service debt and Maintenance and Operations (M&O) taxes to fund daily operations.

<sup>9</sup>In this example, the state pays 60%( $=1-\$140,000 \div \$350,000$ ) of the district's debt service payments on the approved bonds because the district can raise 40%( $=\$140,000 \div \$350,000$ ) under the current assessed property valuation.

<sup>10</sup>The IFA assistance is not zero for some districts with taxable property wealth above the guaranteed yield (\$350,000) due to some additional factors. School districts with less than 400 ADA were treated as if they had 400 students. Taxable wealth was adjusted downwards if the district experienced high enrollment growth over the past 5 years or was denied IFA assistance during the prior biennium.

issued before 1998 were not eligible for debt assistance, meaning that the issuers of these bonds unfortunately had to manage their debt on their own. Lastly, a concurrent legislative change partially negated the state's equalization effort. Both types of property tax rates (M&O and I&S) were initially subject to the recapture in 1993. However, districts have been allowed to retain excess revenues from I&S rates since 1997. This provision effectively induced property-rich districts to issue more debt, aggravating the inequalities in facilities spending.

The state of Texas subsequently launched the Existing Debt Allotment (EDA) program in 2000 to reduce the local share of the debt service on the existing debt. The EDA covered most of the new money bonds that did not qualify for IFA assistance, but non-GO bonds such as revenue bonds were excluded.<sup>11</sup> The EDA also operated under a guaranteed-yield approach, where the state guarantees the same \$35 per ADA for each penny of I&S tax effort up to \$0.29 per \$100 of assessed property valuation.<sup>12</sup> Unlike the IFA, districts are automatically eligible for EDA assistance as long as their taxable property value per pupil is below the threshold. Figure 1 presents the time-series of I&S tax rates during 1994-2006. Since the EDA came into effect in 2000, school districts almost halved I&S tax rates.

Figure 2 shows the proportion of state debt subsidy relative to the district's annual debt service costs. The increase in debt subsidies is modest in the first two years of the IFA as the state only subsidized newly issued debt. However, the state's share of debt service has jumped to roughly 30% since the EDA was introduced. Over 57% of independent school districts in Texas benefited from the EDA during the first biennium, and the state continues to share the debt burden with more than 80% of them as of 2022.

Figure 5 illustrates how the debt assistance programs subsidize local debt payments. Suppose a hypothetical school district currently levies a 0.4% I&S tax rate and has a taxable

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<sup>11</sup>Revenue bonds are another commonly issued municipal bonds. Issuers of revenue bonds typically pledge future cash flows from a specific project. Since most facilities in school districts do not generate cash flows, revenue bonds were rarely issued by districts.

<sup>12</sup>In fact, the I&S tax rate eligible for the EDA funding is limited to the smaller of the three rates: the actual I&S rate during the second year of the preceding biennium, the I&S rate sufficient to pay the annual debt servicing costs on the EDA eligible bonds, and the statutory limit 0.29%.

property value of \$175,000 per pupil. Before the state implements the programs, the school district is responsible for 100% of the debt servicing costs. Based on the funding allocation formula, the per pupil taxable wealth implies that the state will share 50% (i.e.  $\frac{\$175,000}{\$350,000} = 50\%$ ) of the debt payment because the IFA and EDA guarantee a yield of \$350,000 per pupil of assessed property valuation, except that the EDA caps the yield at 0.29%.

In the case of EDA, assuming no new debt issuance for simplicity, the state and district each share 50% of the debt service costs for existing bonds. This implies that the district lowers its I&S tax rate to 0.2%, just enough to cover the local share of debt financing costs, due to the balanced budget requirement. On the other hand, suppose the same district wants to issue new debt, which requires a 10 basis point increase in the I&S tax rate. Assuming the issuance amount remains constant regardless of the district's IFA recipient status, the district would need to raise the tax rate by only five basis points because the state covers the rest through the IFA funding.

In sum, both the IFA and EDA provided substantial debt financing aid to the highly indebted school districts, expanding their debt capacity. The IFA reduced the marginal debt financing costs by allowing the district to issue new debt with smaller increases in property tax rates than before. On the other hand, the EDA lowered the servicing costs of the existing debt, which in turn created more room for taking on additional debt.<sup>13</sup>

### 3. Data and Summary Statistics

#### 3.1. Data

The estimation sample comes from four main sources. First, data on the student-level outcomes come from the Texas Education Agency (TEA), which covers all public K-12 students in Texas since 1993. The TEA records contain granular information on the student demographics, curricular activities, and educational outcomes. Individuals are anonymized

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<sup>13</sup>See [Clark \(2001\)](#) and [Plummer \(2006\)](#) for more detailed descriptions of both programs.

with the identifier, allowing researchers to observe any public K-12 students in Texas throughout their school years. However, the TEA stops to track students moving out of the state. Following the literature, I assume those students dropped out of school and exclude them from the estimation sample (e.g. [Cabral et al. \(2021\)](#)).

I obtain administrative data on all public post-secondary institutions in Texas from the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board (THECB). The THECB provides individual-level information on student enrollment, admissions, and graduation since 2004. As it shares the same individual identifier as the TEA records, the THECB is a useful source for observing whether students pursue a higher degree. Similar to the TEA data, the THECB does not report students who attend out-of-state higher education institutions. I assume the students in the TEA but not in the THECB do not pursue post-secondary degrees.

I use district financials from the merged dataset consisting of the TEA district income statement data and the Common Core of Data (CCD) hosted by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). The merged dataset covers the universe of Texas school districts and includes information on revenues and expenditures as well as outstanding bond principals. Most of the school district financial characteristics date back to 1987, but detailed bond issuance information becomes available in 1993. All financial variables are converted to 2000 dollars using the historical CPI for all urban consumers.

Lastly, I collect other district characteristics from the Academic Excellence Indicator System (AEIS) provided by the TEA. The AEIS mainly publishes student performance at the district level, but it also provides information on district demographics and tax collection data in the 1994-2011 school years.

To understand the effect of debt support on the average student in the district I construct 5 district-level student outcomes from the resulting merged dataset. First, I define capital spending per pupil as the total capital outlays divided by the number of total enrolled students.<sup>14</sup> To measure student academic achievement, I standardize statewide 8th-grade

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<sup>14</sup>In the main analyses, I subtract the direct state subsidy to capital expenditures to mitigate the effects of state assistance prior to the IFA and EDA.

reading and math individual test scores each year and aggregate these measures across all students in the same district-year group. I also define the graduation rates as the fraction of 12th-grade students graduating within the district-year group. College entrance exam participation rates are defined as the fraction of 12th-grade students who took either the SAT or ACT. Lastly, I construct college enrollment rates, defined as the fraction of 12th-grade students who enroll in any 2-year or 4-year institutions within 3 years of graduation.

The estimation sample includes approximately 870 unique independent school districts in Texas from 1994 to 2004 that were eligible to receive any debt support as of 1994. Since I do not observe the actual eligibility measures, I construct a hypothetical debt assistance percentage using the IFA funding formula as a proxy for each district's funding eligibility.<sup>15</sup> Applying this filter effectively excludes around 90 property-rich school districts from the sample. I prefer to focus on the sample of districts eligible for debt assistance for stronger identification. Property-rich districts were likely to benefit from the removal of the I&S tax recapture, as described earlier. Since this change occurred around the same time as the IFA's implementation, it could introduce bias if property-wealthy districts increased capital expenditures independently of the debt assistance programs.<sup>16</sup> Lastly, the sample period reflects the availability of dependent variables in the data and the long-run analysis in this paper.

### **3.2. Summary Statistics**

Table 1 describes the district characteristics between 1994 and 2004. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to minimize the influence of outliers. The average district has a 20% higher net outstanding debt relative to its property tax levy between 1987 and 1991, where net outstanding debt is computed as the long-term bond principal minus the debt service fund balance. The large standard deviation relative to its mean indicates

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<sup>15</sup>Since the IFA had multiple funding rounds, the state adjusted the property wealth of districts that applied but failed to receive debt support in the previous round. The imputed eligibility measure does not consider such adjustments because I do not observe the IFA application records.

<sup>16</sup>In untabulated results, I find that including these districts does not qualitatively alter the findings.

that there are substantial variations in local debt burden. The state is expected to cover 54% of the school district's debt servicing costs on average. Together with the average per pupil property wealth well below the proposed threshold of \$350,000, a vast majority of Texas school districts are eligible for any debt support through the IFA or EDA. The average district spends around \$975 per pupil on large-scale facilities improvement projects every year. Capital spending is a large part of total expenditures, as it alone represents around 11.9% of total expenditures per pupil. Also, capital expenditures tend to be lumpy, often clustering around the bond issuance. Figure 3 plots the average per pupil spending around bond issuance years. School districts typically allocate a significant portion of bond proceeds within a few years of issuance, as indicated by relatively lower levels of capital spending outside these years. This is consistent with the nature of infrastructure projects, which often require a lump sum payment at the beginning. Therefore, I aggregate the three-year cumulative capital spending to capture the full scope of capital investment activity in the following analysis.

#### **4. Empirical Specification**

This paper attempts to understand whether and how capital expenditures can improve education quality in the long run by focusing on debt-laden school districts.

To this end, a naïve OLS approach would be to regress actual capital spending on educational outcomes  $h$  period later. However, the regression fails to establish causality if unobservable district characteristics drive both capital expenditures and measures of educational improvement. For example, school districts with better economic conditions can offer more educational resources to their students. On the other hand, their strong local economies allow them to easily finance infrastructure project costs to properly maintain their facilities. In this case, they would still exhibit considerable enhancement in academic performance in the absence of debt support, which would result in an underestimation of the OLS coefficients.

I take several steps to alleviate the endogeneity concerns. School district and year fixed effects are included to capture time-invariant school district characteristics and aggregate shocks. Importantly, school district fixed effects eliminate any level differences in school district economic conditions, which limits the sources of the endogeneity to time-varying conditions. To control for the remaining time-varying local economic conditions, I also add various observable district characteristics. I include an enrollment size quartile dummy to proxy for the school district size, which could be correlated with the growth in local economic activities. I add a log of per pupil current expenditures as wealthy school districts spend more on instructional spending. I use cash holdings scaled by current expenditures in the regression, as districts can utilize unrestricted cash holdings at their discretion to boost educational spending. Finally, I control for the local share of total revenue per pupil to factor in the district's dependence on state funding.

To further strengthen the causal interpretation of the results, I employ an instrumental variable (IV) approach. The instrument takes advantage of school districts' heterogeneous responses to the introduction of state debt assistance programs in Texas based on their pre-existing debt burdens.<sup>17</sup> Conceptually, the instrument stems from the idea that districts with higher existing debt burdens are more incentivized to apply for IFA funding or to receive larger EDA support, holding per-pupil property wealth constant. Although property wealth determines eligibility through the allocation formula, its level alone is not sufficient to guarantee debt support. At a given level of per-pupil property value, a district must apply for IFA funding or have previously issued debt to be granted EDA assistance. To the extent that heavy outstanding indebtedness constrains a district from initiating new capital projects, debt-laden districts have greater incentives to receive debt support on new debt. On the other hand, the extent of debt-financing cost reductions for existing debt

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<sup>17</sup>I utilize pre-existing debt burdens instead of the kink regression discontinuity around the threshold or the allocation formula for the following reasons. A bulk of school districts have property wealth well below the cutoff, which leaves very few districts around the kink to reliably test the hypothesis. Also, the allocation formula is a function of per pupil taxable property value. If property wealth captures the extent of educational resources available in a district, the resulting effects may be confounded.

escalates with the size of the current debt load.

Specifically, I define the instrument as the interaction term between a cross-sectional group indicator and a post-policy period indicator variable, expressed as:

$$(1) \quad DTL\ High_i \times Post_t,$$

where  $i$  denotes the district and  $t$  the year. This difference-in-differences estimator captures identifying variation arising from heterogeneous responses in capital expenditures across districts with varying levels of pre-existing debt burdens to the debt assistance programs. To construct the cross-sectional indicator, denoted as  $DTL\ High_i$ , I divide school districts into two groups based on the median value of their average net long-term debt-to-property tax levy (DTL) ratio from 1987 to 1991—a period well before the onset of the first debt assistance cycle in 1998—as a proxy for program exposure.<sup>18</sup> Similar to a corporate leverage ratio, this measure reflects a district's outstanding debt relative to cash flows from property tax revenues. The indicator equals 1 if the district has this ratio above the median and 0 otherwise.  $Post_t$  is set to 1 for the years 1998 and onward and 0 otherwise. I choose 1998 as an event date because it is when the initial IFA funding round took place. Lastly, the interaction of these two indicators serves as the instrument for capital spending.

The historical DTL ratio captures a district's debt burden without reflecting its contemporaneous economic conditions. Anecdotal evidence suggests that debt financing decisions do not reflect the economic outlook too far ahead. In general, Texas restricts school districts from excessively relying on projected future property taxes when they demonstrate their ability to pay off the bonds. Texas Education Code, Section 45.0031 allows school districts to use projected property tax revenues anticipated for the earlier of the tax year five years after the current tax year or the tax year in which the final payment is due for the bonds. This effectively limits school districts from incorporating the information

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<sup>18</sup>This ratio mechanically drops districts with zero or missing property tax revenues in the 1987-1991 period because their debt-to-property tax levy ratios are undefined.

on future property tax bases more than five years ahead when considering debt financing. Therefore, bond issuance decisions made prior to 1991 may not reflect the economic outlook at least seven years ahead, which supports the validity of the instrument.

Furthermore, the historical DTL ratio tends to persist and has a high correlation with a district's debt burden around policy implementation. As the average maturity of newly issued bonds has been roughly 10 years since the 1980s ([Cortes et al. \(2022\)](#)), school districts with higher bonded indebtedness around the late 1980s continue to bear sizeable debt service costs as their prior debt obligations extend into subsequent years. Figure A1 shows an example of a debt payment schedule in Elgin ISD in 1997. Over 70% of the incremental debt servicing costs in 1998 are projected to remain in the district's balance sheet for more than 14 years after the issuance in 1997. This feature allows  $DTL\ High_i$  to be highly predictive of the level of debt burden around 1998.

This instrument motivates the following two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression model:

$$(2) \quad Cap_{i,t} = \pi(DTL\ High_i \times Post_t) + \Pi C_{i,t} + \alpha_i + \alpha_t + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

$$(3) \quad \bar{Y}_{i,t} = \beta \widehat{Cap}_{i,t} + \Gamma C_{i,t} + \delta_i + \delta_t + u_{i,t},$$

where  $i$  denotes district,  $t$  denotes year, and  $\bar{Y}_{i,t}$  represents the average of  $Y$  over a specified period. In what follows, I focus on the average from  $t$  to  $t+4$ , which I refer to as short-term, and the average from  $t+5$  to  $t+9$  as long-term.

In the first stage, I instrument the endogenous variable,  $Cap$ , using  $DTL\ High \times Post$ .  $Cap$  is cumulative per pupil capital spending from  $t$  to  $t+2$ .  $C_{i,t}$  is a vector of control variables, including the imputed eligibility using the allocation formula, a log of current expenditures per pupil, and cash holdings scaled by current expenditures.  $\delta_i$  and  $\delta_t$  denote district and year fixed effects, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.

In the second stage, I regress the predicted capital spending on various district-level outcomes,  $\bar{Y}_{i,t}$ . The parameter of interest is  $\beta$ , representing the average cumulative improvement in outcome variables in the short or long run.

A causal interpretation rests on the relevance condition and exclusion restriction. A formal test of this relevance condition in the regression framework confirms a strong and positive relation between the instrument and the endogenous variable. Table 2 shows that school districts with previously high indebtedness spend around \$570 per student more on capital projects than those with low indebtedness. In addition, Figure 6 plots the yearly estimates of equation 2 using annual capital expenditure per pupil instead of three-year cumulative spending. Trends in capital spending between high- and low-DTL districts only begin to diverge after the state introduced the debt assistance programs. Importantly, high F-statistics in excess of 10 ensure that the instrument strongly predicts the endogenous variable.

I also investigate the exclusion restriction in several ways to evaluate the instrument's validity. While the instrument conditional on various controls including school district fixed effects can handle most of the time-invariant unobservable district characteristics or relatively short-lived economic growth, there may still exist some endogeneity concerns. I test if school districts with high *DTL* exhibit higher growth in several proxies of local economic conditions: a log of per capita income, a log of median household income, a log of total labor force, and unemployment rates. Due to a lack of school district-level measures during the sample period, I rely on the 1990 and 2000 Decennial Census. This approach effectively leaves a single observation for each school district around the first debt assistance program in 1998.

Table 3 indicates that most of the local economic conditions are not strongly predicted by the instrument. Income measures and unemployment rates show no statistically significant relationship with the instrument, whereas the total employment growth is strongly correlated with *DTL High*. This may not come as a surprise given that high *DTL* school

districts are often located next to or within metropolitan areas. Figure 7 shows the geographical distribution of school districts by indebtedness, with districts shaded in dark blue concentrated around some of the most populous cities in Texas. In this respect, column 4 of Table 3 raises a reasonable concern that the instrument may affect outcome variables through changes in local employment rather than debt subsidies.

I take several steps to address this concern. First, I show that parametrically controlling for the population size does not alter the results in this paper. I rerun the main analysis after incorporating the interaction term between the log of employment in 1990 and linear trends. The results remain robust to the inclusion of the interaction terms. In addition, I include the log of enrollment size, which is available at an annual frequency and highly correlated with the total employment in the regression equation. This approach also does not change the results. Finally, I show that the results are robust to dropping the school districts in the top enrollment size quartile as of 1997 and reassigning *DTL High* among the remaining school districts. Since fast-growing districts are around metropolitan areas and tend to exhibit a larger number of enrolled students, this exercise ensures that the results are not driven by the school districts with high employment growth.

Concurrent events around the policy implementation might influence the outcome variables as well. A couple of notable changes coincided with the debt assistance programs, including the exclusion of I&S tax rates from the recapture and fracking booms. Changes to recapture rules were made, where excess revenues from I&S rates were retained since 1997, potentially incentivizing highly wealthy districts previously subject to recapture to issue debt. This change implies that highly wealthy districts previously subject to recapture may become more incentivized to issue debt, perhaps to offset the recaptured surplus from M&O taxes. To mitigate the confounding effects from such concurrent events, I eliminate districts that have no change of receiving debt subsidies in the pre-policy period.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup>While \$350,000 per pupil was the cutoff for the IFA and EDA, dropping these districts still leaves around 90% of all school districts in Texas. I prefer this sample over the full sample because the highly wealthy districts may exhibit improvements in educational outcomes through any events unrelated to the debt programs. The results remain qualitatively similar using the full sample.

Furthermore, the significant fracking booms in the early 2000s, affecting available school resources and local labor market conditions, especially around districts with large shale oil and gas reserves, are considered. The extraction booms had impacts on students from those areas as well, resulting in lower graduation rates ([Kovalenko \(2023\)](#)). Results are robust to excluding districts with high exposure to the oil and gas industries, proxied by the percentage of taxable property values derived from oil and gas production sites.

School districts with below- and above-median debt-to-property tax levy ratios might also be different along unobservable dimensions. If this is the case, I may observe the same results in the absence of the debt relief programs. For example, one might be concerned that highly indebted school districts have already spent a substantial sum of money on ongoing or recently finished capital projects before the sample period, possibly showing improvements in educational outcomes in the following years.

Measuring the school district's indebtedness relative to property tax levies before 1991 alleviates this concern. The typical facilities improvement projects take around 3 years to complete. Figure A2 presents a recent construction schedule from the Austin ISD's bond proposal. As shown in Figure A2, most constructions are planned to take less than 5 years. At the beginning of the pre-policy period, 1994, it is plausible that most of the projects funded by the pre-1991 debt were already finished. Given that it may take several years for enhanced facilities conditions to pay off, one would be able to observe the effects of those projects by 1998. To the extent that these effects stabilize over time, district fixed effects should capture the permanent increase in outcomes due to the previous projects.

Furthermore, it is unlikely that school districts keep the proceeds over an extended period to spend on capital projects in the distant future. Rather, they tend to use bond proceeds within a few years. Note that the IRS prohibits tax arbitrage where districts borrow at the tax-exempt yield and invest at the taxable interest rate. The maximum yield the bond proceeds can earn is often much lower than the prevailing interest rate for that reason. Since most school bonds are tax-exempt, saving the bond proceeds in the

investment account for a long time may result in negative returns or negative tax arbitrage.

## 5. Results

### 5.1. District Capital Investment

Most of the incremental capital spending goes to major construction or renovation projects. Table 4 reports the estimation results for equation 2, where the dependent variables are the three-year cumulative expenditures on construction, equipment, and land and existing structures. Column 1 shows that treated school districts direct around \$486 per pupil to construction expenditures over the three-year period, including replacements and major facility alterations. This accounts for roughly 85% of the total state-sponsored capital investments reported in Table 2 (i.e.  $\$486/\$569=85.4\%$ ). Columns 2 and 3 suggest that the remaining fund goes to costs associated with instructional equipment purchases, land acquisition, and site improvements.

Although data on a more granular breakdown of capital outlays or on maintenance at the facility level is unavailable, these findings suggest that debt relief allows school districts with high debt burdens to finance critical infrastructure projects within their facilities. This allocation likely reflects districts' prioritization of long-term, capital-intensive improvements that contribute directly to the quality of physical learning environments. Therefore, by alleviating existing debt obligations, state-sponsored support facilitates these debt-laden districts' investment in essential structural resources, fostering an improved student learning environment.

### 5.2. District Educational Outcomes

The results in the previous section document that an increase in state debt support leads to a substantial rise in the school district's capital expenditures, particularly for major infrastructure improvement projects. To measure potential gains from the reduction in

debt financing costs, I next investigate how the quality of public goods changes after receiving debt relief.

### **5.2.1. Academic Achievement**

I first examine the effects of capital spending on standardized 8th-grade reading and math test scores from the statewide assessment. To the extent that debt relief brings material benefits to students in the treated school districts, test scores can be used to measure improvements in the average student's academic performance.

I find that incremental capital spending leads to long-term improvement in academic performance. Table 5 presents the estimation results of equation 3 using 8th-grade standardized reading and math test scores as dependent variables. To construct the dependent variables, I standardize individual 8th-grade test scores each year, converting them to z-scores based on the statewide distribution, and then calculate the district-level average of these standardized scores. These district-level averages are then smoothed as five-year rolling averages. In columns 1 and 2, capital spending increases average reading scores in the long run, with no short-term effect. The coefficient estimate in column 2 is both economically and statistically significant. The estimate implies that a \$1,000 increase in per pupil capital spending results in roughly a 0.057 standard deviation increase in reading scores on average five years later.

The same increase in capital spending enhances average math scores as well. Columns 3 and 4 in Table 5 present the estimation results using 8th-grade standardized math test scores as dependent variables. The results for math scores also exhibit long-lasting improvements. The estimates imply that a \$1,000 increase in per pupil capital spending leads to approximately a 0.12 standard deviation increase in math scores on average five years later.

Graphical representation of the coefficient estimates briefly summarizes the results, characterized by long-term improvements in test scores following the initial dip. Each

panel in Figure 8 graphically depicts the estimates from the dynamic version of equation 3 , where I rerun equation 3 using  $Y_{i,t+h}$  for each  $h = 0, 1, \dots, 9$  instead of the rolling average. The evolution of the estimates is in line with prior studies documenting the positive effects of capital spending on educational outcomes(e.g. [Cellini et al. \(2010\)](#)). Test scores are negatively affected by debt assistance during the initial periods as a major renovation of the existing facilities or construction of new buildings may disrupt student learning. For example, loud noise from the construction sites or temporary portable classrooms due to facility upgrades can adversely impact students' motivation and result in muted or even negative effects during the first few years. Several years after these projects, the coefficient estimates gradually increase and stabilize. This is consistent with the benefits of school infrastructure improvements, which can take years to materialize([Jackson and Mackevicius \(2021\)](#)).

The magnitude of the effect in this study is large compared to existing studies on the impact of capital spending on academic achievement. Much of the literature finds little to no improvement from additional capital expenditures (e.g. [Martorell et al. \(2016\)](#), [Baron \(2022\)](#)). Among the studies that do document positive effects, [Cellini et al. \(2010\)](#) find that bond measures that are narrowly passed result in a capital spending increase of about \$5,000 per pupil over the next five years, raising the year-six test scores by 0.16 standard deviations. Their findings imply that the effect is 0.03 standard deviations per \$1,000 per pupil capital spending (i.e.,  $0.16 \div 5 = 0.03$ ), representing around 28% to 52% of the effect size found in this paper. More recently, [Biasi et al. \(2023\)](#) show that closely winning bond elections leads to substantial improvements in test scores. Their estimates suggest roughly 0.02 to 0.03 standard deviations per \$1,000 per pupil in capital expenditures, with a more pronounced impact in districts serving a higher share of students from low socioeconomic backgrounds and minority groups.

The difference in magnitudes between this paper and existing studies can be attributed to the type of marginal infrastructure projects considered. A significant portion of the

literature exploits close bond elections as the main identification strategy (e.g., [Biasi et al. \(2023\)](#), [Boyson and Liu \(2022\)](#), [Martorell et al. \(2016\)](#)). While the random bond passage provides a clean setting to establish causality, the randomness may come at the expense of focusing on a limited set of capital projects that are narrowly passed or failed. To the extent that individual voting decisions depend on evaluating a proposed project's potential gains, the marginal capital projects in close bond elections might have minimal or negligible expected returns. Furthermore, this setting excludes school districts that cannot frequently make it to the bond election. Most likely, candidates are those with a substantial amount of outstanding debt burdens as these districts cannot issue more debt for various reasons<sup>20</sup>. Their proposed projects may create much greater impacts if these districts are relieved of their debt burdens, allowing them to undertake projects with significant potential for educational improvements. As a result, studies using narrowly passed bond elections may find smaller or no effects compared to this paper, as they miss the significant gains that could be achieved by addressing the constraints faced by heavily indebted districts.

Treated school districts in this paper are unable to undertake additional projects due to the outstanding debt burden. This might be a huge loss to those school districts if these projects can generate substantial educational gains. Hence, reducing the debt burden generates much larger gains than narrowly winning the bond election. This is because alleviating the debt burden enables school districts to initiate projects that may have significant educational returns, thus maximizing the potential benefits of infrastructure investments. By focusing on reducing debt constraints, this study highlights the importance of financial flexibility in allowing districts to pursue projects that can meaningfully enhance student outcomes.

The effect on test scores is also comparable to findings in the literature regarding the impacts of operational spending on student outcomes. For instance, the Tennessee

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<sup>20</sup>State-imposed debt ceiling can limit them from participating in bond elections. Alternatively, they may not attempt elections at all if they believe residents would not approve bond measures due to high current property tax rates.

Student/Teacher Achievement Ratio experiment (STAR) reduced the number of students per class by roughly 30% to 40% and improved standardized test scores by 0.15 standard deviations (e.g. [Chetty et al. \(2011\)](#), [Schanzenbach \(2006\)](#)). Since STAR cost roughly 47% of operating expenditures, this estimate implies that \$1,000 spent on the class size reduction leads to a 0.051 standard deviation increase in test scores.<sup>21</sup> As the literature often finds the impact of non-capital spending on educational outcomes exceeds that of capital spending ([Jackson and Mackevicius \(2021\)](#)), the estimates in this section suggest that debt assistance generates substantial returns to educational achievement. However, given the differences in purpose and characteristics between capital and operational spending, these comparisons should be interpreted with caution, particularly as each category affects students through distinct channels.

The results for both academic achievement measures consistently find the positive and long-lasting effects of capital spending. This finding suggests that incremental capital spending from lower debt financing costs yields long-term positive gains for students, as value-adding capital projects become affordable for school districts.

### **5.2.2. Non-Test Outcomes**

While capital expenditure leads to long-term improvements in academic outcomes, test scores alone do not fully capture its benefits to student learning. For example, students on the margin can complete public education and pursue higher degrees if they can stay comfortable during hot weather thanks to the updated air-conditioning system. To evaluate the overall impact on students, I examine a set of non-test outcomes.

Non-test outcomes improve following an increase in capital spending, consistent with the previous results on academic achievement. Table 7 estimates equation 3 with graduation rates, college entrance exam participation rates, and college enrollment rates as dependent variables. In columns 1 and 2, the coefficient estimates point to evidence sup-

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<sup>21</sup>Since the average current spending per pupil is \$6,280, this approximately results in an effect of 0.051 standard deviations in test scores per \$1,000 operating spending per pupil(i.e.  $0.152 \div (\$6,280 \times 0.47 \div \$1,000) = 0.051$ ).

porting the positive effects of debt assistance in the long run. The coefficient estimate is statistically and economically significant only in column 2. The results imply that a \$1,000 increase in capital expenditure leads to a roughly 1.9 percentage point increase in graduation rates after five years. Similar to the previous results for the test scores, the pattern observed in columns 1 and 2 assures that the effects come from improvements in school facilities; graduation rates show muted or negative effects in the short term, but they go up after five years.

Panel A in Figure 10 visualizes the results. It shows the long-lasting effect of debt subsidies on high school completion rates. In the short run, the coefficient estimates remain close to zero, but they jump around six years later and stay elevated until the 9th year.

I also show that students become more motivated to pursue higher degrees, although the estimates exhibit positive but statistically insignificant responses. Columns 3 through 6 of Table 7 report the estimation results using college entrance exam participation rates and college enrollment rates as dependent variables, respectively. Both results suggest that extra funding for capital projects influences students by motivating them to take college entrance exams such as the SAT and attend post-secondary institutions. A \$1,000 increase in capital spending raises college exam participation rates by roughly 1.3 percentage points after five years. The effects on college enrollment rates are positive as well. The results imply that the same change in capital expenditure leads to a roughly 0.9 percentage point increase in college enrollment rates after five years. Although most of the estimates are insignificant at a 10% significance level, the general pattern across the two results resembles the previous results.

Several factors can explain relatively weak responses on non-test outcomes. First, both college entrance exam participation rates and college enrollment rates could be imprecisely measured. For example, if better educational facilities increase the likelihood of pursuing higher education throughout one's life, these measures fail to identify individuals

who change their minds about attending college after working for a few years. In addition, the TEA and THECB do not report students who leave the state before they graduate and attend higher education institutions elsewhere. This could either bias the coefficient estimates toward zero due to measurement errors or downward if the attrition rate is systematically higher among the treated school districts.

## **6. Alternative Explanations**

The proposed mechanism through which incremental capital investment affects educational outcomes in this paper is the improvement of educational infrastructure. To further explore other channels that could generate observably similar effects, I turn to operational spending and teacher quality.

### **6.1. Operational Spending**

Debt-laden school districts may seek to increase operational spending by capitalizing on lower debt service costs following the implementation of debt assistance programs. This raises the possibility that a positive spillover into operational funding (i.e., an increase in current spending) could account for the findings discussed in the previous section.

To examine this, I modify the dependent variables to reflect current spending and its components in equation 2. Table 8 suggests a negative spillover effect on current expenditures, which at least rules out the operational spending channel. Column 1 shows that three-year operational spending per pupil decreases by \$400. This represents about 2% of the average current expenditures over the three-year period (i.e.  $\$400/(\$6654 \times 3) = 2\%$ ). Over 57% of this reduction is attributable to instructional costs, which is not surprising given that a majority of current expenditures cover teacher wages.

## **6.2. Teacher Quality**

Changes in teacher quality could also explain the previous findings. Specifically, districts may attempt to replace existing teachers with those who have higher educational backgrounds to enhance public education quality.

I show that debt-strapped districts do not exhibit an increase in teacher quality relative to less leveraged counterparts. Table 9 reports the estimation results on various measures of teacher quality. Column 1 indicates that teachers in treated districts receive, on average, around \$1,300 more in salary. Since these districts are more likely to anticipate rapid enrollment growth, as reported in Table 3, the relatively inelastic short-term supply of teachers may necessitate a salary increase. On the other hand, in columns 2 and 3, teachers in debt-constrained districts have lower experience both in total and within the district. This likely stems from hiring more inexperienced teachers to manage the growth in student population. Consistent with this view, the proportion of teachers with advanced degrees does not differ significantly between highly indebted and less constrained districts, as shown in columns 4 through 6.

In sum, the findings in this section provide supporting evidence that the observed educational gains are unlikely to be driven by increases in operational spending or improvements in teacher quality. Instead, these results reinforce the view that capital investment directly contributes to long-term improvements in educational outcomes.

## **7. Conclusion**

As the school district's debt capacity is tightly linked to its property tax base, some districts find it much harder to raise funding to improve the outdated educational facilities. Overwhelmed by the outstanding debt position, students in highly indebted districts are forced to learn in a disadvantaged environment without external debt support.

In this paper, I investigate the relationship between debt relief and educational out-

comes in the context of independent school districts in Texas. Using the introduction of a series of state-level debt assistance programs, I first find that additional debt support allows heavily indebted school districts to increase capital spending. The state intervention has substantial impacts on capital investment as these districts raise their three-year cumulative capital expenditures by 22% relative to less levered counterparts. In addition, the incremental capital outlays are spent on construction expenditures as opposed to equipment purchases, suggesting that large-scale infrastructure improvement projects are aimed at enhancing poor building conditions.

I also document that students benefit in the long run from additional infrastructure projects with state-sponsored capital investment. Despite an initial drop, standardized reading and math scores reveal that improved building conditions have long-term positive impacts on students. The magnitude vastly exceeds what the existing studies relying on close bond elections find and corresponds with what has been observed from the well-known results on current spending. In a similar vein, incremental capital outlays lead to higher graduation rates and attendance rates.

The findings of this study shed light on how lowering the local debt burden can contribute to narrowing the education gap due to poor educational infrastructure. The examples of the IFA and EDA in Texas illustrate how strategic policy interventions can enable highly indebted districts to overcome previous borrowing limitations, resulting in enhanced educational facilities and improved student outcomes. Importantly, this has broader implications beyond school district financing as public goods provision by other types of local governments also hinges on their debt positions. This study underscores the significance of municipal finance policies in shaping residents' well-being and local communities' sustainability.

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
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
**FIGURE 1. Average I&S Tax Rates in the 1994-2006 period.**

This figure plots the average I&S tax rates, a part of property tax rates dedicated to debt service, from 1994 to 2006.




**FIGURE 2. Average State Debt Assistance in the 1996-2004 period.**

This figure plots the average state debt assistance as a fraction of annual debt service payments between 1996 and 2004. Debt assistance includes debt subsidies from both IFA and EDA. Annual debt service payments are defined as the sum of the amount of long-term debt retired and interest payments, subtracted by the changes in the sinking fund balance.




**FIGURE 3. Average per pupil Capital Spending Relative to Issuance Year.**

This figure shows the average per pupil capital spending relative to the issuance year. Year 0 represents the year of bond issuance.




**FIGURE 4. IFA Funding Recipients in the 1996-2006 period.**

This figure plots the districts receiving IFA assistance as a fraction of the total number of school districts in each group defined by  $DTL\ High_i$  between 1996 and 2006. The blue line indicates the average percentage of IFA funding approval among districts with low ex-ante borrowing constraints ( $DTL\ High_i = 0$ ). The red line indicates the average percentage of IFA funding approval among districts with high ex-ante borrowing constraints ( $DTL\ High_i = 1$ ).




**FIGURE 5. Example of I&S Tax Rates around IFA/EDA.**

This figure illustrates how the IFA or EDA program shifts the Interest & Sinking (I&S) tax rate for a hypothetical school district. The district is assumed to levy a tax rate of 0.4% prior to the implementation of the program and to be eligible for 50% of the existing debt up to 0.29% of the original rate. The burnt orange block represents the tax rate levied by the school district, while the blue block represents the portion covered by the state. The vertical arrows indicate the distance between the tax rate cap and the rate charged by the school district.




**FIGURE 6. First Stage Estimation Results.**

This figure plots coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from the following first stage of the IV approach:  $\text{Annual\_Cap}_{i,t} = \sum_{j \neq 1997} \pi_j (\text{DTL High}_i \times \mathbf{1}_{t=j}) + \Pi C_{i,t} + \alpha_i + \alpha_t + \epsilon_{i,t}$ . The dependent variable is annual per pupil capital spending. The coefficient estimate is allowed to vary by year where the reference point is the year 1997.  $\text{DTL High}_i$  takes a value of 1 if the district has an average outstanding net long-term debt-to-property tax levy ratio in the 1987-1991 period that is above the median and 0 otherwise. Control variables in  $C_{i,t}$  include the imputed eligibility using the allocation formula, a log of current expenditures per pupil, and cash holdings scaled by current expenditures.  $\alpha_i$  and  $\alpha_t$  are district dummies and year dummies, respectively. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Standard errors clustered at the district level.




**FIGURE 7. Geographical Distribution of School Districts by Indebtedness.**

This figure shows the geographical distribution of school districts by *DTL High*, which takes a value of 1 if the district has an average outstanding net long-term debt-to-property tax levy ratio in the 1987-1991 period that is above the median and 0 otherwise. White indicates districts that are not included in the sample.




**FIGURE 8. Effect of Debt Relief on Standardized Test Scores.**

This figure plots coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from the following second stage of the IV approach:  $Y_{i,t+h} = \beta^h \widehat{Cap}_{i,t} + \Gamma^h C_{i,t} + \delta_i^h + \delta_t^h + u_{i,t+h}$ , across horizons  $h=0,1,\dots,9$ . The dependent variables are standardized 8th-grade reading scores in panel A and math scores in panel B.  $\widehat{Cap}_{i,t}$  is the three-year cumulative capital spending per pupil in thousands of 2000 dollars.  $\widehat{Cap}_{i,t}$  is the predicted value of  $Cap_{i,t}$  from the first stage. Control variables in  $C_{i,t}$  include the enrollment size quartile dummies, the imputed eligibility using the allocation formula, a log of current expenditures per pupil, and cash holdings scaled by current expenditures.  $\delta_i$  and  $\delta_t$  are district dummies and year dummies, respectively. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.



a. Reading Scores




b. Math Scores


**FIGURE 9. Effect of Debt Relief on Non-Test Outcomes.**

This figure plots coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from the following second stage of the IV approach:  $Y_{i,t+h} = \beta^h \widehat{Cap}_{i,t} + \Gamma^h C_{i,t} + \delta_i^h + \delta_t^h + u_{i,t+h}$ , across horizons  $h=0,1,\dots,9$ . The dependent variables are attendance rates in panel A and dropout rates in panel B.  $\widehat{Cap}_{i,t}$  is the three-year cumulative capital spending per pupil in thousands of 2000 dollars.  $\widehat{Cap}_{i,t}$  is the predicted value of  $Cap_{i,t}$  from the first stage. Control variables in  $C_{i,t}$  include the enrollment size quartile dummies, the imputed eligibility using the allocation formula, a log of current expenditures per pupil, and cash holdings scaled by current expenditures.  $\delta_i$  and  $\delta_t$  are district dummies and year dummies, respectively. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.

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
a. Attendance (%)




b. Dropout (%)

**FIGURE 10. Effect of Debt Relief on Non-Test Outcomes.**


This figure plots coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from the following second stage of the IV approach:  $Y_{i,t+h} = \beta^h \widehat{Cap}_{i,t} + \Gamma^h C_{i,t} + \delta_i^h + \delta_t^h + u_{i,t+h}$ , across horizons  $h=0,1,\dots,9$ . The dependent variables are graduation rates in panel A, college entrance exam participation rates in panel B, and college enrollment rates in panel C.  $\widehat{Cap}_{i,t}$  is the three-year cumulative capital spending per pupil in thousands of 2000 dollars.  $\widehat{Cap}_{i,t}$  is the predicted value of  $Cap_{i,t}$  from the first stage. Control variables in  $C_{i,t}$  include the enrollment size quartile dummies, the imputed eligibility using the allocation formula, a log of current expenditures per pupil, and cash holdings scaled by current expenditures.  $\delta_i$  and  $\delta_t$  are district dummies and year dummies, respectively. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.



a. Graduation (%)



b. College Exam Participation (%)



c. College Enrollment (%)

**TABLE 1. Summary Statistics**

This table provides descriptive statistics at the district-year level. The sample consists of independent school districts in Texas from 1994 to 2004. *DTL* is the ratio of the outstanding long-term debt to property tax revenues. *DTL 1987-1991* is defined as the average *DTL* in the 1987-1991 period. *Subsidy-to-Debt Payment* is calculated as the sum of state debt funding divided by the annual debt service payment. *Property Wealth* is the taxable property value per pupil. *% Eligible* is the imputed eligibility based on the allocation formula. *% Local Rev* is local revenues as a fraction of total revenues. *Capital* and *Current* are capital and current expenditures, respectively. *Reading* and *Math* are the district averages of standardized 8th-grade reading and math scores, respectively. *LT Debt* is defined as outstanding long-term debt. *Cash-to-Current Exp.* represents cash holdings scaled by current expenditures. *Attendance* is the district-average attendance rate. *Dropout* is the dropout rate across all grades, 7 through 12. *Graduation* is the high school graduation rate among 12th-grade cohorts. *College Exam Participation* is the college entrance exam participation rate. *College Enrollment* is calculated as a fraction of 12th-grade students who enroll in any two-year or four-year institutions within three years of graduation. All spending variables are in 2000 dollars.

	Mean	SD	p25	p50	p75
DTL 1987-1991	1.20	1.3	0.16	0.88	1.89
Subsidy-to-Debt Payment	0.16	0.3	0	0	0.25
Property Wealth (\$ K/pp)	229425.1	290432.2	107776.5	155186.0	237387.8
% Eligible	53.8	26.6	39.4	60.8	74.2
Total Revenue (\$/pp)	8100.1	3469.7	6598.3	7350.3	8400.6
% Local Rev	42.2	21.3	26.2	36.5	53.4
Total Expenditure (\$/pp)	8151.6	3397.7	6452.3	7363.8	8764.7
Current (\$/pp)	6654.0	1664.6	5639.7	6309.7	7188.5
Capital (\$/pp)	974.8	1394.8	246.9	495.9	1132.9
LT Debt (\$/pp)	3107.7	3966.1	0	1949.9	4708.9
Cash-to-Current Exp.	0.37	0.4	0.19	0.29	0.44
Reading ( $\sigma$ )	0.061	0.3	-0.11	0.089	0.26
Math ( $\sigma$ )	0.063	0.3	-0.14	0.081	0.28
Attendance (%)	95.9	0.8	95.4	95.9	96.5
Dropout (%)	0.81	0.9	0	0.50	1.30
Graduation (%)	74.4	12.6	66.7	74.4	82.5
College Exam Tested (%)	62.7	15.9	52.1	62.2	73.5
College Enroll (%)	45.6	12.0	37.5	45.0	53.1

**TABLE 2. First Stage Estimation Results.**

This table reports coefficient estimates from the following first stage of the IV approach:  
 $Cap_{i,t} = \pi(DTL\ High_i \times Post_t) + \Pi C_{i,t} + \alpha_i + \alpha_t + \epsilon_{i,t}$ . The dependent variable is the three-year cumulative capital spending per pupil in thousands of 2000 dollars. Columns 1 and 2 estimate the first stage without and with control variables, respectively.  $DTL\ High_i$  takes a value of 1 if the district has an average outstanding net long-term debt-to-property tax levy ratio in the 1987-1991 period that is above the median and 0 otherwise.  $Post_t$  is an indicator denoting if  $t$  is greater than or equal to 1998. Control variables in  $C_{i,t}$  include the enrollment size quartile dummies, the imputed eligibility based on the allocation formula, a log of current expenditures per pupil, and cash holdings scaled by current expenditures.  $\alpha_i$  and  $\alpha_t$  are district dummies and year dummies, respectively. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the district level. Significance levels are denoted by \*, \*\*, \*\*\*, which correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

	(1)	(2)
Dep. Var.: Capital Spending(\$1,000)		
DTL High × Post	0.610*** (0.143)	0.569*** (0.138)
% Eligible		-0.011** (0.005)
Cash-to-Current Exp.		3.115*** (0.287)
Log Current Exp. pp		-0.852* (0.506)
Size FE	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Adj $R^2$	0.32	0.35
Obs	9590	9590
F-stats	18	17

**TABLE 3. Correlations between Local Economy Growth Measures and Treatment Assignment.**

This table reports coefficient estimates from the following cross-sectional regression equation:  $\Delta Y_i = \rho DTL High_i + \Gamma \Delta C_i + \epsilon_i$ . The dependent variables are a log of per capita income growth, a log of median household income growth, unemployment rate growth, and a log of total employment growth between 1990 and 2000.  $DTL High_i$  takes a value of 1 if the district has an average outstanding net long-term debt-to-property tax levy ratio in the 1987-1991 period that is above the median and 0 otherwise. Control variables in  $C_{i,t}$  include changes in the enrollment size quartile, growth rates of the local share of total revenue per pupil, a log of current expenditures per pupil, and cash holdings scaled by current expenditures. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are presented in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by \*, \*\*, \*\*\*, which correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

	(1) Log Per Capita Dep. Var.: Income90_00	(2) Log HH Med Income90_00	(3) Unemployment Rate90_00	(4) Log Employment90_00
DTL High	0.002 (0.011)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.003 (0.002)	0.150*** (0.013)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj. $R^2$	0.00	0.01	-0.00	0.21
Obs.	860	861	856	856

**TABLE 4. First Stage Estimation Results by Each Category.**

This table reports coefficient estimates from the following first stage of the IV approach:  
 $Cap_{i,t} = \pi(DTL\ High_i \times Post_t) + \Pi C_{i,t} + \alpha_i + \alpha_t + \epsilon_{i,t}$ . The dependent variables are the three-year cumulative spending on construction, equipment, and land and existing structures in thousands of 2000 dollars..  $DTL\ High_i$  takes a value of 1 if the district has an average outstanding net long-term debt-to-property tax levy ratio in the 1987-1991 period that is above the median and 0 otherwise.  $Post_t$  is an indicator denoting if  $t$  is greater than or equal to 1998. Control variables in  $C_{i,t}$  include the enrollment size quartile dummies, the imputed eligibility based on the allocation formula, a log of current expenditures per pupil, and cash holdings scaled by current expenditures.  $\alpha_i$  and  $\alpha_t$  are district dummies and year dummies, respectively. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the district level. Significance levels are denoted by \*, \*\*, \*\*\*, which correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Construction	Equipment	Land and Existing Structures
DTL High × Post	0.486*** (0.132)	0.036* (0.020)	0.014* (0.008)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj $R^2$	0.33	0.55	0.37
Obs.	9590	9590	9590

**TABLE 5. Effect of Debt Relief on Test Scores.**

This table reports coefficient estimates from the following second stage of the IV approach:  $\bar{Y}_{i,t} = \beta \widehat{Cap}_{i,t} + \Gamma C_{i,t} + \delta_i + \delta_t + \bar{u}_{i,t}$ , where  $\bar{Y}_{i,t}$  denotes the average of  $Y$  over a specified period. The dependent variables are standardized 8th-grade reading scores in columns 1 and 2 and math scores in columns 3 and 4. In particular, the dependent variables are the average between  $t$  and  $t + 4$  in columns 1 and 3, and between  $t + 5$  and  $t + 9$  in columns 2 and 4.  $Cap_{i,t}$  is the three-year cumulative capital spending per pupil in thousands of 2000 dollars.  $\widehat{Cap}_{i,t}$  is the predicted value of  $Cap_{i,t}$  from the first stage. Control variables in  $C_{i,t}$  include the enrollment size quartile dummies, the imputed eligibility based on the allocation formula, a log of current expenditures per pupil, and cash holdings scaled by current expenditures.  $\delta_i$  and  $\delta_t$  are district dummies and year dummies, respectively. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the district level. Significance levels are denoted by \*, \*\*, \*\*\*, which correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

	Reading		Math	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Yr 0-4	Yr 5-9	Yr 0-4	Yr 5-9
Capital Spending(\$1,000)	-0.025 (0.015)	0.057*** (0.020)	0.018 (0.019)	0.121*** (0.034)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	9590	9589	9590	9589
F-stat	17	17	17	17

**TABLE 6. Effect of Debt Relief on Non-Test Outcomes: Attendance and Dropout Rates.**

This table reports coefficient estimates from the following second stage of the IV approach:  $\bar{Y}_{i,t} = \beta \widehat{Cap}_{i,t} + \Gamma C_{i,t} + \delta_i + \delta_t + \bar{u}_{i,t}$ , where  $\bar{Y}_{i,t}$  denotes the average of  $Y$  over a specified period. The dependent variables are attendance rates in columns 1 and 2 and dropout rates in columns 3 and 4. In particular, the dependent variables are the average between  $t$  and  $t + 4$  in columns 1 and 3, and between  $t + 5$  and  $t + 9$  in columns 2 and 4.  $\widehat{Cap}_{i,t}$  is the three-year cumulative capital spending per pupil in thousands of 2000 dollars.  $\widehat{Cap}_{i,t}$  is the predicted value of  $Cap_{i,t}$  from the first stage. Control variables in  $C_{i,t}$  include the enrollment size quartile dummies, the imputed eligibility based on the allocation formula, a log of current expenditures per pupil, and cash holdings scaled by current expenditures.  $\delta_i$  and  $\delta_t$  are district dummies and year dummies, respectively. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the district level. Significance levels are denoted by \*, \*\*, \*\*\*, which correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

	Attendance (%)		Dropout (%)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Yr 0-4	Yr 5-9	Yr 0-4	Yr 5-9
Capital Spending(\$1,000)	0.060 (0.048)	0.123** (0.052)	-0.105* (0.059)	-0.018 (0.031)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	9590	9590	9590	9590
F-stat	17	17	17	17

**TABLE 7. Effect of Debt Relief on Non-test Outcomes: Graduation, College Entrance Exam Participation, and College Enrollment Rates.**

This table reports coefficient estimates from the following second stage of the IV approach:  $\bar{Y}_{i,t} = \beta \widehat{Cap}_{i,t} + \Gamma C_{i,t} + \delta_i + \delta_t + \bar{u}_{i,t}$ , where  $\bar{Y}_{i,t}$  denotes the average of  $Y$  over a specified period. The dependent variables are graduation rates in columns 1 and 2, college entrance exam participation rates in columns 3 and 4, and college enrollment rates in columns 5 and 6. In particular, the dependent variables are the average between  $t$  and  $t+4$  in columns 1, 3, and 5, and between  $t+5$  and  $t+9$  in columns 2, 4, and 6.  $\widehat{Cap}_{i,t}$  is the three-year cumulative capital spending per pupil in thousands of 2000 dollars.  $\widehat{Cap}_{i,t}$  is the predicted value of  $Cap_{i,t}$  from the first stage. Control variables in  $C_{i,t}$  include the enrollment size quartile dummies, the imputed eligibility based on the allocation formula, a log of current expenditures per pupil, and cash holdings scaled by current expenditures.  $\delta_i$  and  $\delta_t$  are district dummies and year dummies, respectively. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the district level. Significance levels are denoted by \*, \*\*, \*\*\*, which correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

	Graduation (%)		College Exam Tested (%)		College Enrollment (%)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Yr 0-4	Yr 5-9	Yr 0-4	Yr 5-9	Yr 0-4	Yr 5-9
Capital Spending(\$1,000)	0.553 (0.536)	1.938*** (0.686)	0.248 (0.916)	1.290 (1.011)	-0.042 (0.551)	0.942 (0.625)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	9590	9590	9557	9575	9590	9590
F-stat	17	17	19	18	17	17

**TABLE 8. First Stage Estimation Results: Operational Spending.**

This table reports coefficient estimates from the following first stage of the IV approach:

$Cur_{i,t} = \pi(DTL\ High_i \times Post_t) + \Pi C_{i,t} + \alpha_i + \alpha_t + \epsilon_{i,t}$ . The dependent variable is the three-year cumulative current and instructional spending per pupil in thousands of 2000 dollars.  $DTL\ High_i$  takes a value of 1 if the district has an average outstanding net long-term debt-to-property tax levy ratio in the 1987-1991 period that is above the median and 0 otherwise.  $Post_t$  is an indicator denoting if  $t$  is greater than or equal to 1998. Control variables in  $C_{i,t}$  include the enrollment size quartile dummies, the imputed eligibility based on the allocation formula, a log of current expenditures per pupil, and cash holdings scaled by current expenditures.  $\alpha_i$  and  $\alpha_t$  are district dummies and year dummies, respectively. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the district level. Significance levels are denoted by \*, \*\*, \*\*\*, which correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

	(1)	(2)
	Current Spending	Instructional Spending
DTL High × Post	-0.400*** (0.092)	-0.230*** (0.053)
Controls	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Adj $R^2$	0.92	0.92
Obs.	9590	9590

**TABLE 9. First Stage Estimation Results: Teacher Quality.**

This table reports coefficient estimates from the following first stage of the IV approach:

$Tch_{i,t} = \pi(DTL\ High_i \times Post_t) + \Pi C_{i,t} + \alpha_i + \alpha_t + \epsilon_{i,t}$ . The dependent variables include average teacher salary, total years of teacher experience, years of experience within the district, and the proportions of teachers holding bachelor's, master's, and doctoral degrees.  $DTL\ High_i$  takes a value of 1 if the district has an average outstanding net long-term debt-to-property tax levy ratio in the 1987-1991 period that is above the median and 0 otherwise.  $Post_t$  is an indicator denoting if  $t$  is greater than or equal to 1998. Control variables in  $C_{i,t}$  include the enrollment size quartile dummies, the imputed eligibility based on the allocation formula, a log of current expenditures per pupil, and cash holdings scaled by current expenditures.  $\alpha_i$  and  $\alpha_t$  are district dummies and year dummies, respectively. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the district level. Significance levels are denoted by \*, \*\*, \*\*\*, which correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Salary (\$1,000)	Experience (Yr)	within District (Yr)	Bachelor (%)	Master (%)	Doctorate (%)
DTL High × Post	1.326*** (0.239)	-0.204** (0.083)	-0.202*** (0.067)	0.021 (0.342)	0.127 (0.336)	-0.039 (0.032)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj $R^2$	0.93	0.74	0.82	0.77	0.79	0.36
Obs.	9590	9590	9590	9590	9590	9590

## **Appendix A. School Budgeting System in Texas**

### **A.1. Property Tax Rates**

Independent school districts in Texas have generated over 85% of their local revenues through imposing property tax rates, which consist of the Maintenance and Operation (MO) and Interest and Sinking (IS) rates.<sup>22</sup> They use the property tax collections from the former to pay for expenditures associated with day-to-day management and the latter to finance major facility improvements or instructional equipment purchases.

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<sup>22</sup>Property tax revenues are the most common approach to finance a local share of educational spending among public school districts in the U.S.

## Appendix B. Tables and Figures


### FIGURE A1. 1997 Elgin ISD Debt Payment Schedule

This figure is an example of a debt payment schedule from the Elgin ISD in 1997.

Year Ending 8/31	Outstanding Debt(a)			The Bonds			% of Principal Retired
	Principal	Interest	Total	Principal	Interest	Total	
1998	\$ 53,000	\$ 212,000	\$ 265,000	\$ -	\$ 300,290	\$ 300,290	\$ 565,290
1999	46,202	223,796	269,998	-	794,885	794,885	1,064,883
2000	40,263	234,739	275,002	-	794,885	794,885	1,069,887
2001	34,449	240,549	274,998	-	794,885	794,885	1,069,883
2002	39,121	325,882	365,003	-	794,885	794,885	1,159,888
2003				-	794,885	794,885	794,885
2004				375,000	786,729	1,161,729	1,161,729
2005				395,000	769,784	1,164,784	1,164,784
2006				440,000	750,985	1,190,985	1,190,985
2007				465,000	730,164	1,195,164	1,195,164
2008				485,000	707,955	1,192,955	1,192,955
2009				510,000	684,318	1,194,318	1,194,318
2010				535,000	659,238	1,194,238	1,194,238
2011				560,000	632,398	1,192,398	1,192,398
2012				590,000	603,648	1,193,648	1,193,648
2013				620,000	573,398	1,193,398	1,193,398
2014				655,000	541,195	1,196,195	1,196,195
2015				690,000	506,898	1,196,898	1,196,898
2016				725,000	470,453	1,195,453	1,195,453
2017				765,000	431,713	1,196,713	1,196,713
2018				805,000	390,893	1,195,893	1,195,893
2019				850,000	347,863	1,197,863	1,197,863
2020				900,000	302,138	1,202,138	1,202,138
2021				950,000	253,575	1,203,575	1,203,575
2022				1,000,000	202,388	1,202,388	1,202,388
2023				1,060,000	148,313	1,208,313	1,208,313
2024				1,115,000	91,219	1,206,219	1,206,219
2025				1,180,000	30,975	1,210,975	1,210,975
	<u>\$ 213,035</u>	<u>\$ 1,236,965</u>	<u>\$ 1,450,000</u>	<u>\$ 15,670,000</u>	<u>\$ 14,890,947</u>	<u>\$ 30,560,947</u>	<u>\$ 32,010,948</u>


## FIGURE A2. 2022 AISD Bond Proposal Construction Schedule

This figure is an example of a construction schedule from the Austin ISD's 2022 bond proposal.




**FIGURE A3. Potential IFA Assistance and Taxable Property Value per pupil.**

This figure shows the relationship between the potential IFA assistance as a fraction of the debt service payments on the approved bond and the taxable property value per pupil. The sample is the universe of school districts in Texas in the 1998-2003 period.




**FIGURE A4. First Stage Estimation Results Using State Debt Support.**

This figure plots coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from the following first stage of the IV approach:  $DA_{i,t} = \sum_{j=1997} \pi_j(DTL\ High_i \times \mathbf{1}_{t=j}) + \Pi C_{i,t} + \alpha_i + \alpha_t + \epsilon_{i,t}$ . The dependent variable is the fraction of annual debt service payments supported by the state. The coefficient estimate is allowed to vary by year where the reference point is the year 1997.  $DTL\ High_i$  takes a value of 1 if the district has an average outstanding net long-term debt-to-property tax levy ratio in the 1987-1991 period that is above the median and 0 otherwise. Control variables in  $C_{i,t}$  include the imputed eligibility based on the allocation formula, a log of current expenditures per pupil, and cash holdings scaled by current expenditures.  $\alpha_i$  and  $\alpha_t$  are district dummies and year dummies, respectively. Diamond plots indicate that heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are used. Square plots indicate that standard errors are clustered at the school district level. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile.



**FIGURE A5. Geographical Distribution of School Districts by Oil Property Value per pupil.**

This figure shows the geographical distribution of school districts by taxable oil and gas property values per pupil as of 1994.



**TABLE A1. Effect of Debt Relief on Test Scores - Robustness Checks Controlling for the 1990 Employment  $\times$  Linear Trends.**

This table reports coefficient estimates from the following second stage of the IV approach:  $\bar{Y}_{i,t} = \beta \widehat{Cap}_{i,t} + \Gamma C_{i,t} + \delta_i + \delta_t + \bar{u}_{i,t}$ , where  $\bar{Y}_{i,t}$  denotes the average of  $Y$  over a specified period. The dependent variables are standardized 8th-grade reading scores in columns 1 and 2 and math scores in columns 3 and 4. In particular, the dependent variables are the average between  $t$  and  $t+4$  in columns 1, 3, and 5, and between  $t+5$  and  $t+9$  in columns 2, 4, and 6.  $Cap_{i,t}$  is the three-year cumulative capital spending per pupil in thousands of 2000 dollars.  $\widehat{Cap}_{i,t}$  is the predicted value of  $Cap_{i,t}$  from the first stage. Control variables in  $C_{i,t}$  include the imputed eligibility based on the allocation formula, a log of current expenditures per pupil, cash holdings scaled by current expenditures, and the interaction term between the log of 1990 employment and linear trends.  $\delta_i$  and  $\delta_t$  are district dummies and year dummies, respectively. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the district level. Significance levels are denoted by \*, \*\*, \*\*\*, which correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

	Reading		Math	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Yr 0-4	Yr 5-9	Yr 0-4	Yr 5-9
Capital Spending(\$1,000)	-0.019 (0.019)	0.069*** (0.026)	-0.012 (0.024)	0.135*** (0.046)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	9524	9523	9524	9523
F-stat	11.41	11.39	11.41	11.39

**TABLE A2. Effect of Debt Relief on Non-test Outcomes - Robustness Checks Controlling for the 1990 Employment  $\times$  Linear Trends.**

This table reports coefficient estimates from the following second stage of the IV approach:  $\bar{Y}_{i,t} = \beta \widehat{Cap}_{i,t} + \Gamma C_{i,t} + \delta_i + \delta_t + \bar{u}_{i,t}$ , where  $\bar{Y}_{i,t}$  denotes the average of  $Y$  over a specified period. The dependent variables are graduation rates in columns 1 and 2, college entrance exam participation rates in columns 3 and 4, and college enrollment rates in columns 5 and 6. In particular, the dependent variables are the average between  $t$  and  $t+4$  in columns 1, 3, and 5, and between  $t+5$  and  $t+9$  in columns 2, 4, and 6.  $Cap_{i,t}$  is the three-year cumulative capital spending per pupil in thousands of 2000 dollars.  $\widehat{Cap}_{i,t}$  is the predicted value of  $Cap_{i,t}$  from the first stage. Control variables in  $C_{i,t}$  include the imputed eligibility based on the allocation formula, a log of current expenditures per pupil, cash holdings scaled by current expenditures, and the interaction term between the log of 1990 employment and linear trends.  $\delta_i$  and  $\delta_t$  are district dummies and year dummies, respectively. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the district level. Significance levels are denoted by \*, \*\*, \*\*\*, which correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

	Graduation (%)		College Exam Tested (%)		College Enroll (%)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Yr 0-4	Yr 5-9	Yr 0-4	Yr 5-9	Yr 0-4	Yr 5-9
Capital Spending(\$1,000)	0.033 (0.603)	1.707** (0.772)	0.420 (1.091)	2.077 (1.322)	0.593 (0.655)	1.995** (0.912)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	9524	9524	9491	9509	9524	9524
F-stat	11.41	11.41	12.63	12.03	11.41	11.41

**TABLE A3. Effect of Debt Relief on Test Scores - Robustness Checks Controlling for the Enrollment Size Directly.**

This table reports coefficient estimates from the following second stage of the IV approach:  $\bar{Y}_{i,t} = \beta \widehat{Cap}_{i,t} + \Gamma C_{i,t} + \delta_i + \delta_t + \bar{u}_{i,t}$ , where  $\bar{Y}_{i,t}$  denotes the average of  $Y$  over a specified period. The dependent variables are standardized 8th-grade reading scores in columns 1 and 2 and math scores in columns 3 and 4. In particular, the dependent variables are the average between  $t$  and  $t + 4$  in columns 1, 3, and 5, and between  $t + 5$  and  $t + 9$  in columns 2, 4, and 6.  $Cap_{i,t}$  is the three-year cumulative capital spending per pupil in thousands of 2000 dollars.  $\widehat{Cap}_{i,t}$  is the predicted value of  $Cap_{i,t}$  from the first stage. Control variables in  $C_{i,t}$  include the log of enrollment size, the imputed eligibility based on the allocation formula, a log of current expenditures per pupil, and cash holdings scaled by current expenditures.  $\delta_i$  and  $\delta_t$  are district dummies and year dummies, respectively. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the district level. Significance levels are denoted by \*, \*\*, \*\*\*, which correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

	Reading		Math	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Yr 0-4	Yr 5-9	Yr 0-4	Yr 5-9
Capital Spending(\$1,000)	-0.029 (0.019)	0.037* (0.020)	-0.015 (0.022)	0.073** (0.031)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	8666	8666	8666	8666
F-stat	12.65	12.65	12.65	12.65

**TABLE A4. Effect of Debt Relief on Non-test Outcomes - Robustness Checks Controlling for the Enrollment Size Directly.**

This table reports coefficient estimates from the following second stage of the IV approach:  $\bar{Y}_{i,t} = \beta \widehat{Cap}_{i,t} + \Gamma C_{i,t} + \delta_i + \delta_t + \bar{u}_{i,t}$ , where  $\bar{Y}_{i,t}$  denotes the average of Y over a specified period. The dependent variables are graduation rates in columns 1 and 2, college entrance exam participation rates in columns 3 and 4, and college enrollment rates in columns 5 and 6. In particular, the dependent variables are the average between  $t$  and  $t+4$  in columns 1, 3, and 5, and between  $t+5$  and  $t+9$  in columns 2, 4, and 6.  $Cap_{i,t}$  is the three-year cumulative capital spending per pupil in thousands of 2000 dollars.  $\widehat{Cap}_{i,t}$  is the predicted value of  $Cap_{i,t}$  from the first stage. Control variables in  $C_{i,t}$  include the log of enrollment size, the imputed eligibility based on the allocation formula, a log of current expenditures per pupil, and cash holdings scaled by current expenditures.  $\delta_i$  and  $\delta_t$  are district dummies and year dummies, respectively. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the district level. Significance levels are denoted by \*, \*\*, \*\*\*, which correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

	Graduation (%)		College Exam Tested (%)		College Enroll (%)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Yr 0-4	Yr 5-9	Yr 0-4	Yr 5-9	Yr 0-4	Yr 5-9
Capital Spending(3-Yr)	-0.358 (0.561)	1.154* (0.650)	-0.757 (1.143)	1.502 (1.235)	-0.829 (0.651)	0.465 (0.652)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	8666	8666	8664	8664	8666	8666
F-stat	12.65	12.65	12.57	12.66	12.65	12.65

**TABLE A5. Effect of Debt Relief on Test Scores - Robustness Checks Dropping the Top Enrollment Size Quartile.**

This table reports coefficient estimates from the following second stage of the IV approach after dropping the school districts in the top enrollment size quartile as of 1997:

$\bar{Y}_{i,t} = \beta \widehat{Cap}_{i,t} + \Gamma C_{i,t} + \delta_i + \delta_t + \bar{u}_{i,t}$ , where  $\bar{Y}_{i,t}$  denotes the average of  $Y$  over a specified period. The dependent variables are standardized 8th-grade reading scores in columns 1 and 2 and math scores in columns 3 and 4. In particular, the dependent variables are the average between  $t$  and  $t + 4$  in columns 1, 3, and 5, and between  $t + 5$  and  $t + 9$  in columns 2, 4, and 6.  $Cap_{i,t}$  is the three-year cumulative capital spending per pupil in thousands of 2000 dollars.  $\widehat{Cap}_{i,t}$  is the predicted value of  $Cap_{i,t}$  from the first stage. Control variables in  $C_{i,t}$  include the enrollment size quartile dummies, the imputed eligibility based on the allocation formula, a log of current expenditures per pupil, and cash holdings scaled by current expenditures.  $\delta_i$  and  $\delta_t$  are district dummies and year dummies, respectively. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the district level. Significance levels are denoted by \*, \*\*, \*\*\*, which correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

	Reading		Math	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Yr 0-4	Yr 5-9	Yr 0-4	Yr 5-9
Capital Spending(\$1,000)	-0.038 (0.026)	0.071** (0.033)	0.003 (0.028)	0.122** (0.052)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	7113	7112	7113	7112
F-stat	7.85	7.83	7.85	7.83

**TABLE A6. Effect of Debt Relief on Non-test Outcomes - Robustness Checks Dropping the Top Enrollment Size Quartile.**

This table reports coefficient estimates from the following second stage of the IV approach after dropping the school districts in the top enrollment size quartile as of 1997:

$\bar{Y}_{i,t} = \beta \widehat{Cap}_{i,t} + \Gamma C_{i,t} + \delta_i + \delta_t + \bar{u}_{i,t}$ , where  $\bar{Y}_{i,t}$  denotes the average of Y over a specified period. The dependent variables are graduation rates in columns 1 and 2, college entrance exam participation rates in columns 3 and 4, and college enrollment rates in columns 5 and 6. In particular, the dependent variables are the average between  $t$  and  $t+4$  in columns 1, 3, and 5, and between  $t+5$  and  $t+9$  in columns 2, 4, and 6.  $\widehat{Cap}_{i,t}$  is the three-year cumulative capital spending per pupil in thousands of 2000 dollars.  $\widehat{Cap}_{i,t}$  is the predicted value of  $Cap_{i,t}$  from the first stage. Control variables in  $C_{i,t}$  include the enrollment size quartile dummies, the imputed eligibility based on the allocation formula, a log of current expenditures per pupil, and cash holdings scaled by current expenditures.  $\delta_i$  and  $\delta_t$  are district dummies and year dummies, respectively. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the district level. Significance levels are denoted by \*, \*\*, \*\*\*, which correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

	Graduation (%)		College Exam Tested (%)		College Enroll (%)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Yr 0-4	Yr 5-9	Yr 0-4	Yr 5-9	Yr 0-4	Yr 5-9
Capital Spending(\$1,000)	-0.249 (0.800)	2.619** (1.228)	0.653 (1.436)	1.980 (1.633)	-0.126 (0.860)	1.347 (1.041)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	7113	7113	7107	7105	7113	7113
F-stat	7.85	7.85	8.45	7.98	7.85	7.85

**TABLE A7. Effect of Debt Relief on Test Scores - Robustness Checks Dropping the Top Oil Revenue Quartile.**

This table reports coefficient estimates from the following second stage of the IV approach after dropping the school districts in the top oil revenue quartile as of 1997:

$\bar{Y}_{i,t} = \beta \widehat{Cap}_{i,t} + \Gamma C_{i,t} + \delta_i + \delta_t + \bar{u}_{i,t}$ , where  $\bar{Y}_{i,t}$  denotes the average of  $Y$  over a specified period. The dependent variables are standardized 8th-grade reading scores in columns 1 and 2 and math scores in columns 3 and 4. In particular, the dependent variables are the average between  $t$  and  $t + 4$  in columns 1, 3, and 5, and between  $t + 5$  and  $t + 9$  in columns 2, 4, and 6.  $Cap_{i,t}$  is the three-year cumulative capital spending per pupil in thousands of 2000 dollars.  $\widehat{Cap}_{i,t}$  is the predicted value of  $Cap_{i,t}$  from the first stage. Control variables in  $C_{i,t}$  include the enrollment size quartile dummies, the imputed eligibility based on the allocation formula, a log of current expenditures per pupil, and cash holdings scaled by current expenditures.  $\delta_i$  and  $\delta_t$  are district dummies and year dummies, respectively. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the district level. Significance levels are denoted by \*, \*\*, \*\*\*, which correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

	Reading		Math	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Yr 0-4	Yr 5-9	Yr 0-4	Yr 5-9
Capital Spending(\$1,000)	-0.014 (0.016)	0.051** (0.020)	0.024 (0.021)	0.096*** (0.033)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	7115	7115	7115	7115
F-stat	14.32	14.32	14.32	14.32

**TABLE A8. Effect of Debt Relief on Non-test Outcomes - Robustness Checks Dropping the Top Oil Revenue Quartile.**

This table reports coefficient estimates from the following second stage of the IV approach after dropping the school districts in the top oil revenue quartile as of 1997:

$\bar{Y}_{i,t} = \beta \widehat{Cap}_{i,t} + \Gamma C_{i,t} + \delta_i + \delta_t + \bar{u}_{i,t}$ , where  $\bar{Y}_{i,t}$  denotes the average of  $Y$  over a specified period. The dependent variables are graduation rates in columns 1 and 2, college entrance exam participation rates in columns 3 and 4, and college enrollment rates in columns 5 and 6. In particular, the dependent variables are the average between  $t$  and  $t+4$  in columns 1, 3, and 5, and between  $t+5$  and  $t+9$  in columns 2, 4, and 6.  $\widehat{Cap}_{i,t}$  is the three-year cumulative capital spending per pupil in thousands of 2000 dollars.  $\widehat{Cap}_{i,t}$  is the predicted value of  $Cap_{i,t}$  from the first stage. Control variables in  $C_{i,t}$  include the enrollment size quartile dummies, the imputed eligibility based on the allocation formula, a log of current expenditures per pupil, and cash holdings scaled by current expenditures.  $\delta_i$  and  $\delta_t$  are district dummies and year dummies, respectively. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the district level. Significance levels are denoted by \*, \*\*, \*\*\*, which correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

	Graduation (%)		College Exam Tested (%)		College Enroll (%)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Yr 0-4	Yr 5-9	Yr 0-4	Yr 5-9	Yr 0-4	Yr 5-9
Capital Spending(\$1,000)	0.803 (0.579)	1.000* (0.589)	0.412 (0.983)	0.266 (1.041)	0.682 (0.599)	0.657 (0.623)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	7115	7115	7108	7105	7115	7115
F-stat	14.32	14.32	15.19	14.61	14.32	14.32