Online Supplementary Material

Aggregate Wealth and Its Distribution as Determinants of Financial Crises

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The following supplementary material is intended to accompany the article "Aggregate Wealth and Its Distribution as Determinants of Financial Crises," submitted for initial review to the Journal of Economic Inequality.

A Data




Figure A.1: Crisis and Observations Timeline Notes: Observations restricted to subsample of country-year observations

with top1% wealth shares, aggregate wealth-income ratios, and finance's share of total income. Sources: Reinhart & Rogoff (2010)

Table A.1: Number of Crisis Episodes: 1870–2010, Subsample 1

	Banking Crisis	Stock Market Crash	Both
Australia	0	4	0
Denmark	0	2	0
France	0	5	0
Italy	3	1	1
Netherlands	0	1	0
Spain	4	5	1
Sweden	1	6	1
United Kingdom	6	10	1
United States	13	24	7
Total	27	58	11
Likelihood of crisis	0.127	0.272	0.052
(213 Obs)	0.127	0.272	0.032

Notes: Subsample is restricted to country-year observations with top 1% wealth shares, aggregate wealth-income ratios, and finance's share of total income. Sources: Reinhart & Rogoff (2010)

Table A.2: Summary Statistics: Full Sample

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	Obs	Countries
Top 1% Shr Net Worth	0.275	0.126	0.063	0.690	401	13
Wealth-Income ratio	4.59	1.421	1.805	8.855	$1,\!174$	12
Finance Shr of Income	0.036	0.02	0.001	0.124	1,402	15
$ ilde{r}$	0.001	0.117	-1.415	0.799	731	15
\hat{g}	0.018	0.052	-0.509	0.659	2,702	15
Private Sector Credit	0.724	0.404	0.114	2.022	813	15
Top Marginal Tax Rate	58.366	20.704	2	97.5	714	10

Notes: The full sample includes all observations on all available countries for a given variable, thus exceeding the number of countries in each of our sub-samples.

Table A.3: Summary Statistics: Subsample 1

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	Obs	Countries
Top 1% Shr Net Worth	0.246	0.12	0.063	0.690	213	9
Wealth-Income ratio	4.195	0.985	2.258	8.855	213	9
Finance Shr of Income	0.047	0.011	0.011	0.079	213	9

NOTES: Subsample is restricted to country-year observations with top 1% wealth shares, aggregate wealth-income ratios, and finance's share of total income.

B Results

B.1 Five Year Averages

Table B.4: FIVE YEAR AVERAGES: LIKELIHOOD OF BANKING CRISIS

Panel A			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Top 1% Shr Net Worth	-3.452	-8.960	-20.488*
	(4.674)	(7.531)	(8.040)
Wealth-Income ratio	-0.020	-0.623	-1.837
	(0.424)	(0.648)	(0.973)
Top 1% Shr Net Worth \times Wealth-Income ratio	0.987	3.882	8.186**
	(1.539)	(2.824)	(2.351)
Finance Shr of Income	-8.678	-17.527***	-9.406
	(7.582)	(5.035)	(11.715)
$ ilde{r}$		9.187^{**}	7.806
		(3.347)	(4.480)
\hat{g}		-12.034	-1.229
		(7.285)	(10.969)
Private Sector Credit			-0.026
			(0.495)
Top Marginal Tax Rate			-0.009
			(0.009)
Panel B			
Marginal Effects of Top 1% Shr Net Worth			
at Mean of Wealth-Income ratio	0.699	7.129	11.613***
	(2.183)	(4.315)	(1.598)
at P25 of Wealth-Income ratio	0.135	5.401	7.564^{***}
	(1.471)	(3.095)	(1.009)
Average Marginal Effect			
	0.699	7.129*	11.613***
	(2.183)	(4.315)	(1.598)
AIC	47.5	30.9	11.5
R^2	0.506	0.582	0.683
Countries	9	9	6
Obs	72	59	45

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

NOTES: All variables are averaged over five year intervals. Dependent variable takes the value 1 if crisis type occurs in given country over five years. Linear probability model is estimated with two-way fixed effects (2FE), controlling for country and half-decade. Financial development is the sum of all bank deposits and stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP, and a proxy for the rate of return on capital, r. A second proxy, \tilde{r} is the difference in first-differences of financial development. The variable \hat{g} , a proxy for growth, is the annual percentage change in GDP per capita. Private sector credit is measured as a share of GDP and the top marginal tax rate is a percentage. Panel B depicts marginal effects of wealth inequality on the crisis type when evaluated at the mean and 25^{th} percentile of aggregate wealth.

^{*} p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01


Table B.5: FIVE YEAR AVERAGES: LIKELIHOOD OF STOCK MARKET CRASH

Panel A			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Top 1% Shr Net Worth	-6.732	-9.218**	-5.906*
•	(4.275)	(3.491)	(2.734)
Wealth-Income ratio	-0.720*	-0.996***	-0.417
	(0.368)	(0.296)	(0.275)
Top 1% Shr Net Worth \times Wealth-Income ratio	2.805*	4.011**	3.245**
•	(1.470)	(1.274)	(1.026)
Finance Shr of Income	-0.644	-0.326	$3.136^{'}$
	(6.435)	(4.770)	(15.122)
$ ilde{r}$,	-3.294	-7.308
		(2.602)	(5.383)
\hat{g}		9.419	-23.691**
		(5.663)	(5.877)
Private Sector Credit		, ,	-0.563
			(0.587)
Top Marginal Tax Rate			-0.023**
			(0.009)
Panel B			
Marginal Effects of Top 1% Shr Net Worth			
at Mean of Wealth-Income ratio	5.074*	7.406***	6.819**
	(2.250)	(2.118)	(1.743)
at P25 of Wealth-Income ratio	3.470*	5.621***	5.214**
	(1.538)	(1.625)	(1.346)
Average Marginal Effect			
	5.074**	7.406***	6.819^{***}
	(2.250)	(2.118)	(1.743)
AIC	30.4	31.3	8.8
R^2	0.638	0.615	0.698
Countries	9	9	6
Obs	72	59	45


Clustered standard errors in parentheses

Notes: All variables are averaged over five year intervals. Dependent variable takes the value 1 if crisis type occurs in given country over five years. Linear probability model is estimated with two-way fixed effects (2FE), controlling for country and half-decade. Financial development is the sum of all bank deposits and stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP, and a proxy for the rate of return on capital, r. A second proxy, \tilde{r} is the difference in first-differences of financial development. The variable \hat{g} , a proxy for growth, is the annual percentage change in GDP per capita. Private sector credit is measured as a share of GDP and the top marginal tax rate is a percentage. Panel B depicts marginal effects of wealth inequality on the crisis type when evaluated at the mean and 25^{th} percentile of aggregate wealth.

^{*} p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01



(a) Banking Crisis



(b) Stock Market Crash

Figure B.2: Marginal Effect of Wealth Inequality on Likelihood of Financial Crisis: LPM Five Year Averages

B.2 Large Crisis or Both Banking Crisis and Stock Market Crash

Table B.6: FIVE YEAR AVERAGES: LIKELIHOOD OF LARGE CRISIS

Panel A			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Top 1% Shr Net Worth	-4.844	-7.292	-13.221**
	(3.616)	(5.866)	(4.871)
Wealth-Income ratio	-0.391	-0.791	-1.320*
	(0.338)	(0.538)	(0.621)
Top 1% Shr Net Worth \times Wealth-Income ratio	1.604	3.326	5.831***
	(1.272)	(2.278)	(1.230)
Finance Shr of Income	1.339	-4.357	5.536
	(3.851)	(3.627)	(16.744)
$ ilde{r}$,	1.933	-3.229
		(3.684)	(3.159)
\hat{g}		-3.224	-8.441
		(4.553)	(6.453)
Private Sector Credit		,	-0.290
			(0.436)
Top Marginal Tax Rate			-0.007
			(0.007)
Panel B			,
Marginal Effects of Top 1% Shr Net Worth			
at Mean of Wealth-Income ratio	1.908	6.493	9.644***
	(2.122)	(3.912)	(1.585)
at P25 of Wealth-Income ratio	0.990	5.013	6.760***
	(1.517)	(2.969)	(1.620)
Average Marginal Effect	(>)	(200)	(3-0)
	1.908	6.493*	9.644***
	(2.122)	(3.912)	(1.585)
AIC	24.4	16.4	-2.2
R^2	0.464	0.466	0.598
Countries	9	9	6
Obs	72	59	45

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

NOTES: All variables are averaged over five year intervals. Dependent variable takes the value 1 if both crisis types occur in given country over five years. Linear probability model is estimated with two-way fixed effects (2FE), controlling for country and half-decade. Financial development is the sum of all bank deposits and stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP, and a proxy for the rate of return on capital, r. A second proxy, \tilde{r} is the difference in first-differences of financial development. The variable \hat{g} , a proxy for growth, is the annual percentage change in GDP per capita. Private sector credit is measured as a share of GDP and the top marginal tax rate is a percentage. Panel B depicts marginal effects of wealth inequality on the crisis type when evaluated at the mean and 25^{th} percentile of aggregate wealth.

^{*} p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01




Figure B.3: Marginal Effect of Wealth Inequality on Likelihood of Large Crisis: LPM Five Year Averages

B.3 Aggregate Wealth and Instability


Table B.7: Test of Nonlinear Aggregate Wealth Effect on Likelihood of Financial Crisis

	Banking Crisis	Stock Market Crash	Large Crisis
Top 1% Shr Net Worth $t-2$	-5.137**	-6.680***	-7.568***
	(1.969)	(1.031)	(1.261)
Wealth-Income ratio $_{t-2}$	-0.631*	-0.520**	-0.726***
	(0.299)	(0.197)	(0.176)
Wealth-Income ratio squared $_{t-2}$	0.033^{*}	-0.006	0.015
	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Top 1% Shr Net Worth \times Wealth-Income ratio $_{t-2}$	2.060***	2.406^{***}	2.479^{***}
	(0.583)	(0.253)	(0.421)
Finance Shr of Income $t-2$	-8.466	9.461**	2.766
	(6.373)	(3.477)	(2.328)
AIC	-24.2	-101.8	-189.7
R^2	0.582	0.825	0.517
Countries	9	9	9
Obs	213	213	213


Clustered standard errors in parentheses

Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator if a type of financial crisis occurs for a given country and year. Linear probability model is estimated with two-way fixed effects (2FE), controlling for country and year.

^{*} p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01



(a) Banking Crisis



(b) Stock Market Crash

Figure B.4: Marginal Effects of Nonlinear Aggregate Wealth on Likelihood of Financial Crisis

C Fixed Effect Logit

Table C.8: Fixed Effect Logit: Likelihood of Banking Crisis

Panel A			
Tallet A	(1)	(2)	(3)
TD 107 Cl NJ XX 1	c 0cc	40.700	75 469*
Top 1% Shr Net Worth $_{t-2}$	-6.966	-42.786	-75.463*
XXX 101 T	(8.851)	(32.020)	(43.574)
Wealth-Income ratio $_{t-2}$	0.126	-2.827	-5.696**
T 10/01 N 11/11 N 11/11 N	(0.495)	(2.052)	(2.884)
Top 1% Shr Net Worth \times Wealth-Income ratio $_{t-2}$	1.111	10.772	22.956*
	(1.626)	(9.182)	(12.134)
Finance Shr of Income $t-2$	34.281	22.723	-1.471
	(20.941)	(28.316)	(42.871)
$ ilde{r}_{t-2}$		-1.104	-0.861
		(2.735)	(2.823)
\hat{g}_{t-2}		-12.478	-13.896
		(13.092)	(13.916)
Private Sector Credit $_{t-2}$			-1.788
			(1.554)
Top Marginal Tax Rate $_{t-2}$			-0.068**
			(0.031)
Panel B			
Marginal Effects of Top 1% Shr Net Worth			
at Mean of Wealth-Income ratio	-0.322	4.8e-5	0.022
	(0.947)	(3.9e-4)	(0.015)
at P25 of Wealth-Income ratio	-0.441	-2.4e-5	0.011
	(1.133)	(3.9e-4)	(0.009)
Average Marginal Effect			
	-0.370	-2.1e-5	0.064*
	(0.811)	(3.1e-4)	(0.037)
AIC	140.5	102.3	94.3
Pseudo- R^2	0.072	0.055	0.116
Countries	7	6	5
Obs	201	141	130

Standard errors in parentheses

NOTES: The dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to one if a crisis occurs for a country in a given year. Fixed effect logit model is estimated with country fixed effects. Coefficient estimates are reported. A proxy for the rate of return on capital, \tilde{r} is the difference in first-differences of financial development (the sum of all bank deposits and stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP). The variable \hat{g} , a proxy for growth, is the annual percentage change in GDP per capita. Private sector credit is measured as a share of GDP and the top marginal tax rate is a percentage. Panel B depicts marginal effects of wealth inequality on the crisis type when evaluated at the mean and 25^{th} percentile of aggregate wealth.

^{*} p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table C.9: FIXED EFFECT LOGIT: LIKELIHOOD OF STOCK MARKET CRASH

Panel A			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Top 1% Shr Net Worth $_{t-2}$	-0.403	-154.572***	-118.591**
	(6.036)	(50.103)	(53.712)
Wealth-Income ratio $_{t-2}$	-0.246	-9.227***	-6.990**
	(0.501)	(2.751)	(2.939)
Top 1% Shr Net Worth \times Wealth-Income ratio $_{t-2}$	1.505	46.240***	36.959***
	(1.495)	(13.410)	(14.330)
Finance Shr of Income $t-2$	21.232	36.716	33.731
	(16.587)	(26.872)	(38.773)
\tilde{r}_{t-2}		-2.379	-1.370
		(2.226)	(2.341)
\hat{g}_{t-2}		12.543	8.275
		(12.778)	(13.401)
Private Sector Credit $_{t-2}$			-0.199
			(1.784)
Top Marginal Tax Rate $_{t-2}$			-0.005
			(0.025)
Panel B			
Marginal Effects of Top 1% Shr Net Worth			
at Mean of Wealth-Income ratio	0.929	0.030***	0.037^{**}
	(1.129)	(0.011)	(0.015)
at P25 of Wealth-Income ratio	1.083	0.025**	0.020^*
	(0.805)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Average Marginal Effect			
	0.957	0.117^{***}	0.128***
	(1.023)	(0.037)	(0.049)
AIC	212.0	118.6	112.2
Pseudo- R^2	0.054	0.197	0.166
Countries	9	9	6
Obs	213	156	134

Standard errors in parentheses

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to one if a crisis occurs for a country in a given year. Fixed effect logit model is estimated with country fixed effects. Coefficient estimates are reported. A proxy for the rate of return on capital, \tilde{r} is the difference in first-differences of financial development (the sum of all bank deposits and stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP). The variable \hat{g} , a proxy for growth, is the annual percentage change in GDP per capita. Private sector credit is measured as a share of GDP and the top marginal tax rate is a percentage. Panel B depicts marginal effects of wealth inequality on the crisis type when evaluated at the mean and 25^{th} percentile of aggregate wealth.




Figure C.5: Marginal Effect of Wealth Inequality on Likelihood of Crisis: Logit Model

Table C.10: FIXED EFFECT LOGIT: LIKELIHOOD OF LARGE CRISIS

Panel A			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	, ,	· , ,	· · ·
Top 1% Shr Net Worth $_{t-2}$	2.264	-236.830^*	-6011.834
	(11.211)	(127.471)	(2210388.052)
Wealth-Income ratio $t-2$	-0.830	-23.836**	-1092.064
	(1.090)	(11.444)	(405450.635)
Top 1% Shr Net Worth × Wealth-Income ratio $_{t-2}$	1.793	90.916**	4933.949
	(2.106)	(44.482)	(1844686.373)
Finance Shr of Income $t-2$	76.136**	184.791**	3469.885
	(34.972)	(93.213)	(4730344.580)
\tilde{r}_{t-2}		-12.249	-930.945
		(8.442)	(351738.545)
\hat{g}_{t-2}		17.678	-137.834
		(43.241)	(358416.950)
Private Sector Credit $_{t-2}$			-30.853
			(143921.207)
Top Marginal Tax Rate $_{t-2}$			-9.999
			(4362.300)
Panel B			
Marginal Effects of Top 1% Shr Net Worth			
at Mean of Wealth-Income ratio	0.487	0.164**	
	(1.997)	(0.075)	
at P25 of Wealth-Income ratio	1.068	0.584	
	(2.975)	(0.408)	
Average Marginal Effect			
	0.680	0.364^{***}	
	(2.233)	(0.140)	
AIC	61.9	29.1	16.0
Pseudo- R^2	0.126	0.486	1.000
Countries	5	4	3
Obs	155	98	90

Standard errors in parentheses

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to one if a both a stock market crash and a banking crisis occur in a country in a given year. Fixed effect logit model is estimated with country fixed effects. Coefficient estimates are reported. A proxy for the rate of return on capital, \tilde{r} is the difference in first-differences of financial development (the sum of all bank deposits and stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP). The variable \hat{g} , a proxy for growth, is the annual percentage change in GDP per capita. Private sector credit is measured as a share of GDP and the top marginal tax rate is a percentage. Panel B depicts marginal effects of wealth inequality on the crisis type when evaluated at the mean and 25^{th} percentile of aggregate wealth.




Figure C.6: Marginal Effect of Wealth Inequality on Likelihood of Large Crisis: Logit Model

D Income Inequality

Table D.11: LIKELIHOOD OF BANKING CRISIS WITH INCOME INEQUALITY

Panel A			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Top 1% Shr Income $_{t-2}$	-5.288	1.623	2.492
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	(7.879)	(6.373)	(10.819)
Wealth-Income ratio $_{t-2}$	-0.040	0.084	0.143
v <u>-</u>	(0.123)	(0.089)	(0.222)
Top 1% Shr Income × Wealth-Income ratio $_{t-2}$	1.940	$0.233^{'}$	-1.273
•	(1.623)	(1.394)	(2.482)
Finance Shr of Income $t-2$	-9.405**	-7.214**	-7.048
· -	(3.449)	(2.892)	(7.334)
\tilde{r}_{t-2}	,	-0.296*	-0.524***
· -		(0.139)	(0.126)
\hat{g}_{t-2}		-2.070	-2.793
		(2.122)	(1.646)
Private Sector Credit $_{t-2}$,	0.571**
			(0.221)
Top Marginal Tax Rate $_{t-2}$			-0.013***
			(0.004)
Panel B			
Marginal Effects of Top 1% Shr Income			
at Mean of Wealth-Income ratio	2.895^{*}	2.585	-2.653
	(1.449)	(1.485)	(2.402)
at P25 of Wealth-Income ratio	1.478	2.419	-1.665
	(2.403)	(2.029)	(3.394)
Average Marginal Effect			
	2.895**	2.585*	-2.653
	(1.449)	(1.485)	(2.402)
AIC	115.8	105.1	57.1
R^2	0.346	0.260	0.320
Countries	10	10	8
Obs	393	335	271

Clustered standard errors in parentheses in Panel A

Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator of crisis type for given country and year. Linear probability model is estimated with two-way fixed effects (2FE), controlling for country and year. A proxy for the rate of return on capital, \tilde{r} is the difference in first-differences of financial development (the sum of all bank deposits and stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP). The variable \hat{g} , a proxy for growth, is the annual percentage change in GDP per capita. Private sector credit is measured as a share of GDP and the top marginal tax rate is a percentage. Panel B depicts marginal effects of wealth inequality on the crisis type when evaluated at the mean and 25^{th} percentile of aggregate wealth.


^{*} p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01


Table D.12: Likelihood of Stock Market Crash with Income Inequality

Panel A			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Top 1% Shr Income $t-2$	-0.951	-4.728	-7.596
	(4.074)	(5.942)	(9.811)
Wealth-Income ratio $t-2$	0.023	0.000	-0.004
	(0.057)	(0.089)	(0.175)
Top 1% Shr Income × Wealth-Income ratio $_{t-2}$	0.053	0.812	1.654
	(0.900)	(1.297)	(2.009)
Finance Shr of Income $t-2$	-1.464	-1.995	-6.405
	(3.039)	(3.751)	(7.277)
\tilde{r}_{t-2}		-0.070	-0.207
		(0.195)	(0.278)
\hat{g}_{t-2}		1.279	0.598
		(1.402)	(1.672)
Private Sector Credit $_{t-2}$			-0.023
			(0.219)
Top Marginal Tax Rate $t-2$			-0.002
			(0.005)
Panel B			
Marginal Effects of Top 1% Shr Income			
at Mean of Wealth-Income ratio	-0.729	-1.376	-0.910
	(2.111)	(2.527)	(3.689)
at P25 of Wealth-Income ratio	-0.767	-1.958	-2.194
	(2.120)	(2.699)	(4.388)
Average Marginal Effect			
	-0.729	-1.378	-0.910
	(2.111)	(2.527)	(3.689)
AIC	166.2	185.8	155.9
R^2	0.531	0.438	0.396
Countries	10	10	8
Obs	393	335	271

Clustered standard errors in parentheses in Panel A

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator of crisis type for given country and year. Linear probability model is estimated with two-way fixed effects (2FE), controlling for country and year. A proxy for the rate of return on capital, \tilde{r} is the difference in first-differences of financial development (the sum of all bank deposits and stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP). The variable \hat{g} , a proxy for growth, is the annual percentage change in GDP per capita. Private sector credit is measured as a share of GDP and the top marginal tax rate is a percentage. Panel B depicts marginal effects of wealth inequality on the crisis type when evaluated at the mean and 25^{th} percentile of aggregate wealth.





10

(b) Stock Market Crash

2 4 6 Wealth-Income ratio

Figure D.7: Marginal Effect of Income Inequality on Likelihood of Financial Crisis: LPM

E Predicted Probabilities of Crisis





Figure E.8: Predicted Probabilities of S&T Defined Crisis






Figure E.9: Predicted Probabilities of Large Crisis

References

Reinhart, C. M., & Rogoff, K. S. (2010). From financial crash to debt crisis. NBER Working Paper 15795, National Bureau of Economic Research.