

TTM3: SASHA

Self Adaptive System for Home Automation

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We present a HTTP-based Self Adaptive System for Home Automation (SASHA); a hybrid approach to home automation, with a focus on privacy and security. Communication in general is done peer-to-peer, while configuration and management is done in a client/server manner. The system is extensible and gracefully handles failures in both units and network.

1 Introduction

1.1 Terminology

Partitioning in this document should be interpreted as for distributed systems, where it refers to units being separated due to network failure. When we talk about HTTP we mean HTTP over TLS (HTTPS). An association is a mapping between two units, that only one of the units are aware of. A unit (or device) refers to any IP-connected appliance running SASHA-compliant code.

1.2 Overview

SASHA is a partition-tolerant, secure system for home automation over HTTP. New units can be added to the network by swiping them close to the "master", taking advantage of NFC or other near-field network technology to acquire the network's configuration parameters. The units then have to be approved by an end-user before access to other units is granted. Authentication is achieved using a PKI, with certificates being signed by the master. The system handles dynamic IP allocation by keeping an up-to-date mapping between certificates and last seen IP for that certificate in the master. Most communication between units is done peer-to-peer, the master is only involved for handling configuration changes and environment updates, or if a reported sensor value breaches a threshold for some action to be taken.

Environment changes trigger real-time notifications to the relevant units from the master, and could be extended to also notify units returning from extended absence about changes since last check-in.

The system has been tested and validated on a setup consisting of Raspberry Pi units with BerryClip extensions [1], providing light and sound interfaces that could be controlled by another Raspberry Pi with a PiFace control panel [2]. A regular laptop was used as master. Most aspects of the system was handled in the experimental setup, apart from the TLS configuration. Complete source code and configuration instructions can be found in [3, the source code repository].

2 Design and Functionality

SASHA has two different types of units, both expected to be accessible over the Internet. At the heart of the network there is the master, which keeps track of other devices in the system, and provides a configuration and management interface to the user. The master is identified by its hostname, which should have a dynamically updated DNS record if

its IP changes. The master is the central point of trust in the system, maintaining a registry of all authenticated units in the network and their certificates. The master's certificate is exchanged in an initial handshake with new units, and is used by the units in the network to verify that incoming connections are only approved for other units that can present and validate a certificate signed by the master. Access to the master's web interface has to be restricted, and can use either passwords or other techniques to accomplishing this.

The second type of unit in SASHA is appliances like sensors and actuators. The relationship between this second type of unit and the master can be described as a client-server relation; the units are initially requesting the master for access to the system, and later performing check-in requests, containing information about their status. The master is collecting and processing this information. The units will check-in to the master regularly with status updates. These update messages serve as a means to maintain up-to-date sensor data on the master if the unit is a sensor, and to keep the unit's IP address in the registry accurate. Additionally they act as a heartbeat, to let the master know when a unit has left the network, or been unavailable for a longer period of time, so that the user can be notified and associated units can stop trying to communicate with it.

The connected units are defined by a hierarchy of types. The top level type indicates a set of capabilities that the unit is expected to have. These capabilities are fulfilled in the form of interfaces. Each of these interfaces are again identified by a type which defines the methods they expose, which can be sensor readings communicated during check-ins, or actuators that allow outside sources to instrument the unit to take specific actions, such as turning the light on, start playing a video, or open a door.

When all units have been authenticated and associations are set up, there are two forms of communication that will occur, besides the regular check-in messages to the master. Something might occur to a unit's physical interfaces, such as motion detected by a camera, buttons being pressed or similar, and the unit will use the data about its associated units as received from the master to instruct them based on the event that occurred. This case is depicted in Figure 1.

In the other case, the master has been configured with a rule, saying that if a given condition occurs, an action should be sent to a set of devices, for example if a sensor detects temperatures below a given threshold, send an action to a set of units requesting them to turn on their heating elements.

3 Self-Adaptiveness

SASHA is self-adaptive, attempting to reduce human intervention to a minimum. This is done through two main strategies, discussed below.

3.1 Dynamic Handling of Environment Changes

SASHA thrives in a dynamic system such as IP networks, and sensibly handles offline units and network partitioning. If a unit loses power or network connection, it should automatically restart when power is restored, and automatically inform the master about




Figure 1: SASHA interface subscription pattern. Message number 1 is a DynDNS update record to keep the master hostname updated to the master’s current IP. Message number 2 and 3 are both register messages, but only message 2 contains subscription information. Message number 7 is a HTTP POST to one of Unit B’s interfaces as auto-configured in the master through the subscription.

its restored network status. If the master goes down, all inter-unit communication is unaffected as long as the IPs stay unaltered. Units will continue trying to check-in with the master, with an exponential backoff until it returns.

3.2 Auto-Configuration

SASHA enables a low barrier of entry through smart defaults, but always allows the user full control over the configuration. Such defaults might be units subscribing to other types of units, or to unit tags. This makes sure that newly added light bulbs might be auto-associated to the only light switch in the environment, or that newly added light bulbs tagged with “living room” in the web interface is auto-connected to the light switch with the same tag.

When a unit matching the profile another unit is subscribed to checks in, the other unit will be immediately notified about the new unit and can choose how to react to its presence. The unit itself does not need to be aware of the association, as it will happily execute any valid incoming action, which enables easy one-time interactions in addition to the regular ones.

The design also prevents the user from ever having to configure anything manually

on the device. If the device can perform the handshake with the master, it'll be auto-configured with the master's certificate, necessary URLs, and will get any other configuration it needs to join the network and configure itself. The system promotes a type-based configuration, to enable a unit's configuration to be implied from its type, and thus only configured once by the user for all similar units. All configuration will be backed up and restorable by the master. This should be a clear usability win for the end user, and might make the devices simpler since they won't need as many inputs for configuration.

4 Secure Discovery

4.1 NFC Handshake

Our design features a secure discovery of new units. The security is based on the idea that each trusted unit will have a certificate signed by the master, which acts as a Certificate Authority. To achieve this, there is a requirement for a trusted channel to communicate the certificate request from a new device to the master. Our proposal for such communication channel is to use a near field communication (NFC) channel, that will allow the new device to send the certificate signing request (CSR) to the master, given that the device at some point is in close proximity to the master. In practice this would require the end-user to swipe the new device close to a NFC device associated to the master, to exchange the necessary information to bootstrap the device.

Note that the usage of NFC to complete the master handshake is not necessary, this could be tuned to better suit a given deployment of SASHA. Other solutions could be connecting over HTTP through an intranet, or manual entry of the master's URL and then verify that the certificate digest matches an expected value. The only requirement for the channel should be that it assures the master's identity, exchanges the necessary configuration parameters, and prevents unauthorized access and modification of packages from the unit.

The information exchanged over the NFC channel is depicted in Figure 2. In addition to the CSR required for future secure communication, the new unit communicates its metadata, such as its type, available interfaces and a textual description of the device. The response comprises three different URLs to be used by the unit as soon as it's connected to the Internet, as well as the master's TLS certificate.

Certificate URL Describes where the unit's signed certificate can be downloaded. The certificate is required for the unit to communicate with the master and the other units on the network. The certificate will not be available for download until the user has approved the new unit through the web interface, the unit has to retry regularly until the certificate is approved or rejected.

Check-in URL The check-in URL is used by the unit to report to the master, i.e. it allows the unit to communicate directly to the master over the Internet through this URL.




Figure 2: Messages passed in the initial handshake. The new unit will not be able to download its certificate until the user has approved it. After finishing this step, the unit continues with the operations depicted in Figure 3. Note that the last message also contains the master’s certificate.

Registry URL The registry URL allows the new device to query the registry, i.e. find information about all devices connected to the master. This will allow for more flexibility regarding peer-to-peer communication between devices, as all devices in theory are capable of browsing the entire registry.

After completing the handshake, the new device is awaiting an Internet connection before completing the bootstrap procedure. The master will fully acknowledge the new device when it has performed its first check-in after having been verified by the user, and seeing that the check-in was authenticated with the certificate signed by the master.

4.2 Certificate Retrieval

Devices that have gone through the handshake will show up in the web interface served by the master, and thus allow the user to verify that the associated devices are indeed intended to be trusted. The signed certificate will not be generated and made available on the promised Certificate URL until the user manually approves the device through the web interface; requests to this URL will return 404 not found until the user has taken action. The user has two possibilities; he can reject or approve the device. Approval means that a signed certificate will be made available, thus the device will no longer get a 404, but a 200 OK, and thus complete the bootstrap. Rejection means that requests to the certificate URL will return 410 Gone, instructing the device to stop its effort to try to obtain a certificate, and thus end the bootstrap procedure.




Figure 3: HTTP messages sent during the registration phase. The two cases illustrated are 1) where the user approves the new unit, and 2) the user rejects the new unit.

The message flow in these last steps of the bootstrap procedure is given in Figure 3. After a successful bootstrap, the device can communicate with the master over a communication channel that provides authentication, confidentiality and integrity.

5 Justification of Design Choices

5.1 HTTP

The reason for choosing HTTP as our transport protocol boils down to not wanting to reinvent the wheel, when it comes to routing and content negotiation. We utilize the routing features of HTTP to address the different interfaces a unit might provide, and flexible units might use the content-negotiation features provided by HTTP to reply in either JSON, msgpack, XML or others. HTTP also offers content encoding negotiation. Also part of the consideration is framework support, no matter what language you choose to implement your SASHA client in, you'll find several options for HTTP libraries you might use.

One consideration about HTTP, and especially HTTP over TLS, is message delay. Many home automation use cases have strict requirements for maximum perceptible delay for the user, e.g. turning on lights. HTTPS requires first a three-way TCP handshake, then a content-negotiation and certificate exchange between communicating parties, before the actual HTTP body can be transmitted. We haven't tested the actual delay you'd get in this setup, but if it turns out to be too large to be practical this could be optimized by the initiating unit always keeping an established TLS connection to associated units, and thus avoiding the handshake phase when data needs to be transmitted. The connections can be established either on first use if there's lots of associated units, or could be established upon the first registry update from the master with the unit's IP if there's few enough associates to keep all the connections around.

5.2 NFC

NFC was chosen mostly as an example protocol suitable for close-field communication, since the closeness and direct communication makes it much harder to compromise this channel. If the initial setup was done over the Internet, a clever attacker could perform a Man-in-the-Middle attack on the association, and thus gaining access to your network internals.

5.3 Security

We wanted to make the SASHA system secure, because we think it's an essential requirement for any Internet-facing service being developed today. Building the protocol on top of HTTP also helps make this step rather simple, since tools for working with client certificates over HTTPS are well supported. We consider security to be one of the most important challenges in the coming Internet of Things-age, as the number of units connected to the Internet will increase greatly, and thus the consequences of poor security will get even worse than it is today. It is also a privacy concern, household devices work on a lot of sensitive data, such as your habits, preferences, location, and much more, which should remain confidential also in a network of smart units.

No device will be able to access any other before a manual approval has been done through the master web interface. Devices are handed the master's certificate at regis-

tration time, and will check each interacting device for a valid certificate signed by the master. The master's certificate is not expected to be signed by any known certificate authority, since the master needs to be able to sign certificates himself. One benefit of this is that the certificates generated can utilize elliptic curve cryptography, which is much faster and better suited for resource constrained units that you might expect to find in a home automation scenario than traditional RSA-based certificates issued by most CAs today.

6 Market Potential

Detection of new units in SASHA relies on the master to have a resolvable hostname or a static IP address. Since most households would probably not provide static IP addresses without additional configuration, the static hostnames seem like the most natural design. The existence of a resolvable hostname will allow devices to locate the master despite changing IP addresses. However, this comes at the cost of a new requirement, being a DNS server to keep track of the masters changing IP address.

A dynamic DNS requirement is not something that is fulfilled by SASHA alone. This enables manufacturers of SASHA devices – or other third party providers – to provide hostnames as a service, which again potentially can be monetized. This would enable customers to access their master on domains such as `myname.sasha.org` or similar.

There's also a possibility for OEMs to provide backup services for the master configuration, registry and keys, to be able to restore the network in case the master dies. The provider could even ship a new, fixed master with all the configuration of the previous one already applied, making it truly plug-and-play to replace the master for the user. These kinds of services also provide lock-in opportunities for the OEMs.

Classical ways to monetize on SASHA also includes offering different levels of support, from on-site technicians, to phone or mail-based services.

7 Related Work

Now we'll discuss some other home automation tools and see how they compare to SASHA.

ZigBee [4] is a wireless mesh network often used for sensors to report in to devices, designed for low-power low-rate communication. ZigBee complements SASHA and could co-exist, as sensors could report in wirelessly to controlling devices, which then reports in to the master. Since the sensors are not on a IP network directly, this poses little to no additional risk.

OSGi [5] is a Java-specific framework, which only works on units that can run a Java VM. OSGi also doesn't seem to encrypt communication or ensure the identity of communicating parties, as their security layer only seems to make sure execution is limited to pre-defined modules. SASHA is a network-level standard that can be implemented in any language on any platform.

Z-Wave [6, Annex A] is another mesh network technology, operating on 900Mhz. Z-Wave does not seem tailored to Internet of Things, where every unit has an IP address. Since Z-Wave doesn't have any central point, there's also no authentication of new devices, so the setup is relatively easy to infiltrate for an attacker.

INSTEON [7] is yet another wireless mesh networking technology, which due to its mesh nature employs no authentication or end-to-end encryption, and would also be limited to devices in close physical proximity. SASHA is completely independent of physical proximity, save during the initial bootstrap step, and can control any device connected to the Internet, whether in the next room or on a different continent.

The IETF is working on standardizing formats for Internet of Things, one of the formats they're working on, SenML [8], is a format for reporting sensor values to other devices. This is quite similar to how our sensors report values to the master, or could perhaps be utilized over ZigBee to have wireless sensors without an IP to report to a connected unit.

In researching the other solutions it appears that many of the units produced today are made to one specific networking technology, which isn't exactly in the Internet spirit of heterogeneous units communicating over lots of different interfaces and technologies. Basing communication to IP networks like SASHA makes it possible for a device vendor to comply to multiple different standards and not locking the user in to one specific solution. There also seems to be none of the other solutions that take authentication and security seriously, which absolutely should be taken into account with all the sensitive data flowing through a home automation network.

For a more through comparison of INSTEON, Z-Wave and other networking technologies, we refer the reader to the 2010 report by Gomez and Paradells [9].

8 Security Considerations

Private keys should be securely stored in the devices, such that it cannot be retrieved by an attacker (which is definitely not the case for our Raspberry Pi environment, where anyone can retrieve the data from the unencrypted memory card). The handshake is the most critical step in the system, as the NFC channel must be trusted. During the handshake, an attacker can impersonate the initial request, containing the public key (CSR) of a device, thus the attacker can set up a man-in-the-middle attack at this stage, and impersonate the device on the network if the device is approved.

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