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# Search strategy

These papers were found by starting with a limited set of known papers and relevant references herein. Subsequently, we searched for papers that referenced any of the papers in this initial set using the following query.

TITLE-ABS-KEY ( experiment AND ( network OR reputation ) AND ( trust OR cooperation OR “social dilemma” ) ) AND ( REFAUTH ( buskens ) OR REFAUTH ( bolton ) OR REFAUTH ( huck ) OR REFAUTH ( pfeiffer ) OR REFAUTH ( duffy ) )

# Papers

## Potentially relevant but missed initially

Stahl, D.O. (2013). An experimental test of the efficacy of a simple reputation mechanism to solve social dilemmas. *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 94,* 116-124. Doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.08.014

Networked PD game with either no reputation (supergame 1 and 5), or reputation through a color-coding scheme (in supergame 2,3,4). When paired with a green participant, one’s colour turned green if one cooperated, or purple if one defected; if one paired with a purple participant, one’s colour remained what it was in the previous round).

Bracht, J., & Feltovich, N. (2009). Whatever you say, your reputation precedes you: Observation and cheap talk in the trust game. *Journal of Public Economics, 93,* 1036-1044. Doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.06.004

Networked trust game in which the trustor could observe the previous action of the trustee when this trustee played the role of trustee, but there was no information provided on the actions of the trustors (they also have two treatments in which trustees could share a non-binding message that we can disregard for our study). The players first played five rounds of one-shot trust games, after which they either played the trust game with information, without information (control condition) or one of two conditions with non-binding messages.

Lumeau, M., Masclet, D., & Penard, T. (2015). Reputation and social (dis)approval in feedback mechanisms: An experimental study. *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 112,* 127-140. Doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.02.002

Repeated investment game (20 rounds) with one of three information conditions, either without information, with a public rating (after each interaction, players can provide their opponents with a rating that is either positive or negative, and this reputation is disclosed to any new opponent), and with private feedback (only available to the player who received feedback).

Du, N., Huang, H., & Li, L. (2013). Can online trading survive bad-mouthing? An experimental investigation. *Decision Support Systems, 56,* 419-426. Doi: 10.1016/j.dss.2012.10.054

Networked trust game for 30 rounds in groups of 16. In a no rating treatment, no information on trustee behavior was provided, and in a fair information treatment, full information on the seller’s past behavior was available.

Kamei, K. (2017). Endogenous reputation formation under the shadow of the future. *Journal of Economic Behavior, 142,* 189-204. Doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.07.012

Networked PD games in groups of four (five supergames). No information treatment without sharing of any information (also not on their opponent’s idea) and a reputation within group treatment, where one is informed about one’s entire history within the supergame. Apart from this, there were five alternative treatments that are irrelevant to us.

Gong, B., & Yang, C.-L. (2019). Cooperation through indirect reciprocity: The impact of higher-order history. *Games and Economic Behavior, 118,* 316-341. Doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.09.001

Networked PD games in groups of 12, in which they played either first 40 rounds of the PD with information and then 20 rounds without, or first 20 rounds without information and then 40 rounds with information. In the information treatment, participants could see their opponents past behavior of up to 10 rounds, with either solely first order information, or with additional second order information (information on one’s opponents previous partner’s behavior).

Charness, G., Du, N., & Yang, C.-L. (2011). Trust and trustworthiness reputations in an investment game. *Games and Economic Behavior, 72,* 361-375. Doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.09.002

Networked trust games in groups of 10. There was a no information treatment, with no information exchange between different players in the same network. Another treatment shared only the history of return of a trustee (both aggregate and round-by-round) in previous interactions with other trustors. The third treatment revealed a trustee’s past actions as a trustor against other trustees (but this is probably not relevant for our study).

Ignat, C.-L., Dang, Q.-V., & Shalin, V.L. (2019). The influence of trust score on cooperative behavior. *ACM Transactions on Internet Technology, 19 (46).* Doi: 10.1145/3329250

Investment game in groups of six (25 rounds), with a no information treatment and a treatment in which some trust score was computed for each player and disclosed to their partner in the current round. However, the trust score is not simply one’s reputation, but a complicated function that factors in how one’s current trust changed compared to one’s trust in the previous round. Nevertheless, the design does seem to allow for evaluating a network control effect, as participants had to factor in how their current behavior would affect their future transactions.

Klempt, C. (2016). The impact of random help on the dynamics of indirect reciprocity. *Economics Bulletin, 32*, 1058-1063.

Networked helping game in which there were both information treatments and no-information treatments. Apart from these factors, there was a treatment in which whether cost and benefits were actually materialized depends on some external probability, but these treatments can be disregarded.

## Maybe relevant but missed initially

Kuwabara, K. (2015). Do reputation systems undermine trust? Divergent effects of enforcement type on generalized trust and trustworthiness. *American Journal of Sociology, 120,* 1390-1428. Doi: 10.1086/681231

Investment game; two experiments, one in which trustees are preprogrammed to return high amounts, one in which trustors are preprogrammed to invest high amounts (the other actor is an actual player/person); reputation was a subjective score (positive or negative rated by the trustor, although this did not seem to have an effect on the shown score).

Cassar, A., & Rigdon, M. (2011). Trust and trustworthiness in networked exchange. *Games and Economic Behavior, 71*, 282-303. Doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.04.003

Investment games with either two trustees and one trustor, with competition between the trustees (i.e., the trustor divides the common pool of resources between the trustees), or two trustors and one trustee, where the trustee returns a proportion of each trustor’s investment (but the resources are not pooled at the trustee’s end). Then, there is a no information treatment, in which no information is shared about the other players’ interactions, and a full information treatment in which all information about the other players’ interactions is shared.

Bolton, G. E., Katok, E., & Ockenfels, A. (2005). Cooperation among strangers with limited information about reputation. *Journal of Public Economics, 89,* 1457-1468. Doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.03.008

Image scoring game in a network of 16 observations, where either no information on an opponents previous move was available, only first-order information was available, or first- and second order information was available. I thought to remember that we decided during the thesis that this was a limited amount of information that is not really like network embeddedness as implemented in the other studies considered.

Masclet, D., & Pénard, T. (2012). Do reputation feedback systems really improve trust among anonymous traders? An experimental study. *Applied Economics, 44,* 4553-4573. Doi: 10.1080/00036846.2011.591740

Investment game in a network of 10 participants, with either no information exchange, or reputation that was voluntarily provided (and at a cost), with different treatments that related to the order of providing these reputations.

Abraham, M., Grimm, V., Neeß, C., & Seebauer, M. (2016). Reputation formation in economic transactions. *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 121,* 1-14. Doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.10.010

Networked investment game in groups of 8. In control conditions, there was a no information treatment, an information treatment with amounts send and returned and an information treatment where players could indicate how satisfied they were with the interaction (on a scale from 1 to 5). However, in these control conditions, dissemination of information was still optional and at a (small) cost.

Horita, Y., Takezawa, M., Kinjo, T, Nakawake, Y., & Masuda, N. (2016). Transient nature of cooperation by pay-it-forward reciprocity. *Scientific reports, 6*. Doi: 10.1038/srep19471

Image scoring game in groups of about 18 participants, where participants either knew whether they received money from the previous player, or whether the potentially receiving player would pass money on to the next player. Although sanctioning is possible, the trade-off is rather different than in the other games we consider, in the sense that the outcome of the “upcoming” interaction is already known (the receiving players passes the favor onward, or does not).

Teubner, T., Dann, D., Hawlitschek, F. & Möhlmann, M. (2024). First vs. Lasting Impressions: How Cognitive and Affective Trust Cues Coordinate Match-Making in Online Sharing Platforms. *Group Decisions and Negotiation, 33 (2),* 217-265. Doi: 10.1007/s10726-023-09860-y

Investment game with network embeddedness in the form of ratings versus no embeddedness (no ratings), but the ratings were subjective, and no objective history is provided. There was an additional varying factor with either profile pics or not, but we can focus on the no profile pictures conditions.

Hoffmann, R., Kittel, B. & Larsen, M. (2021). Information exchange in laboratory markets: competition, transfer costs, and the emergence of reputation. *Experimental Economics, 24,* 118-142. Doi: 10.1007/s10683-020-09652-0

Networked investment games between trustors and trustees, and in principle suitable to include, but information was not necessarily shared, but only if the trustor wanted to share information.

Borzino, N., Fatas, E. & Peterle, E. (2023). In transparency we trust an experimental study of reputation, transparency, and signaling. *Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 106,* 102061. Doi: 10.1016/j.socec.2023.102061

In principle the study allows to evaluate network embeddedness, as they employ a investment game that is played with two trustors and one trustee. However, there is no information exchange between the two trustors within a round, but between trustors in different rounds (random rematching for each round). Also, there are some additional features that make the network control effect less clean. First, trustors need to earn their endowment by performing some task; second, they receive a random non-binding proposal on how much of their endowment to share to the trustee, and the trustors receive a random non-binding proposal on how much to return.

Kas, J., Corten, R. & Van de Rijt, A. (2023). Trust, reputation, and the value of promises in online auctions of used goods. *Rationality and Society, 35 (4),* 387-419. Doi: 10.1177/10434631231170342

Networked trust games with and without reputation, so in that sense the experiment allows to evaluate the network control effect. However, with 50% probability, the trustee has no opportunity to honor trust, which may interfere with the effect we are looking at.

Khopkar, T. & Resnick, P. (2009). In the eye of the beholder: Culture, trust, and reputation systems. In *eTRUST: Forming relationships in the online world,* 109-135.

I cannot obtain access to the chapter, but I assume at least Vincent has. It seems like there is no absence of embeddedness condition, though.

Hauser, O.P., Hendriks, A., Rand, D.G., & Nowak, M.A. (2016). Think global, act local: Preserving the global commons. *Scientific Reports, 6*. Doi: 10.1038/srep36079

Two-stage game; first a multiplayer public goods game (say 40 participants), after every round the players played a PD game against their immediate neighbors, in which they could sanction their opponent for not contributing enough to the public good. I'm not sure whether this allows for a clean evaluation of the network control effect, because first round behavior is only observed in the PGG game, but punishments where only possible in the PD game. However, the PD games were played with the same individuals, so people also had an incentive to cooperate in the PD games to establish long-term cooperation there.

Milinski, M., Semmann, D., Krambeck, H.-J. & Marotzke, J. (2006). Stabilizing the Earth's climate is not a losing game: Supporting evidence from public goods experiments. *PNAS, 103,* 3994-3998. Doi: 10.1073/pnas.0504902103

Rather complex experimental design, with a public goods game where no network control is possible, alternated with a helping game in which people who did not contribute to the public good can be "punished" by refusing to help them (rather similar in design to the study above). However, I'm not convinced this design really allows for a clean comparison between network conditions.

## Articles in different languages (my knowledge of these languages is insufficient to read academic articles)

Lumeau, M., Masclet, D. & Pénard, T. (2010). Manipulating reputation on online feedback systems: An experimental study; [Les conséquences de la manipulation de la réputation dans les systèmes d'évaluation en ligne: Une étude expérimentale]. *Revue Economique, 61,* 1123-1134. Doi: 10.3917/reco.616.1123

In French

Boero, R., Bravo, G., Castellani, M., Laganà, F. & Squazzoni, F. (2009). La reputazione come vettore di fi ducia nei sistemi socio-economici: Alcuni risultati sperimentali. *Stato e Mercato, 86,* 263-294. Doi: 10.1425/30176

In Italian

Masclet, D. & Penard, T. (2007). Why providing feedback matters in a ebay transaction? An experimental approach; [Pourquoi évaluer son partenaire lors d'une transaction à la eBay? Une approche expérimentale]. *Revue d’Economie Politique, 117,* 365-386. Doi: 10.3917/redp.173.0365.

In French

García-Valdecasas, J. I. (2020). The effect of social network structures on trust: An analysis based on computer simulations and the evaluation of coleman’s theory; [El efecto de la estructura de las redes sociales sobre la confianza. Un análisis de simulaciones computarizadas y evaluación de la tesis de coleman]. *Papers, 105,* 5-27. Doi: 10.5565/rev/papers.2549.

In Spanish

## Already included

Corten, R., Rosenkranz, S., Buskens, V. & Cook, K.S. (2009). Reputation effects in social networks do not promote cooperation: An experimental test of the Raub & Weesie model. *PLoS ONE, 11,* e0155703. Doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0155703

Barrera, D., & Buskens, V. Third-party effects. *eTRUST: Forming relationships in the online world,* 37-72. <https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-77956934267&partnerID=40&md5=2c152964d7df886aae2d4f03284cf493>

Frey, V., Buskens, V., & Corten, R. (2019). Investments in and returns on network embeddedness: An experiment with trust games. *Social Networks, 56,* 81-92. Doi: 10.1016/j.socnet.2018.07.006