

# Flexible Authorization for Java Applications with Open Policy Agent

## Overview and Use-cases

Thomas Darimont




# About me

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- Thomas Darimont
- Principal Consultant @codecentric
- Open Source Enthusiast
- Spring Team Alumni
- Keycloak Contributor for over 8 years
- Official Keycloak Maintainer
- Extism Java SDK (WASM for Java)
- Java User Group Saarland Organizer



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*“Every Non-Trivial Application  
Uses Some Form of  
**Access Control.**”*

**Access Control**

∈

**Identity & Access Management**

# IAM: Identity & Access Management

## Identity Management

- Identity Proofing
- Identity Life-cycle
- Identity Self-services
- ...
- **Authentication**

## Access Management

- Policy Administration
- Entitlements Management
- Auditing
- ...
- **Authorization**

# Authentication & Authorization

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- Authentication (AuthN)
  - *who* the user *is*
  - → **Identity** (Alice, Bob, ..., Guest)
- Authorization (AuthZ)
  - *what* the user *is allowed* to do
  - usually happens AFTER authentication
  - Rights, Permissions, Privileges
  - → **Entitlements** (payroll:access, contact:export, etc.)

# Typical Authorization Use Cases

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- *Restrict access based on HTTP endpoints*
  - Can \$user perform HTTP GET /salaries/bob ?
  - Can \$user perform HTTP POST /salaries/bob/raise ?
- *Restrict access on functional level*
  - Can \$user export customer contact information?
  - Can \$user with role support impersonate users?
  - Can \$user see the delete account button in the UI?
- *Restrict access on resource level*
  - Can \$user access the salary information of \$user2?
  - Can \$user cancel subscription for customer 42?
  - Can \$user access the finance system?

# Authorization in Applications

- Access Control Types

- RBAC: Role based access control      User has role “Manager”
- ABAC: Attribute based access control      User has plan:premium
- PBAC: Policy based access control      Allow helpdesk from 9am-5pm
- ReBAC: Relation based access control      Org users can access doc

- Access Control within Application code

- Explicit checks for user / roles / group / permissions / attributes
- Imperative: Method calls integrated with business code
- Declarative: Annotations augmenting business code
- Checks before calls (Guarded Commands, Filter, PreAuthorize)
- Checks after calls (Filter Results, PostAuthorize)

- Access Control outside of Application code

- Policies describe access control logic
- Textual Policy Languages (XACML, ALFA, Rego, etc.)



# Java Frameworks / Libraries for Authorization

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- JAAS: Java Authentication and Authorization Service
- Java Authorization Frameworks
  - [Spring Security](#)
    - @Secured, @PreAuthorize, @PostAuthorize
  - [Apache Shiro](#)
    - subject.hasRole("admin");
    - subject.isPermitted("user:delete:jsmith")
  - [OACC](#) Framework
- Policy based authorization (XACLM)
  - WSo2 Balana
  - Sun XACML
- Externalized Authorization
  - Casbin, Cerbos, Open Policy Agent

# Policy based Authorization

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**Policies** contain **Rules** with **Conditions** to **decide** if a **Subject** (user) is **allowed** to perform an **Action** with a **Resource** in a given **Context**.

- XACML
  - eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
  - WSo2 Balana
  - Sun XACML
- Alternatives
  - Casbin,
  - Cerbos
  - **Open Policy Agent**

# History: Policies with XACML


- [eXtensible Access Control Markup Language](#)
- XML-based language for access control policies
- Quite dated OASIS standard (V1 2003; V2 2005)
- Java Implementations [Sun XACML](#) and [WSo2 Balana](#)

***Policies*** containing ***Rules*** with ***Conditions*** to ***decide*** if a **Subject** (user) is **allowed** to perform an **Action** with a **Resource**.


[Example XACML Policy](#)

# Policy Based Access Control Components

- **PEP**  
**Policy Enforcement Point**  
Requests and applies policy decision.
- **PDP**  
**Policy Decision Point**  
Evaluates policy with input from request.
- **PAP**  
**Policy Administration Point**  
Policy life-cycle management.
- **PIP**  
**Policy Information Point**  
Provides additional information for policy evaluation.




# Evolution of Authorization Systems



# Authorization Variants for Microservices

# Authorization Variants for Microservices

## Hardcoded




### ADVANTAGES

- Available and performant

### DRAWBACKS

- Risk of breakage
- More repeated work
- Inconsistent implementation and logging

## Centralized Service




### ADVANTAGES

- No repeated work
- Consistent policies
- Hot-patching
- Fast security reviews

### DRAWBACKS

- Availability and performance suffer
- Inconsistent enforcement

## Sidecar




### ADVANTAGES

- No repeated work
- Consistent policies
- Hot-patching
- Fast security reviews
- Available, performant

### DRAWBACKS

- Inconsistent enforcement

## Service Mesh



### ADVANTAGES

- No repeated work
- Consistent policies
- Hot-patching
- Fast security reviews
- Available, performant
- Consistent logging

### DRAWBACKS

- Deploy proxy

# Open Policy Agent





# Open Policy Agent Overview



- Open-Source **policy engine** written in Go
  - Pull / Push, Validate, Eval
- Developed by [Styra Inc.](https://www.styra.com/) and community
- Propagates “***Policy as Code***”
  - Authorization logic as source
  - version, lint, test, refactor, audit
  - **Rego**: Declarative policy language
- **Sidecar deployment**
  - **Idea: decouple policy decision from enforcement**

# Open Policy Agent Use Cases

- **Microservice authorization**
  - e.g. REST, GRPC, GraphQL
- **Kubernetes admission control**
  - can we run the deployment?
- **Configuration validation**
- **CI/CD quality gates, stage propagation**
- **Software Delivery Feature flags**

# Policy as Code


*“A **programmatic** approach to **uniformly define, maintain, and enforce authorization policies** throughout cloud-native **applications** and the **infrastructure** they run on.”*

Think infrastructure as code, but for AuthZ!


Reusable policy logic for authorization, Kubernetes admission, request processing, CI/CD deployment

Human and machine readable textual description of policies that can be put on source-control.  
Policies can be updated and distributed without application restart!

# How does OPA work?



# OPA Usage with Microservice



1. OPA instance runs besides Microservice (colocated)
2. OPA instance provides REST / GRPC API Input & Result (Decision) JSON / ProtoBuf
3. Microservice generates authz query and delegates authorization decision to OPA
4. OPA uses policies to make decision (OPA acts as *Policy Decision Point*, **PDP**)
5. Policies and data loaded into memory via push / pull (policy bundles)
6. Policy decision enforced by Microservice

# OPA Policy Queries

- REST / GRPC API Interface
  - POST <https://opa-service/v1/policies/path/to/policy/rule>
  - Policy and Rule selected via request path
- { “input”: data }
- Context data from request / application
- data can be any JSON Object

# OPA Policy Query Styles

- Example: **Subject, Action, Ressource**
  - Subject: User / Service-Account / System
  - Action: Operation
  - Resource: Object type / Object Entity (Type+ID) / Instance
- Example: **Subject, Permission**
  - Subject: User / Service-Account / System
  - Permission: logical access right

# OPA Example Session

User Bob clicks on a the relative link in the browser `/finance/salary/alice`

Decision

Query POST `https://127.0.0.1:8181/v1/policies/app/authz/allow`


`{ "allow": true }`

`{ "input": { "user": "bob", "method": "GET", "path": ["finance", "salary", "alice"]} }`

## Policy

*Allow users to access their own salary as well as the salary of their direct subordinates.*

```
1 package app.auhtz
2
3 # bob is alice's manager, and betty is charlie's
4 import data.subordinates
5
6 default allow := false
7
8 # Allow users to get their own salaries
9 allow {
10   input.method == "GET"
11   input.path == ["finance", "salary", input.user]
12 }
13
14 # Allow managers to get their subordinates salaries
15 allow {
16   some username
17   input.method == "GET"
18   input.path = ["finance", "salary", username]
19   subordinates[input.user][_ ] == username
20 }
```





# Rego Policy Language


- Declarative DSL, inspired by [Datalog](#)
- **Policy** = Collection of **Rules**
- **Rule** = named collection of **Conditions**
- **Condition** = boolean expressions, calculations
- Implicit variables **input** and **data** for data access
- Many [built-in functions](#) (decode JWT, parse JSON, etc.)

```
1 package myapp.authz
2
3 default allow := false
4
5 allow { # allow IF
6     input.method == "GET"    # HTTP Method is GET
7     input.path == ["public"] # AND HTTP Request path is /public
8 }
```

Rules

Conditions

# Demo: Simple Rego Policy

 **The Rego Playground**

Examples ▾

Options ▾

Evaluate

Format

```
1 package app.demo
2
3 import future.keywords.in
4
5 default allow := false
6
7 allow {
8     input.method == "GET"
9     input.path == "/public"
10 }
11
12 allow {
13     input.method == "GET"
14     input.path == "/admin"
15     "admin" in input.subject.roles
16 }
```

**INPUT**




```
1 {
2     "method": "GET",
3     "path": "/admin",
4     "subject": {
5         "name": "bob",
6         "roles": ["user", "admin"]
7     }
8 }
```

**DATA**

**OUTPUT**

```
Found 1 result in 155µs.
1 {
2     "allow": true
3 }
```

# Demo: RBAC Rego Policy

 **The Rego Playground** Examples ▾ ☒ Strict ☐ Coverage  Evaluate  For

```
1 package app.access
2
3 default allow := false
4
5 allow {
6   input.required_permission = current_user_permissions[_]
7 }
8
9 user_permissions[user] := perms {
10   role = user_roles[user]
11   perms := data.role_permissions[role].add[_]
12 }
13
14 current_user_permissions[perm] {
15   role = current_user_roles[_]
16   perm = data.role_permissions[role].add[_]
17 }
18
19 current_user_roles := roles {
20   roles = user_roles[input.user]
21 }
22
23 user_roles[user] := roles {
24   direct_roles = data.user_roles[user]
25   role_graph[direct_role]
26   roles := graph.reachable(role_graph, direct_roles)
27 }
```

**INPUT**

```
1 {
2   "user": "alice"
3 }
```

**DATA**


```
1 {
2   "roles": {
3     "global": {
4       "board": {
5         "parent": "manager"
6       },
7       "manager": {
8         "parent": "manager"
9       }
10    }
11 }
```

**OUTPUT**

```
Found 1 result in 291.464 µs.
1 [
2   "access:internal",
3   "access:public"
4 ]
```

**Annotations:**

- Input from Request**: Points to the INPUT section.
- Data from memory**: Points to the DATA section.
- Generated results**: Points to the OUTPUT section.

Built by  styra

OPA v0.44.0

# Demo: OPA with Quarkus

```
/**
 * Provides a coarse grained interface for the greeting service.
 */
2 usages  Thomas Darimont *
@ApplicationScoped
@RequiredArgsConstructor
class GreetingFacade {

    1 usage
    private final GreetingService greetingService;

    /**
     * <pre>{@code
     * @PreAuthz(resource = "#name") --> {"action": "greet", "resource": "#name"}
     * }
     * </pre>
     */
    1 usage  Thomas Darimont *
    @PreAuthz(resource = "#name")
    public String greet(String name) {
        return greetingService.greet(name);
    }
}
```

→ Declarative Authorization for easy use and integration!

# Demo: OPA with Spring Boot

1 usage    👤 Thomas Darimont

@SpringBootApplication

@EnableConfigurationProperties(OpaProperties.class)

public class SpringOpaApp {

    👤 Thomas Darimont

public static void main(String[] args) {

    SpringApplication.run(SpringOpaApp.class, args);

}

}

# Demo: OPA with custom Policy Server

```
1 usage  👤 Thomas Darimont*  
@SpringBootApplication  
public class SpringOpaPolicyServerApp {  
  
    👤 Thomas Darimont*  
    public static void main(String[] args) {  
        SpringApplication.run(SpringOpaPolicyServerApp.class, args);  
    }  
  
}
```

→ Generate Policies & Data dynamically based on your Application data!

# Demo: OPA for Access Control in Keycloak

[Authentication Flows](#) > [Browser Identity First](#) > opa-auth

Opa-auth 

ID	<input type="text" value="8c67d724-84ed-4c54-b8dd-a35433a2b4b7"/>
Alias ?	<input type="text" value="opa-auth"/>
Authz Server URL ?	<input type="text" value="http://acme-opa:8181/v1/data/iam/keycloak/allow"/>
Use user attributes ?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ON
User Attributes ?	<input type="text"/>
Use realm attributes ?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ON
Realm Attributes ?	<input type="text" value="acme.greeting"/>
Use client attributes ?	<input type="checkbox"/> OFF
Client Attributes ?	<input type="text"/>
Use realm roles ?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ON
Use client roles ?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ON
Use groups ?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ON
<input type="button" value="Save"/> <input type="button" value="Cancel"/>	

→ Access Decisions with more powerful policy language!



# Demo: Validate configuration with OPA

The screenshot shows a GitHub repository interface for 'jugsaar-58-opa-for-java'. The repository is public and has 0 stars. The navigation bar includes links for Code, Issues, Pull requests, Actions, Projects, Wiki, and Settings. The current view is the commit page for 'b1dfa29' from 7 days ago, titled 'Add opa keycloak-config validation example'. The file list shows a 'policies' folder and a 'readme.md' file, both added in the same commit. The 'readme.md' file content is displayed below, titled 'Keycloak OPA Config Validation', describing a PoC for validating Keycloak configuration with Open Policy Agent (OPA) using the 'rego' policy definition language and the configtest tool.

jugsaar / jugsaar-58-opa-for-java Public

Code Issues Pull requests Actions Projects Wiki 0 Settings

main jugsaar-58-opa-for-java / keycloak-opa-config-validation /

Thomas Darimont Add opa keycloak-config validation example b1dfa29 7 days ago History

File	Commit	Time
..	..	..
polices	Add opa keycloak-config validation example	7 days ago
readme.md	Add opa keycloak-config validation example	7 days ago

readme.md

## Keycloak OPA Config Validation

PoC for validating Keycloak configuration with [Open Policy Agent](#). In this example we use OPA's "rego" [policy definition language](#) and the configtest tool to validate a client configuration.

The example policy can be found in the [policies](#) folder.




# Styra DAS - Declarative Authorization Service

<https://www.styra.com/styra-das/>


## Policy-based Access Management

The Styra Declarative Authorization Service (DAS), built on top of the open-source project [Open Policy Agent \(OPA\)](#), provides authorization through policy management across the cloud-native ecosystem. Styra DAS allows least-privilege access through APIs, identities, systems and services for context-rich authorization.



# OPAL Open Policy Administration Layer

- OPAL is an another community project
- Provides control-plane for distributed orchestration of policies



## Where does OPA fit well?

- **Logic driven** authorization
- Function / Endpoint level authorization / RBAC / ABAC
- Temporal access restrictions (9am-5pm)
- Uniform cardinality low/medium data
  - Policy Style Authorization (OPA, Ory Keto, Cerbos)

## Where does OPA NOT fit well?

- **Data driven** authorization
- Ownership / relational based authorization
- Annotated direct / indirect relations
- Heterogeneous / (very) high-cardinality data
  - ReBAC Style Authorization (OpenFGA, Authzed, ...) 35

# Summary

- **Open Policy Agent**
  - **Flexible policy management** and **easy to integrate**
  - **Decisions** can be **delegated** and **enforced** in app
  - **Helps to consolidate** existing **access logic**
  - **Commercial products: Styra DAS, Styra Load, Aserto, Topaz**
- **Policies as Code**
  - Allows **policy sharing** and **lifecycle** management
  - **Rego** is a powerful policy language
- **OPA enables “Modern Authorization” for existing applications**

# Styra Academy - Free Training



<https://academy.styra.com>

ALL COURSES SIGN IN

Learn how to enforce authorization  
policy across your cloud-native stack.

## Courses on Unified Policy Direct from the creators of Open Policy Agent

Policy as Code, Infrastructure Policy  
**OPA for K8s Admission Control**

29 Lessons | Free

styra | ACADEMY

An icon showing a gear connected to a circuit board.

**OPA for K8s Admission Control**

Policy as Code  
**OPA by Example**

★★★★★ (3)

33 Lessons | Free

styra | ACADEMY

An icon showing a lightbulb above an open book.

**OPA by Example**

Policy as Code, Infrastructure Policy  
**Terraform Validation with Styra**

18 Lessons | Free

styra | ACADEMY

An icon showing a blue geometric shape resembling a stylized 'Y' or a building.

**Terraform Validation with Styra**

**Thank you**

Questions?




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- Extism Java SDK (WASM for Java)
- Java User Group Saarland Organizer



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@jugsaar  
t.darimont@codecentric.de

# Slides & Code

Github

[thomasdarimont/javaland2023-authz-for-java-devs-with-opa](https://github.com/thomasdarimont/javaland2023-authz-for-java-devs-with-opa)



# Links

- [Open Policy Agent Product](#)
- [Open Policy Agent Web Site](#)
- [Awesome OPA](#)
- [Rego Styleguide](#)
- [Gatekeeper](#)
- [OPA Gatekeeper Library](#)

## PUBLICATIONS ›

# Zanzibar: Google's Consistent, Global Authorization System

Ruoming Pang, [Ramon Caceres](#), Mike Burrows, [Zhifeng Chen](#), Pratik Dave, [Nathan Germer](#), Alexander Golynski, [Kevin Graney](#), Nina Kang, Lea Kissner, [Jeffrey L. Korn](#), Abhishek Parmar, [Christina D. Richards](#), Mengzhi Wang

2019 USENIX Annual Technical Conference (USENIX ATC '19), Renton, WA

[Download](#)[Google Scholar](#)[Copy Bibtex](#)

## Abstract

Determining whether online users are authorized to access digital objects is central to preserving privacy. This paper presents the design, implementation, and deployment of Zanzibar, a global system for storing and evaluating access control lists. Zanzibar provides a uniform data model and configuration language for expressing a wide range of access control policies from hundreds of client services at Google, including Calendar, Cloud, Drive, Maps, Photos, and YouTube. Its authorization decisions respect causal ordering of user actions and thus provide external consistency amid changes to access control lists and object contents. Zanzibar scales to trillions of access control lists and millions of authorization requests per second to support services used by billions of people. It has maintained 95th-percentile latency of less than 10 milliseconds and availability of greater than 99.999% over 3 years of production

# Zanzibar Implementations

- [ory/keto](#)
- [Auth0 FGA](#)
- [OpenFGA](#)
- [Speedle](#)
- [AuthzDB](#)