


# 100 more behind cockroaches?

or how to hunt IoCs with OSINT

Hiroaki Ogawa & Manabu Niseki



# Before Starting

- English version is available for non-native Japanese folks :D



***“For every cockroach you see there  
are 100 more behind the walls”***





**Does it apply to cyber threats?**

A close-up photograph of a baby with light brown hair and blue eyes, sitting on a sandy beach. The baby is wearing a green and white long-sleeved shirt and has a grumpy or sad expression on their face. The background is a blurred view of the ocean and beach. The word "YES" is overlaid in white text on the right side of the baby's face.

**YES**


# ゴキブリキヤッチャー

ゴキブリ捕獲器



はがすだけ  
使える  
簡単タイプ

- 1.よく入るVカット
- 2.強力誘引剤配合(ソトロン)
- 3.タテ置き・ヨコ置き自在
- 4.便利なホイ捨てつまみ




We have to install traps!

# Tracking Fingerprints

- Attackers are good friends with bad habits.
  - Reusing infrastructures
  - Reusing components
  - Reusing SSL certificates
  - Reusing SSH host keys
- Reusing something increases a possibility of tracking.
  - Let's say it's a fingerprint of an attacker.
  - You can track him down based on his fingerprint.



# Fingerprints on the Internet





# Methodologies

- Domain fuzzing
- Passive DNS
- HTTP fingerprint
- SSH host key fingerprint
- Certificate Transparency
- IoC feeds aggregation
- YARA

# Domain Fuzzing

# Domain Fuzzing

- Techniques to find typosquatting domains.
  - Converting **1** to **2** or **q**. (See your QWERTY keyboard)
  - Converting **a** to **à, á, â, ã, ä, å, α, ą, ă, ǎ, ȃ** or **ȣ**.
  - Converting a vowel(**a, e, i, o** or **u**) to another vowel.
    - e.g. example.com
      - **a**xample.com, **i**xample.com, **o**xample.com, **u**xample.com, ...
  - etc.
- Domain fuzzing is useful for finding similar domains.

A close-up, slightly angled shot of a black smartphone lying on a dark-colored laptop keyboard. The phone's screen is illuminated with a vibrant green light, displaying a dense, scrolling pattern of binary code (0s and 1s) that resembles the 'Matrix' effect. The keyboard keys, including 'T', 'R', 'E', 'D', 'X', and 'alt', are visible in the background, slightly out of focus. The overall composition suggests a theme of digital security, hacking, or cybersecurity.

# Domain Fuzzing: MoqHao



# MoqHao

- An Android malware.
- It uses DGA like domains.

**ysu3g.xyz**

**hs3dg.xyz**

**Nsi3h.xyz**

*/[a-z][a-z][a-z0-9][a-z0-9][a-z]\.xyz/*

# MoqHao

- How to do domain fuzzing for finding MoqHao hosts.
  - Write your own script. 😊
    - <https://gist.github.com/ninoseki/8c3b9dd54506691c105c629cd3aa284e>
  - Use dnstwist.
    - <https://github.com/elceef/dnstwist>

```
$ dnstwist -r hs3dg.xyz

  _ _ | _ | _ _ _ _ | _ _ _ _ _ ( _ ) _ _ _ | _ | _
 / _ \ | _ | _ _ \ _ _ \ _ _ \ / _ \ / _ \ / _ \ | _ |
 | ( _ | _ | _ _ \ _ _ \ _ _ \ V _ _ V / _ \ \ _ _ | _ |
 \ _ , _ | _ | _ _ \ _ _ \ _ _ \ / _ \ / _ \ \ _ _ | _ | {20190706}

Processing 846 domain variants ....15%....33%....49%....64%....80%....95%. 3 hits (0%)

Original*      hs3dg.xyz  NS:dns1.registrar-servers.com MX:eforward1.registrar-servers.com
Omission       hsdg.xyz   NS:dns23.hichina.com
Transposition  hs3g.xyz   162.255.119.169 NS:dns1.registrar-servers.com MX:eforward1.registrar-
servers.com
```

# Certificate Transparency

# Certificate Transparency

- Certificate Transparency enables to monitor HTTPS websites.
  - <http://www.certificate-transparency.org/>
  - Roughly speaking, Certificate Transparency gives you newly domains for free.
- Useful services/tools:
  - CertStream
    - <https://certstream.calidog.io/>
    - Near real-time certificate transparency log update stream.
  - Phishing Catcher
    - [https://github.com/x0rz/phishing\\_catcher](https://github.com/x0rz/phishing_catcher)
    - Phishing catcher using Certstream
  - urlscan.io certstream-suspicious feed
    - <https://urlscan.io/search/#task.source%3Acertstream-suspicious>
    - Suspicious domains flying through CertStream





# Certificate Transparency: 16shop

Email

Enter email

Password

Enter password

☐

Remember me

Powered by Zloder Team

Login

# 16shop

- An Indonesian phishing kit targeting Apple and Amazon users.
  - Akamai says 16shop is “a highly sophisticated phishing kit.”
    - <https://blogs.akamai.com/sitr/2019/05/16shop-commercial-phishing-kit-has-a-hidden-backdoor.html>
  - C2:
    - 128.199.154.155 / 167.99.79.91

# 16shop

- Does 16shop use HTTPS?
  - Yes.
    - <https://account-alertautorizher.com>
    - <https://amazon.legal-privacy-comercial.com>
    - <https://appleid.apple.com.accountt-updates.reviews>
    - <https://applesecurityapp.hopto.org>
    - <https://applid.manage-account.information.terdjasilagi.com>
    - <https://apps-amazon.co.jp-logsrvslo29s.info>
    - <https://bublewrap-tcoapple-api.ddnslive.com>
    - <https://id.amazon.corn.idmsa-authsighin-verify.pakistanapimn.com>
    - <https://mails-amazon.us>
    - etc.

# 16shop

- Analyzing occurrences of words in 6,500+ 16shop domains.


appleid.apple.com.accountt-updates.reviews



appleid apple com accountt updates



# 16shop



# 16shop

- If a CN in a CT log contains common 16shop words, it might be a 16shop website.
- You can check whether it is 16shop or not by checking an HTTP response hash of **/admin/index.php**
  - 16shop Apple version.
    - 0e06d02dab03e8085b18ebedb0f54dc68508c40c5d1b8c6e3e8da98e3d3b6649
    - ce4fe392dd0f996923c5cf272d98e1e2778a2a44ffb2a4435fdb9c13665215f3
  - 16shop Amazon version.
    - 2edfff035a357aec4cea23057ea2e10af1dd3431713c904cf1cd804640bd2965

# Omake: Bizarre Domains

- `manage.unauthorized.login.amazon.co.jp.omachikudasai.com`
- `xn--id-zb4axila5esc1e1f9bvhzd4a6fe.manage-konohajp.tokyo(アップルジャパンのログインid.manage-konohajp.tokyo)`
- `youji-kyoiku.com`


HTTP fingerprint

# HTTP Fingerprint: Predator The Thief



# Predator The Thief

- A stealer malware.
- @fumik0\_ published a detailed report about Predator The Thief.
  - <https://fumik0.com/2018/10/15/predator-the-thief-in-depth-analysis-v2-3-5/>
- Predator The Thief C2 returns a static HTTP response.



```
<head lang="en">
  <meta charset="UTF-8">
  <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1, user-
scalable=no">
  <meta http-equiv="x-ua-compatible" content="ie=edge">
  <title>Predator The Thief – Нативный стиллер с большим функционалом / Лучшая цена!
- Вход</title>
  <link rel="shortcut icon" href="">
  <!-- HTML5 shim and Respond.js for IE8 support of HTML5 elements and media queries
-->
  <!--[if lt IE 9]>
    <script src="https://oss.maxcdn.com/html5shiv/3.7.2/html5shiv.min.js"></script>
    <script src="https://oss.maxcdn.com/respond/1.4.2/respond.min.js"></script>
  <![endif]-->
  <link href="/upload/css/adminlte.css" rel="stylesheet">
  <link href="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/admin-lte/2.4.8/css/skins/_all-
skins.min.css" rel="stylesheet">
  <link rel="stylesheet" href="/upload/css/login.main.css">
  <link href="https://maxcdn.bootstrapcdn.com/font-awesome/4.4.0/css/font-
awesome.min.css" rel="stylesheet">
  <link
href="https://stackpath.bootstrapcdn.com/bootstrap/4.0.0/css/bootstrap.min.css"
rel="stylesheet">
  <link rel="stylesheet" href="/upload/css/main.min.css">
</head>
...
```

# Predator The Thief

- “A static HTTP response” means it always returns same HTTP response.
  - It can be used as a fingerprint.
- Queries for Predator The Thief C2:
  - Censys(SHA256):
    - `b064187ebdc51721708ad98cd89dacc346017cb0fb0457d530032d387f1ff20e`
  - BinaryEdge(SHA256):
    - `b064187ebdc51721708ad98cd89dacc346017cb0fb0457d530032d387f1ff20e`
  - Shodan(MurmurHash3):
    - `http.html_hash:-1467534799`

PANDA

U Name...

P Password...

☐ Remember me

Log In

copyright ©2011

# HTTP Fingerprint: PANDA



# PANDA

- PANDA is used by ShadowVoice.
  - FSI published a report about ShadowVoice in BlackHat Asia 2019.
  - <https://i.blackhat.com/asia-19/Fri-March-29/bh-asia-Jang-When-Voice-Phishing-Met-Malicious-Android-App-updated.pdf>
- HTTP response of PANDA is not static.
  - Because it uses an absolute path to load a resource.

```
<head>
  <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
  <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1,maximum-scale=1,
user-scalable=no">

  <title>PANDA</title>
  <link rel="icon" type="image/x-icon"
href="http://103.117.137.175/assets/img/favicon.ico">
  <link rel="shortcut icon" type="image/x-icon"
href="http://103.117.137.175/assets/img/favicon.ico">
```

# PANDA

- So the hash value matching doesn't work.
- Instead of the hash value matching, you can use another techniques.
  - Free text, favicon hash, etc.
- Queries for PANDA C2:
  - Censys:
    - ("PANDA" AND "SMAdmin" AND "layui")
  - BinaryEdge:
    - ("PANDA" AND "SMAdmin" AND "layui")
  - Shodan:
    - [http.favicon.hash:-633986505 http.title:PANDA](#)

# SSH Host Key Fingerprint



東京地方検察庁  
Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office

[本文へ](#)

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[標準](#) [拡大](#)

[色変更・音声読み上げ・ルビ振り](#)

検索

[ホーム](#)

[東京地検について](#)

[各種制度](#)

[広報](#)

[調査中事件](#)



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[捜査に御協力ください](#)

[裁判に御協力ください](#)

[罰金等の納付](#)

#### ● 犯罪被害者の方々へ

[被害者支援センター](#)

[被害回復給付金支給制度](#)

#### ● 関係機関

[関係法令・各種事務規程](#)

#### ● 関連サイト


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# SSH Host Key Fingerprint: Fake Tokyo Public Prosecutors Office

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2017年12月25日

[平成30年度東京地方検察庁ほか2か所における歳入金等の警備輸送業務の入札に係る公告](#)

2017年12月25日

[電動式移動柵一式（政府調達）に係る公告](#)

# Fake Tokyo Public Prosecutors Office

- A scam impersonating the Tokyo Public Prosecutors Office.
  - A kind of fraud.
- Hosts of fake websites reuse same SSH host key.
- Queries for fake hosts:
  - Censys(SHA256):
    - 8e60fb30fb9a268b90a3d5af984c9326d3568a2554fc7ae5bfab1eb621c15518
  - BinaryEdge(MD5):
    - "f2:03:78:e5:a3:bb:50:6b:32:be:22:ad:52:3e:cc:98"
  - Shodan(MD5):
    - f2:03:78:e5:a3:bb:50:6b:32:be:22:ad:52:3e:cc:98
- Credit to @tiketikeke and @catnap707
  - <https://tike.hatenablog.com/entry/2018/07/03/004132>

# IoC Feeds Aggregation

# IoC Feeds

- URLhaus: <https://urlhaus.abuse.ch/>
  - Malware URL exchange by abuse.ch.
  - Sources:
    - abuse.ch, individuals, etc.
- IOC-DB: <https://labs.inquest.net/iocdb>
  - Indicator of Compromise database by InQuest.
  - Sources:
    - Twitter, GitHub and blogs.
- Twitter IOC Hunter: <http://tweettioc.com/#>
  - Twitter based IoC database/feed by @fatihsirinnnn.
  - Sources:
    - Twitter

# EMOTET

## IoC Aggregation: Emotet





# Emotet IoC Feeds

- URLhaus:

```

$ curl -X POST https://urlhaus-api.abuse.ch/v1/tag/ -d "tag=emotet"
{
  "query_status": "ok",
  "firstseen": "2018-03-06 15:27:00",
  "lastseen": "2019-12-23 06:00:03",
  "url_count": "92092",
  "urls": [
    {
      "url_id": "275484",
      "url": "http://www.csnserver.com/blog/trust.accs.docs.biz/",
      "url_status": "online",
      "dateadded": "2019-12-23 02:33:04",
      "reporter": "zbetcheckin",
      "threat": "malware_download",
      "tags": ["doc", "Emotet", "Heodo"],
    }
  ]
}
```

# Emotet IoC Feeds

- IOC-DB:

```
$ curl "https://labs.inquest.net/api/iocdb/search?keyword=emotet"
{
  "data": [
    {
      "artifact": "rule MAL_Emotet_JS_Dropper_Oct19_1 {\n    meta:\n      description =\n\"Detects Emotet JS dropper\"\n      author = \"Florian Roth\"\n      reference =\n\"https://app.any.run/tasks/aaa75105-dc85-48ca-9732-085b2ceeb6eb/\"\n      date = \"2019-10-03\"\n      hash1 = \"38295d728522426672b9497f63b72066e811f5b53a14fb4c4ffc23d4efbbca4a\"\n      hash2 = \"9bc004a53816a5b46bfb08e819ac1cf32c3bdc556a87a58cbada416c10423573\"\n      strings:\n        $xc1 = { FF FE 76 00 61 00 72 00 20 00 61 00 3D 00 5B 00\n          00 }\n        condition:\n          uint32(0) == 0x0076feff and filesize <= 700KB and $xc1 at 0\n      }\n      \"artifact_type\": \"yarasignature\",\n      \"created_date\": \"Fri, 04 Oct 2019 14:08:34 GMT\",\n      \"reference_link\": \"https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base.git\",\n      \"reference_text\": \"\nrule MAL_Emotet_JS_Dropper_Oct19_1 {\n    meta:\n      description\n= \"Detects Emotet JS dropper\"\n      author = \"Florian Roth\"\n      reference...\"
    }
  ]
}
```

# Emotet IoC Feeds

- Twitter IOC Hunter:

```
$ curl http://www.tweettioc.com/v1/tweets/daily/ioc/hashtags/emotet
[
  {
    "md5": [],
    "sha1": [],
    "sha256": [],
    "mail": [],
    "ip": [],
    "domain": [
      "hasmob.com"
    ],
    "url": [
      "http://hasmob.com/other/alibaba.com/Login.htm"
    ],
    "tweet": {
      "date": {
        "$date": 1577581873000
      }
    }
  }
]
```

YARA

# YARA

- YARA is a tool aimed at helping malware researchers to identify and classify malware samples.
- With YARA, it could catch files that has same strings or binaries from a large number of files and could be grouping these files.



<https://twitter.com/plusvic/status/778983467627479040?s=20>

# Where can we use YARA?

- Online services
  - Hybrid Analysis
    - <https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/>
  - VirusTotal Hunting
    - <https://www.virustotal.com/gui/hunting-overview>
  - Malpedia
    - <https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/> (Invitation only)
  - Koodous
    - <https://koodous.com/> (Android malware only)
- YARA command line tool
  - <https://virustotal.github.io/yara/>

A close-up, slightly angled shot of a black smartphone resting on a dark laptop keyboard. The phone's screen is illuminated with a vibrant green digital rain effect, reminiscent of the 'The Matrix' aesthetic, with characters falling from the top. Overlaid on the center of the screen is the text 'YARA: MoqHao' in a clean, white, sans-serif font. The background keyboard is out of focus, showing keys like 'U', 'K', 'O', 'T', 'R', 'E', 'D', 'X', and 'alt'.


# YARA: MoqHao



# Fake Sagawa Express Mobile Application (MoqHao)

- Fake mobile app is used in a SMiShing campaign which impersonates Sagawa Express. The fake mobile app is malware called MoqHao.
- Here is a YARA rule for fake Sagawa Express mobile app.











```
1  rule MoqHao_regex_MultipleDEX
2  {
3      strings:
4          $a = "AndroidManifest.xml"
5          $b = /classes(\d{1,3}|.*)\.dex/
6          $c = /assets\/\S{3,7}\/\S{3,7}/
7      condition:
8          ($a and $c)
9          and #b > 5
10         and filesize < 500KB
11 }
```




Set it to the  
VT hunting



# Results of VT Hunting with a YARA rule for MoqHao

b1b51af1721818f3f12a1d95880ad705dbb8035ac763974f57264714856e84d9 EKOHT3 6.6.apk	Fake Econt Express MoqHao_regex_MultipleDE X MoqHao	21 / 61	451.25 KB	2019-12-23 15:34:26	2019-12-23 17:25:21	1	
b8883ab4f78dbe407bee6ba8358bbd9030b2242f927caca5c6928f1b7beaea58 smartcat.apk	Fake Fedex MoqHao_regex_MultipleDE X MoqHao	22 / 62	444.60 KB	2019-12-09 16:29:02	2019-12-23 15:48:42	1	
c803b2da50761d0df47246434103fe4eab2c9fb76da13871a9b0006ad2b3b39 smartcat.apk	Fake Fedex MoqHao_regex_MultipleDE X MoqHao	22 / 62	435.18 KB	2019-12-09 08:21:34	2019-12-23 15:44:59	1	
3371118f72444fa2adacaf019c97e0f46d9fbc00117ed0bae99f3e31f9fc4a8 /sagawa4.2.5.apk	Fake Sagawa Express MoqHao_regex_MultipleDE X MoqHao	13 / 63	453.47 KB	2019-12-23 04:11:31	2019-12-23 05:13:47	1	
b92964a7025b3dff864d6604c0b3efa9da4d73b5d3b6bed291558c6506237361 /sagawa9.4.7.apk	Fake Sagawa Express MoqHao_regex_MultipleDE X MoqHao	13 / 63	453.47 KB	2019-12-23 03:14:07	2019-12-23 04:16:55	1	
6c5550872466bde72d217c6bda8cf77372f0de256a8bdc4ceda7c0c5bf906498 /sagawa8.8.9.apk	Fake Sagawa Express MoqHao_regex_MultipleDE X MoqHao	13 / 63	447.05 KB	2019-12-23 03:12:30	2019-12-23 04:14:36	1	
2267227bc63e3b3660cada35e854f33075de3644adf62ecfae0b896d02a2ca03 yHxnzDyRoEyyN7uMPva420191223-36210-15tg5al	Fake DHL MoqHao_regex_MultipleDE X MoqHao	15 / 64	450.05 KB	2019-12-23 02:21:56	2019-12-23 03:23:10	1	
4b365e1ff416250156d65233e0a53ce99bf14b75f448cc2ffe24c93832893cd /sagawa9.3.8.apk	Fake Sagawa Express MoqHao_regex_MultipleDE X MoqHao	15 / 64	450.05 KB	2019-12-23 02:08:23	2019-12-23 03:10:44	1	
21b238c28eace817e253071281c0859e0eb263b3285e4115af66b5c0b31a8007	Fake Google Chrome MoqHao_regex_MultipleDE X MoqHao	15 / 64	451.41 KB	2019-12-23 01:16:04	2019-12-23 02:17:00	1	
6382c9a99c6e4b8c1314bce6a135cc8e3dd878992f1c5fa94cb7fda7e2e3b342	Fake Sagawa Express MoqHao_regex_MultipleDE X MoqHao	15 / 64	450.28 KB	2019-12-23 01:10:34	2019-12-23 02:11:36	1	

YARA could catch variants of MoqHao. We could know other target brands of MoqHao automatically.



Office 365

# YARA: Emotet

You are attempting to open a file that was created in an earlier version of Microsoft Office.

If the file opens in Protected View, click Enable Edition and then click Enable Content.

ANY RUN

# Emotet

- There are ~~ridiculous~~ characteristics strings in the Emotet :).

```
00 00-62 61 64 20 61 6C 6C 6F nFrame..bad allo
00 00-FC 2A 43 00 D4 00 00 00 cation...*C.....
40 00-B0 44 43 00 00 00 00 00 ....`-@..DC.....
43 00-D0 29 40 00 ED CA 41 00 .....}C..)@...A.
73 20-44 65 66 65 6E 64 65 72 Windows Defender
64 20-53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 Stupid Security
7A 74-68 23 7D 32 7E 61 52 59 :)..q*zth#}2~aRY
25 61-53 4A 71 45 61 3F 54 3F rE72qD%aSJqEa?T?
4E 6B-5A 67 3D 00 57 49 4E 44 E...eGNkZg=.WIND
40 00-9C 2B 43 00 00 00 00 00 IR....@..+C.....
00 00-00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
00 00-80 7D 43 00 20 2C 40 00 .....}C. ,@.
```

MD5:f8105a0e4af7d61006e5e3974710daf3

bad allocation

Windows Defender Stupid Security:)







aRYrE72qD%aSJqEa

Create a YARA rule by  
characteristics strings

```
1 rule emotet
2 {
3     meta:
4         date = "2019-12-17"
5         Family = "Emotet"
6     strings:
7         $a = "Windows Defender Stupid Security"
8     condition:
9         (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D)
10        and $a
11 }
```

Let's hunt variants of Emotet with this YARA rule!

# Search result of Hybrid Analysis with YARA rule for Emotet

  Sandbox ▾  Quick Scans ▾  File Collections  リソース ▾  Request Info ▾		
<div>Matched Extracted File &lt;28fe30e9...f173de8d&gt; ⓘ</div>		
December 17th 2019 06:56:57 (UTC)	ご入金額の通知・ご請求書発行のお願い1065821 2019_12_17.doc Composite Document File V2 Document, Little Endian, Os: Windows, Version 6.1, Co ... 6b0e0f2008055b4c5333d40c96868f4092f37397a64071260f4726b602aa	malicious
<div>Matched Extracted File &lt;8d8de003...349e6186&gt; ⓘ</div>		
December 17th 2019 06:40:50 (UTC)	ba3a0eb3-20a0-44bd-9e85-9286ab4c3069 Composite Document File V2 Document, Little Endian, Os: Windows, Version 6.1, Co ... 6b0e0f2008055b4c5333d40c96868f4092f37397a64071260f4726b602aa	malicious
<div>Matched Extracted File &lt;6196278f...f9b58b09&gt; ⓘ</div>		
December 17th 2019 06:36:30 (UTC)	http://aimeept.com/wp-includes/INC/lp-2884648-38128-qgew-hxrig8/ Composite Document File V2 Document, Little Endian, Os: Windows, Version 6.1, Co ... 6b0e0f2008055b4c5333d40c96868f4092f37397a64071260f4726b602aa	malicious
<div>Matched Extracted File &lt;684c1624...1c3e684a&gt; ⓘ</div>		
December 17th 2019 06:20:49 (UTC)	07458b8f-3550-4369-808a-eac37e05c2f4 Composite Document File V2 Document, Little Endian, Os: Windows, Version 6.1, Co ... 6b0e0f2008055b4c5333d40c96868f4092f37397a64071260f4726b602aa	malicious
<div>Matched Extracted File &lt;684c1624...1c3e684a&gt; ⓘ</div>		
December 17th 2019 06:12:58 (UTC)	http://df.jaskot.pl/wp-includes/common_qWq4ce2EE_pcYqFIO3/security_profile/ufzdmu44nlf8wx_85v4073ss2/ Composite Document File V2 Document, Little Endian, Os: Windows, Version 6.1, Co ... 6b0e0f2008055b4c5333d40c96868f4092f37397a64071260f4726b602aa	malicious
<div>Matched Extracted File &lt;30b88a06...3d65d43c&gt; ⓘ</div>		
December 17th 2019 06:11:04 (UTC)	http://voyeur-jp.com/wp-content/7hd-f8v1-49/ Composite Document File V2 Document, Little Endian, Os: Windows, Version 6.1, Co ... 6b0e0f2008055b4c5333d40c96868f4092f37397a64071260f4726b602aa	malicious
<div>Matched Extracted File &lt;8d8de003...349e6186&gt; ⓘ</div>		
December 17th 2019 06:10:09 (UTC)	https://saca.vn/wp-admin/private-57180712944-meltXjQ/86563129646-uwpiUsxj-warehouse/nihw-20uyw323y3yss/ Composite Document File V2 Document, Little Endian, Os: Windows, Version 6.1, Co ... 6b0e0f2008055b4c5333d40c96868f4092f37397a64071260f4726b602aa	malicious
<div>Matched Extracted File &lt;30b88a06...3d65d43c&gt; ⓘ</div>		


## Considerations:

- There are 38 samples in Hybrid Analysis.
- These variants had been used from 16/Dec/2019 to 17/Dec/2019.

**AUTOMATE**

**Automation**

**ALL THE THINGS!**





# Automation

- Why automation is so important:
  - Automation reduces operating costs.
  - Automation reduces human errors.
  - Making something auto is interesting. 😊



# Automation

- Apullo:
  - A tool for taking basic fingerprints of a target.
  - <https://github.com/ninoseki/apullo>
- Mihari:
  - A monitoring tool leveraging Shodan, Censys, BinaryEdge and etc.
  - <https://github.com/ninoseki/mihari>
- InQuest/ThreatIngestor:
  - A tool for extract and aggregate threat intelligence.
  - <https://github.com/InQuest/ThreatIngestor>

# Apullo


- A tool for taking basic network fingerprints of a target (IP, domain or URL).
  - Hashes of an HTTP response body
  - Hashes of a favicon image
  - Hashes of an SSH host key
  - WHOIS
  - DNS records

```
$ apullo check jppost-be.top
{
  "http": {
    "body": {
      "md5": "74ad15c4ab3f67eee1d546e22248931f",
      "mmh3": -330759974,
      "sha1": "c0280893956852b0c07ae4da752ee5d776d248b8",
      "sha256": "28fa3b0beaf188d48b32557fa4df8f0aa451bd10f8e8bb26e919009d2d41b8fb"
    },
    "cert": {
    },
    "favicon": {
      "md5": "ad184c25a1a01d97696dcb59a1ffef74",
      "mmh3": 111036816,
      "sha1": "cb4842a54c3e96408765290cb810793302c17f0b",
      "sha256": "6949c58f841fa21a89e2e2375ae5645e1db62385f89a0218766f2b0a9c490fb8",
      "meta": {
        "url": "https://www.post.japanpost.jp/img/common/touch-icon.png"
      }
    }
  },
  ...
}
```



# Mihari

- It's just a helper to make a query to a search engine and create an alert / event based on results.




# Mihari

- Supported techniques:
  - Domain fuzzing:
    - dnstwister
  - Passive DNS:
    - SecurityTrails, PassiveTotal, VirusTotal, Pulsedive, CIRCL passive DNS
  - HTTP fingerprint:
    - Shodan, Censys, BinaryEdge, Onyphe, ZoomEye
  - SSH host key fingerprint:
    - Shodan, Censys, BinaryEdge
  - Certificate Transparency:
    - Crt.sh
- Demo

# ThreatIngestor


- A daemon behind IOC-DB by InQuest.



# ThreatIngestor

- Supported sources:
  - Git repositories, RSS feeds, Generic web pages, etc.
- Supported outputs:
  - CSV files, MISP, MySQL, SQLite, ThreatKB, etc.
- A powerful scraping feature powered by iocextract.
  - <https://github.com/InQuest/python-iocextract>
- A built-in (dead simple) Web UI.
- Demo

# ThreatIngestor



A terminal window with a dark background. The top status bar shows 90% CPU usage, 12% memory usage, and 7.6 GB of memory. The prompt is 'tmp >' and the command entered is 'threatingestor /tmp/config.yml'.

```
tmp > threatingestor /tmp/config.yml
```

# Conclusion

# Conclusion

- An attacker leaves his fingerprint on site.
  - OSINT makes possible to trace him based on his fingerprint.
- Automation rocks!
  - Automation reduces human errors in investigation.
  - Automation provides a unified way of investigation.
  - Automation reduces operating costs.
- OSINT and automation enable to make an own intelligence for your organization.

# References

- Shodan的http.favicon.hash语法详解与使用技巧
  - <https://www.cnblogs.com/miaodaren/p/9177379.html>
- The Evolution of XLoader and FakeSpy Two Interconnected Android Malware Families
  - <https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/pdf/wp-evolution-of-xloader-and-fakespy-two-interconnected-android-malware-families.pdf>
- Predator The Thief: In-depth analysis (v2.3.5)
  - <https://fumik0.com/2018/10/15/predator-the-thief-in-depth-analysis-v2-3-5/>
- When Voice Phishing met Malicious Android App
  - <https://i.blackhat.com/asia-19/Fri-March-29/bh-asia-Jang-When-Voice-Phishing-Met-Malicious-Android-App-updated.pdf>
- 16SHOP: COMMERCIAL PHISHING KIT HAS A HIDDEN BACKDOOR
  - <https://blogs.akamai.com/sitr/2019/05/16shop-commercial-phishing-kit-has-a-hidden-backdoor.html>
- 東京地方検察庁の偽サイトを使用した特殊詐欺について
  - <https://tike.hatenablog.com/entry/2018/07/03/004132>



# Image Sources

- P1: <https://www.pexels.com/photo/background-cockroach-shoes-601257/>
- P3: <https://pxhere.com/en/photo/1059154>
- P4: <https://www.flickr.com/photos/christiaancolen/20607150556>
- P5: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Success\\_Kid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Success_Kid)
- P6: <https://www.flickr.com/photos/genista/246042481/>
- P12:  
<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/12/07085742/abstract-mobile.jpeg>
- P36: <https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/emotet-botnet-shows-signs-revival-a-12964>

# List: Tools/Services

Domain Fuzzing		
dnstwist	<a href="https://github.com/elceef/dnstwist">https://github.com/elceef/dnstwist</a>	OSS
Certificate Transparency		
CertStream	<a href="https://certstream.calidog.io/">https://certstream.calidog.io/</a>	OSS
Phishing Catcher	<a href="https://github.com/x0rz/phishing_catcher">https://github.com/x0rz/phishing_catcher</a>	OSS
urlscan.io certstream-suspicious feed	<a href="https://urlscan.io/search/#task.source%3Acertstream-suspicious">https://urlscan.io/search/#task.source%3Acertstream-suspicious</a>	Free service
HTTP Fingerprint / SSH Host Key Fingerprint		
Censys	<a href="https://censys.io/">https://censys.io/</a>	Paid service(has free quota)
BinaryEdge	<a href="https://www.binaryedge.io/">https://www.binaryedge.io/</a>	Paid service(has free quota)
Shodan	<a href="https://shodan.io">https://shodan.io</a>	Paid service(has free quota)

# List: Tools/Services

IoC Feeds Aggregation		
urlhaus.abuse.ch	<a href="https://urlhaus.abuse.ch/">https://urlhaus.abuse.ch/</a>	Free service
IOC-DB	<a href="https://labs.inquest.net/iocdb">https://labs.inquest.net/iocdb</a>	Free service
Twitter IOC Hunter	<a href="http://tweettioc.com/#">http://tweettioc.com/#</a>	Free service
YARA		
Hybrid Analysis	<a href="https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/">https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/</a>	Paid service(has free quota)
VirusTotal Hunting	<a href="https://www.virustotal.com">https://www.virustotal.com</a>	Paid service
Automation		
Apullo	<a href="https://github.com/ninoseki/apullo">https://github.com/ninoseki/apullo</a>	OSS
Mihari	<a href="https://github.com/ninoseki/mihari">https://github.com/ninoseki/mihari</a>	OSS
InQuest/ThreatIngester	<a href="https://github.com/InQuest/ThreatIngester">https://github.com/InQuest/ThreatIngester</a>	OSS