

HUNTING THREAT ACTORS WITH TLS CERTIFICATES

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WHO AM I ?

- Formerly - incident responder / network defender
- Currently – developer / threat analyst

WHO I AM NOT?

Animator - Archer

Lead animator

MARK PARSONS

senior animATORS

TIM FARRELL

MARK PATERSON

THOMAS WEISER



animATORS

mICHAEL BERNHARDT

CAMERON BOGUE

JODIE HUDSON

ALLYSSA LEWIS

DOMINIC MASCHLER

FRANKIE MENDOZA

ED MUNDY

ROBERT PARAGUASSU

WES PARHAM

MARCUS ROSENTRATER

YUSUKE SATO

CARL VOGLER

MACK WILLIAMS

ONE DIRECTION FAN FICTION?

ANGELA WATERCUTTER CULTURE 05.31.12 4:07 PM

VIRAL VIDEO: ARCHER ANIMATOR MAKES BEST ONE DIRECTION FANFIC EVER

QUICK REVIEW


**Traditional methods of infrastructure
hunting/pivoting using network related resources**

PASSIVE DNS (PDNS)

- Historical mappings of domains to IP addresses, and IP addresses to domains
- Some sources of PDNS
 - [Farsight](#)
 - [Mnemonic](#)
 - [RiskIQ/PassiveTotal](#)
 - [OpenDNS](#)

WHOIS TRACKING

- Using domain registrant information to look for other potentially related domains
- Sources of trackable WHOIS information
 - [DomainTools](#)
 - [Whoisology](#)
 - [RiskIQ/PassiveTotal](#)
 - [DomainIQ](#)
 - [Domain Big Data](#)

The background of the slide features a dark blue gradient with several light blue circular data overlays. These overlays include a large circle with a scale from 0 to 210, a smaller circle with a scale from 0 to 200, and two smaller circles at the bottom left and right. Arrows point towards the center of the main circle from the top right and bottom right.

WHAT ELSE MIGHT PROVIDE TRACKABLE DATA THAT HELPS IN
INFRASTRUCTURE HUNTING?

THAT IS RIGHT TLS CERTIFICATES!!!



QUICK CAVEAT

Code signing certificate != TLS certificate

CODE SIGNING CERTIFICATE

Certificate

General Details Certification Path

 Certificate Information

This certificate is intended for the following purpose(s):

- Ensures software came from software publisher
- Protects software from alteration after publication

* Refer to the certification authority's statement for details.

Issued to: Google Inc

Issued by: VeriSign Class 3 Code Signing 2010 CA

Valid from 12/ 13/ 2015 **to** 12/ 14/ 2016

[Install Certificate...](#) [Issuer Statement](#)

Learn more about [certificates](#)

TLS CERTIFICATE

Certificate

General Details Certification Path



Certificate Information

This certificate is intended for the following purpose(s):

- Ensures the identity of a remote computer
- Proves your identity to a remote computer
- 1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.5.1

Issued to: *.google.com

Issued by: Google Internet Authority G2

Valid from 3/ 9/ 2016 **to** 6/ 6/ 2016

Issuer Statement

Learn more about [certificates](#)

TLS HUNTING BASICS

Quick tips to help you get started

WHERE TO START

- IP to certificate
- Certificate to IP

IP TO CERTIFICATE

What certificates have been seen on 185.12.44.51?

CERTIFICATE TO IP

What IP addresses has
a1833c32d5f61d6ef9d1bb0133585112069d770e
been seen on?

BASIC THINGS TO CONSIDER



BEGINNING CONSIDERATIONS

- Do you have malware using this TLS certificate?
- How many other IP addresses are seen using that certificate?

TIME FRAME CONSIDERATIONS

- What time frame was a certificate seen on a suspect IP address
- Expiration dates of the certificate
 - Not Before
 - Not After

CERTIFICATE ISSUER CONSIDERATIONS

- Self Signed
- Free Certificate
- Paid Certificate

NETWORK DEFENSE



IDS MONITORING – TLS FINGERPRINTS

- Suricata
- Bro
- Snort 3 – external package needed

AUTOMATE TRACKING OF TLS CERTIFICATES

- PassiveTotal Monitoring
- Censys.io API script
- Your own local sonar or censys.io datastore
- Combination of all of these
- Create script(s) to put new IP addresses or certificates found into monitoring or blocks as needed for your environment



TLS CERTIFICATES YOU SAY?
WHERE DO YOU START?

YOU NEED SOME DATA



IF YOU DON'T WANT TO SCAN ALL THE THINGS

- You could do any of the following:
 - Ingest [scans.io](#) sonar SSL scans
 - Use [censys.io](#)
 - Use [PassiveTotal](#)

SCANS.IO SONAR SSL SCANS

- Only on TCP:443
- Raw data going back to 10/30/2013
- Easily consumable
- Updated weekly
- Incremental in nature
 - certs.gz - Only new sha1s and base64 raw certificate seen that week
 - hosts.gz - SHA1 and host for all hosts seen
- No public search interface
- Is weekly frequent enough ?

CENSYS.IO

- TLS on TCP:25, 110, 143, 443, 993, 995
- Easy to use search interface
- API Access
- Frequent Updates
- All or nothing in nature
 - If there is a delta between scans
 - Old scan data is not in main search interface
 - Old scan data is available in json format
 - Old scan data is available via query interface

PASSIVETOTAL

- Merge traditional hunting with new methods
- Aggregates multiple passive DNS sources
- Provides WHOIS data
- Provides references to OpenSource reporting
- Also has TLS certificates

NOW THAT WE HAVE COVERED THE BASICS LETS GO HUNTING







APT 28 / XTUNNEL

- Netzpolitik - Digital Attack on German Parliament
- CrowdStrike – Bears in the Midst
- ESET – Lifting the lid on Sednit


STARTING WITH NETZPOLOTIK REPORT



TRADITIONAL PASSIVE DNS PIVOTS



TLS CERTIFICATE PIVOT ON INITIAL IP



LET'S TAKE A CLOSER LOOK AT THE CERTIFICATES



5446b784c01c6a6d84db252fa1833c32d5f61d6ef9d1bb01..fef1725ad72e4ef0432f8cb0...



CN=login.vk. com




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


CN=mail.mfa. gov. ua



PIVOT ON 454-CROOKSERVER CERTIFICATE





TIMELINE

This figure is a horizontal timeline chart showing the active periods of various IP addresses from March 2010 to January 2011. The x-axis represents time from March to January. Each IP address is represented by a colored bar indicating its active status during that period. The colors used are blue, green, orange, red, and white. The IP addresses listed on the left are:

- 176.31.112.10
- 213.251.187.145
- 5.56.133.170
- 172.245.45.27
- 176.31.96.178
- 95.215.46.27
- 46.183.216.209
- 81.17.30.29
- 94.242.224.172
- 131.72.136.165
- 80.255.10.236
- 167.114.214.63
- 80.255.3.93
- 192.95.12.5
- 204.145.94.227
- 5.56.133.42
- 130.255.184.196
- 45.32.129.185
- 23.227.196.217
- 104.156.245.207
- 45.32.91.1
- 109.236.93.138
- 89.45.67.12
- 5.56.133.46
- 89.238.132.210
- 5.56.133.87
- 185.86.151.180
- 89.34.111.119
- 92.114.92.102
- 62.113.232.196
- 95.215.44.38
- 185.25.50.117
- 86.105.1.133
- 86.105.1.136
- 185.61.148.54
- 94.177.12.74
- 94.177.12.157
- 185.86.149.60

APT 28 XTUNNEL SUMMARY

- Initial report 2 domains, 2 IPs, 1 TLS cert
- Traditional pivots reveal 5 interesting domains
- Now have 38 IPs, 7 domains, 3 TLS certs

TRICKBOT

- [ThreatGeek](#) – Blog post

TRICKBOT: WE MISSED YOU, DYRE



POST HAS SEVERAL ADDRESSES
WITH CONNECTIONS TO 443

Trickbot C2s:

188.138.1.53:8082

27.208.131.97:443

37.109.52.75:443

91.219.28.77:443

193.9.28.24:443

37.1.209.51:443

138.201.44.28:443

188.116.23.98:443

104.250.138.194:443


46.22.211.34:443

68.179.234.69:443


5.12.28.0:443

36.37.176.6:443


INITIAL INDICATORS



TLS CERTIFICATE PIVOT



MALICIOUS SAMPLES



TRICKBOT SUMMARY

- Initial indicators 13 IP addresses
- All have common TLS certificate
- 22 new IP addresses
- Malware samples show linkages between IP addresses

CONCLUSION

- Continue to look for new ways to monitor and track infrastructure
- Tracking TLS certificates should be added as part of normal infrastructure hunting
- Processing the data can be an initial steep hill but afterwards it is a green pasture

THANKS TO THE FOLLOWING PEOPLE

- Ben Koehl
- James Elliott
- David Westcott

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QUESTIONS?