

Part I
Security Challenges in
Automotive
Hardware/Software
Architecture Design

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## **Outline**

Motivation (current E/E architectures)

Trends (Integrated Architectures / Connected Car)


Challenges Overview

**Example CAN Bus** 

Challenges Electric Vehicles




## **Recent Automotive Security Issues**





# **Increasing Complexity in Automotive Electronics**





Sources:

Paul Milbredt, AUDI AG, EFTA 2010 - Switched FlexRay: Increasing the Effective Bandwidth and Safety of FlexRay Networks BMW Group, FTF 2010 Orlando - Energy Saving Strategies in Future Automotive E/E Architectures



## Audi A8 - 1994






Source: Selbststudienprogramm - Audi A8 Audi ABS/EDS/ASR (Bosch)



## Audi A8 - 2010



Source: Selbststudienprogramm - Audi A8 '10 Bordnetz und Vernetzung



# **Automotive Industry**

## **OEMs**

BMW, Volkswagen, General Motors, Toyota, Daimler



## Tier 1

Bosch, Continental, Delphi, Denso




## Tier 2

Infineon, NXP, Freescale, Renesas







# Trend 1: From Federated to Integrated Architectures



Costs:
Scalability,
Flexibility,
Extensibility








#### State-of-the-art E/E Architecture

Source: Selbststudienprogramm - Audi A8 '10 Bordnetz und Vernetzung




#### **Domain Architecture Concept from BMW**

Source: Ethernet for Automotive Applications. Robert Bruckmeier. Freescale Technology Forum, Orlando. June 23, 2010.



# In-vehicle network today / Access points



# **Trend 2: Connected Car**



# **Top Ten Most-Destructive Computer Viruses**

Source: http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/Top-Ten-Most-Destructive-Computer-Viruses.html

- 1) Stuxnet (2009-2010)
- 2) Conficker Virus (2009)
- 3) agent.btz (2008)
- 4) Zeus (2007)
- 5) Poisonlyy (2005)
- 6) MyDoom (2004)
- 7) Fizzer (2003)
- 8) Slammer (2003)
- 9) Code Red (2001)
- 10) Love Letter/I LOVE YOU (2000)



# **Automotive Design Objectives**



Safety



Costs

Security issues in vehicles can lead to fatal consequences.



Security



Vs.

# Challenges: Security issues in automobile

## Wireless connectivity



## **Malicious software**



www.computer-automation.de

## **Unauthorized products**



### Accessible buses/ECUs



westseattleblog.com

## **Unprotected sensors**



**VDO** 

## Counterfeits




shoeobsession.wordpress.com

# More than two billion CAN nodes have been sold since the protocol's development in the early 1980s.

Source: D. Wrampler Security Threats and Countermeasures for Intra-vehicle Networks






#### Source:

http://www.ixxat.com/can-controller-area-network-introduction\_en.html




# **CAN** bus operation







## **CAN vs Secure communication**




## Message encryption:



## Message authentication:



## **CAN vs Secure communication**



	CAN	FlexRay	Ethernet
confidentiality	feasible	feasible	Available (IPSEC)
integrity	- ( only 8byte)	feasible	Available (IPSEC)
availability	- (Event-Triggered)	Available (Time- Tiggered protocol + Bus guardian)	Feasible (PTP + switches: bus guardian possible )

# Security challenges - Electric Vehicles

**Drive-by-wire** 

Charging plug

**Battery** 




Nissan Drive-by-wire





# Energy-efficient recuperation


## Enabler of new drive-train architectures




Source: Gunter Freitag, Eine zukunftsfähige E/E-Architektur für PKW



# Vehicle-to-grid / Charging plug



# **Battery Management**



## Monitors:



temperature



voltage




current



# **Cell Operation**

## Battery cells have to be operated in a safe range



Source: http://www.digikey.com/us/en/techzone/energy-harvesting/resources/articles/battery-fuel-gauges.html

**Battery Safety** 



Thank you for your attention.

Questions?